Part IV
Tarawa

The battle for Tarawa would be the first major engagement in the opening of a new American offensive route in the Pacific War, through the Central Pacific. The United States position in the Solomons, which surrounded and contained the key strongpoint of Rabaul, now permitted the opening of the Central Pacific drive, an avenue of approach long-favored In pre-war plans including the Navy's Plan ORANGE. The Japanese had been hurt severely by American air raids against Rabaul and were now unable to mount serious airstrikes against United States offensive moves because Japanese bases in the Solomons, which would have posed a flank threat to American lines of communications in a Central Pacific drive, had been captured for Allied use. Navy thinking favored a Central Pacific route which aimed directly for Japan via capture of the Marshalls and the Marianas Island groups and culminated with the seizure of a major staging base near Japan for the final assault. General MacArthur, Commanding General of the Southwest Pacific Theater, favored a longer route via New Guinea and the Philippines which would provide better security for successive Allied moves due to the greater amount of land available for bases. It would also allow for an early return to the Philippines in fulfillment of his pledge to return, and would provide security for Australia. The debate was resolved during May 1943 at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff In Washington. The Combined Chiefs, the highest

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Map 4. The Gilberts and Marshalls
Map 4. The Gilberts and Marshalls.

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Map 5. Betlo Islet with insert of Tarawa Atoll
Map 5. Betio Islet with insert of Tarawa Atoll.

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military planning council comprised of British and American Chiefs of Staff, favored the Navy's Central Pacific thrust, yet also maintained MacArthur's drive through the New Guinea-Philippines to neutralize the Japanese in that area and provide security for the main drive through the middle Pacific.

The Navy's direct-approach plan was feasible because of the new strength of carrier aviation and the ability of the Navy to support itself at sea with its own army (Marines), air arm, sea force, and mobile service facilities. The Navy was to cut free of the cramped waters of the Solomons and make long-distance leaps between islands through the Central Pacific towards Japan. The increase in speed was promising and the prize was worth seeking. The stage was set for Tarawa.

There was little intelligence available on the main island group, the Marshalls, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff selected the Gilbert Islands as the first objective for the Central Pacific Drive. Capture of the Gilberts would give valuable bases for air reconnaissance of the Marshalls and defenses in the Gilberts appeared weaker than those in the Marshalls.

The Joint Chiefs directive on invasion of the Gilberts was dated 20 July 1943 and an organization for the invasion was established by Admiral Nimitz on 24 August 1943. The Landing Force included the Fifth (V) Marine Amphibious Corps under the command of Major General Holland M. Smith and major ground components were the 2d Marine Division under General Julian C. Smith, and the 27th Army Division commanded by Major General Ralph C. Smith. (None of these Smiths were related.) D-Day was Initially set for 1 November but later moved to 20 November 1943 allowing only two months for the newly established organization to develop plans and organize the teamwork so essential in an amphibious landing.

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The key to the defenses on the Gilberts was the island of Betio in the Tarawa atoll. Here the Japanese had constructed one of the few usable airfields in the Gilberts and had fortified the island. The Island of Makin was selected as the target for the landing of the 27th Army Division due to its weak defenses and its nearness to the Marshalls, while the tougher objective of Betio was given to the 2d Marine Division with its greater amphibious experience.

Planning was based on intelligence information gathered from old charts and aerial photos and little was initially available. The Tarawa Atoll, and the target island of Betio within it, were poorly charted and even Navy Hydrographic Office charts proved unreliable. Interviews were conducted with former residents and aerial and submarine photos were taken. One photo of Betio was particularly valuable because it allowed analysts to estimate the size of the enemy force from shoreline latrines visible in the photo.1 As intelligence accumulated, critical differences from past experiences grew obvious. It became clearer that the island was heavily fortified on the beach, whereas previous landings frequently avoided opposition there. The island of Betio, about the size of New York's Central Park, was three miles long by 1,500 yards wide at Its widest point, and therefore the element of surprise was very difficult to achieve because the defenders would never be far from their positions. On this tiny island there were estimated between 2,500 and 3,100 defenders crammed into bunkers, log emplacements, and foxholes.2 Numerous large caliber guns, anti-aircraft guns, and machine guns were noted in photographs. In contrast to previous landings, Betio in the Tarawa Atoll presented a coral reef with no discernible gaps. Regardless of direction, the reef would have to be crossed in order to land.

