Part IX
Successors to the Legend

The war that developed the LVT was unique in history both in its size and unlimited character. It was a war that brought land, sea, and air into total play for the first time for a level of devastation never before equalled across the globe. These unique conditions forged the LVT into a form that has not changed substantially to this day. The amtrac provided a technological answer to a crucial tactical requirement that led to strategic victory.

The development of the LVT, however, hardly proceeded in a straight line. As evident in the early campaigns at Guadalcanal and Bougainville, the amtrac was not intended as the combat vehicle it later came to be, but rather was initially perceived as a logistical asset for hauling supplies until trucks could arrive or to move goods over terrain no wheeled vehicle could traverse. In the logistical role, the LVT was unarmored and basically lightly armed with only machine guns for self‹ defense. Curiously, before the war, the possible combat use of the vehicle had been outlined in the early editions of the FTP-167, the bible on amphibious war. That it was not initially so used is more a reflection of military conservatism than any early lack of capability for assault landings. The vehicle was radical and untried, and commanders were unlikely to risk a new product on the first waves of a new war. From the first, however, the LVT appears to have fully satisfied expectations

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as a cargo carrier because at Guadalcanal and more particularly at Bougainville, the LVT was the prime rough-terrain cargo carrier and all-purpose vehicle.

If the landings in the Pacific had met less opposition, and if the Islands had no coral, the development of the LVT would have proceeded exclusively along cargo lines because the requirement for assault transport of troops might have been met by the trusty LCVP. Since the need for armor would have been minimized, the amtrac could have grown much larger to increase cargo capacity and the LVT(A) might never have been developed. In reality, the Pacific War was a part of a total war, and the LVT had to meet the test of combat as well as logistic use in the rear areas.

The need to use the LVT in the assault landing role introduced compromise into the design of a vehicle that was already a mass of compromises. Any amphibian must tread the thin line between use on land and employment in the water. To optimize the design for water travel would have given the vehicle a boat-like hull that would be very clumsy on land, yet a box-like hull with land treads would be too slow and dangerously unmanageable in water. The requirements of combat further complicated matters because armor then became an important addition and machine guns were no longer solely for self-defense but required considerable ammunition for suppressive fire as the vehicle approached the beach. The overall result was a loss in cargo space and capacity. Armor alone represented a thirty to forty-percent loss in cargo capacity, although, fortunately, much of it was the bolt-on type which could be dropped after the landing. Only the LVT(A)(2) was developed as an armored cargo carrier for use by the Army; all others remained cargo types with

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only limited amounts of armor permanently mounted on the cab, bow, and sides protecting the gasoline tanks.

The armored LVT was brought in to the full assault role for the first time in the Marshalls. It would be misleading to assume that the use of the LVT at Tarawa to land troops inspired the creation of the armored amphibian because (as stated in Chapter 2) as early as 1941, prior to U.S. entry into the war, Marine Corps and Navy personnel had discussed the need to build an armed amphibian to blast its way ashore against defenses. Due to studies such as those performed by the brilliant Lieutenant Colonel Pete Ellis, the nature of combat in the Pacific had been glimpsed. Opposed landings were expected and an armored amtrac could play a key role in gaining an early foothold. Development of the armored amphibian had started before World War II, but the onset of the war initially interrupted this trend while total effort was directed towards providing enough LVT(1)s to meet the immediate needs of the Marine Corps. With the progress of the war up to the Solomons, the development of the armored amphibian resumed, but the LVT(A)(1) did not enter production until July 1943, too late for Tarawa but in time for the long and complex campaign in the Marshalls.

Like the cargo amphibian, the development of the LVT(A) was not a sure process, and the first vehicle encountered problems in attempting to be something it was not -- a tank. The LVT(A)(1) mounted a tank turret with a tank gun and this expedient tended to shape its tactical use on land. Unfortunately, the compromises of design for an amphibian were especially harmful to the armored amphibian. The vehicle could not be as heavily armored as a tank or it would not float; nor could it be as compact and low in silhouette as a tank since this would not displace enough

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water and, again, it would not float. The use of a tank gun represented a quick solution to the need for a tested and available gun mounting and was the initial direction of the research effort when the M5 tank turret was used in the Borg-Warner Model A and adopted in the final design manufactured by Food Machinery Corporation. The LVT(A)(1) and the later (A)(4) fulfilled its tactical design purpose in water admirably, blasting the shore with its main gun as it approached the beach to keep the enemy pinned down to the last second. Once out of the water, however, the compromises in design, such as a high silhouette and thin armor, made it an easy mark for anti-tank fire.

