CHAPTER VI

CTF 24: ADMIRAL BRAINARD (PART I)


The loss of Admiral Bristol came as something of a shock and a surprise, but apparently the higher Naval authorities had been able to read the handwriting on the wall. Two days before the death of Admiral Bristol, Naval Operations sent out the following despatch to Rear Admiral R. M. Brainard:

Designation Admiral Rolland M Brainard as Vice Admiral signed by President under date April 18 being forwarded by air mail.1

and on the same date Admiral Brainard received a letter from the President ---

SIR:
In accordance with the provisions of an Act of Congress approved May 22, 1917 as extended by an Act of Congress approved July 17, 1941, you are hereby designated as Commander of a Task Force, Atlantic Fleet, with the rank of Vice Admiral, effective on assuming command.

Respectfully,
/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

On the 24th of April Admiral Brainard received his orders from the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox. They read to the effect that:

You are hereby detached from duty as Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, and from such other duty as may have been assigned you; you will proceed

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immediately to the port in which the flagship of Task Force Twenty-Four, Atlantic Fleet, may be, and report to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, if present, otherwise by despatch, for duty as Commander, Task Force Twenty-Four, assuming the rank and hoisting the flag of Vice Admiral in accordance with the designation by the President.2

and shortly thereafter he broke his flag aboard the USS POCOMOKE at Argentia as Commander Task Force 24. His problems were, of course, not entirely the same as Bristol's but were necessarily similar; they were still concerned with bases, escort-of-convoy, and the usual run of incidental ramifications. However, there was one item that seemed to loom larger than the others --- the Plan for the Defense of Newfoundland. It has entered the picture before at various times, but under Brainard's regime it really came into full flower.

Earlier during the year vessels fishing on the Grand Banks had been suspected of furnishing supplies and information to Axis submarines. Also some of these fishing boats had been attacked and during the month of February there had been a Canadian Conference on the defense of the Grand Banks Fishing Fleet. Brainard's first Operation Plan, No. 4-42, as Commander Task Force 24 implemented many of the ideas of this conference.3

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The plan stated that Axis submarines, surface craft, or aircraft might attempt to disrupt fishing on the Grand Banks by the destruction of the fishing fleets of the United States, Canada, and Newfoundland, but submarines were considered the greatest potential threat. It was also felt that the Axis might employ ships, disguised as neutral fishing vessels, to "Obtain information regarding convoys and other shipping, to obtain weather information, to act as submarine supply ships, to transport espionage agents, or to act as transports for raiding and sabotage parties." Though no United States forces were available for the specific purpose of protecting the fishing fleet, the Canadian Government was to maintain a limited patrol of the fishing areas, using trawlers and fairmiles for this purpose. Task Force 24 was to furnish assistance and protection to the fishing fleet by destroying enemy forces while on their primary mission of escort-of-convoy operations and protection of Greenland. The Ocean Escort Vessels were to do much the same thing; this also held for the Greenland Patrol. The Air Detachment was to furnish coverage of Placentia Bay and the Grand Banks Area consistent with their primary mission of protection of convoys.

On 19 May Admiral Brainard wrote the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, concerning the Joint Plan for the Defense of Newfoundland. It had been approved by Commander Task Force 24, the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command, and

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the Flag Officer Commanding the Newfoundland Force (RCN) subject to final action by higher authority. However, it was only recommended for approval by the senior officer of the Royal Canadian Army forces stationed in Newfoundland, and by the Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group (RCAF) because the latter two officers stated that they lacked the authority to approve a Joint Plan. "But", said Brainard,

Regardless of the technicalities involved in securing unanimous approval, the Joint Plan is understood by and agreeable to all of the several Commanders, and will provide the basis for joint action pending final action by higher authority.4

From this it would appear that the situation was pretty well in hand, but as it turned out there were later repercussions.

