Part III
Early Lessons

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor shocked America and galvanized the country into action, although at the time of the attack there were shortages of needed war materiel and few trained men. This situation generally applied to all the armed services, yet the Marine Corps was the first ordered to take the offensive against the enemy. The time for testing of the Corps' new amphibious doctrine and equipment was at hand.

Notwithstanding President Roosevelt's decision to give priority attention to Germany's defeat, the tactical opportunity to take an offensive first developed in the southwest Pacific where the Japanese had landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomons and were constructing an airfield which would threaten United States forward bases at Efate in the New Hebrides and at Espiritu Santo. Japan's extended position on the tip of the Lower Solomon Islands offered the United States a chance to isolate the area and conduct an amphibious landing to seize the initiative, an act badly needed for public morale following setbacks including the loss of Guam, the Philippines, and Wake Island in the first days after Pearl Harbor. On 25 June 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Admiral Nimitz and Vice Admiral Ghormley to prepare for an offensive into the lower Solomons to seize the Tulagi-Santa Cruz-Guadalcanal area, with a D-Day set for 1 August 1942.1 The planning phase began immediately in an atmosphere of urgency.

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Map 1. South Pacific area
Map 1. South Pacific area.

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Map 2. Solomon Islands
Map 2. Solomon Islands.

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At the outset, the LVT(1) was assigned exclusively a supply role. Amphibious planning during this time was guided by Change Number 1 to Fleet Training Publication (FTP) 167, issued 2 May 1941. This document was based on the Marine Corps Tentative Landing Operations Manual of 1935, and its pages contained the latest thinking on the use of landing craft and amphibians. FTP 167 listed the desirable characteristics of leading wave landing boats as:

  1. Armament: Should mount suitable weapons capable of producing heavy volume of fire.

  2. Speed: Should be fast. Boats for leading waves should have a speed of not less than 12 knots; a greater speed is desirable.

  3. Shallow Draft: Should be able to run well up on any type of beach override or overwater obstacles and ground on a fully even keel.

  4. Good Surfboat: Should be seaworthy and easily handled in surf.

  5. Armor: Should have armor protection against small arms fire. This Is particularly necessary for coxswain, gunner, engine and gasoline tank.

  6. Rugged: Not easily damaged by pounding in the surf.

  7. Nesting: It is desirable that the boats be suitable for nesting or stowing In tiers aboard ship.2

FTP 167 also contains a section on Special Navy Landing Boats that gives guidance on the LVT:

. . . vehicle may be employed tactically in groups to effect landings of entire combat teams or they may be distributed to combat teams as small groups for landing of equipment, ammunition, and supplies required in the initial stages of a landing. They should be particularly useful 1in landing artillery and transporting their weapons and ammunition to their firing positions.3

The manual included pictures of current landing craft and had a picture of the Roebling design of May 1940 which was the first military oriented aluminum design. From the above it appears that information on the basic capabilities of the Roebling amphibian was available even though the date

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of Change 1 to FTP 167 was May 1941 a period during which the Roebling had just entered mass production and before the first model rolled off the assembly lines. With the exception of speed, an important factor, the LVT(l) met the requirements of a desirable landing craft for a leading wave, but was never given this mission at Guadalcanal. Leading waves were to be landed in the standard boat-type landing craft then available. There Is no evidence that suggests that the LVT(l) was ever considered for anything other than cargo transportation. This thinking seems to have originated through an early reputation of mechanical unreliability and inefficiency. As described by its manufacturer, Food Machinery Corporation, the LVT(l) held fifty gallons of gasoline for a land cruising range of 120 miles, or 2.4 miles per gallon.4 Although this was an expensive method of transporting supplies, it appeared to be the more prudent use of the vehicle instead of use as an assault vehicle where mechanical break-downs could strand part of the leading waves at sea. The vehicle was not planned for a continual shuttle of supplies, but only until wheeled vehicles were landed to assume the transport of supplies inland.5 Further, at Guadalcanal there were only a few hydrographic charts with just enough information to prevent a trading schooner from grounding, and this minimal intelligence did not indicate off-shore reefs or other obstacles that required the use of the amphibian's land-water capabilities. (In fact, the coral reefs around the island of Tulagi forced early debarkation of the troops from their landing boats on D-Day when they ran aground on coral reefs thirty to hundred yards from shore. Fortunately for the men, waist to armpit-deep in water, there was no initial opposition to the landings because the Japanese were caught by surprise.6)

