Chapter V
Allied Operations
0652, August 7th to 2400, August 7th

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engaged, provided it was quite clear that own forces were not in the line of fire, and the destroyers must be prepared to illuminate the enemy targets for our own cruiser gunfire.*

These instructions were written with the conviction that the enemy would be located by aircraft at such distance that the destroyers would have time to concentrate into a squadron organization and to rendezvous five miles northwest of Savo Island. No provision can be found in CTG 62.6's instructions for night action in the event of a surprise raid by enemy surface ships detected only after they had gotten within gun range. This was the actual situation which resulted in the Battle of Savo Island.

Each screening group commander operated independently of the other group commanders. Commander Vincennes Group notified the other group commanders of his planned operations, but he was not in turn advised by them as to their planned operations.**

CTG 62.6 stated that the consideration that the cruisers Vincennes, Quincy and Astoria had not operated under his command before they joined him just prior to the rehearsals at Koro Island, July 28th, led him to decide to employ them as a separate tactical group. He stated that he had never had the opportunity to confer with, or even meet, the Commanding Officers of the above ships nor to issue them the standing instructions which he had issued his own task force.*** It seems somewhat dubious that no opportunity had presented itself to issue these instructions or to exercise tactically for drill purposes the forces he would have under his command at Tulagi.*** Could not the instructions have been delivered by destroyer, with explanations by both visual and voice means? It appears that ample time was available for appropriate tactical exercises while in the vicinity of Koro Island and while enroute to the objective.

(3) Discussion of Night Disposition


* CTG 62.6 Special Instructions to Screening Groups and Vessels Temporarily Assigned, August 1942.

** Personal Interview by Captain Frederick L. Reifkohl, USN, Commanding Officer, Vincennes, recorded January 26th, 1945 by the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Records and Library.

*** Report of Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, USN(Ret)to CINCPAC, May 13th, 1943 on Informal Inquiry into the Circumstances Attending the Loss of the Vincennes, etc. on August 9th, 1942, para. 92, page 41.

**** Memorandum February 10th, 1943 by Comdr. H.B. Heneberger, USN, Quincy to Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, USN(Ret.) relative to "Additional Information in regard to the ex-U.S.S. Quincy" at the Battle of Savo Island, August 9th, 1942, para. 4, page 2.

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There is considerable doubt as to the soundness of the above disposition and plan* for the following reasons:

(a) the radar and anti-submarine screen consisting only of the Blue and Ralph Talbot was entirely inadequate. The two destroyers could have been as far as twenty miles apart when at the opposite ends of their patrol lines. They could have been as close together as six and one-half miles at the nearest points of their patrols. This was possible because the timing of their course changes was not coordinated so as to maintain a uniform distance between them. Actually at 0110, August 8th, when the Japanese Cruiser Force passed between them on its way into Iron bottom sound, they were about fourteen miles apart.

The two destroyer pickets were equipped with 8 C radars which gave a reliable range of from four to ten miles.** It was thought likely at the time that a destroyer-type ship could not approach closer to a radar-equipped ship than eight or nine miles without being detected.** Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the radar equipment of the Blue and Ralph Talbot on their assigned stations near Savo Island was adversely affected by the closeness of land, and this situation necessitated the usual standard of alertness on the part of lookouts.

The anti-submarine detection range of the sonic devices of the two destroyers varied from a few hundred to about two thousand yards, depending upon the sonic characteristics of the water at the time.

It would have been wiser had at least two additional destroyers been assigned to the outer screen so that their stations would have been no more than five miles apart. In that case, any two adjacent destroyers would have been no further apart than ten miles at any time, which distance was considered within reliable radar limits. As a further refinement, had their patrols been properly coordinated, they would always have remained approximately five miles apart. Despite the threat of submarine attack on the transports, against which CTF 62 took positive defensive measures, two additional destroyers could well have been spared from the inner anti-submarine screens in the transport areas without having seriously reduced their effectiveness.

The radius from the cruiser screening groups on which the radar picket destroyers operated was insufficient. The Ralph Talbot was not sufficiently distant from the Vincennes Group to give adequate warning of enemy approach. With the Ralph Talbot at the easternmost extremity of its patrol line simultaneously with the Vincennes Group at the northern point of its square, there wax only five miles distance between them. Five miles was no more


* A similar conclusion was arrived at by COMINCH in his Battle Experience Bulletin No. 2 on Solomon Islands Actions August and September, 1942.

** Radar Bulletin No. 1, The Tactical Use of Radar, United States Fleet Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, March 1942.

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than the limit of night visibility in the existent weather conditions. Had the optimum of radar effectiveness been obtainable, the Ralph Talbot might possibly have given a warning about fifteen minutes before an enemy could close to within gun range of the Vincennes Group from the northward; but "land interference" denied this degree of radar effectiveness. This analysis is equally applicable to the Blue's radius of patrol from the Australia Group but to a considerable less degree, since the patrol of the Blue was approximately normal to that of the Australia Group. COMSOPAC commented on this formation as follows:* "The orders to the Radar Guard were faulty in requiring them to 'shadow' an enemy force and report them frequently. Time and space did not permit the employment of tactics of this nature. A high speed enemy force would have arrived dangerously close to the objective before our destroyers could have instituted tracking or "shadowing" tactics. The implied restriction on, and lack of definite instructions covering the use of searchlights by the Radar Guard was unfortunate. In the restricted waters in which the Screening Group was stationed, the underlying concept of instructions issued should have been to reveal the presence of enemy vessels in the quickest most positive manner, and this called for the use of searchlights for that purpose, if contact were made."

(b) The disposition of the heavy cruisers of the Amphibious Force in two main screening groups--the Australia Group and the Vincennes Group--to defend the approaches to the transport areas precluded the proper concentration of their total strength against Japanese forces threatening from the west. In addition to the lack of coordination of the planned operations of these two groups, as already pointed out, there was but little exchange of information between them. It was possible for these two groups to be as much as seventeen miles apart when the Vincennes Group was at the northern extremity of its square and the Australia Group was at the eastern extremity of its square and the Australia Group was near the western end of its patrol line as to seriously interfere with one another.

Commander Vincennes Group had objected to this disposition by dispatch to CTG 62.6 pointing out the defect whereby the two groups could become foul of one another. He informed CTG 62.6 of his plan of patrolling clockwise so that when the two groups were near each other he would always be heading out on course 315 #degrees(T) in order to reduce this danger to a minimum.**


* Report of Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, USN(Ret) to CINCPAC May 13th, 1943 on Informal Inquiry into the Circumstances Attending the Loss of the Vincennes, etc. on August 9th, 1942, para. 80(6), page 35.

** Personal Interview by Captain Frederick L. Reifkohl, USN, Commanding Officer, Vincennes, recorded January 26th, 1945, by the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Records and Library.

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At the same time he requested CTG 62.6 to giver him the plan of operation of the Australia Group for the night. CTG 62.6 failed to do so, and the result was that Commander Vincennes Group never knew for one moment where the Australia Group was during the night.* This objection of the Commander Vincennes Group, as well as the Commanding Officers of the Astoria and Quincy, felt that the Japanese ships which later attacked them were probably friendly.

In establishing this night disposition, CTG 62.6 had created a situation in which his forces were divided into two equal screening groups composed of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers. Each group possessed less fighting strength than the reported Japanese cruiser concentration of four heavy cruisers and three light cruisers in the Bismarck Sea area. By this division of his force, CTG 62.6 made possible the chances for a Japanese surface force of approximately equal strength to concentrate its full force on each of his screening groups and knock them out in succession.

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Footnotes

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