Part VIII
Biggest for Last

The decision that brought the Marines to the sands of Iwo Jima also took them to Okinawa. On 3 October 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive giving the final objectives of the Pacific War. MacArthur was to invade the Philippines on 20 December 1944, Iwo Jima was set for 20 January 1945 (and later delayed as seen in Part VII), and Okinawa was targeted for 1 March 1945.1 These final targets represented a shift from the former objectives of Formosa and the China coast to be used as staging areas for the eventual invasion of the Japanese home islands. Concern had grown that both Formosa and the China coast would require more troops than were available and after careful study it was concluded that Okinawa could be seized with far less force and offered a fully adequate staging area for mounting the invasion. The capture of Okinawa, after securing Iwo Jima to aid the air war, would provide the full range of required facilities for preliminary strategic bombing followed by a massive amphibious expedition against Japan itself.

Okinawa was strategically located only 350 nautical miles south of the southern Japanese home island of Kyushu and offered two major fleet anchorages, numerous locations for airfields, with three major existing airfields, and sufficient land area to train assault troops for the upcoming invasion. Okinawa is an irregularly shaped island, sixty miles long, with the jutting Motobu Peninsula at its widest point of eighteen

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Map 16. Nansei Shoto
Map 16. Nansei Shoto.

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miles, and the Ishikawa Isthmus its narrowest width of two miles. The northern two-thirds of the island is mountainous and covered with scrub pines with a rocky and precipitous shoreline; the southern one-third is rolling lowlands broken by deep ravines. Beaches in this area are reef-bound and often backed by sea cliffs. Usable beaches for a landing existed on the west coast near the town of Hagushi, on the east coast within the large fleet anchorage of Nakagusuku Wan, and south near the town of Minatogawa. In contrast to former island objectives of the Central Pacific drive, Okinawa had a significant civilian population of around 500,000, most of whom were farmers and some fishermen. About fifteen percent of the population lived in the major town of Naha in the south, which also contained port facilities.2

Okinawa remained in the background of the war until April 1944, when the Imperial General Headquarters, Japan's supreme agency for direction of the war, created the 32nd Army and assigned it the mission of improving the defenses of Okinawa and surrounding islands. By this time it was obvious that the outer defenses were crumbling and something had to be done to strengthen the inner lines. Prior to 1944, Okinawa boasted only a minor naval base and a few small army garrisons, but steps were taken immediately to increase the number of troops on the island and to use these troops to construct a defensive network to stop the Americans. As part of this construction, the Japanese implemented their new doctrine on Island defense because it was clear to the Japanese on Okinawa, as it was to General Kuribayashi on Iwo Jima, that Americans could not be stopped on the beach. The combination of American naval gunfire, methodically destroying even heavy pillboxes, and pinpoint bombing from aircraft was too powerful to be overcome simply by beach defenses. The Japanese therefore

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adopted the same approach used on Iwo Jima of constructing one or more belts of defenses across the entire width of the island, well inland and away from the heavy preliminary bombardments on the beach. The objective of this defense was to exact the highest casualties from the enemy after they had landed in an attempt to bleed them to a standstill.

Major Japanese reinforcements arrived between June and August 1944 and included the veteran 9th Infantry Division with battle honors dating back to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the 24th Infantry Division (the largest tactical unit with over 14,000 Japanese and Okinawan conscripts), and the 62nd Infantry Division with fewer than 12,000 men, almost all infantry.3 Beyond these three infantry divisions, there were many reinforcing units consisting of an armored regiment with 750 men organized into one light and one medium tank company, a tractor-drawn artillery battery, an infantry company, a maintenance company, an engineer platoon, and 9,000 naval personnel, few of whom were trained for infantry work. In addition, there were super-secret sea-raiding units not previously employed consisting of seven squadrons of one hundred hand-picked men and one hundred boats laden with explosives, charged to destroy amphibious shipping by suicide-ram tactics. Most of these units were stationed on Okinawa, but three were on Kerama Retto, an island group west of Okinawa.4

The strengthening of Okinawa's defenses focused on the south where two main lines of defense were constructed with the strongest anchored in the Shun Region. Positions were constructed underground using the many natural caves in the area and each was mutually supporting. Also, many defenses were organized as reverse slope defenses, using the back side of a hill away from the enemy which permitted the defenders to shoot

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Map 17. Japanese Defensive Positions, 1 April 1945
Map 17. Japanese Defensive Positions, 1 April 1945.