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The planning period was incredibly short considering the complexity of the unknowns, the strategic significance of the operation, and the enormous distances involved. The 1st Marine Division was enroute to Wellington, New Zealand, when the warning order for the Guadalcanal operation was delivered on 25 June 1942. Mount out (departure) for the 1st Division, from Wellington, was set for 22 July. The three infantry regiments and the artillery regiment of the division were scattered across half the globe on 25 June: the 5th Marine Regiment was at Wellington, the 1st Marine Regiment was enroute at sea, the 7th Marine Regiment was at Samoa on garrison duty and was not released until late In the operation, and the Division's artillery regiment, the 11th Marines, was at sea enroute also to Wellington. Units at sea were loaded administratively for maximum usage of space and as the landing plan developed, these units required reloading at Wellington to support the scheme of maneuver. This later reloading was accomplished under severe handicaps of wet weather which ruined non-waterproofed foodstuffs, lack of civilian help--because the highly unionized stevedores at New Zealand could not agree on terms, and inadequate dock space--which stopped trucks from moving among the piles of gear and forced man-handling where possible. The net result was loss of supplies that were badly needed, and significantly for the LVT, seventy-five per cent of the heavier wheeled vehicles had to be left behind with the rear echelon when the division sailed.7 This meant there would be more use of LVTs than originally planned.

Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, was the first unit to leave the United States, when it went overseas with the 5th Marine Regiment to Wellington in May 1942. The entire 1st Amtrac Battalion, less one platoon, was assigned to support the Guadalcanal landings, now

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rescheduled for 7 August, with Company A, 2nd Amtrac Battalion plus the one platoon from 1st Amtracs assigned to support the Gavutu-Tulagi landings across Sealark Channel from the main island of Guadalcanal.8 This detached assignment of one platoon created some hardship initially because maintenance facilities were concentrated in the headquarters company of the battalion which was landing at Guadalcanal, thereby leaving the detached units capable of performing only the most basic type of maintenance such as tightening, cleaning, and lubricating.9 Under the then-existing tables of the organization, the number of tractors assigned to support the Guadalcanal landing was about 86, and those assigned to the Gavutu-Tulagi landings totalled about 42. Each of the three letter companies in an Amtrac Battalion contained 3 platoons with approximately 10 tractors per platoon with 2 tractors in company headquarters. Headquarters and Service Company of the Amtrac Battalion contained mechanics, clerks, cook, and command facilities.10

Surprisingly, considering the haste with which the operation was planned, things went like clockwork on D-Day, 7 August. The Line of Departure was crossed on time by the 5th Marines and they hit the beach after the 5,000 yard approach at 9:10 A.M. On its first day of action, amphibian versatility was demonstrated. Warned that the rivers of the' area would be deep, engineers had constructed a rough wooden bridge from scrap available on ships. This bridge was carried to the beach on D-Day by two LVTs which drove into the Tenaru River, a stream on the flank of the landing area, and became the supporting pontoons for it during the crossing of early assault elements of the landing force.11

The 5th Marines pushed inland against no resistance. The reserve regiment, the 1st Marines, came ashore at 9:30 A.M. Artillery arrived

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Figure 6. LVT(1)s coming ashore somewhere in Guadalcanal. Note the machine guns manned and ready.
Figure 6. LVT(1)s coming ashore somewhere in Guadalcanal. Note the machine guns manned and ready.

