Part V
The Marshalls: The Full Range of Use

The capture of the Gilberts accomplished the seizure of airfields which permitted long-range air reconnaissance against the Marshalls. Three airfields were in operation immediately after the capture of the Gilberts and aerial photos provided badly needed intelligence for staffs who had started planning the conquest of the Marshalls even before the capture of Tarawa. The Marshalls were mandated to Japan after the defeat of Germany in World War I and represented the first penetration of the inner defenses of Japan in the Pacific. The attack of these islands was expected to be as difficult as that of Tarawa, but the lessons of Betio were available and it was assumed the same mistakes were not to be repeated.

The Marshall Islands occupy a vast stretch of ocean and include the worlds largest coral atoll, Kwajalein, which encloses 655 square miles in its lagoon. This group of islands also contained a larger number of major Japanese bases than had been faced in the Gilbert attack. To prevent the Japanese from concentrating against a single United States operation from their bases in the Marshalls which included Mule, Maloelap, Wotje, Jaluit, and Eniwetok Atolls--many of which had airfields, plans were developed calling for simultaneous landings at Kwajalein and Majuro atolls. The Majuro Atoll was selected as a target due to its light defenses and the excellent anchorage it would afford the fleet for later

--102--

Map 6. Marshall Islands
Map 6. Marshall Islands.

--103--

staging against the Marianas. Kwajelein Atoll would also be a future fleet anchorage and contained principal airfields at the islands of Roi-Namur and Kwajalein. The other major bases in the Marshalls were to be neutralized by heavy air raids prior to and during the landing operations.1

The Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the 4th Marine Division, in training in the United States at Camp Pendleton, California, the experienced 7th Infantry, which had landed in the Aleutians, and the 22d Marine Regiment, then on duty in Samoa, as the landing forces for the Marshalls Campaign under overall command of Major General Holland M. Smith, USMC. Another reinforced regiment, the 106th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was added from the 27th Infantry Division as the final plans for the assault on the Marshalls took shape. The Joint Chiefs exerted pressure to strike at the earliest moment and after several delays to allow more training and ship repair, fixed 31 January 1944 as the latest that the operation could be executed. This early date put considerable pressure on the green 4th Marine Division, still in the San Diego area, to complete its training, rehearsals, and organization in time to embark and sail for a rendezvous at the Marshalls. Division exercises were held on 14-15 December and 2-3 January 1944 with the last virtually a rehearsal because this landing included the actual Naval transports which were to carry them to the target area.2 The Naval group was green as the 4th Division and this combination of inexperienced forces would produce unfortunate results later. The 4th DivisIon departed between 6-13 January 1944 without ever having incorporated the final operation orders into their training or rehearsals.3 The 7th Division, by contrast, was stationed in the Hawaiian Islands during the planning phase of the

--104--

Marshalls and was able to review and utilize the final operation plans in their training and final rehearsals between 12 and 17 January 1944. The 22d Marines was shipped to the Hawaiian Islands for training and joined the 7th Division in final landings.

The inexperienced 4th Marine Division was assigned to capture the islands of Roi-Namur and adjacent small islets, while the 7th Infantry Division was assigned the island of Kwajalein and its surrounding small Islands. The Majuro Atoll was to be secured by the Fifth (V) Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company since little or no opposition was expected.

Intelligence showed that Roi-Namur was the headquarters of the 24th Air Flotilla which controlled air operations in the Marshalls and was commanded by Vice Admiral Michiyuki Yamada. The garrison was composed of 1,500 to 2,000 aviation mechanics, ground personnel, and pilots. The only trained ground combat troops were 300 to 600 members of the 61st Guard Force and about 1,000 laborers. Kwajalein totaled about 1,750 men from various sources including 1,000 soldiers from the Army's 1st Amphibious Brigade. 500 men from the Navy's 61st Guard Force, and 250 men from the 4th Special Naval Landing Force. To avoid a repetition of Tarawa, great pains were taken to determine the accurate hydrographic characteristics of the target islands and Underwater Demolition Teams, highly skilled Navy swimmers trained to reconnoiter beaches and destroy underwater obstacles to amphibious landings, were employed for the first time with excellent results. All islands were completely surrounded by coral reefs, as had been the case at Tarawa. The strongest enemy defenses were oriented towards the sea, so United States landings were to be executed from within the lagoon.4

The defenses of Roi-Namur included ten pillboxes scattered over the

--105--

Intended landing beaches of the 4th Division housing 7.7 mm machine guns, Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion. These units contained almost 350 tractors including LVT(2)s of the cargo type and LVT(A)(1)s of the armored amphibian type.

Training conducted prior to departure for the Marshalls had not completely prepared the crews for the coming operation. The root cause appears to be the rapid build-up in amphibian tractor battalions after the Tarawa landing which emphasized the utility of the LVT in attacking across coral reefs. The 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, prior to taking delivery of its new LVT(A)(1)s, had furnished one officer and fifty men to pilot LVT(2)s for the 2d Marine Division at Tarawa. This experienced cadre became the core for that battalions expansion to four companies, but the 4th Marine Division's 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion was split on 5 December 1943 to form the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion composed of B and C Companies, and both battalions were diluted with recruits to bring them up to strength. This dilution was continued when yet another reinforcing tractor unit, Company A of the 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, was formed. In addition to the serious effects of the overall lack of experienced personnel caused by the expansion, about thirty percent of the officers had never had duty with troops. Less than thirty days were available for training the newly formed battalions, but the time was also needed for embarkation and a myriad of other activities required to form and then move a heavy equipment battalion such as an LVT battalion. A partial list of the activities of the newly formed 10th Amtrac Battalion prior to departure from Camp Pendleton serves as an illustration:

  1. Constructing a temporary camp during rainy weather.

  2. RequIsition and moving battalion supplies, followed crating for

--106--

    embarkation aboard ship--this totaled eighty tons of equipment not counting the LVTs.

  1. Assimilating and training new troops.

  2. Collaborating with infantry unit leaders during planning--which consumed much of the officer's time and was aggravated by changes in plans.

  3. Training of naval boat officers in guiding LVTs to the beach.

  4. Armoring both the 4th and the 10th Battalion's LVTs--a task performed by the 10th Amtrac Battalion.8

The net result was to produce an undertrained LVT organization for an operation that was tactically more complex than any previous landings attempted in the Central Pacific.

The detail plans for the capture of the Roi-Namur islands required preliminary landings from the seaward side of the islands of Mellu and Ennuebing to the southwest of Roi-Namur to secure the northern pass into the lagoon. The landing force was then to move inside the lagoon for Ennugarret Island was to be seized by crossing from Ennumennet Island. These islands were to be used for artillery positiOns for the next day's assault. The LVTs were brought into the area by LSTs which were to be stationed about 3,000 yards off the target islands. The landing troops would be brought over to the LSTs from transports in LCVPs, then climb the cargo nets up the side of the LSTs and move down inside where they would board the tractors. This was a complex plan but was an improvement over the procedure used at Tarawa involving the tricky business of transferring troops between the LVT and a bouncing small boat in the open sea. At the line of departure, General Schmidt, commander of the 4th Marine Division, planned to organize his waves with new techniques for a powerful

--107--

Map 7. Kwajalein Atoll
Map 7. Kwajalein Atoll.

