I have attempted to be faithful to the original document: reproducing the form, spellings, and punctuation (including errors), with two exceptions: [1] ship names have been rendered in italics, rather than all UPPER-CASE, as in the original; and [2] the necessary use of a spell-checker to correct my typographic errors has undoubtedly 'corrected' spellings in the original. |
Cincpac File No. A16-3/ Serial 0479 |
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF |
S-E-C-R-E-T | FEB 15 1942 |
From: | Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. |
To: | The Secretary of the Navy. |
Via: | (1) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. (2) The Chief of Naval Operations. |
Subject: | Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor, 7 December, 1941. |
Reference: | (a) Cincpac file A16-3/(02088) of Dec. 21, 1941; forwarded by Cincpac file A16-3/(05)/ Serial 02100 of Dec. 23, 1941. |
Enclosures: | (A-1-5) Chart Diagrams showing Phase I to Phase V of Pearl Harbor Raid. (A-6) Chart Diagram showing plots of Enemy Planes shot down by Antiaircraft fire. (A-7) Chart Diagram showing ship sorties made on 7 December, 1941. (A-8) Composite Chart Diagram of entire action. (B) Photograph of Enemy Horizontal Bombers. (C) Damage Report - Ships. (D) Damage Report - Aircraft. (E) Narrative Reports of Commanding Officers. (F) Chart Reports of Commanding Officers. |
Pursuant to paragraph 7 of reference (a), there is forwarded herewith, in duplicate, an amplifying report on the Japanese Raid of 7 December, 1941, on Pearl Harbor. It is recommended that the duplicate copy be forwarded to the Naval War College when it has served its purpose in the Navy Department.
This report covers the activities of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and refers to other organizations only incidentally and in a general way. It does not report on the operations of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at sea, 7 December, 1941, after the sortie was completed.
This report is divided into four parts:
Part I - Organization. Part II - Situation in Pearl Harbor just prior to Japanese Raid, 7 December, 1941. Part III - Narrative of events during Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor, 7 December, 1941, with graphic representation. Part IV - (A) Casualty Report;
(B) Damage Report (Enclosures (C) and (D));
(C) Ammunition Report:
(D) Recommendations for awards;
(E) Narrative Reports of Commanding Officers (Enclosure (E));
(F) Chart Reports of Commanding Officers (Enclosure (F)).
1. In April, 1941, the United States Pacific Fleet was reorganized into Task Forces. Some additional changes were made October 31, 1941, by pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 14CL-41, pertinent parts of which are quoted:
"2. To provide for all phases of type, intertype, and Fleet training, concurrently with performance of certain required patrol and escort duties, the following Task Force organization are prescribed:"TASK FORCE ONE, (COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE)
Batdivs TWO, FOUR 6 BB Cardiv ONE, less Lexington 1 CV Crudiv NINE 5 CL Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD Oglala, Mindiv ONE 1 CM, 4 DM Primary Mission:
To organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force
in order to provide an efficient Covering Force available for supporting operations of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.
"TASK FORCE TWO, (COMMANDER AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE)
Batdiv ONE 3 BB Cardiv TWO 1 CV Crudiv FIVE 4 CA Desflot TWO 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD Mindiv TWO 4 DM Primary Mission:
To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force
in order to provide an efficient Reconnoitering and Raiding Force for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.
"TASK FORCE THREE, (COMMANDER SCOUTING FORCE)
Crudivs FOUR, SIX 8 CA Lexington plus Marine Air Group 21 1 CV Desron FIVE 1 DL, 8 DD Minron TWO 13 DMS Trainron FOUR 6 AP 2nd Marine Division less Defense
Battalions and Advance DetachmentPrimary Mission:
To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force
in order to provide an efficient Amphibious Force for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.
"TASK FORCE FOUR, (COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT)
That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve the Island Bases.Primary Mission:
To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases
in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advance operations.
"TASK FORCE SEVEN, (COMMANDER SUBMARINES, SCOUTING FORCE)
Subron FOUR less Subdiv FORTY-ONE 1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD Subron SIX 12 SS, 1 AS *Subron EIGHT 6 SS, 1 AS *Subron TEN 4 SS, 1 AS *Upon reporting. Primary Missions:
(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics
in order to provide an efficient Submarine Observation and Attack Force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.
(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet
in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases.
"TASK FORCE NINE, (COMMANDER PATROL WING TWO)
Patwing ONE 36 VPB(A), 1 AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP Patwing TWO 42 VPB(A), 2 AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP Primary Missions:
(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics.
in order to provide an efficient long range Air Scouting and Air Striking Force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.
(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at time prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet
in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases.
"TASK FORCE FIFTEEN, (COMMANDER BASE FORCE)
Units assigned 4 CA or CL Primary Mission:
To escort trans-pacific shipping
in order to protect trans-pacific shipping against possible attack."
2. When the task forces were first formed in April, 1941, two of the three major task forces were kept at sea and one in port. This was a condition impossible to maintain as the fuel supply was rapidly being depleted and the material condition of the ships retrograded. A change was made so that one Task Force was always at sea and two in port except for periods of three or four days when two of the Task Forces would train together at sea. For several reasons, the composition of the Task Forces differed from that set forth in the general directive.
The composition and disposition of the Task Forces at 0700, 7 December, 1941, were as follows:
TASK FORCE ONE (In Pearl) | |||||||||||||||
Batdivs 2 and 4 (less Colorado in NYPS) | 5 | BB | |||||||||||||
Crudiv 9 (less Boise assigned as escort to convoy to Asiatic Station) | 4 | CL | |||||||||||||
Desrons 1 and 3 (less Clark in NYMI) | 17 | DD | |||||||||||||
Raleigh | 1 | OCL | |||||||||||||
Oglala | 1 | OCM | |||||||||||||
Mindiv 1 (overhaul in NYPH) | 4 | DM | |||||||||||||
TASK FORCE TWO (In Pearl) | |||||||||||||||
Batdiv 1 | 3 | BB | |||||||||||||
Desron 4 | 9 | DD | |||||||||||||
Mindiv 2 | 4 | DM | |||||||||||||
Detroit | 1 | OCL | |||||||||||||
TASK FORCE EIGHT | |||||||||||||||
Enterprise | 1 | CV | |||||||||||||
Desron 6 | 9 | DD | |||||||||||||
Crudiv 5 (less Pensacola which was assigned as escort to convoy to Asiatic Station) | 3 | CA | |||||||||||||
Normally, the units of Task Force EIGHT were part of Task Force TWO. Task Force EIGHT had ferried VMF-221 to Wake and was now returning to Pearl; in position Latitude 21-11, Longitude 161-00, about 200 miles to westward of Oahu. | |||||||||||||||
TASK FORCE THREE (At Sea) | |||||||||||||||
Indianapolis | 1 | CA | |||||||||||||
Minneapolis | 1 | CA | |||||||||||||
Minron TWO | 13 | DMS | |||||||||||||
The Indianapolis and five DMS (Hopkins, Southard, Dorsey, Elliot, Long) had just arrived at Johnston Island to conduct tests of a new type landing boat. (Johnston Island is 711 miles bearing 247° from Oahu.)
The Minneapolis and four DMS were in the training area to the southwest of Oahu. | |||||||||||||||
TASK FORCE SEVEN | |||||||||||||||
At Midway | 2 | SS | |||||||||||||
At Wake | 2 | SS | |||||||||||||
At Mare Island | 5 | SS | |||||||||||||
At San Diego | 4 | SS | |||||||||||||
Enroute to Pearl | 4 | SS | |||||||||||||
At Pearl | 5 | SS | |||||||||||||
Pelias | 1 | AS | |||||||||||||
TASK FORCE NINE | |||||||||||||||
VP-21 At Midway | 21 | ||||||||||||||
VP-11 At Kaneohe | 12 | ||||||||||||||
VP-12 At Kaneohe | 11 | ||||||||||||||
VP-14 At Kaneohe (3 in air) | 10 | ||||||||||||||
VP-22 At Pearl Harbor | 12 | ||||||||||||||
VP-23 At Pearl Harbor | 11 | ||||||||||||||
VP-24 At Pearl Harbor (4 in air) | 5 | ||||||||||||||
72 | |||||||||||||||
Overhauling | 9 | ||||||||||||||
Marine Planes | |||||||||||||||
VMF-221 At Wake | |||||||||||||||
VMSB-231 Enroute Midway in Lexington | |||||||||||||||
VMSB At Ewa | 18 | ||||||||||||||
VMJ-252 At Ewa | 2 | ||||||||||||||
In Port | |||||||||||||||
Tangier | |||||||||||||||
Curtiss | |||||||||||||||
McFarland | |||||||||||||||
Hulbert | |||||||||||||||
Thornton | |||||||||||||||
TASK FORCE TWELVE | |||||||||||||||
Lexington | 1 | CV | |||||||||||||
Crudiv 4 (less Indianapolis, Lousiville), plus Astoria | 3 | CA | |||||||||||||
Desron 5 (less Desdiv 10) | 5 | DD | |||||||||||||
Task Force TWELVE was normally a part of Task Force THREE but was enroute to Midway with Marine Scout Bombers (VMSB-231) and in approximate position Latitude 23-30, longitude 170-30 (about 460 miles bearing 125° from Midway.) | |||||||||||||||
TASK FORCE FIFTEEN | |||||||||||||||
Argonne (flagship) plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, were in port or at sea in accordance with logistic requirements. | |||||||||||||||
|
Discounting small craft, there were some 86 ships of the Pacific Fleet moored in Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December, 1941. Their disposition, according to berth assignment, is shown on the Harbor Chart (enclosure (A)) employed herein in describing the action. Aircraft of Patrol Wings, U.S. Pacific Fleet, were, as set forth in enclosure (E) (Commander Patrol Wing TWO report), disposed as follows: Patrol Squadron 21, at Midway; Patrol Squadrons 11, 12, 14, at Haneohe; Patrol Squadrons 22, 23, 24, at Pearl Harbor. Numerically, their disposition was as follows:
VP-21 | 7 | planes | - in the air conducting search 120° to 170° to 450 miles from Midway. | 4 | planes | - on the surface at Midway armed each with 2 dive hundred pound bombs and on 10 minutes notice. |
VP-11 | 12 | planes | - ready for flight on 4 hours notice. |
VP-12 | 6 | planes | - ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. |
5 | planes | - ready for flight on 4 hours notice. | |
VP-14 | 3 | planes | - in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges. |
3 | planes | - ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. | |
4 | planes | - ready for flight on 4 hours notice. | |
VP-22 | 12 | planes | - ready for flight on 4 hours notice. |
VP-23 | 11 | planes | |
VP-24 | 4 | planes | - in the air conducting inter-type tactics with submarines. |
1 | plane | - ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. | |
Total | 72 | ||
or, summarizing: | |||
14 | - in the air (7 on a search from Midway). | ||
58 | - on the surface ready for flight in four hours or less. | ||
9 | - undergoing repairs. | ||
81 | - Total |
Remaining shore-based Fleet Aircraft were disposed as follows: Marine Air Group 21, at Ewa Field, Oahu; Utility Squadrons 1 and 2 (Base Force), at Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T.H.; and Utility Squadron 3 (Base Force), at Maui, T.H.
Weather conditions, as officially logged for the period just prior to the attack, are summarized as follows: 0400-0800: Average partly cloudy with cumulus clouds mostly over the mountains. Cloud base 3500 feet. Visibility good. Wind N. 10 knots. Cloud amounts: 4/10 to 5/10, increasing slightly after 0800 with lower clouds moving out over the harbor at times.
(a) Armament and Material.
(1) Ships.
All types had some ready ammunition at the guns, in accordance with their type directives. Battleships and Cruisers, 15 rounds per gun for two guns for the 5-inch anti-aircraft battery and 300 rounds per gun for half of the .50 caliber battery. The Destroyers present all had .50 caliber ammunition available and some 5-inch ammunition, depending on tests that were underway at the moment. Although a battery condition of readiness for ships had not been designated from the Naval Base Defense Plan, the first batteries opened fire less than two minutes after the attack was initiated. All batteries, except those on ships undergoing overhaul, had taken up the fire within approximately seven minutes after the attack was initiated.
(2) Aircraft.
With regard to the condition of readiness of Fleet Aircraft, reference should be had to enclosure (D) and to the report by Commander Patrol Wing TWO (enclosure (E)).
(b) Personnel.
The ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, were adequately manned from the officer and the enlisted personnel standpoint. Supplementing the restriction of Navy Regulations that not more than one-half of the crew should be granted leave or liberty at the same time, a Fleet directive limited overnight liberty in Hawaii to Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class. While this directive enunciated no policy as to shore leave for officer personnel, Type organizations provided for a duty section of officers on board at all times.
Excerpts from a summarized report on personnel actually on board at the commencement of the attack on 7 December, 1941, are enlightening:
ON BOARD | |
Commanding Officers of Battleships | 5 out of 8 |
Commanding Officers of Cruisers | 6 out of 7 |
Commanding Officers of Destroyers | 63% |
Damage Control Officers of Battleships | 6 out of 8 |
Average percentage of officers: | |
Battleships (approximately) | 60-70% |
Cruisers, Battle Force " | 65% |
Destroyers, Battle Force " | 50% |
Average percentage of men: | |
Battleships | 95% |
Cruisers, Battle Force | 98% |
Destroyers, Battle Force | 85% |
(c) Watertight Integrity.
Directives covering the maintaining of proper watertight integrity for ships at sea and in port, as set forth in F.T.P. 170, and U.S. Navy regulations, 1920, article 1305(4), have been consistently complied with by ships of the Pacific Fleet. In Pearl Harbor it has been the practice for ships to secure all closures below the waterline at night, insofar as practicable. in it general opinion, therefore, that a condition considerably better the XRAY had been the practice. However, just how many closures would have been opened between daylight and the attack, at 0755, is problematical and would vary with different ships.
(d) General.
In reply to a questionnaire put to ships of the Battle Force, the following specific information on Conditions of General Readiness, applicable to December 7, 1941, was obtained:
Battleships | under | 5 minutes. |
Cruisers | 4 minutes. | |
Destroyers | 7 minutes. |
Battleships | All in at least Condition XRAY, and in most cases a number of YOKE closures, with a few ZED, were also set. |
Cruisers (2 ships reporting) | (a) Condition AFIRM below third deck, except in cases where Condition BAKER applied. (b) Condition BAKER, except for airports. |
Destroyer flagships and tenders | XRAY with additional YOKE closures below main deck. |
The first enemy contact of 7 December, 1941, is believed to have been made at 0350, when the U.S.C.G. Condor sighted the periscope of a submerged submarine. At that time the Condor was conducting sweeping operations approximately one and three-fourths miles southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.
The Condor, accordingly, at 0357, informed, by visual signal, the U.S.S. Ward, then patrolling off the Pearl Harbor entrance, of this contact. The Ward thereupon immediately instituted a search and at about 0637 sighted the periscope of an unidentified submarine apparently trailing the U.S.S. Antares, then enroute into Pearl Harbor. At 0640, the Ward commenced its attack, which is believed to have been successful. At 0645, a despatch, by voice transmission, was sent to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who reports its receipt at about 0712, local time. no prior report of either contact had been made to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, or the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. During the previous year there had been several reports of submarine contacts, all of which turned out to be false. Upon receipt of the Ward's report by the Commandant, action was taken to: instruct the ready duty destroyer, the U.S.S. Monaghan, to proceed to sea; close the net gate; attempt to verify the contact report, with details thereon; and to notify, by telephone, at about 0720, the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Duty Officer.
Another telephone call to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, about 0740, from the Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO, relayed a report received at 0732 that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District that the Ward was towing a sampan into Honolulu. At about 0755, the Navy Yard Signal Tower telephoned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows: "ENEMY AIR RAID - NOT DRILL". Almost simultaneously, Japanese torpedo planes attacked the battleships.
The narratives and diagrams are based on reports attacked as enclosure (E), plus additional graphic reports, appended as enclosure (F), submitted in reply to specific questions put to the various ships concerned in the action. There are great conflicts in these reports. Certain events are listed with such wide variations of the time and number of units participating as to cause doubt that the reports are referring to the same vent. Other difficulties incident to the making of an analysis of the action should also be noted, particularly with respect to the differentiation between the estimated total of enemy aircraft attacking and the number of attacks engaged in. For example, some planes that had completed attacks on other objectives on Oahu, carried out strafing attacks on Pearl Harbor. Horizontal bombers undoubtedly made two approaches in some cases. Dive bombers obviously made repeated attacks, combining bombing and strafing initially and then simply strafing when bombs had been expended. It is also apparent from the reports that light bombers and fighters could not be distinguished. However, within these limitations, the attack is interpreted as related.
The narrative and the accompanying graphic representations are divided into five phases. This is arbitrary and does not properly express the continuous action which occurred on the morning of December 7, 1941, but the division does give clarity to the narrative.
Phase | I | -- | 7055-0825 | Combined torpedo plane and dive bomber attacks. |
Phase | II | -- | 0825-0840 | Lull in attacks. |
Phase | III | -- | 0840-0915 | Horizontal bomber attacks. |
Phase | IV | -- | 0915-0945 | Dive bomber attacks. |
Phase | V | -- | 0945- | Waning of attacks and completion of Raid. |
The primary objectives of the Japanese were the heavy ships and aircraft. Damage to the light forces and the industrial plant was incidental to the destruction or putting out of action the heavy ships and aircraft based ashore.
The time of the first attack on Pearl harbor is fixed by the fact that it occurred with the hosting of the morning preparatory signal for eight o'clock colors. At this time, namely, at 0755, Japanese dive bombers appeared over Hickam Field and Ford Island, and, bare seconds later, enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from various sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships moored in Pearl Harbor. An estimated 18 planes engaged in the attack on Hickam Field while approximately 9 dive bombers from out of the northeast bombed and strafed the Naval Air Station, concentrating particularly on Hangar No. 6 and the planes parked in that vicinity.
With the dropping of the first bombs on Ford Island, Commander Patrol Wing TWO, at 0758, broadcast the warning to Al Ships Present: "AIR RAID, PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL!" A similar message from the Commander-in-Chief followed a few minutes later.
The torpedo planes, although assisted effectively by dive bombers, constituted the major threat of Phase I. Adhering strictly to carefully laid plans based on exact information, their attack was directed from those sectors which afforded the best avenues of approach for torpedo attack against selected heavy ship objectives. in this connection, it should be observed that the depth of the water in Pearl Harbor, in the great majority of cases at least, did not militate against the successful prosecution of this form of attack. Specially contrived wooden fins, remnants of which were discovered on salvaged enemy torpedoes, were no doubt responsible for insuring shallow dives of the torpedoes upon launching.
The total estimated number of torpedo planes engaged in this phase is 21.
There were eight dive bomber attacks made during Phase I, as determined by the direction and locality of attack.
Three types of bombs were know to have been employed: light, medium, and incendiary.
The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is estimated at 30.
While a few fighters were reported among the attackers in the various phases, they were no doubt confused with light bombers and accordingly are not treated as a distinct type.
Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal bombers did not occur until Phase III, 15 participated in this phase (Phase I).
Although the Japanese launched their initial attack as a surprise, battleship ready machine guns opened fire at once and were progressively augmented by the remaining antiaircraft battery as all hands were promptly called to general quarters. That all ships present opened fire with commendable promptness is attested by the record. Actually, as stated above, ships opened fire immediately with machine guns, bringing down two, and damaging others, of the first wave of attacking torpedo planes. Within an estimated average time of under five minutes, practically all battleship antiaircraft batteries were firing; cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of about 4 minutes; and destroyers, though opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged seven minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action.
In addition to the initial warnings sent at 0758 and 0800, at 0812 the Fleet was advised that, "HOSTILITIES WITH JAPAN COMMENCED WITH AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR"; and at 0817 the Commander-in-Chief ordered, by despatch, Commander Patrol Wing TWO to, "LOCATE ENEMY FORCE".
At 0820, Commander Battle Force signalled Task Forces ONE and TWO to, "SORTIE". This was in accordance with previously issued Emergency Sortie Plan.
During Phase I there was no movement of ships within the harbor, other than that begun by the U.S.S. Helm, at 0726, in shifting to the deperming buoys in West Loch, and completed by a sortie upon the sighting of enemy planes at about 0800. At 0817, the Helm spotted the conning tower of a submarine to the right of the entrance channel and northward of buoy No. 1. Though immediately submerging, fire was opened when the submarine again surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed.
This phase is described as a "lull" only by way of comparison. Although torpedo planes, supported by dive bombers, had completed their attacks, air activity continued, though somewhat abated, with sporadic attacks by dive and horizontal bombers; the latter attacks overlapping from Phase I.
An estimated total of 15 dive bombers participated in this phase. no doubt these fifteen were included among the thirty dive bombers engaged in Phase I attacks.
Although three attacks by horizontal bombers are reported during the "lull", it appears that these overlapped into phase II and are described thereunder.
Accordingly, no horizontal bombers are credited to this Phase.
As in Phase I, there was, during Phase II, relatively little ship movement within the harbor. The ready duty destroyer Monaghan, having received orders, at 0751 (LCT), to "PROCEED IMMEDIATELY AND CONTACT WARD IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA", got underway at 0830, having been temporarily delayed by the initiation of the enemy action. At about 0837, the Monaghan, having observed an enemy submarine under fire of both the Curtiss and Tangier, proceeded at flank speed and at about 0843 rammed; thereafter dropping two depth charges. The fire of the Curtiss, it might be added, resulted in two direct hits on the conning tower. This submarine was later salvaged for inspection and final disposition. Before being able to check her headway and proceed down the channel, the Monaghan became briefly entangled with a dredge moored near Beckoning Point.
At the same time that the Monaghan got underway, the Henley slipped her chain from buoy X-11 and sortied, following the Monaghan down the channel.
The so-called "lull" in the air raid was terminated by the appearance over the Fleet of considerable numbers of high-altitude horizontal bombers, crossing and recrossing their targets from various points of the compass. Enclosure (B) is a photograph of one group of horizontal bombers flying at 12,000 feet and taken shortly before attacking. Damage from this attack was serious. Some of the bombs dropped were converted fifteen or sixteen inch shells; they penetrated with about 20-inch holes, low order detonation, and very little flame.
Horizontal bombing largely predominated Phase III. The few attacks that possibly overlapped, for a brief period, into Phase IV, are covered herein.
An estimated total of 30 horizontal bombers, including nine planes which engaged in earlier attacks, participated in Phase III. The heavy ships bore the brunt of these attacks.
While Phase II was devoted largely to attacks by horizontal bombers, a number of dive bombers participated.
It is probable that this group did considerable damage to the U.S.S. Nevada, then proceeding down the South Channel about off YFD-2; and to the Shaw, Cassin and Downes, these being set afire.
An estimated total of 18 dive bombers attacked during this Phase.
Considerable ship movement took place during this Phase and, chronologically, occurred as follows:
The reappearance of dive bombers in numbers overlapped by perhaps ten minutes the attack by the horizontal bombers. It seems reasonable to assume that these dive bombers are the same ones that conducted earlier attacks and that this phase was devoted largely to strafing. The following are the attacks as observed from around 0900 until 0945, or to the cessation of the Raid.
An estimated total of 27 dive bombers attacked during this Phase.
Summarizing, the total numbers of planes of all types engaged in the various phases and in the attack as a whole, are as follows:
PHASE I (Torpedo and Dive Bomber Attacks) |
PHASE II ("Lull") |
PHASE III (Horizontal Bomber Attacks) |
PHASE IV (Dive Bomber Attacks) |
NUMBER OF PLANES MAKING ATTACKS (including those which repeated) |
TOTAL NUMBER OF PLANES | |
Torpedo Planes | 21 | --- | --- | --- | 21 | 21 |
Dive Bombers | 30 | *15 | 18 | *27 | 90 | 48 |
Horizontal Bombers | 15 | --- | 21(9)* | --- | 45 | 36 |
TOTALS | 66 | 15 | 48 | 27 | 156 | 105 |
* Engaged in earlier attacks. |
Movement underway during Phase III naturally continued with Phase IV, and included additional ships:
All enemy planes had retired by 0945. There was considerable antiaircraft fire after this time, and one or two of our own planes were shot down because they were thought to be enemy.
Movements in progress during Phase IV continued and were augmented by additional ships making sortie or shifting berth during Phase V:
After about 1200, with the exception of the patrol by the Case, ship activity within the harbor, as an immediate result of the attack, practically terminated.
PART IV | (A) CASUALTY REPORT. | ||
(B) DAMAGE REPORT. | |||
(C) AMMUNITION REPORT. | |||
(D) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AWARDS. | |||
(E) NARRATIVE REPORTS OF COMMANDING OFFICERS. | |||
(F) CHART REPORTS OF COMMANDING OFFICERS. |
(a) | 5"/51 cal. | 150 | rounds |
(b) | 5"/38 cal. | 1,665 | rounds |
(c) | 5"/25 cal. | 1,523 | rounds |
(d) | 4"/50 cal. | 4 | rounds |
(e) | 3"/50 cal. | 1,741 | rounds |
(f) | 3"/23 cal. | 1,060 | rounds |
(g) | 1.1" | 5,770 | rounds |
(h) | .50 cal. | 221,368 | rounds |
(i) | .30 cal. | 48,669 | rounds |
(j) | .45 cal. | 2,519 | rounds |
(k) | Depth Charges | 8 | |
NOTE: This includes only reports received to date. |
A Board of Awards, headed by Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, U.S. Navy, is currently in session for the purpose of making recommendations for awards incident to the Pearl Harbor attack.
Narrative reports, plus track chart reports, from Commanding Officers and Unit and Type Commanders concerned, are appended hereto as Enclosures (E) and (F), respectively. Upon these reports are based the composite narrative under Part III and the Chart Diagrams of Enclosure (A).
[signed]
C.W. NIMITZ
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