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Water depths over the reef became a critical point of intelligence and one difficult to assess with accuracy. Fully loaded landing craft drew four feet of water; the LVT could cross the reef regardless of water depth. Little was known of the tides over the reefs at Betio. Some who had sailed in the area reported freak tides that ebbed and flowed irregularly over the reef and initial estimates of two feet of water were predicted for 20 November 1943. Later discussions with other sailors of the area gave hope for as much as five feet of water over the reef and it was this larger figure that was finally accepted. A former resident of the island, Major F.L.G. Holland, a New Zealander, took strong exception to this optimistic figure but could not disprove the tables prepared by intelligence analysts.3 The strong defense at the beach and the shallow waters of the reef dictated that assault waves of the landing force be embarked in the LVTs to insure an early foothold. This point, however, was hotly disputed between General Holland M. Smith, the landing force commander, and Admiral Kelly Turner, the Amphibious Force Commander, before it was accepted. General Smith finally took a flat stand, "No amtracs, no operations."4 Admiral Turner saw no need for the vehicles due to the accepted five-foot figure for depths of water over the reefs, but nevertheless relented at this point and the vehicles were included in plans.

The Inclusion of LVTs in the operation raised another point of considerable Importance to planners. The 2d Amtrac Battalion was to support the 2d Marine Division, but It had only seventy-five combat-worthy LVT(1)s after much work and preparation in New Zealand.5 More tractors were needed to boat the first three waves, the minimum number of waves considered acceptable for a chance of success by General Smith.6

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Fifty additional LVT(2)s were located and shipped to Samoa, where they were met by a newly formed company of the 2d Amtrac Battalion during October 1943. Unfortunately, the new vehicles were in poor mechanical condition because they were left unattended for four to five months in San Diego. Three of the four weeks available in Samoa prior to embarking for the target area were required for maintenance and combat preparation of the vehicles. Combat preparation of these LVT(2)s included the mounting of a twenty-six inch by forty inch piece of three-eighths inch boiler plate on the front of the cab. Further plating was not possible due to lack of materials. Also, one caliber 50 machine gun and a caliber 30 machine gun were mounted forward and a caliber 30 machine gun mounted aft, to be operated by the embarked troops as they moved towards the beach. Five days of training were conducted after these preparations prior to embarkation of the LVT(2)s on 8 November. One rehearsal was conducted by the Battalion Commander, Major Drewes, on 12 November, on the way to the target area. The new company with its fifty LVT(2)s arrived in the transport area off Betio at 3:30 A.M. on 20 November.7

The LVT(1)s of the 2d Amtrac Battalion underwent a similar preparation in New Zealand prior to embarkation. An additional one-quarter inch of armor plating was mounted on the front and sides of the cab and a 11/2 foot square piece of armor plating was mounted inside the cab to protect the driver. Two caliber 50 machine guns were mounted forward and one caliber 30 was mounted aft. Two large grappling hooks were attached to the rear to pull up defensive wire laid down by the Japanese on the beaches.8 The net effect of these combat modifications was to add weight which would result in a slower water speed of the vehicles. While tests were run to determine the extent of the reduction, the full impacts of

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the slower speeds were not appreciated until the vehicles were on their way against the beaches on D-Day.

Planning for Tarawa utilized some standardized control measures developed from previous campaigns and refinement of amphibious doctrine to organize the movement of landing craft. Amphibious assaults adopted the "Line of Departure" as the start line for the dispatch of waves to the beach. This line was located 6,000 yards from the beach at Tarawa, is marked by an anchored control vessel, and runs parallel to the beach to permit a straight run. The 6,000 yard distance allowed formation of the waves beyond range of small arms and effective machine gun fire, and all unloading, forming, and organization of the assault takes place seaward of this line. The line of departure allows the Naval Commander, through his control vessel, to control the dispatch of landing craft in waves to the beach and thus coordinate their movement with the firing of naval gunfire and air support attacking the beaches. Once dispatched across the line of departure, landing craft proceed in designated boat lanes to the beach. The width of the boat lane is determined by the width of the beach being attacked; a boat lane is normally assigned to each battalion. The number of waves varies with the size of the unit landing. As the leading waves approach the beach, close coordination is important to insure that the ongoing friendly gunfire does not hit the landing forces. At Tarawa this coordination was attempted using a time schedule. The LVTs were scheduled to hit the beach at H-Hour, a term standardized to designate the particular time, to the nearest minute, that the landing force was to touch sand. If the waves of landing craft fell behind schedule or got ahead of schedule, it was necessary to establish a new H-Hour to adjust schedules of fire. Naval gunfire and