Arming the amtrac with a 75 mm howitzer was a practical solution for both effectiveness in water and survival on land. Although the LVT(A)(4) was first used predominantly in direct fire roles, by the time it reached Okinawa it was recognized as a highly effective supplementary artillery piece on land, and this use maximized application of the gun, a howitzer, in the role for which it was designed and kept the vehicle in the rear, away from the deadly anti-tank fire that had caused so many casualties in the past.

The nature of World War II shaped the LVT into a water vehicle with many of the characteristics of the land tank including armor protection, firepower, and mobility. It became clear, however, that the tank's place in the order of battle was not threatened by the advent of the armored LVT but in fact was emphasized. The tank could not be compromised by thin armor for floatation and still be expected to survive in the battlefield, and so it was stoutly built and could accept a heavier, more powerful gun, thus making it the logical vehicle to lead the troops, a function it still performs today.

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The severity of World War II accelerated development of the LVT. A total of 18,616 LVTs of all types were produced during the conflict, and the LVT(1), (2), (3), and (4), plus three designs of armored amtracs, represent a hectic pace of development not matched by post-war years.1

The LVT(3) emerged from World War II as the standard cargo LVT of the Marine Corps with the LVT(A)(5) as its companion amtrac. The main difference between the LVT(A)(5) and the (A)(4) was the installation in the (A)(5) of a gyro-stabilization system to allow accurate shooting from the water. A significant modification was made to the LVT(3) during 1949 when its cargo compartment was covered by folding metal doors to block the entry of breaking waves and shield passengers from enemy grenades. A small turret mounting a machine gun was also added centered near the bow. The LVT(3)C (the "C" signifying it was covered) bore the brunt of the fighting in Korea, functioning more in the role of an armored personnel carrier on land than an amphibious vehicle in water-borne landings because the Korean struggle used the United States Marine Corps as much for its infantry fighting power as for its amphibious capability. Instead of short, sharp fights for islands, the Corps operated nearly continuously on land on the Korean Peninsula, requiring the LVT to assist more overland than over water. Along with the LVT(A)(5), the LVT(3)C performed its duties with efficiency and greater reliability since more maintenance time was generally available than during the hectic days of a major World War II landing in the Pacific. The LVT(3)C remained standard with the Marine Corps until the introduction of the first major post‹war design, the LVT(P)(5), in 1953.

The introduction of the LVT(P)(5) family of LVTs represented the fullest expansion of the role of the LVT. In addition to the basic personnel/cargo

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Figure 46. The LVT(3)C. This view shows the caliber .30 machine gun cupola
Figure 46. The LVT(3)C. This view shows the caliber .30 machine gun cupola.

Figure 47. The LVT(3)C. This view, shows the rear ramp. Vehicle is 
located at the LVT Museum, Camp Pendleton, California.
Figure 47. The LVT(3)C. This view, shows the rear ramp. Vehicle is located at the LVT Museum, Camp Pendleton, California.

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Figure 48. The LVT(P)(5)
Figure 48. The LVT(P)(5). This view shows the front ramp and rear engine design with the machine gun cupola forward in the center. The driver's hatch, surrounded by periscopes, is at the left front of the vehicle.

Figure 49. The rear view of the LVT(P)(5)
Figure 49. The rear view of the LVT(P)(5). The track provided the water drive with its paddle-like cleats in the center section of the track. The command version, with the exception of additional antenna, looks identical on the outside.

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Figure 50. The LVT(R)(1)
Figure 50. The LVT(R)(1). This retriever was highly effective. The boom apparatus is shown in its folded position for movement.

Figure 51. Rear view of the LVT(R)(1)
Figure 51. Rear view of the LVT(R)(1).

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Figure 52. The LVT(H)(6) with its powerful 105mm howitzer
Figure 52. The LVT(H)(6) with its powerful 105mm howitzer. This vehicle remains the only armored amtrac available for service, despite its age.

Figure 53. Rear view of the LVT(H)(6)
Figure 53. Rear view of the LVT(H)(6). This view shows the outline of the large turret that was specifically designed for this vehicle.

