Part
Early Development

With the creation of the FMF, a full-time organization of Marines could now begin to perfect the art of amphibious war. First, however, there was a significant deficiency that had to be corrected before landing exercises could be productively resumed,and that deficiency was the lack of a comprehensive doctrine on amphibious operations. Surprisingly, there had been no coordinated attempt to collect amphibious experiences until 1933. Although there were several manuals published by the Navy and the Joint Board (an agency created for service cooperation and the predecessor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) during the pre-war period, for service dealing with joint overseas expeditions, none actually addressed the mechanics of an amphibious operation. The best attempt was titled Joint Overseas Expeditions, and appeared in January 1933 after approval by both the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War. The stated purpose for this Joint Board manual was ". . . to present a set of general principles for the planning and conduct of joint overseas expeditions . . ."; its total length was only 43 pages.1 Although it dealt soundly with the subject, even at the late date of 1933 it did not mention the Marine Corps and discussed amphibious operations with the assumption that the United States Army would be the landing force. The manual's contents were derived from comments from all services, including the Marine Corps, and it did serve as a basis for further study when the Corps started drafting its own amphibious doctrine.

--25--

Despite its generality, this manual recognized that special equipment was necessary to conduct a successful, large-scale amphibious landing:

Because of the special nature of the operations required in the transfer of troops, equipment, and supplies from ship to shore against enemy opposition and under supporting fire from friendly ships, special equipment must be provided by the Navy. This includes special boats for landing the assault troops, including installation of machine guns therein, and the provision of protection as far as practicable against small arms fire from shore; special boats, barges, and motor lighters for landing all other troops and their equipment, including artillery tanks, airplanes, and motor and animal transport, and supplies; provision of special ammunition required for the artillery support; and special communications equipment.2

With the creation of the FMF, the Commandant saw the need for a detailed document showing how to conduct amphibious landings. To develop "The book" on the subject, the Commandant used the wealth of experience in the student body at Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. Routinely, the Marine Corps ordered its top officers to refresher courses at Marine Corps School, Quantico, as preparation for assumption of greater responsibilities in the future. The students at the Schools in 1933 represented some of the most experienced officers in amphibious operations at that time. He directed that classes be suspended and work begun on writing the manual no later 15 November 1933.3 This may seem delayed because ideally the doctrine should precede the creation of the organization of the FMF, however, a majority of the student body had been mobilized for duty in Cuba in a false alarm which resulted in no landing.4 The student body, after initial meetings and development of an outline, formed separate committees dealing with Tactics, Staff Functions, and Training, which were the bulk of the manual, and smaller groups worked on aviation and naval matters. The Commandant approved this landmark document on 13 June 1934 and its initial title was The Tentative Manual for Landing

--26--

Operations.5 The manual was used in mimeograph form at Marine Corps Schools through the winter of 1934-1935 and was not given outside publication until July 1934 when the Navy Department retitled it Manual for Naval Overseas Operations. A revised version, now titled Tentative Landing Operations Manual, was published in July 1935, with photos and sketches and was widely distributed.6 All versions were published with a "Restricted" Classification which was the lowest order of classification below "confidential" and the highest rating of "secret". Although changed in 1941, 1942, and 1943, this manual's contents at the outset substantially created amphibious doctrine as it would be practiced throughout World War II.7

The manual established the Amphibious Task Force as divided into two main parts, the Landing Force and the naval support groups consisting of the Transport Group, Covering Group, Air Group, and Fire Support Group.8 The overall commander was to be the Naval Commander, with the commander of the Landing Force responsible to the Naval Commander for employment of the forces ashore.9 It discussed the critical area of ship-to-shore movement and assigned responsibility for this phase to the Naval Commander.10 The important area of fire support was explained and the first beginnings of an effective air support doctrine were included as a supplement to the use of naval gunfire. In words which almost exactly describe the later practices of close air support during World War II, the manual states,

When the ship's fire lifts, attack aviation and dive bombers take over the neutralization of strong points in the beach defenses by attacking machine guns, antiboat guns, artillery searchlights and reserves whose movements or location constitutes an immediate threat.11