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the exposed attackers off the skyline as they came over the top of the hill. The Japanese were applying all their hard-earned experience as they organized the island on a schedule to get them ready to meet the Americans when they came ashore. To keep the morale of the troops up, the commanders created a battle slogan:

The landing force for this invasion was to be the largest in the history of the United States' Central Pacific Drive and consisted of two corps (one Army, one Marines) of infantry divisions, the III Amphibious Corps under Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, and the XXIV Corps, under Major General John R. Hodge, USA. The III Amphibious Corps included the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, while the XXIV Corps had the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions. In addition, the 77th Infantry Division was assigned to take Ie Shima and Kerama Retto, island groups west of Okinawa, the 2nd Marine Division was to stage a diversionary demonstration in the south, and the 27th Infantry Division was named the floating reserve. Within this massive force a large complement of LVTs from the 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion (USA), the 1st and 3rd Armored Amtrac Battalions, the 1st, 4th, 8th, and 9th Amtrac Battalions, and the 534th Amphibious Tractor Battalion (USA) would carry the troops ashore over the reef-blocked beaches of Haqushi and against the outlying islands off both east and west coasts.

American intelligence of the Islands was meager at first but between 29 September 1944 and 28 March 1945, 224 photo reconnaissance missions were run over Okinawa which produced an accurate photo mosaic map of the area and rubber relief models to facilitate briefings. It was possible

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to see some of the enemy's strength in the south and intelligence analysts initially figured an enemy strength of 48,600. Thereafter, estimates varied widely as additional reports and information were received and reached a peak of 87,000 in January; by April the number had fallen to 75,000 men based on the news that a division had departed from Okinawa for the Philippines.6 The actual total is not certain because the number of Okinawan home guard participants is not known; from available estimates, however, it appears there was a trained infantry of 67,000 men, an Okinawan home guard of about 23,500, and the Japanese Navy of 9,000 personnel.7 This totals to 100,000 Japanese defenders versus an American assault landing force of 541,866 men.8

The plan for the main landings at Okinawa over the Hagushi beaches and the seizure of the outlying islands was a three-phase operation. Phase one would be seizure of the southern part of Okinawa because it was most suitable for airfields required to bomb Japan and for port facilities to stage naval expeditions. The second phase would capture the remainder of Okinawa and the large Island of le Shima, on Okinawa's west coast, and the third phase would take additional bases in the archipelago. Eventually, the realities faced during the campaign reversed the first two phases and later logistical considerations and favorable progress eliminated the requirement for the third phase.9

The planning for the employment of LVTs followed the successful patterns of past landings. the first wave would be entirely LCI gunboats, followed by five to seven waves of cargo amphibians of both the battle-tested LVT(4) and the new LVT produced by Borg-Warner, the LVT(3). To confuse enemy forces and immobilize them, the main landing at the Hagushi

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Map 18. ICEBERG (Invasion of Okinawa) Scheme of Maneuver
Map 18. ICEBERG (Invasion of Okinawa) Scheme of Maneuver.

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beaches would be accompanied by a feint by the 2nd Marine Division which would appear to be landing at the Minotagawa beach in the south but which would reverse course at the last minute and return to its ships.

The LVT(3) would gain its first battlefield experience on Okinawa. This vehicle represented the tenacious and careful development effort of the Borg-Warner Company after its initial failure to win design competition with the Food Machinery Corporation for the first armored amphibian, the LVT(A)(1) in 1942. It will be recalled that Borg-Warner produced an amphibian, called the Model A which could be converted from a cargo amphibian into an armored amphibian by adding a standard tank turret from the M3 light tank, with 37 mm gun, that fitted into the cargo compartment. The Model A was rejected in favor of the Food Machinery design because of poorer overall performance including an inferior cargo capacity and a suspension system too similar to the original problem-plagued design of the LVT(1). Borg-Warner studied the reasons for their setback and then developed a refined design, designated the Model B, which incorporated substantial re-engineering. A major innovation was mounting the engines in each side of the vehicle rather than in the rear or front as previously done. By installing a pair of Cadillac V-8s, the same engines used to power the M5 light tank, one in each side of the vehicle, a greatly enlarged cargo space was obtained with substantially the same exterior dimensions. The cargo space of the LVT(4), which mounts the engine center-forward just to the rear of the driver, has cargo space dimensions of 150" long by 94" in width. The Model B had a cargo compartment 201" long by 77" in width which opened at the two-thirds mark to 97".10 The Model B thus obtained a substantial increase in overall cargo space, particularly in length, which was critical if jeeps with trailers or guns

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Figure 37. The Borg-Warner Model B
Figure 37. The Borg-Warner Model B.