Figure 7. LVT(1)s approaching the beach on a supply run from anchored transports in the background
Figure 7. LVT(1)s approaching the beach on a supply run from anchored transports in the background

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next and generated one of the first of many improvised missions for the LVT. As the LVTs unloaded heavy cargo on the shore, they also towed artillery into position because there was an inadequate supply of wheeled vehicles which normally did this.12 The perimeter continued to expand throughout the day and next two days, against no resistance. Although the landings at Tulagi were a surprise, the island required two days of fighting to clear. The Gavutu-Tanambogo Islands were tiny fragments hooked together by a causeway and the landings there were heavily opposed but successful with fighting through the first day and on Into the second. Two tanks were used on Tanambogo with one set afire by oil-soaked rags hand-carried by Japanese soldiers. Forty-two Japanese bodies were counted stacked around the burned-out tank after combat.13 Five LVT(1)s of Company A, 2d Amtrac Battalion, proved to be versatile pieces of equipment in this fight:

They carried water, supplies, ammunition, and personnel to shore and evacuated wounded on the return trips. On one occasion a tractor moved some distance inland to attack a Japanese position that had pinned down and wounded a number of Marines. Using their two machine guns, one .30 and one .50 caliber, the tractor's crew neutralized the enemy fire and then evacuated the wounded Marines.15

The 1st Marine Division's Final Report noted, however, that:

. . . This was an emergency undertaking only as it is not considered that the tractor is a tactical combat vehicle.15

The perimeter that stabilized at Guadalcanal was comprised of a 9,600 yard main line of resistance facing seaward and a 9,000 yard inland stretch running through dense jungles. The inland stretch could not be covered by position defenses and a critical need developed for all available personnel to cover these extensive lines. For the remainder of the long struggle for Guadalcanal, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion held an inland sector with machine guns dismounted from their vehicles while

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performing foot patrols. The need for the men was more critical than the need for the vehicle. The 1st Marine Division was relieved by fresh Army and Marine units on 9 December 1942 and sailed for Australia for a well-earned rest and re-training period. With it went the LVTs of the 1st Amtrac Battalion.

There is a scarcity of records concerning the use of the LVT in the Guadalcanal Campaign, but there are only positive reports where the vehicle is mentioned. The keynote to its first debut was the discovery of the vehicle's great versatility through its mobility. Nowhere in the reports are the mechanical problems of the tractor emphasized but rather the focus is on its ability to get the job done. The Marine Corps' official history of the campaign summarizes it concisely, ". . . the amphibian tractor emerged as a versatile piece of equipment whose importance and utility could hardly be overestimated."16

As versatile as it was, the LVT(1) was also the first of its kind, and, as with all initial designs, needed improvements became apparent as time passed. The chief weakness of the LVT(1) was its track and suspension system. Before the War, this weakness had been observed by Borg-Warner engineers who visited Clearwater, Florida, at the request of the Navy during October 1941, to observe the Roebling Alligator in action:

It was quite evident from examination of the tracks that there is a tremendous amount of friction, because the roller bearings cease to function as bearings after a short period of operation and have to be dragged around the track guides. Rapid wear of the bearings is the result of excessive overloading, together with entry of sand and water which soon destroys rolling action.17

The Borg-Warner engineering team further observed:

There does not seem to be however, any method by which the track life can be substantially improved without a complete re-design. It was the consensus of opinion that a track running on bogey wheels of suitable design would be superior to any track which carried its own wheels.18

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Further testing was performed by the United States Army at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland between 30 April to 20 July 1942 and conclusions drawn, while critical of the track design, also address other areas of design:

The outstanding deficiency of the Roebling Amphibian is its propulsive inefficiency on land and on the water. The speed of the Vehicle in water is less than half that of screw-propelled boats with streamlined hulls of the same power and displacement. This comparative inefficiency of the Amphibian is due to (1) inefficient means of propulsion; (2) high towing resistance of the hull. The high towing resistance may be attributed to: (1) high friction loss due to excessive wetted surface; (2) bad wave-making and eddy-making qualities of the hull. Maximum water speed--6.1 mph.19

The Army report represents early interest in the program and they monitored development of the LVT from November 1940 when high ranking Army officers observed the Quantico tests of the vehicle.

The problems noted in the Roebling design pointed to a complete redesign in order to overcome unreliability and improve vehicle performance. Although Borg-Warner was consulted by the Navy on design problems, the Navy chose to continue with Food Machinery for development of an improved amphibian design. FMC's designs were completed during December 1941 and they began tests on prototypes of not only a cargo-carrying LVT, but also concurrently an armored amphibian design. These design efforts were once again under the direction of Mr. J.M. Halt, and included assistance from the faculties of the California Institute of Technology and the University of California. Tests were conducted using models in tanks, and over 100 different shapes of grousers (track cleats) were tested before the best all-around "W" shape grouser was adopted.20

The Navy specified certain broad design criteria for these re-design efforts. For both the armored and the cargo versions of the LVT, the Navy

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Figure 8. The early test version of the LVT(A)1 coming ashore. The armored canopy eventually became a tank turret, based on the Borg-Warner designed Model A.
Figure 8. The early test version of the LVT(A)(1) coming ashore. The armored canopy eventually became a tank turret, based on the Borg-Warner designed Model A.

