Part I
Background to Development

"The development of the amphibian tractor, or LVT, which began In the middle 1930's provided the solution and was one of the most important modern technical contributions to ship to shore operations. Without these landing vehicles our amphibious offensive in the Pacific would have been impossible."1

This evaluation was provided by General Holland M. ("Howling Mad") Smith, United States Marine Corps, an amphibious pioneer and commander of the landings at Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo Jima. This quotation summarizes the importance of the amphibian tractor in the highly complex undertaking known as amphibious warfare, an undertaking studied closely by the United States Marine Corps prior to the outbreak of World War II. The employment of the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) and other tactical measures of amphibious warfare caused General J. F. C. Fuller to write,

Though in Idea these tactics were old, their novel application revolutionized amphibious warfare. In all probability, the were the most far-reaching tactical innovation of the war.2

Despite such praise, the role of the LVT remains largely unsung. Although the amphibian tractor and its armored, gun-carrying versions stormed the shores of Pacific Islands, North Africa, Europe, and crossed the Rhine River against the Germans, there is not one mention of it in Hanson Baldwin's well-known and comprehensive book on the great weapons of World War II.

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Warfare through the centuries has been profoundly effected by technology, and many examples exist. The English. Long bow, by Its superior penetrating power, made the armored knight virtually obsolete In warfare after centuries of dominance. The battle of the armored gunboats Monitor and Merrimac during the American Civil War signaled the end of the era of wooden ships and the increased accuracy of rifle eventually did away with the requirement to mass troops to obtain fire power from shoulder fired weapons. Amphibious war, as practiced prior to World War II, suffered from a host of technical problems in equipment design that virtually barred it as an offensive military operation worth the risks then involved. Naval gunfire control and coordination was not perfected, communications were not reliable, and there was no specially designed landing craft for the delivery of troops on the beach. This last deficiency was perhaps the most crippling for Its effect was to slow to a crawl the transport of troops to the beach and made their debarkation on the beach hazardous and costly.

The World War which faced the United States on 6 December 1941 would require the formation of an amphibious force capable of taking not just Islands but islands with the ideal defensive barrier, the shallow coral reef. The Navy's Pre-War plan for war against Japan, Plan ORANGE called for a drive through the Central Pacific against Japan and it was this axis that was later adopted as the main attack. This required the United States to attack and seize coral atolls which were defended by the enemy at the beach and against which there was little tactical.surprise possible. To successfully conduct such an attack, a highly specialized vehicle was required; one which was capable of carrying troops and cargo through rough seas, surmounting a coral reef, and moving inland with Its payload.

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The design that met this critical requirement was the LVT and without it the Central Pacific drive and much of our amphibious success In the Pacific generally would not have been possible. It is an outstanding example of the decisive impact of technology on the conduct of war.

The LVT record merits examination, and this thesis will study the origin of these vehicles and the role they played In amphibious warfare aS it was developed prior to and during World War II. This study will focus on the Pacific Theater because this was the arena in which the vehicle found its greatest usefulness and where the doctrine governing its usage was forged.

To lay the background for such an examination, however, it Is necessary first to review briefly the development of the Marine Corps up to the years preceding World War II in order to understand how the Marine Corps took the lead in the study of amphibious warfare that led to the Incorporation of the LVT as a vital element of victory In World War II.

In creating Its military establishment, the American colonists in many cases modeled their institutions on the British example; the United States Marine Corps was no exception. The first British Corps of Marines was created in 1664 by King Charles II in his Order In Council authorizing "The Admiral's Regiment." This directed 1200 land soldiers be raised to be distributed into the fleet and put into one regiment under one colonel.3 This follows ancient Greek and Roman warfare practice of detaching soldiers in small groups on board fighting ships to seize other ships or objectives on land if required. These Marines came to be known as the Royal Marines, the model the Continental Congress used when, on 10 November 1775 it passed a resolution creating two

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battalions of Marines,

such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea, when required. . . . That they be distinguished by the names of the first and second battalions of American Marines.4

