The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor

VOLUME III
APPENDIX

APPENDIX III

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS

(August 5, 1941–October 17, 1941)

No. 1

FROM: Tokyo August 5, 1941
TO: Washington # 447.

(In 2 parts—complete).

1. The Imperial Government is trying to give its attention to the all important matter of Japanese-United States relations. This is not an easy task, for there are numerous obstacles involving domestic politics.

According to the various reports you have submitted on the subject, the President and the Secretary of State are displaying considerable understanding in their attitudes toward Japan. You imply that they view the situation cool headedly, regardless of the trend of general public opinion.

On our side, however, there are quite a few persons who vigorously insist that the United States economic pressure on Japan is being daily increased in intensity. For example, the newspaper Yomiuri carried a dispatch from ----- on the 2nd, in which it was reported that the President of the United States had either ordered the complete suspension of, or curtail to the extreme, all exports of petroleum products. As a result of this order, the dispatch continued, even those exports for which permits had already been issued, had to be cancelled.

Regardless of whether there was any truth in the report or not and regardless of the extent of the alleged curtailment, such reports give the antagonists a strong talking point. This is a situation which causes us no end of anxiety.

2. If it is believed by any that our people and country can be threatened into submission by the so-called strengthened encirclement policy or by the application of economic pressure, it is a mistaken notion. As a matter of fact, it is erroneous to the extreme as should be obvious to any who understands our national characteristics.

If such a policy as the above is adopted, we cannot guarantee that the trend will not be in directly the opposite direction from our goal of an improved United States-Japanese relationship. One should be able to see this clearly from the example set forth above.

3. We are convinced that we have reached the most important, and at the same time the most critical, moment of Japanese-United States relations. It was at a time like this that the Imperial Government voluntarily agreed to temporarily cease the bombing of Chungking and its suburban area. This should clearly indicate Japan's sincerity, considerateness, and restraint toward the United States.

If an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan, as two equal powers on the Pacific, is sincerely desired, the points which will most effectively bring about such improvements must be given unbiased and cool consideration.

For the purpose of preventing the possibility of letting anyone, either within or out of the country, be under the impression that the negotiations were conducted under the threat of economic pressure all measures which may be construed as being economic pressure should be abandoned at once. That we shall reciprocate in kind was made clear in the recent statement issued by the Minister of Finance.

4. Based on the general plan outlined by the last Cabinet, the Imperial Government proposes a plan, set forth in my separate message #448[a], to improve Japanese-United States relations. This last plan was drawn up as a reply to the plan suggested by the President on the 24th, and is being submitted only after the respective positions of the United States and Japan as they affect the other, were given thorough consideration.

Will Your Excellency make an effort to clearly impress this point on the President and the Secretary of State and at the same time draw their attention to the graveness of this matter.

5. In form, the proposal which is being forwarded herewith, is a reply to the President's plan of the 24th. Our real motive, however, is to incorporate its provisions into the final agreement. With this instrument, we hope to resume the Japanese-United States negotiations which were suspended because of the delay in the delivery of our revised proposals of July 14 and because of our occupation of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime. Since that is our intention, please relay the matter contained in my separate message #448[a] without delay.

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[a]See III, 2.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 2

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

August 5, 1941
#448.

1. Explanation. (Make this verbally, do not resort to writing.)

The motive and character of the French Indo-China joint defense measure were carefully and fully explained by this Minister and by the Japanese Ambassador in the United States. In brief, the step was taken peacefully, for the purpose of self-defense and in such a manner as to make intervention by a third country unnecessary.

Japanese public opinion had become exceedingly incensed over the trend of the attitude during recent months, of the British, the United States, the Netherlands East Indies, and others.

The French Indo-China measure had to be taken to restrain those who were clamoring for vigorous overseas action and to avert a storm on the peaceful waters of the Pacific.

It is admitted here that the above explanation may not completely wipe away the sense of uneasiness felt by the government of the United States. However, we believe that it will be able to accept it conditionally. On this assumption we make the proposals set forth below.

In view of the times and circumstances, we desire that discussions on the proposals set forth here be conducted in secrecy and entirely off-the-record. Should these discussions culminate in a successful agreement, we desire that the points agreed upon be appropriately incorporated in the plan to promote relations between the United States and Japan which has been under consideration for the past several months.

We are convinced that the government of the United States is as anxious as is the government of Japan to view their respective positions clearly, coolly, and with understanding, in order to determine the fundamental causes which have led to the present critical situation between the two countries. We also firmly believe that the United States is as desirous as we are to remove at the source, or otherwise relieve, any and all military, economic, and political uneasiness which exists between the two nations.

On these assumptions, we propose the following:

2. Proposal.

(1) The government of Japan definitely promises the following:

(a) So as to remove all military threats to the territories held by the United States, Japan will not occupy any territory in the Southwestern Pacific area, other than French Indo-China. Moreover, the Japanese military forces in French Indo-China will be removed immediately upon the conclusion of the China Incident.

(b) For the purpose of removing all military and political threats to the Philippine Islands, we shall, at an opportune moment, guarantee the neutrality of those Islands. In return we ask that the Imperial Government and its people be treated in the same manner as those of all other countries, including the United States.

(c) In order to remove the cause of the unsettled economic condition between the two countries in East Asia, we will cooperate in the production of and access to the natural resources of this area which are essential to the United States.

(2) The United States definitely promises the following:

(a) For the purpose of removing military threats to the Japanese Empire and to the importing and exporting of goods to and from Japan, the United States will cease military operations in the Southwestern Pacific area. Moreover, upon the effectuating of this agreement, the United States will use its good offices to have the governments of Britain and the Netherlands East Indies to take similar steps.

(b) For the purpose of removing the causes of military, political and economic conflict between the two countries in -----, the United States will cooperate with Japan in the production of and access to natural resources of the southwest Pacific area particularly of the Netherlands East Indies, which are essential to Japan. Moreover, the United States will cooperate with Japan in trying to have all the latter's differences with the Netherlands East Indies settled.

(c) In connection with the above, suitable measures shall be adopted immediately by the two nations to bring about the resumption of the profitable trade relations which used to exist between Japan and the United States.

(d) In view of the promise made by the Government of Japan under (1), (a), of the above, and with a view towards bringing about a settlement of the China Affair, the Government of the United States shall use its good offices to bring about a peace conference between Japan and the Chiang regime. Also, even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from French Indo-China, Japan's special position there will be given recognition. (Last sentence garbled, gist guessed at.)

3. Public Announcement. (----- will be stressed, verbally.) As was stated above, negotiations of this proposal shall be made in secrecy. Should, however, it become evident that it would be to the interest of both nations if part of all of the points contained were made public, it shall be done at the time and in the manner agreed upon by the two participants.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 3

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 660.

(To be handled in Government Code.)

Secret outside the department. Separate Wire.

1. The Japanese Government undertakes:

(a) That, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a menace of a military character to the United States, it will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas except French Indo-China and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indo-China will be withdrawn forthwith on the settlement of the China Incident, and

(b) That, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a menace of political and military character to the Philippine Islands, the Japanese Government will guarantee the neutrality of the islands at an opportune time on the condition that Japan and the Japanese subjects will not be placed in any discriminatory position as compared with other countries and their nationals including the United States and its nationals, and,

(c) That, in order to remove such causes as might be responsible for the instability of the economic relations between Japan and the United States (in East Asia), the Japanese Government will cooperate with the Government of the United States in the production and procurement of such natural resources as are required by the United States.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 4

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 660.

(Part 2 of 3.)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

Secret outside the department. Separate Wire.

2. The Government of the United States undertakes:

(a) That, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a direct menace of military character to Japan or to her international communications, the Government of the United States will suspend its military measures in the Southwestern Pacific areas, and also that, upon a successful conclusion of the present conversations, it will advise the Governments of Great Britain and of the Netherlands to take similar steps, and

(b) That, in order to remove such causes as might be responsible for military, political and economic friction between Japan and the United States, the Government of the United States will cooperate with the Japanese Government in the production and procurement of natural resources as are required by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific areas, especially in the Netherlands East Indies, and

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 5

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #660.

(Part 3 of 3.)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

(c) That, in conjunction with the measures as set forth in the above, the Government of the United States will take steps necessary for restoring the normal relations of trade and commerce which have hitherto existed between Japan and the United States, and

(d) That, in view of the undertaking by the Japanese Government as set forth in 1(a) above, the Government of the United States will use its good-offices for the initiation of direct negotiations between the Japanese Government and the CHIANG KAI SHEK Regime for the purpose of a speedy settlement of the China Incident, and that the Government of the United States will recognize a special status of Japan in French Indo-China even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from that area.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 6

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #659.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re your #447[a].

On the evening of the 6th, I called on Secretary of State HULL. Bearing in mind the purport of your caption telegram as well as that of your past telegrams, I gave him a detailed explanation of Part 1 of your #448[b]. (I handed this to him in writing. Please (refer ?) to (separate ?) telegram #660[c].) HULL said, "After carefully studying your proposal, I shall reply one way or another," and he did not seem to take much interest in it. Stating that he was telling me what he personally thought, he began to express his opinions on the present Japanese-American relations, mentioning not a word about our proposal, but going into great details. What he said was, in short, this:

Setting aside the relations between him and me, he said he was greatly disappointed in the actions Japan has been taking one after another, and that so long as Japan does not give up the policy of force, there was no use talking.

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[a] See III, 1—which discusses the criticalness of Japanese-American relations.
[b] See III, 2—which contains explanation and text of the Japanese proposal.
[c] See III, 3-5.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 7

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #659.

(Part 2 of 2)

So long as the Japanese Government authorities say that what the United States is doing is encirclement of Japan, he could not expect anything of Japan ("I can expect nothing from you"). When we wish to live in peace and security, HITLER, saying that he was acting in self-defense, mows down everybody that stands in his way.

He spoke as if Japan was doing likewise. Judging from the impression he gave me, no matter what explanation might be offered, it seems to be impossible to convey Japan's intention to the present leaders in the United States. I felt that the United States Government is determined to deal with any situation.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 8

FROM: Tokyo August 6, 1941
TO: Washington #450.

(Foreign Office Secret)

1. Concerning the action you were requested to take in paragraph 3 of my #397[a], we have never received any report. In the case of instructions of this nature, you must wire us the results.

2. You have instructions to carry out the procedure recommended in my #447[b] without any delay. This time please be sure to wire the results as soon as possible.

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[a] See III, 9—in which Tokyo says they have not determined upon a definite policy and that the occupation of French Indo-China was unavoidable.

[b] See III, 1.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 9

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

23 July 1941
397.

Regarding your message # 545[a].

1. You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined upon a definite policy because of the fact that I have not been in office very long.

As was pointed out in my message # 368[b], our occupation of French Indo-China was unavoidable. This step had been decided upon by the Cabinet even before I assumed office. It is to be carried out peacefully for the purpose of jointly defending French Indo-China. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-United States.

Should the United States, however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as closing of ----- for all practical purposes and the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the United States of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.

2. Please carefully reread messages Nos. 368[c] and 396[c], and make an effort to improve the situation.

3. With regard to your message # 536 ----- (last 13 groups garbled).

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[a] Wakasugi reports conversation with Undersecretary Welles.

[b] Tokyo informs Washington of the contemplated negotiations with France for establishment of Jap naval and air bases in French Indo-China.

[c] See II, 160. Tokyo informs Washington of completed negotiations with French government.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 10

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

August 6, 1941
662.

Re part 1 of your # 450[a].

As a result of the occupation of French Indo-China, and accompanying this change in the situation, the attitude of the American authorities with regard to these negotiations is as I told you in my successive wires relative to the conversations[b] conducted on July ----- by WAKASUGI with WELLES and HAMILTON to the effect that they saw no course but to end all talks.

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[a] See III, 8, in which Tokyo asks for an immediate report.

[b] Wakasugi reports conversation with Undersecretary Welles.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 11

FROM: Washington — August 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #655.

A friend called and expressed himself in regard to American policies, much along the same line as the Wakasugi-Welles conversation, to the effect that these policies have the support of the people, and will not be changed, and while in the Middle West there are many isolationists who are opposed to participation in the war, these and even Wheeler support the administration's policies in regard to Japan. He also said that he is deeply concerned over Japanese-American relations, that ----- ----- who are friendly toward Japan, that he wished articles could be read in Japan too, and that Japan's position is becoming more and more difficult.

Furthermore, he alleged that no one in the world knew that the Soviet had been making so much preparation for war. That Russia is gradually succeeding in her efforts to launch an aggressive pincers operation. The German operations are behind schedule, and the reports from German general headquarters of late are not as reliable as they were formerly, which is ----- that the war against the Soviet is, in the final analysis ----- (remainder missed).

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 12

FROM: Tokyo — August 7, 1941
TO: Washington — #542.

Through my previous messages on the subject, you are perfectly well aware of the fact that the Konoye Cabinets have been sincerely interested in the betterment of Japanese-United States relations. Through misunderstandings and manipulations by third countries, and in spite of our above described desires, Japanese-United States relations are, today, critically tense. We feel that a policy of laissez faire should no longer be pursued.

We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall lay their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to determine a way out of the present situation.

2. In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to this plan, Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt.

Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific. Please sound out their attitude on this proposal.