The 25th of May found Admiral Brainard in something of a quandary. Since becoming Commander Task Force 24 he had been digging into the workings of the organization in order to familiarize himself more completely with the job. In Places he found the going a little rough and some of the things which he would like to have known unavailable on the spot. He therefore wrote Captain Tully Shelley, USN, in Naval Operations requesting information he needed. In this letter Brainard said,

I find this job plenty interesting, active, and with much for me to learn about . . . Would you be good enough to

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scrape together the latest issues of the following and send them along by registered mail, addressed to me personally . . . (He then requested some pamphlets and publications) . . . The above is of course a very small package but I find myself in want of the dope they contain even though some of them have probably not been given so wide a distribution, and this office is admittedly a bit remote.5

Another "M" Day possibility had evidently been brewing, for on 2 June Commander Task Force 24 received a combined letter from the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and the Army Chief of Staff which stated:

The U.S. Army will exercise unity of command over the U.S. Forces involved during the Joint phases of the planning, the preparations and the military operations respecting the movement to, the reception and the maintenance of U.S. Forces in the United Kingdom . . . .

The control and protection of convoys for the trans-ocean movements will remain under the command of the U. S. Navy.

The U. S. Army will make the necessary arrangements with the British respecting command over combined operations of U. S. and British forces in Western Europe. In the final movement to the continent, should U. S. Naval Surface, sub-surface, or air forces participate, they would operate under naval command.6

However the mobilization for the "Second Front" was still a long way in the future and obviously nothing happened with regard to the letter at this particular time. On 5 June Commander Task Force 24 sent a letter to the Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Argentia, requesting

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information on instructions issued him by the Chief of Naval Operations governing the control of shipping of associated powers calling at this port.7 This information was incorporated in Brainard's letter to All Ships Present, Argentia, concerning the temporary procedure for Argentia Port Control. This stated that pending completion of the HECP at the Naval Operating Base, radio communication would be handled by SOPA in the POCOMOKE (Flagship) and visual signals of incoming vessels by the Harbor Approaches Patrol Vessel or the Outer Anchorage Patrol Vessel.8 By this time they finally had a double anti-torpedo net across the inner harbor and through this there would be allowed to go one vessel at a time, outgoing ships having the right of way. Gate vessels would notify ships when the gate was open. The gate was to be opened from sunrise as required for vessels entering having been previously identified. It was opened for outgoing vessels at 0800, 1200, and 1600 and a half an hour before sunset LCT in order to keep wear and tear to a minimum. At all other times it was opened by special permission of the SOPA.

June 20th, Admiral Brainard issued his Operation Plan No. 5-42 which was ostensibly the same as previous plans implementing most of their ideas, but, as always, there were

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a few variations and changes. Probably most noticeable was change in some of the names of the task groups, even though their designators and composition remained the same.9

Task Group 24.9 was an innovation; Commander Hundt had relieved Captain Sallada as Commander of the Air Group and Admiral Jones was designated in charge of the Western Locals. The Greenland patrol, besides its previous responsibility, was to assist Army Aircraft Ferry operations by maintaining weather broadcast and flight security ships as specially directed. The Naval Operating Base, Argentia, was to control Merchant shipping of Associated Powers calling at Argentia in accordance with instructions issued by the Chief of Naval Operations and as directed by Force Commander in separate letter of instructions; maintain and operate

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Naval Air Station; and provide all practicable services to forces afloat. Commander Task Force 24 was to provide limited protection incidental to escort-of-convoy and other operations for fishing vessels in the vicinity of the Grand Banks. Other than these changes and additions the body of the plan contained much the same material as stated by previous plans. 5-42 was effective upon receipt and other plans were to be destroyed, with the exception of 2-42 (revised) and 4-42 which were to remain in effect.

The lack of action concerning the final approval of the combined Plan for the Defense of Newfoundland was evidently beginning to try Admiral Brainard's patience for the 16th of June he sent out a secret memorandum reviewing the Synoptic Precis of a meeting held by the Joint Services Committee, Atlantic Coast (Halifax). The memorandum was prepared for file and for distribution to the commanders forming the military Committee of Newfoundland as a basis for discussion at a meeting of the Military Committee scheduled to be held June 17, 1942, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

The comments and observations in this memorandum refer to a synoptic precis submitted by Major W. E. Baxter, secretary, Joint Services Committee Newfoundland to Major General G. C. Brant, Commanding General Newfoundland Base Command, for further routing to Vice Admiral Brainard, CTF 24, and SOPA, Argentia.