--108--

neutralization of the beach just ahead of the leading waves of LVT(1)s. Landing Craft, Infantry (LCI), a small craft used to land infantry directly on beaches from gangways, was modified to mount caliber .50 machine guns, 40 mm and 20 mm guns, and 4.5 inch rockets. These gunboats would lead the way until about 1,000 yards off the beach, where they were to halt, fire their rockets, and then continue to support the landing with their automatic weapons by moving to the flank of the boat lanes. The LVT(A)(1)s were to pass through the LCIs and open fire with their 37 mm cannon and three caliber .30 machine guns. They would continue this surppressing fire right up to the beach. The troop carrying LVT(2)s were to pass through the LVT(A)(1)s and move to the beach before the defenders could recover. LVT(A)(1)s were to cease fire as their fires became too dangerous to the friendly troops. They were then to continue to support the landing by firing from the flanks of the boat lane or by leading the troops inland in the role of tanks.9

Supporting arms coordination had improved as a result of a valuable lesson from Tarawa, both naval gunfire and close air support would key on the position of the landing craft as they approached the beach rather than attempt to adhere to a fixed time schedule as at Tarawa. This flexibility was to be a key factor in the success of the operation when the LVTs fell behind schedule.

Preliminary softening operations against the Marshalls had commenced in November with air strikes from carriers in the area, with the heaviest tonnages dropped after the airfields were completed in the Gilberts. Land based aircraft was used extensively for neutralization of the Marshalls until 29 January 1944 when carrier aviation returned to the Marshalls in support of the landings. Aerial bombing was longer and more

--109--

Figure 22. The Landing Craft Infantry (LCI), modified as a gunboat, 
was capable of launching hundreds of 4.5-inch rockets and 
later also mounted mortars.
Figure 22. The Landing Craft Infantry (LCI), modified as a gunboat, was capable of launching hundreds of 4.5-inch rockets and later also mounted mortars.

--110--

Map 8. D-Day landings prior to Roi-Namur
Map 8. D-Day landings prior to Roi-Namur.

--111--

intense than at Tarawa and specific targets identified through photos were attacked rather than dropping bombs on "area" targets.10 Surface ship bombardment of the outlying islands began on D-Oay, 31 January 1944, during the early morning hours. Bombardment also started at this time against the islands of Roi-Namur in preparation for the landing on the morning of February 1.

The first landings against Mellu and Ennuebing Islands were scheduled at 9:00 A.M. with the first battalion of the 25th Marine Regiment scheduled as the landing force. The landings on D-Day were to be supported by the 10th Amtrac Battalion and Company A, 11th Amtrac Battalion. The 4th Amtrac Battalion was withheld entirely to ensure that there would be enough tractors to land the 24th Marine Regiment on Roi Island the next day.11 Fire support for the 0-Day landings was also provided by a provisional platoon from the 1st Armored Amtrac Battalion. Company B, 10th Amtrac Battalion, was to carry troops into beaches on Mellu and Ennuebing islands using fifty tractors organized into four platoons. Each platoon had twelve tractors except the 4th, which had ten. Company headquarters used four tractors. Within the 1st Platoon of Company B, six specially modified tractors were included which mounted rocket launchers for added fire support.12

Problems arose almost from the beginning for the landings at Mellu and Ennuebing. Due to the inexperience of both the Marines and Naval personnel, few were present who knew anything about debarkation of LVTs within the LSTs. The elevators which lowered the LVTs from the upper "weather" deck to the lower deck, sometimes called the tank deck, were too small. To position an LVT on the elevator successfully, it had to be driven up a makeshift ramp at an extreme angle which caused wear on the

--112--

clutch and required skill from the driver, often not available.13 Despite this, the tractors were eventually unloaded, but problems did not stop. Once debarked, the tractors were to proceed to transfer areas to receive troops from LCVPs. This is a repeat of the Tarawa procedure, which was used only during the first two landings. (Subsequent landings the following day within the lagoon would bring troops to the LSTs to load aboard the LVTs.) The tractors entered rough seas whipped by winds up to twenty miles per hour, seasonal for the Marshalls at that time of year, which slowed not only their progress to the transfer areas but the progress of the troops in their LCVPs also. Radios became soaked and inoperative so that last-minute changes in the detailed landing plans were received by the tractor company informally from the troops boarding the tractors.

The line of departure was marked by the anchored destroyer Phelps which acted as the control vessel for the landings. The Control Officer aboard the Phelps could see that the original H-Hour of 9:00 A.M would not be met and signaled first a fifteen-minute and then a few minutes later an estimated twenty-minute delay before the troops would hit the beaches. General Schmidt and Admiral Conolly, the Naval Commander, both aboard the task force flagship, realized that a delay was required and at 9:03 A.M. signaled for a new H-Hour of 9:30 A.M.14 As this was being done, the Phelps gave the signal for the waves to cross the line of departure to allow the troops to start the run to the beach to arrive at the new H-Hour of 9:30 A.M. The waves were not organized and, as one LVT platoon commander described it, amounted to ". . . three waves jockeying around as one headed for Jacob Island (code name for Ennuebing Island)."15 The waves were preceded by the LCI gunboats and the armored

--113--

amphibians.

Thanks to the lessons of Tarawa, fire support schedules were adjusted to the position of the waves as they approached the beach. Aerial observers radioed the progress of the waves and naval gunfire and air support, informed of the delay, extended their coverages of Mellu and Ennuebing islands.

The LCIs released their rocket payload with the unholy roar that 4.5 Inch rockets emit when fired and moved to the outside of the boat lanes for further support. The LVT(A)(1)s passed through the gunboats firing their 37 mm cannon on the move. The rocket-loaded LVT(2)s were unable to fire their rockets because assault troops, who were to assist in firing the rockets, were not qualified and the launching racks, burdened with the weight of the rockets, were almost all torn from their mountings as the tractors hit the rough coral reef.16 The LVT(A)(1)s continued to lead until about 200 yards from the beach where they sheered off and lay to the outside of the line of the advancing troop tractors. Fire coordination at this point was tricky since it is desirable to keep cannon fire on the beach up to the last minute. One troop tractor sustained minor damage when it was riddled by an LVT(A)(1) that continued to fire just a little too long.17 The troop carrying tractors hit the beach at Ennuebing and Mellu at 9:52 A.M. and 10:15 A.M. respectively, meeting little opposition, and both islands were secured after about one hour's fighting. A total of thirty enemy dead was counted between the two islands.18 Artillery landed immediately following the seizure of the islands, carried by the tractors of Company A, 11th Amtrac Battalion. Tractors which had carried the first waves reorganized and assisted in further transport of troops and supplies to Mellu and Ennuebing.