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indicated a desired land speed of at least 15 mph and a water speed of approximately 8 mph. The armored amphibian was not to weigh more than 27,000 pounds.21 Early test results were encouraging with the armored design weighing 26,730 pounds with full fuel and oil and attaining speeds of 23 mph on firm land in fourth gear and 7.75 mph in water. The cargo design, weighing 25,400 pounds, attained a speed of 8.03 mph in water.22 The heart of the new designs lay in the new suspension and track which in contrast to the rigid, no springs suspension of the LVT(1), featured eleven rubber-tired bogie wheels on torsional rubber springs mounted on each side of the vehicle to give a smoother and more stable ride on land. The track had hermetically sealed bearings to prevent entry of sand and water and extra-high track guides to keep the track from being thrown off the suspension in tight turns. The new grouser design on the track did not develop lateral pressure and wear in water like the Roebling design. FMC selected front drive using tested components of the M3 light tank, stating, ". . . a front drive is very advantageous, as it permits the chains to unload mud and debris before the links engage the drive sprockets."23 Four universal joints were used between the engine and transmission and flexible couplings between the transmission and final drive to permit hull distortion without power loss or damage to the drive line components.24

While FMC was developing an armored amphibian and cargo carrying LVT, a simultaneous effort was underway at Borg-Warner as a result of their October 1941 visit to observe the Roebling Tractor in operation. Borg-Warner felt that re-design was the only way to overcome the problems of the Roebling Alligator and immediately launched into construction of a pilot model.25 The Borg-Warner effort moved at a fast pace and a

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vehicle was completed and tested within six months, thus gaining for Borg-Warner the honor of completing the first modern armored amphibian, called the Model A. The Borg-Warner approach, while a comprehensive re-design, more closely approximated some of the engineering used in the Roebling LVT. The basic track cleat designed by Roebling was retained, but the rollers were removed from the track, increased in size, and incorporated Into the bottom of the sponsons. These were large Timken bearings, protected by double neoprene and rawhide seals, turning on chrome-plated shafts.26 Larger idler wheels and drive sprockets were used, coupled to a fully automatic transmission, which allowed transition from water to land without hesitation for shifting. Borg-Warner used a high-tensile strength, corrosion-resistant steel which they corrugated to obtain high strength combined with lighter weight. A unique feature of the Model A was the convertability of the basic vehicle. Borg-Warner designed a basic cargo-carrying vehicle of 17,000 pounds to carry a load of 5,000 pounds. To convert the cargo-carrier to an armored amphibian, the turret and decking was lowered into the open cargo space and It became a 22,000 pound combat vehicle with speeds of 17 mph on land and 8 mph in the water. An important engineering feature was the use of the standard M3 light tank turret which allowed the combat version to coaxially mount a 37 mm gun and a caliber .30 machine gun in the turret, which represented heavier gun power than the FMC design using only machine guns. The vehicle mounted in the bow, for use both in the combat and cargo configuration, one caliber .30 machine gun with vertical and horizontal movement and one caliber .30 machine gun with only vertical movement. The limited movement appears to have been intended to permit one gun to fire straight ahead of the vehicle. The vehicle was powered

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by a 141 horsepower, eight cylinder engine.27