3. If, however, they show any signs of hesitation (from the contents of your message #649[a] this possibility cannot be discounted entirely) on the grounds of our occupation of French Indo-China and the reports that we have increased our military strength in the north, put up the following arguments:

(a) That we recognize the exceeding criticalness of the situation and for that reason, the Prime Minister made up his mind to break all precedent to represent his country himself.

(b) That unless every possible effort is made to maintain peace on the Pacific, we would be failing to fulfill our duties to our people.

4. If they are agreeable to holding such a conference, make inquiries as to the time which would best meet the President's convenience. In view of the times and conditions, we are of the opinion that the sooner that such a meeting took place, the better.

The subjects which will be discussed, undoubtedly will depend greatly on the time it is held. In general, however, the discussion will be conducted along the lines of the negotiations which were being conducted in an attempt to bring about better relations between Japan and the United States. In view of the fact that both the Prime Minister and the President have many uses for their time, arrangements should be made so that the discussions between them will last no longer than a few days. With a view to practicalness it is our hope that the delegations representing Japan and the United States will consist of the minimum number of persons.

5. In view of the extremely important nature of this subject, it is essential that strict secrecy be observed until the holding of the discussions is definitely agreed upon. Therefore, Your Excellency will convey this proposal in person to the President or to the Secretary of State. As soon as you come to an agreement and if the President has no objections, it shall be publicly announced. Therefore, will you confer as to the opportune time, etc. and come to an agreement on those points as well.

For the purpose of security, we are not advising the United States Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this subject for the time being. This is for your information.

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[a] Amb. Nomura discusses various angles of Japanese-United States relations with a United States cabinet member; suggests conclusion of an agreement upholding the integrity of territories adjacent to French Indo-China to facilitate supplies of materials.

Trans. 8–8–41

No. 13

FROM: Tokyo — August 7, 1941
TO: Washington — # 456.

Re my # 452[a].

Rumors of Hull's resignation and of the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan are being circulated in Japan. If there is any truth to these rumores, it would hardly be worth our while to take those measures described in the message referred to above.

Will you please, therefore, make investigations and advise us of your findings. We shall issue further instructions upon receipt of your advice.

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[a] See III, 12.

Trans. 8–8–41

No. 14

FROM: Washington August 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 663.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

United States-Japanese relations have now reached an extremely critical stage. However, this does not come unexpectedly; undoubtedly it was unavoidable and is the by-product of our government's pursuing other essential policies.

I now wish to describe the recent outlook in the United States. I realize, of course, that I may be too presumptuous, but I do so only because I believe it might be of some interest to one whose time in Office has been as short as yours.

1. Fundamentally speaking, the United States is under the impression that the ties between the Axis partners are closer than appear on paper. It is convinced that the East is working in close cooperation with the West, and vice versa. It assumes that the aims of Germany and Italy in the West and Japan in the East are to conquer the world. Talking with ones who harbor such policies, the United States says, is out of the question.

We, therefore, carefully explained that Japan is guided solely by the principles of HAKKO ITIU (brotherhood of mankind) and that the Axis Pact, like the earlier Anglo-Japanese Pact, is merely an agreement within limitations. This explanation lead eventually to beginning the unofficial discussions.

Then, while the Secretary of State was on leave due to illness, the occupation of French Indo-China took place. The United States, refusing to accept our explanation that that was a peaceful occupation, discontinued the unofficial discussions then and there. Moreover, the United States returned to its original opinion with regard to Japan. Acting Secretary of State Welles made this clear in his statement and it was later confirmed by Secretary Hull himself. Last night, the Secretary expressed his deep disappointment to me. According to the Postmaster General, this disappointment on the part of the Secretary was all the deeper because he had been so very interested in bettering the relations between Japan and the United States. I have already reported that Secretary Hull and his very good friend Walker were put in an exceedingly embarrassing spot in their relations with their Cabinet colleagues.

2. The United States policy toward Japan cannot be termed as one of definite unfriendliness to Japan herself, they explain. The United States has to take some measures, they say, to counteract certain steps taken by Japan. The United States is only taking measures which will counter Japanese southward or northward expansion attempts.

When Japan occupied French Indo-China, the United States retaliated with the "freezing" order and the export embargo; a joint warning by Hull and Eden was issued with regard to any ambitions in the direction of Thailand. There is no doubt whatsoever that the United States is prepared to take drastic action depending on the way Japan moves, and thus closing the door on any possibility of settling the situation.

With regard to a northward move by us, it must be remembered that the United States has suddenly established very close relations with the Soviet Union. In view of this fact, it is highly doubtful that the United States would merely watch from the sidelines if we should make any moves to the north.

It is reported that the President accompanied by high army and navy officials is meeting with Churchill. This indicates that careful preparations are being made to counter our every move without falling back a single time.

3. It must be noted that the government of Germany is exercising the utmost precaution and perseverance in dealing with the United States. It has even gone so far as to issue peace

terms in an attempt to ease United States public opinion. Therefore, the Pacific, of late, has become the center of public attention and there is a good possibility that, depending on developments in Europe, this trend will be considerably invigorated in the near future.

I have submitted my humble opinions before and they are unchanged today. Our country is at present standing at a most critical crossroads. My only desire is that we choose the right road, for the sake of the future of our country.

Trans. 8–15–41

No. 15

FROM: London — August 8, 1941
TO: Washington — #73.

(Message to Tokyo #552)

Re my #546[a].

Further investigation revealed that CHURCHILL was accompanied by British war experts and by HARRY HOPKINS who had come to England for the second time after he had come to discuss the lend-lease question and subsequently had gone to Moscow. From the American side, General MARSHALL and Admirals KING and STARK joined in the conference, although the question of Soviet aid and the Far Eastern question were the chief topics, the fact that the leaders of American war operations had participated as well deserves our attention.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8–18–41

No. 16

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #672.

(Completed translation.)

To be handled in Government code.

Special telegram.

(Part 1 of 3)

Strictly confidential.

The President's proposal was that, if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indo-China or establishing bases there with its military and naval forces, or, in case such steps had already actually been begun, would withdraw such forces, the President would do everything in his power to obtain from the Chinese Government, the British Government and the Netherlands Government, and the Government of the United States would of course give, binding and solemn declaration, provided the Japanese Government would make the same commitment, to regard French Indo-China as a "neutralized" country in the same way in which Switzerland had up to now been regarded by the powers as a neutralized country.

Trans. 8–11–41

No. 17

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #672.

(To be handled in Government Code)

(Separate Wire)

(Part 2 of 3)

That such a binding and solemn declaration on the part of each of the governments mentioned would imply that none of these governments would undertake any military act of aggression against French Indo-China and that each of those governments would refrain from the exercise of any military control within or over French Indo-China. The President's proposal contemplated further that the government of the United States would endeavor to obtain from Great Britain and the other interested powers a guarantee that, so long as the present emergency continues, the local French authorities in Indo-China would remain undisturbed in control of the territory of French Indo-China. Subsequently, the President's proposal with regard to French Indo-China was extended to include Thailand as well, and the Japanese Government was informed that, should the Japanese Government accept the proposal of the President and abandon its present course with regard to French Indo-China, the President would request of the other governments which he had mentioned in connection with his proposal concerning French Indo-China the same declaration and guarantee with regard to Thailand.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 18

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #672.

To be handled in government code.

Part 3 of 3.

The Government of the United States feels that its view in regard to a broad understanding which would be calculated to establish and maintain peace in the Pacific area to the benefit of each and every country concerned in that area have been made abundantly clear in various official utterances and acts and in the course of the long series of conversations which the Secretary of State has had during recent months with the Japanese Ambassador. It feels that the Japanese Government is well aware of this attitude, of what it is able and willing to do, and of what it cannot do. It, therefore, feels that the proposals advanced in the document handed to the Secretary by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6 are lacking in responsiveness to the suggestion made by the President, the specifications of which have been for convenience of reference reiterated above.

Trans. 8-9-41

No. 19

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #671.

(Part 1 of 2)

Re my #659.

On the afternoon of the 8th, I received from the Secretary of State #672[b] which is the reply to our proposal submitted on the 6th. This shows that they have not compromised in the least beyond what the President said. I further communicated to them the purport of your instructions with reference to #452[c] and #456[d] and proposed that the leaders of the two countries meet for a conference in Hawaii. To this the Secretary replied by saying that since, while they were considering transferring the negotiations to Hawaii, they had received a notice to the effect that the Japanese Government was in favor of participating in them, they have ever since been making preparations for that purpose. Then he added that so long as his conversation with me showed that we were in conflict and so long as Japan's policy is not altered, there is no point to ----- the conversation. I then sought the opinion of BALLANTINE who was also present at the time, but he gave me a similar reply and said that the use of force cannot go hand in hand with the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.

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[a] See III, 6.

[b] See III, 16–18 which give the text of the reply of the United States Government.

[c] See III, 12 in which TOYODA proposes a conference between President ROOSEVELT and KONOYE in an attempt to better United States-Japanese relations.

[d] See III, 13. In which Tokyo asks Washington to investigate rumors of HULL's resignation and of the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan. Instructions will be issued upon receipt of this advice.

Trans. 8–12–41

No. 20

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #671.

(Part 2 of 2)

The Secretary twice repeated the statement that Japan prates about an encirclement policy which is only nonsense, and WELLES muttered some words to the effect that this was Germany's way of talking. Hearing this, I said, "Well, in spite of the fact that the United States is absolutely safe from the point of view of defense, she, too, goes on prating about this danger and that danger, offering the necessity of expanding the national defense as an excuse for prolonging the term of service of the selectees. In the same manner in the face of present dangers, Japan, too, has to prepare the minds of her people".

In sum, they mean to say that they will talk with us if we stop our military operations. They will not yield an inch on that point, so as long as there is no change in the policy of our Government, there is not the slightest chance of parleying with them, so any time you see fit, I would suggest that you might consider having GREW stop.

Trans. 8–9–41

No. 21

FROM: Tokyo August 9, 1941
TO: Washington #464.

Re your #671[a].

It is essential that the contents of my message #452[b] reach Roosevelt's ears. Your message referred to above does not make this point clear, so please make all necessary arrangements with no loss of time.

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[a] See III, 20, (Part 2 of 2). Reports conversation with Hull and Welles.

[b] See III, 12—Ambassador Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of U.S. officials on arranging a meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye for a friendly discussion of steps that may be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 22

FROM: Tokyo August 9, 1941
TO: Washington #465.

Re my #464[a].

Immediately upon President Roosevelt's return to Washington, call on him. Explain to him the importance of the discussions referred to and of the advantages that will be derived therefrom. Do everything in your power to bring about a materialization of these conversations.

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[a] See III, 21.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 23

FROM: Washington August 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #674.

(In 2 parts—complete)

Re your #465[a].

Upon the President's return to Washington (when this will be is unknown) I shall make arrangements to call on him and explain to him the subject contained in your message referred to above. I shall do everything in my power to make a favorable impression on the President on that occasion.

As I have pointed out in my various reports on this subject, I am convinced that as long as we proceed along the lines of our present policy, the United States, too, will undoubtedly undeviatingly follow the course whose trend has already been established. The United States assumes that our occupation of South French Indo-China indicates that Japan has definitely set her course. On this point the President and the Secretary of State are in complete agreement and it would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes. I was made acutely aware of the firm attitude of the United States during my conversations of the 6th and the 8th.

In view of this situation I greatly fear that even the offer of the Prime Minister to personally come here, would not move the United States to any perceptible degree. For this reason, I regret to have to say that I do not expect too much from the interview I plan to have with the President.

Unless we can draw up some plan by which we can persuade the United States to change its policy toward Japan, I can only feel pessimism for any attempts to break up the present critical situation.

Though I regret that I can report only dark clouds over the world from my distant vantage point, I submit these humble opinions to you for whatever value they may be.

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[a]See III, 22—Immediately upon Roosevelt's return to Washington call upon him and do your utmost to bring about a materialization of these conversations (re Jap-American understanding).

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 24

FROM: Washington — August 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — Unnumbered.

Re your message. Am repeating that part of my message #675[a] which was in parenthesis in the first paragraph as follows: (We do not know as to what day that will be).

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[a]This message is in reality #674. See III, 23—Ambassador Nomura expresses the belief that the proposed meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye will have little success in swerving the firm attitude of the U.S. in its Far Eastern policy.

Trans.

No. 25

FROM: Tokyo — August 12, 1941
TO: Washington — #470.

Re my #452[a].

Though it would seem that the Americans considered our proposals in reply to the President's suggestions to be our final answer, this is not necessarily the implication we would like to leave. The Prime Minister did not consider our proposals in that light. In order that the United States not labor under this misunderstanding and in order that the stalemate might be broken, he would be willing to have a heart-to-heart talk with the President of the United States along general lines with the view of maintaining world peace.

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[a]See III, 12 in which Ambassador Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of the United States officials on arranging a meeting between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye for a friendly discussion of steps that may be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 26

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo Unnumbered.

Colonel Iwakuro[a] accompanied by Ikawa sailed for Japan aboard the Tatsuta Maru. Colonel Iwakuro is clear headed and active and continually renders wholehearted assistance. I have requested him to convey my profound gratitude to the Minister of War and to the Chief of the General Staff. Ikawa has the title of non-official employee of the Foreign Office. He has co-operated with Iwakuro and has the confidence of influential people here. He is very useful and has been a great help to me. Since his departure I am greatly inconvenienced, hence I make this special report.

