


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"B"

Soviet Objectives Achieved During the Korean War. The USSR has achieved certain important objectives during the course of the Korean war and thus was willing to advance the Malik cease-fire proposal.

Militarily, the USSR has been able to learn many of the new US weapons perfected since World War II. Except for atomic weapons, the US has used nearly all new arms, including planes and tanks, affording the USSR an opportunity for comparison with its own equipment. Specifically, the USSR has been able to test (a) Soviet jet planes, which although better in speed and maneuverability than US models, are not the best which the Soviets have; (b) the effectiveness of the US anti-tank weapons against the new secret Soviet tanks. Reportedly, the USSR has better bazookas and napalm bombs than those used by the US. Politically and militarily the removal of Gen. MacArthur from the Far East was a success for Moscow since it created US domestic discord thereby contributing to US weakness. Propagandistically, the USSR will be able to exploit the Soviet peace proposals and truce which is expected to be forthcoming. ([redacted] 19 Jul 51) [redacted] COMMENT:

[redacted] appeared to be Soviet "plants" of a propaganda nature. The above information in this latest report should not be characterized as objectives but rather results of the Korean war. It is obviously true that the Soviets have been able to learn much of new US weapons developments since World War II, and test the current US 3.5" bazooka and recoilless guns against new Soviet tank designs. It is equally true that the Soviets have improved jet aircraft under development which have not been seen in combat. The Soviet MIG-15 and Type 15 jet fighters used in Korea are best described as being generally comparable to the US F-86 Sabre Jet. It is considered likely that the Soviets have improved versions of standard US napalm bombs and bazookas under development, but there is no evidence that they have been available to Soviet military forces.



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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: 18-Mar-2010

20 July 1951
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Background of Cease-Fire Proposal.

[redacted] has provided background information, as of 25 June, on Malik's cease-fire proposal. [redacted] the proposal resulted from consultation in Moscow in early June between the Soviets and a Chinese Communist delegation led by LIU Shao-ch'i. Although the Peiping regime is "anxious" to end the fighting in Korea, Peiping does not intend to yield on its demands for admission to the UN, title to Taiwan, and participation in the Japanese peace treaty. [redacted] that "political demands are unlikely to arise during the cease-fire negotiations."

[redacted] 14 July 51). COMMENT: [redacted] have reported an early June Sino-Soviet conference on the Korean conflict. Peiping has frequently reiterated its demands regarding the UN, Taiwan, and the Japanese peace treaty, but has not made clear whether a Korean settlement will depend on the satisfaction of those demands. [redacted] no mention of Peiping's demand for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea which has been specifically reaffirmed for several weeks as essential to a Korean settlement, and which has already arisen as a "political demand" in the cease-fire negotiations.

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"B" KOREA. Enemy Strengthens Anti-Aircraft Defenses in Northeast Korea.
Commander Tash Force 77 reports that the enemy is increasing anti-aircraft defenses in Northeast Korea particularly on the Wonsan-Pyongyang and Wonsan-Pyonggang rail lines. He further reports that the increased flak is detracting from bombing accuracy. [redacted]
[redacted] July 51). COMMENT: This report adds to the observations throughout Communist Held Korea of the strengthening of enemy anti-aircraft defense.

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