While Borg-Warner perfected many engineering changes with their pilot Model A, their approach remained basically closer to the Roebling design and did not represent as great an improvement as the FMC approach. Borg-Warner's suspension did not give the smooth ride of the torsion suspension of FMC, and FMC's track design eliminated lateral forces in the water while Borg-Warner retained the basic Roebling cleat. Speeds of the vehicles were close in the water, but FMC's early designs moved faster (23 mph versus 17 mph) on land. Also, FMC's early designs in the cargo-carrier had a 7,000 pound capacity versus Borg-Warner's 5,000 pounds for the Model A. Despite Borg-Warner's failure to win design competition over FMC, they contributed a significant feature to future armored amphibian design with their use of the standard M3 light tank turret. This feature was incorporated into the official design of the new armored amphibian designated the LVT(A)(1) (A for armored). In their final form, entering production in April 1943 the LVT(A)(1) and its cargo version, the LVT(2), named "The Water Buffalo", were derived from the same FMC basic design sharing all components except the additional armor, turret, and armament of the LVT(A)(1). The turret on the armored amphibian was power operated and the gun gyro-stabilized to increase accuracy while shooting on the move. A comparison of the performances ofthe LVT(1), LVT(2), and the LVT(A)(1) is instructive:

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  LVT(1) LVT(2) LVT(A)(1)
Length 21'6" 26'1" 26'1"
Width 9'10" 10'8" 10'8"
Height (Overall) 8'2" 8'1" 10'1"
Weight (Unloaded) 18,500 lbs. 24,250 lbs. 30,000 lbs.
Cargo 4,500 lbs. 5,950 lbs. 950 lbs.
Fuel Capacity 50 gallons 110 gallons 104 gallons
Cruising Range
    (land)
    (water)
 
120 miles
50 miles
 
150 miles
50 miles
 
150 miles
50 miles
Armament Provision for 1 Cal. 50 MG
up to 4 Cal. 30 MG
Provision for 1 Cal. 50 MG
up to 4 Cal. 30 MG
1 37mm Gun(turret)
1 Cal. 30 MG (turret)
2 Cal. 30 MG external
Engine 150 HP Hercules Continental W-690-9A, 250 HP Continental W-690-9A, 25 HP
Speeds
    (land)
    (water)
 
12 mph
6-7 mph
 
20 mph
7.5 mph
 
20 mph
7.5 mph
Armor Thickness
    (cab)
    (hull)
    (turret)
    sides, front
    rear
    top
 
none
none
 
---
---
 
1/2"
1/4"
 
---
---
 
1/2"
1/4"
 
1/2"
1/2"
1/4"

Source: Instruction Book for Tracked Landing Vehicles, 1943, pages 12-13.

A further development of the Water Buffalo family of vehicles was the LVT(A)(2). This was an armored version of the cargo carrying, unarmored, LVT(2). The LVT(A)(2) did not have a turret and was the only LVT to carry the (A) designation (for armor) that did not have a turret with a large-caliber gun. Its external appearance was nearly identical to that of the LVT(2) except instead of clear plexiglass windows for driving, the LVT(A)(2) was fitted with an armored hatch that opened to.permit direct viewing or closed to protect the driver. The LVT(A)(2) also was equipped with two rotating periscopes on top of the cab to permit the driver to

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see with the direct-view hatch closed for protection. The armor was one-half inch on the cab and one-quarter inch on the hull adding a total of 2,400 pounds to the unloaded weight of the vehicle and reducing its cargo capacity from 5,950 pounds for the unarmored version to 4,550 pounds for the LVT(A)(2). A further significant refinement in the LVT(A)(2) was the addition of self-sealing gasoline tanks.28 All other performance and characteristics of the LVT(A)(2) remained the same as the LVT(2).

As production commenced on the new family of vehicles, the Secretary of the Navy formed the Continued Board for the Development of the Landing Vehicle Tracked on 30 October 1943. This board was to be the chief agency for supervising the improvement of the growing variety of LVTs, based on the recommendations of the users.

The LVT(A)(1) and the armored cargo carrier, LVT(A)(2), were designed to resist heavy machine gun fire and thus were able to function as troop carrying and assault vehicles in the lead waves of a landing against a defended shore. This capability was cited as vital when in 1941 the Commandant of the Marine Corps recommended construction of armored, heavily armed LVTs to overrun beach defenses. FTP-167 had further endorsed the use of the vehicles in the assault role. The production of the Water Buffaloes in 1943 was therefore a logical continuation of this approach, yet the next major campaign in the Pacific again used the LVT as a logistical vehicle.