--114--

The scene of action shifted rapidly to inside the lagoon for landings against the islands of Obella, Ennubirr, and Ennumennet islands, all of which were to be secured by the end of D-Day for artillery positions to support the main landings the following day. The Second and Third Battalions of the 25th Marines were scheduled as the landing force, although only the 2nd Battalion was to be carried by LVTs of Company C, 10th Amtrac Battalion, still aboard the LSTs. There were not enough LVTs to boat units at Obella and Ennumennet and these landings were conducted with LCVPs. Tractors were discharged from their LSTs west of Mellu Island and waited for Mellu and Ennuebing to be secured. These LVTs then received troops from LCVPs and moved through the passage south of Ennuebing to the line of departure for Ennubirr Island. Some loss of control occurred as Company C's radio malfunctioned when soaked by the spray from the sea's heavy swells. The primary control vessel, the destroyer Phelps, due to a Navy decision, reverted to fire support and thus left control to a secondary control vessel equipped with the plans and radios for the job. However, this vessel was not aware of the change in plans and failed to assume control, leaving the Assistant Division Commander, General Underhill, embarked in a small sub-chaser, holding the proverbial bag. The first he knew of the situation was when the Phelps swung by and announced by bull horn, "Am going to support minesweepers. Take Over!"19 By aggressive action and with the aid of the Naval Boat Control Officers and personnel of the infantry battalions making the landings, control was restored. The loss of control caused a delay in the planned hour for landing from 11:30 A.M. to 2:30 P.M. This also could not be met and a further delay to 3:00 P.M. was authorized by Admiral Conolly. The Phelps, free of her duties as fire support for the

--115--

minesweepers, returned to her duties as control ship and took station on the new line of departure for the afternoon assaults. During the time that was consumed in gaining control of the situation and forming waves, additional LVTs were procured for the transport of 11/2 waves of the Third Battalion (500 men) against Ennumennet Island.20 The waves finally crossed the line of departure about 2:32 P.M., led by LCI gunboats and armored amtracs of Company D, 1st Armored Amtrac Battalion. During the delay, bombardment by both air and naval gunfire was prolonged and coordinated to coincide with the progress of the LVTs. At 2:46 P.M. the LCI's released their deadly cargo of rockets against both islands and the LVT(A)(1)s pushed through, firing their cannons on the move. Three minutes later the fire support ships, Haraden and Porterfield, augmented by the Phelps, lifted fire to allow final strafing by aircraft as the LVTs neared the beach. Three hundred yards offshore, the armored amphibians parted, and the troop carrying tractors passed through to the beach, landing between 3:12 P.M. and 3:15 P.M. Both islands were secured rapidly by the two attacking battalions (1000 men) with 24 Japanese defenders killed on Ennubirr Island and ten defenders killed on Ennumennet.21

Company A, 11th Amtrac Battalion immediately commenced landing the 75 mm pack howitzers of the 14th Marines and first elements finally reached Ennubirr at about 6:00 P.M.22 This phase of the operation was difficult because the long trip through the Ennuebing pass and across the lagoon severely depleted the gasoline remaining in the tractors, thus restricting the amount of ammunition the tractors could haul to the various artillery sites and causing a net ammunition shortage. Arrangements had been made to station refuel ("bowser") boats near the landing beaches of Ennubirr and Ennumennet islands, but none materialized so tractors of this

--116--

unit were forced to spend the night on the islands for lack of fuel.

At this point an error in coordination occurred when plans were changed to include an assault against Ennugarret Island, immediately north of Ennumennet. This island is closest to Namur and would be a valuable artillery and direct fire weapons site for later support of the main landings. Plans changed shortly before D-Day called for a landing at 4:00 P.M. but the late seizure of Ennumennet made this time impossible. A hurried conference was held between the 25th Marines regimental commander, Colonel Samuel Cummings, and Lieutenant Colonel Justice Chambers, the battalion commander of 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines, which had just taken Ennumennet. Colonel Chambers' amtracs were ordered elsewhere after taking Ennumennet except the two which carried his headquarters section because the 10th Amtrac Battalion, which was controlling amtrac allocation, did. not receive the late change in plans.23 The tractors had been reassigned to search for fuel since the Navy bowser boats which were to be stationed near the beaches of Ennumennet Island for refuel could not be located. Daylight was waning, but fortunately two more LVTs were procured while operating on an artillery mission. Colonel Chambers jammed 120 officers and men into and on top of the four amtracs and formed a tiny first wave to attack Ennugarret Island. He waited until 6:00 P.M., the most favorable tide, and launched them after a preliminary bombardment of mortars and 75 mm guns firing from half-track cars positioned on Ennumennet Island. Additional personnel were brought by these same four amtracs in a shuttle.24 The first wave usage represents one of the heaviest personnel overloads (normal load is 20-25 Marines per amtrac) ever attempted for an assault landing. Fortunately, resistance was light, and the island was secured rapidly.

--117--

Figure 23. The Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP). This craft, 
derived from boats designed for trappers and oil drillers 
of the lower Mississippi by Andrew Higgins, was the standard 
landing craft of all theaters of World War II and remains 
little changed to this day.
Figure 23. The Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP). This craft, derived from boats designed for trappers and oil drillers of the lower Mississippi by Andrew Higgins, was the standard landing craft of all theaters of World War II and remains little changed to this day.

--118--

Ennugarret Island was secured about 7:15 P.M. and completed the tasks of the 4th Marine Division on D-Day, 31 January. At the end of the day, however, the dispersed operations of the 10th Amtrac Battalion and Company A of the 11th Amtracs had scattered the LVTs over a wide area. This was anticipated to some extent and plans called for reorganization of Company B at Ennuebing Island and Company C on Mellu during the late evening.25 Company A, 11th Amtracs, partly because of lack of fuel and partly due to orders from the Navy Beachmaster (the Navy component of Marine Corps' Shore Party) also spent most of the night on Ennuebing Island.26 Orders for the next day required the 10th Amtrac Battalion to lift the 24th Marine Regiment against Namur Island. To accomplish this, original plans called for the LVTs to reboard their "mother" LSTs for refueling, greasing, and crew rest. Plans called for the LSTs to mark themselves with distinguishing light patterns so that tractors returning to them during hours of darkness could find their way. This was not done for unexplained reasons. It appears, however, that the inexperienced crews of the LSTs feared Japanese fire if they displayed lights and failed to appreciate the total loss of direction that can overcome individuals during night operations. The result of this failure was to cause numerous tractors to lose their way in vain attempts to locate their LSTs while darkness closed on Kwajalein Atoll. As they wandered about, some sought shelter on nearby islands including Ennumennet Island and ten were lost by sinking when they ran out of gas at sea.27 [The LVT(2) was equipped with a bilge pump dependent on the main engine for power and when the vehicles ran out of gas, the bilge pumps ceased to function and the tractors filled with water from the many holes caused by scraping over coral during the day's landings.] The number lost is approximate because seven tractors

--119--

were listed as "probably sunk" at the end of the operation although their fate was not specifically known.28 Directly related to this disastrous evolution was the reluctance of LST captains to take LVTs aboard which did not belong to them because gasoline was limited and skippers feared they would exhaust their supplies before their assigned LVTs appeared. The relationship between the LVT crews and the ship's crews of the various LSTs also was not the best. Inexperience on both sides caused a build-up of tensions due to the Navy crews lacking indoctrination in the basic reason for their existence to transport troops, and the Marines failing in some of their essential housekeeping chores.29 Thus when Marines were in difficulty during the night of 31 January-1 February, there was less than full motivation on the part of the Navy to assist them.