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air support schedules were normally expressed in times of H Plus or minus so many minutes. Thus, if the scheduled time of H-Hour was changed, all air support and naval gunfire would shift also. As the leading waves neared the beach, naval gunfire was to shift inland or to the flanks and air support was to make a last minute strafing run over the beach. If time schedules were accurate, all fire support would shift or cease just as the leading waves hit the beach.

Planning called for 42 LVT(1)s in the first wave, each carrying 18 combat-equipped Marines, 24 LVT(2)s in the second wave, each carrying 20 combat-equipped Marines, and 21 LVT(2)s in the third wave. There were therefore a total of 1,656 Marines designated for the first three waves. There were also to be eight empty LVT(1)s following the first wave and five empty LVT(2)s following the third wave to act as reserve vehicles for those that might become disabled on the 6,000 yard run from the line of departure to the beach.9

Differences in ship design necessitated a complex procedure for embarkation of troops into the LVTs. Troop transports were deep draft vessels and were equipped to carry only the LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel), the standard landing boat with bow ramp. LVTs were too heavy to be carried by the lifting arms of the troop transports, so they were carried to the area by LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank) which were seagoing shallow draft vessels with large bow doors and ramps designed to permit beaching. Due to their shallow draft, the LSTs were capable of stationing themselves much closer to the line of departure in the shallow waters. This procedure was desirable because LVTs were slow and long runs to the line of departure invited increased mechanical failures. With the LSTs in the shallow water near the line of departure, and the transports

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Figure 19. The trusty Landing Ship, Tank (LST) beached at Bougainville. This photograph shows the bow doors through which the LVTs entered the water.
Figure 19. The trusty Landing Ship, Tank (LST) beached at Bougainville. This photograph shows the bow doors through which the LVTs entered the water.

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dropping anchor further out to sea in the deeper waters, troops had to climb down cargo nets to the LCVPs of the transports and be carried to the waiting LVTs which had left their LSTs. The troops then entered the LVTs from the small LCVPs in a designated transfer area seaward of the line of departure prior to the tractors forming into waves for crossing the line of departure. This involved procedure took the better part of two hours, but surprise by this time was already lost due to the pounding by ships and aircraft being delivered. The Japanese were well aware of the impending attack before the waves ever reached the line of departure. Minesweepers were to proceed ahead of the waves, clearing the boat lanes and marking the lanes with buoys. They were then to take station at the line of departure. Later waves were to be landed in the LCVPs which drew three feet of water fully loaded. Because the Commanding General of the 2d Marine Division, Major General Julian Smith, viewed chances for enough water as only 50-50, the troops were briefed to be prepared to debark from the LCVPs If they were unable to cross the reef due to insufficient water over the reef.10

Estimates of the enemy were accurate. The Japanese force, commanded by Rear Admiral Keiji Shibasaki, consisted of 1,122 men of the 3rd Special Base Force, and 1,497 men of the elite Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force. In addition, there were 2,217 laborers from construction units. Since many of these were untrained, the Admiral's effective force was about 3,000 men, with twenty coastal defense guns, ranging in size from 80 nun to 8 inch, ten 75 mm howitzers, five light tanks mounted 37 mm guns, and numerous other smaller weapons. Concrete tetrahedron obstacles had been placed to force landing craft into lanes where the smaller coastal defense guns could destroy them. Inland, the command

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posts, communications, and ammunition dumps had been housed in massive concrete bunkers that would withstand even direct hits from large caliber naval guns. Not all the concrete bunkers were integrated into the defense system, many were built simply as shelters and had areas not covered by fire; the Marines were later able to find shelter in these blind spots.11

Against this formidable target the 2d Marine Division was to land with but one regiment, the 2d Marines, with the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines reinforcing, or a total of approximately 6,000 men. The 6th Marine Regiment was retained under Corps control as the reserve, and General Julian Smith retained the other two battalions of the 8th Marines as division reserve. Thus, there was barely a two-to-one numerical advantage to the attacker; normal combat doctrine called for a three-to-one advantage to the attacker in offensive operations. This ratio was barely enough to permit the Marines to carry the beach.