The central objective of the Solomons Campaign was the isolation of the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul on New Britain Island, with its numerous airfields and naval bases. Rabaul functioned as the Japanese anchor for their Solomons operations and its destruction or neutralization would undermine Japanese strength in the area and make their position

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Figure 9. The Borg-Warner Model A with its tank turret and 37mm gun in place.
Figure 9. The Borg-Warner Model A with its tank turret and 37mm gun in place.

Figure 10. The Borg-Warner Model A with the tank turret removed, ready to haul cargo.
Figure 10. The Borg-Warner Model A with the tank turret removed, ready to haul cargo.

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Figure 11. The LVT(2) in final form. Notice the
Figure 11. The LVT(2) in final form. Notice the "w" shaped grousers on the track. This shape remained standard throughout the war. Photos from the War Department training manual on the vehicle.

Figure 12. An overhead view of the interior of the cargo compartment 
of the LVT(2). Note the driveshaft splitting the compartment.
Figure 12. An overhead view of the interior of the cargo compartment of the LVT(2). Note the driveshaft splitting the compartment.

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Figure 13. A training manual photograph of the LVT(A)2. This was 
identical to the LVT(2) except that it was constructed of 
heavy metal sheet amounting to armor protection from one-quarter 
to one-half inch thick.
Figure 13. A training manual photograph of the LVT(A)2. This was identical to the LVT(2) except that it was constructed of heavy metal sheet amounting to armor protection from one-quarter to one-half inch thick.

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Figure 14. The LVT(A)(1) in final form. Note the turret is identical to that used on the Borg-Warner Model A.
Figure 14. The LVT(A)(1) in final form. Note the turret is identical to that used on the Borg-Warner Model A.

Figure 15. The LVT(A)1 in rear view. Note the provision for two 
externally mounted caliber .30 machine guns. There are no 
statistics on the casualties suffered by the operators of 
these machine guns, but they were clearly vulnerable in 
comparison to the more fortunate crew housed inside the 
vehicle operating the main gun.
Figure 15. The LVT(A)(1) in rear view. Note the provision for two externally mounted caliber .30 machine guns. There are no statistics on the casualties suffered by the operators of these machine guns, but they were clearly vulnerable in comparison to the more fortunate crew housed inside the vehicle operating the main gun.

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Figure 16. A training manual diagram showing the relationship of the 
power train components. The rear engine mounting required 
a long drive shaft through the middle of the vehicle.
Figure 16. A training manual diagram showing the relationship of the power train components. The rear engine mounting required a long drive shaft through the middle of the vehicle.

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untenable. A direct leap from Guadalcanal was not possible for numerous reasons, but the major consideration was the inability of carrier aviation to furnish sufficient air power. It was necessary to secure intermediate islands along the Solomons chain to provide air bases for land based aircraft of the United States Army Air Corps to augment the air effort against Rabaul. Also, there were sufficient Japanese bases in the Solomons to make the establishment of any supply line up the Solomons a difficult matter without first securing these enemy concentrations. Thus, after the termination of the Guadalcanal Campaign in February 1943 the United States embarked on its "island hopping" strategy up the Solomons chain. First captured were the Russell Islands, followed by a difficult and drawn-out campaign against the Japanese complex In New Georgia, completed on 29 August 1943. The New Georgia campaign used twelve LVTs as artillery prime movers.29 The next move would be into the Northern Solomons to secure a site for an airfield to bring land based bombers and fighters within range: of New Britain. After considerable deliberation, the large island of Bougainville was chosen, and the 3rd Marine Division, new and not yet combat tested, was selected as the landing force.

Considerations affecting the choice of Bougainville had bearing on the planned use of the LVTs. After the difficult struggle to take New Georgia, commanders were reluctant to undertake another head-on fight with the Japanese In the Northern Solomons area, which was closer to Rabaul and with large formations of Japanese stationed on the island of Bougainville Itself. To avoid a direct confrontation, Allied planners utilized the large size of the island, 125 miles long by 30 miles wide, and searched for and found a spot relatively undefended and away from air and land

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forces of the Japanese. This was the Cape Torokina area of Empress Augusta Bay, where intelligence estimated only 300 defenders were present. The landing site was a wet, swampy, run-off area for mountain streams running down from the islands central mountain chains. Thick jungle and bamboo choked this region and the beaches were seldom more than 15 yards wide. This unlikely location was also roughly in the middle of the west coast of the island, and a maximum distance away from the two major airfields and concentrations of Japanese, which were 15,000 in the north and 6,800 in the south.30 The landing was therefore a planned surprise, but there was no intention of capturing the entire island and only enough beachhead would be established to defend the planned airfield to be constructed on Cape Torokina.

