CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF BASES IN
NEWFOUNDLAND, ICELAND AND GREENLAND


While Admiral Bristol had been concerned with whipping the Support Force into a smoothly operating organization and planning for prospective operations in the British Isles, he was equally concerned with the establishment of the bases in the North Atlantic. This was particularly true of the air bases. Before he could get his planes to the British Isles he had to have some aviational stepping stones. That is also what the United States Government had in mind when it gained access to the territory in Newfoundland from the British on terms of a ninety-nine year lease. It is development and use of the bases in Newfoundland, Iceland, and Greenland, from which units of the Support Force were to operate in increasing numbers, that now became Admiral Bristol's primary interest.

Construction work had been started on the base at Argentia, Newfoundland, early in the year and this work had been progressing all during the time Admiral Bristol had been training the Support Force for the work that he anticipated would take him to the British Isles. However, he found that actually his work was bringing him into much closer contact with the bases in the North Atlantic. Going back to the beginning of May we find that on 6 May, 1941,

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the Commanding Officer of the USS GEORGE E. BADGER (AVD 3) made a report on advanced base facilities at Argentia to the Commander Support Force. In it he stated that he talked with Commander R. V. Miller, C.E.C. and Lt.(jg) Silliman, C.E.C. NR, officer in charge of construction and resident officer in charge, respectively. They informed him that temporary facilities for beaching a 12 plane patrol squadron could be constructed at Argentia on six weeks notice without affecting the work on the main project to any great extent.1 The report continues:

Argentia harbor is 1.8 miles in length and is excellent for landings and take-offs with a southwest, north, or northeast wind. There are hills of varying heights up to 500 feet along the take-off route when taking off the sound in an easterly direction, however, the take off run available can be increased to any distance desired as the area is unlimited to the westward. At the present time there are about thirty fishing vessels in their present location will seriously interfere with seaplane operations.

These boats were being used to lodge men working on the construction project, but the resident officer in charge of construction said that they could be moved elsewhere.

In speaking of the general status of the progress of construction, the report had this to say: "None of the permanent facilities will be ready for use for a number of

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months. Nine shiploads of materials have been delivered. A vast amount of construction equipment is at work building roads, grading land plane runways, and doing general grading." The RICHARD PECK, which had provided the original facilities, had been supplemented by a complete construction camp. At the southeast end of the peninsula a dock for unloading purposes had been built and this was being extended.

About 2,000 men are now employed and the force is being rapidly expanded. There are no housing facilities. The bottom or cargo deck of the steamer RICHARD PECK is largely empty. Resident officer-in-charge of construction advises that this space can be made into staterooms to accommodate more than one hundred men. In addition, the space occupied by the Marine Detachment aboard this vessel will be vacated upon completion of the temporary barracks.

All the officers attached to the base at that time2 were quartered on the RICHARD PECK.

An aerological detail under the command of Lieutenant F. B. Stephens, USN had arrived in Argentia on 3 May, 1941. This unit, according to the report was to be functioning in all respects not later than 10 May, 1941. Although no recorded data was available at Argentia, they were able to obtain considerable local information which they felt to be reliable from Mr. I. F. Murphy, who had always lived

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in this area. Lt. Stephens was the first Commanding Officer of the Argentia Base. (Later in the spring it was decided to make Argentia a Naval Operating Base as well as a Naval Air Station, and after the necessary plans and alterations were made, it went into commission as such on 15 July, 1941.)

About this time the Iceland and Greenland operations were underway and Admiral Bristol had been given the responsibility for them. Dropping back a little, we find that on the 7th of March the Director of War Plans Division wrote a memorandum to Admiral Stark concerning the reconnaissance of Iceland:

Although Iceland is a potential light force and air base of importance in connection with the protection of shipping in the northwestern approaches to the British Isles, the information available to the Navy Department with respect to Iceland is not sufficiently complete and reliable for use in planning with respect to the actual use of Iceland as an operating base for destroyers and patrol planes.

