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U. S. S. PORTLAND (CA33)

GUNFIRE AND TORPEDO DAMAGE

BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL

13 NOVEMBER, 1942

U. S. S. PENSACOLA (CA24)

TORPEDO DAMAGE

BATTLE OF LUNGA POINT

30 NOVEMBER, 1942

Preliminary Design Branch
Bureau of Ships
1 March, 1944
Navy Department

WAR DAMAGE REPORT No. 35

Printed By U. S. Hydrographic Office


U.S.S. PORTLAND (CA33)

Gunfire and Torpedo Damage

Battle of Guadalcanal

13 November, 1942

U.S.S. PENSACOLA (CA24)

Torpedo Damage

Battle of Lunga Point

30 November, 1942

USS PORTLAND

USS PENSACOLA

Class

Heavy Cruiser

Heavy Cruiser

Launched

21 May, 1932

25 April, 192:

Displacement (Standard)

9,800 tons

9,100 tons

Length (O.A.)

610'-3"

585'-6"

Beam (O.A.)

66'-1"

65"-3"

Draft (prior to damage), fwd

23'-0"

22'-0"

aft

23'-0"

20'-9"

References:

U.S.S. PORTLAND

(a) C.O. PORTLAND ltr. CA33/A16-3, Serial 073, of 21 November, 1942 (Action Report).
(b) C.O. PORTLAND ltr. CA33/L11-1, Serial 085, of 12 December, 1942 (War Damage Report).
(c) C.O. PORTLAND ltr. CA33/L11-1, Serial 015, of 30 January, 1943 (Supplementary War Damage Report).
(d) Comdt. NYMI ltr. CA33/L11-1, Serial (27-D3-576608), of 28 June, 1943 (Supplementary War Damage Report).

U.S.S. PENSACOLA

(e) C.O. PENSACOLA ltr. CA24/A16-3/(0178) of 4 December, 1942 (Action Report).
(f) C.O. PENSACOLA ltr. CA24/L11-1/(0264) of 28 December, 1942 (War Damage Report).
(g) C.O. PENSACOLA ltr. CA24/L11-1/(0263) of 27 December, 1942 (Report of Fire).
(h) C.O. VESTAL ltr. S11, Serial 03, of 16 January, 1943 (Report of Repairs).
(i) Comdt. NYPearl ltr. C-L11/CA/NY10, Serial Y-01356 of 3 July, 1943 (Supplementary War Damage Report).
(j) Comdt. NYPearl ltr. C-L11-1/CA/NY10, Serial Y-01488, of 19 July, 1943 (Supplementary War Damage Report).
(k) Comdt. NYPearl ltr. C-L11-1/CA/NY10, Serial Y-01658, of 4 August, 1943 (Ordnance War Damage Report).


CONTENTS

Section

Page

I

Foreword

1

II

Summary

1

A. PORTLAND

1

B. PENSACOLA

2

III

Narrative

2

A.PORTLAND

2

B. PENSACOLA

7

IV

Discussion

12

A. Type Weapons

12

B. Structural Damage

12

C.Machinery Notes on PENSACOLA

13

D. Fire on PENSACOLA

14

E. Detonation of 8-inch Projectiles Aboard PENSACOLA

15

F. Stability, Flooding and Damage Control

15

G. Conclusions

16

LIST OF PLATES

USS PORTLAND

I

Torpedo and Gunfire Damage

II

Details of Torpedo Damage

III

Flooding Diagram

USS PENSACOLA

IV

Torpedo Damage

V

Damaged Section

VI

Flooding Diagram

LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS

No.

Title

USS PORTLAND

1.

USS PORTLAND after arrival at Tulagi. General view from starboard beam showing location of all hits.

2.

Hit No. 1. Damage to "S" strake at frame 70. Nose indentation measures eight inches.

3.

Hit No. 1. Damage to "K" strake and frame 70.

4.

Hit No. 2. Damage to starboard side of hangar at frame 85.

5.

Hit No. 2. Inboard view of damage to starboard hangar side plating. Mezzanine deck prevented fragments from spreading downward.

6.

General view of torpedo damage to starboard hull between frames 128 and 141 from torpedo detonation.

7.

Main deck view of torpedo damage to starboard side after arrival at Tulagi.

8.

View of damage to main deck looking forward. Note 60 pound STS first platform deck armor plate which caused shock damage to No. III turret.

9.

PORTLAND at Tulagi after removal of wreckage, and installation of temporary girder on starboard shell.

10.

PORTLAND en route to Sydney with all temporary repairs completed. Note openings in port shell to permit free flow of water through damaged section.

11.

PORTLAND in drydock, Sydney, showing No. 2 and No. 3 propeller shafts missing, and below water damage to starboard shell.

12.

Buckle in first platform deck plating just aft of armor in vicinity of frame 141.

13.

Buckle in first platform deck plating just forward of armor between frames 128 and 129.

14.

Damage to training pinion housing in No. III turret.

15.

Distortion to elevating screw in No. III turret.

16.

Broken trunnion cap on left side of No. III turret.

17.

Damage to blading in lower casing and on rotor of No. 2 L.P. turbine due to overspeeding.

18.

Distortion to after flange of No. 2 stern tube shaft.

19.

PORTLAND after completion of all repairs.

USS PENSACOLA

20.

USS PENSACOLA after arrival at Tulagi. Profile view from port beam showing location of torpedo hit.

21.

Close-up view of torpedo damage showing damage to superstructure and crack in sheer strake.

22.

Close-up view of torpedo damage from drydock.

23.

Close-up view of torpedo damage looking forward.

24.

Close-up view of torpedo damage looking aft. Note shell strake "D" bent around port starboard shaft. Note pivoting of armor bulkhead about first platform deck.

25.

Structural damage to main deck before removal of wreckage - looking forward.

26.

Structural damage to main deck after removal of some of the wreckage - looking aft.

27.

Looking inboard from port shell on second deck showing torpedo damage to bulkhead 104 and projectile damage to No. III barbette.

28.

Damage from projectile explosions to inside of No. III barbette looking forward and to port.

29.

Damage to No. III turret rotating structure.

30.

First platform deck looking aft on port side from frame 105 to bulkhead 109 showing structural and electrical damage.

31.

Buckling of second platform due to pivoting of armor bulkhead and longitudinal bulkhead No. 2. (See plate V for cross section).

32.

Cut-away view below second platform showing damage to port inboard shaft alley and surrounding structure.

33.

Break in port outboard shaft in way of torpedo hit. Note longitudinal bulkhead No. 2 pressed around port inboard shaft.

34.

Broken steady bearing housing on port outboard shaft.

35.

Damage to after end of No. 3 reduction gear due to movement of port inboard line shafting.

36.

Wrinkles in shell plating on port bow due to shock of torpedo detonation.

SECTION I - FOREWORD

1. PORTLAND was damaged by a shallow-running torpedo which struck the starboard shell in way of the armored box containing the steering gear, and by two bombardment projectiles amidships. PENSACOLA was struck by a shallow-running torpedo which struck the shell about 25 feet abaft the after engine room and in way of the port internal longitudinal armored bulkhead which protects the after magazines. The two cases of torpedo damage, when considered together, present a fairly complete picture of the effects on cruiser hulls when struck by single torpedoes abaft the main machinery spaces. For this reason a combined report has been issued rather than a single report for each vessel.

2. This report is based on the excellent and complete data contained in the references. The photographs of damage to the PORTLAND were furnished by the Commanding Officer and the Navy Yard, Mare Island and those of the PENSACOLA similarly by the Commanding Officer and the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. The plates were prepared from plans submitted by the two yards.

SECTION II - SUMMARY

A. PORTLAND

3. At 0158 on 15 November, 1942 PORTLAND, while participating in the Battle of Guadalcanal, was struck on the starboard side by a destroyer torpedo. The torpedo struck and detonated at frame 123 about 6 feet below the waterline in way of the steering motor and steering gear rooms. PORTLAND was also struck by 2 bombardment projectiles which detonated upon impact. The projectile damage was of a minor nature.

4. The resulting torpedo damage to the hull was extensive. Forty-five feet of the side plating and all of the main and second decks in way of the hit were destroyed. The port store rooms and the second deck compartments in way of the hit were opened to the sea. An armor plate from the first platform deck and portions of the main and second decks were blown upward striking the guns in No. III mount, jamming it in train and elevation. The torpedo detonation destroyed the 2 inboard shafts and damaged the steering gear. This resulted in loss of steering control. The slewing effect of the rupture in the shell almost completely prevented maneuvering with the 2 outboard propellers.

5. With the assistance of numerous small craft PORTLAND made Tulagi Harbor. After emergency repairs PORTLAND proceeded to Cockatoo Drydocks, Sydney, Australia, where semi-permanent repairs were made to the hull. Upon completion of these repairs PORTLAND proceeded to Navy Yard, Mare Island where permanent repairs together with authorized alterations have been completed (photo 19).

6. The loss of 2 propellers and steering control radically reduced the vessel's effectiveness. Despite this reduction in fighting efficiency, the 2 forward 8-inch mounts continued in action, engaging a Japanese battleship shortly after receiving

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the damage and sinking a Japanese destroyer the following dawn. This record is impressive and is a tribute to the skill of her personnel as well as the ruggedness of her design and construction.

B. PENSACOLA

7. PENSACOLA, while participating in the action subsequently named the Battle of Lunga Point, was struck by either a Japanese submarine or destroyer torpedo. This torpedo detonated on the port side at frame 103 about 6 feet below the waterline in way of fuel oil tanks. Fuel oil from these tanks was blown over the entire structure aft. The vapors from this oil caught on fire almost immediately. The fire was fought for 12 hours before it was finally extinguished.

8. The resulting damage to the hull was extensive. Flexural vibration was severe and resulted in buckles in the bow at frames 11 and 15. About 48 feet of the side plating and all of the decks on the port side in way of the hit were ruptured.

The after engine room and the magazines aft were flooded and the side tanks contaminated. In addition, both port shafts were damaged; thus, power was available on only the outboard starboard shaft. Both after 8-inch mounts were rendered inoperative by damage from fire.

9. PENSACOLA proceeded to Tulagi Harbor under her own power where the fire mentioned above was finally extinguished. After temporary repairs were completed PENSACOLA proceeded to Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor on 1 propeller. Permanent repairs together with authorized alterations were completed at Pearl Harbor and PENSACOLA returned to service the latter part of October, 1943.

10. PENSACOLA's effectiveness was sharply reduced by the loss of the use of 3 shafts and the flooding of the after engine room. Further, the fire was of such proportions that it might well have forced the abandonment of the vessel had it not been effectively combatted. Although she was never in danger of capsizing or sinking, conditions were sufficiently serious to cause a reasonable doubt of her ultimate survival. That she did survive was due, to a large extent, to the determination of her personnel.

SECTION III - NARRATIVE

A. PORTLAND

(Plates I, II and III - Photos 1 through 19)

11. PORTLAND, on the night of 12-13 November, 1942, was a unit of a cruiser task force. At midnight this task force, in column, entered Lengo Channel from the eastward in search of Japanese forces. Speed was 18 knots. The sky was overcast, the moon had set and the night was dark. Visibility was fair to good and the wind was about 10 knots from the southeast. A slight sea was running. PORTLAND went to general quarters and condition ZED was set - thus the vessel was ready in all respects for a night action.

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12. At 0127 an enemy force was discovered about 31,900 yards to the northwest (for estimated strength and distribution of enemy forces see plate I, USS SAN FRANCISCO - War Damage Report No. 26). At the time this force was discovered, the United States force was on course 280 degrees. The latter turned northwest and then north. At 0150 PORTLAND turned west conforming with a column movement. As the rudder was put over, enemy searchlights illuminated. Destroyers in the van immediately counter-illuminated. Fire was then opened by both forces practically simultaneously. PORTLAND engaged an enemy destroyer 6,200 yards distant to starboard. This target was sunk by the first 2 salvos. Shortly after opening fire, PORTLAND received 2 projectile hits in close succession, both on the starboard side (photo 1). One projectile (hit No. 1) struck the double-course shell plating, starboard side, just above the armor at frame 70. The other (hit No. 2) struck the hangar at frame 85. Neither of these hits caused serious damage and PORTLAND continued the engagement, firing at a second target - a light cruiser in the same group - and set it on fire with a 9-gun salvo.

13. At 0153 course was changed to 000 degrees. About 0158, 8 minutes after the engagement opened, PORTLAND was struck on the starboard side near the stern by a torpedo, presumably from a destroyer. This hit destroyed the shafts to the inboard propellers, jammed the rudder at 5 degrees right, caused a 7 -1/2 degree starboard list and blew the main deck and other structure (including one armor plate from the first platform) up against the guns of No. III mount putting them out of action. An attempt was made to steer by the engines (the outboard propellers and shafts were undamaged) but the ship commenced to turn to starboard and could not be brought to a steady course. This was due to the starboard turning moment created by the breach in the starboard shell. As the first swing to the right was completed, a KONGO-type battleship became clearly visible. Fire was opened by the forward two mounts at 4,000 yards and continued throughout that turn. Although the enemy battleship returned the fire, all of the salvos passed overhead.

14. There were no fires or dangerous progressive flooding to combat and the immediate damage control measures that were required consisted mainly of patching or isolating severed electrical circuits and shifting liquids to correct the 7-1/2 degree starboard list. The following action was taken to correct the list (plate III): At 0223 salt water ballast was pumped from B-905-F to B-906-F using No. 1 and No. 2 fire and bilge pumps. At the start of this operation B-905-F was about two-thirds full. Nine thousand gallons (34-1/2 tons) of water were transferred to B-906-F and the balance was pumped overboard to empty the tank. At 0225 fuel oil was pumped from B-929-F to B-930-F using No. 3 and No. 4 fuel oil booster pumps. At 0240 the ship was reported on even keel. No water was intentionally admitted to the ship for counterflooding measures.

15. After the brief engagement with the Japanese battleship, the situation became confused, and it was impossible to identify vessels present. Firing continued to the northward and finally ceased at 0235. PORTLAND continued to turn in small circles throughout the night. After daybreak at 0630, an enemy destroyer

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southwest of Savo Island was positively identified and taken under fire by the forward mounts. This destroyer blew up upon being struck by the sixth salvo. At 0700 a tow was requested from Tulagi. At 0953 the tug BOBOLINK reported and was directed instead by the Commanding Officer of PORTLAND (SOPA) to take the burning ATLANTA in tow. In the meantime, some progress was made to the southeast by "crabbing." To accomplish this, Higgins boats which had arrived after daybreak, pushed on the starboard bow while PORTLAND'S engines were alternately reversed. About 4 miles had been gained toward Lunga Point when YP238 arrived at 1200. This vessel lacked sufficient power to take PORTLAND under tow. Finally at 1432 BOBOLINK came alongside after having anchored ATLANTA off Lunga Point. Attempts to tow were unsuccessful as the starboard turning moment could not be balanced. BOBOLINK and YP238 then nosed against the starboard bow of PORTLAND. This arrangement, with the backing of the port propeller, overcame the turning moment and permitted PORTLAND to advance at about 2 or 3 knots. Course was set for Tulagi where PORTLAND arrived at 0108 on 14 November.

16. Hit No. 1, which appears to have been from a medium caliber projectile, probably with a light case and instantaneous fuse, struck the starboard side on the double-course 30-pound (3/4-inch) STS shell plating just above the armor belt at frame 70 (photos 2 and 3). The projectile was defeated by the double-course STS plating, the plating being given support by the armored deck, the side armor plating just below the point of impact and by a heavy frame directly behind. The indentation in the outer shell made by the projectile nose measured approximately 8 inches in diameter. Fragments from the projectile severed the degaussing coils which were installed on the outside of the hull. The insulation on these cables was set on fire but was quickly extinguished by the use of CO2 fire extinguishers. 17. Hit No. 2, which the ship identified as a 14-inch bombardment projectile, detonated on impact with the starboard side plating (15-pound MS) of the hangar about 5-1/2 feet below the boat deck. A section of plating 36 Inches by 44 inches was blown out and frame 85 was destroyed (photos 4 and 5). Fragments inboard penetrated the uptake and bulkheads enclosing the airplane crane machinery adjacent to the starboard hangar. Equipment in the near vicinity on the hangar mezzanine deck was demolished; however, further fragment damage to equipment in the hangar was reduced because of the presence of this deck. Other fragments severed power and lighting circuits on the overhead of the hangar and penetrated the starboard bulkhead of the airplane crane machinery room where several cables for fire control, searchlight control and I.C. circuits were also cut.

18. Minor damage was also received from automatic weapons. A projectile, probably of 45mm caliber, penetrated the starboard side of the hangar between frames 80 and 87 about 3-1/2 feet above the main deck destroying a pipe just inside the hangar. Fragments continued on to the port side and penetrated the uptake enclosure. It is also believed that a hole found in the forward stack was made by a 45mm projectile. In addition, various fragments from hit No. 1 or near misses penetrated structure on the signal bridge as shown on plate I.

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19. Structural damage from the torpedo was extensive (plates I and II - photos 6 through 11). No shock or flexural vibration was noted from this hit. The center of impact appears to have been at frame 133, starboard, not more than six feet below the waterline. Damage extended longitudinally from frame 128 to frame 143 and vertically from the main deck to the second platform deck. The starboard shell was blown apart leaving an opening about 45 feet long and 25 feet deep; decks, bulkheads and other structure inside of the ship were demolished and distorted beyond the centerline.

20. The stern structure was thrown out of line by the torpedo detonation. The flat keel was arched upward between frame 129 and the extreme stern with a maximum deflection at frame 134-1/2 of 4-5/16 inches. The vertical keel from frame 131-1/2 to the extreme stern was likewise out of line. This misalignment was greatest at frame 144 at which point it was 4-1/2 inches to port. It was also discovered that considerable distortion had taken place adjacent to the steering engine and motor room, near the keel and at the second platform deck. The starboard longitudinal armored (2-inch STS) bulkhead was deflected inboard between frames 129-1/4 and 139-1/2. The rivets in the butt connection at frame 139-1/2 were sheared. The butt connection at frame 133-1/2, which was abreast the torpedo detonation, was ruptured and the plates were severely distorted. The starboard ram of the steering gear was damaged by the inboard movement of the armored bulkhead. The distortion and relative movement of the ship's structure in the area of the port steering room armored bulkhead (2-inch STS) resulted in the shearing of all rivets between frames 132 and 140 which connected the port bulkhead to the vertical flange of the angle attaching it to the shell. Brackets and stiffener connections on the port side were likewise torn loose and distorted, and at frame 132 the vertical butt between the armored bulkheads overlapped, shearing off the rivets.

21. On the first platform deck the 10-pound medium steel plating aft of the deck armor was deeply wrinkled from frames 142 to 146. Bulkheads 145 and 146 on the first platform deck were also distorted (photo 12). The light (9-pound MS) first platform plating at frame 128 and frame 129, port, likewise was wrinkled (photo 13).

22. No. III mount had just completed firing a salvo off the starboard quarter and was preparing to fire another when the torpedo struck. In order to prevent any further damage to the mount, which might have been caused by accidental firing, circuits were immediately cut out locally. A subsequent investigation disclosed that the mount was jammed in elevation and train from damage caused by a 60-pound (1-1/2-inch) STS armor plate from the first platform deck striking the underside of the guns. The force which was thus imparted to the guns resulted in the training pinion housing pulling away from the training gear bracket at the bolted connections (photo 14), the breaking of the right hand trunnion cap and deck lug assembly casting (photo 16), and the bending of the elevating screw (photo 15). Bolts in the weather seal lower casting were sheared off completely around the starboard side to about 3 feet past the centerline. The mantlet plates in way of the gun ports were torn and distorted.

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23. The principal machinery damage, other than the complete loss of electrical wiring in the damaged area, occurred to the inboard propellers and propeller shafts, the No. 2 low-pressure turbine and condenser and the steering gear.

24. The explosion carried away the inboard starboard (No. 2) propeller shaft, propeller and struts, parting the shaft at. the outboard coupling. The tapered coupling bolts pulled through the after flange of the stern tube shaft stretching the bolt holes approximately 1/4-inch in diameter and bending the flange 0.225 of an inch (photo 18). The force of the explosion also damaged the inboard port (No. 3) propeller shaft and propeller, breaking the strut and slightly distorting the outboard coupling, but not completely parting it. The tapered coupling bolts were partially pulled through the after flange of the stern tube shaft, stretching the bolt holes 0.015 of an inch and bending the flange 0.020 of an inch.

25. The break in the No. 2 propeller shaft caused the No. 2 turbines to over-speed. Before the throttle could be closed, blading was thrown from the after stages of the ahead blading (photo 17) of the low pressure turbine. Considerable blading was thrown into the No. 2 main condenser, rupturing approximately 500 of the condenser tubes and making re-tubing necessary. The second row of the second stage astern blading was also bent and cut by the loose blading.

26. The port and starboard steering engine units were badly damaged by the explosion and salt water corrosion. This damage, which was largely repaired at Sydney, involved the pump and motor foundations and bases, which were broken, and all piping, operating rods and external fittings, which were either bent or broken. In addition, the starboard steering ram was bent and its forward cylinder was broken. The steering engine hydraulic pumps were put in serviceable condition at Sydney by straightening or removing damaged operating rods and fittings, and patching broken foundations and bases with steel plates.

27. All electrical equipment and wiring in the after compartments were damaged by the explosion and salt water. The refrigerator equipment in compartment D-305-E was also damaged by salt water.

28. A determination of the extent of the structural damage was made at Tulagi after the debris had been cut away, compartments cleared and a diver had inspected the bottom. It appeared feasible after this examination to restore the structural strength sufficiently by temporary repairs above water to allow passage to Sydney. The after section (from frame 141 to the stern) was temporarily secured to the forward portion of the ship on the starboard side by installing a heavy pre-fabricated girder at the main deck level which bridged the gap from the intact structure at frame 141 to the intact structure at approximately frame 129 (photos 9 and 10). The port side was stiffened by installing a longitudinal girder against the shell frames just below the main deck and reinforcing the area, where possible, with pipe supports to intact structures and wire line ties to the opposite side. In order to permit steering, the links to the rudder cross-head were cut so that a jury rig could be installed.

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29. The stern was lightened in every way possible by shifting liquids, pumping out intact compartments and jettisoning damaged equipment. A partial correction of trim was accomplished by pumping the fuel oil in the after "C" and "D" tanks to the forward "A" and "B" tanks and transferring the balance of about 435 tons to other ships. The above pumping and transferring of fuel oil plus the pumping out of the flooded ice machine room D-305-E raised the stern about 2-1/2 feet; this trim was maintained on the trip to Sydney. Openings were cut in the port shell between the first platform and the second deck in the stern to permit a free flow of seas through the damaged area while under way (photo 10).

30. On the trip to Cockatoo Dry Dock, Sydney, Australia, the port shell and first platform plating opposite the damaged starboard side were seen and heard to be working and bending. While en route, a crack occurred in the shell at frame 132. The seas encountered, however, were not heavy and the voyage was completed with no serious damage occurring.

31. At Sydney, semi-permanent repairs were made to the shell, main deck and steering gear equipment. PORTLAND then returned to the Mare Island Navy Yard for permanent repairs, operating on 2 propellers and with turret III jammed.

32. At Mare Island all damaged structure and equipment were replaced or reconditioned. Approved alterations were made. Repairs and alterations were completed in a relatively short time and PORTLAND returned to service in May, 1943 (photo 19).

B. PENSACOLA

(Plates IV, V and VI - photos 20 through 36)

33. On the night of 30 November, 1942 PENSACOLA was a member of a cruiser task force composed of 4 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 6 destroyers. This task force entered Lengo Channel on the evening of 30 November in search of an enemy Japanese force. After clearing the Channel this force formed in column and proceeded along the north coast of Guadalcanal Island at 20 knots. The night was clear and dark -the moon had not risen. The wind was about 8 knots from the east.

34. At 2311 a destroyer in the van made radar contact with an enemy force bearing 280 degrees. At 2320 the leading cruiser opened fire to port followed 3 minutes later by PENSACOLA. A few minutes after opening fire, MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS were torpedoed. PENSACOLA, which was astern of these cruisers, passed to port and continued the engagement. At 2339, when 2 miles south of Savo Island, PENSACOLA was struck on the port side aft by a torpedo reported fired from either an enemy submarine or destroyer.

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35. This hit opened the hull to the sea from frames 93 to 108 (photo 20). The port shafts were damaged and the after engine room was flooded immediately - thus only the starboard outboard propeller remained in service. Flooding resulted in the vessel settling almost 9 feet by the stern and listing 13 degrees to port. The list was promptly corrected by pumping overboard water and fuel oil - no additional water was taken aboard for counterflooding measures.

36. After assessment of damage by the Commanding Officer, it was decided to proceed to Tulagi. Although steering control had been lost temporarily, it was regained by shifting control to steering aft. PENSACOLA was able to proceed at 7 or 8 knots on the starboard outboard shaft. Between 5 and 10 degrees right rudder held the ship on a fairly steady course. At 0345, 1 December PENSACOLA entered Tulagi Harbor.

37. In addition to the structural damage caused by the torpedo detonation, fuel oil from tanks in way of the hit (D-2-F, D-4-F, D-6-F and D-8-F) was thrown into many of the living spaces below the main deck aft of the machinery spaces. Oil was also thrown over most of the structure aft including the mainmast, No. III mount and 20mm clipping room. Fire broke out almost immediately and in a few minutes the entire mainmast structure and surrounding area was on fire, the blaze reaching over 100 feet in height. Shortly thereafter, fire was raging in the mess compartment C-202-L, the crew's space C-201-L and spaces surrounding No. III barbette. Oil continued to rise to the top of the water near the large hole In the second deck where vapors were ignited due to the intense heat - thus, a large blaze was continuously fed from this hole. Fire quickly became so intense as to block all passageways fore and aft.

38. The fire was fought by 7 hose lines led from fire plugs forward of frame 48. Numerous sections of hose line were found to have deteriorated and these ruptured when fire main pressure was applied. This caused some delay in fighting the fire during its early and critical stage. Fog nozzles were used on all hose lines. In addition to the 7 hose lines used, C02 (15-pound portable and 50-pound cylinders) was effectively used until the supply was exhausted. Foam was also effective but the supply was inadequate.

39. In about an hour and a half it was possible to lead several hose lines past the fire on the starboard side. This assisted in controlling the fire by making it possible to fight it from both sides. Holes were also cut in decks and bulkheads in order to fight fires in spaces inaccessible by other methods.

40. In addition to the direct attack on the fire discussed above, some magazines aft were flooded. Handling room D-403-M and 8-inch powder magazine D-404-M flooded immediately from the torpedo detonation. Eight-inch powder magazines D-405-M and D-408-M flooded gradually. An attempt was made to flood the after 5-inch magazines, the hold magazines and the forward and after 8-inch powder magazines for No. III mount from the sea; but the hydraulic system to the group control valves had been carried away. Flooding of these spaces was then attempted by operating the manual controls, but it was not definitely

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determined at that time which magazines had been successfully flooded. A subsequent examination revealed that they were all flooded. Due to a misunderstanding originating from poor communications, flooding was commenced in the 8-inch powder magazines for No. IV mount, but was subsequently secured.

41. An attempt was also made to sprinkle No. III mount, but the only water (850 gallons) available was in the 2 sprinkling tanks. The quantity of water available by this means was too small to be of any practical value. A bucket brigade made a further attempt, but the heat was too great. Powder in the hoist was sprinkled and powder in the powder passing circle was immersed in tubs of water. The heat became sufficiently intense to boil the water and cause the powder to burn after the water had evaporated.

42. At 2348 (9 minutes after the torpedo detonation) 20mm ammunition began to detonate. At 0145 8-inch projectiles on the shell deck of No. 3 barbette began to detonate blowing holes in the shell deck and barbette. Approximately 150 rounds of 8-inch projectiles detonated singly over a period of several hours.

43. At 0355 on 1 December PENSACOLA reached Tulagi Harbor and anchored. A destroyer came alongside and passed over several hose lines to augment the 7 lines used on PENSACOLA. One of these lines was connected to the foam generator on the destroyer. Additional foam powder was obtained for use in the ship's generators. This additional source of foam and water was very effective and eventually brought the fire under control. It was approximately 12 hours from the time of the torpedo detonation until the fire was extinguished, and even then it continued to rekindle and break out in various spaces. It was necessary to continue cooling decks and bulkheads with fog applicators to prevent oil vapors from re-igniting. Throughout the whole period of the fire dense smoke, which resulted from the burning oil vapors, was a severe handicap in combatting the fire. Rescue breathers were successfully used by the crew to enter smoke-filled spaces to quench smoldering embers.

44. Distortion and damage to the ship was unusually extensive and was caused first, by the torpedo detonation, second, by the ensuing fire and third, by the 8-inch projectiles which detonated in No. 3 barbette. Shock from this hit was not appreciable inasmuch as only the trunnions of the 24-inch signal searchlights were broken. Flexural vibration on the other hand was quite severe. Men below decks as well as those on the bridge were thrown off their feet. This motion was reported to have been both horizontal and vertical. Vibration caused buckles in the port (photo 36) and starboard sides of the bow between frames 11 and 15 (see plate IV). Some frames were broken and a few rivets were loosened causing slight leaks. Light partition bulkheads were pulled away from deck plating at several places in officers' staterooms. It was later found that the bow was out of line 1/2-inch to port. Radar antennas were also damaged as a result of this vibration.

45. The center of impact appears to have been at frame 103, port, about 6 feet below the waterline. Damage to the hull on the port side extended longitudinally from frame 97 to frame 109

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and vertically from the main deck to No. 1 longitudinal on the port side (photos 22 through 26, 30 and 32). Decks, bulkheads and other structure inside of the ship were demolished and distorted to the centerline.

46. Destruction of the plating and decks enumerated above resulted in a sufficient reduction in longitudinal strength to cause the stern section to sag and twist to port. Readings at Pearl Harbor at the sheer strake port and starboard at frame 131 showed a sag of 2-3/4 and 1-5/16-inches respectively.

47. The heavy 140-pound (3-1/2-inch) STS port longitudinal armored bulkhead abreast the torpedo hit was deflected inboard (plate V, photos 24 and 31). This bulkhead (between frames 97 and 109-3/4) pivoted as a unit about the first platform deck. The heavy first platform deck plating kept the top of the inboard armored bulkhead from being pushed inboard. The second platform deck, of lighter plating, gave way under the force applied to the armored bulkhead from the torpedo detonation. The maximum deflection at the bottom of the armor was about 18 inches.

43. No. 3 barbette was extensively damaged by the detonation of 150 8-inch projectiles (photos 27 through 29). Both the lower and upper shell decks were partially blown down and torn from the barbette. The barbette itself (30-pound STS), from the main deck to the top of the after deckhouse, was bulged outward at the main deck level on the forward port side. The upper portion of the barbette was slightly distorted. The forward side of the barbette plating on the second deck was bulged outward locally and in a few instances was ripped open, apparently by tension failure of the plate when stretched (photo 27). No fragments are reported to have penetrated the barbette.

49. The principal machinery damage, other than the complete loss of all electrical wiring in the damaged area, occurred to the port shafts and the No. 3 reduction gear unit. In addition, all machinery in the after engine room was damaged by submergence.

50. The torpedo detonation dislodged the port outboard shaft (No. 4) aft of bulkhead 85. The third and fourth sections of line shafting parted, leaving about 8 inches between flanges. Bolt holes in the flanges were elongated and the tapered bolts themselves were bent. Distortion of the hull occurred in the vicinity of the stern tube bearing. The stern tube shaft parted at the forward coupling and the flanges were separated almost 4 feet (photo 33). The stuffing box at bulkhead 85 was damaged by the longitudinal movement aft of the shaft. This permitted some minor leakage through this bulkhead. Watertight integrity was restored by boxing over the shaft. The steady bearing foundations aft of bulkhead 85 were destroyed by shock (photo 34).

51. Distortion of the hull in the vicinity of the explosion pushed the port inboard shaft (No. 3) Inboard, completely destroying the forward 2 steady bearings. The coupling at the bull gear and that between the first and second sections of the line shafting were parted. The tapered bolts were bent and the bolt holes themselves elongated. The stern tube and strut bearings were undamaged.

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52. When PENSACOLA was placed in dry dock the 2 starboard shafts (Nos. 1 and 2) were found to be considerably out of alignment. The misalignment of the shafts was due to the sag of the stern which caused the stern tube bearings and propeller struts to be forced out of line. The sag of the stern was approximately 2-1/4 inches. That No. 1 shaft remained operable is a matter of some interest in view of the large misalignment which occurred.

53. All machinery in the after engine room was damaged by submergence. All turbines and reduction gears were forced out of alignment, but no serious structural damage resulted. The supporting members for No. 1 and No. 2 high pressure air compressors collapsed due to rupture of the after engine room bulkhead. Damage to the compressors themselves consisted of a broken cylinder head, a bent connecting rod and crank shaft to No. 2 unit and minor damage to the other. The upper half of the cast aluminum port reduction gear casing had a section about 5 feet square broken out as shown in photo 35. Most of the piping systems in the damaged area were ruptured or distorted.

54. All cables which terminated in or extended through the area below the second deck and aft of No. 2 fireroom, with the exception of the starboard power feeder to the steering motors, were all saturated with salt water and rendered useless. In addition, the majority of these cables within a radius of approximately 30 feet of the torpedo explosion were severed. All cables extending into the area between frames 185 and 113 on the second and main decks together with all cables running up the mainmast were destroyed by fire.

55. On 1 December, after the fire had been extinguished, a determination of the extent of structural damage was made at Tulagi. The stern was lightened in every way possible. All of the mainmast structure was removed complete to the main deck level. All of the deck houses on the main deck around the mast were removed. An attempt was also made to unwater the after engine room by building a concrete caisson around the damaged after engine room bulkhead. This failed, however, when the inner face of the caisson began to erode due to leakage. Despite this difficulty, the water was lowered sufficient! to permit securing loose gear. The space was then permitted to reflood. Due to time limitations, no further attempt was made to build a new caisson. A temporary shear strake was installed on the port side in order to increase the longitudinal strength. All propellers were removed except the starboard outboard propeller (No. 1). A great deal of difficulty was experienced in removing the propellers inasmuch as they were apparently "frozen to the tail shafts. Numerous methods of removal were tried including the use of an explosive charge from a 3-inch projectile with a strongback. This failed to remove No. 4 and No. 2 propellers, however, it was successful in the removal of No. 3 propeller. No. 4 and No. 2 propellers were eventually removed by cutting the tail shafts. After removal of the propellers and completion of the temporary repairs, PENSACOLA proceeded to Pearl Harbor for permanent repairs, operating on the starboard outboard propeller.

56. At Pearl Harbor all damaged structure and equipment was replaced or reconditioned. Approved alterations were made and PENSACOLA returned to service late in October 1943.

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SECTION IV - DISCUSSION

A. Type Weapons

1. PORTLAND

57. The projectile which struck the hangar (hit No. 2) is known to have been a 14-inch bombardment projectile with an instantaneous fuze setting. The base ring recovered on top of the hangar was identified as a part of a projectile of this type. As may be noted from the small amount of damage inflicted (photos 4 and 5) this type of projectile is not well suited for use against naval targets.

58. The projectile which struck immediately above the armor belt at frame 70 (hit No. 1) is believed to have been a medium caliber bombardment projectile with an instantaneous fuze. No fragments were recovered.

59. The torpedo which struck PORTLAND was undoubtedly fired from a Japanese destroyer inasmuch as no submarines were known to be present during the action. Japanese destroyers are known to use two types of torpedoes. One type is a 21-inch torpedo which has a warhead charge of 660 pounds of hexa, and the other is a 24-inch torpedo which has a warhead charge of 1076 pounds of hexa. Damage indicates that the 21-inch type was employed against PORTLAND.

2. PENSACOLA

60. The source of the torpedo which struck PENSACOLA has never been definitely established inasmuch as enemy destroyers and submarines were both known to be operating in the vicinity. It is known, however, that the larger size Japanese submarines use two types of 21-inch torpedoes. The latest type has a warhead charge of 660 pounds of hexa, while the older type has a warhead charge of only 450 pounds of explosive. As discussed above, the Japanese are also known to have a 21-inch destroyer torpedo with 660 pounds of explosive. Thus, judging from the damage, it is concluded that, regardless of the source, a torpedo with a warhead charge of approximately 660 pounds of explosive was employed against PENSACOLA.

B. Structural Damage

61. Structural damage above the waterline to PORTLAND and PENSACOLA was unusually severe - the second and main decks on both vessels were destroyed over a large area. Severity of above water damage may be attributed in part to: (1) the proximity of the point of detonation to the upper decks, (2) the presence of internal armored bulkheads and (3) the shallowness of the ship's girder aft.

62. In both PORTLAND and PENSACOLA the torpedoes detonated not more than six feet below the waterline, i.e., just below the first platform deck. Thus, the second and main decks were nearer to the point of torpedo detonation than in instances of deep torpedo hits. Under the circumstances extensive damage to these decks was inevitable. A superficial comparison

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of the damage to decks, photos 6 and 7 of PORTLAND versus photos 20 and 21 of PENSACOLA, seems to indicate that structural damage to PORTLAND was more extensive than that to PENSACOLA. Close examination, however, reveals that damage in both cases is roughly of the same order when the differences in beam and weight of scantlings in way of the damage are considered. For example, at the main deck PORTLAND's beam at frame 133 is only 40 feet while PENSACOLA's beam at frame 103 is about 62 feet. Main deck plating on PORTLAND in the damaged area is either 9 or 10.2 pound M.S. between narrow stringer plates of 17.5 pound M.S. while that on PENSACOLA has wide heavy stringer plates of 25 pounds HTS with 10.2 pound M.S. plating between. On PENSACOLA the heavy stringer strake remained substantially intact, thus causing a narrower athwartships rupture than on PORTLAND. The hole in PORTLAND's main deck was about 40 feet by 40 feet and that on PENSACOLA was about 52 feet long by 20 feet wide. On PENSACOLA, however, transverse damage to main deck extended beyond the centerline and measured 40 feet in width, even though this width of plating was not completely ruptured.

63. Judging by the damage it appears that on both vessels the armored bulkhead inboard of the hit deflected the force of the detonations upward, another factor causing severe damage to the main and second decks. In the present state of knowledge concerning the damaging effects of underwater explosions, however, it is impossible to evaluate the effects of such secondary factors as reflection from relatively rigid surfaces. In the case of PORTLAND, it is noted that upward force was sufficient to blow an armor plate from the outboard strake of the first platform up through the second and main decks, striking the underside of the guns of No. III mount.

64. A third factor in the severity of damage was the shape of the ship's girder aft. Abaft the machinery spaces in each case the ship's girder is relatively shallow in depth but quite wide. Since the vertical distance between the keel and the main deck in this area is roughly of the same order as the radius of destruction from a torpedo detonation (with 600-700 pounds of explosive involved) damage extending from keel to main deck is not unusual.

C. Machinery Notes on PENSACOLA

65. It will be noted in paragraph 52 that despite the 2-inch sag of the stern section, the starboard outboard shaft (No. 1) remained operable. This shaft was used for the trip to Pearl Harbor and functioned satisfactorily despite the misalignment -noteworthy evidence concerning the ruggedness of U.S. cruiser shaft installations, and also of the ability of shafts in general to operate under rather surprising conditions of misalignment. The reason for continued operation of this shaft is, of course, that shafting is much more flexible than the supporting hull.

66. All electrical cables in the vicinity of the torpedo hit were destroyed with the single exception of the starboard power cables to the steering motors. Although separation of the cable runs did maintain the integrity of one of them, new light cruisers will be provided with a 30-pound (3/4-inch) STS wiring trunk on the port and starboard sides for additional

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protection of the cable runs to the steering gear compartment. Similarly, new heavy cruisers will be equipped with a 40-pound (1-inch) STS wiring trunk on both the port and starboard sides.

D. Fire on PENSACOLA

67. Fuel oil vapors were ignited immediately following the detonation of the torpedo. Oil from the ruptured tanks was mixed with the water in all flooded spaces, and, being lighter than water, rose to the surface. The rate of burning progressively accelerated as the after structure became heated. This made it necessary not only to extinguish the fire but to cool decks and bulkheads in order to prevent rekindling of fires from this source.

68. If an adequate volume of water had been immediately available in the vicinity of the fire it possibly could have been brought under control in a much shorter period of time. The failure of several sections of hose resulted in an unfortunate delay during the early and critical period of the fire. This permitted the fire to gain considerable headway before water was applied.

69. It was thought at the time - by damage control personnel -that the fire main had been ruptured just aft of frame 48. Actually, the only rupture was between frames 98 and 109, and the only riser ruptured was at frame 104. In isolating the ruptured section it is apparent that the cut-off valve at frame 61 (plate IV), was operated. This cut out all fire plugs aft of frame 61. If the stop-valve at frame 87, which is operated by a reach-rod on the second deck in compartment C-202-L, could have been cut out, water would have been available at the fire plugs at frames 76 and 69 considerably closer to the fire. It is apparent that damage, flooding and fire in C-202-L prevented accomplishing this.

70. The use of fog nozzles was advantageous inasmuch as 7 hoses could be employed whereas the remaining pumping facilities in the forward engine room - 2 fire and bilge pumps with a capacity of 235 g.p.m. each and one fire and flushing pump with a capacity of 500 g.p.m., all at 100-pounds pressure -would have been inadequate to support more than 3 straight-stream nozzles.

71. As a result of the application of lessons from war experience prior to this action a greatly improved fire main and additional pumps had been authorized for PENSACOLA but had not been installed, because of lack of Navy Yard availability. While under repair at Pearl Harbor these alterations were accomplished. The fore and aft fire main was replaced with a loop system. This is composed of a horizontal loop running through the machinery spaces and 2 vertical loops, 1 forward of the machinery spaces and 1 aft. In addition to the 4 fire and bilge pumps and the 2 fire and flushing pumps in the engine rooms, one 1000 g.p.m. diesel pump was installed at frame 40 and two - 300 g.p.m. electric-driven pumps were installed, 1 forward and 1 aft. The 3 loops, with the various cross-connections, give a flexible layout and one which is capable of better subdivision than the previous system. This

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arrangement, therefore, in addition to almost doubling the pumping capacity, will increase the probability of retaining firefighting facilities in the event of severe battle damage.

72. It is noted that the fire on PENSACOLA was of major proportions and easily could have jeopardized the survival of the vessel. Of U.S. cruisers which have suffered fires of similar proportions, incident to the present war, this was the first to be successfully controlled and extinguished. That this was done despite the inadequacy of fire fighting facilities is a tribute to the determination and skill of her personnel.

E. Detonation of 8-Inch Projectiles

Aboard PENSACOLA

73. As noted in paragraph 41, 150 8-inch projectiles were reported to have detonated singly throughout a period of several hours in No. III mount from the heat generated by the fuel oil fire. The detonation of these projectiles resulted in extensive damage to the barbette and hoist mechanism of No. III mount (photos 28 and 29). It is probable that most, if not all, of these were 8"/55 cal. A.P. projectiles containing a bursting charge of 3.64 pounds of explosive "D". The location of these projectiles in No. III barbette was not reported; however, it is apparent from the damage that they were stowed in the bins on the forward port side of the barbette on the projectile platform and projectile shelf immediately above. The fact that these projectiles detonated singly adds additional evidence to previous war experience that a mass detonation of projectiles does not necessarily occur when they are exposed to high temperatures, even when the time of exposure covers several hours, as in this case. The heavy wall thickness of these projectiles is apparently sufficient to prevent the detonation of one projectile by fragment attack from another projectile detonating adjacent to it. The 30-pound (3/4-inch) STS barbette, as described in paragraph 48 and shown in photo 27, was split open and bulged outward locally in some places. These tears and bulges, however, definitely were not the result of fragment penetration but rather appear to have been caused by the effect of blast assisted possibly by large fragments which did not penetrate. The tear shown in photo 27, for example, has the appearance of failure in tension caused by stretching. These indications are consistent with previous war experience, notably that of ERIE* and SAVANNAH**, in which projectiles subjected to fire for an appreciable period definitely went off with low order detonations. On the other hand, no specific evidence of high order detonations of projectiles caused by fire has yet been reported.

F. Stability, Flooding and Damage Control

74. The initial stability of each of these vessels was adequate - GM was in excess of 4.5 feet before the action. Although PORTLAND and PENSACOLA took aboard a large quantity of water, about 1150 tons and 2900 tons respectively, GM was reduced only about 1.8 and 2 feet respectively. Thus, the stability characteristics of both vessels remained satisfactory after damage.

* War Damage Report No. 31.

**War Damage Report No. 44 (Not yet published).

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75. As the result of flooding, PORTLAND and PENSACOLA acquired lists of 7-1/2 degrees and 13 degrees due to unsymmetrical flooding and trims by the stern of five feet and nine feet respectively. It is noted that in these two cases the angle of heel was about twice that shown in the flooding effect diagrams. The difference between the predicted and the actual angle was, of course, due to the loss of GM by free surface and reduction of intact waterplane area. The list was removed in about 40 minutes in the case of PORTLAND and 60 minutes in the case of PENSACOLA by transferring liquids and pumping fuel oil and water overboard. It is noted that no water was admitted on either vessel for counterflooding purposes.

76. Trim on both vessels was reduced at Tulagi. PORTLAND transferred fuel oil forward and also discharged about 435 tons to a barge. This reduced the trim to 2-1/2 feet. On PENSACOLA, trim by the stern was reduced by unwatering compartment D-306-L and by removing all of the mainmast structure. Attempts to unwater the after engine room were unsuccessful (see paragraph 55) because of the damage to the after bulkhead.

77. It is noted on PORTLAND that bottom tanks aft were emptied in correcting trim. If transverse stability had been seriously impaired this action would have been unwise because the removal of low weight would have reduced further the remaining GM. FTP 170A contains a specific warning of the dangers involved in emptying low tanks when stability is involved. In this case, however, the emptying of the tanks involved offered a rapid solution to the problem of removing excessive trim under the circumstances of ample GM remaining after damage.

G. CONCLUSIONS

78. Hull damage on both PORTLAND and PENSACOLA, although extensive, was not unusually severe when the shallow depth at which the torpedoes struck and the size of charge probably employed are considered. It will be noted, moreover, that the hulls of both vessels absorbed the structural damage and effects of flooding in such a manner that neither vessel was in danger of capsizing or sinking. The fire on PENSACOLA caused considerable apprehension for the vessel's survival until it was controlled.

79. Torpedo hits located as these were will always cause the loss of a major portion of the propulsive power. The one unusual aspect of the damage to propellers and shafting, is the fact that the outboard starboard shaft on PENSACOLA remained operable in spite of the major misalignment which occurred to the stern of the vessel.

80. Damage control and engineering personnel of both vessels displayed marked skill and determination in the handling of the various problems with which they were confronted.

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Photo 1. U.S.S. PORTLAND upon arrival at Tulagi. Profile view, starboard, showing location of all hits.

 

Photo 2: Hit No. 1. Damage to "S" strake at frame 70.

 

Photo 3: Hit No. l. Damage to frame 70 and "K" strake.

 

Photo 4: Hit No. 2. Damage to starboard side of hanger at frame 85.

 

Photo 5: Hit No. 2. Inboard view of damage to starboard hanger side plating. Mezzanine deck prevented fragments from spreading downward.

 

Photo 6: General view of torpedo damage to starboard hull between frames 128 and 141 from torpedo detonation.

 

Photo 7: Main deck: view of torpedo damage to starboard side after arrival at Tulagi.

 

Photo 8: View of damage to main deck looking forward. Note 60 pound STS first platform deck armor plate which caused shock damage to No. III turret.

 

Photo 9: PORTLAND at Tulagi after removal of wreckage, and installation of temporary girder on starboard shell.

Photo 10: PORTLAND en route to Sydney with all temporary repairs completed. Note openings in port shell to permit free flow of water through damaged section.

 

Photo 11: PORTLAND in drydock, Sydney, showing No. 2 and No. 3 propeller shafts missing, and below water damage to starboard shell.

 

Photo 12: Buckle in first platform deck plating just aft of armor in vicinity of frame 141.

 

Photo 13: Buckle in first platform deck plating just forward of armor between frames 128 and 129.

 

Photo Damage to pinion housing

in No. III turret.

 

Photo 15: Distortion to elevating screw in No. III turret.

 

Photo 16: Broken trunnion cap on left side of No. III turret.

 

Photo 17: Damage to blading in lower casing and on rotor of No. 2 L.P. turbine due to overspeeding.

 

Photo 13: Distortion to after flange of No. 2 stern tube shaft.

 

Photo 19: PORTLAND after completion of all repairs.

 

Photo 20: USS PENSACOLA after arrival at Tulagi.Profile view from port beam showing location of torpedo hit.

 

Photo 21: Close-up view of torpedo damage showing damage to superstructure and crack in sheer strake.

 

Photo 22: Close-up view of torpedo damage from drydock.

 

Photo 23: Close-up view of torpedo damage looking forward.

 

Photo 24: Close-up view of torpedo damage looking aft. Note shell strake "D" bent around port starboard shaft. Note pivoting of armor bulkhead about first platform deck.

 

Photo 25: Structural damage to main deck before removal of wreckage - looking forward.

 

Photo 26: Structural damage to main deck after removal of some of the wreckage - looking aft.

 

Photo 27: Looking inboard from port shell on second deck showing torpedo damage to bulkhead 104 and projectile damage to No. III barbette.

 

Photo 28: Damage from projectile explosions to inside of No. III barbette looking forward and to port.

 

Photo 29: Damage to No. III turret rotating structure.

 

Photo 30: First platform deck looking aft on the port side from frame 105 to bulkhead 109 showing structural and electrical damage.

 

Photo 31: Buckling of second platform due to pivoting of armor bulkhead and longitudinal bulkhead No. 2. (See plate Y for cross section)

 

Photo 32: Cut-away view below second platform showing damage to port inboard shaft alley and surrounding structure.

 

Photo 33: Break in port outboard shaft in way of torpedo hit. Note longitudinal bulkhead No. 2 pressed around port inboard shaft.

 

Photo 34: Broken steady bearing housing on port outboard shaft.

 

Photo 35: Damage to after end of No. 3 reduction gear due to movement of port inboard line shafting.

 

Photo 36: Wrinkles in shell plating on port bow due to shock of torpedo detonation.

Plate I: Torpedo and Gun Fire Damage

Plate II: Details of Torpedo Damage

Plate III: Flooding Diagram CA 33

Plate IV: Torpedo Damage

Plate V: Damage Section

Plate VI: Flooding Diagram CA 24