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1. "Calm firmness" urged in Chinese-Korean situation—
US Embassy Moscow notes, concerning the attitude of
the USSR toward the Korean situation, that the Soviet
press has recently been relatively subdued in its pro-late
nouncements on Korea, in contrast to its earlier strident
support of the North Koreans. The Embassy has been
told that "agitators and lecturers" addressing groups in
Moscow are "comparatively colorless" on Korea. The
Embassy believes that this evidence does not permit it
to draw "important conclusions" but does suggest a measure of Soviet uncertainty regarding the future Communist
course in Korea. The Embassy reasons that this uncertainty, together with other considerations, makes it desirable
to take a firm line in the UN regarding the Chinese Communist intervention.

Concerning future courses of action regarding Korea, the Embassy reports that friendly colleagues in Moscow, widely concerned that the present military-diplomatic situation may deteriorate further, believe that adroit diplomatic action is essential to conclude the Korean affair. Basing their thinking on the defenseless position of Europe in the face of uncommitted Soviet forces, a number of these colleagues have been urging various moves ranging from obtaining a cease-fire agreement to proposing negotiations for an armistice; they have also urged that "the fiction of non-involvement" by the Peiping regime be continued. The Embassy takes issue with this view, however, and urges that these lines of action would not only fall into "the pitfall of appeasement" but would stimulate the Communists, who would regard such moves as a sign of weakness, to further efforts. The Embassy believes that "calm, determined firmness" in the face of this Chinese Communist campaign offers the best possibility of restoring the

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balance militarily and diplomatically to a point where it will be in the Chinese-Soviet interest to treat with the West on "suitable terms."

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2. UN reaction to Korean crisis—According to the US delegation to the UN, the European and Commonwealth delegates generally feel that it is necessary for the General Assembly to take up the Korean question and that there will be no difficulty in obtaining GA agreement to a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops from Korea. Although most delegates hold no real hope for fruitful conversations with the present Chinese Communist delegation, they consider that negotiations of some type should be undertaken in order to cut military losses. The US delegation also reports that there is widespread, strong criticism and distrust of General MacArthur and that President Truman's statement on the atom bomb has caused great consternation.

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3. Indian views on Korea--The US delegation to the UN also transmits a message from Indian Prime Minister Nehru to Indian delegate Rau, in which Nehru, in expressing his "great anxiety" about recent developments, stated that steps should be taken for a cease-fire as soon as possible, to be followed by the demarcation of a demilitarized zone.

Meanwhile, US Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi has expressed his fear that in the forthcoming parliamentary debate, Congress Party members may be instructed to be critical of the US and friendly towards Communist China. Henderson reports that Nehru in off-the-record talks is vehemently denouncing any suggestion of using atomic weapons,

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is rather violent in his condemnation of UN forces for crossing the 38th Parallel, and is showing special hostility towards General MacArthur.

In a discussion with Bajpai (Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs), Henderson gained the impression that the Indian Government is hoping British Prime Minister Attlee will prevail on the US to agree to some kind of cease-fire pending discussions, either in or out of the UN, which would result in: (a) admission of Communist China to the UN; (b) settlement of the Taiwan problem in a manner acceptable to the Chinese Communists; and (c) a Korean settlement which would, without sacrificing Korean independence, permit the Chinese to save face. Henderson also believes the Indian Government wishes to avoid casting blame on Communist China for intervening in Korea as long as the Peiping regime is not in the UN.

4. Norwegian thinking on UN and Korean case—Foreign Minister Lange has informed US Embassy Oslo of his government's opinion that introducing a resolution in the General Assembly calling for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea would inexorably lead to a state of declared war between the Communist Government of China and the UN. The Norwegian Government therefore considers that at least a few more days should elapse before this fatal sequence is started. Lange has also been informed that both Indian UN delegate Rau and Secretary General Lie are pessimistic as a result of their recent conversations with General Wu, but do not yet feel that an approach in this direction is hopeless.

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5. Anticipated British positions in Truman conversations --US Embassy London transmits its forecast of the positions Prime Minister Attlee(with) take in the 5 December discussions with President Truman. Regarding Korea, the Embassy believes the British will make clear their intention to support the UN police action but will press hard for agreement on a more limited military objective, for consultations before the US makes major moves in the Security Council, and for assurances that the atom bomb will not be used except after consultation and concurrence by the UK. Concerning Western Europe, the UK will seek US reiteration of the primary importance of the European theater and will discuss ways of accelerating NAT defense measures; the British will also point to the dangers of costly involvement in the Far East. On economic problems, the UK will seek close collaboration on efforts to obtain an equitable distribution of scarce raw materials which, the British believe, the US is stockpiling and consuming at too fast a rate. The UK will also seek a US reaffirmation that the defense effort will be so adjusted as to maintain Britain's economic strength. The Embassy believes that any possible US moves to reaffirm or extend Anglo-US relations will " pay real dividends in UK and Commonwealth efforts."

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#### FAR EAST

6. INDOCHINA: French fear repercussions from Korean war—A French official has informed US Legation Saigon of the uneasiness of French authorities over the repercussions in Indochina of the Chinese Communist offensive in Korea. The official emphasized that the balance of force between French and Viet Minh forces was most precarious and could easily be upset by even limited Chinese intervention, whether by "volunteers"



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or otherwise. The French official stressed that it would be some time in January before reinforcements from metropolitan France would reach the field, that much US aid would also not be effective before then, and that therefore there was a most dangerous interim period which the Chinese could exploit. He declared that this situation was perfectly apparent to the Viet Minh and the Chinese in Tonkin and South China.

7. THAILAND: Reported plans for coup--US Embassy Bangkok has been confidentially informed of an imminent coup against the Phibun Government. According to the Embassy's information, Communist gerrilla units from the southeast coast of Thailand, together with local dissident Chinese Communists, defected police, and dissident Malayans, will attempt to seize southern Thailand and presumably link up with Chinese Communists in Malaya. The Embassy comments that this plot appears to have much more substance than numerous others recently reported and is seriously regarded by Phibun and his supporters.

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