Then for eighteen pages he "worked" over the precis giving his opinion on practically every paragraph. He concluded by saying:

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Without being able to forecast the trend of the meeting of the Newfoundland Committee scheduled June 17, 1942, CTF 24 must assume the tenor of the remarks quoted in the precis that the General Officer Commanding the Newfoundland defenses and the Air Officer Commanding Number One Group may not be inclined nor empowered to express concurrence with some opinions set forth above by CTF 24. There would seem to be a possibility that the Newfoundland Committee may be unable to draft a plan which will be acceptable to all concerned. Should such a situation develop through no fault and no lack of willingness on the part of the several commanders, CTF 24 suggests that the situation be acknowledged in a frank and friendly spirit in order that the next step may be initiated without delay.

The next step would be for CTF 24 to lay before the Atlantic Coast Committee his own views and the views of such other commanders as may wish to express themselves on the points discussed herein before. This is too vital a subject to permit further delay and CTF 24 intends to prosecute the matter vigorously in order to obtain a clear-out decision on which some sort of plan can be drawn.

In the meantime CTF 24 wishes to point out that he considers paragraph 0102 to be in effect.10

This paragraph stated that the plan, by mutual agreement of the commanders concerned, would serve as a basis for joint action from the date of its execution until modified or suspended by higher authority, or until superseded by another plan unanimously adopted by those commanders. This Was Admiral Brainard's politic way of saying that he was tired of "fooling around".

On the 18th of June 1942 a meeting was held in St. John's Newfoundland, to consider proposed amendments to the Joint Defense Plan of Newfoundland. With reference to a memorandum

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made Of these amendments Admiral Brainard wrote the General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland on the 21st of June. In this letter Brainard states that he considers the amendments acceptable with a few minor exceptions which he listed.11 He further remarked that a Secretary of Navy letter12 required that military collaboration between two or more of the United Nations be referred to as "combined". Therefore, throughout the entire plan for the Defense of Newfoundland the word "combined" should be substituted for the word "Joint" wherever it appeared. Also Admiral Ingersoll authorized Commander Task Force 24 to use the combined plan as originally submitted, as a basis for combined action pending final approval Of the Plan. When the points now under discussion were settled to the agreement of all concerned he would forward the amended plan to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and in the meantime Brainard urged the General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland to lay this matter before the Atlantic Coast Committee at the earliest possible moment.

On June 23rd, Admiral Brainard put out his Operational

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Plan No. 2-42 (Revised).13 This plan, like 2-42, was a Plan for Western North Atlantic Escort-of-Convoy but it was eventually cancelled and superseded by a later plan.

The subject of routing instructions and general orders for Greenland convoys came up on 14 July.14 Admiral Brainard pointed out to the Naval Control Service Officer at Sydney, that in order to provide the maximum anti-submarine protection with the small number of escorts available, it was essential that merchant ships (when not in excess of three) of the convoy be formed in column rather than in line, as was indicated in the control officer's orders. Also the

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Admiral said that escorts assigned to the convoy must, unless directed otherwise by Commander Task Force 24, continue the voyage to Greenland regardless of stragglers; otherwise it would be impossible to maintain the southbound schedule. Admiral Brainard on 18 July sent Admiral Stark a memorandum on minutes of a meeting at CinCWA Headquarters, Liverpool, May 21, 1942. In this Admiral Brainard said:

CTF 24 in the past has provided CinCWA with copies of his current operation plan which covers the combined escort operations of North Atlantic Trade Convoys. The formulation of the mutually-accepted governing agreements for these escort operations was consummated in Washington in January. All parties concerned were notified by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, as to the substance of these agreements. Since that time some changes in the original plan have been made after mutual agreement. The major changes involved resulted in: (1) Opening out sailing of convoys to seven days; (2) Reduction of mid-ocean escort groups from fourteen to eleven; (3) Extending convoy system to Boston-Cape Cod area.

The foregoing changes necessitated slight rearrangement of Western Local Escorts to meet the new situation. The number of Western Local Escort Groups were increased from seven to eight. WESTOMP was changed from approximately 45° W. to approximately 52° W. for westbound convoys and 50° W. for eastbound convoys.

Exact number and type of ships employed by the Canadians in the Western Local Escort Force is variable. Four, and in some instances, five ships compose the actual operating escort unit for the HX, SG, ONO and ONS. To meet actual danger the Canadians have established a number of local convoy systems between Halifax-Sydney, Halifax-St. John's, Sydney-St. John's, Sydney-Cornerbrook, and Sydney-St. Lawrence. These are usually escorted by one or two ships, depending on ships available in COAC's Force . . . In connection with the foregoing, conversation with a former member of CinCWA's Staff indicates that CinCWA is principally interested in whether the Canadians are making best use of all escorts available to them. This matter of distribution of all Canadian escorts to the various problems of

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shipping protection is a matter not entirely within the province of CTF 24, but is checked as a matter related to Canadian Western Local Commitments.

Aircraft coverage from Newfoundland is provided by U.S. Navy and RCAF planes. As a general policy RCAF planes from Torbay and Gander provide coverage for shipping north of 48° N. and east of Newfoundland, U.S. Navy planes from Argentia provide coverage south of 48° N, to 55° W. RCAF planes from Sydney-Halifax-Yarmouth provide coverage west of 55° W. to within Canadian Coastal Zone to Boston-Cape-Cod15.

The items discussed in this memorandum provide a clarifying picture on several points concerning the escort-of-convoy operations which up until this time had been more or less hanging fire.

On the same day, 18 July, Admiral Brainard also wrote the Commander in Chief Western Approaches concerning some comments he (CTF 24) had made on the tentative draft of Atlantic Convoy Instructions (ACI).16 Brainard recommended that there be but one agency for preparation and distribution of the final draft of the Convoy Instructions. In order to expedite distribution of future changes or additions he considered that British authorities should disseminate those matters of detailed operating procedure in which general agreement is known to already exist between the authorities concerned. Matter affecting policy should be

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issued only after there is mutual agreement between British and United States authorities on such matters. In order that officers engaged in escort operations may have knowledge as to the cognizant United States Naval Authorities in connection with convoy operations, Brainard submitted following:

  1. CinCUS (Cominch) (Convoy and Routing Section) exercises direction of all matters pertaining to merchant ships.
  2. CinClant exercises operational control of escorts for troop convoys.
  3. CTF 24 exercises operational supervision and control of escorts for trade convoys in the Western North Atlantic.17

Then after discussing convoy instructions through twenty-five pages, Brainard concluded by saying that to expedite the distribution of Atlantic Convoy Instructions and future changes and additions, copies consigned to Commander Task Force 24 for distribution to escort ships should be delivered via mid-ocean escorts direct to Argentia. He also requested that those copies consigned to the individual ships (British, Canadian, and U.S.) be delivered to the Eastern terminals, namely, Londonderry, Greenock, etc. Just about this time and before Admiral Brainard had Force operations to the point of refinement he desired his Chief of Staff, Captain Carney, was ordered to a ship. Commander Wooldridge, operations Officer, was the obvious man to "fleet up" to Chief of Staff, but there was no one to

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his place in operations and this was essential. Brainard therefore wrote Admiral Jacobs in the Bureau of Personnel requesting that Carney might be held until one month before he was to go to his ship and in the meantime to send him someone to complete his quota of experienced operations personnel. This letter was more of an appeal than a request for with escort operations at their present pitch Admiral Brainard felt that it would be impossible to carry on if his key personnel were taken away.

Returning to the "Combined Plan far the Defense of Newfoundland", on 25 July Commander Task Force 24 outlined developments to date on that subject. The plan had been submitted to the Joint Services Committee in Halifax for consideration with a recommendation for approval and, pending further action by higher authority, the commanders of the five services in Newfoundland adopted the plan for their own guidance. The Joint Services Committee at Halifax took exception to numerous articles in the original plan and returned lengthy comments which were transmitted to Commander Task Force 24 in the form of a synoptic precis prepared by the General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland. At a subsequent meeting of the commanders of the several services in Newfoundland, strong objections were registered by the United States Navy and United States Army concerning many of the points raised by the Joint Services Committee in Halifax. Examination into the attitude of the Halifax

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Committee brought to light the following points which Brainard enumerated:

  1. Any suggestion of unity of command is abhorrent to RCAF.
  2. The idea of flexibility in defense planning did not agree with the Canadian Army's idea of fixed defense forces within fixed areas.
  3. The RCN representative expressed little or no objection to the original plan.
  4. The review by the Halifax Committee was narrow in that it concerned itself only with Canadian Army and RCAF matters and completely lost sight of the fact that the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army (including Army Air Corps) and RCN were concerned and are involved with commitments beyond the scope of the Halifax Committee's jurisdiction.18

Admiral Brainard stated that a strong stand was taken by the U.S. representatives of the Newfoundland Committee toward ending dilatory tactics in connection with this plan, and the General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland presented these views to the Halifax Committee with the urgent recommendation that they not further delay their approval by continued discussion of minor matters. The chief stumbling-block - unity of command - was overcome by adoption of the expression "operational control" which in the understanding of all the commanders would give a satisfactory degree of unity of command without relinquishing the autonomy which was the chief concern of the Royal Canadian Air Force. All of the other services were in favor

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of, and prepared to practice, unity of Command. The Halifax Committee agree and their approval was forwarded.

On August 16 Commander E. T. Wooldridge submitted a memorandum on a trip to Washington to the Admiral which contained some interesting points on the escort-of-convoys. Wooldridge said, "The conference held in Washington on August 1st, in connection with rearrangements of present convoy system and the establishment of additional convoy routes had as its main objective reduction of dead-loss time of merchant ships." This dead-loss at various wayports had become particularly serious in the case of important material such as oil and bauxite. It was not expected that any reduction in escorts would be accomplished by the projected convoy system and the only point that was of direct concern to Commander Task Force 24 was that Western Local Groups were going to be required to escort between New York and WESTOMP and vice versa. It was intended to route both east and westbound convoys sufficiently close to Halifax and Sydney to permit shipping from those places to join up and break off. The eight escort units of the Western Locals could meet their part of the task by having four units escort between New York and the Junction off Halifax and four to escort between the Junction off Halifax and WESTOMP. The Chief of Staff at Halifax assured Commander Wooldridge that they could do this without any particular difficulty, and this was eventually carried out.

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In a convoy escort meeting held in St. John's on 22 August it was noted the schedule for these two groups had become sufficiently tight to warrant either adding a 9th group or opening the sailing interval from 7 to 8 days. Also brought to light was the fact that during winter weather conditions the distance between WESTOMP (52° W) and Londonderry appeared to be excessive for DDs of the Mid-Ocean Groups. Therefore it would be necessary either to have relief DDs at an EASTOMP or move WESTOMP eastward to 47° W., the latter appearing the better. If either of these were not done the Mid-Ocean Escort then operating with 11 groups would have to add a 12th. However, if the cycle of convoys was opened out to 8 days, the Western Local Escort Force could work in 8 groups and the Mid-Ocean Escort Force could work in 11 groups with the WESTOMP in 47° W.19

The 3rd of September finds the focus of attention Shifted back to the plan for the Defense of Newfoundland and, strangely enough, this time with no problems. The General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland had sent Admiral Brainard a memorandum on combined operations on July 30th, and after having studied it thoroughly, Admiral Brainard sent him a reply. The Admiral concurred with the

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desirability for an exercise to train the Services and Forces in solving the communication and intelligence problems that would inevitably arise in the conduct of combined operations in Newfoundland. He further stated that in this connection the General Officer might count on the wholehearted cooperation of the United States Naval Forces under Brainard's command. "The Combined Communication Plan which has recently gained the approval of the Senior Officers of the five services concerned should", remarked the Admiral, "afford a simple and reliable means of serving to pass intelligence and operational signals with acceptable accuracy and rapidity."20 Apparently there was now a sound basis for a working agreement and future problems would be largely limited to changes and additions.

About the middle of September a Greenland Patrol escorted convoy SC-6, was attacked and several ships sunk or damaged. Concerning the incident Commander Task Force 24 pointed out some flagrant violations of escort-of-convoy doctrine and some lessons that could be learned from them. The escorts USCGCs MOJAVE, ALGONQUIN, and MOHAWK, were provided to escort Convoy SG-6, consisting of five merchant ships and the United States Navy tanker LARAMIE. One of these merchant ships, the CHATAHAM, was a transport capable Of a speed of 12-13-knots. At the sailing conference prior

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to the departure from Sydney, a decision was made to divide the convoy into two sections after clearing the swept channel from Sydney. The MOJAVE was to escort CHATHAM independently at 12 knots; ALGONQUIN and MOHAWK to escort the remaining five ships at a speed of 7 knots. It is not clear as to who made this decision, but the escort commander must have been in agreement on the matter. The division of the convoy into two parts was definitely contrary to the accepted principles of the most effective utilization of the available escorts for protection of ships involved. A single low-speed escort could not provide adequate protection for a ship of the CHATHAM class. Furthermore, by this division of the convoy and escorts, the protection for the remainder of the convoy was unwarrantedly reduced. Later, when CHATHAM was torpedoed, MOJAVE did not communicate the fact to the Force Commander or other United States Naval authority. The only information received by Commander Task Force 24 was a plain language message relayed by Belle Isle Radio Station to the effect that CHATHAM had been torpedoed, or mined with the inference that the latter was more probable.

The failure to provide Commander Task Force 24 the information, both as to the splitting of the convoy and later as to the nature and position of attack prevented his taking such action as the circumstances warranted. He naturally assumed that MOJAVE (escort Commander) was with the entire convoy and hoped that with the knowledge of the situation

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at the scene of action the escort commander would divert the convoy as necessary for its protection. However, receiving no further information, Commander Task Force 24 directed MOJAVE to return the convoy to Sydney; the only answer received from MOJAVE in this matter indicated that at the time of the receipt of the directive he was not with the convoy. However, subsequent information confirmed that he did not issue any directive to ALGONQUIN to divert the convoy in accordance with Commander Task Force 24's orders as addressed to MOJAVE. Due to the slowness in communications and lack of necessary information, Commander Task Force 24 did not know that the convoy had been diverted nor turned toward Sydney until receiving a plain language report, again from Belle Isle, that ARLYN, another ship of the convoy had been torpedoed and sunk. ALGONQUIN, then acting as escort commander failed to notify Commander Task Force 24 of the attack position of the convoy, and it was not until approximately 24 hours later that it was even known by the Force Commander that LARAMIE had been torpedoed. When ARLYN was sunk and LARAMIE torpedoed, ALGONQUIN was directed by the Force Commander to proceed with the remainder of the envoy to Sandwich Bay. A report some 48 hours later revealed that instead of proceeding to Sandwich Bay ALGONQUIN, with BISCAYA and ALCOA GUARD, was enroute to Greenland. ALGONQUIN had displayed sound judgment in not proceeding to Sandwich Bay in view of the fact that he was far from the

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position visualized by the Force Commander. However, his Wire to promulgate information to the Force Commander by high frequency radio that he was not proceeding to Sandwich indicated a lack of appreciation as to the necessity of keeping proper authorities advised when it had become advisable to deviate from definite orders.

The lessons to be learned by all Greenland Patrol vessels engaged in escort operations and anti-submarine warfare from the foregoing are hereby summarized:

  1. The absolute necessity for keeping operation authorities promptly informed.
  2. In general, maximum protection is afforded by keeping all the convoy together under the protection of all available escorts.
  3. The necessity for prompt origination of despatches to the Force Commander in the event of attack. The enemy contact despatch should be brief and should include a definite position of attack or contact. Within a reasonable length of time after origination of the foregoing despatch another amplifying despatch should be sent to the Force Commander giving the details of the attack.
  4. Radio silence on low frequency is of utmost importance. However, radio silence on high frequency to the extent that the operational authorities are deprived of information which is essential in coordinating operations is not desirable and furthermore, hazards the success of the operation. Despatches from senior authority requiring breaking of radio silence do not permit discretion in the matter of answering.
  5. Ships making over nine knots should adhere to scheduled zig-zag plans; ships making under nine knots should steer evasive courses as directed by the escort commander. Speed is one of merchant ships' best safeguards.

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  1. Escorts maintaining positions 500 - 1,000 yards from a convoy are not in proper position for providing protection against submarines owing to limits of asdic effectiveness with relation to torpedo firing range of submarines.21

Commander Greenland Patrol was ordered to take the necessary steps to see that other ships of his command were appropriately indoctrinated to avoid such an unfortunate chain of events as illustrated by the escort of Convoy SG-6.

On the 1st of October Commander Task Force 24 wrote the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command concerning possible enemy activities in the Labrador-Greenland area.22 Admiral Brainard pointed out that many local fishing vessels operated off the Grand Banks, and in addition, a large Portuguese fishing fleet moved up into the Davis Strait area during the course of the summer. Many of these vessels had been boarded and searched in detail during the summer, but to date none of them had been in any way implicated in enemy activities. However, there were distinct possibilities that some of these vessels in the Newfoundland-Davis Strait area had been engaged in aiding submarines either by delivering or transmitting enemy information. Ships engaged in escort operations and aircraft on patrol had orders to investigate all suspicious craft, for submarines

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had been in the Davis Strait area as was evidenced by sightings in the vicinity of Greenland in the region extending to northward of Goose Bay. In the light of the foregoing Admiral Brainard requested that the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command arrange coastal flights for patrol-reconnaissance and the protection of shipping along the Labrador Coast, north of 53° N. The Admiral invited attention to the fact that the value of information obtained from such flights was governed by its accuracy and rapidity of receipt; that numerous uninvestigated and unevaluated reports would lead to loss of confidence in all reports received under similar circumstances.

Commander E. T. Wooldridge, now Admiral Brainard's Chief of Staff, sent out a letter for Commander Task Force 24 on 21 October stating,

Information has been received from the General Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland that the Combined Plan for the Defense of Newfoundland had been given final approval by the Joint Services Committee, Atlantic Coast, and that the respective Chiefs of Staff of the services concerned have concurred in the action taken by the above committee.23

This was something of a moral victory for Admiral Brainard, for he was largely responsible for expediting matters.

In writing to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, 13 November Admiral Brainard remarked upon a tendency

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of those engaged in escort operations to consider the "defensive" to the neglect of the "offensive" attitude and action. Whereas he considered the most important task of escort that of getting the convoy safely to port, when too many ships are not getting safely to port the supplementary task becomes one of destruction of the enemy.

Those engaged in escort work have a highly developed inherent offensive spirit . . . The thrill of the chase and the beckoning lure of the kill are emotions that we can well assume to exist . . . and the escort commander who doesn't succumb to the lure has sincerely and regrettably believed that accomplishment of his first task, safe arrival of his convoy, could best be carried out by remaining with the convoy, rather than with the hunt. Escort of convoy operations are strategically offensive in that they move forward through territory whose control is challenged by the enemy. Therefore, any defensive attitude of mind, in connection with them must necessarily end in unsuccessful completion of the task.24

Admiral Kauffman and Captain Thebaud had both commented on this lack of "offensive" attitude earlier in the escort game, but they would have undoubtedly agreed with Admiral Brainard in feeling that the adoption of a dogmatic line of action with regard to either of the two tasks would be a bad policy. Brainard said that consideration for the above leads to the conclusion that extreme care must be exercised in the issuance of directives to escort personnel in order that the proper balance between the importance of the two tasks be maintained. In general, the Admiral felt that escort forces in the North Atlantic had maintained a very satisfactory

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balance.

November 26th Admiral Brainard ran into a different type of escort problem. The Commending General, Newfoundland Base Command, wrote him requesting escorts for transport vessels. Brainard replied, however, that with his limited number of escorts and priority commitments he could not handle such an assignment on any set date. Something might come up at the last moment causing a delay and thereby tying up the shipping involved. He therefore suggested that the General sail his transports from St. John's with the regularly established escort groups.25

On 15 December Admiral Brainard wrote Admiral Ingersoll informing him of the inadequacy of the ships in the Greenland Patrol for escort duty due to their small size and slow Speed and the problems encountered in winter weather conditions. Information had indicated that the United States had acquired some single screw corvettes and that in the near future they expected to acquire some more of this type ship from Canada. This type of ship, with additional ice protection, was most desirable for escort work in the Greenland-Labrador area, and while the present volume of shipping was then small it would undoubtedly increase with the opening of the season in the late spring. To take care of this anticipated increase in shipping Admiral Brainard requested that

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six of this type ship be assigned to the Greenland Patrol to the 1st of April, 1943.26

CTF 24 officially concluded his escort operations and problems for the year of 1942 on the 22nd of December when he published that year's last escort order No. 63-42. However, this was only a temporary conclusion and the new year held new problems as the war progressed.

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FOOTNOTES

1. BuNav despatch of 18 April 1942 to CTF 24.
2. SecNav ltr. ser. 32056 of 24 April 1942 to Adm. Brainard.
3.

CTF 24 Op Plan 4-42 sec. ser. 00160 of 4 May 1942. The Task Organization, without designators, is as follows:

  1. Argentia Aircraft Detachment -- Senior Officer
  2. Ocean Escort Vessels -- Senior Officer
  3. Greenland Patrol Vessels -- Senior Officer
4. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00175 of 19 May 1942 to CinClant.
5. Personal ltr. from Admiral Brainard of 25 May 1942 to Captain Tully Shelly.
6. CinCLant sec. ltr. serial 00447 of 2 June 1942 to All U. S. Forces concerned with Operations in W. Europe.
7. CTF 24 sec. ltr. serial 00184 of 5 June 1942 to Comdt. NOB, Argentia.
8. SOPA Argentia (CTF 24) sec. ltr. serial 00195 of 11 June 1942 to All Ships Present, Argentia.
9.
CTF 24 Op Plan No. 5-42 sec. serial 00202 of 20 June 1942.
24.1 ALLIED MID-OCEAN TRADE CONVOY ESCORT GROUP*
24.2 U.S. NAVY TRADE CONVOY GROUP*
24.3 AIR GROUP - Commander L. T. Hundt.
24.4 HOME BASE GROUP
24.5 TASK FORCE TWENTY-FOUR ADMINISTRATION
24.6 TASK FORCE TWENTY-FOUR ESCORT CONTROL ICELAND - Comdt. NOBI
24.7 TASK FORCE TWENTY-FOUR ESCORT CONTROL, UNITED KINGDOM (LONDONDERRY) - Captain L. H. Thebaud.
24.8 GREENLAND PATROL - Captain E. H. Smith.
24.9 NAVAL OPERATING BASE, ARGENTIA - Captain Gail Morgan.
24.11 ASSIGNED TO CANADIAN MID-OCEAN ESCORT FORCE - Rear Admiral Murray, RCN.
24.18 ASSIGNED TO CANADIAN WESTERN LOCAL ESCORT FORCE - Rear Admiral Jones, RCN.
24.19 MID-OCEAN ESCORT UNITS AT SEA
* Group names changed.
10. CTF 24 sec. memo 00199 of 16 June 1942.
11. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00205 of 21 June 1942 to General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland.
12. SecNav ltr. ser. 65213 of 26 February 1942.
13.

CTF 24 Op Plan No. 2-42 (Revised) for Western Atlantic Escort of Convoy sec. ser. 00206 of 23 June, 1942.

TASK ORGANIZATION:
  1. United States Mid-Ocean Escort Group - U.S. DDs and CGCs, plus RCN corvettes as assigned.
  2. Royal Navy Mid-Ocean Escort Group - CINCWA Escort Units "B-1" to "B-4" inclusive, plus "B-6", "B-7". RN DDs and corvettes as assigned.
  3. Royal Canadian Navy Mid-Ocean Escort Group - FONF Escort Units "C-1" to "C-4" inclusive, RCN DDs and corvettes as assigned.
  4. Western Local Escort Group - COAC. Escort Units "W-1" to "W-8" inclusive, RN and RCN DDs, RCN corvettes and minesweepers, Free French corvettes plus other vessels assigned.
  5. Iceland Escort Group - Senior Officer in Group U.S. DDs and CGCs.
  6. United States Escort Control United Kingdom (Londonderry) - CTF 24 Representative.
  7. United States Escort Control, Iceland - Comdt. NOBI.
14. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00221 of 14 July 1942 to Naval Control Service Officer, H.M.C. Dockyard, Sydney, N.S.
15. Secret memo from Admiral Brainard for Admiral Stark (no serial) 18 July 1942.
16. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00226 of 18 July 1942 to CinCWA.
17. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00226 of 18 July 1942 to CinCWA
18. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00237 of 25 July 1942 to CinClant.
19. Minutes on Conference held at St. John's to discuss Escort Arrangements for Trade Convoys during the winter months, 22 August, 1942.
20. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00265 of 3 September 1942 to General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops, Newfoundland.
21. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00280 of 21 September 1942 to ComGreenPat.
22. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00284 of 1 October 1942 to Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command.
23. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00297 of 21 October 1942 to CinClant.
24. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00307 of 13 November 1942 to CinClant.
25. SOPA Argentia (CTF 24) sec. ltr. ser. 00314 of 26 November 1942 to the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command.
26. CTF 24 sec. ltr. ser. 00331 of 15 December 1942 to CinClant.

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