As dawn approached on 1 February, the situation facing the 10th Amtrac Battalion was poor with respect to its mission for the day--lifting the 24th Marines against Namur Island with an assigned H-Hour of 10:00 A.M. Only a portion of its tractors had returned to their parent LSTs for refueling and maintenance with the remainder low on fuel and scattered between Mellu, Ennuebing, and Ennumennet islands. Communications remained poor because radios once soaked dried slowly, if at all. LSTs were ordered to discharge LVTs inside the lagoon to lessen the distance the tractors would have to travel to the line of departure, and troops were to be brought to the LSTs for transfer to the amphibians rather than the difficult transfer between the small LCVPs and the tractors. The movement of the LSTs into the lagoon created the first increment of delay since many had wandered as far as forty miles away from the atoll during the night's operations and took too much time to return to meet H-Hour.30

--120--

Further delay was required in order to procure sufficient tractors to carry the 24th Marines. Major Victor J. Croizat, Battalion Commander of the 10th Amtrac Battalion, notified Admiral Conolly during the early morning hours of the shortage of tractors for the morning landing. A replacement plan was devised which ordered the tractors of Company A, 11th Amtracs, assigned in support of the division's artillery, to report to the line of departure to assist in the transport of troops. This plan was not quickly successful and at 6:30 A.M. Colonel Franklin A. Hart, Regimental Commander of the 24th Marines, reported to General Schmidt that he was forty-eight tractors short of the 110 assigned for the landing on Namur.31 The search for tractors intensified during the next two hours, but few additional tractors were found. Tractors of Company A, 11th Amtracs, were low on gas and required time to refuel before they could be loaded with troops. With these accumulating problems, the time of attack was delayed at 8:53 A.M. to a new H-Hour of 11:00 A.M.32 Bombardment was prolonged to cover the considerable delay.

As the time approached to start the thirty-three minute run from the line of departure to the beach for an 11:00 A.M. landing, Colonel Hart was convinced his regiment was not yet ready. He requested another postponement and received word that W-Hour (H-Hour at Namur) would be delayed "until the combat team could make an orderly attack."33 This message gave Colonel Hart the impression that timing was still flexible enough to allow him to fully organize and he set about getting his waves in final order. The new landing hour of 11:00 A.M. came and went without Colonel Hart feeling ready. However, Admiral Conolly was being pressured to launch the attack by several factors. Hydrographic conditions were favorable for an attack around the 11:00 A.M. hour, there was concern

--121--

Map 9. Capture of Namur
Map 9. Capture of Namur

--122--

that the landing should not be delayed so that the neutralizing effects of the intensive preliminary bombardment would be dissipated, and tractors idling at the line of departure were consuming scarce gasoline. At 11:12 A.M. Admiral Conolly ordered the Phelps to drop the signal flag on her yardarm and thus the signal for crossing the line of departure was given. It caught Colonel Hart by surprise and his regiment was still not ready to make an organized assault. The landing on Namur Island resembled more of a ferry operation than a powerful assault but Admiral Conolly had correctly counted on the devastating effects of the aerial and naval bombardment to carry the landing.

Meanwhile, the situation that faced the 4th Amtrac Battalion and the landings on Roi was a contrast to the hectic morning of the 10th Battalion on Namur. The 4th had been withheld from D-Day landings to insure an adequate supply of tractors for the 23rd Marines for the landings on Roi, and although all tractors were on hand, the 4th Amtrac Battalion still experienced some of the same problems firing the initial unloading of their tractors from LSTs that had previously plagued the 10th Battalion on D-Day. Tractors loaded on the weather (upper) deck of the LSTs had to be driven up a steep ramp on the elevator in order to clear for lowering to the tank (lower) deck. At one point, to obtain clearance, crews on one LST were forced to use welding gear to cut off the tips of fenders of the vehicles prior to lower them.34 Although this process delayed the 4th, the assault of the 23rd Marines was organized in time to meet the 11:00 A.M. H-Hour. The landing force was ready for landing long before the 24th Marines and impatiently waited as the H-Hour passed without any signal from the Phelps which was controlling landings on both Roi and Namur. Control was weakened within the 4th Battalion due to wet,

--123--

inoperative radios, but the improved performance of Navy guide boats over the previous day overcame this weakness and when the signal came from the Phelps, the crossing of the line of departure proceeded in good order.

The attack on Roi was powerfully reinforced. In addition to the 4th Amtrac Battalion, the 23rd Marines were preceded by five rocket-firing LCI gunboats, thirty LVT(A)(1)s of Companies A and C, 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, and twelve LVTs of the 4th Amtrac Battalion equipped with rockets.35 The LCIs released their rockets 1,000 yards off the beach and cleared to either side to provide further support with their 40 m cannon and machine guns. The LVT(A)(1)s of the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion passed through and commenced firing their 37 m cannon and machine guns. The rocket-firing LVT(2)s fired their rockets successfully, but they fell short, landing around the LVT(A)(1)s proceeding ahead of them. Incredibly there was no damage and the armored amtracs continued towards shore. The armored amtracs were particularly heavily concentrated in front of the right half of the beach with eighteen of the thirty vehicles attached to the 2nd Battalion, 23rd MarInes, landing in that zone.36 The armored amphibian wave had a tendency to narrow and widen its width in an accordion fashion, particularly after they got near the beach and the drivers closed their protective hatches. The reduced visibility through periscopes caused some tractors to collide, but they managed to maintain fair alignment as they hit the beach.37 At Roi, the armored amtracs did not stand off the beach but preceded the troops inland. The attack hit with a great deal of momentum and the advance across Roi was so fast that it became disorganized. Tanks that had raced ahead had to be called back In order to get a coordinated attack to sweep the island.38 During the

--124--

Map 10. Capture of Roi
Map 10. Capture of Roi

--125--

forward motion of the attack, the armored amphibians protected the right flank of the attack moving along the beaches. with some armored amtracs in the water and some out, shooting at dugouts and sending the Japanese scurrying. The island was secured by the end of the day.

Back at Namur, the disorganized start of the ship to shore movement of the 24th Marines carried to the beach. The armored amphibians of Companies B and D, 1st Armored Amtrac Battalion, approached the beach under orders from the regimental commander to precede the troops to positions one-hundred yards inland, but they did not execute the order. About two-hundred yards from shore, they stopped and attempted to support the landing in place and allowed the troop carrying tractors to pass. The halt of the LVT(A)(1)s caused confusion, but the LVT(2)s managed to pass through, even though the armored amtracs continued to fire both their 37 mm cannons and machine guns after the LVT(2)s were in front of them.39 This was a dangerous practice created by inexperience coupled with a greater amount of rubble on the Namur beaches and the presence of an anti-tank ditch just inland of the beaches which stopped a number of LVTs.40 The 24th Marines met greater resistance as they attacked, due to the greater number of buildings and storage bunkers providing cover to the enemy and thick underbrush which gave the defenders further concealment. The 24th Marines' attack did not have the momentum of the attack on Roi due to the rough beach and the disorganized condition of their landing waves and the net result was congestion on the beaches involving troops, LVTs, and later light tanks that tried to come ashore to reinforce. The heavier construction of the few plilboxes and fortifications that survived naval gunfire was unaffected by the 37 mm cannon fire of the armored amtracs or the light tanks, which mounted the same 37 mm guns, and

--126--

so the Regimental Commander relied on the 75 mm guns of his supporting armor half-tracks.41 Despite the handicaps at the beachhead, the attack moved inland close to the scheduled pace, but suffered a major disruption at 1:05 P.M. when Marines attacking a storage bunker ignited a large cache of Japanese torpedo warheads. The ensuing explosion covered the entire island in a thick pall of smoke that convinced some Marines of a gas attack; many panicked looking for discarded gas masks.42 Two more blasts followed detonated by Japanese to capitalize on the confusion. The three blasts, which caused chunks of concrete to become deadly missiles and tree trunks to fly through the air like toothpicks, accounted for about half of the 24th Marines' total casualties during the attack on Namur. The first blast was the biggest and accounted for twenty killed and one hundred wounded, most from Company F, 24th Marines, the attackers of the bunker.43 As the problems of the attackers on Namur became known, support began to arrive. The company of medium tanks operating on Roi was switched to Namur over the connecting causeway and participated in the later advances as the spearheads. Light tanks and armored amtracs were also used, but their light guns were not decisive against many of the fortifications on the island and their chief service appears to have been firing cannister rounds to shred foliage or against personnel caught in the open.44 Hard fighting continued throughout the afternoon and into the morning of 2 February. The island was finally secured at 2:18 P.M., 2 February 1944.45

