

REPORT

OF

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *December 1, 1845.*

SIR: During the past year, the usual squadrons of the navy of the United States have been maintained. In the Mediterranean, Commodore Smith had command of the Cumberland and the Plymouth. He would have despatched the Plymouth to the Black Sea, but leave was refused by the Ottoman Porte. He conducted our newly appointed consul to Tangiers, and ensured his reception.

Our ships in the Mediterranean have usually lain inactive at Port Mahon during the winter; this can be obviated by an interchange of service. The Plymouth has, therefore, been directed to join the Brazil squadron, and the Cumberland has returned home. Their places will be taken, at the opening of the season, by a part of the present African squadron.

The African squadron was organized by Commodore Perry, by whom good sanitary regulations were established. He was relieved by Commodore Skinner in the Jamestown, who has shown equal consideration for the health of all under his command. Yet the Preble and the Truxton contracted disease, and, as an act of humanity, were ordered to return home. The Southampton has been sent out with stores, to remain on the coast. The Marion and the Dolphin followed as a reinforcement. The Boxer is destined for the same station, and will sail immediately. The Cumberland, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Read, will proceed in January to relieve the Jamestown and Yorktown, which will then repair to the Mediterranean.

On the Brazil station, Commodore Rousseau, the first officer west of the Alleghanies ever selected to command a squadron, relieves Commodore Turner. The Raritan will repair to the home squadron; the Boston is ordered to return to the United States. The Columbia, the Saratoga, the Plymouth, and the Bainbridge, will, for the present, constitute the Brazil squadron.

Commodore Parker, after a very successful cruise, returned from the Asiatic station in September, bringing home the Brandywine, the St. Louis, and the Perry. At the Bay of Islands, Captain McKeever, in the St. Louis, had the happiness to render valuable service to the inhabitants of an infant British settlement.

In May Commodore Biddle sailed for the East Indies in command of the Columbus ship of the line and the Vincennes, bearing our minister to China, and the ratified treaty between the United States and the Chinese emperor. The health of Mr. A. H. Everett, the minister, having induced his return,

the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty was committed to the charge of Commodore Biddle, who will doubtless show that an able and gallant naval officer conducts, satisfactorily, all affairs intrusted to him.

The Constitution is on her return from China, after having visited different ports and islands in the Indian seas.

The Pacific squadron, under Commodore Sloat, has consisted of the Savannah, the Levant, the Warren, and the Shark. The three first will return in 1846, and will be relieved by the Congress, the Portsmouth, and the Cyane. The difficulty of communicating with our ships in the Pacific makes it proper to suggest the advantage of a public mail through our own territory to a convenient port on the straits of Juan de Fuca. Arrangements should also be made at the earliest day that is proper, for getting supplies for our Pacific squadron from our own soil and our own citizens in that region.

The home squadron has been under the command of Commodore Conner, who has distinguished himself by sound judgment in the performance of his duty. His force, which consisted of the Potomac, the Falmouth, the Vandalia, the Lawrence, and the Somers, was weakened by the return of the Vandalia, which visited Hayti, and was driven home by the yellow fever contracted at Port-au-Prince, where she had been ordered on duty. The squadron was increased by the Princeton and Porpoise, the St. Mary's and the Saratoga, under Commodore Stockton, and soon after by the John Adams and the steamship Mississippi. The aggregate force of Commodore Conner was much larger than has usually rallied under one American pennant. It gave efficient protection to our interests in the gulf of Mexico, and contributed to spread a sense of security over our country, to its extreme limit of the Del Norte.

Deeming it of great importance to become acquainted with the navy-yards and establishments connected with the navy, I have, during the past summer, visited all of them, except those at Pensacola and at Memphis. They are generally in excellent order. The principal improvements in progress at those I visited are at Brooklyn, where the work on the dry dock is advancing with efficiency and economy. The vicinity to a city which is the emporium of naval stores, and is crowded with seamen, ship-builders, and excellent mechanics of all kinds, gives to that yard great facilities for the prompt repair and equipment of ships of war.

At the naval asylum in Philadelphia, more than a hundred veteran sailors are enjoying the ample provision wisely reserved for the comfort of their declining years. Yet I would earnestly advise that the buildings of the asylum, at their present location, be never enlarged; but that, after it is full, new pensioners should be placed in some salubrious spot near the ocean, where the aged seaman can watch ships as they come and go, and have old familiar objects within his sight.

The charge on the navy hospital fund, which is noticed in the communication from the Bureau of Medicine, was incurred in 1841, on the recommendation of the chief of that bureau, at whose urgent suggestion houses for the governor and surgeon of the asylum were authorized to be erected. The expenditures have been circumscribed; and the recommendation to encroach still further on the fund, by erecting other dwellings at other stations, has not been complied with. The fund should be sacredly reserved for the immediate and personal benefit of those from whose earnings it has accrued. Nor have I thought it just to continue to appropriate a large

part of the buildings at the asylum to the use of the midshipmen, who were preparing for the established examination previous to their passing to a higher grade.

Congress, in its great desire to improve the navy, had permitted the department to employ professors and instructors at an annual cost of about \$28,200; and it had been usual, besides the few employed at the receiving ships and the naval asylum, to send professors with the midshipmen into every ocean and clime. But the ship is not friendly to study; and the office of professor rapidly degenerate into a sinecure; often not so much was done as the elder officers would cheerfully do for their juniors; the teachers on board the receiving ships gave little instruction, or none whatever; so that the expenditure was fruitless of great results. Many of the professors were able and willing; but the system was a bad one. The idea naturally suggested itself, of seizing from the time when the midshipmen are on shore, and appropriating it to their culture. Instead of sending migratory professors to sea with each handful of midshipmen, the midshipmen themselves, in the intervals between sea duty, might be collected in a body, and devote their time to suitable instruction. For the pay of the instructors Congress has provided; in looking out for a modest shelter for the pupils, I was encouraged to ask for Fort Severn, at Annapolis. The transfer was readily made, by order of the Secretary of War, and a school was immediately organized on an unostentatious and frugal plan. This institution, by giving some preliminary instruction to the midshipmen before their first cruise; by extending an affectionate but firm supervision over them as they return from sea; by providing for them suitable culture before they pass to a higher grade; by rejecting from the service all who fail in capacity or in good disposition to use their time well, will go far to renovate and improve the American navy.

The plan pursued has been unpretending, but it is hoped will prove efficient. A few professors give more and better instruction than four-and-twenty at sea. No supernumerary officer has been ordered to Annapolis; no idle man is attached to the establishment. Commander Buchanan, to whom the organization of the school was intrusted, has carried his instructions into effect with precision and sound judgment, and with a wise adaptation of simple and moderate means to a great and noble end. Let not Congress infer that new expenses are to be incurred. Less than the amount that has hitherto been at the disposition of the department for purposes of culture, will support the school, and repair and enlarge the quarters received from the hospitality of the army.

At Washington, the admirable instruments provided for the observatory have been placed under the charge of officers of the navy, who are well aware that the opportunities afforded them for advancing astronomical science are unequalled on this continent, and scarcely surpassed in Europe. Results honorable to the country may, therefore, be justly expected of them. From that institution charts are furnished to the navy at cost; and the instruments used at sea are there preserved, corrected, and repaired. Would it not be well that the plates of all charts authorized by Congress to be engraved, should be deposited there, as the place most appropriate for their preservation and use?

It was a subject of great regret that the pressure of business left no opportunity to visit the yards at the south and southwest. The plans for their improvement should be such as will not interfere with or injure each other.

Pensacola, by its position, arrests public attention. The security of our naval power in the gulf of Mexico depends, in a great measure, on its condition and resources. The events of the summer show conclusively the necessity for a liberal provision at that station of all the means essential to a well furnished and efficient navy-yard. A large estimate for that yard is therefore presented, although I desire to await further information before finally approving the proposed mode of its expenditure.

Memphis, on the contrary, being in the heart of the country, on an ocean river, yet a thousand miles from the sea, is inappropriate for the repairs of ships of war; but in building steamships, it may compete with Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, with St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Pittsburg. It lies, moreover, just below the great hemp-growing region, and is recommended by its position for the establishment of the manufacture of cordage. A rope walk, with the latest improvements, is therefore proposed, so that the west may not only produce but manufacture the hemp used for the American navy.

I have disapproved some of the details of the plan proposed for the navy-yard at Memphis, because it was framed on a scale of extravagant expenditure, which, for the mere work of preparation, would have consumed many years, and would have cost, by estimate, at least two millions of dollars; and which contemplates the residence of many officers, civil and naval, who, in any event, would be useless. I recommend that Congress confine the use of the moneys it may appropriate, first to the immediate construction of a rope walk, and next to simple arrangements for building and equipping steamers. To introduce at the west the manufacture of American hemp for the navy, will prove a national benefit.

The United States should produce all the hemp used in its navy. Enterprise, climate, and soil leave no doubt that it may be raised and prepared of the best quality, and at prices within the limit prescribed by law. To insure that end, I gave the subject early and continued attention; and nothing but American hemp has been received under any contract made since I came into the department.

Finding, by short experience, that to insist on the inspection at Charlestown, as heretofore practised, would be injurious to the western planter, I directed that while all who had made contracts at prices based upon inspection and delivery at Charlestown should be held to fulfil their engagements, purchases should be made of three hundred tons during the present fiscal year, to be delivered and finally inspected at Louisville and St. Louis. The subject of lake defences is reserved for a special communication.

The care of the reservations and plantations of live oak, I recommend should be transferred to the land office, which alone has the proper means of ascertaining titles, and which can assume the charge with less expense and greater efficiency than this department.

I may ask leave during the winter to present some suggestions on the organization of the department and its bureaus.

The present contract system requires modification, so that no fraud to the United States may shield itself under the letter of the law; nor contracts be given out at prices exceeding the market price.

The balance of appropriations on hand will, it is believed, with the exercise of rigid economy, be sufficient for the remainder of the fiscal year. The estimates for the next year contemplate no increase in the force employed during the present. Those for the civil department are precisely the

same as were granted for the current year. For the improvement of yards and docks, I recommend only what the chief of that bureau declares to be absolutely necessary. Some of the shore stations, which had been needlessly multiplied, have been abolished; in transmitting the estimate for the remainder, I am far from expressing an opinion that no further reduction should be made. The estimate for provisions, and that for pay, rest on the basis of the present restriction by law to seven thousand five hundred men; but the estimate for pay, without proper retrenchments by Congress, may prove deficient.

As the marine corps is placed under the direction of the Navy Department, it becomes my duty to present the estimates for its support. Its services on ship-board are highly valued; its evil consists in its luxury of field officers, who have no duties to perform proportionate to their pay and emoluments. During the past year this burden has been increased. By a decision of your predecessor, an addition has been made to the pay of its gallant colonel commandant; and although the procedure on which the decision rests has never had the sanction of the House of Representatives, and apparently conflicts with law, I have not felt justified in withdrawing from the consideration and decision of Congress the estimates of that officer for his own increased pay and the pay of his aide-de-camp, an officer heretofore unknown to the corps, and of doubtful propriety. The marine corps is not a brigade; not even a regiment. It is never assembled; seldom even does a full company come together. It serves in small detachments, commanded chiefly by junior officers. Though about two thirds of the corps were in summer on ship-board, all the field officers remain on shore. Of thirteen captains, but two are at sea; of forty lieutenants, about seven of each grade are at sea. At one shore station, a major, a captain, and three lieutenants have had charge of about twenty-eight men. An increase of the officers of the corps is therefore not needed for naval purposes, even on an increase of the men.

For the increase of the navy no estimates are presented. The department awaits on that subject the instruction of Congress. Yet it is to be observed, that, in comparison with other nations, our navy is poorly supplied with sea going steamers; which cannot, indeed, in the present state of science, form the main reliance of a squadron, but as auxiliaries are of vast advantage. The Mississippi and the Princeton are our only efficient vessels of that character on the ocean. Should it be determined to increase this class of ships, it is desirable that the best experience should be consulted in their construction; and that doubtful novelties, especially such as conflict with the known laws of mechanical forces, should be disregarded.

I earnestly hope that our gallant navy during the next year, as heretofore, may perform its whole duty; displaying the flag of our republic in every ocean, protecting our commerce, extending the bounds of human knowledge, overawing semi-barbarous nations, restraining the piratical traffic in African slaves, and by its presence promoting the preservation of the peace of mankind. It contains all the elements of efficiency. It has able and skillful officers, who compete with alacrity for every post of danger or adventure; its men excel in seamanship, courage, and fidelity to their country. Unsued to purposes of maritime dominion, it inspires respect for the American flag in every part of the world. Yet a regard for its best interests, a desire to promote the welfare of its meritorious officers, and

a sense of justice to the country, induce me to add that its annual cost is disproportionate to its magnitude; and the system of its organization and preferments deprives merit of hope, by conferring the highest rank in the profession without much regard to capacity or previous activity in the public service.

Age alone now claims precedence, though that claim is unauthorized by the constitution, and unsustained by law. Seniority demands promotion as its right, and the highest rank and pay are awarded to the longest life; yet the chances are, that the oldest are not the most meritorious. Excellence seeks the opportunity of displaying itself, and is selected for the most perilous and wasting service; while mediocrity fails to be employed, and obtains length of days in safe and affluent retirement. Promotion by seniority is a premium upon inactivity.

Many of the best among the older officers received high promotion while comparatively in early life. The younger officers of to-day are equally full of talent and ambition; but the present system refuses to them the opportunity of command while life is in its vigor, and reserves it for the decline of their powers. In consequence, the average age of captains is constantly increasing, and is already nearly sixty. The average number of annual promotions is about two. The average age of commanders, from whom captains are and should be taken, is not much less than fifty. From their great numbers, the little sea service to which they are called is favorable to longevity. Continue the present usage twenty years longer, and while hope will be crushed in the young men in the service, the class of commanders will itself be composed of none but aged men, and there will not be a captain under threescore years and ten.

This custom discourages the most worthy, and leads the incapable and the indolent to cling with tenacity to their commissions.

Why should the incapable be promoted? Why should they be allowed to postpone the promotion of the capable? Why should gallantry, temperance, integrity in the payment of debts, distinction by service at sea, weigh no more than opposite considerations? Why should men deficient in capacity and inexperienced in their profession, be advanced; and, as a consequence, officers with every naval and manly virtue, and the brilliancy and vigor of matured powers, be left to wait till great age gives them the preferment, which genius, alacrity, and merit could not attain?

No naval service can maintain an efficient and elevated character under a long continuance of a system which levels merit and demerit, and tends to change the profession of the navy from a career of rewarded honor to a career for a livelihood. It is not strange, under this system, that the navy even contains a very few officers who have scarcely been at sea, and some who have not seen sea service enough to accomplish them in the proper qualifications of their profession.

Those that are capable—and our service abounds in them—those, and those only, should be promoted. The office of captain in the navy is a high executive trust. Like the judges of the Supreme Court, he considers himself as appointed for life. The oldest captain, when in service, receives a salary equal to that of a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; the pay of the youngest captain, even when doing no duty, and only waiting orders, is much above the average salaries of the district judges of the United States. He bears the flag of his country to foreign climes; he has authority over officers and men; he directs the power of armed

squadrons; he is the protector of the persons and interests of our citizens abroad. The body of captains should be a body of chosen men. There should not be among the number one of doubtful merit. The nomination and confirmation to that post should be acts of solemnity, fixing the attention of the country, enhanced in value by approving public opinion, and conceded to those only whose characters and career are guarantees of honorable conduct and professional merit all their life long.

Selection, it is objected, will degenerate into favoritism. In promotions there should certainly be no favor. The records of the department, or the concurrent opinion of officers, will disclose professional merit. If these could be disregarded, the Senate may interpose. If the Senate yields; the voice of public opinion, the press, the vigilance of party, the restorative influence of the popular will, would, in the end, make impartiality a necessity—would certainly protect merit from neglect. Indiscriminate promotion is injustice to the country, and, if persevered in, will prove fatal to the navy.

The efficiency of the service demands a reduction in the number of officers in active service, or awaiting it. Sudden, indiscriminate, and excessive promotions, compel the recommendation of such a reduction. There are so many captains and commanders, that, under existing laws, were all capable of commands, and each cruise to consist of three years, each captain would be at sea once in twelve years; each commander once in eighteen years. This evil attracted the attention of the last Congress; and the power so necessary to the service, of placing a reluctant officer on furlough, was restored to the department. I have been informed that this power was granted with a view to have a large part of the captains and commanders put on half pay. But it does not fully appear so on the record. The experience of the summer leaves me confident in the belief that a large number of captains and of commanders might, with public advantage, be placed on furlough, and smaller proportions of other grades. Should Congress direct this to be done, their will can perhaps be carried into effect with less division of opinion in the service than might at first be apprehended: especially if the furlough pay were in some cases to be one-half of the pay of officers on duty at sea. A board of officers, properly constituted, and the records of the department, with other information within reach, would readily make the necessary discriminations.

The service should be relieved from the burden of carrying along so very much greater a number of officers than can be employed. It is not just to the people of the United States to retain on pay, as waiting orders, men who, since their promotions, have not received orders, and, from the excess of officers, and for other reasons, can never receive them. None should have the pay as waiting orders, but those who are one day to receive orders, and are able and willing to obey them. Some very few have lived at ease on shore for so many inactive years, having no connexion with the navy but to take rank and pay, that a want of knowledge of their profession has become added to original inaptitude for the service.

The benefit to the country, by pursuing the course I have proposed, would be incalculable. They who know our officers will agree, that, after proper eliminations, you might in vain look through the world for a service that would do more honor to its country.

Wherever the principle of discrimination has been applied, the navy has been benefited. Some years ago, the rule was established for the corps of

surgeons; and the result has given the navy a body of well-educated and well trained surgeons, of which any nation might be proud.

The same system has been applied during the summer to the engineers, and with very beneficial results. It is the only system which will shut the door against favor, and prevent the offices in the navy from becoming branches of an unauthorized pension list.

This is seen most decidedly in the case of masters. The United States navy has the grade of master—a high station, well paid, and requiring great ability and experience at sea. Full pay is given to thirty one masters. Of this number, some are, and have ever been, incompetent to their duty; nor can I learn that more than six or five, or perhaps four or three, are able to navigate a ship. Those who are, and, by an examination, prove themselves to have ever been incompetent, should be discharged; the rest should be employed in their turn at sea, or be put on half-pay.

To the younger branch of the service, I have felt no scruple to extend somewhat further, than was heretofore usual, the principle of discrimination by authority of the department. The number of midshipmen has gradually become so reduced, that new appointments begin to be made. A medical survey, and an examination of the candidates for appointment, have been prescribed.

It would be very desirable if a system of free competition for appointments could be devised, which would preclude all possibility of favoritism. I ought also to add, that many of the best friends of the navy believe the number of midshipmen should be brought within a still narrower limit than that which is at present established by law. If Congress, also, should be of that opinion, I would recommend that, for every five vacancies which may occur, two only should be filled, until the number is still further reduced.

I regret to be obliged to ask the interposition of Congress for new legislation respecting the corps of pursers. The law of August 26, 1842, gives them "on leave, or waiting orders, the same pay as surgeons;" that is, large and increasing pay, according to the number of years they have been in the service, without reference to their sea duty or present merit. Under the operation of this law, the old purser doing nothing on shore is frequently paid more than the faithful young purser whom duty carries round the world. The consequence is, naturally, a great love of the shore. Will not Congress remedy this, and make it for the pecuniary interest of pursers to perform their duty at sea? If this can be accomplished, their number needs no increase.

In the army, disbursing officers periodically come before the Senate to be confirmed anew. Would it not be well to extend this principle to the navy, and to require that pursers should once, in every few years, be subject to re-appointment? And would it not be a good rule that no purser should be re-appointed who has not, within a reasonable period, performed a cruise?

Changes in the present law are needed to protect the treasury. Balances are sometimes retained too long, for which the best remedy is prompt settlements. Three months are now allowed to disbursing officers within the United States to render their accounts. The efficient pursers will agree unanimously, that for them forty five days are ample for the purpose. If Congress will establish that limit, I believe the Auditor will be able to settle their accounts within the next forty five days, to the immense benefit of themselves and the public service. Moneys can only come into their

hands on specific requisitions for specific purposes, and ought never be diverted by them to the payment of their own claims, real or pretended, against the United States. These claims, in some cases, extend back twenty years, and, when traced to their origin, are not unfrequently found to be based upon services which, when rendered, were recognised as a regular duty. Such unfounded demands pursers sometimes pay, by retaining public money in their hands, constituting themselves judges in their own cases, and vexatiously persist in carrying them forward in their accounts, after they have been repeatedly rejected by the legally constituted authorities. If pursers desire to hold large sums of public money for the purpose of contending in courts against the decisions of the accounting officers, sustained by the opinions of the Attorney General, they should first become private citizens; for while they are contending, the government must lose their services, or expose itself to the charge of undue advantage in sending them from home. It is, moreover, manifestly unsafe to trust them, under such circumstances, with further amounts of the public money. This subject calls for the action of Congress.

The law of January 31, 1823, requires that disbursing officers who fail to render their accounts for settlement in due time, shall be promptly reported to the President of the United States, and dismissed from the public service. Might not this law be extended, with great propriety and advantage, to those who, upon a settlement of their accounts, are reported as holding balances, and who, on requisition by the proper authority, refuse or neglect to pay into the treasury the public money remaining in their hands?

Although the aggregate number of disbursing officers in the service need not be increased, an improvement might be made by establishing, within the present limit, the grade of assistant pursers. The services of this grade would be chiefly called for in the smaller vessels; and their pay, being regulated by the amount of their responsibility, might properly be less than that of the pursers. As vacancies occur among the pursers, these assistants, if on examination they prove themselves to be fitly trained for the higher duties of their profession, might well be promoted; a system would thus be formed, which would prevent the appointment of the inexperienced and incompetent.

The excess of officers exists almost exclusively in the higher grades of the navy. Of the forward officers, the interests of the service demand that the number, especially of boatswains and gunners, should be a little increased. If permission were granted to appoint six acting boatswains, and as many acting gunners, it would be but a reasonable alleviation to a class of men, who now, from their limited number, are almost always at sea.

It has been my strenuous endeavor to make the condition of the seamen in the public employ such as Congress designed. The apprentice system, as heretofore regulated, though it has produced some excellent seamen, has not been wholly successful; but, it is believed that the failure has arisen from defects of arrangement, and not from the system itself. An attempt will be made to revive it in a simple, unpretending form, and with the hope of beneficial results in the increase of accomplished American seamen. Meantime, our mercantile marine of nearly one hundred thousand men, readily yields patriotic and skillful crews to our ships of war. The limitation of these to seven thousand five hundred men has never, in the past

summer, been exceeded, and has had a wholesome effect in compelling reductions at the naval stations at home.

It is the glory of our navy, that our sailors are held by affection and choice. They enlist voluntarily; they are freely discharged on their return from a cruise; and, with few exceptions, they readily enlist again. They love the service; and, on whatever sea they are found, they are Americans at heart.

Efforts have been made to break up a violation of law, which has too long existed on ship-board. The mercy of the statute intrusts the power of the lash exclusively to the commanding officer. No officer, worthy of a command, will inflict punishment, except after due examination into the offences charged. The former custom of delegating this power to subordinate officers is a flagrant violation of the will of Congress and the people. The men have rights, and must be protected in them. Experience shows that discipline is never so good, as when the commanding officer sets the example of subordination by obedience to the laws of his country.

Freedom to enter the service; protection in their rights during their service; freedom to leave it after a cruise; skillful medical attention, with comfortable quarters at naval hospitals in case of sickness; a pension in case of disability; a home at the naval asylum in old age;—these provisions show that the sailor has not been neglected by his countrymen.

I cannot close this communication without repeating that the evils in our navy, to which I have called attention, spring from the defects in the system that has been followed, rather than from the want of proper personal qualities in the officers. A period of peace, which it is to be hoped may continue, left employment at sea without the strong attraction that comes from the imminence of danger and the prospect of winning renown; and the department, while it possesses authority to summon into activity the services of all, without exception, has yet had no opportunities of rewarding those who distinguish themselves by alacrity and capacity. An exploring expedition was, indeed, sent forth and kept at sea for a long series of years; and many cases of ordinary employment have imposed great hardships and privations; but not a lieutenant or a midshipman has, in any one instance, received so much as the slightest advancement beyond those who remained, during the same period, on shore or at easier stations. Ours is the only service where activity and inactivity have fared alike; and it is the highest evidence of the capacity and integrity of our officers, and the vast amount of talent which a proper system would call forth, that, in spite of this usage of indifference, which prevails in no other country, and ought no longer to prevail in our own, the sentiments of honor and the pride of professional duty have still educated gallant officers enough to secure to our navy the confidence of the country and the respect of the world.

GEORGE BANCROFT,

To the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.