The Sicilian campaign was unique in many respects but the most impressive fact was the vast scale upon which it was launched. Since future amphibious operations in this conflict may well exceed in proportions this campaign, it is felt that the "lessons learned" should receive close study by those charged with the planning and execution of such offensive efforts. In order that maximum benefit may be derived from the mistakes made and the experience gained, special emphasis is directed to specific items of primary importance recapitulated herewith:


  1. The approved policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, governing command functions in amphibious operations, should be widely promulgated to all services.

  2. Publications FM 31-5, FTP 155, and FTP 167 should be brought to conformity through elimination of inconsistencies.

  3. The term "Headquarters Ship" should be abolished. The naval term "Flagship" should be used in lieu thereof.

  4. Early issuance of the directive from the high echelons should be made, setting forth the respective commanders, their authority and responsibility, particularly with relation to other services on the same echelon.


  1. Planners from the staffs of the Naval Commander and the Army Commander should participate in the preliminary planning of the higher echelon staff.

  2. The high echelon planning staff should prepare an "Appreciation" or "Estimate of the Situation" from which should be formulated an "Outline Plan."

  3. The high echelon Outline Plan must support the Appreciation from which it is derived: the Appreciation must be consistent with the Strategic Concept upon which it is based.

  4. When the correct physical objectives have been derived, the Outline Plan should include effective actions with reference thereto.

  5. Interruption of enemy commerce by offensive naval movements should supplement the air effort against land communications.

  6. Prior to the invasion, propaganda leaflets, radio broadcasts, and other forms of psychological warfare should be fully employed in softening the fiber of the enemy.

  7. When the locale of operations permits, the plan should provide for the early capture and exploitation of an enemy port.

  8. The logistic requirements of all military forces should be computed in detail and weighed against the capacity of the beaches selected for maintenance.

  9. Where extended beach maintenance is imposed by the absence of suitable ports, the plan should provide for greatly augmented Shore Parties or Beach Groups.

  10. Where the assault beaches lack suitable exits, the plan should provide for greatly augmented Road Construction and Transportation units.

  11. An advance base, capable of mounting troops, vehicles, and logistic supply is essential in any shore to shore movement.

  12. In shore to shore assaults, economy of time afloat for troops embarked in landing craft must be considered; staging of craft to other ports may be found desirable.

  13. In determining the D day and H hour, the requirements of all services should be examined in detail and given full consideration.

  14. The success of the plan should not be dependent upon the employment of a fair-weather weapon, such as paratroops.


  1. Forces allocated to the naval commander for the operation should be placed under his command at the earliest practicable date in order that adequate special training may be undertaken.

  2. Material requirements of these naval forces should be given highest priority by the Bureaus and special effort should be made to ensure prompt shipment of material from the United I States to the theater of operations.

  3. All planners on the Task Force Commanders echelon (Army, Navy and Air) should be in the same building and develop their plan concurrently.

  4. It is essential that the naval commander be provided with prints of all photographic reconnaissances made over enemy areas selected as the geographical objectives.

  5. Information acquired through the landing of agents on enemy shores should be placed at the disposal of the naval commander.

  6. A demonstration by naval forces should be planned and executed to confuse the enemy as to the locale of the major landing, and to tax his communications at the outset.

  7. If light forces are available, a diversion plan employing deceptive devices should be executed in conjunction with the main assaults. Diversion bombings should be a part of the plan.

  8. Where practicable, the initial movement of assault forces, should be in conformity with the "cover plan."

  9. PTs are suitable for use as flanking offensive screens when used in adequate numbers. When operating against German E-boats, U.S. PTs should be supported by a destroyer.

  10. Submarines are eminently suited for pre - D day reconnaissance of the assault area and for use as navigational beacons to aid the approach of the assault forces to the initial transport Sarea. The ability of submarines to lay various types of buoys to aid the assault boat waves should be exploited where circumstances permit.

  11. Beach defenses to be softened by air bombing prior to D day should be determined by the planners of Navy, Army and Air in joint study.

  12. Preliminary softening of the enemy prior to D day by heavy scale air bombardment is necessary. This effort should become increasingly heavy with selected targets being land communications, air fields, air forces, and fixed defenses.