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[a] Colonel Hideo Iwakuro, Assistant Military Attaché.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 27

FROM: Washington August 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #678.

To (*Secretary* ?) Tasiro from Iguti[a].

As has been reported in dispatches concerning the attitude of the United States toward Japan, the United States will not turn away from resorting to force of arms should she deem that Japanese actions demand it. I realize, of course, that our government is fully cognizant of the above fact as well as the fact that U.S. preparations for such an eventuality is proceeding uninterruptedly. I also assume that being aware of the above, the Government is setting up all necessary counter measures and precautionary steps.

The reports being carried by Japanese newspapers and magazines, however, indicate that the general public in Japan is still unaware of the recent determined attitude of the United States described above. (Apparently, not even the very clearly and strongly worded statement issued by Welles recently, regarding the attitude of the United States toward Japan, was carried in full in our dailies.) There were indications that our people are viewing the United States attitude with unwarranted lightness and with considerable wishful thinking.

Let us suppose that the day will come when we shall have to face the worst. Under the present circumstances, I fear that we would be unable to guarantee that it wouldn't come as a complete surprise, water being poured into a sleeping man's ears, to our populace in general.

I strongly recommend, though you may have many doubts as to its wisdom, that the Intelligence Section of the Cabinet or some other body, start a campaign to give the general public a clearer picture of the situation, to further enlighten it as to the real attitude of the United States toward Japan at present. I pray that by such means our people will be perfectly prepared if worse comes to worst. They should be given guidance, so that in that unfortunate eventuality, they will be able to knit themselves into a solid unit in the minimum of time.

I realize, of course, my great audacity in suggesting such a thing to you, particularly in view of the fact that you have undoubtedly thought of this very thing on many occasions already.

We appreciate the fact that the Intelligence Section of our main office is issuing a summary of European and American intelligence for distribution to our various offices. We would appreciate it even more if these reports were issued oftener and if they were to contain more concrete information.

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[a] Counselor of Embassy.

Trans. 8–14–41

No. 28

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 12, 1941
TO: Los Angeles #79.

Secret outside the section.

To be handled in Government Code.

To Minister WAKASUGI.

1. It is hard for you to imagine the critical nature of the current Japan-American question and its effect upon the internal situation here in Japan. The interview which you gave over international telephone, being released for internal consumption, has made the position of this Government extremely difficult. Therefore, I would like to have you make absolutely no comments on your opinions with regard to the Japan-American question to any newspapermen until you have made your statement to me upon your arrival here in Japan.

Furthermore, it is absolutely necessary that your returning home does not give the impression that you are bearing any important proposals from the United States Government.

Trans. 9–18–41

No. 29

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #450.

Secret outside the section.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re your #79[a].

From Minister WAKASUGI:

I have read Your Excellency's wire. I am amazed at your statement that the interview I gave by phone to Japan has made difficult the position of the Government. Furthermore, I am well aware of the delicacy of Japan-American relations. I would have you believe that I was prompted by no other motives than a desire to make a frank statement which I felt to be most fitting.

In addition, I had no intention of implying such a thing as the lessening of America's responsibility. The statement which I made does not go beyond the suppositions which I explained to American newspapermen prior to my leaving Washington.

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[a] See III, 28.

Trans. 9–18–41

No. 30

FROM: Washington — August 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #684.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

On this the 13th, I had a talk with one of the Cabinet members. During this conversation he said that he was convinced that the occupation of French Indo-China was accomplished with the cooperation of Germany. He said that he would see the application of pressure on the French Government by Hitler who controls it, anyhow.

He went on to say that he was in full accord with the President and Secretary Hull with regard to the desirability of maintaining peace on the Pacific.

I replied that I didn't believe that Japan could now remove her troops from French Indo-China. However, I am sure, I said, that the government of Japan states, when the opportune moment arrives, it shall be done.

Taking this opportunity, I brought up the subject of the meeting of the leading men of the two countries. I pointed out that though a solution which was thoroughly satisfactory to both countries may not be made, some means of surmounting the crisis may be discovered by them.

The Cabinet official did not show much enthusiasm over this proposal but he said that he would take the matter up with Hull.

I then said, in effect: "The press is reporting that the United States Navy, having been assigned all responsibility on the Pacific, will concentrate all of its forces in thos waters; and that Britain and the United States will pool their navies and place necessary power in the Pacific".

"Recently", I continued, "The press is drawing more attention to Japan than it is to Germany. There are more than a mere two or three writers who comment that it is easier to get Congress to agree to be against Japan than it is to have them agree to be against Germany".

The Cabinet official said that he would not deny those statements. "Japan has an excellent navy", he said, "and if she throws in her lot with Germany and works jointly, she will become exceedingly troublesome".

He went on to say that it was not that the United States likes the U.S.S.R. Moreover the United States can foresee some trouble with it in the future. However, joint action with it at the present time is unavoidable from the viewpoint of destroying Hitler.

I said that the application of pressure on Japan was exceedingly harmful. Instead, I said, the matter should be tackled from an entirely different angle. After giving it a thorough consideration from a purely political angle, the United States should take steps which would bring about a reaction in Japan. I said that if the right policy were pursued, the people of Japan would use their common sense and gradually adjust themselves.

I am to see Hull at his request at four o'clock this afternoon.

Trans. 8–18–41

No. 31

FROM: Washington August 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 690.

(English text)

(In 5 parts—complete)

Recent cases of interference with American rights and interests in Japan and in Japanese occupied areas of China.

Information received by the Department of State from American diplomatic and consular offices in Japan and in Japanese-occupied areas of China indicate that the Japanese authorities and Japanese-sponsored authorities have recently undertaken widespread and expanding activities of arbitrary nature against American official establishments.

American officials, and American rights and interests.

In North China the travel of Americans, including American consular officers, is being stopped, severely restricted, or delayed by a system of travel permits set up by the Japanese military authorities and by refusal of permits or delay in their issuance. At Chingwangtao, Americans embarking for Shanghai are required not only to have a permit for rail travel to Chinwangtao but also a landing permit from the Japanese naval authorities which requires at least one week to obtain. (It is assumed that similar requirements are in force at Tientsin and Tsingtao.)

At Peitaiho, where a large number of Americans and other foreigners pass the summer, transportation of baggage of Americans to the railway station is forbidden and the railway refused to receive baggage for checking. Travel of American citizens in Japan has been restricted so that Americans desiring to proceed to Shanghai to obtain available accommodations for travel to the United States have been unable to proceed.

At Tsingtao the mail of American citizens, including the official mail of the American Consulate, is apparently being held up and censored, American firms are being prohibited from moving their stocks and carrying on business and are not permitted to draw funds from Japanese banks to pay their staff salaries. The premises of the Standard-Vacuum and Texas Oil Companies and of the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company have been occupied by Japanese gendarmes. Protests against the smoking of cigarettes by Japanese sentires in the oil installations of American companies have been without avail. Garages have been forbidden to furnish taxicabs to American citizens, including the American Consul, or to do automotive repair work for American citizens. It is reported on good authority that the restrictions imposed by the Japanese authorities on Americans there include, in addition to some of those listed above, a prohibition of coal deliveries to American citizens and the withholding of American Red Cross famine relief wheat from distribution to refugees by the International Relief Association. Chinese have been intimidated and instructed not to sell food products to or engage in other transactions with Americans if the products exceed in value, or the transactions involve more than, twenty local dollars, and orders have been issued for the cancellation of American insurance policies. At Chefoo mail addressed to Americans is being held up and registered mail received by the American Consulate has shown evidence of having been opened by censors. The stocks of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and the Texas Company have been placed under the control of the Japanese special military mission; sales may only be made by permit and the proceeds must be handed over to the Japanese; and American firms cannot withdraw funds from the Yokohama Specie Bank to meet their pay rolls.

At Hwanghsien, Shantung, the Baptist Mission is being picketed, no American is allowed to move his personal effects, the American members of the mission are restricted to the immediate vicinity of the compound and are prohibited from using their automobiles, as well as being prevented from traveling to Chefoo.

At Tientsin, American firms are unable to make rail shipments and the post office in one instance refused to accept a registered letter addressed by an American firm to the United States.

At Foochow, two policemen visited the Consulate stating that they had been instructed by the Japanese authorities to see that "nothing passed in or out" and asking to be given quarters in the Consulate. (The policemen departed upon being asked to do so by the Consul.) Similar activities were undertaken by the police with more success against American firms and missionary institutions.

At Hsinan, a virtual blockade of Cheeloo University (Anglo-America) the Cheeloo Hospital (American) has been established, no foodstuffs or other articles being allowed to enter those two missionary institutions.

At Kobe, the telephone service of the Standard Oil Company was cut off because the Company was unable to draw funds to pay the telephone bill.

At Swatow, unwarranted interference by the Japanese with American firms engaged in the linen drawn work trade has occurred and shipments have been obstructed.

In Japan, by the restrictions on the use of the English language over the telephone, American diplomatic and consular offices are denied a facility which is essential to the proper functioning of these offices.

At Mukden, control over the movements and activities of Americans has been rigid.

American Catholic mission sisters at Fushun were permitted by police to visit the Consulate for passport service only on the condition that they would guarantee to return to Fushun the same day. Long distance telephone calls have been restricted to the Japanese or Chinese languages and when the consulate at Mukden attempted to telephone to the Consul at Dairen, it was informed that it "had better cancel the call".

At Dairen, consular officials are under police surveillance and are followed in all their movements, persons entering and leaving the Consulate are stopped by police and questioned, the Consulate's messengers are stopped by police and the mail and telegrams in their care taken for scrutiny, and in general the conduct of the Dairen authorities toward, and their interference with the legitimates of, the American Consulates seem to show a desire by those authorities to make the position of the Consul untenable.

Trans. 8-18-41

No. 32

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

August 13, 1941
689.

Re my message # 684[a].

At four o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th, I had an interview with the Secretary of State. He handed me a note, the text of which is contained in my separate message # 690[b], which listed recent instances of interferences and damages to U.S. rights and interests in Japan and in areas taken over by Japan. The Secretary said that these had no connection with the "freezing" order but, in the main, concerned only individuals. He added that he had no intention of releasing the contents of the note for press publication, etc. which would unduly aggravate general public opinion. The Secretary pointed out that whereas there were only a few hundred U.S. citizens in Japan, there were a hundred odd thousand of Japanese in the United States.

I, therefore, replied that Japan was taking action to parallel the "freezing" order enacted by the United States. Moreover, it is true that measures against individuals are being taken there to parallel those here.

Such pin prickings, however, do not particularly affect the general situation but they are annoyances. I expressed my hopes that such practices would be mutually discontinued.

The Secretary took this opportunity to bring up the subject of the bombing of Chungking, so I explained that we had promised not to bomb any of the suburban areas for a time.

In parting, Hull inquired whether I planned to be in Washington during the latter part of this week. I replied that I did. The way he said it, gave me the impression that he was planning to issue some sort of a statement.

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[a] See III, 30.

[b] See III, 31.

Trans. 8-18-41

No. 33

FROM: Tokyo — August 15, 1941
TO: Washington — # 480.

Regarding my # 452[a].

There seem to be those persons who interpret the misfortune which befell Vice Premier Hiranuma as extremist's reaction to any cooperation with Britain and the United States. This is a completely erroneous conclusion.

Public opinion in Japan will approve any fair revision of national relations, regardless of who the other party may be. In spite of the recent unfortunate incident, the government's attitude is unshaken.

Therefore, although we are aware of the matter contained in your message # 674[b], will you please relay the matter contained in my message # 470[c] to the President immediately, in an attempt to have this proposal accepted. Our aim is the settlement of broad issues and the prevention of a general calamity. We intend to convey our proposal to the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo at the first opportune moment.

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[a] See III, 12—Amb. Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of U.S. officials on arranging a meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye for a friendly discussion of steps that my be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.

[b] See III, 23—Amb. Nomura expresses the belief that the proposed meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye will have little success in swerving the firm attitude of the U.S. in its Far Eastern policy.

[c] See III, 25—Our proposals in reply to President's suggestions were not intended to imply a final answer on our part. Please see that there is no misunderstanding on this point.

Trans. 8-19-41

No. 34

FROM: Washington — August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 705.

(In 4 parts—complete.)

I received intelligences to the following effect regarding the meeting of leaders of Britain and the United States: Britain's aims at this conference were to draw the United States into the war, and to utilize her to take care of the critical situation in the Far East. The United States aimed at forcing Britain to clarify her war aims and thus to check British ambitions. The joint statement which was announced subsequent to the conference was clear proof that the United States gained her aims with Britain having to assume a disadvantageous position.

Upon receiving the above report, I deemed it essential that we make some preliminary overtures to the government of the United States prior to the return of the President to Washington.

I, therefore, called on the Secretary of State this afternoon and relayed to him your instructions to me, and added that it was of vital importance that the relations between the two countries be revised.

To this, the Secretary repeated his stock replies and added, in effect:

"You and I are striving to come to a peaceful settlement. In the meantime, however, we have been forced to witness military domination."

I pointed out that if matters were permitted to proceed unchecked along the present course, the outcome was only too clear.

"A Pacific war", I continued, in effect, "will not be as simple an undertaking as is apparently imagined by the high officials. It will be mass murder to an unprecedented extent in the history of the world. Do not be mislead into thinking that such a war would be terminated speedily simply because the United States is rich and Japan is poor. It will probably develop into a war of exhaustion, lasting several years. And in the final analysis, neither will have anything to gain by it.

"The politics of our countries should not be swayed by the hot heads which exist in both. Our two countries must, moreover, keep constantly on guard against the enticing counters made by third countries."

The Secretary gave indications of agreeing with this. He agreed that third countries were engaged in considerable activities in Japan and also in the United States.

"There are even those", he said, "who claim that Hitler launched the war knowing far in advance what Stalin's attitude was".

I strongly denied the charges of military domination, pointing out that Japan has an Imperial family whose line has been unbroken for 2600 years. The characteristics of Japan and the Japanese differed from those countries which could change themselves overnight through a simple revolution.

Although we do talk of the Far Eastern Sphere of Co-prosperity, this does not mean military conquests, but merely means living together by defending together. It does not differ much from the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States, I said.

The Secretary pondered over this statement for a while. Then he said, "The United States merely recognizes the equal status of all of the countries involved without resorting to the force of arms".

"The stronger the pressure is on her from the outside," I said, "the stronger Japan will retaliate. On the other hand, if the pressure is taken off of her, Japan will resort to her common senses and will find a peaceful way out".

The Secretary showed an inclination to agree with this.

With regard to the meeting of the leaders of the two countries, I said that as a purely personal opinion of a simple individual, it seemed to me that it should be encouraged rather than discouraged. Many of the points contained in the Eight Point Joint Agreement coincide directly with the Konoye Statement made public some time ago, I said. In view of this fact it seemed logical that two of the authors might be able to find a way, through those instruments, to revise the relations between the two countries. The only reason that Japan is willing to send her leaders to such a conference is because she sincerely wants the meeting to be a successful one, I pointed out.

"In spite of this," I asked, "does the United States still deem that it is an impossibility?"

The Secretary replied that although he had been unable to take the matter up with anyone outside the office as yet, he would take it up with the White House at the earliest opportunity if I sincerely desired it. This was a different attitude from that which he had expressed earlier. (This may have been due to his talking with a Cabinet colleague about which I reported in an earlier message.)

He then asked me what I thought of the general outlook in the United States today. So I replied that it would be exceedingly dangerous under present conditions in the United States, if we were to leave matters as they are.

I have already been advised of the situation with regard to our southward moves. Recently, much alarming news has been distributed in this area with regard to the Siberian area. I would like to be advised, for my information only, what the true state of affairs there is.

Trans. 8–20–41

No. 35

FROM: Washington — August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 703.

(Part 1 of 4)

Re your # 480.

(1) As I have successively reported to you, Japanese-American relations have today reached a state in which anything might happen at any moment, and they are likely to grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move. That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree. As I have already informed you, the United States has not yet attained sufficient unity of mind with regard to participation in the European war, and the President himself is hesitant. However, the people are unanimous with regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. According to those well versed in political affairs, this is what Great Britain approves of and both China and Germany desire.

Trans. 8–19–41

No. 36

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 703.

(Part 2 of 4)

I hardly think the President will go to the extreme, inasmuch as he and the naval leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific war would be. I understand that the British believe that if they could only have a Japanese-American war started at the back door, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war. The people here believe that though Germany might eventually defeat Soviet Russia, the war has already passed the stage of being a short, decisive one and has entered the stage of being one of attrition; that inasmuch as the submarine war in the Atlantic is turning in favor of Britain and the United States, these countries will be able in time to attain their original objective; and that the situation resembles closely that which existed in 1917. I understand that confidence in ultimate victory is gaining.

Trans. 8–19–41

No. 37

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #703.

(Part 3 of 4)

(2) Since such is the state of affairs in this country, I could not have helped but refer to the State Department the proposal for a conference which you made in your telegram, but as you already know, the Secretary of State gave a negative reply to the proposal. I, therefore, subsequently tried to interest a member of the cabinet who was intimately associated with the Secretary of State, but he also showed little interest in the subject. Besides, it is customary for the Secretary to be present at such conversations. I understand the President at one time had thought of arranging for a conference between the leaders of the two countries, but since Japan's occupation of French Indo-China, he has come to believe that Japan does not want a fundamental re-adjustment of Japanese-American relations but that she is carrying on an appeasement policy toward the United States. I hear that they are beginning to think that I have been fooled by my country and that his having conferred with me was an exceptional thing.

Trans. 8-19-41

No. 38

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #703.

(Part 4 of 4)

In the meantime, Japanese newspapers have printed scorching criticism of the statement issued by the American Government. Thus the atmosphere is getting worse. Unless something is done now to eliminate this misunderstanding, I shall not be able to accomplish our object. Furthermore, viewing the problem from the political standpoint, so long as the head of the country remains unfavorable to the proposal, we cannot expect him to do anything about it. I believe the United States is wishing that we would give, at least, some sort of a pledge regarding those three critical points taken up during the past conversations; namely, the question of self-defense, withdrawal of troops from China, and non-discrimination in trade. Today, when the Secretary of State has already rejected our proposal, I cannot help but feel keenly the necessity of careful consideration and a great deal of smoothing out if we are to bring about what you have instructed me in your telegram. I am told that the President will be returning in a few days, so will you please consider the points I have given above, and if you have any further instructions wire them at once.

Trans. 8-19-41

No. 39

FROM: Washington August 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 707.

(*English text*)

(In 2 parts—complete.)

During past months the Governments of the United States and of Japan, through the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, have engaged in protracted conversations directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a sound basis for negotiations between the two countries relative to the maintenance of peace with order and justice in the Pacific. The principles and policies which were under discussion in these conversations precluded pursuit by either government of objectives of expansion by force or by threat of force.

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the governments of Great Britain, of the Netherlands and of China that they make a binding and solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indo-China and that they would agree that the markets and raw materials of Indo-China should be available to all powers on equal terms. The President stated further that he would be willing to suggest to the powers mentioned that they undertake this declaration, in which the United States would be willing to join, upon the understanding that the government of Japan would be disposed to make a similar declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval forces from Indo-China. Notwithstanding these efforts, the government of Japan has continued its military activities and its disposal of armed forces at various points in the Far East and has occupied Indo-China with its military, air and naval forces.

The government of the United States is in full sympathy with the desire expressed by the Japanese Government that there be provided a fresh basis for amicable and mutually profitable relations between our two countries.

This government's patience in seeking an acceptable basis for such an understanding has been demonstrated time and again during recent years and especially during recent months. This government feels at the present stage that nothing short of the most complete candor on its part, in the light of evidence and indications which come to it from many sources, will at this moment tend to further the objectives sought.

Such being the case, this government now finds it necessary to say to the government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 40

FROM: Washington — August 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 706.

This afternoon, in spite of the fact that it was Sunday, I called, at his personal request, on the President, who had just returned to Washington this morning. (Secretary Hull was also present.) Upon our arrival, he read two papers, the contents of which is being sent to you as my message # 707[a] (the gist of which was that if Japan makes further aggression through the use of force of arms, the United States will take any and all necessary steps immediately to protect the interests of the United States and of United States citizens), and my message # 708 (the gist of which is that in connection with Japan's proposal to conduct a meeting of leaders of the two countries, the United States would like to be advised of the aims of the Japanese Government).

After reading them, he requested me to relay the contents of my home government. He added that the two papers were not to be considered as oral statements, but were to be given the status of only reference material. As such, he said, he had had the State Department prepare them. I accepted the papers on condition that they would be for only my information.

I am sending you the gist of our talks and the opinions expressed in subsequent messages.

[a] See III, 39.

Trans. 8–20–41

No. 41

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 709.

(Part 1 of 5)

At half past four the afternoon of the 18th, I had a private and secret interview with the President (the Secretary of State was present). The President, opening his remarks by saying that he had spent some few days enjoying life at sea, remarked that sailing was fine, and little fog had been encountered to mar the pleasure of the voyage. He went on to say that he sailed on his yacht, transferred to a warship, and then kept a rendezvous at a point off the Maine coast. Then, speaking as though there were many advocates of war, he took up the business of the interview and, holding notes in his hand, he said, "The Secretary of State, you, and I are continuing our efforts to bring about peace in the Pacific, but no one else is." I said, "There are many among the third powers who desire war in the Pacific." He affirmed this, and continued by saying, "The United States, Britain, and probably the Soviet too, hope for peace in the Pacific. But there are not many others who desire it."

Trans. 8–20–41

No. 42

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #709.

(Part 2 of 5)

After joking about "our German friend" who maintains no warships in the Pacific, the President said, "Neither you, the Secretary of State, nor I have come up through the diplomatic ranks and, therefore, do not observe diplomatic conventions. What we have here is not in the form of a diplomatic document, nor is it in the form of an *aide memoire* but is merely what we want to say." Having said this, he read in a clear-cut, spirited manner the material which I incorporated into my #707[a] and then said, "I have no desire to put these things in writing." Yet he seemed to be of the opinion that it should be expressed in writing.

Bearing in mind your instructions.

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[a] See III, 39.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 43

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #709.

(Part 3 of 5)

I expressed myself on the following points:

ITEM—The Japanese Government is sincere in its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations.

ITEM—The Japanese Government would like to be advised as to the possibility of arranging an interview with Prince Konoye.

ITEM—The Japanese Government would like to be advised as to the possibility of informal conversations being realized in the near future along lines of conversations of the past few months.

ITEM—The Japanese Government, having already expressed its various opinions with regard to the French Indo-China question to the Secretary of State, feels that no additional explanations are necessary.

ITEM—The Japanese Government wishes to advise that Prince Konoye is willing for an exchange of opinions along several lines from the viewpoint of world peace.

ITEM—The Japanese Government has every expectation that the finest statesmanship will be exercised by the United States Government. The Japanese Government will reciprocate in like manner.

I went on to say: "We have every confidence in your exemplary statesmanship and your ability to settle matters." The President listened closely to my remarks. Holding the Memoire outline in my #708[a] in his hand, he said "Geographically speaking, it is impossible for me to go to Honolulu. I am not permitted to travel in an airplane."

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[a] See III, 52.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 44

FROM: Washington August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 709.

(Part 4 of 5)

"If it is difficult for the Japanese Premier to come to either S.F. or Seattle, how about Juneau?" (I believe he mentioned Sitka which is in Alaska, too, but I don't clearly recall.)

He also asked about how many days it would take from Japan and I replied about ten days. He then asked what the climate was like around the middle of ----- and I replied it would be all right till about then.

Then he continued by saying: "For these reasons I have made a few changes in this paper." He then explained that it is merely for geographical reasons that he had stricken out the word "President" from the original text in which it was stated that the President himself would be present, and he read the paper to me. He added the remark: "It is not that I welcome the 'closed door' such as we have today, but, since we have been forced to it by Japan's actions, there is only one country that can open the door. This time it's Japan's turn." He changed his subject to that of French Indo-China, stating that an official representing the Secretary of State was -----.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 45

FROM: Washington August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 709.

(Part 5 of 5)

The President from beginning to end maintained an extremely tactful attitude and received me with kindness. (I got the impression that he was undoubtedly thrilled at the reception given by the British people to the joint British-American peace terms which he had succeeded in getting from CHURCHILL in his conversations with him during the past few days. (Unlike the independent declaration by the American Government in Wilson's Fourteen Points, this time, because of the insistence of the United States, joint peace terms by England and America were achieved.) In addition, some 14 or 15 days of life at sea, which he likes so well, have left him in the best of spirits.) Furthermore, the Secretary of State when we parted asked me to call any time that I so desired. The China question, being a separate problem, was not referred to at all in our conversations today.

During the course of our conversations, the President casually mentioned by name Postmaster General WALKER as being ardently endeavoring to bring about Japanese-American good will and, with regard to the early realization of the suggested interview, it seems that he had spoken in its favor.

With regard to our conversations of this day, I shall make a full report of my humble opinions separately.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 46

FROM: Washington — August 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — Gogai.

Re your gogai.[b]

The following is a repeat of that portion of part five or five parts of my message #709[a] as requested by you in the captioned message[b].

"In view of the success of the recent conversations with Churchill (Wilson's fourteen articles was a statement of the U.S. alone. This time, however, the United States had succeeded in drawing England in and in having her accept these peace terms. Being confident that the people of the U.S. would feel jubilant over this victory, and because he was able to put in ten days of life on the seas which he loves so much, the President appeared to be in exceedingly high spirits) and the State -----.

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[a] See III, 41—(Incomplete)—Part of a conversation regarding the proposed meeting of President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye in which Juneau is suggested as a possible meeting place.

[b] See III, 47—Tokyo requests repetition of part of Washington's #709.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 47

FROM: Tokyo — August 19, 1941
TO: Washington — Unnumbered.

Please repeat that part of Part 5 of 5 of your message #709[b], between TYU ZYO SAI NAKI TAIDO WO MOTTE OTAISI[a] and KOKUMUTYOKAN WA WAKARE NO TEI[a].

---

[a] *Translation:* During which time he received me with frank ----- the Secretary of State at his departure.

[b] See III, 41—(Incomplete)—Part of a conversation regarding the proposed meeting of Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye in which Juneau is suggested as a possible meeting place.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 48

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — August 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #719.