Figure 38. Photograph from the Borg-Warner Sales Pamphlet showing a 
Ford sedan mounting the loading ramp
Figure 38. Photograph from the Borg-Warner Sales Pamphlet showing a Ford sedan mounting the loading ramp.

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Figure 39. Views of the Model B from the Borg-Warner Sales Pamphlet 
showing the loading completed
Figure 39. Views of the Model B from the Borg-Warner Sales Pamphlet showing the loading completed.

Figure 40. A view of the drivers controls in the Model B
Figure 40. A view of the drivers controls in the Model B showing the two steering levers,
the shorter transmission shift lever, and the loading ramp crank at the far left.

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were to be loaded over its ramp. The Model B was only 24' long by 11' wide versus a 26'1" length and 10'8" width for the LVT(4).11 Another feature was the addition of a four-speed and reverse automatic transmission which had successfully been powering the M5 tank and had proven Its reliability and which relieved the driver from anticipating contact with the beach and shifting into a lower gear just before touching. This shifting had been the most difficult part of driving and was now eliminated. The suspension of the Model B used the time-proven torsilastic principle of previous amtracs and the same grouser proven optimum in early tests conducted by Food Machinery in 1943 and battle-proven since then. Borg-Warner was aware of the early lessons of combat vulnerability of the cargo LVT and had added 3/8 inch of armor to the cab and sides of the vehicle covering the engine and gasoline tank.12

The Continuing Board for the Development of Landing Vehicle, Tracked, the Navy's chief body for guiding the development of LVTs within the Bureau of Ships, had become interested in the Model B while it was being developed, and reviewed the vehicle's progress. It was clear that the Increased cargo capacity of the Model B was justification for a contract and Borg-Warner at last received the green light to produce the LVT(3), the official designation given to the final version of the Model B. Although production of the LVT(3) commenced in April 1944, it was one year before it received its baptism of fire at Okinawa, a lag caused by the requirement to produce sufficient spare parts for the vehicle to replace battle damage and the need to train the crews and mechanics in the operation of the new components of the vehicle, particularly the transmission, prior to committing them to action.13 The following is a further comparison between the LVT(3), the second ramped amphibian, and

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the first ramped vehicle, the LVT(4):

        LVT(3)       LVT(4)
Cargo Capacity (no armor)       12,000 lbs.       9,000 lbs.
Weight (empty)       26,600 lbs.       27,400 lbs.
Ground Clearance       19 inches       18 inches
Speed (land)       17 mph       20 mph
           (water)       6 mph       7.5 mph
Cruising Radius (land)       150 miles       150 miles
           (water)       75 miles       75 miles
Gasoline Load       130 gallons       140 gallons
Engine       Engine Cadillac V-8
(two engines)
      Continental radial
W 670-9A
Horsepower       220 HP (each)       250 HP
Source: Robert J. Icks, "Landing Vehicles Tracked," in Armored Fighting Vehicles In Profile, ed. Duncan Crow (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), p. 162.

The LVT(3) was the culmination of the development of the cargo LVT during World War II because no further modifications were produced before the war ended. The LVT(3), with modifications including a covered cargo space, became the standard cargo LVT of the post-War Marine Corps. The key role played by the LVT in the Central Pacific drive was recounted in colorful language to new crewmen in an early LVT(3) training manual:

Maybe you're new in this business, and maybe not-- but either way you should have heard of the record the Bushmaster's mammy and pappy set at Bougainville, Tarawa, Kwajalein, Saipan and other places. They were the Alligator LVT(1) and the Water Buffalo LVT(2)--two damn fine tractors Most of the guys who gave the Japs the old one-two punch at those islands will tell you it would have been murder to hit the beach in anything but an amphibian tractor. Anything else would have had its guts ripped open by the reefs surrounding the islands--and provided a sitting duck target for some slant-eyed son of heaven, ashore.14

As in previous operations, the LVTs were conveyed to their target, Okinawa, in LSTs, and because these ships did not contain adequate accommodations for large numbers of soldiers. The assault troops that were to ride the LVTs to the beach were transported most of the way to

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Figure 41. Side view of the LVT(3)
Figure 41. Side view of the LVT(3).