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version, designated with the "P", other specialized variants were researched and construction at the factory to complement particular missions rather than modified later from the basic cargo vehicle. In addition to the cargo LVT, a specialized retriever vehicle was constructed with two winches, a welding rig, a crane, and other maintenance accessories to assist other LVTs needing repair or towing. It had a maximum winch capacity with a single line of 45,000 pounds.2 A command vehicle, the LVT(C)(5), "C" for command, was produced to provide communications facilities to the unit commander in the mobile mode, a role first attempted on Saipan and one which has become very useful through the years. Communications operators In the command vehicle could send and receive on seven channels,'and monitor four additional channels. By contrast, the cargo version of the LVT(P)(5) had radio equipment sufficient to send and receive on one channel and listen on two channels. In addition, the LVT(C)(5) had space for chairs, tables, and map boards and has been used not only for command during amphibious landings, but also during mobile operations on land.3 The LVT family also expanded to include an engineer vehicle, fitted with an Imposing V‹shaped bulldozer blade with plow blades extending downwards to detonate mines, with the dual mission of clearing mines and breaching obstacles. It was also capable of firing a rocket-pulled, 350-foot line charge, resembling connected sausage, which would be detonated on the ground after being stretched to its full length by the rocket. The explosion cleared mines by sympathetic detonation in the area of the line charge and cleared a 350-foot lane for a vehicle to pass. In addition to the above array of vehicles, the new LVT family also included a redesigned armored LVT based on the new cargo vehicle's chassis, the LVT(H)(6), "H" for howitzer, which mounted a standard 105 mm artillery piece used throughout

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the Marine Corps and the United States Army, with an effective range of 12,000 yards. The LVT(H)(6) featured a fully enclosed turret designed specifically for the vehicle rather than an adaptation of an existing tank turret or self-propelled artillery motor carriage. With its standard artillery piece, the LVT(H)(6) was routinely used to provide artillery fires once ashore, an outgrowth of the World War 11 experience with howitzer-equipped armored amtracs.

The LVT(P)(5) family of vehicles were the largest and heaviest yet produced and represented the fullest range of LVT capabilities (command, cargo, armored amtrac, retriever), yet this advance in technology did not necessarily represent an overall increase in cargo capacity. The following is a table of comparison:

        LVT(3)       LVT(P)(5)
Length       24'6"       29'8"
Width       11'2"       11'81/2"
Height (top of vehicle)
           (top of machine gun cupola)
      9'11"       8'71/2"
10'1/2"
Weight (empty)       26,600 lbs.       69,780 lbs.
Cargo capacity       12,000 lbs.       12,000 lbs. (water)
18,000 lbs. (land only)
Speed (land)       17 mph       30 mph
           (water)       6 mph       6.8 mph
Engine Cadillac       V-8(2) Continental
each at 220 HP
      V-12 (1)
810 HP
Source: Robert J. Icks, "Landing Vehicles Tracked," in Armored Fighting Vehicles in Profile, ed. Duncan Crow (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), p. 162, and United States Marine Corps, Amphibian Vehicles: FMFM 9-2 (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps, 1971), pp. 94‹96.

The LVT(P)(5) family was used in combat in Viet Nam in a wide variety of roles from normal assault landing (although rarely against significant

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opposition) to resupply overland and employment in the swampy riverine environment of Viet Nam's rivers and delta regions. Although the vehicle was aging during the Viet Nam War, its availability remained high throughout most of the war with eighty percent or more remaining operational at any one time due to the complete maintenance facilities and personnel brought into Viet Nam for LVT support. LVT operations in Viet Nam were characterized by use of amtrac crewmen as infantry in addition to their duties with the vehicles and from this came the nickname "AmGrunts" ("Grunt" was the affectionate appellation given the hardworking infantryman). The armored amtrac, the LVT(H)(6), supplied artillery fire for LVT operations and for mobile infantry operations and won high praise from the infantry for its versatility and staying power under sustained operations.

As with any complex vehicle, age eventually made repeated rebuilding of the same engines and vehicles uneconomical. Even during Viet Nam, persistent failures of some key parts and hydraulic and fuel leaks signaled the approach of the end of the useful life of the LVT(P)(5). The Marine Corps, designated after World War II as the action agency for development of new LVTs, commenced design of a new family of LVTs, the LVT(P)(7), which began phase-in during the early 1970s. (No LVT(P)(6) design was ever developed.)

