NAVY DEPARTMENT
RADIO BULLETIN
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DECEMBER 27, 1937

The Secretary of the Navy released for publication in this afternoon's newspapers, the following report received from the Commanding Officer of the USS Panay, Lieutenant Commander J.J. Hughes, U.S. Navy:

On Sunday, December 12, 1937, the U.S.S. Panay was operat­ing under the orders of the Commander Yangtze Patrol and at that time was anchored about fifteen miles above Nanking acting as a refuge for American citizens and members of the American Embassy. The ship was accompanied by the American merchant ships Mei Ping, Mei Hsia and miscellaneous launches and junks. The latest orders from the Commander Yangtze Patrol to the Commanding Officer had been received the day before by dispatch and said the commanding officer was to have complete discretion in moving the ship up or down the river.

The ship was identified as an American vessel by two large horizontal flags, one spread over the forward top deck and one over the after top deck, both clearly visible from the air at any angle. Each of these flags measured about eighteen feet in length and about fourteen feet in width and had been freshly painted. In Addition to these two flags and on account of the emergency condi­tion existing, the Panay had been flying her largest size ensign at the gaff both day and night whether underway or at anchor. All ensigns both horizontal and vertical were brightly illuminated all night.

At 8:14 a.m., I observed artillery shells falling in the river about four hundred yards off our starboard beam pre­sumably from Japanese artillery although the batteries were not visible. At eight twenty-five a.m., I got the Panay underway for up river to get clear of this firing and signaled the convoy to follow at eight forty-three a.m.

At 9:40 a.m., having resumed our journey with the Panay at the head of the column followed in the order named by the Mi Ping, Mei Hsia and Mei An. Two groups of Japanese soldiers were sighted on the left north bank. They waved hand flags at the Panay and seemed to want to communicate with us. Accordingly, the Panay hove to and a Japanese armed tender came alongside carrying Lieutenant Shesyo Murakami and about ninety men most of whom were armed with machine guns. Lieutenant Anders, my executive officer, met this officer at the gangway as he stepped on board, accompanied by his sword bearer and two privates with fixed bayonets. Lieutenant Anders informed me that the officer desired to speak to me so I turned the conn over to Lieutenant Anders and went to the gangway.

Lieutenant Murakami asked me where the Panay was going and I said to a point upriver twenty-eight miles from Nanking. He said, "Why are you going there?" To which I replied, "To keep clear of artillery fire." He asked me about the three merchant ships and I informed him that they were American ships under my protection. His next question was about the Chinese troops holding solidly to which I said that the U.S. was friendly to both Japan and China and therefore I could not give him any information about the Chinese Army. This conversation was witnessed by Second Secretary, Mr. George Atchison, Jr., of the American Embassy, Nanking, China. Lieutenant Murakami then invited me to repay his call ashore which invitation I respectfully declined. At nine fifty-three a.m., the Japanese tender cleared the side.

At 9:54 a.m., the Panay again resumed her way upriver. At 11:00 a.m., I anchored the Panay at a point twenty miles upriver from Nanking and about two hundred and twenty-one miles a above Woosung in a broad open space in the river. My reason for anchoring there was simply to keep out of the way of the contending armies. This by location seemed highly desirable. We were easily visible especially accompanied as we were three merchant ships for miles around on every side. It seamed unlikely that any troops would try to cross the river in our vicinity. In selecting this spot I had in mind primarily the safety of the Panay and the refugees whom she was carrying but also the safety and well being of the American ships in the convoy and their personnel. Immediately upon anchoring, I posted sentry lookouts for airplanes and troops movements. At 1:00 p.m., I allowed a party of about eight men to visit the Mei Ping nearby. These men were still on board the Mei Ping when the attack started and wore therefore unable to return to the ship.