Before the Marines arrived, preliminary bombardment featured the heavy use of 7th Air Force B-24s in addition to carrier aviation of the Navy. The preliminary air strikes began as early as 17 September with carrier aircraft striking targets In the Gilberts including the Tarawa Atoll. B-24s began their strikes on 13 November with 18 bombers against the Tarawa Atoll. This attack pace varied but continued until 19 November combining both the high-level attacks of the B-24s with the lower level work of the carrier aircraft.12 It should be noted at this point, however, that the impressive figures for tonnage of bombs and naval gunfire thrown against Betio did not yield impressive results. The general approach taken was that of area neutralization. While this produced some casualties and did extensive damage to the Japanese communications system

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on the island, it did not destroy many of the concrete fighting structures or kill a significant portion of the dug-in garrison. One of the hard lessons that was to come out of this fight was that preliminary bombardment, particularly by naval gunfire, had to be registered on individual targets and each destroyed in turn to produce a true softening of the beach. The Japanese were building substantial, tough pill boxes and bunkers and only direct hits would knock them out of action. Direct hits are not achieved by area fire but by painstaking one-round-at-time adjustment.

Dawn of D-Day found the LSTs opening their huge bow doors and lowering their ramps into the sea. The LVTs rumbled out and wallowed into the ocean to move to rendezvous points to receive troops. The troops, embarked in assault transports, clambered down large rope nets and entered LCVPs, which were also carried by the assault transport. They were then carried to the waiting amtracs where the transfer was made into the LVTs prior to the run into the beach. Little difficulty was encountered at this stage although the water was turbulent. Some enemy fire was landing in and near the transport area where the transfer operations were taking place, but no interference was experienced and the amtracs formed up in lines and headed for the line of departure, preceded by a guide boat. The LVTs were delayed approximately fifteen minutes to permit last minute shelling of the beach, but then they crossed the line of departure and headed for shore at top speed. There was some initial difficulty with wave formation, but at the half-way point all was in proper formation.13

Due to the late start over the line of departure, H-Hour (the hour that the troops were to hit the beach) at 8:30 A.M. could not be met and was postponed until 8:45 A.M. This was followed by another postponement

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due to the slow progress of the tractors towards the beach caused because the leading wave consisted of slower LVT(1)s which forced the faster LVT(2)s in wave 2 to slow down to keep the 300 yard interval assigned between the waves. H-Hour was finally set at 9:00 A.M. as the tractors neared the beach, but due to the poor communications of the day, not all fire support agencies were aware of this new time. Dust and smoke concealed the progress of the tractors, so the naval gunfire ceased fire at 8:55 A.M. to allow aircraft to make their close-in runs just ahead of the approaching amtracs. The aircraft complied but the amtracs were even behind the new scheduled H-Hour of 9:00 A.M. Most of the first wave hit the beach at 9:10 A.M. with movement during the last ten minutes unsupported by naval gunfire or aircraft.14 At distances between 500 to 800 yards the tractors encountered the reef and climbed over it with no difficulty. Machine gun fire was received from this point into the beach with increasing severity. During the last 200 yards to the beach, eight tractors were put out of action by this type of fire.15 LVT machine guns were operated by the embarked troops and assisted in putting down some of the fire that swelled from the beach as friendly supporting fire diminished and died away prematurely. Four LVTs negotiated the log wall at the beach and moved inland to the middle of the island before discharging their Marines. Offloaded LVTs backed off the beach to take advantage of their frontal armor, and most returned out to sea to attempt to pick up troops from the later waves embarked in LCVPs. There was not enough water over the reef to float the LCVPs, only a few inches in some places, and these troops were forced to wade ashore, exposed from the waist up to withering cross-fire, unless they were fortunate enough to be collected by the returning LVTs. On the first return trip to the

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Figure 20. A view of the beach after D-Day. The horrible aftermath is evident and this and other Marine Corps photographs shocked America. The attrition among the LVTs is clear.