This doctrine was an indirect outgrowth of early tests with naval gunfire which demonstrated a characteristic flat trajectory and a large range

--27--

error despite good accuracy in deflection. The large range errors required the early halt of naval gunfire on the beach area to insure the safety of the approaching troops. Aircraft had demonstrated acceptable accuracy with bombs when working in the proximity of troops, and aviation became the chief weapon for the task of hammering the beach. The manual also discussed the logistics of the amphibious operation including a wealth of detail on the loading data for standard Marine Corps equipment and boat capacities, and it stressed the fundamental relationships of the landing force scheme of maneuver on the beach to the combat loading of transports carrying the assault troop units. This was one of the great failings at Gallipoli. In amphibious war, after the mission has been assigned, the manual described what could be called a backwards planning process, that is, the first decision made is the scheme of ground maneuver that is to be employed by the Landing Force to secure the objectives. From this decision, it could be determined what unit will land first and this in turn decided the sequence in which the transports are to be loaded. This sequential loading to support the tactical scheme of maneuver ashore is called combat loading and is detailed in the manual because the combat loading of ships is a science which occupies the attention of many logistic planners early in the amphibious planning process.

The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations included an overall description of the state of the art in landing craft design to 1934. Progress remained limited and the boats listed for use in landing troops and supplies were ship's lifeboats and launches modified for use in landing operations. Three types were listed and described in detail:

--28--

1. A squad of "X" Boats was listed as desirable for assault waves. These were self-propelled, seaworthy, with a speed of twelve knots when loaded; they had a capacity of ten men, fully equipped, lying prone on the bottom, with a crew of three men - a coxswain, a gunner, and an engineer. They were armored from the turn of the bilge to about one foot above the waterline at the sides, with an armored, removable shield forward, high enough to protect the coxswain and gunner from shrapnel and small arms fire. A large number of boats of this type would be required and there was no overhead cover. Armament was a double machine gun in the bow and/or shoulder-fired automatic weapons.

2. A section of "V" Boats was listed as desirable for assault waves. This was an enlarged "X" boat with a capacity of 25 men in addition to the crew, and was suitable for the transportation of a rifle section or a machine gun section, less one machine gun cart. It's speed of twelve knots and general characteristics, other than size, were similar to the "X" boat. It was noted that this boat facilitated "nesting" or stacking of boats if both "X" and "V" boats were used together.

3. The 45 foot Artillery Lighter or "W" Boat was the third type described. It was efficient for landing artillery, tractors, and tanks It had shallow draft, square stern, and was not self-propelled. Its capacity was listed as two "light" tanks.

The detailed description of these special boats was followed by a comment which illustrated the tentative nature of research in this vital area:

--29--

Although the above special type boats are shown here in detail with their characteristics and capacities, it should be noted in passing that they are to date still subject to further experiment, development, and improvement; that in their present development, they have not been constructed in any quantity. Provisions, therefore, must be made in case of boats in volume to use the Standard Navy Types now generally distributed throughout the Fleet.12

Concern was expressed throughout the manual over the difficulty of bringing fire to bear on the beach from the landing waves themselves. If this could be done, then the defenders on the beach would be pinned down right to the last second before the leading waves touched shore. Many types 6f arrangements were mentioned including beaching specially built ships with artillery lashed to their decks, landing boats with mortars mounted in them, and mounting machine guns on the bows of landing boats. None of these measures were thoroughly tested and at one point the manual even spoke in a gloomy tone on the subject:

Attempts to employ field artillery materiel fastened to the decks of vessels are of doubtful value due to the sights and elevating and traversing mechanism ordinarily installed on field artillery.13

The manual concludes one part:

Thus, in order to keep the hostile machine-gun fire reduced to a minimum, a great deal will depend upon the supporting fire of accompanying ships and the guns mounted in the bows of landing boats.14

The qualities of protection and firepower for the leading waves were not to be incorporated into amphibious warfare for many years, and these same critical factors would be supplied by the advent of the LVT.