  13. Naval gunfire plans should provide for engagement, prior to and during the assault, of all enemy defenses that threaten the safe landing of the assault troops on the selected beaches, the control of these fires must be regulated solely by the Naval Commander.

  14. The element of "surprise" should be examined with penetrating thoroughness on a realistic and practical basis.

  15. The plan should provide for an "assault scale" of weapons and equipment for those military forces making the assault landings.

  16. Once Division troop lists have been approved by the Army Commander, changes must be held to a minimum in order that plans of lower echelons may be developed and promulgated to the required forces.

  17. After sailing from embarkation ports, the Naval and Military Commanders should re-give timely enemy intelligence information by radio; the assessment of the results of pre-D day bombing missions affecting the landings should be broadcast.

  18. A planning factor of at least one hour should be allowed transports in lowering boats and loading assault waves; this allows a safety factor in the event of delays caused by weather.

  19. Particular attention should be given in the Naval Attack Plans to the timing of assault it waves in order to avoid congestion on beaches.

  20. The Army Attack Plans usually require the Floating Reserve to land through a prepared beach; in such cases the Shore Party elements of the Reserve Force should not be held afloat, at should be landed early on D day to augment the regular Shore Party which is invariably lard-pressed at this critical time.


  1. Where hydrographic conditions' of the theater permit, an anti-submarine minefield is most effective in protecting the transport area.

  2. If the transport area must be used for protracted periods for maintenance of the landing force, the minefield should be supplemented by an extra-light indicator net and later, if feasible, by an anti-torpedo net.


  1. The Air Plan should be in detail and show when, where and what fighter cover and air support will be provided the naval and ground forces during the assault phases of the operation.

  2. Air plans involving the transport of paratroops over naval forces should be submitted to the Naval Commander for approval.

  3. Air forces participating in support of joint operations should be placed under the command; of the commander who is responsible for the success or failure of the joint effort.

  4. Where practicable, naval aviation should be used for close support in amphibious operations. Where this is not practicable, Army dive bomber forces should be assigned under the operational control of the Naval Commander to carry out vital close support missions until the ground forces are firmly established ashore.

  5. In a theater where maritime traffic is under constant attack by enemy aircraft, it is essential that strong air protection be provided troop transport movements enroute to an amphibious assault.

  6. Fighter cover by high and low standing patrols is essential over shipping anchored off the assault beaches; the scale of fighter cover provided for this purpose in this operation was inadequate.

  7. Fighter Director Ships should be provided and equipped with G. C. I. for the control of night fighters. These ships should be separate from Flagships and should have freedom of movement to enable them to obtain best radar results.

  8. The senior Fighter Director officer should be attached to the staff of the Commander, and should assist in the planning of fighter direction, fighter cover, aerial reconnaissance, close air support, radar coverage, communications, and AA fire control.

  9. In areas where allied shipping is concentrated and cover is being provided by friendly aircraft, a plan establishing Gun Defended Areas and Inner Artillery Zones should be in effect. Such a plan should define limits for AA fire and limits for aircraft operations.

  10. The employment of cruiser planes (SOC and OS2U) for spotting naval gunfire, when opposed by enemy fighters, is either impracticable or exceedingly costly. Direct fighter escort to present type cruiser planes is not considered satisfactory.

  11. When practicable, Army aircraft of a type capable of defending itself against enemy fighters should be employed for spotting of naval gunfire; the Army P-51 appears to be a suitable type.


  1. Gridded chart-maps of the assault area, on a scale of 1/50,000, having land contours at meter intervals, should be constructed by the Hydrographic Office in advance of amphibious operations. The map-charts furnished by the Hydrographic Office for this operation were excellent and were invaluable for naval gunfire control.


  1. Photographic reconnaissance of the assault area should include, in addition to usual vertical mosaics, at least one oblique sortie during the early part of the planning phase in order that beach sketches may be prepared, and an additional oblique sortie as late as possible before D day to obtain last minute changes on defenses, mines, etc. If the last-named sortie is interpreted and evaluated after the assault forces have gone to sea, detailed information must be transmitted by radio to the Flagships.


  1. The determination of off-shore bars and beach gradients by "wave study" is considered accurate within acceptable limits.


  1. A qualified aerologist on the naval planning staff is essential.

    56. Flagships of Naval Task Force Commanders should be provided with an aerological unit trained and equipped to furnish the special forecasts peculiar to amphibious operations.

  2. A continuous radio watch of special trained operators should be maintained by Flagships to copy meteorological radio traffic and decrypted enemy reports.

  3. Weather forecasts should be promulgated to all ships concerned during the assault and maintenance over the beaches phases of an operation; this traffic must be given sufficient priority to insure its timely reception.


  1. Naval Task Force Commanders should have adequate training periods for the correlation of mine sweepers, control vessels, gunfire support ships, transports, etc., in the details of their attack plans. Such training must follow the installation of special equipment, apparatus and devices to be used in the assault.

  2. Adequate time should be made available to permit rehearsals to be planned in detail so as to simulate as nearly as possible the actual assault.

  3. Individual RCTs should be fully landed during rehearsals prior to execution of the Division rehearsal. Full-scale landings are required to give the Shore Party, Beach Party, and boats' crews a full scale workout under service conditions.


  1. Rendezvous of forces at sea should be made in full daylight; under no circumstances should rendezvous be planned to take place at dawn or evening twilight.

  2. Where possible, a suitable landfall should be made for obtaining an accurate navigation fix prior to commencement of approach to assault beaches.

  3. Forces should deploy during daylight on the approach courses to the assault beaches.

  4. Radar jamming vessels should be in the van of assault forces during the approach to the transport area.

  5. In selecting approach courses of assault forces, consideration should be given to suitable use of fathometer and radar as navigational aids.

  6. Where practicable, the approach courses should be selected to give the main assault forces a long run on the approximate approach course, with a minimum of maneuvering after entering the initial transport area.


  1. An investigation should be made of the cargo handling gear of our combat-loaders with a view to strengthening deck fittings, booms, guys, heavier steadying lines, etc., to meet stresses imposed by unloading operations in heavy seas.

  2. A CENTral controlling authority is required at Embarkation Ports to strictly regulate the loading of combat-loaders. The Army G-4 section should function in an office in the Flagship of "the Naval Task Force Commander until the transports are unloaded in the assault area.

  3. Combat-loading plans should limit the materials being loaded to those required by the assault. These plans should have the approval of the Naval Task Force Commander as well as the Army Commander concerned. Once loading has commenced, these plans should not be changed without their specific approval in each case.

  4. Greater attention must be given to vertical loading of transports with relation to the Army tactical plan; accessibility of anti-tank weapons must be emphasized in an assault against armored enemy forces.


  1. Pallet loading should be studied with a view to wider use.

  2. Each APA, XAP and AKA should be provided with 30 extra nets; additional slings should be provided these ships to take care of all vehicles in the assault waves.

  3. Boat Group Commanders and Boat Officers in the assault waves should be experienced officers of the highest available ranks. The responsibility and authority of these officers should be kept alive, and improvement of boat discipline stressed.

  4. Fuller briefing of boat crews in the plan of attack, and in assault beach silhouettes and land marks is necessary.

  5. Boat crews of transports require additional training in night and bad weather landings of loaded boats. This training should include retraction and salvage methods.

  6. Unloading Detachments ("Hatch Crews") should be increased when the unloading plans provide for unloading combat-loaded transports by using LCTs. At least 20 soldiers should be placed in each LCT to unload the craft on beaching, unless present organization of Shore Party is modified to provide this labor.

  7. Unless labor troops are included in the Shore Party organization in greater numbers than now provided, unloading plans should provide for 2 soldiers to be placed in each LCVP and 4 to 6 soldiers in each LCM to unload these boats at the beach.

  8. LSTs should not be employed for unloading transports unless no other types are available. When so employed, special detachments of troops should be assigned LSTs to load stores and unload at beaches.

  9. Transports should establish as standard doctrine a Condition IV watch which will provide sufficient control officers and gun crews to meet an air raid by using ready service boxes, thereby permitting unloading to proceed without interruption.


  1. When merchant vessels are scheduled to arrive in follow-up convoys immediately after the assault, each ship should be deck loaded with the maximum number of LCM(3)s (complete with spare parts, diesel fuel oil and lubriciating oil) manned by U. S. Navy personnel. One officer-in-charge and one motor machinist's mate should be assigned to each ship.

  2. Greater attention must be given to the segregated stowage of explosives and inflammables in merchant vessels entering the assault area.

  3. Adaptors should be provided to permit interchange of hose, nozzles, and other fire fighting equipment when Allied naval and merchant vessels are engaged in the same operation.


  1. In combat-loading landing ships and craft particular care must be taken that beaching draft is not exceeded.

  2. Landing craft should be used primarily as assault craft and for the immediate follow-up of assault forces. They are not designed for "ferrying service." Army build-up and maintenance should be carried in merchant vessels.

  3. Landing craft can transport the necessary logistic maintenance to ground forces by unloading immediately in the rear of our front lines, when our Army flanks reach to the sea. This method is most effective when land motor transport is heavily taxed or when roads are mined and demolished by enemy action.

  4. Combat-loading of LSTs require of TQMs a preliminary study of deck arrangements and template loading, in order that vehicles may be properly loaded under their own power. The main deck of LSTs should be loaded to provide increased A A protection to the ship.

  5. LSTs are not suitable for carrying stores; if such employment is contemplated, these ships should have installed winches, booms, and other mechanical means for discharging stores, to boats and DUKWs alongside.

  6. When LSTs cannot be beached, the most effective methods of unloading LSTs, in order iof preference, are: (1) over naval pontoon causeways, (2) into LCTs, and (3) into DUKWs.


  1. Side carrying of naval pontoons by LSTs is a more desirable method of transport than ring.

  2. A DUKW, manned by the pontoon crew, should be a part of the equipment of each T fitted as a pontoon-carrier. LSTs should be altered as follows:

    1. Strengthen ramp chains and fittings.

    2. Install 10,000 gallons per day distilling plant.

    3. Install 5-ton boom and winch on main deck in way of hatch.

    4. Install cross-connection between Fire and Bilge pumps and Fresh Water tanks, and discharge piping from Fire and Bilge pumps to bow with 21/&" hose connection, to enable discharge of potable water to shore tankage.

    5. Install barrage balloon fittings, winch, etc., provide stowage for barrage balloons, helium gas cylinders, and accessories.

    6. Install 150 portable bunks in after end of tank deck on all 6-davit LSTs.

    7. Install fittings and provide gear on LSTs designated to side-carry pontoon causeways.

    8. Increase diameter of one forward inboard hole on bottom of ramp from 6" to 12" to provide socket for King pin on causeway.

  3. LCI(L)s are not suitable for carrying stores; they may be used for transferring personnel from transports to shore, and are particularly well suited for use as salvage vessels on beaches.

  4. One LCI(L), especially fitted out with salvage equipment and trained personnel, should provided as salvage vessel for each Division beach; each Battalion beach should be provided the one LCM carrying a bulldozer and special salvage gear and trained personnel.

  5. The present ramps on LCI(L)s are too heavy and cumbersome. During this operation, tips were lost due to difficulty in retracting, ramp brakes did not hold, and in heavy seas ramps were thrown back off the rollers. Ramps should be redesigned to provide lighter, longer and wider ramps with suitable power retraction.

  6. Assault LCTs should be loaded in such manner that tanks and S. P. guns are able to 3 during the approach.

  7. LCTs, employed to unload transports, should be provided with double crews to enable continuous operation.

  8. LCTs are eminently suitable for side loading from LSTs.

  9. LCTs should be altered as follows:

    1. Strengthen ramp chains and fittings.

    2. Render amidship section of bulwark portable on each side to permit side loading and unloading.

    3. Strengthen hull to prevent working and buckling in heavy seas.

  10. LCVPs should be altered as follows:

    1. Reduce or eliminate down-by-the-bow trim.

    2. Improve design of rudder and skeg to reduce time required to remove and repair.

    3. Substitute cast steel for brass lifting pads and fittings.

    4. Provide reinforcement in way of cleats, and on Chris-Craft increase size of cleats.

    5. Provide standard ring-type slings for all boats; discard the Chris-Craft curved bar-type sling.


  1. There is a definite need for Control Vessels, of the LCC type, having adequate navigational and signaling equipment.

  2. Greater emphasis should be given to the training of control vessels in the ship to shore movement; these vessels should be an integral part of amphibious forces; attack plans of Naval Task Force Commanders should provide in detail for the full employment of Control Vessels.



  1. Greater attention should be given to the selection, training, equipping and briefing of Amphibious Scouts.

  2. Scout boats should be fully employed as smokers to cover assault craft under favorable wind conditions.

  3. Scout boats should be employed to assist in the hydrographic surveys off the assault beaches.


  1. Training of the Shore Party should include full-scale landing of infantry divisions with supplies and equipment by day and night, practical training in all types of boats and landing Taft, and in working cargo on board ship and as winchmen.

  2. The Shore Party organization requires immediate reorganization to provide adequate labor troops to unload boats on the assault beaches until the combat-loaded transports have landed artillery, anti-tank weapons, and ammunition replacements.

  3. The Shore Party should develop, prior to the assault, detailed plans for the organization and location of beach dumps. Vehicles should be earmarked for beach to dump traffic and these trucks should not be diverted from such employment without the approval of the Shore Party Commander.

  4. When assault beaches are backed by extensive dunes without road exits, the Road Contraction units of the Shore Engineers must be greatly augmented.

  5. The Shore Party Commander must be fully conversant with the unloading plans and his organization must allow for some flexibility in the landing of army stores and equipment at other than planned beaches.

  6. The Engineer Shore Regiment should not be withdrawn from the beaches to inland combat positions unless the Commanding General is prepared to accept a complete break-down in his supply system.

  7. There is a need for air-raid sirens or warning devices on beaches where large numbers of craft and personnel are employed.

  8. More guns of large caliber should be assigned to AA beach defense which should be CENTrally-controlled on each division beach.

  9. Slit trenches and fox holes should be promptly dug on beaches near boat landing points.

  10. Mobile fire fighting trucks should be part of the Shore Party equipment; fires in beach .umps caused by enemy strafing produce serious losses of maintenance stores unless extinguished by fire fighting equipment.

  11. Stores must be segregated in dumps; the piling of ammunition, food, gasoline, and miscellaneous stores in one vast mass presents a target to enemy aircraft.

  12. Beaches must be kept clear of stores by movement to beach dumps behind the dune line.

  13. Greater attention must be given to the prompt erection of beach markers; the marking safe landing points for DUKWs is important.

  14. Prompt clearance and sign-posting of paths through minefields is essential prior to the rival of DUKWs and motor transport on the beaches.

  15. Until the transports are unloaded, DUKWs should not be diverted to the interior beyond the dune dumps; DUKWs may be used advantageously to unload LSTs and merchant ships.

  16. Closer coordination and more positive land-line communications should exist between irmy and Navy Medical groups on shore; casualties should not be brought to exposed beaches ntil boats are available to evacuate them at once.

  17. Military Police must keep idlers off unloading beaches or impress them into labor of loading boats at the shore line. Troops, upon landing, must be directed to properly marked


    staging areas and not be allowed to loiter on beaches. Military Police must be particularly active at night to prevent unauthorized absence from beaches by Shore Party personnel.


  1. Beach Battalions should receive intensive shipboard training of all ratings along predetermined lines.

  2. Shore training of Beach Battalions should include basic field training of the soldier, overhead firing and battle courses. Joint training with the Shore Party Engineers should include defensive tactics of the rifle squad and platoon, the detection, removal and destruction of enemy mines and booby traps, removal of wire and beach obstacles, swimming and life saving.

  3. The plans of Naval Task Force Commanders should provide in detail for the hydrographic surveys to be conducted at first light off assault beaches, and for the utilization of this information by the Beachmaster.

  4. The plans of Naval Task Force Commanders should provide in detail for the execution of traffic control off assault beaches.

  5. The plans of Naval Task Force Commanders should provide in detail for the boat salvage organization off assault beaches.

  6. The Beachmaster should be fully conversant with the attack plans and the unloading plans showing Army priority of items.

  7. Beachmaster should be officers of adequate rank, experiences and personality.

  8. Personnel of the Navy Beach Battalions should be garbed in a distinctive uniform, and helmets should be marked so as they may be identified on the beaches.

  9. Except in an emergency, personnel of Naval Beach Parties should not be diverted from their assigned tasks.

  10. avy Beach Battalions should be provided with adequate motor transport to enable the organization to function on beaches of a wide frontage. They should have as organic equipment 12 jeeps and 10 21/2 ton trucks with 1-ton trailers.

  11. Each infantry division beach should be provided with a "Jaheemey" with a bulldozer as a prime mover. The "Jaheemey" must be completely rigged prior to being landed on the beach.

  12. Naval Combat Demolitions Units should be utilized in amphibious operations to assist in the removal of underwater obstacles at assault beaches and later assist Beachmasters in salvage, marking of channels, and other off-shore work.

  13. Beach Parties required to remain ashore for protracted periods should have as additional equipment such items as tentage, bedding rolls, field kitchens, water-making apparatus, etc. Cooks should be included in the complement. Special items as mosquito bars, insect repellents, flea powder, etc., should be provided.

  14. Beach Parties should be relieved at the earliest opportunity by Advance Base organizations; Beach Parties normally should withdraw from the assault area with the combat-loaded transports or as soon thereafter as the military maintenance situation permits.


  1. The operational control of hospital ships should be simple and direct.

  2. In shore to shore movements, LSTs should be used as hospital ships if regular hospital ships are not available. Such LSTs, as designated for this use, should be provided with standee bunks, and the medical complement should include one officer and four enlisted men.


  1. Combat-loaded transports carrying wounded should not be used for the evacuation of Prisoners of War.

  2. The Army should provide guards for Prisoners of War embarked in naval ships; this (should be set up in the Army-Navy plans; the unexpected withdrawal of combat troops for this


    purpose is not desirable. The Navy ships, having been specified in the plans for evacuation of Prisoners of War, will have prepared proper cages, ets., on board ship to receive the evacuees.

  1. The factors determining the capacity of ships for accommodating Prisoners of War were sanitary facilities, life-saving capacity, and the number and nature of causalities embarked.

  2. All ships carrying Prisoners of War should be thoroughly fumigated as soon as the prisoners are disembarked. The Army-Navy plans should make provisions for this fumigation at ports designated in the plans as the discharge port of prisoners.


  1. Lethal Barrage Balloons Units of trained naval personnel should be provided each APA, XAP, AKA, LST and merchant vessel included in the assault forces.

  2. Army balloon units should not be eliminated from Troop Lists on the pretext that such units are not "fighting troops"; lethal balloons are essential in amphibious operations.

  3. Army balloon batteries, embarked in combat-loaders for subsequent landing on shore, should so stow their equipment as to be readily accessible for unloading. Army balloons must be in position over beaches by daylight on D day when enemy air delivers its full attack on the assault beaches.

  4. Barrage balloons should be erected every 200 yards on the Beach, over gasoline and ammunition dumps, and at the seaward and shoreward ends of each pontoon causeway.


  1. Troop convoys enroute to an assault should maintain maximum sustained speed and zigzag. At night, during moonlight, a smoking plan must be continuously carried out to thwart enemy torpedo aircraft.

  2. Transports, merchant vessels and LSTs must give greater attention to the laying of smoke screens during an air alert; the plans of Naval Task Force Commanders should cover the details of the smoking plan.

  3. At night, during moonlight, smoke must be laid by small craft and/or ship's boats, (and by beach smoke pots, if wind is favorable) to cover the transport anchorage. This screen should be thickened at dawn until sufficient daylight exists for our gunners to see enemy aircraft.


  1. Sufficient mine sweepers should be made available to the Naval Task Force Commander to enable him to assign sweepers to each Task Force Commander adequate in numbers to sweep transports in to their initial area and combatant ships in to close gunfire support areas.

  2. An effective method of sweeping or detonating mines in shallow water should be developed.


  1. Neutralization of assault beach defenses by full employment of naval gunfire is a prerequisite to a successful landing against opposition.

  2. The training of Naval Gunfire Liaison officers should include some of the elements of Ranger training, particularly overhead fire, battle courses, and physical conditioning courses.

  3. Dropping of Naval Gunfire Liaison officers by parachute may be found advantageous if the technique is developed further.

  4. Even though ships are illuminated offshore by enemy searchlights, ships are not always visible from shore. For this reason it may be advantageous to hold fire even when illuminated, other things being equal.

  5. The naval attack plans should provide for wider use of the 5"/38 white phosphorous projectile in laying smoke screens on the flanks of assault beaches and for demoralizing enemy troop concentrations.


  1. When naval gunfire compels the enemy to evacuate an area, the Army ground forces should advance promptly to exploit the enemy's retirement.

  2. The rocket armament of LCS(S)'s is most effective in neutralizing beach areas.

  3. Destroyers are superior to British LCGs in rendering close supporting fire, particularly when target is obscured.

  4. AA fire discipline in our ships requires improvement. Graduates of aircraft identification schools should be assigned to all destroyers and larger ships.

  5. There is a vital need for the development of our radar installations to enable the detection of enemy aircraft approaching ships from landward.

  6. Enemy bombers frequently direct bombs at night against targets which disclose their importance by the volume of their fire.

  7. The use of tracer ammunition at night is a controversial subject. A heavy barrage at night usually keeps enemy bombers at heights where they must resort to area bombing yet, on occasion, enemy bombers have sought shelter in our flak when pursued by our night fighters.

  8. Non-tracer 40 mm projectiles should be developed for use of these batteries at night when controlled by radar.

  9. A self-destroyer 20 mm projectile should be developed.

  10. High capacity ammunition employed by our 6" cruisers was very satisfactory.


  1. Naval officers destined to be Port Directors of captured ports should be present during the planning, and should participate in the development of naval administrative plans, and in the supervision of procurement, assembly, loading plans and movements of base personnel and equipment.

  2. An intelligent study of the enemy port facilities should form the basis for the determination of the requirements of Port Parties to be landed. Much equipment shipped as Lions, Cubs, etc., is not applicable to enemy ports in this theater.

  3. Army loading plans must make provision for the inclusion in the assault movement of Naval Port Parties and essential equipment required for the prompt opening of ports to be captured on D day. The remainder of Advance Base Party equipment and stores must be provided for in follow-up movements.

  4. Naval Combat Intelligence Officers should be landed early in the assault to carry out their special missions. Upon the opening of enemy ports they should join Advance Base Parties for the organization of port security.

  5. When major ports become available for our merchant shipping, the Army plans must provide for the availability of stevedore and dock side labor troops to unload such shipping in ports. It is not a naval responsibility to provide naval personnel in the task of unloading merchant [vessels.


  1. The staff organization of the Naval Commander Western Task Force as constituted was found to be adequate for the operation.


  1. From a naval viewpoint, the press coverage of the Sicilian campaign was inadequate and ineffectual.


  1. Large scale amphibious operations require the employment of specially designed AGC's.

  2. During the planning stage of an operation, adequate communication personnel and material must be available in the theater of operations.


  1. Vessels of the U.S. Navy taking part in the operation require improvement in the individual and coordinated use of air search radar under air attack conditions.

  2. Better discipline in the use of voice circuits is required.

  3. In a theater where naval forces of a number of nations are employed in amphibious operations, there is a need for a common communication language embodying procedure, call signs and cryptographic aids.

    The relentless vigor with which the assault was pressed home, regardless of loss or difficulty, merits the highest praise.

    The initiative, perseverance, and loyalty of the officers and men comprising the Western Naval Task Force is acknowledged with pleasure. The Naval Commander is fully aware of the labor and effort expended in meeting the requirements of the planning, training, material readiness and employment of the large naval forces of different types and characteristics.

    The co-operation manifested between the Army and Navy, and the comradeship and combat efficiency demonstrated by units of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy in joint action against a common foe presages the ultimate victory of the Allied Nations.

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy.






CTF 81


CTF 82


CTF 83


CTF 84


CTF 86


CTF 87


CTG 89.1










CG 15th Army Group


CG 7th Army


Air CinCMed






CG 12th ASC






Rear Admiral Hall


Rear Admiral Conolly


Rear Admiral Kirk


Naval Staff ComNavNAW




*--For distribution as deemed appropriate.

Commander, U.S.N.R.
Flag Secretary.




















ARMY ATTACK PLAN (Diagrammatic)














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