Use of the LVT(2)s after the attacks on Roi and Namur was light. Logistical considerations for an attack on a small island are minimal and so was the use of the tractors of the 4th and 10th Battalions. The battalion command post of the 10th Amtrac Battalion was established on

--127--

Ennubirr Island on 1 February, and most of the 10th Battalion's tractors reorganized on that island after landing the waves at Namur. Maintenance and salvage operations were conducted for the remainder period in northern Kwajalein Atoll, although some tractors were used to clear tiny islands to the south of the target area between 2 through 5 February. No further difficulties were encountered.

While the Marines were assaulting the northern portion of the Kwajalein Atoll, the United States Army's 7th Infantry Division was attacking the southern end using the same overall approach of first securing the outlying islands for security and artillery positions, followed by a main attack on 1 February against the big island of Kwajalein. The Army Division had less than half the number of LVTs the Marines had. The 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion was divided into four groups, Able, Baker, Charlie, and Dog, each with thirty-four tractors. Groups Able and Dog had participated in the D-Day landings against the outlying island and groups Baker and Charlie were fresh.46 This parallels the Marines' use of the 10th Amtrac Battalion on D-Day and holding the 4th Amtrac Battalion fresh for the main landings the following day. The tractors used by the Army were forty-six LVT(2)s and fifty-six LVT(A)(2)s which the Army had requested as a modification of the unarmored LVT(2).47 The armored version of the LVT(2) used by the Army suffered from reduced cargo carrying capacity because of the permanent attachment of its armor plate, but it was a tougher machine against enemy fire, and resistance was expected to be heavy. In addition to the LVT(A)(2)s of the 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion, Company A of the 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion would precede the main landings with their seventeen LVT(A)(1)s. The Army supplemented the cargo capacity of its

--128--

amphibians with the addition of one-hundred newly developed amphibious trucks, the two-and-one-half ton DUKW. This was to be one of the Army's greatest contributions to amphibious equipment and it became a workhorse during the remainder of the war. Sixty of these vehicles were assigned to transport artillery and forty were preloaded with emergency supplies to be used as floating dumps, available for instant dispatch to the beach as the situation required.48 The vehicle was designed around the standard two-and-one-half truck chassis as a cargo carrier and therefore was not armored.

The 7th Infantry Division had been stationed in Hawaii near the planning center at Admiral Nimitz's Pearl Harbor headquarters and was therefore able to incorporate fully the latest schedules and tactical measures into its final rehearsals. The advantage of this was clear on 1 February as the 7th Division executed a smooth landing against the main island of Kwajalein. The only problem appeared to be the tendency of the LVT(A)(2) to veer to the left, which caused drivers to overcompensate to the right, bunching waves in the right portion of their boat lanes. Rather than precede the leading waves, as at Roi-Namur, the Army stationed their armored amphibians on each flank of the leading wave, with the LVT(A)(1)s angled towards the beach at about forty-five degrees. From overhead, this formation, including the troop-carrying LVTs, looked something like a large "V".49 This formation allowed the leading troop LVTs to use their machine gun power along with the firepower of the armored amtracs and cleared the armored amtracs from the path of the troop LVTs as they hit the beach. Thus, the confusion that occurred at Namur was avoided. Such an arrangement required a wider frontage for the first wave because the armored amtracs extended off each side of the first wave. It was

--129--

successful at Kwajalein due to the relatively generous amounts of usable beach for the assault, equipped as it was with amtracs.

Preliminary bombardment by ships and air had been thorough, and little immediate resistance was encountered by the troops of the 7th Division as they landed on schedule at 9:30 A.M. An observer commented that the island "looked as if it had been picked up to 20,000 feet and then dropped."50 The armor available was later increased with M-10 tank destroyers, which were a tank-like vehicles with an open turret mounting a powerful three-inch gun. With this amount of armor, with large guns already available, the armored amtrac was not to play a role in the fighting on Kwajalein. LVT(A)(2)s and the DUKWs acted in logistical support of the operation as the infantrymen fought the length of the island. It took the 7th Division four days to secure the island in fighting characterized by excellent Army tank-infantry coordination. The Japanese tended to infiltrate Army positions successfully at night, causing confusion and firing in all directions, but these incidents occurred in small numbers and did not significantly hinder the progress of the battalions. The buildings and fortifications on Kwajalein resembled those found on Roi-Namur although many of the heavy concrete structures were clearly designed for protective storage rather than for combat use.51

With the seizure of Kwajalein, the first phase of the conquest of the Marshalls was complete. It had been far quicker and cheaper than anyone had dared dream based on the intelligence gathered and the grim memories of Tarawa. The 4th Marine Division lost 313 killed and 502 wounded while the 7th Division lost 173 kIlled and 793 wounded.52 The Kwajalein Atoll had been seized with greater speed than anticipated and General Holland Smith and Admirals Spruance and Turner all felt that a speed-up in the

--130--

timetable for the complete conquest of the Marshalls--the attack on Eniwetok--was in order.

Admiral Nimitz had planned the capture of the Eniwetok Atoll during the early preparation for the seizure of the Marshalls. During January 1944, the 2nd Marine Division and the 27th Infantry Division, United States Army, were designated the landing forces for the atoll which lay in the western reaches of the Marshall group, 326 nautical miles from Roi-Namur. The lagoon measures twenty-one miles in length and seventeen miles in width with ample space for a major fleet anchorage. The three islands within the atoll were Engebi, Parry, and Eniwetok, all principal bases. None of the islands were large, varying only from one to two miles in length with widths from one mile to six-hundred yards. Engebi Island contained the atoll's only airfield, completed in July 1943, which occupied almost all of the island's area. Intelligence gathered prior to the departure of the task force from Hawaii for the Marshalls was limited to a few overhead photos. Material captured during the attacks on Kwajalein Atoll included a detailed hydrographic chart of the Eniwetok Atoll which greatly assisted in attack planning. Photo coverage was gradually expanded during January 1944, and the enemy force in Eniwetok was estimated from this source to be from 2,900 to 4,000 men. This force was constituted mainly from the 1st Amphibious Brigade which arrived in the area on 4 January 1944, to garrison the atoll and erect fortifications. The brigade was 3,940 men strong and General Yoshima Nashida, its commander, distributed his strength among the three principal islands on the atoll, Parry, Eniwetok, and Engebi, with brigade headquarters on Parry Island. The force sent to Engebi numbered 736 from the brigade, some aviation, civilian, and labor personnel, and totaled about 1,200 men.