After the publication of the manual, landing exercises resumed on an annual basis with the objective of measuring the progress of amphibious tactics and techniques. Fleet Landing Exercise Number 1, sometimes abbreviated Flex 1, took place between 24 January and 8 March 1935 and consisted of daily troop landings at Culebra Island and tactical landings

--30--

of a reinforced regiment with artillery and aviation to establish the defense of a fleet base. This exercise used regular ship's boats of up to 50 feet in length which could carry 110 Marines. The exercise was considered to be a success despite an insufficient number of landing craft which hampered realistic landing practice. From 29 April through 12 June 1935 the FMF also participated in United States Fleet Exercise XVI by landing a battalion of infantry and a battalion of artillery at Midway Island in the Pacific.15 Fleet Landing Exercise Number 2 was staged between 4 January and 24 February 1936 and placed more emphasis on ship-to-shore operations, although training ashore was also performed. During this exercise a recommendation was made that the Marine Corps FMF be provided with assault transport ships, configured to carry troops. This critical shortage was not met until 1941.16 The deficiencies in landing craft continued to attract concern and General Holland Smith noted, "The need was also recognized for a fast, maneuverable, well protected landing boat."17 Fleet Landing Exercise Number 3, 24 January through 10 March 1937 was notable for the first actual live firing of naval guns in support of troops landing on San Clemente Island, and included the 1st United States Army Expeditionary Brigade, under Marine Corps overall command, within the landing force. Three experimental landing craft were thoroughly tested by the bad weather experienced during the landings. A forty foot standard ship's boat proved to be the best available ship's launch, but recommendations for a maneuverable, surf-capable landing craft were still renewed.18

The Marine Corps was well aware of the unsuitability of existing craft for landings and in 1933 formed the Marine Corps Equipment Board composed of eleven members who served on a part-time basis to discover

--31--

and recommend types of equipment for amphibious operations. The Board gained in importance as the years passed and by 1937 was expanded to twenty officers assigned full-time.19 The corresponding. Navy department. responsible for design, construction, and purchase of all boats and ships was the Bureau of Construction and Repair, renamed the Bureau of Ships In 1940. During the mid-1930s there was little money to spare and procurement of landing craft remained a low priority item on the Navy's list. Curiously, despite the obvious strategic importance of amphibious equipment, particularly landing craft, the Navy's reluctance to spend money on this vital area, which they viewed as Army and Marine operations, persisted until 1942. Presidential pressure, generated by concern over the upcoming North African landings, caused the Navy to move construction Of landing craft from tenth position on the list in March 1942 to second position, only behind aircraft carriers, by October 1942.20 Any progress made before this time was due primarily to the tenacity of Marine officers on the Equipment Board and a few sympathetic Naval officers in Washington. However, the Navy did recognize enough importance in the issue to establish the Continuing Board for the Development of Landing Boats for Training Operations, in January 1937. This board had representatives from the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Bureau of Construction and Repair, and the Army Bureau of Ordnance.21 The driving force among all these agencies, however, remained the Marine Corps Equipment Board.

At the conclusion of Fleet Landing Exercise Number 3, there still remained no suitable American amphibian vehicle for testing. With the rejection of the Christie Tank in 1924, the void remained unfilled. The Borg-Warner Report of 1957 supplied a well-informed opinion as to

--32--

the reasons for this lag:

It should not be concluded that this lack of interest was due solely to particular weaknesses of the first amphibian tanks or of their designers, rather, the dormant period in military amphibian, and to a large extent all military vehicle development, was largely the result of a lack of available funds for research and development caused by the reduction in military expenditures which normally accompany periods of peace. Further, the perfecting of ferrying and bridging equipment for tanks rather than adapting them for water travel, slowed the development of a true amphibian.22