(In 2 parts—complete)

The fact that upon his return to the capital on Sunday, the President wished to see me before any other person, with the exception of the Secretary of State with whom he talked for several hours, clearly indicates the graveness with which he views Japanese-U.S. relations. It is apparent that the note contained in my message #707[a] was prepared in advance of the President's return. I have already reported that while reading the note, the President interrupted himself on several occasions to make minor and major comments thereon.

The note which I relayed to you as my message #708[b], on the other hand, seemed to contain much that was the President's own attitude and opinion. From that, it seems as if the President was inclined to be in favor of our proposal on certain conditions.

However, when I said that the matter depended entirely on the President's statesmanship, he replied that the United States was not in favor of the "closed door" and that it was Japan's turn to figure out ways and means of opening it.

The impression I got throughout my talks with him was that he harbored other desires. There is no room for doubt, however, that the President hopes that matters will take a turn for the better.

According to recent comments in the newspapers, the President is fearful of the dangers of the United States being drawn into a war in the Far East. Apparently, he believes that there is a 50–50 chance that Japan will attempt further aggression.

It is true that by our proposing that talks be held between the leaders of the two countries, the attitude of the U.S. Government has been considerably eased. However, it is of the utmost importance that this matter be kept strictly secret for if it should once leak out, attempts will be made from every direction to destroy the project. I feel above all else that it is essential that a strict secrecy be maintained in Japan, also.

We, too, are giving this matter our careful attention and study, and should we stumble on to some good ideas, we shall report them to your for whatever value they may have.

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[a] See III, 39.
[b] See III, 52.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 49

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

August 21, 1941
(?).

----- (Preamble and first couple of lines missed.)

----- in view of this request (the said Ambassador notified me, also, on the 15th), I had the various circles concerned make investigations, I said. I went on to say that we are trying to dispose of the matter in accordance with the desires expressed by the United States and that I was certain that I would be able to submit a reply to him at an early opportunity.

Then, on condition that he keep it strictly confidential and "off the record" I talked to him for over two hours concerning the matter contained in my message # 452[a]. I pointed out to him, in accordance with the lines contained in my previous messages, the absolute necessity of displaying some real statesmanship if we are to surmount the crisis which now confronts us.

So saying, I strongly urged that the proposed talks take place. I added that since he had worked so tirelessly during the past nine years in behalf of Japanese-U.S. friendship, I was counting on his services in the promotion of these talks.

The above is for your information.

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[a] See III, 12—Amb. Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of U.S. officials on arranging a meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Prince Konoye for a friendly discussion of steps that may be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 50

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #722.

(Part 1 of 2)

During my conversation with a member of the Cabinet, he remarked, "The President has a broadminded view of the world and is not anti-Japanese. In his past speeches and in his recent statement he had never referred to Japan. As soon as he returned to Washington he had the Secretary of State take up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conference and replied to you. This is an unprecedented thing and it seems that Japan should reciprocate in a like manner." So I replied by saying that it was with a strong resolution that the Japanese Government had come thus far in dealing with this question; whereupon the Cabinet member replied, "It is equally true in the case of the President. Above all, even if there is no real justification for it, the country is replete with anti-Japanese sentiment."

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 51

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #722.

(Part 2 of 2)

"And when the atmosphere in Congress is just as bad, if this fact leaks out there is no doubt that a strong opposition will be made, but if the conference succeeds and as a result peace is maintained in the Pacific, the people will for the first time ----- -----. Since I myself had endeavored in the same direction, the success would make me feel that life is worth living. Inasmuch as there is no way of telling whether the President will continue to take such an open-hearted attitude in the future, I earnestly wish that a way could be found to successfully settle this question."

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 52

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #708.

English text.

(Part 1 of 8) (Strictly Confidential)

Reference is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on 8 August during a conversation with the Secretary of State, whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The thought of Prince Konoye and of the Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated.

Reference is also made to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during a call on the Secretary of State on 16 August, that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

(Part 2 of 8[a])

(Part 3 of 8)

On two occasions officers of the Department of State, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, called on the Japanese Ambassador to indicate concern over the reports that Japan intended to acquire by force or threat of force military and naval bases in French Indo-China. Subsequently, on July 20 and July 23 the Acting Secretary of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French Indo-China and pointed out that the government of the United States could only assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indo-China or the acquisition of military and naval bases in that area constituted notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the South Pacific area. The Acting Secretary pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

(Part 4 of 8)

The government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the opinion of this government, the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

Informal discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation would naturally envisage the working out of a program attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed.

(Part 5 of 8[a])

(Part 6 of 8)

If such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this government and this government would cooperate with other nations in extending assistance to any country threatened.

Under such a program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the government of the United States, attain all the objectives which Japan affirms that it is seeking. This program would not enable any country to extend its military or political control over other peoples or to obtain economic rights of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character.

(Part 7 of 8)

In those areas where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, the government of the United States would expect to use its influence to see that

all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies and at a fair price.

If the Japanese Government is seeking what it affirms to be its objectives, the Government of the United States feels that the program above outlined is one that can be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program.

In case the Japanese government feels that Japan desires and is in position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, the government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal explanatory discussions which were interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.

(Part 8 of 8)

The government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two governments, it would be helpful to both governments, before entering a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans.

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[a] Parts 2 and 5 are attached hereto.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 53

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #708.

(*English text.*)

(Part 2 of 8)

When the Japanese Ambassador brought up the suggestions, the Secretary of State reminded the Ambassador that the government of the United States had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a desire to follow courses of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this course this government had received reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Government was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been predicated. It was pointed out also that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of State made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States.

(Part 5 of 8)

The program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principles of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It

would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own economies but also the economies of regions where productive capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of living, and to create conditions conductive to the maintenance of peace.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 54

FROM: Washington — August 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #725.

According to reports along the lines of those contained in my #722[a], there are indications that the President himself is becoming seriously interested in participating in the resumption of the negotiations to revise Japanese-U.S. relations. It is even said that the latter half of the note which I sent to you as my message #708[b], was composed by the President himself. I have also heard that he expects to have me hand our reply to that note directly to him. For these reasons, I believe that it would be well if we omitted all of the involved and complicated points in the composition of our reply and instead have it in the most simple and direct phraseology as possible. In my opinion, I think it would be to our interest if we omitted expressions like "continuance of encirclement" as it appears in section three of my message #724[c]. Other corrections which I would make would include the changing of the phrase "of discrimination, of boycott, and barriers, of personal integrities and attack" as it appears in Section 18, to, simply, "circumstances in the recent pact". I also feel that it is essential that we point out the fact that we place much emphasis on the point concerning the guaranteeing of the safety of the Far East.

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[a] See III, 50, 51—Nomura reports the gist of a conversation with a Cabinet member in which he is told of President Roosevelt's interest in the proposed conference (with Konoye) and of his (the Cabinet member's) hope for its success.

[b] See III, 52, 53—Text of memorandum handed Amb. Nomura by the President.

[c] See III, 56-62—Text of Amb. Nomura's (proposed) reply to the President's note.

Trans. 8-25-41

No. 55

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #723.

(Part 1 of 2)

It seems that the President believes that he could meet with Premier KONOYE depending on the circumstances (my #722[a]). It is not hard to imagine that he is also of the opinion that he would like to take this matter out of the hands of the authorities and settle it himself because of the general situation. It may be said that the President had made this proposal so that he could make his last political stroke at this moment when Japanese-American feelings are at their worst. It is well for Japan to respond in a like generous spirit to this move on the part of the President. It would be well also to leave the decisions of the concrete points until some future date ----- and show that there is nothing that would conflict with ----- and I think it is imperative that we thus bring about the resumption of the informal negotiations which have been disrupted.

From this standpoint, I am submitting a proposal we have drawn up (----- 724[b]). There may be points in it that need to be dealt with more in detail. Should I think of any points that should be added I will wire them later. This proposal gives due respect to the policy proposed by the United States Government.

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[a] See III, 50, 51.
[b] See III, 56–62.

Trans. 8–25–41

No. 56

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #724.

(Part 1 of 7)

To be handled in Government Code.

Strictly confidential.

Reference is made to the communication conveyed, on August 17, 1941, to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State and the President of the United States.

The Government of the United States mentions certain circumstances and measures considered as inimical to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of world crisis and international cohesion, it is difficult to ascertain whether an event is a cause or a consequence.

Accordingly, not unlike the press in Japan, much news and editorial comment in the United States has forecasted the "encirclement" of Japan as the outcome of American-British policy in the Far East. Elaborate specifications have been made by the press to indicate how, with the assistance of Russia, Japan would be deprived of natural resources and opportunity in the East Asia region. Meanwhile, the United States had taken certain measures which could be interpreted in Japan as indicative of a continuing unfriendly pressure at variance with our then current amicable conversations.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 57

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #724.

(Part 2 of 7)

The Government of the United States considers that certain of its actions vis-a-vis Japan have been only counter-measures to policies and precedures prejudicial to American interests and principles. On the other hand, the Government of Japan considers that its own actions have been dictated by considerations responsive to hazards, circumstancial and political, affecting the national sufficiency and protection of Japan.

It is quite conceivable that both Governments are right.

With admirable modesty of mind, the Government of the United States has seemed, frequently, unaware that the words of policy are weighted with the immense power of America's natural endowment and potential might. The President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, in their own unquestioning adherence to the way of peaceful procedures, might find it difficult to believe that other nationals, anywhere, could consider themselves threatened by the United States.

Yet, so long as they lack that assuagement of possible threat (so convincingly eliminated from South America by the good neighbor policy) there will be some, geographically less well endowed and, by nature, poor in essential resources, who will feel compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 58

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #724.

(Part 3 of 7)

It is not, therefore, surprising that temporary measures taken by the Government of Japan for the protection of its own equitable and necessary supply of living commodities, should be interpreted, though never so intended nor operated, prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials.

Equally, it is not surprising that, lacking such guarantees as are mentioned in the communication of August 17th, and in default of a consummated understanding with the United States, the Government of Japan felt compelled by current conditions to take certain measures of precautionary defense.

Accordingly, the Government of Japan appreciates that, having indicated difficulties, the Government of the United States now encourages an exchange of basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area.

For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready for such a united effort toward—a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation—the Government of Japan would be proud to make sacrifices.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 59

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #724.

(To be handled in government code)

(Part 4 of 7)

The government of Japan, with lively appreciation, endorses as its own, without qualification, the cogent "program attainable by peaceful methods". As outlined in the communication of August 17, 1941, the program is such as has long been desired and sought by Japan.

The government of Japan desires, for itself and all others, the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. The government of Japan desires to make possible for itself and all countries, access to raw materials and

to all of her essential commodities. The government of Japan desires cooperation by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary and peaceful basis, for the utilization of available resources of capital, technical skillfull, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own but also the economy of regions where the productive and distributive capacities can be improved, in such manner that for the nations and peoples concerned, purchasing power will be increased, living standards raised and conditions conducive to peace will be created.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 60

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #724.

(Part 5 of 7)

(To be handled in Government Code)

If such a program, based upon peaceful and constructive principles, is adopted for the Pacific and if, thereafter, any of the countries or areas in the Pacific are menaced, the Government of Japan will cooperate with the other nations in extending assistance to any nation so threatened. The Government of Japan believes that such a program if faithfully carried out, with the consideration for the relative conditions of the various nations, would preclude the extension, by any one country, of political or military control to attain economic right of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character. In those cases where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, it is expected that the Government of the United States will use its great influence to see that all countries are given fair and guaranteed share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies, and at a fair price.

Moreover, the Government of Japan rejects any intention of territorial aggrandizement or exploitation of other peoples. It desires the orderly establishment of effective, responsible, independent sovereignty in a united China. It desires the political inviolability of all Pacific nations.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 61

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #724.

To be handled in Government Code.

(Part 6 of 7)

The Government of Japan does not desire, unless forced thereto by political or economic aggression, that the East Asian region should be cut away from a world economy of equitable and peaceful processes, but it does desire that the principle of non-discrimation should be operative and exercised by other nations, no less than by Japan, for both citizenry and commerce. The Government of Japan has sought to express, in its international procedures, the cultural and ethical ideals of peace and harmony which are part of Japanese national culture. Japan participated in the League of Nations and cooperated in various disarmament conferences. But multiple events of world turmoil—of discrimination—of boycott and barriers—of personal indignities and attack, motivated the Governments, responsible for the welfare of

the Japanese people, to take certain counter measures which they would have preferred to avoid. Some of those measures, whether faction or alliance, were interpreted as aggressive.

The Government of Japan has no intention and no alliance and no policy of aggression. The Government of Japan conceives its people as members of the family of nations, each of whom ought to live, and let live, under the common bond of brotherhood and just tolerance.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 62

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #724.

(Part 7 of 7)

We consider that the natural position and circumstances of Japan and her people is not incomparable to that of Britain; and the deprivation of economic opportunity by boycott and discrimination are measures against which, not less than against military attack, the prescripts of national security and honor require resistance. It is this policy of resistance, extended to armed conflict, that has been interpreted by some as aggressive.

But, the Government of Japan prefers a policy of cooperation and desires to sincerely respond to the cordial, penetrating proposals of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State by the rapid conclusion of our informally negotiated, and almost completed, understanding. The meeting of the responsible head of our respective Governments would confirm and give such sanction to our purposes that peace in the Pacific would be insisted with the date of that meeting.

