

## T W O C A M P S

Korea

KOREAN WAR

Moscow comment on the Korean war centers on the United Nations debates and total attention rises to 300 commentaries in the second week. This volume was exceeded this year only during the bacterial warfare and the POW atrocity campaigns. The following are salient propaganda elements:

1. A defense of the Communist stand on Korea, with emphasis on their proposals for peaceful settlement of the long-standing POW issue. The letter from Kim Il Sung and Peng Te-huai to General Clark as well as the speech by Vishinsky at the 18 October General Assembly session set forth this phase of Communist propaganda treatment.
2. An attack on the U.S. position on Korea on the ground it is obviously aggressive. It is charged that the debate on Korea in the U.N. will be used solely to justify U.S. aggression and to gain U.N. sanction for its continuance.
3. A rejection of the U.N. investigation of BW charges because the refusal of the U.N. to invite Chinese and North Korean representatives to testify on these atrocities has rendered the investigation illegal. North Korea has also branded U.N. discussion of the Korean question "invalid" without the participation of North Korean representatives.
4. Further evidence of U.S. bad faith is contained in charges that the Communist proposals presented at Panmunjom for truce settlement have been concealed from the press, the general public and also from the United Nations itself.
5. The familiar theme of U.S. monopolists reaping swollen profits--broadcast more widely than ever before--is perhaps intended to buttress claims of U.S. intransigence on the truce deadlock and alienate support of the U.S. position.

Communist Truce Position Unchanged: Despite the heavy volume of attention to the exposition of the Communist truce position as outlined by the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom and endorsed by Vishinsky before the General Assembly, there is nothing in the content which would indicate any change in the rigid Communist opposition to voluntary repatriation. The letter from Kim Il Sung and Peng Te-huai to General Clark on 16 October has been hailed by Moscow as containing proposals "able to lead the talks at Panmunjom out of the impasse." But Moscow does not indicate how this would be accomplished.

Vishinsky's opening speech to the United Nations on 18 October, broadcast more widely than any of his addresses during the 1951-52 General Assembly session, endorses these Communist proposals advanced at Panmunjom. He also discusses the Polish proposals advanced at the United Nations on 16 October, which refer only in general terms to settlement of the war and withdrawal of foreign troops.

Acheson Attempts to Justify U.S. Aggression: A TASS review of Secretary Acheson's detailed address before the Political and Security Committee on 24 October consists largely of denunciation of Acheson's "slanderous assertions" and of charges he "attempted to absolve" the United States from responsibility for the Korean war. There is little attempt to refute directly Acheson's documentation. The Secretary is accused of attempting to portray U.S. intervention in Korea as defense, of falsifying the history of the Korean question, of attempting to absolve the U.S. from responsibility for disruption of the truce talks, and of not replying to the proposals contained in the letter from Kim and Peng to General Clark. Moscow's failure to attempt refutation of the charges made by Acheson may indicate that further expansion of the Soviet position must wait for official response, presumably by Vishinsky.

Moscow makes only oblique reference to the 17 international treaties signed by the Soviet Union and cited by Acheson as evidence of previous Soviet acceptance of the principle of no voluntary repatriation. The TASS review states only that Acheson "cited various international treaties on repatriation of POW's which, however, are in no way related to the refusal of the United States Government to return Korean and Chinese POW's to their homes...." Even this reference in the original TASS release was eliminated in the version later broadcast to North America. No reference was made to Acheson's statements that U.S. attempts to secure Soviet diplomatic assistance to end the war were ignored, to the Communist approval of the original screening of POW's, nor to the U.S. offer to let an international body conduct rescreening of the Communist prisoners.

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