BW AND THE KOREAN ""R

5/15/5"2

After a week's decline of attention to the lowest point since the campaign began, the introduction of new elements has again sharply reversed the downward trend of Soviet concentration on the germ war issue. This increase parallels the upward trend in Chinese and North Korean propaganda.

This new impetus has not been accompanied as in the past by a de-emphasis on other aspects of the war. On the negotiations Soviet broadcasts reflect Peking's line that the prisoner repatriation issue remains the sole obstacle to a quick truce, and that continued American obstinacy can wreck the talks.

Moscow also evidences greater coordination with Peking and Pyongyang in stressing the depressed state of the South Korean population, and in reporting growing dissatisfaction with the war among the American satellites and increased popular concern at American intransigence among all circles in the United States.

New Charges Spark BW Campaign: After Soviet commentary attention to bacteriological warfare had declined during the first week of the SURVEY period (28 April-4 May) to the lowest point since the campaign began, the introduction of new charges, first by Peking and Pyongyang and then by Moscow, again reverses the general downward trend to give the campaign a new impetus. The new high level of comment is largely accounted for by rebroadcasts of American airmen's confessions and Joliot-Curie's letter to Warren Austin reiterating the BW charges and insisting that the Red Cross is not competent to conduct an investigation. Some 83 out of a total of 131 commentaries are devoted to the texts of the various statements.

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In quickly repeating Peking and Pyongyang's "donfessions" of American airmen that they had consciously engaged in germ warfare, Moscow directed the bulk of its references to European audiences and North America. The confessions were not broadcast in the Asiatic languages. Moscow's studied avoidance of these new charges in its Far Eastern transmissions suggests that there is a division of labor in this sphere between the USSR and China; Peking's international services in Asiatic languages after the introduction of the "confessions" were devoted almost exclusively to presentation of the new proofs of American bestiality, while heavy Soviet concentration in the European beams suggests a desire to give maximum publicity to the charges in areas where Peking broadcasts are not available.

The current increase in the level of attention brought an extension of the BW charges to other areas. Moscow reports, and neither Peking nor Pyongyang has yet echoed this contention, that the Americans have made detailed investigations into the possibility of waging BW in Central, East and Southeast Asia, that experiments are continuing in the Near and Middle East, and that scientific conferees in Canada recently decided to investigate the possibility of destroying domestic herds through deliberate infection of cattle with hoof-and-mouth disease. Moscow has also given wide currency to Pyongyang's recent allegation that poison gas had been used in Korca on 33 occasions during past months. Peking alone has not yet devoted measurable attention to this latter charge. The introduction of these new elements suggests that the campaign can be expected to remain a dominant part of Communist propaganda concerning the war, although there may be weeks when attention will decline to extremely low levels.

Moscow Takes Note of Truce Impasse: This new spate of propaganda concerning American BW criminality is not accompanied by a concomitant eclipse of Soviet references to other aspects of the Korean situation. The truce negotiations per se are given markedly increased attention in Soviet news broadcasts; however commentary attention to the negotiations continues to be low in volume. Soviet media generally reiterate Chinese and North Korean insistence that only a solution to the prisoner repatriation question is needed to bring a rapid truce. Nam Il's vehement denunciation of American obstructionism is reported only to the Soviet home audience. The Koje island incident is reported in a single broadcast in Korean. In this Moscow repeats Peking's claim that the incident reveals the true nature of America's treatment of prisoners. At the same time Moscow parallels Pyongyang and Peking in warning that continued American intransigence can wreck the talks. This increased coordination with Chinese and North Korean propaganda represents a radical departure from Moscow's usual dissociation from the negotiations or the military aspects of the war.

<u>U.S. Satellites Increase Opposition to War:</u> Moscow also dwells upon the depressed state of South Korean finances, production and popular morale, reports increased uneasiness among the American "satellites" concerning U.S. adamancy in the talks, and details the increasing opposition to the war among American troops and civilians in the United States.

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