The design of the LVT(P)(7) represents a response to the shortcoming of the LVT(P)(5). The relative lack of maneuverability of the LVT(P)(5) in water was corrected in the LVT(P)(7) by a sophisticated water jet propulsion and steering system which allowed it to literally pivot on its own axis in the water. The ramp was in the rear of the vehicle, similar to the World War II position because the front placement was never popular with

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the hapless infantryman who must charge into the face of fire from a front ramp. The slow water speed of the LVT was always a major planning constraint and the LVT(P)(7) design represents an attempt to optimize its hull shape for better water performance with the net result of an improvement In water speed from 6 mph in the LVT(P)(5) to 8.4 mph in the LVT(P)(7). In achieving this, however, the boxy and cargo-efficient design of the LVT(P)(5) hull was discarded in favor of the new shape of the LVT(P)(7)--which does not allow as much troop or cargo capacity. The following comparison demonstrates the major differences:

        LVT(P)(5)       LVT(P)(7)
Length       29'8"       26'
Width       11'81/2"       10'33/4"
Height
  (top of vehicle)
  (top of machine gun cupola)
       
  8'71/2"
10'1/2"
       
9'9"
Weight       69,780 lbs.       40,000 lbs.
Cargo       12,000 lbs. (water)
18,000 lbs. (land)
      10,000 lbs.
Speed (land)
  (water)
      30 mph
  6 mph
      40 mph
  8.4 mph
Engine       Continental V-12
810 HP
      Detroit Diesel
400 HP
Source: United States Marine Corps, Amphibian Vehicles: FMFM 9-2 (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps, 1971), pp. 94-96, 106-107.

Post-war LVTs have been rated in troop capacity based on the spices provided by seating in contrast to the World War II practice of simply having the troops stand in the open-topped cargo compartments. With the advent of covered cargo compartments, troops could no longer comfortably stand and troop benches were provided. The LVT(P)(7) seats only twenty-five

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Figure 54. The LVT(P)(7)
Figure 54. The LVT(P)(7). This vehicle returned to the rear ramp and front engine design of the LVT(4), with the bow area modified for better water speed.

Figure 55. The LVT(C)(7)
Figure 55. The LVT(C)(7). The command version has seven antennae

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Figure 56. The LVT(R)(7), rear view
Figure 56. The LVT(R)(7), rear view. The boom operator's seat is just visible with control levers in front of the seat.

Figure 57. The UH-1 Iroquois
Figure 57. The UH-1 Iroquois. Standard light helicopter flown by all services.

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combat equipped troops versus the old LVT(P)(5) which could seat thirty-four.

The LVT(P)(7) family of vehicles has not reached the level of diversity of the older LVT(P)(5). There are no new armored amtracs; the LVT(H)(6) remains the only available armored amtrac and it is currently in preservative storage. There are no armored amtrac battalions active in the Marine Corps. The engineer vehicle, although developed, has not been fully introduced, primarily because of money. The passenger/cargo version; the command vehicle, LVT(C)(7), and the retriever, LVT(R)(7), constitute the new family of the LVT(P)(7), and this shrinkage raises a fundamental question regarding the future of the vehicle. As in the past, it is a high-maintenance vehicle that wears rapidly and is costly to replace. With cost-effectiveness as a phrase permanently enshrined in the consciousness of the Defense Department planners since the McNamara Era, they are willing to invest only as many dollars as are justified and this justification involves looking at what other options are available in today's amphibious operations for delivering troops and supplies ashore. No discussion of the post-war LVT can be complete without mentioning the role of the greatest single tactical innovation in amphibious warfare since the LVT, the helicopter.

The helicopter was used during World War II, but only in the most limited roles such as messenger service and limited observation. In the post‹war years the capabilities of this remarkable machine improved to the point where military applications were developed. The first uses were sea‹air rescue and resupply but the last years of the Korean War saw some used for troop transport. As the study of helicopter employment continued, the concept of "vertical envelopment" was created. Essentially

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this concept viewed the helicopter as a means of delivering troops and supplies inland behind the beaches, either in concert with a surface assault or separately. Helicopter capability would force the enemy to consider a vast number of possible landing sites, a problem very difficult to solve because defenders cannot be everywhere at once with any significant strength. Helicopters in the vertical envelopment phase of an amphibious landing would be organized in waves much like the surface assault and designated helicopter landing zones would receive air strikes or naval gunfire just as surface assaults did prior to launching.