This plan dodged a head-on assault against a heavily defended beach and therefore eliminated the requirement for armored LVTs to blast their way onto the beach as part of the leading waves and emphasized LVT logistical capabilities, similar to the Guadalcanal landings. D-Day was set for 1 November 1943.

With the landing site within air attack range from airfields on Bougainville and New Britain, an intensive air campaign was conducted to reduce any Japanese air retaliation to zero. In September, one month prior to the landings, the Japanese air strength was estimated at 154 planes in the Northern Solomons area compared with 476 planes of all types for the Japanese in the overall Bougainville-Rabaul area.31 The air command for the Bougainville [operation] could muster 728 planes of all types and were assisted by the Army Air Force bombers of General Kenney. Air operations during October were intensive with U.S. aircraft in the air almost daily. One Japanese airfield on Bougainville was hit 23 times and resembled a

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Map 3. Landings, Central and Northern Solomons, June 1943 to February 1944.
Map 3. Landings, Central and Northern Solomons, June 1943 to February 1944.

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moonscape after the treatment from Marine, Navy, and Army fliers.32 Rabaul was also hurt by high level bomber attacks during October. The net result of this air campaign was to eliminate Japanese air interference when the landings were executed on 1 November 1943.

The element of surprise was retained and the landing force moved ashore largely without opposition. Only in the area of Purata Island and Cape Torokina was resistance significant due to a troublesome 75 mm antiboat gun and defensive works on the beach. The landing force moved inland and reorganized, opening the beach for logistical activity, even though along the northern beaches many landing craft had been damaged by unexpectedly high surf and were cluttering the beach. The congestion of the northern, beaches caused a decision to switch cargo deliveries to the southern beaches that remained uncluttered from damaged landing craft, and this in turn caused some congestion because the narrow beaches could not accommodate increased dumps and there was no room in the thick jungle to transport supplies inland. Despite this problem, the supplies were moved due to increased emphasis on the unloading process which initially entailed using fully forty per cent of the landing force strength in logistical duties to avoid the congestion and pile-up that occurred at Guadalcanal. Some soldiers were not released back to their parent units for several days. Ammunition and gasoline were dangerously close to each other and to troop areas and a vulnerable build-up of supplies did occur during the early days of the Bougainville landing despite the best efforts of the large working party. Fortunately, the devastating blows dealt to the Japanese air power in the area reduced the size of Japanese air retaliation. There were air attacks during the peak periods of supply congestion on the beach but fighter cover and the anti-aircraft fire of

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Figure 17. The LVT(1) at Bougainville working in its primary role for 
that campaign. Note the requirement to hoist everything 
over the side due to the lack of a loading ramp.
Figure 17. The LVT(1) at Bougainville working in its primary role for that campaign. Note the requirement to hoist everything over the side due to the lack of a loading ramp.

Figure 18. Maintenance in the field took place under difficult 
circumstances. The engine is being removed from the forward vehicle.
Figure 18. Maintenance in the field took place under difficult circumstances. The engine is being removed from the forward vehicle.

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the destroyer screen drove off the attackers. The largest attack occurred at 1:00 P.M. and consisted of 70 Japanese planes. They were driven away with no significant damage to U.S. forces but valuable time was consumed due to the need for evasive tactics by transports that were required to stop unloading and put to sea.33 The congestion was further aggravated by the lack of exits from the beach and non-existent roads. It was under these circumstances that the LVT once again demonstrated Itself as the machine of the hour. According to the official history:

Already these lumbering land-sea vehicles had proven their worth in carrying cargo, ferrying guns, and evacuating wounded men through the marsh lands and the lagoons, and the variations of their capabilities under such extreme circumstances were just beginning to be realized and appreciated.34