Figure 21. Another grim view of the beach at Tarawa. LVT number 
twenty-sevenmay be the mine casualty mentioned in 2d 
Amtrac Battalion Special Action Reports. The pier, which 
figured in the action during D-Day and after is in the background.
Figure 21. Another grim view of the beach at Tarawa. LVT number twenty-seven may be the mine casualty mentioned in 2d Amtrac Battalion Special Action Reports. The pier, which figured in the action during D-Day and after is in the background.

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edge of the reef, about fifteen tractors sank in deep water due to the many holes in their hulls from machine gun and rifle fire.16 The tractors had power driven bilge pumps, but these were not enough to handle the flood of water coming into the hulls and the later common practice of carrying wooden plugs to drive into bullet holes had not been adopted. Major Henry J. Drewes, the Battalion Commander, was killed by anti-boat fire in an LVT(2) about 9:30 A.M. on D-Day and Captain Henry G. Lawrence assumed command for the remainder of the operation. LVTs returning to the beach after landing the initial waves used a route covered from fire along a pier jutting out into the reef. This single route was used by the LVTs to return troops from the boats at the edge of the reef to the beach. There were never enough LVTs, however, to handle all the troops and most had to wade to shore, over 500 to 800 yards of fire swept, blood stained water. Casualties among this group were grim with companies sustaining thirty-five to seventy per cent losses just to reach the beach.17 It was only through the outstanding combat leadership and initiative of young officers and NCOs that Marines reached the shore at all. In such a terrifying atmosphere, one man retreating to the rear would have started a stampede; none did. The amtrac's mechanical cousin, the tank, did not fare well. Only seven tanks out of fourteen landed on D-Day managed to cross the reef and gain the beach. All others suffered from drowned engines when they sank into deep potholes.18 Once the tanks went into battle, they gave good service, although most were disabled by the end of D-Day. General Julian Smith committed his division's reserves and asked for permission to commit the Corps reserve before D-Day had ended. This permission was granted but the 6th Marines were not landed until the next day when the situation clarified and General Julian Smith

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was able to piece together the positions of his units and their situations. After the Initial movement of troops to the beaches, LVTs immediately assumed logistical roles by bringing supplies in from boats at the edge of the reef and evacuating casualties out to boats at the reef, or in some cases, directly to ships at sea. For the most part, however, the dwindling number of LVTs were badly needed to carry supplies across the reef as only the LVTs and very small boats were able to move in the shallow water. Much of this activity was done at night due to heavy enemy fire during the day. LVTs pulled sleds, rubber boats with cargo, trucks, and caterpiller tractors across the reefs. Many other tasks were assigned by the Division's Shore Party organization which had the responsibility of moving the incoming supplies across the beach into dumps, and moving supplies inland to the troops.

After the main landings against Betio's lagoon side, heavy congestion developed on the narrow beaches because troops were unable to penetrate far inland. As night fell on the first day, some assault companies had lost more than half their men to effect a penetration of only 300 yards. The night was surprisingly quiet and the fire discipline of the Marines was good considering this was the first combat for many. The following day reserves landed from LCVPs and took severe casualties as they waded towards shore. They were badly needed because many rifle companies were now down to fifty to seventy-five men from their normal strength of 235.19 Gradually, despite the losses, combat power of the Marine units grew as machine guns were put back into action that had been lost during the fury of the landing and tanks were repaired that had been damaged during D-Day. LVTs continued to perform logistic runs and aided in evacuation of the wounded. Progress continued to be slow as all battalions

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forged straight ahead; by nightfall positions were as far as 750 yards Inland across the 1,500 yard width of the island. The fighting was marked by small groups of Marines, together with engineers with blocks of TNT, attacking the heavy fortifications. The Engineer would tie the blocks of TNT together and throw this makeshift charge through the gun ports of the pill boxes. After the explosion, a flame-thrower man would direct a stream of flaming fuel through the gun port and riflemen would then mop up any remaining resistance. Gains were a yard or two at a time.20 During the third night the Japanese conducted three night attacks which resulted in heavy casualties to them and thus speeded American victory. The biggest was at about 4:00 A.M. in the morning of 23 November, and consisted of about 300 Japanese. Dawn revealed the bodies of 200 Japanese 50 yards in front of Marine positions. The last day's fighting secured the last of the island around 1:00 P.M.21