The workhorse of the Marine Corps in the early years of development was the H-19 Chickasaw, built by Sikorsky, with a crew of two and accommodations for ten combat-equipped troops. Far heavy lift, the Sikorsky CH-37 Mojave was developed in the years immediately after the Korean War and could carry thirty-six troops.

Helicopters have generally followed the pattern of light, medium, and heavy types with the light helicopter used for observation, small lifts of personnel, and to provide commanders with an outstanding command vehicle for observation of the battle field. The medium helicopter primarily carries the assault waves of troops landing in the airborne portion of the amphibious operation. The heavy helicopter is used as a cargo lift vehicle but may be used for troop lift if available.

The current medium lift helicopter is the CH-46 Sea Knight which can lift twenty‹five troops or carry a 6,600 pound cargo for a distance of 109 miles at sea level.4 The current heavy lift helicopter is the CH-53 Sea Stallion, a fast helicopter capable of going 200 mph and lifting up to sixty-four combat-equipped troops or over 15,000 pounds of cargo.5 From the above figures it can be seen that the CH-46 can carry as many

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Figure 58. The CH-46 Sea Knight
Figure 58. The CH-46 Sea Knight. This veteran helicopter is made by Boeing Vertol and is primarily for troop transport.

Figure 59. The CH-53 Sea Stallion
Figure 59. The CH-53 Sea Stallion, made by Sikorsky, is primarily for cargo. This is the first helicopter in the world to perform an aerial loop.

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troops as the LVT(P)(7), and the heavy lift helicopter can outlift the LVT by about 5,000 pounds. It is not surprising therefore that with these capabilities the helicopter was the chief vehicle for moving men and supplies in Viet Nam. The LVT was employed in a wide variety of tasks, but its operations were generally restricted to swamp or water areas best suited to its amphibious capability while the helicopter ranged over the entire countryside. Helicopter medical evacuation was a great morale boost to the troops in the field in Viet Nam because they knew the response time on an emergency evacuation call was as little as five minutes.

Although the CH-46 and the CH-53 were both used extensively in Viet Nam, no recommendation was ever made to replace Marine Corps surface assault capability in the LVT with the vertical envelopment of the helicopter. Replacing or eliminating the LVT is not a practical solution at this time because the helicopter has some definite shortcomings such as significant reliance on the weather. For example, if visibility is below a quarter mile, the helicopter becomes unusable. The helicopter also has maintenance problems similar in severity to the LVT, and availability of operational machines, even with sufficient servicing, can vary widely from one day to the next. The helicopter has a demonstrated vulnerability to ground fire from small arms as seen in Viet Nam, and the crash of a helicopter usually results in very high losses among the passengers.

The maintenance of the dual capability of landing on the beach against opposition and attacking inland with helicopters represents a desirable mix that will be maintained in the future. The all-weather capability of the LVT is a necessary back-up to the weather-sensitive

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helicopter, but the slow water speed of the LVT is causing significant concern among Marine Corps planners of future amphibious operations against enemies armed with sophisticated weapons. Modern missile artillery can deliver nuclear and heavy conventional explosives over very long distances and this long-range capability, plus the overall threat of nuclear war at any time, forces the amphibious attacker to resort to ever greater dispersion of his task forces to prevent too great a loss from artillery or nuclear strikes. One result of this necessary dispersion is the need to launch LVTs at a greater distance from shore and to lengthen the run into the beach. If ships launched the LVT at normal distances of less than 5,000 yards, they are too vulnerable to an array of hard-hitting enemy guided missiles that can be launched from shore or from patrol boats protecting the coast. Radar, the ever-present guardian of many coastlines in the world today, would have ample time to track the attackers and launch additional radar-guided rockets and aircraft, regardless of weather or time of day. The Navy desires to develop an over‹the‹horizon capability for launching amphibious assaults to defeat enemy radar, and while this is possible with the helicopter, such a launch at sea for the LVT (about twenty-five miles is considered distance to horizon) would necessitate over three hours in the water for the new LVT(P)(7) traveling at 8 mph. This great length of time gives the enemy far too much time to bring his weapons to bear on this vulnerable target and tends to fix the amphibious task forces in place while they attempt to protect the LVTs as they move towards shore. In addition, the troops would be in poor condition after a three-hour ride in an LVT and many sea-sick men would be facing the crisis of their lives on the hostile beach at a time when they need absolutely clear heads. Something must be