It is recommended that a destroyer from the Support Force, Atlantic Fleet, with one or more naval aviators from the patrol squadrons of the same force, be sent to Iceland as soon as practicable to investigate and report on aviation operating conditions, and the problems which may be involved in basing light forces and seaplanes in Iceland.3

A week later Admiral Bristol sent out the following letter to the Commanders of Support Force Destroyers and Support Force Patrol Wing concerning the proposed reconnaissance of Iceland:

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It has been proposed that the U.S. Navy make a reconnaissance of Iceland with a view to its use as a base for destroyers and patrol planes engaged in the protection of shipping in the northwest approaches to the British Isles.

It is expected that a destroyer of DesRon 7 will be used for this purpose, and that a civil engineer and one or more aviators from PatWing SupFor will be detailed for the reconnaissance.

The Force Commander anticipates that the CNO will issue a directive and will furnish for guidance a folder of existing information and war plans studies.

Limited information is now available in the files of the Force Commander for preliminary study by personnel who may be expected to conduct the proposed reconnaissance.

Addressees be prepared to carry out reconnaissance promptly, if ordered, preparations to include selection of ship and personnel and preliminary estimates of logistic requirements.

/s/ Robt. B. Carney
Acting Chief of Staff4

On 5 April the Commander Support Force ordered the NIBLACK to Iceland for a short stay. Enroute she was to stop in at Halifax and consult the British Admiralty as necessary in connection with navigation and convoy routings, weather information, communications, ice conditions, movement of belligerent vessels, logistics, official contacts, currency, and other information pertaining to the success of the mission. The mission was to determine the suitability of Iceland for the operation of air craft and surface vessels and to obtain specific information on

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conditions and facilities existing at that time; also the possibility of increase thereof for immediate operations. It was to be estimated how many destroyers and how many squadrons of tender based planes could operate from Iceland if the United States was to use it as a base under existing war plans. On the 8th of April Admiral Bristol writes from the USS PRAIRIE at Newport, saying that a study of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet's intentions and plans indicates that the operation of patrol planes from Iceland is to be expected. If this task is assigned to the Support Force, Bristol said he would need a second large aircraft tender in addition to ALBERMARLE. He suggested the USS POCOMOKE. The reason for this request was that existing Support Force plans had committed the use of ALBERMARLE to areas other than Iceland. (That is, Bristol planned on having it in the British Isles for his patrol planes when they were supposed to arrive there.) Towards the end of the month NIBLACK returned from the far north to Newport, arriving on the 28th of April with her mission completed.

On 9 April, 1941, the United States Agreements with Denmark were completed. (Previous to this, the USCGC CAYUGA had landed a party of men for the purposes of survey.) The agreement was signed with the Danish Minister, Henrik de Kauffman, on behalf of the King of German-occupied Denmark.

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It gave the United States the right to establish American air bases and other naval and military facilities on Denmark' s strategic island possession.

The United States was particularly interested in Greenland for several reasons over and above the fact they wanted to prevent the establishment of Axis weather stations and the threat of possible German occupation. It could be used to our own advantage by setting up United States weather stations and bases for iceberg patrols; airfields located there could be used both for reconnaissance flights and stop over points for trans-Atlantic plane ferry flights; and then there was the cryolite mine at Ivigtut which although Danish controlled, was vitally important to the Allied aluminum industry. This was the only accessible mine of its kind in the world, and without cryolite the rapidly expanding and highly essential aluminum industry in the United States would be greatly crippled.

The Chief of Naval Operations stated that President Roosevelt had approved of joint plans for preventing German operations in Greenland, but at the time no United States garrison was to be established in northeast Greenland. However, survey expeditions and plane patrols were to be conducted under the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet's cognizance. Germany had made numerous attempts to establish

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weather stations in Northeast Greenland, and because she might attempt something like this again, Admiral King was ordered to send an expedition to Greenland composed of the Coast Guard vessels NORTHLAND, BEAR, and NORTH STAR. Admiral Stark also wanted King to send a section of patrol planes and tender to Reykjavik, Iceland, as soon as possible, using Iceland as a reconnaissance base to cover the region between Mackenzie Bay and Cape Brewster and the vicinity of Angmagassalik in Greenland to determine possible German activities.5

9 May, 1941: Under this date Admiral King informed the Commander Support Force that his despatches of 18 April and the 3rd and 8th of May had to do with the establishment and maintenance of a group at Argentia "to include one destroyer division and not less than six planes, the latter with suitable tender service."6 This same letter also directed the Commander Support Force to send a detachment from the Argentia group of not more than four patrol planes and a tender, and at least one destroyer as plane guard, to base in Iceland, near Reykjavik. From there, they were ordered to carry out a reconnaissance to determine the presence or absence of an Axis detachment in the Scoresby Sound area of Greenland.

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The Commander Support Force acknowledged, stating his compliance, and he sent Admiral King a contemplated schedule of operations showing the prospective movements of the Argentia Groups and Greenland Reconnaissance Task Units.7

Naval Operations had evidently anticipated this move, for Bristol's acting Chief of Staff, Commander Carney, says in a Support Force memorandum, "there is being issued a directive from CNO covering the procedure for securing permission for ships and planes to visit Halifax. I was instructed to consider this procedure already in effect as far as we are concerned."8 This procedure amounted to twenty-four hours previous notification of authorities in Halifax, giving as much information about the ship or plane and its

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intended duration of stay as was practicable. Carney said that he was informed at War Plans that there was no objection to sending ships or planes to Halifax for any reasonable purpose.

It is evident then that the ground work was pretty well planned when on 11 May Admiral King requested Commander Mullinnix to notify Canadian authorities that two seaplane tenders and four destroyers would base at Argentia beginning 16 May, and that VP-52 would skirt the east coast of Nova Scotia about 18 May, enroute to Argentia. On the 12th of May Mullinnix published his Operation Order 14-41, which authorized a "Greenland Reconnaissance Flight"9. In it Commander Mullinnix stated that it was suspected that a German controlled weather station was in operation in Greenland, although no definite information was available. The force was to proceed to Iceland, conduct aerial reconnaissance flights over Greenland, and return to Newfoundland at the earliest practicable date. (The flight was actually made from May 31st to June 6th, 1941.) On the 15th of May the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a despatch notifying Admiral Bristol that arrangements had been made through the

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State Department for the BELKNAP plus two destroyers to visit Halifax for fuel that day. This seems to be the first instance of any Support Force vessel using a belligerent country's port for fueling.

Bristol later received word from London that there might be a German observation station on the East Coast of Greenland, just north of Aggas Island, and that this station might have been visited by German aircraft. Therefore, on 16 May, the Admiral wrote to the Senior Naval Aviator, Iceland reconnaissance Group, and told him to include the vicinity of Aggas Island in the area to be covered by the aerial reconnaissance patrol planes operating from Iceland.10

Evidently Admiral Bristol wanted some on-the-spot information with regard to how his northern operations were getting along, for on 20 May two PBY flying boats departed from Newport, Rhode Island for Argentia with Admiral Towers and Admiral Bristol on board. Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal had intended to accompany them, but was prevented by complications at the last minute. Apparently this was the first time Admiral Bristol had been in Argentia, and he must have found things to his satisfaction, for later it became his headquarters for operations.

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On the same day the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a letter to the effect that operations would be required to support Army expeditions to be sent to Greenland to establish an air base in the vicinity of Julianehaab11, and to explore the region of Angmagssalik for air field sites. The USS MUNARGO, USCGC COMANCHE and the CG ice-breaking tug RARITAN would be equipped to transport Army personnel and material for that purpose, leaving for Greenland about 12 June. The BOWDOIN, owned by Lt. Comdr. D. B. McMillan, USNR, was expected to be made available to the Navy for operations, although McMillan had not yet been recalled to active duty. MUNARGO and RARITAN were to take the Army to Julianehaab and COMANCHE was to take personnel and material for exploration to the Angmagssalik area. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, was to provide a convoy escort group for the expedition.12

A directive was sent out to Commander Support Force (CTF 4) from Admiral King on 21 May to take precautionary measures against attacks on southwest Greenland, particularly on Ivigtut and the cryolite mine located there. The NORTHLAND was also directed to make ready an armed force to protect

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this mine with the MODOC standing by during the absence of the NORTHLAND.13 (The Chief of Naval Operations had ordered the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to take precautionary measures against attacks on the mine.) The defenses under the Greenland Government consisted of a small detachment of former Coast Guard men with one 3-inch gun, machine guns, rifles, and pistols. These were experienced men, and had purposely been taken out of the Coast Guard so that they might be hired by the Government for the defense of Greenland and, specifically, the cryolite mine at Ivigtut. They remained in the employ of the Greenland Government for several years, and then in 1942, went back into the Coast Guard when their services were no longer required.

1 June, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations stated that the South Greenland patrol was established as of this date.14 Furthermore, this Task Force of the South Greenland Patrol was to operate directly under the Chief of Naval Operations.15

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On the same day the USCGC NORTHLAND was ordered by Admiral Stark to report to Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet for special duty. The same orders were received by NORTH STAR and BEAR, and they reported that they would be ready 10 June and 16 June respectively. Also, on or about June 1st Commander E. H. Smith reported to Admiral King for duty. This was in connection with a Chief of Naval Operations directive which ordered King to send out the Northeast Greenland Patrol as early in the season as ice conditions would permit, and the patrol was to be in the Greenland area until late in the summer.16 They were to smoke out possible Axis activities, and generally patrol the area of Northeast Greenland.

About this time Admiral Bristol had returned from his trip to Argentia, for on the 29th of June he was back in Norfolk on the PRAIRIE, continuing Support Force exercises, and on 5 June, he departed for Newport, conducting training exercises enroute. He had one destroyer and three planes from VP-53 make raider attacks on him as though he were a convoy, in order that his men and supporting units could simulate battle practice.

Commander Task Force 4 sent out his Operation Plan No. 6-41 on 3 June 1941 which gave the task organization for the

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Greenland Advanced Base Air Detachment.17 After he had this plan all made up, using Ivigtut as the area for the base, he sent out a secret despatch, changing it to Narsarssuak. On this operation the Navy was doing reconnaissance work looking for an advanced Army Air Base site in the locality between Narsarssuak and Angmagssalik, where they were to conduct a photographic survey. The Task Group18 was to remain in Argentia until ice conditions in Greenland were favorable. They were informed that after 22nd of June there would be a Navy tanker with fuel at Argentia.

About a week later, on 11 June, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote the Commander Third Naval District in reference to the order of the USS MUNARGO, stating that MUNARGO would depart from New York 19 June, and was to arrive in Argentia on 23 June.

The following vessels will proceed in company with the MUNARGO from New York to S.W. Greenland; Coast Guard Cutter COMANCHE, and the motorship, NORA. The latter vessel has been chartered by the Army, and will be manned by a crew of Army Transport Service. The CG tug RARITAN will also be directed to rendezvous enroute to Argentia, and will continue with the expedition to Tunugliarfik Fjord. For the information of those concerned, Commander Support Force, Atlantic Fleet, will provide an escort detachment of three destroyers (the Newport Group) to accompany MUNARGO and other vessels of the expedition from New York to Greenland. On departure from Newfoundland, the USS GOLDSBOROUGH (AVD 5) will join the escort group and proceed in company therewith

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until arrival off S.W. Greenland, at which time that vessel will then proceed independently to Ivigtut.

By 12 June, Bristol at Newport informed King that he was in a bad way with only seven destroyers available; others were in Navy Yards for overhaul; an Iceland Detail, composed of the BROOME, TRUXTON, and BAINBRIDGE would not be available before 23 June; BAINBRIDGE was acting as a plane guard from Argentia for the Iceland flight scheduled for the 11th of June; COLE and OVERTON were at that time escorting the USAT ALEXANDER from St. John's, Newfoundland, to New York, departing as of 12 June; REUBEN JAMES and SIMPSON were escorting the MUNARGO convoy from St. John's to Ivigtut; and McCORMICK and TARBELL were scheduled to escort the MUNARGO convoy about 12 June to the vicinity of St. John's and join the Argentia detachment. All four tenders were scattered from Argentia north on various operations, so none were available at the time. Outside of this Bristol had two available mine sweepers, others being overhauled, and a maximum of thirty-three planes on which he could call, most of these being on patrol operations.19 This gives a good overall picture of how busy on a variety of assignments Commander Task Force 4's ships and planes were, in spite of the fact that the Support Force had only been in existence a little over five months.

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Also on the 12th of June, Admiral Bristol received a memorandum from his Chief of Staff concerning the Northeast Greenland Patrol.20 Captain Denfeld noted that Commander E. H. Smith, USCG, Prospective Commander of the Northeast Greenland Patrol, had presented the following facts and recommendations at a conference on board the USS AUGUSTA on 10 June 1941. Commander Smith had stated that the Patrol would consist of the NORTHLAND, NORTH STAR, and BEAR, and that these ships were preparing for this expedition in Boston, to be ready not later than 20 June. The Commander proposed to be off the Northeast Coast of Greenland about 15 July, the earliest that operations could be undertaken because of ice conditions, and planned to leave about 1 September --- approximately as late as the ice would permit his remaining in the vicinity. Captain Denfeld commented:

The entire value of his expedition, in finding and destroying German radio stations, is surprise. Otherwise, the Germans will inform their Government as to ships in the vicinity and they will establish new stations and possibly bomb our ships to prevent them from carrying out their mission.

When asked about the conditions in southwest Greenland, Commander Smith stated that,

Kungnait Bay, in the vicinity of Ivigtut, was the best place for patrol planes to base; that the winds reach as high as 70 knots in gusts at times in the bay, and it would be essential to provide portable runways to haul

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out the planes, and means to secure them. Winds of this strength only last for a short time, and occur only occasionally.21

He said that an aircraft tender could enter Kungnait Bay in the summer, but might have some delay in entering and leaving at the beginning and end of the summer, respectively, due to drift ice. It was felt that the ice-breaker tug RARITAN could clear ice for ships going in or out any time between July and September. He recommended several sites for the establishment of radio and meteorological stations and the selection of joint Army -Navy-Coast Guard air and seaplane sites along the east coast of Greenland. Finally he remarked upon the lack of fuel supply in Greenland.

The Chief of Naval Operations promulgated the Basic Joint Army and Navy Plan for the defense of Greenland on 13 June, 1941. This was not a war plan. As has been previously noted, on 9 April, 1941, articles of agreement were signed, giving the United States construction rights for military facilities in Greenland which might be used as necessary to protect that country. On 12 April, 1941, the Joint Planning Committee received a directive from the Joint Board, stating that on 9 April, the President had announced the signing of the agreement and directing that a basic joint plan for the defense of Greenland be prepared. This plan was drawn up and approved by the President

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on 7 June 1941. Provision was made for the Greenland Government's requests that Ivigtut be furnished the maximum possible military protection; That the United States leave the existing radio network under the control of Greenland authorities, and set up its own communication system.

The importance of cryolite to the aluminum industries of both the United States and United Kingdom, coupled with the vulnerability of Ivigtut made this mine an attractive and perhaps profitable object of attack. The mine was subject to flooding in the event of a rupture of the protective seawall through sabotage or hostile action, and at this time it was only protected by a small group of inadequately armed former United States Coast Guardsmen, hired by the Greenland Government.

Tentatively, Kungnait Bay was selected as the best site in Southwest Greenland for operation patrol planes from a tender, and the United States planned to establish one or more landing fields in Greenland for the purpose of staging aircraft to England. A survey was made and a tentative landing field had been selected at the head of Tunugliarfik Fjord, near Julianehaab. Further surveys planned to locate landing fields in the Angmagssalik area on the east coast, and another on the west coast, probably around Sondrestrom Fjord. However, with the exception of airfields, United

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States installations requiring defense would be limited to radio and weather stations, and fuel and supply depots.