It is with great good will that the Government of Japan anticipates the complete resumption of the historic friendship with the United States.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 63

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #723.

(Part 2 of 2)

It explains the immutable policy of our government based on the important statements by Prime Minister KONOYE and Ministers HIRANUMA, ARITA and MATSUOKA and attempts to correct misunderstandings regarding this policy. I believe that since it is limited to those points included in the American proposal, it would be accepted as a sufficient statement and is within the possibility of the United States giving it careful consideration. Of course, it is not wise to refer to those points which the President had not taken up. This is only a convenient method for opening Japanese-American negotiations and is not of a nature that could be proclaimed to the world as Japan's national policy.

I would like to have this proposal considered by the Foreign Office bearing in mind the points I have mentioned above. If the Japanese Government is determined to adjust Japanese-American relations, this is the time. Losing this opportunity, there will be no other that we can take. If the meeting is to take place about the middle of September, as the President has suggested, there is left for preliminary negotiations less than two months, in fact a little more than a

month. Besides, if the meeting is really to take place, it would be necessary to have a ship ready and to select those who will accompany the party. For these reasons I urge that you decide on this matter quickly.

Trans. 8-25-41

No. 64

FROM: Tokyo — August 23, 1941
TO: Washington — #495.

(Strictly Confidential)

According to newspaper reports, it is alleged that a British-U.S.-Soviet conference will be held early in September. This comes at the same time as the reports that the United States is shipping goods to aid the Soviet Union, which in many respects confirms the already existing rumors of "encirclement". Under these circumstances, if the proposed talks between the leaders of Japan and the United States comes subsequent to the above referred to tripartite conference, the general impression would be that Japan had given in in the face of the threat of "encirclement."

We are, therefore, doing everything in our power to rush our reply to the United States and at the same time to bring about the "leaders conference" at an earlier date. Under these circumstances, will you please exert as much effort as possible to accomplish this. At the same time will you please draw the United States' attention again to the matter contained in the last part of my message 487[a].

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[a]Tokyo's intentions regarding her northern policy are outlined to Amb. Nomura for his information with the request that should the U.S. question the increase of Jap troops in the North, it should be explained as a precautionary measure taken to offset dangers that might arise from a Soviet defeat and subsequent political confusion in Eastern Russia. Also that should the U.S. ship vital materials to Russia via Japanese coastal waters, it would provoke the feelings of the Japanese people and have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting U.S.-Japanese relations.

Trans. 8-25-41

No. 65

FROM: Washington — August 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #739.

I called on Secretary Hull again at 5 o'clock this (Saturday) afternoon, and in accordance with the contents of your message #495 (?)[a], reported that Japan was prepared to make an early reply and at the same time to hold the "leader's conference" at an earlier date than previously proposed. As you instructed, I requested that the Moscow conference be delayed and the proposed material aid to the Soviet Union be withheld for the time being.

The Secretary made no comment with regard to the first part. With regard to the second portion of my statement, he again—as he did this morning—pointed to the Japanese-U.S.S.R. Neutrality Pact.

He did assure me, however, that my statement would be relayed to the President. According to reports ----- the President has made inquiries as to whether Japan's reply had arrived or not. In my opinion, the President is the one who shows the most interest in the "leader's conference".

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[a]See III, 64—Tokyo wires Washington that every effort is being made to rush a reply to the President's note, etc., etc.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 66

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

Re your # 707[a] and 708[a].

This is a matter of great gravity and the Premier is eager concerning these conversations. Therefore, I am wiring you under this date, message # 502 containing a message from the Premier to the President and in # 503 the reply of the Imperial Government, (in which connection see also # 504).

Will you please go and report them immediately to both the President and the Secretary of State.

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[a]For 707 See III, 39 and for # 708 See III, 52, 53 which are the texts of two notes handed Ambassador Nomura by President Roosevelt.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 67

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

August 26, 1941
502.

(Part 1 of 2) (To be handled in Government Code)

I am very much pleased to learn from the document which you handed to Ambassador NOMURA on August 17 that you are in agreement with the idea contained in our proposal regarding holding a meeting between you and me.

Today, when the whole world is in confusion, for the two countries of Japan and the United States, who hold the key to world peace, to drift as we are drifting toward the worst of relations, not only is an unfortunate thing in itself but also means the downfall of world civilization. The reason for Japan being so concerned over the question of peace in the Pacific lies in no other than her desire not only to improve the relations between Japan and the United States, but also to contribute to the realization of world peace through the opportunity which such improved relations would afford.

It seems to me the reason that Japanese-American relations have come to be so bad as they are today is to be found largely in the fact that the governments of the two countries have been lacking in mutual understanding and have repeatedly doubted and misconstrued each other's intentions. It seems also to have been due to machinations on the part of third-power countries. Unless we begin with the elimination of such causes, we cannot by any means hope that the relations between the two countries could be adjusted. Herein lies the reason for my proposing that I meet you face to face for the purpose of frankly exchanging our views.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 68

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

August 26, 1941
502.

(Part 2 of 2)

However, the method upon which we have hitherto been relying; namely, the method of informal negotiations, which was disrupted in July—though it may have been, on the whole, appropriate in consideration of the attitude then taken and of the matters discussed—even if continued from now on with a view of having the leaders of the two governments later giving recognition to the matters discussed, is not a suitable method under the present circumstances in which rapid changes are taking place and the possibility of an unfortunate condition arising is unforseeable. I believe the need of the moment is for the leaders of the two countries to meet face to face and to discuss whether there is any possibility of saving the present situation by studying together with a proper perspective the important questions which affect the whole area of the Pacific Ocean lying between the two countries, and to do this without being bound by the customary method of negotiations. It would be all right to have the details settled by those officials specializing in such matters according as the necessity arises after the leaders have conferred on them.

This is the idea underlying my proposal. It is my earnest wish that you would accept this proposal in an understanding spirit and reciprocate. The situation being such as explained above, I am eagerly waiting for the day of our meeting. As to the place of the meeting, I believe that, in view of various circumstances, it would be best if it were somewhere in the vicinity of Hawaii.

Trans. 8–26–41

No. 69

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

August 26, 1941
503.

(Part 1 of 7) (To be handled in Government Code)

The Imperial Government has received the communication which was given to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on August 17, 1941, and sets forth its viewpoint as follows:

1. The Government of the United States, claiming that the actions and measures which Japan took in French Indo-China have deprived it of the basis upon which the conference having to do with settlement by peaceful means of problems affecting the Pacific area should be continued, wishes that the Japanese Government would abandon its expansionist activities, adjust its attitude, and work toward the program of peace in the Pacific, in accordance with the principles embodied in the program which the United States upholds. At the same time, the United States Government wishes that the Japanese Government would submit a clearer statement that those hitherto submitted regarding Japan's present attitude and plans. Furthermore, the United States Government has definitely stated the fact that it will resort at once to every method it deems necessary should Japan take any further steps in line with the policy of militarily dominating Japan's neighboring countries by threat of force or by means which are in the nature of a threat by force.

Note: In deciphering this ----- ----- -----

Trans. 8–26–41

No. 70

FROM: Tokyo August 26, 1941
TO: Washington #503.

(Part 2 of 7) (To be handled in Government Code)

2. The Government of Japan cannot help but feel deeply regrettable that despite Japan's past pledges and her repeated explanations concerning her activities and measures toward other countries, the United States Government is still harboring misunderstanding and fear. The Government of the United States refers to certain situations and measures which it considers harmful to the peaceful settlement of problems affecting the Pacific area and does so on the bais solely of the fundamental conception to which it has pledged itself. However, in such a world crisis as we face today and in such an atmosphere of international confusion, it is exceedingly difficult to judge whether a certain incident is the cause or the result. It is, furthermore, dangerous to base that judgment one-sidedly upon certain political facts only. The Government of Japan cannot but point out how harmful such a judgment is to lasting peace.

When a country's natural and peaceful progress is interfered with or when its right of existence is threatened from without, for that country to take measures to cope with the threat or to resort to methods for its defense not only is unavoidable, but also must be said to be a most natural thing from the standpoint of maintaining peace. Therefore, before criticizing such counter-measures or defensive measures, to ascertain the cause and to correct the situation must be regarded as the greatest factor for a speedy establishment of peace.

Trans. 8–26–41

No. 71

FROM: Tokyo August 26, 1941
TO: Washington #503.

(Part 3 of 7)

We shall not consider at this time those things which have happened in the far past. However, if the matter is regarded in the light of recent incidents, we find that many newspaper articles and editorials in the United States have predicted that a British-American joint policy in the Far East would result in a threat to Japan and have hinted the formation of an anti-Japanese front by Britain, the United States and the Netherlands Indies. In the meantime, in conflict with the friendly conversations that were taking place at the time between Japan and the United States, the United States Government has expressed its intention of applying a continuous and unfriendly policy of pressure and has taken measures which might deprive Japan of the opportunity of obtaining the natural resources necessary to Japan. Although the United States considered some measures as having been taken in opposition to Japan's policy and activities which the United States considered as harmful to her rights to the principles she upholds, on the other hand, the Japanese Government believed that her action was governed by certain measures which she had taken to cope with circumstantial and political obstacles which affected her national requirements of self-sufficiency and defense.

It should not be forgotten that, as pointed out, what the government of one country considers as just proves to be exactly the opposite when regarded by another country, and that it often proves to be a cause for contention as well. Looking back upon past instances, we find among those methods which the United States Government has considered as peaceful, there have

been some which lead one to think that she has overlooked the fact that they have been a threat to another country because of the established facts relating to the United States, of natural circumstances, and of the United States' monopolistic power.

Trans. 8–26–41

No. 72

FROM: Tokyo August 26, 1941
TO: Washington # 503.

(Part 4 of 7) (To be handled in Government Code)

Because of the fact that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State have a firm attachment to peaceful means, it seems to be difficult for them to believe that the peoples in other countries should feel that they are threatened by the United States. It should be firmly borne in mind that so long as this silent threat is not lightened, the peoples in the countries which are less favorably situated than the United States (especially because of the scarcity of resources) cannot help but regard their relations with the United States in a defensive way. Japan believes that in everything peaceful happiness can be obtained only by really understanding the position and the circumstances which affect the others, rather than by criticizing the individual acts of the others. From this standpoint, the Government of Japan is pleased with the fact that the United States encourages the exchange of opinions regarding the policy and attitude which must form the basis of the understanding which is essential to a lasting and broad peace in the Pacific area.

Trans. 8–26–41

No. 73

FROM: Tokyo August 26, 1941
TO: Washington # 503.

(Part 5 of 7)

3. The steps which Japan has taken for the joint defense of French Indo-China, as stated repeatedly in the past, had for their purpose hastening of the settlement of the China incident which originated from the threat against Japan's right of existence. They constituted also a policy which became, for reason of self-defense, inevitable for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific by coping with various threats which tended to disrupt that peace, and thereby to achieve an equitable supply of materials which are essential to the country. It was not in the nature of merely making a threat. Therefore, should the China incident be settled or should a just peace be established in the Far East, the Government of Japan, as you already know, is willing to withdraw its troops immediately from French Indo-China. In order that every bit of possible doubt may be wiped out, the Government of Japan reiterates here the statement she had repeated in the past—that her steps with regard to the joint defense of French Indo-China were not taken with the intention of making that area a basis from which to advance by force into the neighboring areas. From the statements made above, we believe that Japan's attitude toward Thailand is self-evident. Also, as regards Japanese-Soviet relations, the Japanese Government is to state clearly here that so long as the Soviet Government respects the terms of the Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement and refrains from taking actions which are a threat to Japan and Manchukuo or are in contravention to the spirit of this agreement, Japan will not resort to military action against that country. It is, therefore, an

earnest desire on the part of the Japanese Government that the United States Government refrain from any action that would instill fear in the Japanese, to say nothing of the people in those countries which might fear a threat by the United States and Soviet-Russia acting jointly.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 74

FROM: Tokyo August 26, 1941
TO: Washington # 503.

(Part 6 of 7) (To be handled in Government Code)

In order that we might do this, the Imperial Government is not inclined to exercise force toward the various countries adjacent to her.

4. The Government of the United States has gone on record as having said that these informal discussions between the Governments of Japan and the United States have for their purpose the discovery of bases for negotiations having to do with bringing about a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area as a means of drafting a program which will achieve natural peaceful measures. In this respect the Government of Japan is wholeheartedly in accord. Furthermore, the Government of the United States has made it clear that she will give no consideration to any proposals except those having to do with any of the rights and prerogatives of either Japan or of the United States, or harmonize with the principles which have been observed by the United States in the past. This principle applies equally to the principles which the Government of Japan has embraced in its fundamental national policy.

5. The Imperial Japanese Government believes that the Government of the United States considers that the program coming out of these informal discussions will set forth principles and desires which will be applicable to the whole world and, therefore, to that one part of the world which is the Pacific. In order that this may be achieved, countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries economically, politically, militarily, from the point of view of natural resources or geographically shall assume an attitude of strict impartiality with regard to cooperation and to the distribution of such advantages. It is natural and essential that, first of all satisfying the requirements essential to the existence of a country, in a spirit of reciprocity adjustments should be made in relation to the areas adjacent to it. It is furthermore important in hastening the establishment of peace.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 75

FROM: Tokyo August 26, 1941
TO: Washington # 503.