A total of 124 LVTs were landed at Bougainville, all being the Roebling designed LVT(1). Twenty-nine landed early with the assault echelons on 0-Day with later increments bringing the 3rd Amtrac Battalion up to its total strength.35 As the perimeter expanded, the LVT was frequently the only vehicle that could carry supplies forward through the knee-deep mud. This continuous strain on the vehicles created a maintenance problem of significant proportions and the largest number of vehicles available at any one time was sixty-four, with the number once dropping to twenty-nine.36 Nevertheless, the official history pays further tribute to the LVTs during the expansion of the perimeter:

Without the 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion, the operation as planned could not have been carried beyond the initial beachhead stages; and it was the work of the LVT companies and the skill of the amtrac operators that made possible the rapid advance of the IMAC forces during the first two weeks.37

After 24 March 1944 sIgnificant Japanese attacks against the perimeter, now reinforced with United States Army units of the 37th Division, ceased and departure of the Marine units commenced with the last Marine units

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departing on 21 June 1944. It had been a protracted campaign, in difficult terrain, against a determined enemy, and it also marked a high point for the reputation of the LVT. The official history states flatly, "Had it not been for the amtracs, the supply problem would have been insurmountable."38 The amtracs hauled 22,992 tons of rations, ammunition, weapons, organizational gear, medical supplies, packs, gasoline, and vehicles, as well as reinforcements and casualties.39 Another quotation from a Marine captain who served on Bougainville summarizes the appreciation felt by the Marine riflemen in the foxholes:

Not once but all through the campaign the amphibian tractor bridged the vital gap between life and death, available rations and gnawing hunger, victory and defeat. They roamed their triumphant way over the beachhead. They ruined roads, tore down communications lines, revealed our combat positions to the enemy--but everywhere they were welcome.40

With such a complete demonstration of its logistical value to its credit, the LVT was next to be called on to lead the assault as well. The new model LVT(A)(1) and the LVT(2)s were coming off the production lines and the LVT(2) would be ready for the next major operation planned for the Central Pacific theater. It was to be a severe test at a place called Tarawa.

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Footnotes

1. Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, Vol. I of History of the United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II (5 vols.; Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1958), p. 236.

2. United States Navy, Fleet Training Publication - 167, Change No. 1 (Washington: U.S. Navy Department, 1941), p. 44.

3. Ibid., p. 56.

4. Food Machinery Corporation, Amphibians (San Jose: Food Machinery Corp., 1942), p. 16.

5. 5Borg-Warner Corporation, Research, Investigation, and Experimentation in the Field of Amphibious Vehicles (Kalamazoo: Ingersoll Kalamazoo Division, 1957), p. 66.

6. Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, pp. 263-264.

7. Ibid., p. 250.

8. Ibid., p. 261.

9. Victor J. Croizat, "The Marine's Amphibian," Marine Corps Gazette, June, 1953, p. 43.

10. 1st Amtrac Battalion, Muster Rolls (In the Field: 1st Amtrac Battalion, 1943).

11. John L. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign (Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1949), p. 45.

12. Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 256.

13. Ibid., p. 269.

14. Ibid., p. 270.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 270.

17. Harold Nutt, "Amphibian Tank Report," (Borg-Warner Memorandum, 1941), p. 1.

18. Ibid., p. 2.

19. United States Army, First Report on Amphibian Tractor (Roebling) (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 1942), p. 1.

20. Food Machinery Corporation, Amphibians, p. 4.

21. Ibid., p. 3.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 5.

24. Ibid.

25. Nutt, "Amphibian Tank Reports," p. 6.

26. Borg-Warner Corporation, "Borg-Warner Amphibian," (Undated Information Brochure), p. 3.

27. Ibid., pp. 1-6.

28. War Department, Instruction Book For Tracked Landing Vehicles (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1943), p. 13.

29. Douglas 1. Kane and Henry I. Shaw, Isolation of Rabaul, Vol. II of History of United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II (5 vols.; Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1958), p. 56.

30. Ibid., pp. 171-176.

31. Ibid., p. 185.

32. Ibid., p. 186.

33. Ibid., p. 217.

34. Ibid., p. 229.

35. Ibid., p. 292.

36. Ibid., pp. 252-253.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 292.

39. Ibid.

40. John Monks, Jr., A Ribbon and A Star (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1945), p. 65.



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