The most successful amphibian of the times appeared to be the British Vicker-Armstrong Light Amphibious Tank, a design not imported by the United States. Two experimental tanks were developed for testing by the British War Office in 1931-1932. They were not accepted by the British but enjoyed considerable success as a foreign sales item, particularly to Russia, which later developed its successful T-37 design from this model. The Vicker Tank used a mounted Caliber 30 machine gun, had a crew of two, weighed 2.17 tons, and was powered by a 90 horsepower six-cylinder engine. Like the Christie in 1924, the British attached balsa wood mudguards, covered with sheet metal, to the watertight hull to give the tank added buoyancy. It moved 20 to 27 mph on land but was capable only of 3.72 mph in water, thus making its usefulness to the leading waves contingent upon a tricky feat of coordination by sending it ahead of the leading waves which were catch up near the beach to take advantage of its machine gun firepower as they neared the beach.23 Such feats were not feasible at this stage in amphibious development. The chief difficulty with the vehicle lay in its floatation with decks awash, making it susceptible to complete submersion in rough water or surf. Despite the dearth of seemingly effective amphibious designs, a chance event was to occur that would provide the Marine Corps with a pilot model for the design of a successful amphibian vehicle.

--33--

The 4 October 1937 issue of Life Magazine ran an article entitled "Roebling's Alligator for Florida Rescue", with the following lead:

Shocked by the great Florida hurricane of September, 1935, John A. Roebling of New Jersey's bridge building family, told his 28 year old son, Donald, that some sort of amphibian vehicle might have saved many lives by transporting victims through the swamps, over drowned roads, across debris filled bayous. Donald agreed, went to work, after many expensive months produced the "Alligator" shown in operation on his Florida estate.24

The article contained pictures of the tracked amphibian moving through swamp, in water, and climbing a steep embankment. During this period, Major General Louis McCarthy Little, Commanding General of the FMF, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel E. P. Moses, were conferring with Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, Commander, Battleships, Battle Force, United States Fleet, concerning upcoming landing exercises. At a dinner, the Admiral remarked on the Life article and the possible value of the "Alligator" to the Marine Corps. General Little was quick to see the possible significance of the Roebling amphibian and forwarded the article to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.25 The Commandant in turn forwarded the information on to the Marine Corps Equipment Board. and asked them to look into the usefulness of the amphibian for military purposes. In March 1938 Major John Kaluf, the Secretary to the Equipment Board, visited Mr. Roebling at his shop in Clearwater, Florida, at the direction of the President of the Equipment Board, Brigadier General Frederick I. Bradman, USMC. Major Kaluf took about 400 feet of movie film of the Alligator, which was fully operational, and returned to Quantico to give a favorable endorsement of the utility of this vehicle.26 Kaluf wrote in his official report, ". . . subject boat has possibilities for use in landing troops and supplies at points not accessible to other types of small boats."27 The Commandant concurred with Major Kaluf's observations

--34--

Figure 3. The actual Life magazine article which led to the discovery of the LVT(1)
Figure 3. The actual Life magazine article which led to the discovery of the LVT(1).

--35--

Figure 4. Side view of the Vickers-Armstrong Tank of 1931-32 which was the most successful amphibious tank design of the era
Figure 4. Side view of the Vickers-Armstrong Tank of 1931-32 which was the most successful amphibious tank design of the era.

Figure 5. Rear view of the Vickers-Armstrong. Note the propeller-rudder apparatus
Figure 5. Rear view of the Vickers-Armstrong. Note the propeller-rudder apparatus.

--36--

and in May 1938, recommended to the Navy's Continuing Board for Development of Landing Craft that "steps be taken to procure a pilot model of this type of amphibious boat for further tests under service conditions and during Fleet landing Exercise Number 5."28 Though attached comments on the Commandant's letter, the Continuing Board, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and finally the Chief of Naval Operations reacted negatively citing lack of funds (much of the available money had been absorbed by ongoing landing craft development) for such a purely experimental project.29 To classify the Roebling Alligator as a purely experimental project was perhaps an injustice and a closer look at this remarkable private development project will be valuable.