The first Continental Marine Unit was formed during December 1775, and put aboard the Cabot.5 The Marines participated In numerous naval engagements during the Revolutionary War and fought as part of Washington's Army. It is significant to note that, even as early as the Revolutionary War, Marines made amphibious landings. The first significant landing was on 27 January 1778 when Marines landed and seized the forts on New Providence Island in the Bahamas.6 Five more landings were made during the course of the war with the last landing In 1782.7 Marine Corps involvement in amphibious operations continued into the Mexican War, where they reached a level of technical and tactical expertise not equalled until the beginning of the 1900s.8 The most significant amphibious operation of the Mexican War Involved the landing of 12,000 men of General Scott's army at Vera Cruz on 7 March 1847.9 This early landing was notable for precise execution in waves of boats and the use of specially-designed surfboats ordered by General Scott for ferrying his troops ashore. As described by K. Jack Bauer In his book Surfboats and Horse Marines, these boats were

the first specially built American amphibious craft and were admirably suited to their purpose, their only weakness being their rather light planking. They were double-ended, broad-beamed, and flat-bottomed, with frames built of well-seasoned white oak and thwarts of pine. They were built In three sizes so that they would be stacked for transport; the largest was 40 feet long and could carry 45 or more men; the medium size was 37 feet 9 inches long and could carry 40 or more men; while the smallest was 35 feet 9 inches long and could not carry as many as 40 men. Each one carried a crew of six oarsmen, one coxswain, and a skipper.10

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Landings during and after the Mexican War, until the advent of aircraft, featured naval gunfire as the chief weapon to gain a foothold, and were effected by surprise or In such a location so as to avoid resistance. A landing force of this period typically consisted of various ship's detachments of Marines and sailors, or In the case of Vera Cruz, where large numbers were required, specially trained Army troops. The troops were loaded on steamers or other shallow draft vessels from their transports or parent ships and were taken as close as possible to the hostile shore before debarking into ship's boats. Naval gunfire was directed against shore targets and the landing force was rowed ashore at top speed. After the initial waves, subsequent shuttling was accomplished until the entire force was ashore. Ordinary boats were most often used with the troops going over the sides with their muskets and powder, taking great care to keep their powder dry. The head-on amphibious assault that characterized the Central Pacific drive In World War II was still many years away.

Further developments in amphibious warfare occurred in the Spanish-American War, during which our involvement brought the United States Into the role of a Pacific power. During this war, the Marines successfully seized Guantanamo Bay by amphibious landing with a specially organized battalion of five rifle companies and a three-inch artillery battery under the command of Lieutenant Colonel R. W. Huntington, USMC. This landing was attempted only after one month of intensive training to perfect methods of ship-to-shore movement using small boats. Its successful execution gained a vital base for advanced naval blockade operations and was instrumental in containing the Spanish Fleet In

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Santiago Harbor.11 A further indication of the growing appreciation by the United States Navy for Marine Corps capabilities in naval warfare was Admiral Dewey's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, written after the Spanish American War in which he stated,

If there had been 5,000 Marines under my command at Manila Bay, the city would have surrendered to me on May 1, 1898, and could have been properly garrisoned. The Filipinos would have received us with open arms, and there would have been no insurrection.12

After the Spanish American War, the United States Navy was forced to review its ability to project its power into the far western Pacific. This was a new requirement and the need for bases along a vast line of communications leading to the Philippines became more urgent. The demonstrated ability of the Marines to conduct amphibious landings, and In particular the seizure of the base at Guantanamo Bay, directed the attention of Naval planners to what became known as advanced base operations. This involved the seizure and defense of bases that were to serve as coaling sites and supply points for naval vessels on their. journey across the Pacific. A detachment of five officers and forty men was formed at the Naval Torpedo Squadron Station, at Newport, Rhode Island, as the forerunner of what would later be known as the Advanced Base Force, and their early training consisted of the proper use of mines, torpedoes, and signal conmunications.13 It was envisioned that such an Advanced Base Force would be trained to operate with the Fleet to seize and defend forward bases in support of naval operations. From Its small beginnings, the Advanced Base Force grew to a battalion of four rifle companies which participated in landing exercises with the Fleet at Culebra Island, in the Caribbean. These early exercises were the forerunners of a long series of landing exercises that eventually

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brought amphibious warfare into being as a viable offensive weapon.