Figure 42. Rear view of the LVT(3) with ramp lowered
Figure 42. Rear view of the LVT(3) with ramp lowered.

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Figure 43. The front view of the LVT(3)
Figure 43. The front view of the LVT(3). This shows the machine gun mount on the left and the attached armor plate.

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Okinawa on the faster troop transport ships and then transferred to the LSTs at Ulithi Lagoon, a vast lagoon captured without resistance in September 1944, lying midway between the Marianas and the Palau Islands.

Carrier planes first struck Okinawa hard on 10 October 1944, with raids again on 3 and 4 January 1945. During this period, United States Navy submarines ranged the Pacific and fast carrier task forces were also striking Formosa and Tokyo to reduce the enemy's ability to reinforce the beleaguered garrison on Okinawa. By mid-February 1945, Okinawa was effectively isolated from support from the nearby homeland except for one potent force, the Kamikaze.

Because substantial American naval support was retained in the Philippines area when the fighting took an unexpectedly heavy turn, the date for Iwo Jima was set back twice. This in turn postponed the landing for Okinawa since the same naval gunfire forces at Iwo were also required at Okinawa. The final date for Okinawa was 1 April 1945.

The first American units to appear off Okinawa were the trusty minesweepers, clearing the way for the battleships to begin bombardment on 24 March 1945, as well as preparing the way for the seizure of the Kerama Retto on 26 March by the 77th Infantry Division. This latter operation proceeded on schedule using the LVT(4)s of the 534th Amphibian Tractor Battalion and LCI gunboats firing rockets and mortars ahead of them. Most of these landings were battalion-size or smaller and in two days the Kerama Retto was available for conversion to a valuable naval base and logistical staging area for the upcoming main landing at Okinawa.

On 26 March, during the landings at Kerama Retto, the Kamikaze struck the landing force for the first time. Between 26 and 31 March these planes rose from Okinawan airfields and damaged six ships including Admiral

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Spruance's flagship, the Indianapolis; near misses accounted for damage to ten others.15 This was the beginning of a deadly campaign that was to cause the United States Navy to suffer more men killed during the Okinawan campaign than either the Army or the Marines received fighting on the land.16 It was the valiant work of the Navy, especially its picket ships (destroyers with early-warning missions), that allowed the Okinawa landing to proceed with clock-work precision. The total number of ships involved in the landings was a record 1,213 and these would have been lucrative targets for the Japanese had the Kamikaze been allowed to get through.17 During the three-month campaign on Okinawa from 1 April to 1 July, antiaircraft defenses coordinated by the Navy accounted for an astounding 7,830 Japanese aircraft destroyed.18

Naval gunfire commenced on 25 March and fired a total of 27,226 rounds, 5-inch caliber or larger, most of which was directed into the beaches and fell on virtually empty space. Due to the failure of American intelligence to discover fully the dispositions of the Japanese, it was felt that the Japanese would defend at the beaches as they had done in the past with the notable exception of Iwo Jima. In fact, there was little defense at the beach and little damage was done by the heavy naval gunfire preparation except to the airfield at Yontan. The main lines of defense to the south escaped a heavy pounding.

On 30 March, valuable support was given by Navy UDT swimmers who destroyed 2,900 underwater obstacles, most of them wooden posts six to eight inches in diameter, by hand-placed charges.19 The UDT also supplied valuable intelligence, basically favorable, concerning the beach conditions at Hagushi.

There were calm seas and good weather for the landing on the morning

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of 1 April 1945. Air support orbited overhead as LSTs discharged their tractors at 7:00 A.M. H-Hour was set for 8:30 A.M. and prior to that hour the beaches were subjected to a fierce pummeling by ten battleships, nine cruisers, twenty-three destroyers, and 177 LCI gunboats. Unfortunately for the attackers, as already noted, this fire fell for the most part on empty space. Japanese response was only scattered, ineffective fire. The pennant dropped from the control ships at 8:00 A.M. and sent the first wave of LVT(A)(4)s across the line of departure, 4,000 yards offshore, behind mortar and rocket firing LCI gunboats. The run was estimated to take one-half hour. During this time the main battery fire of the battleships continued and 138 planes strafed the beaches. The landings proceeded on schedule and within twenty-five minutes the LVT waves were ashore with no losses to enemy fire. LVT(A)s moved to the flanks of their units to protect them during the landings. There were difficulties only in the sector of the 1st Marine Division where the rough reef caused some units to be late.20 As the troops stormed out of their LVTs, they were greeted by an unusual silence. The Japanese were not there.