At about 1:27 p.m., the lookout called down that two planes were in sight, altitude about four thousand feet. The weather was clear with good visibility and no wind. The planes were clearly visible in spite of their altitude, which may not have been as high as reported to me at that time. I had no idea whatsoever that the planes intended to attack us. About this time I went up to the bridge with Chief Quartermaster John Lang in order to keep a better lookout for further planes approaching. About 1:29 p.m., I looked out the door of the bridge to pick up again the two planes I had originally seen and was astonished to discover that both wore rapidly losing altitude in a direction towards us. Almost immediately they appeared to go into power dives. Almost immediately a bomb seemed to strike directly over our heads ripping a big hole in the roof of the bridge. I lost consciousness for what must have been only a minute or two; when I came to I discovered myself on the deck of the bridge badly stunned with my head covered with blood and my right leg painfully injured at the hip making it impossible for me to rise to my feet. A hole had also been broken in the deck of the bridge near where Lang and I had boon standing. I asked Lang if he were injured to which ho replied, "No, Sir". Not being able to determine the extent of the damage from the inside of the bridge, which was completely wrecked, he helped me down to the ship's galley, which is on the main deck and a good central point from which to direct operations. Before I was able to roach the galley, which was necessarily a slow process on account of my disability wound, I heard the Panay's machine guns firing and realized that the crew was carrying on, probably under the immediate direction of the executive officer. At the galley I sent Lang to notify all officers that I was in the galley incapacitated and to tell the engineer officer, Lieutenant (jg) Geist, to let me know if we wore taking water and if we could get the ship underway.

From then on the planes bombed us continuously until about 2:25 p.m. They appeared to be attacking us in relays of two or three each. The first group that came over dive bombed from a considerable altitude which kept them beyond range of our Lewis machine guns. Later when the Panay was visibly smashed up they came much closer and not only let go their bombs from low altitudes, of perhaps one or two hundred feat, but also machine gunned our decks firing as they came down diving. I distinctly heard their guns, which had a different sound from the Panay's.

I was informed at the time that the planes were Japanese Navy planes identified by their characteristic red circle. According to my reckoning, the Panay must have received about twenty-four direct hits. I could not believe it was possible for such a small ship to receive such damage and still float. I was informed later that the first bomb, which disabled me, also put the forward 3-inch gun and the radio room out of action and brought down the foremast.

At 1:58 p.m., the ship appeared to be settling quite fast; meanwhile, before the engines officer could reach no to give me to give me a report on the status of our propelling machinery, I heard a sharp rush of steam escaping from our steaming boiler. The engineer officer, Lieutenant Geist, reported shortly thereafter and said we could not get underway because the steaming boiler had been ruptured. About this time someone informed me that we appeared to be in danger of being run down by one of the merchant ships. I got Mr. Paxton to carry me the door of the galley and from what I could see, I supposed that the vessel was attempting to cone alongside the Panay, probably to take off our personnel. About that instant another storm of bombs fell both on the Panay and the merchant ship. The latter then abandoned her attempt to help the Panay. It should be remembered that attacking planes concentrated almost all their efforts on the Panay during at least the first half-hour.

By 2:00 p.m., it seemed unlikely to me that I should be able to save the ship. About 2:00 p.m., Ensign Biwerse returned and said he thought we should abandon ship especially as he thought the job would take some time with only two small boats. Accordingly, I gave the order to abandon ship and to start by sending the worst wounded ashore first. Boats carried only wounded except for the boat's crews, Chief Boatswain's Hate Mahlmann, and several of the crew that had not been injured. They came to the galley to put me in the first boat. I protested against leaving the ship at this tine and was most unwilling to do so, but it appeared that they did not heed my protest because of my condition. With Mr. Paxton assisting, they carried me down to the deck and laid me flat on my face across the bow of the motor sampan.

I told Ensign Biwerse to tell Lieutenant Anders and the other officers that if the attack should cease I wanted Ensign Biwerse to remain on board with a small detail of about six uninjured men to do what they could to keep the ship from going down and that in any case Ensign Biwerse and his detail were to be the last to leave. I knew at that time that Ensign Biwerse was the only uninjured officer although suffering from shock and had had most of his clothes blown off and believed that Lieutenant Anders and Lieutenant(jg) Geist were sufficiently injured to justify their leaving the ship before the last boat load. After arriving on shore I [was] informed both the motor sampan and pulling sampan had been machine gunned by the attacking planes. Sometime thereafter I hoard the sound of a motor launch in the river close to where we were hidden in the reeds. The launch stayed in our vicinity a few minutes and then left. I cannot say whether or not they attempted to search for us because I was keeping my men cut of sight and had deliberately left no debris on the beach by which we could be traced. Shortly afterwards a second launch passed.

About this tine the planes started bombing the merchant vessels. At 2:25 p.m., they ceased bombing the Panay altogether. It was while they were bombing the Panay that two of the merchant vessels were able to get underway and beach themselves.

With only two small boats available, it took many return trips to take all the personnel off the ship. Starting at 2:05 p.m., we completed the operations at a little after 3:00 p.m. Sometime before the ship sank I heard the, rattle of machine guns and was informed that an armed Japanese boat had sent several men on board who remained only a few minutes and then left. I was formerly informed that the ship sank with her colors still flying at 3:54 p.m., turning over to starboard.

While on board the roar of the bomb explosions and the pieces of debris flying around nude it impossible to keep any written record of the various hits, the damage sustained, or the injury to personnel.

There was absolutely no panic. The orders I gave were carried cut exactly. The ship had the normal Yangtze Gunboat General Quarters station bill. We had special details for air defense which involved using only our machine guns.

The hull had many holes when abandoned and was shipping water rather rapidly. It would have been impossible to get the ship underway to beach her because her steaming boiler had been ruptured. Lieutenant Anders, My executive officer, with great courage and perseverance maintained the fire of all our machine guns, although he had been badly wounded, almost immediately in the throat, and later in the arm and both hands. He was able, however, to keep his feet and maintained active charge.

As already mentioned, I had my men abandon ship in the order of the worst wounded. First, I sent the boats to the nearest bank, which was covered by high reeds. I told the men that after they reached the beach they were to get in shore and hide in the reeds without however getting too far separated. After getting all the men off the ship and on the beach we found two Japanese planes flying fairly low overhead apparently looking for the Panay survivors. The reeds, however, apparently afforded us sufficient cover to remain unseen. Planes subsequently departed, but shortly after, bombing attacks were made on the two merchant vessels which were by now beached on the bank opposite us. The third merchant vessel had already been sunk by bombs.

We were on an island; Lieutenant Arthur E. Anders, my executive officer, was by this time badly weakened from loss of blood and Lieutenant(jg)Geist was also badly wounded in the leg. Ensign Biwerse had escaped actual injury but was suffering somewhat from shock, I felt that under the circumstances of our urgent condition and position that I should utilize the experience and mature judgment of Captain Frank M. Roberts, U.S. Army, the Assistant Military AttachŽ to the American Embassy in China, who had come on board at Nanking. He had escaped injury and was most anxious as an officer to assist me in any way. His ability to speak Chinese was also a valuable factor. I therefore appointed him as my immediate representative to take active physical charge under my direction and such orders as he gave were after consultation with me and by my authority and direction. I also acknowledge gratefully the kind and efficient assistance of Mr. Atchison in the same way. It is my grateful duty to add that Captain Robert's services wore absolutely invaluable and it is impossible for me to express my full appreciation f them. I am sure that every member of the Panay would agree that his efficiency, kindness, and tact, end his experience in handling an operation of this nature on shore, greatly contributed to our final escape. Mr. Atchison, who also speaks Chinese, agreed, at my request, to remain with the party to facilitate dealings with Chinese officers.

At about 5:15 p.m., Second Secretary of the Embassy, Mr. J. Hall Paxton, who also speaks Chinese, left our party at my request to try to get a message through either by telephone or telegram to the American Ambassador at Hankow, informing him of our plight.As already mentioned, after dark all able bodied men tracked the launch carrying the wounded around the little island close to the mainland on which we had found ourselves. In the meantime, Mr. Paxton, who had gone on ahead, sent back coolie carriers from the first village and they carried our wounded there. At this village we engaged more coolies and set out for the next village inland, Hohsien, which was five miles away and three miles away from the river bank. When we arrived at Hohsien about midnight, we were received and treated with the greatest kindness by the magistrate and all the Chinese there and were quartered in the hospital where we remained throughout the daylight. On Monday, 15 December 1937, Enaminger, storekeeper first class, and Mr. Sandro Sendri, Italian journalist, died from their injuries while we were there.

At dark that evening, 13 December, we set out for the next town, Hanshan, by junks which Captain Roberts had engaged. It was while we were at Hanshan, approximately 12 miles inland from the left (north) bank, that I received word of the American and British gunboats, which had been sent to assist us and of the presence of a Japanese gunboat to guarantee us safety from further attacks. The magistrate and tho Chinese residents of the second village were Just as helpful as those of the first. Finding the party and rendering medical aid they were willing to have us in spite of the fact that they thought as we did that our presence among them would draw down bombing attacks from the Japanese planes.

We left Hanshan about noon on 14 December in the same junks in which we had arrived and reached the Yangtze River about 9:45 p.m., that night. The entire party was on board the USS Oahu and HMS Ladybird by 1:00 a.m., 15 December. All the passengers who were on board the Panay were there at their own request.

I have no complaint to make regarding the conduct of any officer or enlisted man or any passenger. In my opinion everyone acted with fine courage and initiative, I consider that the action of my officers and crew in attempting to return the fire, rendering first aid, safely evacuating all personnel, transporting the wounded together and returning as one party with the dead and wounded, is sufficient evidence of their courage, discipline and fortitude. I keenly regret that my own injury prevented me from observing individual acts of courageous conduct of which I feel certain under the circumstances every officer and man performed both while on board ship and during the subsequent traveling ashore. I was particularly impressed by and grateful for the high morale and cheerful and faithful manner in which my officers and men assisted one another. I deem it my duty, however, to comment particularly upon the conduct and courageous conduct of Lieutenant Arthur F. Anders, my executive officer, who though wounded in several places, unable to speak and suffering severe loss of blood, kept his feet, directed the fire and supervised the abandoned ship. His conduct was an inspiration to all hands. I also consider that Lieutenant Clark G. Grazier, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, our only doctor, who was fortunately not wounded, displayed coolness, ability and resourcefulness with his treatment of the many wounded both while under fire aboard ship and under very difficult conditions ashore. His untiring efforts and professional skill undoubtedly contributed greatly to reduce the seriousness of the injuries.


REPORT OF NAVAL BOARD OF INQUIRY

The Secretary of the Navy released for publication in Saturday morning newspapers the text of the report of findings Of the court of inquiry ordered to investigate the bombing and sinking of the USS Panay. The Secretary's announcement stated that these findings have been approved by the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. The text of the report follows:

The court finds as follows:

1. That on December 18th, 1957, the U.S.S. PANAY, a unit of the Yangtze Patrol of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, was operating under lawful orders on the Yangtze River.

2. That the immediate mission of the USS Panay was to protect nationals, maintain communication between the U.S. Embassy, Nanking, and office of the Ambassador at Hankow, provide o temporary office for the U.S. Embassy Staff during the time when Nanking was greatly endangered by military operations and to afford a refuge for American and other foreign nationals.

3. That due to intensive shell fire around Nanking, the USS Panay had changed berth several times to avoid being hit and on the morning of December 12th, 1937, formed a convoy of Socony Vacuum Oil Co., vessels principally the SS Mei Ping, Mei Hsis, and Mei An and proceeded upriver.

4. That adequate steps were taken at all times to assure that the Japanese authorities were informed of the movement, of the USS Panay.

5. That in addition to her regular complement, the USS Panay had on board at this time four members of the American Embassy staff, four American nationals, and five foreign nationals.

6. That at 9:40 a.m., while standing upriver, the USS Panay was stopped in response to a signal from a Japanese landing boat, a Japanese Army boarding officer with guard wont on board and was informed that the USS Panay end convoy were proceeding to anchorage twenty eight miles above Nanking, no warning was given of any danger likely to be encountered.

7. That at about 11:00 a.m., December 12th, 1937, the USS Panay and convoy anchored in the Yangtze River in a compact group at about mileage two hundred twenty-one above Woosung, twenty-eight miles above Nanking.

8. That the USS Panay was painted white with buff upper works and stacks end displayed two largo horizontal flags on her upper deck awnings plus large colors at her gaff.

9. That the Socony Vacuum ships Mei Ping, Mei Esia and Mei An each displayed numerous horizontal and vertical American flags all of larger size.

10. That at 1:30 p.m. the crew of the USS Panay were all on board except visiting party of eight men on board the SS Mei Ping.

11. That at about 1:38 p.m., three large Japanese twin motored planes in vee ormation were observed at a considerable height passing overhead down river, at this time no other craft were in the near vicinity of the Panay and convoy and there was no reason to believe the ships were in a dangerous area.

12. That without warning these three Japanese planes released several bombs, one or two of which struck on or very close to the bow of the USS Panay aid another which struck, on or very close to the SS, Mei Ping.

13. That the bombs of the first attack did considerable damage to the USS Panay, disabling the forward three inch gun, seriously injuring the Captain and ethers, wrecking the pilot house and sick bay, disabling the radio equipment and the steaming fireroom so that all power was lost and causing leaks in the hull which resulted in the ship settling down by the head and listing to star board thereby contributing fundamentally to the sinking of the ship.

14. That immediately thereafter a group of six single engined planes attacked from ahead diving singly and appearing to concentrate on the USS Panay. A total of about twenty bombs were dropped, many striking close aboard and creating, by fragment and concussions, great damage to the ship and personnel. These attacks lasted about twenty minutes, during which time at least two of the pianos attacked also with tie chine guns, one machine gun attack was directed against a ship's boat bearing wounded ashore causing several further wounds and piercing the boat with bullets.

15. That during the entire attack the weather was clear with high visibility and little if any wind.

16. That the planes participated in the attacks on the USS Panay and its convoy were unmistakingly identified by their markings as being Japanese.

17. That immediately after the first bomb struck, air defense stations were manned and the thirty-caliber machine gun battery opened fire and engaged the attacking planes throughout the remainder of the attack. The three-inch battery was not manned nor were any three inch shells fired at any time; this was in accordance with the ships air defense bill.

18. That during the bombing many were injured by flying fragments and concussion and all suffered shock on the first bomb. The Captain suffered a broken hip and severe shock; soon thereafter, Lieutenant Anders, Executive Officer, was wounded by fragments in the throat and hands, losing power of speech. Lieutenant junior grade Geist, Engineer Officer, received fragments in the legs. Ensign Biwerse had clothing blown off and was severely shocked this included all the line officers of the ship, the Captain being disabled, the Executive Officer carried on his duties, giving orders in writing. He issued instruction to get underway and beach the ship. Extensive damage prevented getting underway.

19. That at about 2:00 p.m., believing it impossible to save the ship and considering the number of wounded and the length of time necessary to transfer them ashore in two small boats, the Captain ordered the ship to be abandoned this was completed at about 3:00 p.m. By this time the main deck was awash and the Panay appeared to be sinking.

20. A11 severely wounded were transferred ashore in the first trips. The captain protested in his own case. The executive officer when no longer able to carry on duo to wounds left the ship on the next to last trip and Ensign Biwerse remained until the last trip.

21. The after the Panay had been abandoned, Mahlamann, Chief Boatswain's Mate and Weimers, Machinist's Mate first class, returned to the Panay in one of the ship's boats to obtain stores and medical supplies. When they were returned to the beach, a Japanese power boat filled with armed Japanese soldiers approached close to the Panay, opened fire with a machine gun, went alongside, boarded and loft within five minutes.

22. That at 3:54 p.m., the Panay shortly after the Japanese boarding party had left rolled over to the starboard and sank in from seven to ten fathoms of water at approximately latitude 30”44 30" North, Longitude 117” 27" East. Practically no valuable government property was salvaged.

23. That after the Panay survivors had reached the left bank of the river, the Captain, in view of his own injuries and the general feeling that attempts would be made to exterminate the survivors, requested Captain F.N. Roberts, U.S. Army, who was not injured and who was familiar with land operations end the Chinese language, to act under his directions as his immediate representative, Captain Roberts functioned in this capacity until the return of the Panay survivors on board the USS Ohau on 15 December 1937. Performing outstanding service.

24. That Messrs, Atchison and Paxton of the U.S. Embassy staff rendered highly valuable services on shore where their knowledge of the country and language coupled with their resourcefulness and sound advice contributed largely to the safety of the party.

25. That after some fifty hours ashore during which time the entire party suffered much hardship and exposure somewhat mitigated by the kindly assistance of the Chinese, they returned and boarded the USS Ohau and HMS Ladybird.

26. That from the beginning of an unprecedented and un-looked for attack of great violence until their final return, the ship's company and passengers of the USS Panay were subjected to grave dangers and continuous hardship their action under those conditions was in keeping with the best traditions of the naval service.

27. That among the Panay passengers, Mr. Sandro Sandri died of his injuries at 1:30 , 13 December. Messrs. J. Hall Paxton, Emile Gassie, and Roy Squires were wounded.

28. That early in the bombing attacks, the Standard Oil vessels got underway. Mei Ping and Mei Hsia secured to a pontoon at the Kaiyuan wharf. The Mei An was disabled and beached further down river on the left bank; all these ships received in juries during the first phase of the bombing. Serious fires on the Mei Ping were extinguished by the Panay visiting party of eight men who wore unable to return to their ship.

29. That after attacks on the Panay had ceased, the Mei Ping and Mei Hsia were further attacked by Japanese bombing planes, set on fire and destroyed. Just previous to this bombing, Japanese Army units on shore near the wharf attempted to avert this bombing by waving Japanese flags. They were not successful and received several casualties. It is known that Captain Carlson of the Mei An was killed and that Messrs. Marshall Vines and Pickering and Squires were wounded. Casualties among the Chinese crews of these vessels were numerous but cannot be fully determined.

30. That the following members of the Panay crew landed on shore from the Mei Ping after vainly attempting to extinguish oil and gasoline fires on board, V.F, Puckett, Chief Machinist's Mate, J.A. Granes, Gunner's Mate first class, J.A. Dirnhofer, Seaman first class, T.A. Coleman, Chief Pharmacist's Mate, J.A. Bonkowski, Gunner's Mate third class, R.L. Browning, Electrician's mate third class, J.L, Kodge, fireman first class, and W.T. Hoyle, machinist's Mate second class. These men encountered Japanese soldiers on shore who were not hostile on learning they were Americans.

31. That all of the Panay crew from the Mei Ping, except J.L. Hodge, fireman first class, remained in one group ashore until the following day when they were rescued by HMS Bee. Hodge made his way to Wuhu and returned to Shanghai via Japanese Naval plane on 14 December.

32. That in the searching for and rescuing the survivors, Rear Admiral Holt, Royal Navy, and the officers and men of the HMS Bee and HMS Ladybird rendered most valuable assistance under trying and difficult conditions thereby showing a fine spirit of helpfulness and cooperation.

33. That Charles L. Ensminger, storekeeper first class, died at one thirty p.m., 13 December at Hohsien, China, from wounds received during the bombing of the USS Panay and that his death occurred in line of duty.

34. That Edgar G. Hulsebus, Coxswain, died at 6:30 a.m. 19 December at Shanghai, China, from bombing of the USS Panay and his death occurred in the line of duty.

35. That Lieutenant Commander James J. Hughes, Lieutenant Arthur F. Anders, Lieutenant junior grade John W. Geist, John H. Lang, Chief Quartermaster, Robert R. Hebard, fireman first class, Kenneth J. Rice, Electricians Mate third class, Carl H. Birk, Electrician's Mate first class, Charles S. Schroyer, Seaman first class, Alex Kozak, Machinist's Mate second class, Peros D. Ziegler, Ship's Cook third class and Newton L. Davis, Fireman first class, were seriously injured in line of duty.

36. That Lieutenant Clark G. Grazier, Medical Corps, Ensign Denis H. Biwerse, Charles S. Adams, Radioman second class, Tony Barba, Ships Cook third class, Walter Cheatham, Coxswain, John A. Bonkowski, Gunner's Mate third class, Ernest C. Branch, Fireman first class, Raymond L. Browning, Electrician's Mate third class, Thonas A. Coleman, Chief Pharmacist's Mate, John A. Dirnhofer, Seaman first class, Yuan te Erh, Mess attendant first class, Fred G. Fichtenmayer, Carpenter's Mate first class, Emery F. Fisner, Chief Watertender, Michael Gerent, Machinist's Mate second class, Cecil B. Green, Seaman first class, John L. Hodge, Fireman first class, Fon B. Hoffman, Watertender second class, Earl H. Johnson, Machinist's Mate second class, Carl H. Kerske, Coxswain, Peter L. Krumpers, Chief Machinist's Mate, William P. Lander, Seaman first class, Ernest R. Mahlmann, Chief Boatswain's Mate, William A. McCable, Firerman first class, Stanley V. McEowen, Seaman first class, James H. Peck, Quartermaster second class, Reginaly Peterson, Radioman second class, Vernon F. Puckett, Chief Machinist's Mate, King F. Sung, Mess attendant first class, Harry B. Tuck, Seaman first class, Cleo E. Waxler, Boatswain's Mate second class, John T. Weber, Yeoman first class, and Far Z. Wong, Mess Attendant first class, were slightly injured in line of duty.

The court of inquiry was composed of: Captain H.V. McKitrick, U.S. Navy, Commander M.L. Deyo, U.S. Navy, Lieutenant Commander A. C. J. Sabalot, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant C.J. Whiting, U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate.


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