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	Comment: While frequent reports have been received indicating hinese Communist unwillingness for a variety of reasons to continue that in Korea, this is among the most implausible to date.
	Korean war reported as springboard for Communist invasion of Ju
ŗ	ollowing explanation for continuation of the war in Korea and of Sovie lans to invade Japans
p	(1) Continuation of the war in Korea is part of the "long-range oviet plan for invasion of Japan." A cease-fire now would remove the retext for launching "air raids against Japan before Japan can prepare y rearming."
W	(2) North Korea and the Soviet Union are not prepared for all-ou ar in the Far East, and action against Japan "is not expected until t ummer of 1952."
B	(3) The Soviet timetable for aggression in the Far East includes orea, June 1951; Japan, August to October, 1952; Taiwan, Indochina, auguma, to follow Japan; and the Philippines plus "the other South Pacislands," to be conquered under the supervision of a "Japanese-Soviet lanning board."
H	(4) The invasion of Japan would be accomplished by using Japanes roops from "Siberia, Sakhalin, and Manchuria" to invade and secure okkaide. Following the establishment of a base, Korean, Chinese, and other Asiatic troops" would follow for the invasion of Honshu and yushu.
	Comment:
	It is probable that such statements, if

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preparing to make amphibious landings on	
coasts in order to drive "the Korean and	Chinese forces back to the Yalu
river. M. The Communists further character	rized recent UN activity as
"wrecking of the Kaesong negotiations."	

Comment: This latest Communist claim may be an effort to counter effective UN propagands that the Chinese and North Koreans have successfully utilized the respite of the Kaesong talks to rebuild their offensive potential. Additionally, it is known that Communist forces in Korea have a genuine fear of UN amphibious capabilities.

- Occurrently on Communist air activity in the Korean war, observes that while previously most encounters with enemy jet aircraft took place over the Yalu river in the vicinity of Sinuiju, during "the past two weeks, the majority of encounters between friendly and enemy jets occurred in the Sinanju area, with occasional engagements in the immediate Pyongyang vicinity, and only a small number in the Sinuiju area." FECOM comments that it is "evident" that the Communist have "expanded the normal area of counter-air operations to include most of northwest Korea, almost to Pyongyang."
- 15. Communist prisoners report seeing Soviet antiaircraft personnel in the Antung area this summer: Preliminary field interrogation of recently captured Communist soldiers reveals that in late May and early June 1951 one soldier observed "thousands of Russian antiaircraft troops deployed along the Yalu river in the vicinity of Antung and in the hills surrounding Antung." Another prisoner claims to have seen 5,000 Soviet antiaircraft troops, dressed in Chinese Communist uniforms, detraining in Antung in early June, 1951.

Comment: The presence of a considerable number of Soviet troops in North Korean rear areas is accepted. Although not a firm estimate, it is possible that they number in excess of 20,000. While generally performing a technical, advisory, or service function, some organized antiaircraft units are believed to be operating in northwestern Korea. These dated and still unconfirmed reports although dealing with the Antung area are further evidence pointing to the presence of a relatively large number of Soviets in the Korean-Manchurian theater.

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