Later waves of troops were brought to the beach using the transfer line technique which established a rendezvous line seaward of the reef where troops were transferred from LCVPs to LVTs for the trip across the reef. Later, at high tide, direct beaching was possible for some of the landing craft, including those carrying tanks. The first tanks hit the beach within thirty minutes of the first wave using the new T-6 floatation gear; thirty minutes later, tanks were being directly beached by landing craft. The T-6 floatation gear, which worked very well in the calm waters off Okinawa, consisted of pontoons fastened to the M-4 tank by spot welds,

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Figure 44. LVT(A)(4)s crossing the line of departure
Figure 44. LVT(A)(4)s crossing the line of departure.

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a makeshift steering device, and small, electrically detonated charges to detach the pontoons after the tank had landed. The tracks of the tanks provided the drive through the water.21

By 3:30 P.M. on D-Day the majority of assault forces were ashore. The advance inland was halted for the day between 4:00 and 5:00 P.M. to allow troops to dig positions and commence patrolling the front to find. the enemy. The average penetration was a considerable 3,500 yards and both Yontan and Kadena airfields had been captured. L-Day on Okinawa (different letters used due to the many different landings executed at Okinawa--L-Day was used for the main landing) was an unqualified success.

After the first day, the fortunes of the two corps, the XXIV and the III Amphibious Corps, began to vary widely. The Army units of XXIV Corps were ordered to turn south and in so doing discovered the true strength of the Japanese defenses in the Shuri Castle area of southern Okinawa. Meanwhile, the Marines striking north were met by little or no resistance because the enemy had left only token forces to hold the area. The toughest fight for the Marines in the early days in the north was the fight for Motobu Peninsula where the rough mountainous country of that peninsula hid a Japanese force of over 1,000 men which required four days of close fighting to eliminate. Due to the rough terrain, neither tanks nor any type of LVT could be used to support the fighting.

The rapid progress of the Marines in the north led to the decision to capture le Shima, lying off northern Okinawa's west coast, ahead of schedule. It had been anticipated that the fight for Motobu Peninsula would require an amphibious landing, but naval forces that might have been required for that operation were now free to land the 77th Infantry Division against Ie Shima. The 77th had been at sea in transports waiting

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for the word to attack and had endured an attack of eight kamikazes which scored three hits and heavy loss of life to one of the regiments. As the day approached for the landing, observation planes and photos failed to disclose any sign of enemy activity. Despite this, the Commanding General, General Bruce, remained suspicious. Rather than. land,two companies on a daylight reconnaissance as had been suggested in view of the apparent enemy inactivity, he landed two battalions abreast on 16 April, despite kamikaze attacks largely defeated by the sturdy picket destroyers of the Navy. The General had been right in his suspicions about the island, for it masterfully camouflaged a force of 7,000 people, including 1,500 Okinawan civilians who fought fanatically for their island. The senior officer on the island, Major Masashi Igawa, must have been an outstanding leader for the civilian resistance was the fiercest experienced anywhere in the Okinawan campaign.

The landings on le Shima used Army LVT(4)s of the 534th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, with air and naval gunfire cover, but references give no mention to any use of LCI gunboats. The fight for Ie Shima was bitter and protracted due to the Japanese use of many caves and the necessity of taking high ground heavily defended and thickly strewn with mines and booby traps. The island was declared secure on 21 April, but mopping-up continued for four more days. Total Japanese losses were 4,706 killed versus the 77th's loss of 239 killed and 879 wounded.22 These American casualties included the sad loss of one of the nation's most beloved war correspondents and friend of the GI, Ernie Pyle.