The model viewed by Major Kaluf in March 1938 was actually the third modification of the original vehicle completed in 1935. The engineering on the vehicle featured two decisive refinements over previous attempts at amphibian design. The first was the incorporation of aluminum into the hull of the vehicle to reduce weight. At this time aluminum was not well known and methods to work it had to be devised by Mr. Roebling at his shop. Weight reduction resulted in less immersion of the hull and higher water speeds are obtained. The second feature of the Roebling design was the use of paddle-like cleats bolted to the track to derive propulsion from the track in the water as well as on land. The first model had these cleats set straight across the track, but water speed was a disappointing 2.3 mph despite an impressive twenty-five mph on land. The original vehicle was twenty-four feet long, weighed 14,350 pounds, and was powered by a ninety-two horsepower Chrysler engine. A second modification was completed in April 1936 with the cleats now set diagonally across the track, weight reduced by 2,240 pounds, and an

--37--

eighty-five horsepower Ford V-8 engine used for power. Land speed dropped to eighteen mph but the water speed increased to 5.45 mph. Further interim work was done on this vehicle and the weight decreased by 310 more pounds, with a slight increase in land and water speeds. A third modification, completed in 1937, resulted in the most significant advances. The length of the Alligator was reduced by four feet, which cut weight by 3,100 pounds, and the cleats were changed to a curved shape, set diagonally across the track. Roebling also redesigned his track away from the traditional bogie and idler wheels used in tanks, which caused considerable drag in the water. His new track was a chain with built-in roller bearings sliding on a smooth steel channel which encircled the track contour. Idler blocks actuated by hydraulic jacks kept track tension rather than the old idler wheels. The net result of all these improvements was a new low vehicle weight of 8,700 pounds, increased maneuverability, a water speed up to 8.6 mph, and a land speed between eighteen and twenty mph.30 This third modification was the design featured in the Life article and later viewed by Major Kaluf.

Despite Navy disapproval of the Marine Corps request for purchase of a pilot model, interest continued. Major Kaluf returned to Florida in January 1939 and viewed further operations of the Roebling Alligator. His favorable comments were reviewed by Brigadier General E. P. Moses, the new President of the Equipment Board, whose reaction was summarized by it. Colonel Croizat, "The General agreed with Kaluf that the vehicle as it stood was not suited to hard military use but that it was of potential value and that necessary modification could be made."31 In September General Moses and Major Linsert, the new Secretary of the Equipment Board, visited Mr. Roebling and witnessed further trials. The

--38--

most significant development of this visit was that General Moses finally persuaded, Mr. Roebling on the military value of his vehicle and Mr. Roebling agreed to design an Alligator with military characteristics.32 Roebling completed this new design by May 1940 incorporating all experience gained up to that time. The vehicle was twenty feet, eight inches long, eight feet wide, eight feet high at the driver's cab, and weighed about 8,000 pounds. Its speeds were fifteen to twenty-five mph on land and eight to ten mph in water. It had a nineteen inch ground clearance which was a great advantage in overland travel and precluded becoming "high-centered" or stuck on obstacles between its tracks. It could push down an eight inch Yellow Pine tree without difficulty and climb a fifty-five degree slope. It would not sink, even with its open hold full of water, and it drew less than three feet of water empty. The Alligator was powered by a ninety-five horsepower Mercury engine, and steered by two vertical levers between the driver's knees.33 The $20,000. for this vehicle was procured from the Navy's Bureau of Ships (formerly Bureau of Construction and Repair) from funds allocated for landing craft development. It is interesting to note that Mr. Roebling only used $16,000. to build his model and spent considerable time and effort attempting to return the unused $4,000 (he was eventually successful).34 At this point, with more money becoming available as the European military situation worsened, the Navy contracted with Mr. Roebllng to build a vehicle based on the May 1940 design but powered by a 120 horsepower Lincoln-Zephyr engine. This work was inspected by General Moses and a party of Marine and Navy officers on 26-27 August 1940. The results were highly satisfactory with some minor modification being agreed on within the terms of the contract. This model was completed and given

--39--

its final tests by 14 October 194O.35 Speeds were twenty-nine mph on land and 9.72 mph in water.36 It was shipped to Quantico during the first week in November for tests and on the day of its arrival at the Equipment Board, a call was received indicating that the Commandant was going to personally inspect the vehicle. He arrived two days later with an unexpected party of high ranking Army and Navy officers to observe the tests. The demonstrations were a success with the admirals and generals being taken for rides without incident, although later the Alligator did get stuck in the mud.37

This test won acceptance by the Navy, but they had modifications in mind. The test models during this time had been constructed of aluminum and Marine observers were convinced that this would not withstand hard military use. Aluminum during this period was not completely exploited as a construction material and methods for its shaping and attachment were not well-suited to LVT construction. Mr. Roebling had to devise original methods of construction in order to incorporate aluminum. This primitive state of affairs accounts for much of the reluctance on the part of Marine Corps observers to accept aluminum for combat use. In retrospect, the desire of steel construction appears justified in view of the pummeling the vehicles received pushing through jungles, scraping over coral, and bouncing against landing craft during troop transfer operations.