--131--

Map 11. Eniwetok Atoll
Map 11. Eniwetok Atoll

--132--

General Nishida maintaIned 1,115 brIgade men to defend Parry and his headquarters, and Eniwetok had about 908 brigade soldiers. Defenses were trenches, dugouts, log barricades at the beaches, and "spider traps" consisting of fighting holes interconnected with oil-drum tunnels dug Into the earth. Each hole was covered with a sand cover, palm frond, or ordinary piece of metal. It allowed a sniper to pop up, fire, and disappear from sight, and if necessary to abandon his hole via the tunnels.53 The Japanese approach, as it had been at other atolls, was to attempt to destroy the landing force at the beach by fire and counterattack.

The reserves designated for the Kwajalein landings were immediately available against the Japanese forces at Eniwetok Atoll. They consisted of the 22nd Marine Regiment and the 106th Regimental Combat Team from the 27th Infantry Division. With the Japanese split among three islands, the available forces numberIng 10,000 assault troops were sufficient to achieve superiority at each island. Because forces were immediately available in the Marshalls area, the, timetable for attack against Eniwetok was radically accelerated. Previous dates considered for the attack had been in the March-May 1944 period. The new date set for the landings was 15 February, but this was ultimately shifted to 17 February to allow additional time for carrier strikes against the Japanese bastion in the area, Truk Naval Base, 669 miles southwest of Eniwetok. Truk was a major staging area, repair facility, and naval and air base, which would require neutralization to conduct unmolested landings at Eniwetok.

With Kwajalein secured only on 5 February, little time remained for planning. The Eniwetok plans resembled those executed against Kwajalein. Three outlying islands would be seized on D-Day, 17 February, for use as artillery positions to support the landings the next day by the 22nd

--133--

Marines on Engebi. After seizure of Engebi, when it became clear that the reserves designated for use in that landing would not be needed, landings would be conducted by the 106th Regimental Combat Team against Eniwetok and two hours later against Parry Island. Aerial photos assured intelligence analysts that most of the atoll's defenders were concentrated on Engebi with smaller detachments on Parry and Eniwetok.54 From this conclusion came the decision to use the more highly trained 22nd Marines against Engebi and the less experienced Army unit, supported by one battalion of the 22nd Marines, against Parry and Eniwetok.

Although preliminary naval gunfire support and air strikes were not as heavy as those against the Kwajalein Atoll, they wreaked havoc among the defenders. One prisoner of war estimated that fully half the defenders of Eniwetok were killed by the naval gunfire and air strikes that hit the atoll during 17 and 18 February, from cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft.55 There was a heavy air strike against Truk simultaneously with the landings and the airfield at Engebi had been heavily damaged by carrier raids on 30 January and again on 10-12 February. The few defenses which the Japanese had been able to construct during the six weeks prior to the American landings suffered heavily from the efficient and effective preliminary fires. The sole American weakness was the failure to use heavier bombs against Eniwetok, which had the highest elevation--up to twenty feet above sea level, and thus yielded the Japanese more earth in which to bury their spider traps and resist air attack.56 Nevertheless, the atoll's defenders were near starvation when the United States Navy finally and boldly steamed into the lagoon of Eniwetok Atoll through the narrow deep passage in the southern end of the atoll.57

The landings were to be supported by the 708th Provisional Amphibian

--134--

Tractor Battalion, minus one group remaining at Kwajalein Atoll. This support totaled forty-six LVT(2)s and fifty-six LVT(A)(2)s, plus seventeen LVT(A)(1)s of Company A, 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion.58 The latter was the team that had performed so well during the Kwajalein Island landings of the 7th Infantry Division. About ten tractors were used during the preliminary landings on 0-Day, 17 February, thus leaving the bulk of the battalion rested and fully ready for the landings against Engebi and Eniwetok on 18 February.

The LVTs for the Eniwetok landings were carried to the atoll in LSTs, but in contrast to the Navy-Marine cooperation problems at Roi-Namur, Navy-Army cooperation between the LSTs and the 708th Amphibian Tractor Battalion was excellent. Histories do not offer explanations for this, but it appears probable that the traumatic experiences of the LVT crews during the assault on Roi-Namur developed some lessons on cooperation which the LST crews at Eniwetok understood and took action to implement. The LSTs stationed themselves within one-thousand yards of the line of departure and thus reduced the run required by the LVTs.59 Because the operation was staged from within the lagoon, eliminating the rough passage at sea experienced by LVTs at Roi-Namur, radios stayed drier and schedules were met.

The Engebi H-Hour was set at 8:45 A.M. Preliminary landings the day before had been successful and artillery would join the naval gunfire bombarding the island as the LVTs approached the beaches. Cruisers were to cease fire when the LVTs were within one-thousand yards of the beaches, but destroyers were instructed to keep firing with their five-inch guns until the LVTs were three-hundred yards from the beach.60 The Engebi ship-to-shore movement was power laden. Six LCI gunboats preceded the

--135--

LVTs and armored amtracs to fire their rockets and automatic fire. Next came the leading five waves of LVTs carrying troops. Each wave consisted of eight to ten tractors for each of the two battalions, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 22nd Marines, making the landing against Engebi.61 Five LVT(A)(1)s were echeloned on the outside flanks of the leading troop LVT wave, and the remaining seven were a "V" shape between the two battalion formations of LVTs, with the open end of the "V" pointing towards the beach.62 This formation thus produced an integrated troop carrying and LVT(A)(1) formation, similar to that used against Kwajalein Island by the Army.

The troop transfer proceeded smoothly using the same methods employed at Kwajalein Atoll. The Amtrac Battalion Commander was directed to take position in the control vessel at the line of departure and after the LVTs landed, they were to report to him for further orders. LVTs were preloaded with water and ammunition to permit a fast build-up of supplies at the beach. The LVTs crossed the line of departure at 8:15 A.M. LCI gunboats released their rockets and veered away, but the rockets fell short. At 8:43 A.M., two minutes ahead of schedule, the LVTs hit the beach against light resistance. Although scheduled to proceed inland for about one hundred yards for fast penetration and to provide fire support with their machine guns, LVTs were forced to stop on the beaches by the rubble of coconut tree logs and other material churned up by the preliminary bombardment. This initially created some congestion but did not seriously Impede the landing. Some LVTs of the left zone landed two-hundred yards too far to the left, but junior officers and non-commissioned officers quickly reorganized and pressed inland. On the right, one platoon was late in landing due to mechanical break-down. This platoon belonged to

--136--

Company A, 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines, which held the right flank sector in the attack across Engebi. Company C of the 1st Battalion was to attack Skunk Point, to the right rear of A Company, to secure that point as A Company swept inland. The late platoon hurried into position, but too late to prevent Japanese flushed by Company C's attack from penetrating into a widening gap between A and C Companies as A Company's attack progressed inland. The terrain was tangled undergrowth and it was necessary to halt the advance of A Company and call on tanks, which had just landed, to rectify the situation.63

The fighting on Engebi resembled the contrasts that occurred between Roi and Namur. On the left, the 2nd Battalion moved rapidly through the open terrain of the airfield on Engebi, and Newt Point at the far end of the island in the 2nd Battalion's zone was seized at 1:10 P.M.64 It was not all quick work because the Japanese had entrenched medium tanks with 47 mm guns in this area and they were overcome only with combined artillery and 75 mm tank fire. On the right, fighting moved more slowly as Japanese took refuge in the dense undergrowth and staged a last-ditch fanatical defense. The few pillboxes encountered on Engebi were in this area as well as many spider traps. The Marines quickly discovered that by throwing smoke grenades into the passages of the spider web, they could readily locate the network's terminal fighting holes and seal them with explosives. In this way, the Marines punched forward supported by tanks and half-tracks carrying 75 mm guns. LVTs, both armored and cargo, were not used due to the extreme ruggedness of the terrain and the need for the heavier gun power of the medium tank, M4, known as the General Sherman. Because of the devastating effect of the preliminary bombardment, the island was secured far faster than might have been the case

--137--

with less preparation. Despite the fanatical defense of Japanese in the 1st Battalion's zone, the island was declared secure at 2:50 P.M. by the Landing Force Commander, Brigadier General Watson.65

Although mopping-up was to continue on Engebi for another day and a half, it was time to commence the next phase of the Eniwetok Atoll operation, the attack of Eniwetok Island itself. The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines and the 2nd Separate Tank Company with its M4s, was ordered reembarked for this landing. The 3rd Battalion was the floating reserve for the landing which was made by the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 106th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), and the Marine tanks were attached to the 106th for support.