The 96th Infantry Division ran into the main defenses on Okinawa on 6 April and the pace in the south slowed to a crawl. Progress was curtailed by enemy artillery and mortar fire combined with counterattacks to

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seize lost or critical terrain. The 1st Marine Division was sent south to reinforce this attack and officially came into the line on 1 May. The whole Marine attack from this point would be re-oriented to the south. LVT support during this phase was limited to logistical roles for the cargo LVTs and direct and indirect firing by armored LVTs. As in the past, the tanks of the Marine Division, with their more powerful 75 mm guns, were in front of the infantry blasting the caves and flamethrower tanks were invaluable for sealing caves as they had on Iwo Jima. Roads were few and the cargo LVT provided direct logistical support to Marine units as the drive southward progressed. An enemy counterlanding was attempted on the rear of the 1st Marine Division, but these attackers were destroyed by LVT(A)(4) crews. Throughout this period operations of the cargo LVT were continuous and drained the availability of operational vehicles. The LVT(3), like its predecessors, required extensive maintenance which was not available because these vehicles were vitally needed to transport the massive requirements, particularly in ammunition, needed by the 1st Marine Division as it fought south.

The III Amphibious Corps entered the fight for the south on 6 May. To reinforce its attacks, LVT(A)(4)s were employed to fire artillery missions using high-angle fire under the control of artillery fire direction officers.23 The LVT(A)s' role as artillery increased later in the campaign with six platoons (thirty vehicles) giving fire support on 19 May. When not engaged in fire support, the most common application of the LVT(A) on Okinawa was to guard the seaward flanks of the divisions as they drove south.

The progress of the attack was severely hampered by rains which fell in torrents for ten days starting 22 May and made movement of even a jeep

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or man difficult in knee-deep mud. Even the LVT was bogged down by this mud and the gap between logistical support and the requirements of battle. widened to the point that air drops were required to supply the troops. LVTs were reassigned to supply the troops beach-to-beach using, the sea as a supply route and were in continuous operation during the rainy ten days.

The 1st Marine Division had the mission of conducting a shore-to-shore amphibious landing against the Oroku Peninsula, which lies west of the principal city of Naha. This peninsula, after the fall of the main bastion of Shuri some days previously, was now defended only by the remnants of Japanese naval forces. D-Day was set, for 4 June and for this operation a critical shortage of LVTs developed. Of the four battalions or 400 cargo LVT vehicles that had landed on Okinawa, only 72 were operational and these were in poor condition because of the continuous supply support required during the rains.24 For this reason, the attack was reduced to regimental level with two battalions landing abreast. H-Hour was set for 6:00 A.M., but as the cargo LVTs formed on the line of departure at 5:30 A.M., five of those in the first wave had mechanical failure. Despite this loss of troop strength,the regimental commander ordered the assault forward and the remaining six vehicles of the first wave crossed the line of departure behind a line of LVT(A)(4)s. The landing was successful and this was due in no small measure to the pounding dealt by no less than fifteen artillery battalions which were supplying the preparation fires for the landing.25

LVTs were active to the last days of the campaign. LVT(A)s and LVTs were used to attack positions in the extreme south of Okinawa on 6 June. The island was declared secure on 21 June 1945 by General Geiger, who succeeded General Buckner who was killed by a mortar round on 8 June.

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Figure 45. A platoon of LVT(A)4s waiting for orders during the fighting for the Oroku Peninsula on Okinawa
Figure 45. A platoon of LVT(A)4s waiting for orders during the fighting for the Oroku Peninsula on Okinawa.

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The Okinawan campaign was the largest amphibious operation in the Pacific and represented the very latest thinking in LVT application. For the cargo amphibian, Okinawa represented the classic mix of assault delivery of troops against the enemy beachhead on D-Day followed by logistical support for the troops, often in situations where the LVT was the only vehicle that could get through. The latter occurred on Okinawa where sea resupply had to be used when the torrential rains made the island literally an ocean of mud. Figures are not available for a comparison of the stamina of the new LVT(3) versus its predecessor, the single-engined LVT(4), however, records show that the LVT(3) was very sensitive to the need for maintenance time in between operations or malfunctions would increase. Tracked vehicles as a family have this fault and even the long line of development leading to the LVT(3), using time-proven parts from the M5 light tank, did not greatly change its maintenance requirements.