Training of the Advanced Base Force, as recommended by the Navy's General Board, its war planning body, was to be In the following areas:

  1. The construction of field fortification, gun emplacements, gun platforms and magazines;

  2. The transportation of guns of less than 8-inch caliber from ship to point of emplacement and the mounting of same;

  3. The construction and operating of field telegraph and telephone lines, signal, searchlight and range-finder stations;

  4. The planting of mines, countermining and the operating of torpedoes for harbor defense.14

To Insure mastery of these areas, the Marine Corps' Major General Commandant established the Advanced Base School in 1910 at New London, Connecticut, and later at Philadelphia.15 In reviewing the training of the Advanced Base Force, it is important to note that the thrust of its doctrine was defensive. Landings to seize advanced bases were not envisioned as assault landings against opposition and the majority of the concern was with the defense of the base once it was secured.16 Study of the seizure of advanced bases was theoretical only in the Advanced Base School.17

The first major landing exercise employing the Advanced Base Force was executed in January 1914 with the following training objectives:

  1. Stowing material on transports;

  2. Landing material from the transport to the beach;

  3. Transporting the material from the beach to the various sites;

  4. Preparation of battery sites and mounting of the guns;

  5. Establishment of fire control and observation points;

  6. Planting of mines;

  7. Defense of mine fields;

  8. Establishment and use of searchlight stations;

  9. Exercise with guns, Including target practice;

  10. Covering the site selected against attacks from the land, Including transportation necessary for supply and handling of materials.18

The exercise was carried' out according to plan, complete with landings

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against defenses by Marines and sailors of the fleet. Umpires on the scene ruled that the defenses held.19 The valuable experience gained from this exercise caused the Secretary of the Navy to approve recommendations that such exercises be held once a year.20 Expeditionary tasks followed which interrupted the annual landing exercises until 1922. For example, the landings at Vera Cruz to seize the customhouse in 1914 absorbed the Advanced Base Force or most of that year. Marines also landed in June 1915 at Cap-Haitien in Haiti to begin what amounted to a twenty year occupation when civil war and revolt led to a virtual collapse of order in that country. Under State Department orders, Colonel Waller assumed command of 88 officers and 1,941 men of the 1st Marine Brigade and commenced the long work of restoring a permanent peace.21 In May 1916 with the bulk of the Advanced Base Force now committed in Haiti, civil war in Santo Domingo required further efforts to restore peace using Marines from the Advanced Base Force and detachments from Marine Barracks, Guantanamo Bay.22 Then, World War I caused a major effort on the part of the Marine Corps bringing with it important changes for the future of the Corps.

At the time of declaration of war on 6 April 1917 the Marine Corps numbered 511 officers and 13,214 enlisted. During the course of the war, the Corps expanded to a peak of 2,462 officers and 72,639 enlisted just after Armistice.23 Marines fought as part of major United States Army formations and one Marine General Commanded an Army division. There was no amphibious warfare for the Marines, instead they fought hard on the continent executing the same missions as those given to the Army. No landings were required because units were transported to friendly ports in France and from there to training areas before going into combat on

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the Western Front. When the war ended, the Marine Corps rapidly demobilized to a strength of 1,104 officers and 16,061 enlisted by 30 June 1920.24 Although the Corps shrank to near pre-World War I size, It was to be forever changed by the aftermath of the War.

As a result of the War, Japan received as a mandate from the League of Nations all the Islands in the Pacific formerly governed by Germany, which included the Marianas (less Guam), the Marshalls, and the Carolines. Japan was instructed not to fortify these islands but secretly did so as tension grew against the United States. In particular, the Marianas became the anchor of Japan's inner defenses in the Pacific.25 Even prior to World War I, United States military planners had viewed Japan as a probable adversary of the United States as periods of tension came and went between the two countries. Color-coded plans had been drafted prior to World War I for action against all of the United States' possible enemies, and one of these, Plan ORANGE, was the plan for war against Japan. Plan ORANGE required substantial revision as a result of the new situation in the Pacific After World War I and the need for advanced bases of operation was accepted If the United States was to fight Its way across the Pacific to reinforce the garrisons of the Philippines and Guam, now surrounded by Japanese territory.26 In view of the Marine Corps experience In advanced base operations and amphibious landings, the conclusion might be drawn that the mission of seizing and defending the needed advanced bases for the Navy would be a logical one for the Marine Corps This was not always the case and many Marine Corps officers remained oriented toward World War I doctrines even as late as 1926. General Holland M. Smith described the officers with whom he attended school at the field officer's course at Quantico, Virginia as