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done to correct this situation, but the history of the development of the LVT offers little hope of improvement. In fact, the reader may recall that early test versions of the LVT(1) attained water speeds of over 9 mph, a figure not equalled to this day. The amtrac represents a compromise of many conflicting requirements and continuous development over thirty-five years has not created a break-through in this critical area, nor is any on the horizon. Many Marines agree that the present LVT(P)(7) represents the last of its kind. A new vehicle for modern war must be developed to solve the problem of water speed to reduce the time spent in making long runs to the beach. Fortunately there are some alternative surface vehicles that may inherit the amtrac legend.

It is not widely known that the air cushion vehicle (ACV), which rides on a cushion of air forced out at the bottom, was combat tested in the Viet Nam War and has proven its ability to move at speeds up to 60 mph. Large versions of the ACV transport passengers across the English Channel, although ACVs used in Viet Nam carried no more than a squad of ten men and were used in the swamp and riverine environments to patrol large areas. To date, however, the ACV has poor lift capability and requires a great deal of power for lift and forward motion. It is also a relatively noisy machine that can be heard for quite a distance. Another alternative is the hydro‹foil used on boats which is also capable of great speed, but has the serious drawback of being unable, in its present form, to move onto land. The ACV is capable of moving from water to land without even slowing down although its mobility on land is limited and it is unable to negotiate broken terrain. At this time, most of the Marine Corps' attention is focused on the ACV as the successor to the amtrac and its final combat design will incorporate many real constraints

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including the need to adapt the ACV to fit within available Navy transport ships. Currently, there is little real progress towards developing a practical ACV due to the lack of money for an extended research and development program. There is a real gap between the squad-carrying ACVs of Viet Nam and a vehicle that could carry a 10,000 pound cargo in an amphibious operation of the future. A comprehensive design effort is required to bring the ACV concept into the realm of practicality, but it appears it will be some time before such an effort can be funded.

The design of the ACV of the future for amphibious operations represents another round in the continuing interaction between war and technology. Given a set of conditions, if time permits, science and engineering will design a new answer to the problem of amphibious war in the 1970s and 1980s, essentially repeating the story of the LVT. World War II generated new amphibious requirements and the solution in the form of the LVT appeared just as radical as the ACV might appear to some today. Nevertheless, a solution must be achieved or this nation's military posture will be irretrievably degraded.

It is possible that the Central Pacific drive might have been successful without the LVT in World War II. Tremendous bombardment, in combination with something like parachute assault, a costly form of attack, or a landing using only the LCVP (also very costly if not prohibitive) might have succeeded. It would have been slower at best, possibly unsuccessful, and the net result would have been a longer war with many more lives lost. Today, the stakes are higher. The radar guidance systems and missiles of the modern battle field are far more accurate and have greater hitting power than anything else seen by man and unless the right vehicle is used, total failure is predictable. The

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present LVT is simply much too slow in the water for the job. The need is for a ten-fold increase in speed, or the gap will be too great in view of the modern weaponry that will be defending the beaches.

One can only hope that the future solution will work as well as the LVT did in World War II. The new vehicle will have a legend to follow, a legend that started in Guadalcanal and continued across the Pacific against beaches that were fanatically defended. Future defenders must be made to feel impending defeat as the Japanese, North Koreans, and North Vietnamese felt when they saw the LVTs climb over all obstacles and come at them, spitting fire from their machine guns and howitzers, on their way into the pages of history.

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Footnotes

1. Robert J. Icks, "Landing Vehicle Tracked," in Armored Fighting Vehicles in Profile, ed. Duncan Crow (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), p. 161.

2. United States Marine Corps, Amphibious Vehicles: FMFM 9-2 (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps, 1971), p. 105.

3. Ibid., p. 173.

4. John W. R. Taylor and Gordon Swanborough, Military Aircraft of the World (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1973), p. 23.

5. Ibid., p. 123.



Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation