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4. North Korean Army unit disproves police report of BW incident: Two messages from a North Korean battalion in the Hamhung area reported on 25 March that a civilian police officer had discovered an American bacteria bomb. The policeman's findings apparently were based on the coincidence of a UN bombing attack and the appearance of "flies" in the area.

A North Korean military sanitation officer, sent to affirm this incident, reported that the policeman's report was false and that the flies "were not caused from the bacterial weapon but from the fertilizers on the place." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-1045, 25 Mar; Det 151 15th RSM Korea, 26 Mar 52)

Comment: This is the first observed instance in which a Communist unit has investigated and entered a negative report on an alleged American use of BW agents.

5. Additional subordinate of new Chinese Communist army group reported in Korea: A recent message, probably passed by the Chinese Communist 7th Artillery Division, states that "the 18th Army requests that you compute the total number of all personnel under your command..."

FECOM comments that the 18th Army, subordinate to the 5th Chinese Communist Army Group, has been located in Korea by several collateral reports. The reference to "18th Army," FECOM warns, could be a garble for "68th Army" known to be in the general area of the 7th Artillery Division. (SUEDE CINCFE SIB 468, 26 Mar 52)

Comment: Communications intelligence in 1952 has suggested the presence in Korea of four new Chinese Communist armies—the 10th, 16th, 18th, and 21st. While it is possible that all or elements of these armies may have entered Korea, there is insufficient evidence to accept their presence in the combat zone.

6. North Korean V Corps loses two major units: A
29 January North Korean message mentions that "since the
V Corps is transferring the control of the 46th Division

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and the 25th Division (probably 25th Brigade), and since

Comment: The loss of these two major units leaves the V Corps with the 6th, 12th, and 32nd Divisions. It is possible that this January transfer was a preparation for the V Corps' return to combat in eastern Korea, possibly to relieve the II Corps. The 25th Mechanized Artillery Brigade has been generally identified in a coastal defense role. The V Corps has been engaged in training and coastal security duty in the Wonsan-Hamhung area, since it was relieved from combat by I Corps in the fall of 1951. North Korean regiment at Kaesong has large security element: A poorly translated 20 March message from the North Korean 82nd regiment, the Kaesong guard force, to its parent 8th Division reports the current strength of security men in the regiment as 324, organized into between 50 and 70 nets. (SUEDE 29/78, 21 Mar 32) Comment: Although it is not known what the normal complement of security personnel is in a North Korean regiment of 3,000 soldiers, this figure seems high. The "showpiece" role of the 82nd Regiment as the Kaesong guard force may account for the extra security precautions. NR		to" (SUEDE 3003, 29 Jan 52)	IR70-14
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