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". . . still foundering among the outdated doctrines of World War I."27

He further noted that,

From the first day of the course, I found myself deep in difficulties because I objected to the emphasis placed upon defensive tactics. The Mission of the Marine Corps is primarily offensive. Any other role deprives us of our effectiveness.28

Fortunately for the development of the Marine Corps, there were perceptive men in the Corps who agreed with General Smith's views and were already taking steps to orient the Marine Corps towards an offensive, amphibious future. During and after World War I, Major Earl H. Ellis, stationed at Headquarters, Marine Corps, lectured and wrote concerning plans necessary to execute advanced base seizure and defense. During the World War I period, his work was directed more towards the defensive aspects of advanced base operations, but as a result of the Japanese mandates in the Pacific, he rewrote his studies with a greater offensive emphasis.29 His new study was titled "Advanced Base Operations In Micronesia", and was approved by the Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune on 23 July 1921 as Operation Plan 712H. This plan examined the steps necessary to seize advanced bases in the Pacific, and was so detailed In Its examples that it predicted nearly the exact number of Marines which were required later to seize Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands on 17 February 1944.30 ThIs operations plan became the basis for Marine Corps planning between the world wars. It Is fortunate for the United States that Ellis completed his principal work prior to his untimely death in 1923 on the Japanese mandated Island of Palau in the Pacific. His death occurred under mysterious circumstances and the Japanese put out the unlikely story that Ellis drank himself to death. A young chief pharmacist's mate from the U.S. Naval Hospital in

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Yokahama volunteered to go to Palau and recover the body. He cremated the body but returned a mental case, unable to give a consistent, coherent account of his trip or of the manner of Ellis' death. His condition began to improve but both he and his wife died in the 1923 Japanese earthquake which destroyed the hospital.31

The importance of Ellis' work merits a brief look at the contents and direction it gave to Marine Corps planing during that period. The complete operations plan contained a War Portfolio, a work sheet to accompany the war portfolio, and Ellis' study. As stated In the Introduction to the War Portfolio section, the overall purpose of the document was:

  1. To set forth for the information and guidance of those concerned:

    1. War Plans based upon existing conditions which can be put into effect immediately.

    2. Development Plans, i.e., plans for development of the Marine Corps beyond that now authorized as may be required to insure a satisfactory condition of readiness for the presentation of effective and economical war against our most probable enemies.

  2. To serve as a guide for the coordination of all the peace activities and training of the Marine Corps towards reaching and maintaining the prescribed condition of readiness to execute the War Plans.32

Ellis began the plan by describing the then current (1921) posture of the Marine Corps and the detailed action necessary to mobilize it in case of war. This included preparation of orders, movements of supplies, and assignment of ships to ports for embarkation. After mobilization, Ellis named the Marshalls, Carolines, and the Marianas Islands the strategic groups which had to be attacked, seized, and denied to the enemy and on which bases were to be constructed for exerting pressure on Japan and bringing her fleet to decisive battle.33 He then launched

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Into his detailed study, "Advanced Base Operations In Micronesia", which covered the following subjects:

  1. Description of the theater of operations to include sea, air, land, economic, and population factors.

  2. Description of the enemy in the area, and the strategy, tactics, and forces needed to defeat him.

  3. Discussion of the details necessary to conduct.a successful defense of such bases from enemy attacks, whose characteristics are described.