(Part 7 of 7) (To be handled in Government Code)

6. I believe that the opinions of the Imperial Government as set forth above are clear and concise. We believe that it is paramount for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific that the governments of Japan and the United States confer dispassionately and constructively together on problems great and small.

From this point of view it is my fervent belief that it would be highly significant for the leaders of both countries to meet together for an immediate conference. However, in order that

such a conference can be conducted in the most friendly manner, I believe that it is essential to immediately quiet the impression that this step is due to pressure put upon the Japanese Government by the Government of the United States. The Japanese Government is convinced that the Government of the United States is in the main interested in the establishment of world peace and Japan has decided to reciprocate and in the light of the present international situation has decided to endorse the early invocation of this conference.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 76

FROM: Tokyo August 26, 1941
TO: Washington #504.

Re my #503.

That message contains the maximum concessions that we can make to the proposal of the President of the United States; however, whether or not you can convince the Americans of this is naturally another matter. Now the international situation as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hopes on an interview between the Premier and the President.

Please try to convince ROOSEVELT and HULL to this effect and please bear in mind that I do not consider that the interview need necessarily be bound strictly by what is set forth in my caption message.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 77

FROM: Washington August 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo #748.

Regarding your message #501[a].

On this day, Wednesday, at noon, I called on the Secretary of State, in accordance with your instructions, and handed him a copy of the message from the Premier. At the same time, I relayed the various points contained in your message #503[b] orally (because the English text had not been completed) and strongly urged him to allow me to see the President today. The Secretary replied that it would be impossible today, but that a reply would be made tomorrow morning.

During this conversation, I mentioned that I thought the Churchill speech was very harmful and the Secretary of State, in reply, referred to his comments to the press. (He refused to make any comments when press representatives pressed him for details.) He went on to say that apparently in Japan the extremist views were holding away in the various publications. I did my best to make appropriate replies.

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[a]See III, 66—Tokyo directs Amb. Nomura to immediately report to the President and Secretary of State the contents of two messages (JD-1: 4795 and 4796) being sent separately.

[b]See III, 69-75—Text of Japan's reply to the President's note requesting a clarification of Japan's aims in the Far East.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 78

FROM: Tokyo — August 26, 1941
TO: Washington — # 505.

Notwithstanding representations made by us on successive occasions the United States is treading a course which seems to be bent on exciting public opinion within our country. Beginning the first day of September they are exercising stringent limitations on gasoline shipments essential to our civilian population. At this time they are planning to pass through waters adjacent to our shores with cargoes of petroleum products which should be coming to us. The fact that they are transporting these petroleum products to Vladivostok has dealt a severe blow to the sensibilities of our government and people. At the same time that this brings about grave effects upon Japan and American relations, a terrific blow is being dealt by those in Washington to the whole country far more than you can realize.

This being the case, we are forced to cry out our disapproval of the realization of such measures and the Ministry of Interior as well as the War Ministry are very apprehensive. Therefore, because such measures are not in keeping with the neutrality treaty between Japan and Soviet Russia nor in accord with the interpretation of international law, I would like to have you make representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general view point of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations. Wire me back as soon as you have filed these representations.

In the event the United States assumes the position that it is impossible to cut off shipments of petroleum products to the Soviet, then as it seems advisable to your Excellency make suggestions that they change the transportation route. However, should they not comply with this request, either, I think it would be wise to try to persuade the American authorities that they revive shipments of petroleum products to Japan immediately.

Furthermore, additional representations have been filed with the Soviet too, as of the 26th.

Trans. 8–26–41

No. 79

FROM: Washington — August 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 749.

Re your # 505[a].

When I talked with the Secretary of State on the 27th, he brought out graphs showing the amounts of oil that have been furnished to Japan since the beginning of the year, and in view of the small amount supplied to Russia as compared with the enormous amounts supplied to Japan, he thought it strange that so much should be made of this now in Tokyo. (Previous to his talk with me he had had a talk with the Soviet Ambassador.)

I replied that it is only natural that public opinion should be stirred up over the U.S. Government's action in embargoing oil to Japan, while supplying it to Russia, and that in tankers passing the very throat of Japan. ----- the necessity of changing the route. The Secretary ----- the reasons, ----- discussed normal trade relations with the Soviet on the basis of documents submitted by his subordinates. He further stated that even though export permits were given for Japanese tankers, because of the freezing of funds in the United States this money could not be circulated, and he said he would like the consent of the Japanese Government for payment to be made from moneys in South America and desires an early reply.

You know about this from the messages I have been sending, and as there is no other way but to use South American moneys, I wish you would take the matter up with the departments involved and advise as to the results by return dispatch.

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[e]See III, 78—Amb. Nomura is directed to make representations to the U.S. over the shipment of petroleum supplies to the Soviet via waters adjacent to Japan and request that this practice be discontinued, or the present embargo on oil shipments to Japan be reconsidered and lightened.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 80

FROM: Washington — August 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #758.

Re my #749[e].

The Secretary of State also is cognizant of the fact that in consequence of the exceedingly delicate nature of the relations existing between Japan and America at the present time, a single incident may serve as a spark to set off an immediate explosion, and is manifesting great concern over the situation.

Referring to the freedom of the seas he said to a group of newspaper reporters and also to me, that he had no desire to set a precedent in this matter of having any third country interfere in Japanese-American trade or with American trade itself. Besides he said that he had faced great popular disapproval in permitting the export of several millions of barrels of oil to Japan and that there was no reason now for Japan to make a great problem over the shipment of a few hundred thousand barrels of oil to Russia and that if the Japanese Government would fully recognize these facts all would be clear. To this I explained that, entirely apart from the legal aspects of the situation, from the standpoint of national feeling, the shipment of oil that is prohibited to Japan right through Japanese territorial waters to Vladivostok is a major problem. He seemed to see that there was indeed some logic in this, for in today's newspapers there appeared various explanations about routing the oil through the Persian gulf, etc.

I feel very keenly the necessity of doing something to break the deadlock in the situation, and I suggest that as a temporary measure you arrange immediately for the use of those funds that are outside of the area affected by the freezing order for the purchase of petroleum that is being negotiated now.

I make telegraphic request again for the above.

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[e]See III, 79—Amb. Nomura reports conversing with the Secy. of State regarding shipments of oil to Russia, whereas, shipments to Japan have been embargoed. The Secy. further requested that as permits have been granted to Jap tankers, arrangements be made for payment from moneys in South America, inasmuch as Jap funds in the U.S. have been frozen.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 81

FROM: Washington — September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #771.

I made English translations of your messages #502[a] (The Premier's message), and #503[b] (the Imperial Government's reply). I am forwarding those translations to you as my messages #772[c] and #773[d] respectively, after making a few changes. Please check and approve.

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[a] See III, 68, 69.
[b] See III, 69–75.
[c] See III, 82, 83.
[d] See III, 84–88.

Trans. 9–6–41

No. 82

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #772.

(English text)

(Part 1 of 2)

I deeply appreciate the courtesy of Your Excellency in delivering personally to Ambassador Nomura the reply of the United States Government to the proposal of the Japanese Government regarding a meeting between Your Excellency and myself.

In the face of universal war like turmoil Japan and the United States are the last two major powers who hold the key to international peace. That the two nations *should fall* in the worst of relations at this time would mean not only a disaster in itself, but also the collapse of world civilization. Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese-American relations.

The present deterioration of the Japanese-American relations is largely due, I feel, to a lack of understanding which has led to mutual suspicions and misapprehensions, and also encouraged the machinations and maneuvers of third powers.

Without first eliminating such causes, it is impossible to expect adjustment of Japanese-American relations. This is why I wish to meet Your Excellency personally for a frank exchange of views.

Trans. 9–5–41

No. 83

FROM: Washington September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #772.

(English text)

(Part 2 of 2)

Chief of Office Routing

The preliminary informal conversations disrupted July last, were quite appropriate both in spirit and content. But the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion confirmed by the responsible heads of the two governments does not meet the need of the present situation which is developed swiftly and may produce unforeseen contingencies.

I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore the possibility of saving situation. Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary, be left to negotiations between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting.

Such is my aim in making the present proposal. I sincerely hope my views in this regard are fully understood and reciprocated by your excellency.

Because of the nature of the meeting as stated above, I would prefer that it will take place as soon as possible.

Trans. 9–5–41

No. 84

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #773.

(English text)

(Part 1, 2, and 3 of 8)

Part 1

The Japanese Government has received the communication conveyed by the Secretary of State and the President of the United States to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941. The Japanese Government desires to state its views as follows:

The Japanese Government profoundly regrets that despite the pledge it has given heretofore as well as its repeated explanations concerning Japan's actions and measures in the foreign field, the United States Government continues to entertain misgiving.

The United States Government mentions certain situations and measures which it regards as inimical to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of world crisis and international confusion, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain when an event is a cause and when it is a consequence.

Part 2

When a nation is obstructed in the path of natural and peaceful development, or when the means of its existence is threatened, not only is it imperative that that nation should take defensive measures, but it is also required to do so for the maintenance of a just peace. This was the motivating policy of the Japanese Government.

Meanwhile, the United States had taken certain measures which could be interpreted in Japan as indicative of a continuing unfriendly pressure at variance with the current amicable conversations.

The United States Government certainly regards some of those actions as merely countermeasures against Japan's policy and procedures which were considered as conflicting with American interests and principles. On the other hand, to the Japanese Government they were measures determined by considerations of self-protection for meeting national requirements or removing environmental and political obstacles against national security.

Part 3

With admirable modesty of mind, the government of the United States has seemed frequently unaware that its words and policies are automatically weighted with the immense power of America's accomplished facts, natural endowment and potential might. The President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, in their own unquestioning adherence to the ways of peaceful procedures, might find it difficult to believe that other nations, anywhere, could consider themselves threatened by the United States. And yet, as long as there is lacking the assuagement of that possible threat, there will be some less favorably endowed (especially in essential resources) who feel compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

Trans. 9–5–41

No. 85

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #773.

(Part 4 of 8)

In consequence, the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the government of the United States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area. For such peace, the government of Japan is ready; for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the government of Japan like the government of the United States would be proud to make sacrifices.

Japan's measure in Indo-China was intended to accelerate the settlement of the China incident; and at the same time it was calculated to remove all menace to the peace of the Pacific and to secure to Japan an equitable supply of essential materials. It was a measure of self-defense the Japanese Government felt obliged to take. But the Japanese Government has no intention of threatening thereby other countries.

Trans. 9–8–41

No. 86

FROM: Washington — September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #773.

(English text)

(Part 5 of 8)

Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indo-China as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia.

Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indo-China is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories. The Japanese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japan's intention toward Thailand.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 87

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #773.

(English text)

(Parts 6 and 7 of 8)

Part 6

As regards Soviet-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchuoukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty. On the other hand, the Japanese Government sincerely hopes that the United States Government will avoid any action that might give rise to a fear of menace to Japan through collaboration with the Soviet Union.

In a word, the Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation.

Quite properly discussions between the Japanese Government and the government of the United States directed toward ascertaining if there existed a basis for negotiations for a peaceful settlement covering the entire situation,—such discussions would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program, obtainable by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the government of the United States.

Part 7

It is also stated by the United States Government that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as these might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committted. The fundamental national policy long cherished by the Japanese Government is again in full agreement on that point.

Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 88

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #773.

(English text)

(Part 8 of 8)

The Japanese Government now confidently hopes that from the larger viewpoint of a constructive world peace, and in the light of the current international situation, past differences may be merged in an agreement of principles and a cooperative effort based on order and justice. The meeting of the responsible heads of our respective government would confirm and give such sanction to our purposes that peace in the Pacific would be instituted by that meeting.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 89

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #752.

(Part 1 of 2)

Re my #748.

Today, the 28th, at 11:00 a.m. in accordance with your instructions, I had an interview with the President (the Secretary of State was present). I gave him at that time your message as well as the English text of your #503[a]. While the President was reading the message he flatteringly commended it. Having read it thoroughly, in discussing the point having to do with discrimination he smilingly and cynically said, "Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince KONOYE, I wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those conversations just as an invasion of French Indo-China occurred during Secretary HULL's conversations with your Excellency." However, I could see that he was well pleased. He continued by saying, "I am looking forward to having approximately three days talk with Prince KONOYE. The main thing that I am interested in is the saving of time. Hawaii is out of the question for according to the constitution the President must sign bills passed through the Houses of Congress within ten days and I cannot have the Vice-President do it for me."

[a]See III, 69-75—English text message containing statement to be made to Roosevelt.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 90

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #752.

(Part 2 of 2)

He explained that in this respect it is different with the Japanese Government in that the Japanese Government could appoint an acting minister and added that if it is going to be in Juneau, it would take three days to Seattle, and the round trip from that point on being ten days, if we had fourteen days in all, we would be able to do it, but it would be impossible if it is going to be in Hawaii, since it would take three weeks. I, therefore, told him that insofar as the Japanese Government is concerned, their chief object is to hold a conference, and question of the place of the conference is secondary. I promised that I would communicate the details to the government. I then said that we would like to have the earliest possible date set, whereupon the President replied that he did not object to having an early date set, but he did not give the immediate reply as to when.

The President added also that the recent meeting with CHURCHILL was to have taken place in ----- this year but had been postponed on account of the Balkan War and that the meeting was held after the Congress had approved of it. The conversations between the President and me was as given above. These conversations will be continued.