The Quantico tests were on a Thursday, and the following Saturday the Navy negotiated a contract with Mr. Roebling for delivery of 100 Landing Vehicles Tracked (LVT) of all-steel construction, based on Marine Corps recommendations.38 The Food Machinery Corporation had a plant at Dunedin, Florida, near Mr. Roebling's Clearwater shop and had constructed

--40--

some parts for him previously. Mr. Roebling now turned to FMC for assistance in production and redesign necessary for an all-steel amphibian. Mr. James M. Halt, Chief Engineer of the Peerless Division of FMC, organized an engineering team for redesign using all-steel construction and welding vice rivets, which until this period were a common method of constructing steel vehicles. Two prototypes were built at the Riverside FMC plant. This successful effort was followed by the Navy awarding FMC the contract for further official design of the vehicle, now officially known as LVT(1), and a contract for further delivery of 200 more LVT(1)s. The first vehicle came off the assembly line in July 1941.39

Aluminum test vehicles received their sea test as part of Fleet Landing Exercise Number 7, which was the last in the series of Landing Exercises before World War II. It took place between 4-14 February 1941, under the overall command of General Holland M. Smith, Commanding General of the newly organized (1 February 1941) 1st Marine Division. This exercise involved units of the Army and was a successful test of the amphibian's worth at sea.40 Following this test a small amphibian tractor detachment was formed at Quantico and moved to a site at Dunedin, Florida, on 2 May 1941. It was commanded by Major W. W. Davies and included four other officers and thirty-three enlisted. This detachment established a training center for drivers and mechanics and received the new LVT(1)s as they came off FMC assembly lines at Lakeland, Florida, and Riverside, California. After training, personnel were sent to newly forming units of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (AmTrac is the official abbreviation today). This battalion was part of the new 1st Marine Division and its organization was to consist of a Headquarters and

--41--

Service Company and four letter companies (A, B, C, and D) which contained the tractors and crewmen. The Battalion was complete by 16 February 1942.41

Even during the initial design stages of the LVT(1), a turreted model had been envisioned by Mr. Roebling. Such an amphibian, armored and mounting a gun, would be the practical answer to the problem of incorporating firepower into the leading waves of the landing force to keep the beach defenders pinned down until the last second. Initial sketches were made in January 1940 by Mr. Roebling and later completed by Major Linsert, but no further action was taken. During June 1941 the Commandant of the Marine Corps recommended that a turreted LVT be developed mounting a 37 m gun and three machine guns, with enough armor protection to withstand Caliber 50 machine guns, in order to overrun beach defenses. The Chief of Naval Operations approved these specifications and directed the Bureau of Ships to perfect a design. Bureau engineers began development in cooperation with Mr. Roebling and FMC, but their plans were not finished until December 1941.42 The Bureau of Ships called in the Morse Chain Company Division of Borg-Warner to assist in redesign of the Roebling Track. As the United States entered the War, it was felt that a complete redesign was necessary and Borg-Warner thus launched a design project in cooperation with the Navy for a turreted LVT. These efforts were to lead to an invaluable addition to the LVT family of vehicles as the War progressed.

At the opening of World War II, the only available LVT was the military version of the Roebling Alligator, the LVT(1) which had the following characteristics:

--42--

Construction: Hull constructed of arc-welded steel from 14 gauge to 3/16 inch thickness. Bottom plate is 3/16 inch sheet steel running from stern to forward bumper. Sponsons (sides) of the vehicle were 12 gauge, and cab was from 14 gauge sheet steel. Hull was divided into three compartments: cab, cargo, and engine compartment in the rear.