The armored amphibian on Okinawa was used for the first time in large numbers to deliver artillery fire reinforcing conventional artillery, a use which has become a cornerstone of post-war doctrine and one which is totally compatible with the 75 mm howitzer design capabilities. The assault gun role of the LVT(A) was required in a landing until tanks came ashore to assume direct-fire infantry support. Occasional efforts have been made to design add-on equipment to float main battle tanks and the success of the T-6 floatation gear is notable. However, the Dual-Drive tanks of Normandy, which used a collapsible canvas screen erected to provide the necessary floatation, were generally lost at sea in the rougher waters of the English Channel. Until such time as a reliable floatation scheme can be designed for a main battle tank, and three

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decades later there has been no promise of such a successful apparatus, the role of the armored LVT is assured. The Marine Corps has continued to maintain the capability of reinforcing its landings with armored amphibians of the latest model rather than attempt to design floatation gear for its main battle tanks.

The disadvantages of the LVT(A)(4) were well known and development was underway during World War II's last months to rectify the lack of a gyro-stabilization system in its turret. The LVT(A)5, essentially an LVT(A)(4) with stabilization added, was scheduled for action in the Pacific, but the war ended before it could be employed.

World War II represented a period of intense development of the LVT for the speed with which new models arrived on the battlefield scene exceeded anything seen in post-war years. Necessity was, quite literally, the mother of invention. Yet, in retrospect, the LVT(1) possessed certain characteristics which were not matched by later LVTs, not the least of which was speed in the water. It must be recognized that the LVT represented a vital technical solution of a problem in warfare that had to be solved before victory could be achieved. It came to represent the desirable characteristics of armor protection, firepower, and mobility for the troops in the amphibious mode, and achieved the status of a required item for success with minimum loss of life. The confidence and state of mind of the LVT crews was clearly expressed in the closing pages of an early training manual on the LVT(3):

Yeah, it's been a long way. What's more, there's still a long tough road ahead. Don't kid yourself that it's going to be a picnic. It's not. These little yellow B------s we're trying to exterminate are screwy, fanatical fighters who get crazier the closer they get to home. They've got beliefs, too, even if they don't agree with ours. Before you can get them to change their minds, you'll probably have to ram an LVT down their oriental throats. And we hope you do it!26

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These might seem harsh, racist words today, but they represented the state of mind of the participants in a total war, not a war limited to a peninsula or to one country, and they typify the commitment developed by the combatants towards victory. If such words seem oddly out of place in war today, they at least serve to highlight to unique character of World War II as this country's only global, total war involvement. The LVT emerged from this war in almost its final form, yet modern wars require nuclear considerations and technology far in advance of that which confronted the LVT in World War II. Despite these changes, the LVT today remains basically similar in overall capabilities to the early Alligator conceived over forty years ago by Donald Roebling. A review of the further evolution of the vehicle from the end of World War II to the present will trace the trends that have developed to keep pace with the changes in war.

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Footnotes

1. Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Victory and Occupation, Vol. V of the History of the United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II (5 Vols.; Washington D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1968), p. 13.

2. Ibid., pp. 34-36.

3. Charles S. Nichols, Jr. and Henry I. Shaw, Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific (Washington D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1955), p. 50.

4. Ibid., pp. 50-52.

5. Frank and Shaw, Victory and Occupation, p. 40.

6. Ibid., pp. 80-81.

7. Nichols and Shaw, Okinawa, p. 304.

8. Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The United States Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 535.

9. Nichols and Shaw, Okinawa, p. 23.

10. Borg-Warner, Model B Amphibian Cargo Carrier (Sales Pamphlet, undated with no location), p. 3.

11. Ibid., p. 12.

12. Ibid.

13. Borg-Warner, Borg-Warner and You (Kalamazoo: Borg-Warner, 1945), p. 1.

14. Bureau of Ships, Meet the LVT(3): Technical Publication No. 7 (Washington: Bureau of Ships, 1944), p. 3.

15. Frank and Shaw, Victory and Occupation, p. 100.

16. Nichols and Shaw, Okinawa, p. 260.

17. Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, p. 535.

18. Nichols and Shaw, Okinawa, p. 260.

19. Ibid., p. 45.

20. Ibid., p. 64

21. Frank and Shaw, Victory and Occupation, p. 111.

22. Nichols and Shaw, Okinawa, p. 118.

23. Ibid., p. 154.

24. Ibid., p. 215.

25. Ibid., 218.

26. Bureau of Ships, Meet the LVT(3), p. 35.



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