  4. Summary of strategy, tactics, and organization with supporting tables.

Ellis summarized strategic situation facing the United States in his introduction:

In order to impose our will upon Japan, it will be necessary for us to project our fleet and our forces across the Pacific and wage war in Japanese waters. To effect this requires that we have sufficient bases to support the fleet, both during its projection and afterwards. As the matter stands at present, we cannot count upon the use of any bases west of Hawaii except those which we may seize from the enemy after the opening of hostilities. Moreover, the continued occupation of the Marshall, Carolines, and Palau Islands by the Japanese (now holding them under mandate of the League of Nations) invests them with a series of emergency bases flanking any line of communications across the Pacific throughout a distance of .2200 miles. The reduction and occupation of these islands and the establishment of the necessary bases therein, as a preliminary phase of the hostilities, is practically imperative.34

The study then touched on the key point with respect to Marine Corps development:

The extent to which the Marine Advanced Base. Force will participate in these operations will very likely depend upon the number of Marines available -- and their military worth in advanced base operations. If skilled in ship-to-shore operations and inculcated with a high morale and offensive spirit, they will doubtless be used to the limit -- if only for the sake of general economy of lives.35 (Emphasis Ellis')

It Is important to realize that at this stage of development the offensive nature of amphibious warfare was only beginning to take shape. Emphasis was shifting from preoccupation with the defense of bases to the seizure of bases because of the loss of so many strategic bases in

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the Pacific to Japan after World War I. With Operation Plan 712H signed and approved by the Commandant, the Marine Corps had its marching orders. Although the course had been charted, there were to be many Intervening steps before anything resembling modern amphibious readiness was to be achieved.

A period of training, education, and discussion now began, led by the Major General Commandant. Amphibious exercises were resumed In April 1922 and in 1923 the name of "Advanced Base Force" was changed to "Expeditionary Force". General Lejeune lectured on this subject at the Naval War College on 14 December 1923 clearly expressing his views when he stated:

It has been recognized by the Joint Board and by the War Plans Division of Naval Operations, and Is so recorded, that a large force of Marines for expeditionary work is essential to the furtherance of the naval plans, and that this force should be an Integral part of the Fleet. The Joint Board has laid down that "The most Important function of the Marine Corps (in relation to War Plans) is to seize and hold temporary advance bases In cooperation with the Fleet and to defend such bases until relieved by the Army."36

Lejeune emphasized the value of fleet exercises with debarkation under conditions closely resembling that of combat, and then went on to stress the great advantage that the Marine Corps enjoys with respect to the key Issue of unity of command In amphibious operations by being part of the Naval service and able to achieve mutual understanding through familiarity with amphibious problems.37 He concluded his discussion of expeditionary duty by stating,

The maintenance, equipping, and training of its expeditionary force so that it will be in instant readiness to support the Fleet in the event of war, deem to be the most important Marine Corps duty in time of peace.38

General Lejeune's lecture touched upon a key factor that should be

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examined during this important period in Marine Corps and amphibious warfare development. This factor was the attitude of the United States Army towards the developing specialization of the Marine Corps in the amphibious role. Even In the early days of the Advanced Base Force, the Navy had considered the suitability of the Army for the mission of advanced base defense but decided that the Marine Corps presented fewer problems because It was already part of the Navy Department. As stated by Admiral Dewey, President of the General Board:

In the opinion of the General Board the requirements of the naval establishment of the United States include a military organization of sufficient strength in numbers and efficiency to enable the Navy to meet all demands upon it for services within its own sphere of operations, without dependance upon the corporation of the Army for troops and military supplies, for such a force of the Army may not always be available.39

The Navy's preference for a service within its own department seems natural enough in 1975, but in 1900 the amphibious capabilities of the Marine Corps were far from developed. It is also true that the preference of the Navy for the Marine Corps was not seriously disputed by the Army at that time or even until World War II. The United States Army, having as its mission sustained combat on continental land masses, tended to be preoccupied with its own internal problems and commitments and disputes over the ownership of the amphibious mission did not arise. The Army's inattention to amphibious warfare prior to World War II is eloquently summarized in a statement attributed to General George C. Marshall, who In conversation with Marshal Voroshilov during the Tehran Conference of 1943, stated,

My military education and experience in the First World War has all been based on roads, rivers, and railroads. During the last two years, however, I have teen acquiring an education based on oceans and I've had to learn all over again. Prior to the present war I never heard of any landing-craft except a rubber boat. Now I think about little else.40

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A further deterrent to Army acceptance of amphibious responsibility was the negative interpretation of the World War I lessons of Gallipoli. The Gallipoli Landings by the British during February and March 1915 were considered by many to be the first modern attempt at amphibious warfare. These major amphibious landings were to support Russia's request for a British diversion against Turkey by forcing the Dardanelles and attacking towards Constantinople using only Royal Navy units. Although nearly successful, the first attempt was cancelled when two ships struck mines in an area the British thought they had cleared. Four weeks later British, Australian, and New Zealand troops landed on Gallipoli Peninsula, but the Turks had used the interim time to good advantage by heavily reinforcing their position. The landings on 25 April 1915 took place at six separate beaches and there was great confusion and loss of life. Of the 60,000 troops Initially put ashore, casualties had reached 20,000 by May 8. Reinforcements were sent and effected two promising landings in the Turkish rear; these both failed due to confusion over conflicting orders. After this fiasco, the British decided to evacuate the troops, which they did in a brilliant night withdrawal without losing a single life. Throughout the operation lack of amphibious expertise had caused major problems. For example, the original loading was done in Alexandria without regard to the sequence In which the supplies would be needed. Reloading was required and was conducted on an island in the immediate area of the objective thus thoroughly compromising any hope of surprise. In addition, there were at all times critical shortages of landing craft and Naval ships. Communications failed nearly completely and there was little emphasis on the essential element of speed. Troops sat on the beach and did nothing while their commanders worried about further

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orders.41 This disaster led many to feel that amphibious landings were still not feasible, particularly in daylight. Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Keyes, who commanded naval support elements in the Gallipoli Campaign, wrote:

Among the most valuable lessons we learnt from the original landings was the folly of attempting to storm a defended beach in daylight. All our amphibious operations after this, whether attacking or evacuating, were carried out with as many hours of darkness in hand as was possible, and also, having regard to the vital importance of surprise, done nothing to disclose our intention before dark.42

It is also true that writings dating far back into military history have painted gloomy pictures of the chances for success of landings from the sea. One of the military classics on strategy, The Art of War by Baron De Jomini, states:

These are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among the most difficult in war when effected in presence of a well prepared enemy. . . A great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact that the transports can never get near the beach, and the troops must be landed in boats and rafts, which takes time and gives the enemy great advantages. If the sea is rough, the men to be landed are exposed to great risks; for what can a body of infantry do, crowded in boats, tossed about by the waves, and ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sickness for the proper use of their arms?43

Thus, the failure of the Gallipoli landing tended to reinforce the pessimistic view held by Army military strategists with regard to the value of amphibious operations on a major scale. In contrast, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, adopted the study of the Gallipoli Landing as a model for lessons to be learned.44 This basic difference in outlook between the Army and the Marine Corps allowed the Marine Corps to move ahead alone in the development of amphibious strategies between the wars. As stated by Russell F. Weigley,

it was the Marine Corps that did most to follow up these lines of thought and, in fact, made ship‹to‹shore landing operations a particular specialty.45

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Experimentation continued between 1922 and 1925 with landing exercises at Culebra and Hawaii, where the Army was part of the landing force. It Is during this period that the Christie Tank, a forerunner of the LVT, was tested. The enterprising inventor and manufacturer, Walter Christie, won permission from the Marine Corps and the Navy to test his amphibious tank as part of the exercises at Culebra in February 1924. This was a test of Christie's third modification since he first started work on the vehicle In 1921. The vehicle used could be operated on tracks, wheels, or in the water and had a barge-shaped hull, open at the top and constructed of one-fourth inch armor plate. In the water it was driven by two propellers and steered by varying the speed of the propellers and/or the tracks. The entire tank was sixteen feet, eight inches long, weighed seven tons, was powered by ninety horsepower, six cylinder engine, and had a remarkable suspension system consisting of rubber tires on coil springs. The vehicle could travel at 18.5 miles per hour on tracks, thirty mph on wheels, and move at 7.5 mph In the water, faster than many later LVTs. Although tested. successfully in the Hudson and Potomac, this promising design did not impress the Naval observers at Culebra as being sufficiently seaworthy. It was subsequently rejected, scrapped, and the design later sold to Japan.46 It Is helpful to realize at this point that interest In amphibious vehicles focused on making tanks amphibious rather than on the development of cargo or personnel carriers that were amphibious because of the concern over the, lack of firepower in the leading waves as they approached the beach. Naval gunfire of the day was not sufficiently accurate to work in close to the troops and aviation was in its infancy. Therefore, ways were sought to incorporate maximum firepower into the approaching landing waves themselves to pin down the enemy after the naval gunfire had lifted from

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Figure 1. The early Beetle Boat undergoing tests during landings in 1924
Figure 1. The early Beetle Boat undergoing tests during landings in 1924.

Figure 2. The Christie Amphibious Tank tested and rejected in 1924
Figure 2. The Christie Amphibious Tank tested and rejected in 1924.

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the Immediate landing area. No further testing of this type of vehicle was conducted until the discovery of the Roebling Tractor In 1937.

In addition to the Christie Tank, attention and concern also focused on the clear deficiencies in existing landing craft of the mid-1920's. A derivation of a British designed boat, nicknamed the "Beetle Boat", was tested during the Culebra exercises in 1924 and found to be awkward and too large for the limited load it carried (75 mm gun and 60 to 100 troops).47 The landing craft of the day continued to be basic whale boats and Navy launches, which were round bottomed, wood constructed, and limited in carrying capacity. Because these boats had a round bottom, they drew too much water to be easily retracted after beaching and unloading troops and their handling in surf was also tricky. The search for proper landing craft was to be more continuous than the attention paid to amphibious vehicles and many types of craft were tested between 1924 and 1940 before a successful design emerged.

After 1925, landing exercises ceased due to the heavy demands placed on the Marine Corps by expeditionary duty in Nicaragua and China. In China, for example, Marines settled down to a routine of drills and demonstrations under the command of General Smedley D. Butler, one of the Corps' most colorful figures. The point of the productions was to show the flag conspicuously and display American ability and competency to foreign nationals abroad. One such event had an unexpected climax:

During an exhibition of stunting, Captain James T. Moore zoomed over the crowds, went into a spectacular climbing roll, lost both wings off his plane and parachuted into a moat in front of the stands. "Trust Smedley," a lady spectator commented, "he always puts on a wonderful show."48

Despite the frivolity in China, both commitments, China and Nicaragua, were more than enough to drain the Marine Corps of every man who could

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carry a rifle and amphibious exercises were halted until 1935. In the Interval however, momentous events were occurring In the Corps-events that would be turning points In the history of amphibious warfare.

During the 1920's and 1930's, as Marine expeditionary forces were being dispatched to Nicaragua and China, the concept crystallized of assigning a portion of the Marine Corps on a permanent basis to the Naval Fleet primarily to make landings. This idea had long been held by the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General John H. Russell, who suggested it to the Commandant, Major General Ben H. Fuller. Fuller approved a letter to Chief of Naval Operations on 17 August 1933 which recommended that the name of the expeditionary forces be changed to Fleet Marine Force and that such a force be incorporated as a permanent and integral part of the Fleet. This recommendation intended to alleviate the constant manpower drain imposed by peacetime garrison duties and would dedicate a body of Marines to the full-time study, development, and practice of amphibious war. This historic letter was fully endorsed by Chief of Naval Operations, Director of War Plans (Navy), and Commander In Chief, U.S. Fleet, In four weeks, a remarkably short period of time considering the scope of the letter and the levels of endorsement it required. The entire concept drew relatively little comment in view of its future Impacts. With one decision to implement the concept of the letter, the Secretary of the Navy, Claude A. Swanson, created the force that would fight its way across the Pacific during World War II using a new form of warfare.

At the suggestion of the Director of War Plans for the Navy, Swanson chose the term "Fleet Marine Force" to describe the new attachment and requested that the Major General Commandant draw up recommended doctrinal

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guidelines for Implementation.50 These guidelines were embodied in Navy General Order Number 241 of 7 December 1933 which was the charter for the Fleet Marine Force of today. Certain portions of that Order clarify the new status of the Marine Corps:

  1. The force of Marines maintained by the Major General Commandant In a state of readiness for operations with the Fleet is hereby designated as Fleet Marine Force (F.MF.), and as such shall constitute a part of the organization of the United States Fleet and be included in the Operating Force Plan for each fiscal year.