H-Hour was set at 9:00 A.M. on 19 February for Eniwetok Island. Because it was believed that this island was more lightly defended than Engebi, naval gunfire and air strikes had been more harassing than deliberately destructive in nature. Only 204.6 tons of projectiles were thrown against Eniwetok Island with none larger than eight-inch, in contrast to the 1,179.7 tons fired against Engebi.66 H-Hour was delayed first to 9:15 A.M. and then to 9:22 .A.M. due to fears that the armor, reembarked from the landings at Engebi, would not arrive on time. The armor was on time and assault troops were ordered across the line of departure at 9:09 A.M., with troops hitting the beach at 9:16 A.M.67

Trouble began at once. The LVT(A)(1)s were under orders to proceed one-hundred yards inland, but were stopped by a log barricade at the beach. The area was heavily fortified with spider traps and the Army attack stalled. The Japanese counterattacked around noon with three-hundred to four-hundred men but the attack was beaten down with some Army casualties. Despite this success, the Army attack continued forward only

--138--

by inches mainly because many defensive installations survived the preliminary naval gunfire and in fact most of the spider traps were untouched due to their greater depth. Against this tough nut, the 106th, an inexperienced outfit, made very slow progress. A Marine Battalion in floating reserve was landed at 1:30 P.M. to impart momentum to the attack and was thrown into the line heading south against the rear of the island main defenses, fighting alongside the 1st Battalion, 106th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). The Marine battalion did accelerate the attack but gaps opened between it and the lagging Army unit, into which troublesome Japanese infiltrators moved causing some confusion until in each case they were eliminated. Fighting frequently occurred in dense underbrush which limited observation and log emplacements were sometimes not discovered until the attackers were less than thirty-five yards away. Due to the close proximity, naval gunfire or other heavy caliber support could not be used and individual action was required by groups of Infantrymen to silence these defenses.68 Problems were also encountered In allocation of the tank support and the Regimental Commander, Colonel Ayers, did not appear willing to release tanks from either the Marine medium tank company or the Army light tank company to the Marine battalion despite repeated requests. They remained in support of Army units who were also having difficulty with the enemy situation. It required another day, until 2:45 P.M. on 20 February, to secure the southern end of the island; the northern end was not secured until 2:30 P.M. on 21 February.69

As on Engebi, armored amtracs did not take part. In the combat on the island because the defenses were too heavy for the vehicles light 37 mm gun. Cargo carrying LVTs reverted to logistical roles after the landing.

--139--

Map 12: Seizure of Eniwetok Atoll
Map 12: Seizure of Eniwetok Atoll

--140--

The unexpected toughness of the Eniwetok fight forced changes in plans for the attack on Parry, the last objective. This had been scheduled for the 106th, but it was clear that to keep a rapid timetable, it would be necessary to give this mission to the 22nd Marines, the. victors of Engebi. H-Hour was scheduled for 9:00 A.M. on 21 February, and both the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the regiment were available in time for that original H-Hour. Timetables were delayed, however, when General Watson decided to postpone the landing until the 3rd Battalion, fighting on Eniwetok, would be available as a floating reserve. The new time was 9:00 A.M. on 22 February. With the unexpected resistance rising, preliminary bombardment of Parry was increased and the island rocked under an intense load of shells including 143 6-inch, 751 14-inch, 896 8-inch, and 9,950 5-inch shells into an area of only 200 acres.70 Another significant change was the decision by General Watson to compress the frontages originally planned for the landing beaches because he felt they were too large and in doing so, he also shifted their location three-hundred yards northward. However, this information was not completely distributed, and caused problems during the ship-to-shore phase of the landing.71

Utilization of the LVTs remained the same as previous landings executed by the 708th AmphibIan Tractor Battalion. The first waves crossed the line of departure at 8:45 A.M. preceded by LCI gunboats, as usual. Naval gunfire continued during the early part of the approach and three LCI gunboats on the right flank were struck by 5-Inch shells from ships firing on radar because of the smoke. They lost thirteen men killed, forty-six wounded, but stayed on station and fired their rockets before leaving the area.72 As the LVTs approached the shore, they were

--141--

guided by Navy guideboats towards the originally planned beaches, three hundred yards too far south. This drift affected the LCIs and appears to be the cause of the friendly fire hitting the right flank gunboats. Buoys to within 500 yards of the beach, along the division between the two landing teams, were to guide the LVTs, but the wind was carrying the smoke from the naval gunfire out over the incoming waves and drivers could not see any of the buoys or landmarks.73 The Marines of the first wave landed 300 yards too far south, but succeeding waves, lost in the smoke, landed at varying positions along the beach. This confusion was corrected, as it had been in the past, by the aggressive leadership of junior officers and non-commissioned officers. Resistance on the beach was heavy but companies rapidly pushed through, assisted by the medium tanks of the 2nd Separate Tank Company. Three Japanese tanks were part of the defense of Parry and were not entrenched as stationary pillboxes as on Engebi. For unknown reasons, the Japanese chose to wait until Marine armor had landed before conducting a tank attack with their three tanks. (Japanese tanks throughout the war remained flimsy with inferior gun power by American standards.) The attack was disastrous for the Japanese, losing all three tanks and crews,with no damage to the General Shermans of the 2nd Separate Tank Company.74 Tank-infantry coordination was excellent during the Parry fighting, assisted by the light tank company of the 106th RCT, and this support led to the rapid elimination of the defenders of Parry even though many spider traps and trenches had survived the shelling. Although a narrow strip of land at the southern end remained contested at nightfall, the Regimental Commander, Colonel Walker, declared the island secure at 7:30 P.M. on 22 February.75 With this declaration, the final objective of the Eniwetok operation, code

--142--

named CATCHPOLE, was completed.

As in the Kwajalein Atoll, for six weeks after Eniwetok there were follow-up landings on tiny islets ringing the atoll. The procedure usually involved a low-level aerial photo run by a PBY flying boat, which delivered photos to the landing force consisting of an LST carrying the assault troops and six to nine LVTs. Two LCI gunboats, a destroyer escort for gunfire support, and a mine sweeper to clear the approaches to the islets and atolls being visited made up the remainder of the miniature task force. Resistance varied from none to intense fire fights where a maximum of eighteen Japanese were killed on one island. Units of the 22nd Marines performed many of these landings, but a force of 199 Marines from the 1st Defense Battalion also conducted some operations during this phase. The last landings were made on 21 April 1944. Only four atolls were by-passed which contained airfields and sizeable enemy forces: Maloelap, Wotje, Mule, and Jaluit atolls. These targets were kept neutralized by the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing which began entering the Marshalls bases at Roi and Engebi during February 1944.