Word had been received on 17 June from the British Military Mission at Washington that the British Admiralty contemplated establishing an advance base for convoy forces at St. John's; that plans called for 3O DD's, 24 corvettes, and 2 sloops to be in the harbor in the near future.22

On 21 June 1941 Commander E. H. Smith ordered the Commanding Officers of the NORTH STAR and BEAR to report to him, as Commander of Task Force 11, for duty. Admiral Bristol's Operation Plan No. 8-41 shows on the Task Organization of the Northeast Greenland Patrol.23 This force, along with the South Greenland Patrol, was standing by from this time on for the patrol and defense of Greenland.

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On the 24th of June the Chief of Naval Operations sent a letter to the Army Chief of Staff in answer to the latter's memo of 19 June. (This memo was concerned with the location of airfield sites in Labrador, and on Baffin Island.) Admiral Stark said the Navy would cooperate in accomplishing this purpose; that it would require a naval detachment including two patrol planes and one small sea-plane tender. The latter was to be supplied by Admiral King, and the Commanding Officer of the 21st Reconnaissance Squadron was to cooperate with him. Stark further stated that the Navy Department would initiate, through the State Department, the necessary diplomatic arrangements, and would have aviation fuel available in the early part of July at Cartwright, Hebron, and Lade Harbor. Support Force planes were assisting in the survey of the coast of Labrador and Baffin Island.24

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The Chief of Naval Operations informed the Commander Support Force on the 20th of June that the vicinity of the base airdromes site in Greenland at Narsarssuak was a better base for patrol planes than Kungnait Bay at Ivigtut. It afforded a more sheltered body of water for ship and plane anchorages, a better beach for hauling out planes, and was 100 miles closer to the area of operations for the east coast reconnaissance group. (The change of the advanced air base to Narsarssuak area was authorized in ComSupFor's Operation Plan No. 6-41.) On the following day the GOLDSBOROUGH reported that she had arrived in Reykjavik, and on the same day the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to detail immediately two patrol planes and one Bird class tender to cooperate with the Commanding officer of the 21st Army Air Reconnaissance Squadron at Newfoundland airport. They were to assist in locating airdrome sites in Labrador and Baffin Island for the War Department. This detachment was to be assembled at Argentia as soon as possible, and in the meantime the Royal Canadian Air Force was to make aviation gasoline available at Cartwright, Hebron, and Lake Harbor and in Newfoundland25. Commander Task Group 4.2 (Captain Mullinnix) drew the assignment and reported on the 30th that

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LAPWING and planes for both the Labrador and the MUNARGO expeditions were ready; that two planes would depart from Argentia for Labrador on the first of July, but that the Commander in Chief of the Labrador party would not use LAPWING until the l5th of July.

Commander Battleship Division 5 (Rear Admiral LeBreton) was told on 1 July 1941 by Admiral Stark to proceed and execute the task report planned in accordance with departure dates and times. This started troops on the final leg of their trip from Argentia to Iceland.26

On 9 July Admiral Bristol in a letter concerned with refueling bases along the Newfoundland and Labrador Coasts says that,

Support Force planes are already assisting in a survey of the coast of Labrador and Baffin Island, with Cartwright and Hebron, Labrador and Lake Harbor, Baffin Land as operating points. It is probable that future operations in this general area will necessitate the use of refueling stations by planes of this Force, since the services of tenders cannot be counted on, due to availability and to the distance involved.27

The 16th of July found LAPWING at Lake Harbor from which place she reported to the Argentia Group that an Eskimo, picked up that morning, had guided the ship past the reefs guarding the entrance to the harbor; that the ship was at that time anchored at the foot of the bay, which was

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completely ice free. LAPWING stated that she would be able to handle both party and planes the following morning, and that the site was ideal, being large and well sheltered. The only draw back was that the entire coast was rock bound, and beaching planes was impossible. Admiral Bristol directed LAPWING that on the return of planes to Argentia from Lake Harbor -- about 25 July -- to proceed to Narsarssuak and report to MUNARGO. After fueling she should establish a base at Kungnait Bay or Narsarssuak if directed by the MUNARGO.