Suspension: Suspension was rigid with rollers built into track riding on steel channels which acted as guides around the sponson. Drive sprockets were rigidly attached to the hull in the rear and slack in the track was reduced by an idler block in the front of the sponson. Each track weighed 650 pounds.

Maneuverability/Mobility: Ground pressure with the cleats fully sunk into the ground (4 inch penetration) was 7.8 pounds per square inch. The LVT(1) could turn in the water in its own length by reversing one track and going ahead with the other, both at full speed.43

Weights: The LVT(1) weighed 17,500 pounds empty with maximum gross weight of 22,000 pounds (full of fuel, fully loaded, with full crew). Cargo capacity was 4,500 pounds.

Dimensions: The Alligator was 21 feet long, 9 feet 10 inches wide, 7 feet 8 inches high, and had a ground clearance of 19 inches.

Speeds: Powered by a 150 horsepower Hercules engine, speed on land was 12 mph (far slower than previous models due to the weight increase from all-steel construction) and between 6 and 7 mph in water.44

As the Marines entered World War II with this vehicle, much potential could be seen, yet the specific tasks for its use were to be developed from the lessons of battle. Such lessons were not long in coming.

--43--

Table of Contents
Previous Part ** Next Part


Footnotes

1. Holland M. Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," Marine Corps Gazette, October, 1946, P. 22.

2. J.F.C. Fuller, The Second World War (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949), p. 207.

3. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1962), pp. 3-4.

4. Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., The Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (34 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-1937), III, p. 348.

5. William M. Miller and John H. Johnstone, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1775-1934 (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1965), p. 8.

6. Ibid., p. 21.

7. Ibid., p. 30.

8. Holland M. Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," Marine Corps Gazette, July, 1946, p. 46.

9. Ibid., p. 29.

10. K. Jack Bauer, Surfboats and Horse Marines (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1969), p. 66.

11. Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," Marine Corps Gazette, July, 1946, p. 46.

12. Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps 1900-1970 (Washington: History and Museum Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1973), pp. 3-4.

13. Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," Marine Corps Gazette, July, 1946, p. 46.

14. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 10.

15. Ibid., p. 13.

16. Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," Marine Corps Gazette, July, 1946, p. 47.

17. Ibid.

18. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 18.

19. [Footnote text missing from original.]

20. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper Brothers, 1948), p. 554.

21. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 48.

22. Borg-Warner Corporation, Research, Investigation, and Experimentation in the Field of Amphibious Vehicles (Kalamazoo: Ingersoll Kalamazoo Division, 1957), p. 45.

23. Peter Chamberlin and Chris Ellis, Tanks of the World, 1915-1945 (New York: Galahad Books, 1972), p. 84.

24. "Roebling's Alligator for Florida Rescues," Life, October 4, 1937, pp. 94-95.

25. Victor J. Croizat, "The Marine's Amphibian," Marine Corps Gazette, June, 1953, p. 41.

26. John Kaluf, "Selling the Amphibian," Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1953, p. 8.

27. Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig,and Henry I. Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, Vol. I of History Corps Operations in World War II (5 vols.; Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1958), p. 32.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 33.

30. Borg-Warner Corporation, Research, Investigation, and Experimentation, pp. 45-46.

31. Croizat, "Marine's Amphibian", Marine Corps Gazette, June, 1953, p. 41.

32. Ibid., p. 42.

33. The Alligator, Sales pamphlet (Clearwater; Donald Roebling, 1940).

34. Croizat, "Marine's Amphibian", Marine Corps Gazette, June, 1953, p. 42.

35. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 56.

36. Borg-Warner Corporation, Research, Investigation, and Experimentation, p. 49.

37. Croizat, "Marine's Amphibian", Marine Corps Gazette, June, 1953, p. 42.

38. Ibid.

39. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, pp. 56-57.

40. Holland M. Smith, Coral and Brass (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 97.

41. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, p. 57.

42. Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 34.

43. Borg-Warner Corporation, Research, Investigation, and Experimentation, pp. 65-66.

44. Food Machinery Corporation, Amphibians (San Jose: Food Machinery Corp., 1942), p. 16.



Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation