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USSR SURVEY 11 DECEMBER 1952

TWO CAMPS

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KOREAN WAR

Moscow continues its concentration on the U.N. debate of the Korean question. Vishinsky's denunciation of the Indian proposal on 24 November is followed by a temporary increase in comment while the amendments to the Soviet proposal, also introduced on 24 November, occasion renewed attention to the positive feature of the Soviet stand. However, anticipating the adoption of the Indian resolution, Moscow reduces the volume of attention related to the U.N. as well as to other aspects of the Korean war even before the 4 December Assembly vote. Peking comment in general coincides with the Moscow position.

Indian Proposal is American Trick to Prevent Peace: Moscow broadcasts continue to attack the Indian proposal after it was categorically rejected by Vishinsky on 24 November. In addition to the original charge that the proposal adhered to the "notorious American resolution," broadcasts allege that the proposal (1) does not insure the solution of the PCW problem, (2) delays the repatriation of all PCWs, (3) makes no provision for immediate cease-fire, and (4) is unrealistic in that the mediator called for in the India-proposed commission would be appointed by the U.N. Since the U.N. considers itself part of the Korean war, "how then can it act as arbitor or judge in this dispute?" This reference to the United Nations as a belligerent in the Korean fighting is in contrast to the usual singling out of the United States as the enemy. It may be an indication of Moscow's efforts to fully explain its rejection of the Indian proposal.

In a further attempt to explain the Soviet rejection, Moscow reveals that—in view of the more independent attitude of the Arab-Asian delegates at this session—the United States was forced to resort to trickery to gain Arab-Asian support.

The Soviet amendment calling for an immediate cease-fire and settlement of the POW question by two-thirds vote in the proposed Korean commission is stressed in what seems to be an attempt to exploit the belief that "the peoples of India and other Asian nations would be concerned if their delegates voted against an armistice in Korea."

Moscow further seeks to bolster Soviet rejection of the Indian resolution by broadcasting the official statements of Chou En-lai and Pak Hun Yong.

New BW Confessions Ignored by Moscow: Pyongyang on 4 December reports the confessions of two more American officers who admitted their part in the alleged use of bacterial warfare by American forces in Korea. One is a member of the Air Force, as were the other confessers, while the second is identified only as a member of a "chemical unit." Although details as to place and time of the use of BW are not mentioned, the charges presumably refer to recent developments inasmuch as one of the officers arrived in the Far East on 7 July 1952. Neither Moscow nor Peking has reported these confessions.

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Peking however on 8 December broadcasts as part of its present series of messages from U.S. prisoners, one addressed to the people of South Carolina by Lt. Floyd O'Neal, which repeated his confession of participation in the alleged use of bacterial warfare. O'Neal also refers to the American bombing of North Korean civilians and cities and appeals to the residents of South Carolina to support peace in Korea.

Intended Use of Asiatic Troops Reported: Having previously ignored speculation—which arose during the U.S. election campaign—over the use of Asian troops to fight Asians, Moscow notes a Tokyo press report that 8,000 Japanese volunteers are already in Korea and that the National Security Corps will soon be dispatched to Korea. Moscow also repeats charges that Assistant Secretary of State Allison sought new mercenaries during his visit to Japan. Krainov reports that negotiations are now in progress in Washington between the representative of Chiang and David Bruce, acting Secretary of State, for the use of Kuomintang troops in Korea.

These charges are grouped with other reports concerning the expanding South Korean army and the American intention to force Korean and Chinese prisoners to serve in the Chiang and Rhee armies. Although Moscow reports of the use and intended use of Japanese and Kuomintang troops have appeared throughout the year in news stories, it is unusual for them to be reported in commentary form. But the present commentary does not present detailed argumentation; only passing reference is made to General Eisenhower's trip to Korea.

Anti-Aircraft Capabilities. POW Outrages Reported: Moscow continues to report the increased anti-aircraft capabilities of the Communist forces in North Korea. A Borzenko dispatch to PRAVDA reports that travel over Korean roads is now safe even in the daytime because "Korean anti-aircraft units are now so good that American flying fortresses are keeping well out of range." This and other Korean strength references have not yet been broadcast to Korea. Moscow has also revealed more POW outrages, with 1400 Communist prisoners killed in atomic experiments in 1951 and hundreds more killed by more conventional weapons such as flamethrowers, machine guns and grenades.