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USSR SURVEY
9 JULY 1953

- 1 -

GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Korea

NR

KOREAN WAR

Moscow broadcasts have in general echoed the restraint which has characterized Peking attention to the Korean situation, a restraint culminating in Communist acceptance of General Clark's 29 June proposal that the Panmunjom talks be resumed. While basing its broadcasts largely on Peking and Pyongyang dispatches, Moscow has, however, been careful to hew to a middle ground, avoiding certain opposing extremes evident in the two Asian transmitters. Thus Pyongyang's unofficial rejection of Clark's letter, denounced in at least five separate North Korean news agency dispatches--the last on 3 July--is given only brief mention in a 5 July TASS dispatch which avoids Pyongyang's insistence that all "released" prisoners be returned. At the same time TASS deletes those portions of a 4 July NCNA dispatch which referred to the "spirit of independence and democracy of the American people," predicted that "the American people will not fall into (Rhee's) trap," and reported the increased Western sentiment for a truce agreement despite South Korean opposition.

Dissociation from War Noted on Anniversary: A further striking example of Moscow's current failure to take a leading role in propaganda comment on the Korean war is provided by its avoidance of the third anniversary of the Korean war in all but a few news items. Previous anniversaries in 1951 and 1952 accounted for 4 and 10 percent of all Moscow broadcast output during the respective anniversary weeks. Moscow's failure to comment on one of the major anniversary themes of the Asian transmitters, namely that the record of the war proves that international disputes can be solved only through peaceful negotiations, is particularly unusual in the light of present Soviet advocacy of the role of peaceful negotiation. Peking and Pyongyang

* For further discussion of this article, see SURVEY supplement to be issued 10 July 1953.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

USSR SURVEY
9 JULY 1953

anniversary comment also placed the major credit for the successful outcome of the Korean war on Sino-Korean unity, while the praise accorded the Soviet role--and in particular that of Stalin--in last year's comment is avoided. This failure of the Asian radios to accord major credit to the Soviet Union and Moscow's failure to claim such credit is identical to the characteristics of Communist comment noted at the time of the 8 June signing of the POW agreement at Panmunjom. (For background discussion of this point see SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS, 11 June 1953 and SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS, 18 June 1953.)

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