The Marshalls campaign represents a rugged test of the family of LVTs available at that time because it exploited the full range of LVT capabilities and was the first extensive use of the armored amphibian LVT(A)(1) which mounted the 37 mm gun as its main armament--the same gun as the light tank M5, extensively used by both Army and Marine units. As far back as Tarawa, however, the 37 mm gun had demonstrated its inability to destroy many of the substantial Japanese fortifications commonly encountered in the Pacific. In contrast, the 75 mm gun of the M4 Medium Tank, the General Sherman, was highly effective and frequently responsible for destroying pillboxes impeding infantry progress. It was

--143--

clear that the armored LVT needed a heavier gun to become a more valuable support weapon to the Marine infantry fighting their way inland. Another point requiring review was the type of gun needed because the capabilities of the gun would shape the ultimate tactical utilization of the vehicle. The 37 mm gun was a flat trajectory tank gun which tended to force the LVT(A)(1) to attempt to assume the role of the tank, an attempt generally unsuccessful since the overall power of the gun was Insufficient and the vehicle was frequently blocked from proceeding inland by beach debris. It appeared that the tank made the best tank and the gun chosen for the armored LVT should be complimentary to the tank gun rather than try to duplicate its characteristics.

The LVT(2) and (A)2 were heavily used during the Marshalls and in many ways stood the test, but problems became obvious. The loss of many LVT(2)s of the 1Oth Amtrac Battalion at Roi-Namur due to sinking focused attention on the need for an additional bilge pump for the incoming water from coral and bullet holes when the vehicle's engine stopped. Water inside the vehicle also caused considerable trouble with communications so a better installation of the radios was required to water proof them. In response to the frequent loss of communications plaguing LVT operations, Marine tractor crewmen were now required to learn semaphore signalling which was frequently used to control the LVT in the water later in the war.76 The desirability of adding a ramp to the design of the LVT had long been recognized. It was necessary to lift cargo over the side of the LVT(1) and (2); the incorporation of a ramp would greatly speed the loading and unloading of cargo as well as make room for the possible loading and transport of vehicles within the LVT. Maintenance continued to be a prime consideration in the availability of

--144--

the LVT. The track grousers (cleats) required continual tightening and wore down rapidly when in contact with the coral or rock. A worn grouser reduced the speed of the LVT in the water which in turn had a direct bearing on its ability to execute assault and logistics runs. The grouser also had a direct bearing on the response and control of the vehicle in the water--never an outstanding feature of the LVT. As one former crewman recalled, control in water was like "being in a bathtub with an oar."77

Despite the technical problems, the tactics evolved for the use of the LVT in the assault role resembled those standardized for the remainder of the war. The placement of the LVT(A)(1) in the lead wave or ahead of the lead wave of troop tractors gave the landing fire power and momentum right up to the sand. The Army practice of placing the LVT(A)(1)s to each side of the leading wave simplified the control problem encountered at Namur when the LVT(A)(1)s were placed directly ahead of the troop carrying LVTs and endangered friendly troops by firing over their heads with their tank guns as the troop LVTs passed ahead to make the landing. The use of rocket firing troop LVTs was only a marginal success, but experimentation continued with this type of fire support with later models. Roi-Namur emphasized the need for detailed briefing of the LVT crews on all aspects of the landings so that beaches would not be missed and the correct troops were carried ashore. Another refinement needed was a smoother transfer of troops to the LVTs because the complex business of offloading troops from their transports and boating them over to LSTs for loading into LVTs consumed so much time that an 4:30 A.M. reveille was required for a landing at 9:00 A.M. The rest and feeding of the troops immediately before they landed was important and two to three hours of riding around

--145--

in LCVPs and LVTs before actually landing was destructive for morale and troop efficiency.

The Marshalls was atoll warfare. Although it was characterized by an overwhelming naval gunfire preparation that General Holland M. Smith, the overall landing force commander, described as "historic", it nevertheless required the services of the LVT to overcome the ever-present coral reefs that surrounded every island in the area. The whole Marshalls campaign was accomplished with a light cost in lives due in no small part to the continued use of the LVT. General Holland Smith summarized his feelings on the use of LVTs by stating, "Our amphibian tractor proved effective but . . . our control and employment of amtracs was capable of improvement."78 Everyone from engineers at Food Machinery Corporation to Marines in the field were working on just such improvements so that Operation GRANITE, the capture of the Marianas, would be swift. The first objective was a large island called Saipan.

--146--

Table of Contents
Previous Part ** Next Part


Footnotes

1. Robert D. Heinl and John A. Crown, The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo (Washington D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1954), p. 13.

2. Henry I. Shaw, Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, Vol. III of History of United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II (5 vols.; Washington D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1966), p. 135.

3. Ibid., p. 136.

4. Ibid., pp. 140-141.

5. Ibid.

6. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 44.

7. Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The United States Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 262.

8. 10th Amtrac Battalion, Report on Operations of the 10th Amtrac Battalion During Operation Flintlock (In the Field: 10th Amtrac Battalion, 1944), p. 2.

9. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 128.

10. Ibid., p. 137.

11. Ibid., p. 152.

12. 10th Amtrac Battalion, Report on Operations, Enclosure (a), p. 2.

13. Ibid., Enclosure (a), p. 8.

14. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 44.

15. 10th Amtrac Battalion, Report on Operations, Enclosure (a), p. 6.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 46.

19. Ibid., p. 48.

20. Ibid., p. 49.

21. Ibid., p. 50.

22. 10th Amtrac Battalion, Report on Operations, Enclosure (c), p. 3.

23. Ibid., Enclosure (a), p. 1.

24. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, pp. 51-52.

25. 10th Amtrac Battalion, Report on Operations, Enclosure (a), p. 7.

26. Ibid., Enclosure (c) pp. 3-5.

27. Ibid., Enclosure (d), p. 2.

28. Ibid.

29. Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, p. 273.

30. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 67.

31. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 157.

32. Ibid..

33. Ibid., p. 158.

34. Ibid., p. 157.

35. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, pp. 68-69.

36. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 161.

37. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 69.

38. Ibid., p. 75.

39. 10th Amtrac Battalion, Report on Operations, Enclosure (a), p. 12.

40. Ibid., Enclosure (a), p. 9.

41. Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, p. 283.

42. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 89.

43. Ibid.

44. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 172.

45. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 98.

46. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, pp. 100-101.

47. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 190.

48. Ibid., p. 134.

49. Ibid., p. 175.

50. Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, p. 277.

51. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 103.

52. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 180.

53. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, pp. 118-20.

54. Ibid., p. 124.

55. Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, p. 124.

56. Ibid., p. 299.

57. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 194.

58. Ibid., p. 190.

59. Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, pp. 296-297.

60. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 189.

61. Ibid., p. 190.

62. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 131.

63. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, pp. 200-201.

64. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 134.

65. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 203.

66. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, pp. 136-137.

67. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 206.

68. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 139.

69. Ibid., p. 142.

70. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 211.

71. Ibid., p. 210.

72. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 146.

73. Ibid.

74. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 213.

75. Heinl and Crown, The Marshalls, p. 149.

76. Interview with MGYSGT Thomas J. Grover, USMC, 15 June 1975.

77. Ibid.

78. Holland M. Smith, Coral and Brass (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), pp. 148-149.



Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation