CV5/A16-3
(OP-10-Rd)
(063)
U.S.S. YORKTOWN
May 16, 1942.

     
From: The Commanding Officer.  
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.  
Via: (1) The Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN POINT FIVE.
  (2) The Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN.
     
Subject: Air Operations of Yorktown Air Group against Japanese Forces in the vicinity of the LOUISIADE ARCHIPELAGO on May 7, 1942.  
     
Reference: (a) Article 712, U.S. Navy Regulations.
     
Enclosures: (A) Disposition of Enemy Force.
  (B) Photographs of Attack on Enemy Carrier (1 to 14).
  (C) Track of U.S.S. Yorktown.
  (D) Radar Plot of Unidentified and Enemy Planes on screen for morning of May 7, 1942.
  (E) Radar Plot of Unidentified and Enemy Planes on screen for afternoon of May 7, 1942.

  1. The U.S.S. Yorktown under command of Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN, Rear Admiral F.J. Fletcher, U.S. Navy, made the following air attacks on JAPANESE FORCES operating in the vicinity of the LOUISIADE ARCHIPELAGO on May 7, 1942:

    1. Attacked and shot down one four engine patrol bomber.

    2. Attacked and sunk one aircraft carrier and one light cruiser (Neither of which could be identified).

    3. Attacked and shot down 8 enemy planes.

    4. Our losses consisted of 2 F4F-3's and 1 SBD airplane.

  2. Ships in company with the U.S.S. Yorktown were: Lexington, Astoria, Chester, Portland, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Phelps, Dewey, Aylwin, Morris, Russell, Hammann, Anderson, and Monaghan.

    Commander Carriers, A.W. Fitch, U.S. Navy, in U.S.S. Lexington. All fighter direction was done from the U.S.S. Lexington, with Yorktown as standby Fighter Director.

--1--

  1. Detailed Report

    This report, where it pertains to aircraft operations, was compiled from the narratives of the personnel participating in the attack recorded immediately on their return from each flight.

    1. Movements of the U.S.S. Yorktown

      At 0600, May 7th, 1942 (Zone -11½ time) the U.S.S. Yorktown was in position latitude 13° 25.5' S, longitude 154° 48' E, base course 270°(T), speed 22 knots. From 0649, various courses were steered, maneuvering to launch and land aircraft. At 0655 base course was changed to 025°, speed 15 knots. 0800 position was latitude 13° 9' S, longitude 154° 24' E, at 1054 changed fleet course to 290°, speed 23. 1200 position was latitude 12° 32' S, longitude 154° 44' E. At 1408 changed fleet course to 225°, speed 22 knots. At 1700 set clocks to Zone - 11 time. 2000 position was latitude 13° 14' S, longitude 154° 43' E, At 2205 changed course to 150°, speed 20 knots.

    2. Weather

      The Yorktown was in a frontal area extending East and West. In the early morning there were Strato-Cumulus clouds which developed into Cumulus, Alto-Stratus and Cirrus by noon. There were sufficient breaks for launching and landing planes. Visibility was 10 - 15 miles reduced to 3/4 of mile in rain squalls. Wind was E. to ESE. 12 - 22 knots with gusts to 30 knots. The weather at sunset was hazy, with a heavy overcast and visibility about 4 miles. The frontal area ended about 50 miles to the North of the Yorktown's position. In this area to the North, the weather was fine, unlimited ceiling, with visibility in excess of 20 miles, and an East wind of 7 - 15 knots.

--2--

    1. Task Organization of Air Group

      Air Group Commander, Lt.Comdr. Oscar Pederson, USN.

      VT-5 - 10 TBD's - Lt.Comdr. J. Taylor, USN.
      VS-5 - 17 SBD's - Lt.Comdr. W.O. Burch, jr., USN.
      VF-42 - 17 F4F-3's - Lt.Comdr. C.R. Fenton, USN.
      VB-5 - 18 SBD's - Lieut. W.C. Short, jr., USN.

    2. Search

      At 0649 launched Search Group of 10 SBD's to conduct a single plane search for a distance of 250 miles on a median of 025°T, limiting bearings 325° and 085°. At 0845 received a contact report from a scouting plane reporting 2 CV's and 4 CA's in latitude 10° 03' S, longitude 152° 27' E, course 140°T, speed 18 - 20 knots. At 1100 landed Search Group and discovered that the first contact was in error, it should have been 2 DD's instead 2 CV's. As it turned out this was a fortunate mistake. The error was caused by the fact that the contact pad did not line up with the holder and when the pilot checked what he thought was DD, he actually checked a CV. At 0805 another scout made contact with 2 CA's in latitude 10° 40' S and longitude 153° 15' E, on course 310°, speed 12 knots. The ships must have sighted this scout for they challenged him with two long flashes on the searchlight. Two scouts each shot down one twin float, KAWANISHI 94 Torpedo Bomber, one near MISIMA ISLAND and the other at latitude 11° 35' S, longitude 156° 43' E. The other scouts made no contacts; one scout having the sector with median 067°, went out only 165 miles and returned due to bad weather. At 1052, received from shore based aircraft a message stating that 1 CV, 10 AP's, and 16 Warships were at latitude 10° 34' S, longitude 152° 26' E and course 265°.

    3. Attack

      Upon receipt of the contact at 0845, orders were received to launch the Attack Group, to attack the 2 Japanese CV's reported at latitude 10° 03' S, longitude 152° 27' E. From 1014 - 1043 launched Attack Group of 8 VF, 7 VB, 17 VS, and 10 VT, objective enemy carriers. The VB and VS planes were armed

--3--

      with Mk 13 - 1,000 lb. bombs, fuses Mk 21 and 23, and the torpedo planes with Mark 13 torpedoes, depth setting 10 feet. The mission of the VF was to furnish fighter protection. After ascertaining that the original contact was in error, a message was sent at 1123 to the Lexington and the Attack Group; re-directing the Group to the contact as given by the shore based aircraft (latitude 10° 34' S, longitude 152° 36' E). At 1130, the Attack Group sighted the objective about 20 miles NE of MISIMA ISLAND. The Japanese Force consisted of 1 CV, 1 very large CA or BB, 3 CA's, and 1 CL, disposition as shown in Enclosure (A). No pilot was able to definitely identify either the CV or the CL. The CV closely resembled the Ryujo, except that it had a small island structure on the starboard side, slightly forward of amidships. The CL (about 5,000 tons) had one stack (may have been an inverted "Y" stack) and two forward turrets. It is very possible that both were new ships of which no silhouettes are available. As the group approached, they saw part of the Lexington Group attack and the ships maneuvering violently at high speed, upon completion of this attack, the CV turned into the wind to launch planes, there were about 10 - 20 planes on deck. Just prior to commencement of the Yorktown Group attack, a small fire was noticed on the stern of the CV probably caused by a Lexington bomb. The Group had a perfect dive bombing and torpedo plane target, for the CV was steaming into the wind making no attempt to maneuver. At 1147, VS-5 followed by VB-5 made their dives, down wind, from 18,000 feet; all dives were very steep and the bombs were released at about 2,500 feet. A total of 14 hits out of 24 drops were made. The last bomber, seeing the CV completely enveloped in flames and smoke, picked a large CL for his target. He made a direct hit on the stern, a large explosion was seen and the CL sank in a few minutes. This sinking was confirmed by many pilots and the Staff Gunnery Officer.

      The torpedo planes made their approach from the starboard bow of the Japanese formation (See Enclosure (A)), went between the two leading CA's, where they encountered AA fire, then circled out and launched the attack on the starboard beam of the CV. At this time, the ship was listed to starboard and burning fiercely, only a small section from

--4--

      the bow aft was visible through the smoke, and only two small guns forward were observed to be firing; this enabled the torpedo planes to drop at a very close range and make 10 hits out of 10 drops. The ship sank approximately three minutes after the torpedo planes had completed their attack.

      No air opposition was encountered before the attack, but after the attack the dive bombers and torpedo planes were attacked by about 6 fighters, types 97, and 3 VSB type. VS-5 reported that they obtained some hits on two of the VSB and they broke away smoking. It is open to question, whether these planes were shot down, because our pilots have observed that the japanese planes will emit smoke as a ruse to deceive the attacking plane. The escort fighters were divided into two divisions of 4 planes each, one assigned to the dive bombers, the other to the torpedo planes. In carrying out their mission, they shot down 1 VSB and 3 VF, type 97. The Japanese fighters maneuvered violently in their efforts to escape attack, they would pull up into tight Immelmann turns and loops from 50 feet off the water. Due to the superior maneuverability of the enemy planes, our fighters did not attempt to dog fight with them, but used to advantage their superior speed, to dive, attack, and then break away to take position for another attack. It is certain that four enemy planes were shot down and it is estimated two were damaged.

      The Attack Group returned to the carrier and landed on board at 1309 - 1338. One VB plane was reported missing; this plane was last seen on the return flight, when it broke off to attack an enemy plane.

    1. Combat Air Patrol

      Fighter Director in U.S.S. Lexington, Enclosures (D) and (E) are Radar Plots of unidentified and enemy planes that came on the screen during the day, and a description of these Radar contacts is given below. Due to the fact that no Radar identification was used in the Yorktown planes, the fighters were continually vectored out to check unidentified planes which upon contact were identified as friendly. None of these tracks are included on the plot.

--5--

      At 0903, an unidentified plane was picked up on the Radar screen bearing 295° distance 30 miles, fighters (VF-2) were sent out to intercept, but did not make contact. The plane disappeared off the screen at 0929 going away. At 1049, Yorktown launched a Combat Air Patrol and one was maintained throughout the day. The Fighter Director on the U.S.S. Lexington controlled all planes in the Combat Air Patrol. At 1114, an unidentified plane was picked up, coming in on bearing 045°, distance 41 miles. A section of Yorktown fighters (VF-42) was vectored out, made contact with an enemy four engine patrol bomber and shot it down. At 1653, an unidentified plane was picked up on the Radar screen, coming in on bearing 250°, distance 18 miles; fighters were sent out to intercept, but failed to make contact. This Bogey came within sight of the ship at 1659 bearing 315°, distance 9 miles, and was identified as an enemy seaplane by lookouts. Another section of fighters was vectored out to intercept it, but failed to make contact, and it disappeared off the screen at 1717, bearing 345°, distance 27 miles.

      At 1747, a large group of enemy planes was picked up bearing 145° distance 18 miles; fighters were vectored out by the Lexington Fighter Director and at 1750 eleven more VF were launched, on orders from the Lexington. At 1803 several Yorktown VF were vectored out to intercept the enemy planes, course 240°, the remainder were kept over the ship. On the way out, they passed over a formation of enemy planes, which quickly disappeared in the haze; however, two planes broke away from the formation to attack, one of these planes never returned. The five remaining planes made contact with a group of enemy dive bombers, type 99, and shot down one. The weather was very bad, with many squalls, and very poor visibility; so that contacts with enemy planes were only momentary. Our planes saw five oil patches on the water, which evidently were from planes shot down by the Lexington Combat Air Patrol, that had been sent out prior to our group. During the attack on one enemy plane, he released what appeared to be a large red ball or grenade which exploded in front of one of our fighters, but did no damage. Our planes returned to the vicinity of the ship by using their ZB. At 1850, three enemy planes flew by on the starboard side with their lights on and blinking in morse code on the Aldis Light DOT DOT DASH DOT DOT DASH DOT, these planes crossed over the bow to port, where

--6--

      1 VF opened fire on them. At 1858 commenced landing the Combat Air Patrol. At 1910 opened fire on three enemy planes, one of which was shot down by a ship, one of our planes was damaged by the firing. At 1930 completed landing of the Combat Air Patrol, two planes missing. One of these was the one that broke off from his formation to attack the enemy planes while going out; he was never heard from again. The other plane evidently became lost in the melee around the ship, for radio communication was established with him and every effort was made to get him on the Radar screen and back to the ship. At 2028, the Radar operator was still unable to pick him up, so it was decided to send him to land, while he still had sufficient fuel; accordingly he was given the bearing to TAGULA ISLAND and told to try and make land. It is not known whether he made it or not.

  1. Summary of Attack

    1. Damage Inflicted

      1. Ships Sunk

        1 CV by bombs and torpedoes.
        1 CL by one bomb.

      2. Planes Shot Down (Certain)

        1 Four Engine Patrol Plane (Type 97)
        2 Twin Float Torpedo Bombers (Type 94 - KAWANISHI)
        2 VSB
        3 Fighters (Type 97)

      3. Planes Damaged (Estimated)

        2 VSB possibly more.

    2. Damaged Suffered by Our Forces

      1. Planes Missing

        2 F4F-3's
        1 SBD

--7--

      1. Planes Damaged

        3 VT - Minor damage - bullet and shrapnel holes in wings, tail and fuselage.
        1 VF - Four .50 caliber holes; an oil cooler line, the instrument panel and the landing gear chain were shot away.

  1. General Comments

    1. The performance of all personnel equalled the high standard set on previous attacks. The pilots and flight personnel can not be praised too highly, for the manner in which they disregarded enemy fire and pressed home their attack, to sink an enemy carrier in less than 5 minutes. The performance of all pilots participating in the attack is considered to be extremely outstanding and worthy of special commendation. The Commanding Officer by separate letter will make special recommendations for suitable awards.

    2. Ammunmition Expended

      1. By Planes

        VT dropped 10 torpedoes Mk 13 set for a depth of 10 feet.
        VS dropped 17 Mark 13 bombs, fuses Mk 21 and 23.
        VB dropped 7 Mark 13 bombs, fuses Mk 21 and 23.
        Total .30 caliber ammunition expended 1,684 rounds.
        Total .50 caliber ammunition expended 6,985 rounds.

      2. By Ship

        5 inch - 20 rounds
        .50 cal. - 320 rounds
        20 MM - 320 rounds
        1.1" - 140 rounds

--8--

    1. Tactics Employed by Enemy

      1. Ships against Dive Bombers and Torpedo Attacks

        As soon as the Japanese sighted the attack, the ships scattered, in fact it looked like they were trying to get as far away from their own carrier as possible. It is believed, however, that they depend more on the maneuverability of their ships, to avoid being hit, than on the effectiveness of a concentrated AA fire to repel an attack. The ships, when attacked, maneuver violently, at high speed. The CV, sunk in this engagement, must not have been expecting a second attack so quickly, and turned into the wind to launch planes just as our attack commenced. This gave our dive bombers and torpedo planes a perfect target headed into the wind and on a steady course. This engagement clearly indicates that it is extremely dangerous for a CV to attempt to launch planes while being attacked. Such a situation must be accepted, and the ship maneuvered to avoid the attack, rather than to launch planes to repel it.

      2. Planes versus Planes

        The Japanese planes encountered were a four engine patrol plane, twin float torpedo bombing seaplane, carrier VSB's and fighters of the 97 type. The VSB planes were tentatively identified as Dive Bombers, Type 99, equipped with a belly tank. One pilot reported that the rear gunner was armed with a cannon. Some of these Dive Bombers were painted a light shiny pale yellow and having a noticeably rounded engine cowling, others were painted a light brown or tan. It was noted again, that the Japanese pilots are very partial to violent maneuvers, which seemed to hinder rather than help them. Invariably, they would pull up into a split "S", Immelmann, roll or loop when attacked and thus give the attacking plane a good shot, at one time or another. All the Japanese planes appear very maneuverable, much more so than ours of the same type; however, our planes have a superiority in speed. The tactics successfully

--9--

        used by our fighters is not to dog fight, but use their superior speed to attack, when in position, and then zoom out and regain position for another attack.

        The Japanese pilots have shown a reluctance to attack our planes when in formation, they will attack and close the range on single planes, but will not do this on a formation. The importance of remaining in formation and keeping closed up can not be too strongly stressed; practically every plane that failed to return, can be traced to the pilot leaving the formation and getting lost or shot down.

        The Japanese are resorting to the ruse of emitting smoke when caught in a tight spot. Several attacks by our planes were not pressed home, because the enemy plane commenced to smoke; whereupon our planes pulled out, expecting to see the plane crash, but instead they found he had stopped smoking and was apparently undamaged. Another new innovation encountered by our fighters when attacking Jap planes from the rear, was a flare or grenade discharged from the tail; which looked like a large red ball before exploding. It is practically certain that the Japanese planes encountered are not provided with armor or self-sealing fuel tanks, for most of our pilots were surprised at how quickly the Japanese planes can be destroyed with one short well directed burst. One scout bomber who shot down a twin float torpedo bomber reported that he saw no fixed machine guns firing, indicating this plane was either not equipped with fixed guns or that they were jammed.

      1. Anti-Aircraft Fire

        The Japs apparently have no set doctrine for AA fire, for they open up as soon as the planes are sighted and keep firing, until the planes disappear; each ship selecting its own target. The AA fire encountered by the Dive Bombers was light and ineffective; but the Torpedo Planes ran into a fairly heavy and accurate fire from the ships surrounding the CV. If these ships had

--10--

        been closer to the CV, they would have been able to stop, or seriously reduce the efficiency of the torpedo attack. One squadron received a very unpleasant surprise, while rendezvousing after the attack, the BB opened up with its main battery and landed some shells directly under them. The planes were at 1,500 feet and the jar from the explosion of the shells was considerable. They left the vicinity in a hurry.

      1. Torpedo Planes

        The TBD type torpedo planes, which this ship has, are considered very unsatisfactory for warfare. They are entirely too slow and can not keep up with the Air Group; as a consequence, particularly if there is a layer of low clouds, the dive bombers arrive at the objective and have to wait for the torpedo planes to arrive. This not only subjects them to heavier losses but gives the enemy time to prepare for the attack. It is understood that the TBD's are being replaced by TBF's; it is therefore urgently requested that this group be supplied with TBF's as soon as possible.

        If, as can be expected, the Japs change their tactics and furnish mutual AA support, instead of scattering as they do now, it is not believed that a torpedo attack can be pressed home without suffering excessive losses; as long as the present restrictions on dropping a Mk 13 torpedo at a maximum speed of 115 knots and at an altitude of 75 - 100 feet are retained. It is imperative that a torpedo be designed or the present type modified so that they can be dropped in a glide at speeds up to 200 knots. It is understood that action is being taken on this by the Bureau of Ordnance.

      2. Night Flying

        During this operation some of the Combat Air Patrol did not return to the ship until after dark, at this time there were an undetermined number of enemy planes also flying around the formation. The ships' guns opened up on the planes and as there was no way of distinguishing friend from foe, several of our own aircraft

--11--

        were hit. It is believed that all fighter aircraft should be landed at sunset, as they are of no value in the air during darkness, unless equipped with Radar. If it is found necessary to fly aircraft at night, some positive identification procedure must be formulated.

      1. Combat Air Patrol

        This ship has found that some sure method of communications with the Combat Air Patrol is essential. At present the only method is to break radio silence, which has the grave disadvantage of giving the Japs an opportunity to obtain RDF bearings. When in dangerous waters, where enemy aircraft are present, this risk has to be taken in order to avoid being shadowed or attacked. It is strongly recommended that VF planes be equipped with a short range super-frequency radio set, so that the Fighter Director can feel free to direct the Combat Air Patrol to investigate "Bogies" etc., without breaking radio silence on the regular circuit.

        The necessity of having planes equipped with BI-ABA or ABD equipment was clearly brought out in this operation, the Combat Air Patrol was continually being vectored out to investigate unidentified planes of which over 90% turned out to be friendly. If the BI-ABA transmitter on the Yorktown functioned, it would have been unnecessary to send the CAP out, as the planes would have identified themselves on the screen. Unfortunately, the BI-ABA equipment has never functioned satisfactorily on this ship due to improper and hasty original installation of the BI transmitter and the unavailability of spare parts, that might have permitted the ship's force to put it in workable condition. It is considered that the installation of ABD equipment or the repair of the present BI-ABA equipment is of the utmost importance, and it is recommended that immediate action be taken to rectify this condition.

--12--

      1. Contact Codes

        The mistake made by the pilot in encoding the first contact, is a glaring example of the fallacy of expecting a pilot to encode a message when in contact with the enemy. As happened in this case the pilot is very liable to make a mistake in encoding a message, while trying to maintain contact and watching for enemy planes; there is also a strong possibility that a scout will be shot down before he has a chance to encode and send out a contact report, if the enemy has Radar and a Combat Air Patrol in the air. It is strongly recommended therefore, that a contact should be reported in plain language giving the geographical position and composition of the enemy force and be authenticated with a simple authenticator.

 

E. BUCKMASTER.

Copy to:
Ch. of BuAer.

 

--13--


Last updated: February 7, 2003

Transcribed and formatted by Jerry Holden for the HyperWar Foundation