On 18 July, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations promulgated the "Joint Army and Navy Directive for the reinforcement of the Defenses of Iceland with a United States Army Pursuit Squadron (and Service Detachment)." The short title for this directive was Indigo-1. Previously, on 5 July, the President, in orders given orally to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, directed that one Army Pursuit Squadron with the necessary detachments for the maintenance and administration be sent to Iceland as soon as practicable to reinforce the defense of Iceland. Based on that directive, the Joint Planning Committee prepared the Joint Army and Navy Directive. According to this, the 33rd Pursuit Squadron with accompanying units was scheduled to be sent to Iceland about 27 July, 1941, designated Task Force 4, First Echelon, the Navy supplying

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the necessary sea transportation for troops, supplies, and planes. The Navy would exercise unity of command over all forces during the embarkation, transport and debarkation of the squadron.28

Admiral Bristol stated on 24 July that wide spread patrol plane operations were taxing his limited tender service to capacity, and he requested that the three tenders POCOMOKE, BARNEGAT, and BISCAYNE, then in various stages of construction, be speeded up and their final shake downs be cancelled. Moreover, the operating pace waxed even hotter, for on 30 July the tender USS GOLDSBOROUGH left Newport with ground personnel and material of patrol plane squadrons, arriving at Reykjavik about a week later, to lay moorings and establish a base for 12 patrol planes. GEORGE E. BADGER was to arrive later with additional ground officers and crew.29

Also, on 30 July, Admiral Stark sent out the Joint Army and Navy Directive for the Relief of the United States Marine Forces in Iceland, and for Augmenting the Existing British Defenses with Troops of the United States Army (This was Indigo-2). This plan was cancelled almost immediately by a Presidential Directive which ordered the Marines to be left

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in Iceland and augmented: this developed into Indigo-3. The latter states that Indigo-2 and supporting plans are cancelled and shall be destroyed, and that for Indigo-3 the following ships have been assigned to the Naval Transportation Service: the AP's HEYWOOD, WM. P. BIDDLE, HARRY LEE, and several others. In other words, more troops would be brought in to reinforce those already in Iceland.

Therefore it can be seen that Admiral Bristol, as Commander Task Force 4, had his fingers in practically all of the North Atlantic pies, and by this time most of the pies were pretty well baked. The Naval Air Station and Operating Base at Argentia had been commissioned during the middle of the month and his ships and planes were, and had been, using it as a base for operations being carried on further to ten north. They had been instrumental in the reconnaissance of Iceland and Greenland, and the establishment of bases and fields in those countries such as the ones at Reykjavik, Ivigtut, Narsarssuak, and others. His ships had escorted transports of Marines to Iceland and soldiers to Greenland and both his ships and planes had helped in the establishment of air bases in Labrador and Baffin Land. And finally, the Support Force had a large share of the responsibility in the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plans for both Iceland and Greenland. The United States had been using its time, men, and equipment to good advantage.

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FOOTNOTES

1. CO USS GEORGE E. BADGER ser. 20 of 6 May, 1941 to Com SupFor. Lt. Comdr. H. B. Miller, Bristol's Flag Secretary, had penciled a marginal note which says, "Admiral Bristol has been advised" and on CinClant's copy of this report there is also a note which states, "Has been authorized".
2. Besides those already named there were: Lt.(jg) E. G. Plagge, USNR; Lt. Curry, USNR; Lt.(jg) E. J. Quinn, (CEC) NR; and Lt.(jg) A. E. Poole (CEC) NR.
3. Director War Plans sec. ser. 025712 of 7 March, 1941, to CNO.
4. ComSupFor 001 of 14 March, 1941 to ComDesSupFor and ComPatWingSupFor.
5. CNO sec. ser. 020638 of 8 May 1941 to CinClant.
6. CinClant sec. ser. 0033 of 9 May, 1941, to ComSupFor.
7.

ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 0024 of 11 May, 1941 to CinClant. Prospective Movements of Argentia Groups and Greenland Reconnaissance Task Units.

Contemplated schedule of operations:

  1. ALBERMARLE plus two DD depart Newport 13 May for Argentia.
  2. BELKNAP plus two DD depart Newport for Iceland via Halifax 13 May.
  3. ALBERMARLE establish aviation base at Argentia 16 May.
  4. PatRon 52 depart Newport for Argentia 18 May.
  5. BELKNAP plus two DD arrive Iceland 21 May.
  6. Four patrol planes of PatRon 52 depart Argentia for Iceland 24 May.
  7. Iceland unit conduct reconnaissance of Greenland 26 May-6 June.
  8. Iceland unit depart Iceland for Argentia 5 June, planes arriving 6 June, DD arriving 11 June.

/s/ A. L. BRISTOL

8. SupFor sec. memo 0017 from acting C/S Carney of 25 April, 1941, to all members of Staff.
9. ComPatWingSupFor Op Order 14-41 sec. ser. 001 of 12 May 1941, to PatWingSupFor.
10. ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 0028 of 16 May, 1941, to SenNavAviator.
11. 61°09'N, 45°25'W.
12. CNO sec. ser. 022828 to ComSupFor 20 May, 1941.
13. CNO sec. ltr. ser. 211946 to CinClant, 21 May, 1941.
14.

CNO's confidential ser. 010745, of 1 June, 1941.
South Greenland Patrol
- directly under CNO:

MODOC (F)
COMANCHE
RARITAN
BOWDOIN
MUNARGO

15. CG HQ ltr. Op. P. 610-64-601 of 12 April 1941.
16. CNO sec. ltr. ser. 021738 of 1 June 1941 to CinClant.
17. CTF 4 Op Plan 6-41 sec. ser. 0040/A4-3 of 3 June 1941.
18. CNO sec. ltr. ser. 029983 of 11 June 1941 to Com3rdND. (Composed of the USS LAPWING, four patrol planes from PatWingSupFor, 3 DD's from the Newport Group, and 3 DD's from the Argentia Group.)
19. ComSupFor memo (no ser.) of 12 June, 1941 to CinClant.
20. Conf. memo SupFor C/S Capt. Denfeld (no serial) of 12 June, 1941, to ComSupFor.
21. Conf. memo to ComSupFor from C/S Capt. Denfeld (no ser.) 12 June, 1941.
22. CNO sec. ltr. ser. 067512 of 17 June, 1941 to CinClant.
23.

ComSupFor Op Plan No. 8-41 ser 0055, 27 June, 1941.
Northeast Greenland Patrol - Comdr. E. H. Smith, USCG, Atlantic Fleet.

U.S.C.G.C. NORTHLAND (F)
U.S.C.G.C. NORTH STAR
U.S.S. BEAR

  1. The Northeast Greenland Patrol has been formed as a Task Force of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, performing its duties under the direction of Commander Support Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet . . . The Northeast Greenland Patrol has been designated as Task Force 11 of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. (This designation was later changed to TG 6.5, by ComTaskFor 4's Mailgram 07195 on 4 July, 1941)
  2. The South Greenland Patrol operates under the direction of the CNO.
  3. This Force will cooperate with the Government of Greenland in preventing the establishment in Northeast Greenland of military, naval or air bases by belligerent powers, other than those powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory; and will assist in preventing the landing of European Nationals except as authorized by the Government of Greenland.
24. CNO sec. ltr. serial 072312 of 24 June, 1941 to Army Chief of Staff.
25. CNO secret ltr. ser. 271712 of 27 June, 1941 to CinClant.
26. CNO sec. ser. 012003 to ComBatDiv 5 of 1 July, 1941.
27. ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 0061 of 9 July, 1941 to CNO.
28. This included a total of 940 men and 83 officers, composed of Squadron personnel, an Air Base Squadron, a Transportation Section, Weather Squadron, Quartermaster Detachment, Engineers, etc.
29. ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 0290 of 24 July, 1941 to CNO.

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