Additional mop up was required and conducted by a contingent of troops and LVTs left behind to garrison the island. For the landing force of Marines, It was the bloodiest fight in the history of the Corps with total casualties of 3,149.22 This amounted to 12 per cent of the overall force but a much higher percentage with respect to the fighting troops. The 2d Amtrac Battalion was no exception to this trend. For the assault on Tarawa they were shock troops rather than logistics personnel and their casualties were high. Out of 500 personnel of the battalion, 323 were killed, wounded, or missing.23 The high casualties shocked America, but out of this cauldron came the lessons that were to be the final refinement of amphibious doctrine and they were to be used throughout the remainder of the war.

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The assault on Tarawa was the first assault against a defended coral atoll. Coral atolls were to be the most frequent type of island that the Marines would face until late in the war and the techniques used to take such an island were tested at Tarawa. The most important tactical lesson of the operation was the new role of the LVT as an assault vehicle.24 General Holland M. Smith, the overall commander and the future commander of the landings at Saipan and Iwo Jima, felt that the vehicles had stood the test and stated:

After Tarawa, I made up my mind that all future landings would be spearheaded by amphibious vehicle, either the open-decked amtrac, of which a new improved model was already being made available, or amphibian tanks, carrying heavier guns, which were in production.25

The official Fifth Amphibious Corps recommendation was for an increase from one to two battalions of cargo amtracs supporting a division In future landings and it also recommended the additional support of a battalion of armored amphibians, the LVT(A)(1), which was becoming available.26

The most graphic illustration of the value of the LVT in an assault across a shallow reef is the study of the casualty pattern at Betio. There, the first three waves were in amtracs and their casualties were described as light on reaching the beach. The heaviest casualties, between thirty-five and seventy per cent in some companies, were suffered by the men that had to wade in to the beach from the edge of the reef when their LCVPs could not navigate the shallow water.27 Water depth varied from a few inches to three feet and most landing craft were unable to move across. Although the amtracs attempted to return to save troops wading across the reef, the number of LVTs rapidly began to dwindle and there were never enough to lift even a small portion of the succeeding waves.

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Because of the high mortality of amtrac vehicles, the need was highlighted to embark as many waves as possible in amtracs at the outset, because their later capability to return from the beach for later waves could not be predicted. At Tarawa, the attrition among the vehicles was particularly high among the old LVT(1)s that had outlived their usefulness even before going ashore at Tarawa. General Holland Smith noted in his book that the average mechanical life of the LVT was 200 hours and some used at Tarawa had been run 400 hours before the landing.28 At the end of the operation at Tarawa (that is after the first three days when the island was declared secured) there were only nineteen LVT(1)s functioning out of seventy-five, and only sixteen LVT(2)s out of the original fifty. An examination of the losses shows that only four LVT(1)s were disabled from mechanical failure, while the remaining fifty-two LVT(1)s were lost as a direct result of enemy fire by sinking, burning, or in one case, hitting a mine. This same picture applies to the newer LVT(2)s with only four out of action from mechanical failures while the remaining thirty vehicles were lost as a direct result of gunfire causing them to sink at sea, explode from igniting fuel tanks, or in the case of one, hitting a mine. The Battalion Commander, Captain Lawrence, stated in his recommendations a future need for 300 tractors to support a Marine Division with a replenishment rate of seventy-five per cent for the LVT(1)s and about thirty per cent for the LVT(2).29 With respect to this critical need for sufficient LVTs in a reef assault, the outstanding analysis of Professors Isely and Crowl pinpoints the basic problem: "The critical failure at Tarawa was the lack of momentum in the assault. . . . Blame, if there be any, should rest on the lack of amphibian tractors. . . ."30

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Fire support from the cargo carrying LVT(1)s and (2)s as they closed on the beach consisted of embarked troops firing the machine guns mounted on the tractors. Approximately 10,000 rounds were fired by the eighty-four machine guns mounted forward on the forty-two assault tractors, or an average of about 100 rounds per machine gun. Since preparation fire lifted prematurely at Tarawa by some ten minutes, it was these machine guns that provided the only close-in suppressive fire for the assault waves.31 The mounting of machine guns was to continue on cargo LVTs, although the mission of providing firepower in the leading waves was to shift to the LVT(A)(1)s then just leaving production lines. The Battalion Commander recommended the forward mounting of two caliber 30 machine guns instead of the use of a caliber 50 and a caliber 30 to simplify ammunition requirements and allow more rounds to be available--caliber 50 ammunition is bulky, and many felt the gun was unreliable.32

The vehicle losses at Tarawa also caused recommendations by the Battalion Commander for additional armor on the front of the cab, bow, belly, and sides. Such additional armor was incorporated in the new LVT(A)(2) and was applied to later models of LVTs in the form of portable armor that could be attached to conduct an assault landing then detached to allow the vehicle to carry more cargo in the later stages of the operation when the beach was not under fire and cargo capacity, rather than armor protection, was the capability most needed. Along with armor protection, a recommendation was made for future models to use periscopes rather than direct vision through an opening which endangered the driver.33 For many models of the later LVTs, this type of vision was incorporated.

Many LVTs were lost as a result of fire from igniting fuel tanks pierced by enemy bullets. The two main fuel tanks in both the LVT(1) and

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(2) were located in the rear, one on each side of the engine. These areas were not armor protected and the tanks were steel with no self-sealing capability. Their vulnerability proved to be costly at Tarawa. Later models incorporated Goodrich self-sealing tanks for a higher measure of protection.34

man overall review of Tarawa, differences from previous Marine campaigns are numerous. The emphasis completely shifted from the earlier use of LVTs in logistics to application in the main assault, with the surviving vehicles then employed for logistical missions. The critical need for the LVT in assaults across the reefs of the Central Pacific was emphasized at Tarawa by the high casualties suffered by the men wading ashore from landing craft unable to cross the reef. Although the LVTs at Tarawa were depleted heavily by enemy action, the models in production would provide the design improvements in armor, armament, and durability to make the LVT more survivable and reliable. Success hung in the balance at Tarawa during the first hours using eighty-four LVTs in the assault waves. Without any LVTs at all, the assault on Tarawa would have failed, and it is this fact that was apparent to General Holland M. Smith when he had insisted that unless LVTs were used, there would be no assault at all. As he stated flatly in his book, ". . . for impassable reefs the solution was the amphibious vehicle."35

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Footnotes

1. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, Vol. III of History of the United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II 5 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1966), p. 29.

2. Ibid., p. 30.

3. Ibid., p. 31.

4. Holland M. Smith, Coral and Brass (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 120.

5. 2d Amtrac Battalion, Special Action Report (In the field: 2d Amtrac Battalion, 1943), p. 2.

6. Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 120.

7. 2d Amtrac Battalion, Special Action Report, p. 1.

8. Ibid., p. 2.

9. Ibid., p. 3.

10. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 31.

11. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 48.

12. 2d Amtrac Battalion, Special Action Report, p. 3.

13. Ibid.

14. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, pp. 58-59.

15. 2d Amtrac Battalion, Special Action Report, p. 4.

16. Ibid.

17. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, pp. 59-62.

18. Ibid., pp. 59-62.

19. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

20. Ibid., p. 74.

21. Ibid., p. 89.

22. Ibid., p. 636.

23. Ibid., p. 108.

24. Ibid.

25. Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 133.

26. Shaw, Kane, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 109.

27. Ibid., p. 60.

28. Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 133.

29. 2d Amtrac Battalion, Report of Galvanic Operations (In the field: 2d Amtrac Battalion, 1943), pp. 1-4.

30. Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The United States Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 233.

31. 2d Amtrac Battalion, Special Action Report, p. 8.

32. Ibid., p. 6.

33. Ibid., p. 6.

34. United States War Department, TM 9-775, landing Vehicle Tracked, MK I and MK II (Washington: United States War Department, 1944), p. 170.

35. Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 134.



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