  2. The Fleet Marine Force shall consist of such units as may be designated by the Major General Commandant and shall be maintained at such strength as is warranted by the. general personnel situation of the Marine Corps.

  3. The Fleet Marine Force shall be available to the Commander in Chief for operations with the Fleet or for exercises either afloat or ashore in connection with Fleet problems. The Commander in Chief shall make timely recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations regarding such service in order that the necessary arrangements may be made.

  4. The Commander in Chief shall exercise command of the Fleet Marine Force when embarked on board vessels of the Fleet or when engaged in Fleet exercises either afloat or ashore. When Otherwise engaged, command shall be as directed by the MajOr General Commandant.

  5. The Major General Commandant shall detail, the Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force and maintain an appropriate staff for him.51

Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 treated the basic administrative arrangements of this new force. With respect to the development of amphibious warfare and the future of the LVT, this event was the starting point for serious and continuous experimentation in all aspects of amphibious war and doctrine. The practical effect was to set aside a body of Marines available for amphibious exercises, and to provide for the development of special equipment to meet new tactical needs. The FMF was to be isolated to the maximum extent possible from expeditionary demands for troops which had previously halted landing exercises for years at a time. The Marine Corps now entered an era of accelerated training for amphibious war.

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Table of Contents
Next Part (2)


Footnotes

1. Holland M. Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," Marine Corps Gazette, October, 1946, p. 22.

2. J.F.C. Fuller, The Second World War (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949), p. 207.

3. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1962), pp. 3-4.

4. Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., The Journals of the ContInental Congress, 1774-1789 (34 vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904-1937), III, p. 348.

5. William M. Miller and John H. Johnstone, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1775-1934 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1965), p. 8.

6. Ibid., p. 21.

7. Ibid., p. 30.

8. Holland M. Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1946, p. 46.

9. Ibid., p. 29.

10. K. Jack Bauer, Surfboats and Horse Marines (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1969), p. 66.

11. Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," July 1946, p. 46.

12. Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps 1900-1970 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museum Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1973), pp. 3-4.

13. Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," July 1946, p. 46.

14. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 10.

15. Ibid., p. 13.

16. Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," July 1946, p. 47.

17. Ibid.

18. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 18.

19. Ibid., p. 19.

20. Ibid., p. 21.

21. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 173.

22. Ibid., p. 180.

23. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 22.

24. Ibid.

25. John Toland, The Rising Sun (2 vols., New York: Random House, 1970), vol. 2, p. 594.

26. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), P. 254.

27. Holland H. Smith, Coral and Brass (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 57.

28. Ibid.

29. Earl H. Ellis, "Advanced Base Defense During the Present War," (Unpublished and undated report, Headquarters, Marine Corps), p. 1.

30. United States Marine Corps, Operations Plan 712H (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1921), p. 33.

31. Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 56.

32. Operations Plan 712H, p. 1.

33. Ibid., p. 8.

34. United States Marine Corps, "Advanced Base Operations In Micronesia," in Operations Plan 712H (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1921), p. 1.

35. Ibid., p. 2.

36. John A. lejeune, "The United States Marine Corps," The Marine Corps Gazette, December 1923, p. 250.

37. Ibid., p. 252.

38. Ibid., p. 253.

39. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 10.

40. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper Brothers, 1948), pp. 555-556.

41. Vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas of American Wars (2 vols., New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), pp. 28-32.

42. Lord Keyes, Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations (New York: Macmillan Company, 1943), p. 149

43. Baron De Jomini, The Art of War (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862; reprinted., Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1974), pp. 226-29.

44. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 45.

45. Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 254.

46. Borg-Warner Corporation, Research, Investigation, and Experimentation in the Field of Amphibious Vehicles (Kalamazoo: Ingersoll Kalamazoo Division, 1957), pp. 40-42.

47. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 33.

48. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 292.

49. Major General Commandant Letter of 17 August 1933 to the Secretary of the Navy.

50. Director of War Plans, United States Navy, Letter of 23 August 1933 to the Secretary of the Navy.

51. United States Navy, Navy Department General Order 241 (Washington, D.C.: Navy Department, 1933), pp. 1-2.



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