Trans. 8-29-41

No. 91

FROM: Washington August 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #756.

(4 part message complete)

Regarding my #732 (?)[a].

The following is the gist of my discussion with Hull, last evening, (28th), regarding the proposed conference, etc.

(a) As the result might be quite unfortunate should either one of the conferring heads of the two governments assume an uncompromising attitude on certain points, it is the expressed desire of Hull to hold preliminary conversations for the purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the meeting of the two heads, and also to make the decisions of the two principals as final. (Hull used the expression "certification".) (Regarding this point please refer to my #703 (?)[b].)

(b) While it is necessary to bring up to date the various points of past conversations, the United States maintains that the adjustment of Japanese-American relations can be achieved without considering the question of China, which is vital to her.

(c) Despite Japan's insistence that she cannot alter her policy towards China, the United States government is unwilling to seek adjustments in Japanese-American relations at the expense of existing American-Chinese relations. Neither is the United States Government willing to give cause to "explosion" in China by its action. Furthermore, the task of placating China by the United States Government for accepting the basis of Chinese-Japanese negotiations will involve the tremendous effort of winning the approval of Britain and the U.S.S.R. and for this reason it is deemed unfeasible.

(d) Regarding the question of withdrawal of our troops from China and the right of protection, I informed the Secretary that I had nothing to state except what has already been stated on previous occasions. However, when I explained that so long as Prince Konoye remains in the saddle, I am confident that he will make every effort to settle these questions satisfactorily, Hull replied that he hoped that the Imperial Government will see fit to take definite steps toward this end.

Please check over my #540[c] regarding these questions and let me know the government's opinion regarding them. Also please obtain details regarding same from Colonel Iwakuro upon his return.

(e) I wish to make the following suggestions in the event that it has been decided to hold the "Leaders' Conference".

(1) While it is the desire of the Japanese Government to designate Hawaii as the meeting place, we should consent to accept Juneau, if for reasons of constitutional requirements or personal safety, Hawaii is unsatisfactory to the President.

(2) The conference date should be from September 21st (?) to ----- -----.

(3) Five persons each from the Foreign Office, the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and Consulate, that is a total of 20 persons or less, should be present at the conference.

(Part 4 attached.)

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[a] #732, Not translated. Corrects the word "insisted" in a previous message to "instituted".

[b] See III, 35-38—Amb. Nomura brings up to date the seriousness of Japanese-American relations; reports that since Secy. Hull has already rejected Japan's proposal (for continued negotiations) and the President is returning shortly, Tokyo should consider giving the U.S. some sort of pledge regarding the three critical points: self-defense, withdrawal of troops, and nondiscrimination in trade.

[c] Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that, based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 92

FROM: Washington August 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #756.

(Part 4 of 4—Parts 1, 2, 3 translated 9-3-41)

4. I assume that Prince Konoye will travel by warship and that about ten days will be required en route.

5. The public statement will be made jointly at a time agreed upon by both. I believe that the best time would be shortly after Prince Konoye's departure.

The Secretary of State agreed to discuss these points with the President. In general, it may be said that the Secretary of State is an exceedingly cautious person. There are indications that he is considering this matter from many angles. I feel that unless we are in fairly close agreement the "leaders' conference" will not materialize.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 93

FROM: Tokyo August 28, 1941
TO: Washington #509.

(Part 1 of 3)

Re my #503[a].

(a) For convenience's sake, in exchanging messages in the future on this question, please insert the paragraph numbers in the order used in the caption telegram.

1. (The section beginning "The Government of the United States" and repeating the content of recently received documents.)

2. (The section beginning "The Government of Japan cannot help but feel deeply regrettable that despite Japan's past pledges, etc.")

3. (The section beginning "The steps which Japan has taken for the joint defense of French Indo-China, etc.")

4. (The section beginning "The Government of the United States has gone on record as having said that, etc.")

5. (The section beginning "The Imperial Japanese Government believes that the Government of the United States considers, etc.")

6. (The section beginning "I believe that the opinions of the Imperial Government as set forth above, etc.")

(b) The following are explanations of the points in the caption telegram which need special attention:

(1) Our opinions regarding this question were set forth briefly in response to those views which the United States Government freely submitted with the request that we do likewise.

We made our views clear, believing that by so doing we might find in due time points upon which the two parties can agree in a friendly spirit and that because of this the meeting of the leaders of the two countries would prove to be effective.

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[a] See III, 69–75, which give Japan's viewpoints with regard to American-Japanese negotiations.

Trans. 8–28–41

No. 94

FROM: Tokyo August 28, 1941
TO: Washington #509.

(Part 2 of 3)

(2) With regard to Para. 3, "should a just peace be established in the Far East." This means, for example, when the CHIANG regime has become merely a local regime as a result of the closing of routes used to aid that regime; when Japanese-Chinese relations have, on the whole, actually returned to normalcy; and when it is possible to secure efficiently and justly materials from French Indo-China, Japan will be willing to consider withdrawing her troops even if a complete settlement of the China incident has not been achieved. In other words, it was a statement made because of the desire to allow as much flexibility as possible when the conversations are to be begun.

(3) With regard to Para 5. (a) ". . . which will be applicable to the whole world, etc." was inserted out of consideration of the fact that if the principles and desires expressed by the other side are applied merely within the Pacific area, we would suffer various restrictions within the East Asia sphere of coprosperity in which we hope to establish a new order, while the United States, on the other hand, would not be bound by any pledge with regard to her relations with her adjacent areas. Since this would result in an arrangement which would be one-sided insofar as it affects Japan, I thought that the principle should be such as may be applied to the entire world.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 95

FROM: Tokyo August 28, 1941
TO: Washington # 509.

(Part 3 of 3)

(b) With regard to that section in which it is stated that countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries should assume an attitude of strict impartiality with regard to cooperation and to the distribution of such advantages, we wish to point out the logical reasons for cooperation in the application of leadership to the end of bringing about steps for an equitable distribution of resources by those countries who are advantageously situated, and the passage has to do with the proposal by the United States with reference to equality of economic opportunity and treatment. In other words, it hints the idea that it is natural that Japan should assume peaceful economic leadership within the East Asia sphere of Co-prosperity.

(c) As to the words to the effect that it is natural and essential that adjustments should be made in a spirit of reciprocity in relation to the areas adjacent, etc., the passage clarifies the fact that Japan is inevitably, as well as naturally, endeavoring to bring about peace on the basis of the principle of equality in her relations with Manchukuo and China; that is to say, on the basis of the principle of good neighborliness to the end of establishing the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity. It also goes to show that the policy of adjacent countries each respecting the conditions peculiar to the other, is not a policy, as the United States alleges it to be, of securing a position superior to the others. This has many points in common with the American Monroe policy.

The passage in which appear the words "first of all satisfying the requirements essential to the existence of a country" came from the idea of so-called (joint defense ?) which the United States Government referred to. This passage was given with the idea also of a joint defense in China in our mind.

In other words, (a), (b) and (c) were brought out as to a precaution against the possibility of our being too narrowly restricted when the discussion takes place concerning the method by which the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity should be established.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 96

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #754.

Urgent.

A reporter of the New York Herald Tribune called on TERASAKI this afternoon and inquired concerning the contents of the message from the Premier to President Roosevelt. TERASAKI replied that he was not at liberty even to refer to the contents of that message. He then said: "Well, I had an interview with the President two or three days ago and I gathered from his words that Premier KONOYE would like to have an interview with him in Hawaii."

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 97

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #753.

Re my #752[a].

Since the time for the interview was announced by the White House, the Secretary of State immediately made public briefly the Pact that I had delivered to him after the conference Premier KONOYE's message to the President, which was discussed by us. It was agreed that no reference should be made to the content of the message.

[a] See III, 90.

Trans. 8-29-41

No. 98

FROM: Tokyo August 29, 1941
TO: Washington #510.

As you have been advised by other messages concerning this matter, no information of the "leaders' conference" should be allowed to leak out until it is definitely settled upon. You should be perfectly well aware that such leaks may make it impossible to get some things done which otherwise would be well within the realm of possibility.

On the 28th, however, the Domei and other press dispatches, report that in an interview to the press you made references to Premier Konoye's message. (We suppressed those dispatches here.) Hereafter will you please refrain from making any mention of this until you have communicated with this office.

Although we were able to suppress the above mentioned dispatches, in view of the channel through which they arrived, we are of the opinion that a fairly large group of people are now aware of the news. We are at present figuring out ways and means of making the best of the situation. In the meantime, will you take every precaution against any leakage of the contents of the message.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 99

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

August 29, 1941
#511.

Regarding my message #510[a].

In view of our domestic situation and the delicate international situation, we had intended to keep this matter a strict secret for the time being. However, now that the matter has been made public in your area, we fear that there will be further misunderstanding if we should attempt to suppress or censor the news here. Being of the opinion that it would be best to publicly announce the contents of section 2 of paragraph 5 of the separate message, we did so at 2:30 p.m. on the 29th.

It should be superfluous to mention that because we must take into consideration our relations with Germany and Italy, and in view of the exceedingly complex domestic situation, there is much danger that the project will fail if information is allowed to leak out before a settlement is reached. Bear this in mind and take every precaution to guard against leaks. You should conduct your negotiations, as they were being conducted during your unofficial talks, in such a manner so as to avoid attracting any attention. (We do not feel that the contents of the discussion on the 28th should be made public at this time.) Hereafter, will you please get in touch before you make any public statements. We realize, of course, that you may let an opportunity slip by by this delay, but please look upon such an occurrence as being unavoidable under the present circumstances.

With regard to the location at which the "leaders' conference" should take place, we mentioned Hawaii after giving consideration to our dignity and also because early in the discussions the United States suggested Hawaii.

We do not insist upon Hawaii, but if it is not to take place there, we feel that we should avoid selecting a place which is a part of either nation, but select a spot on the high seas. Please discuss this matter along those lines.

With regard to maintenance of security, in view of the matter contained in your message #754, will you please request the Americans to cooperate fully. (You are aware that our relations with Germany and Italy may be unfavorably affected by announcements made in the United States. It is quite possible that the United States proposed that the announcement be made to estrange Japan from Germany and Italy. We expect to have at least this much cooperation from them.)

With regard to the announcement made by us which was mentioned early in this message, we felt that time was of the utmost importance; we could not consult the U.S. first. Please explain this to them.

---

[a] See III, 98.
[b] See III, 99A.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 100

FROM: Washington — August 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #759.

(*Abstract*)

Re your #511[a].

Very difficult to see the President in secrecy as it is the custom of the Press to avail itself of list of callers at White House. However, will take the matter up with Hull and see what can be done.

---

[a]See III, 99—Amb. Nomura is instructed to make no more public announcements regarding the proposed understanding negotiations and "leaders' conference" without first obtaining permission from Tokyo. Also, that this take place at some place not a part of either country, preferably on the high seas.

Trans. 9–5–41

No. 101

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #760.

(Part 1 of 2)

(To be handled in government code)

On the 26th in the New York Herald Tribune KASAI, M.P. who is now in this country, contributed an article in connection with Japan-American relations to the effect that the Tripartite Alliance was Foreign Minister Matsuoka's great blunder. He continued by saying that at the present time these in the know in Japan oppose it for the reason that it blocks ----- relationship with the United States. However, Foreign Minister Matsuoka believed that this Alliance would, in the long run, contribute to the improvement of relations between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9–23–41

No. 102

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #760.

(Part 2 of 2)

Such an interview as this is in opposition to our national policy. It cannot help but have a great and terrible effect upon the present situation, therefore, I would like to have you immediately exercise extreme caution. Furthermore, in view of the present situation and insofar as circumstances will permit, I would like to have you arrange it so that (*so-called?*) authorities will no longer come to the United States until after boats are again dispatched between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9–23–41

No. 103

FROM: Tokyo — September 1, 1941
TO: Washington — #538.

Re your #752 (?)[a].

Please submit to the United States Government my reply to various proposals made by the President in such a manner as to assure absolute secrecy. If they feel it necessary to publish the gist, please see to it that it is done simultaneously with us. (Publication made by us on the 29th was necessitated by the fact that the matter had already been made public at your end. However, hereafter, we wish to have all publications made simultaneously.)

---

[a]Amb. Nomura reports to Tokyo the results of his interview with the President regarding the time and place for the "leaders' conference."

Trans. 9–3–41

No. 104

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #765.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re my #754[a].

Late on the night of the second HIYUUN[b] of the New York Times called TERASAKI and asked him whether there was any truth in the article printed in the New York Herald-Tribune to the effect that Prince KONOYE had requested an interview with President ROOSEVELT. TERASAKI replied that he knew nothing about it. The Herald-Tribune has not reached our hands as yet. In regard to the secrecy of this matter, I strongly urged Secretary HULL's caution on the ----- of last month and again yesterday, the 1st, but I plan to call this to his attention once more.

---

[a]See III, 96, which concerns an interview between a reporter and TERASAKI, in which the former requests information regarding Premier KONOYE's message to the President. Upon TERASAKI's refusal to disclose the contents, the reporter remarked that he had gathered from the President's remarks during an interview "that Premier Konoye would like to have an interview with him in Hawaii."

[b]Kana spelling.

Trans. 9–5–41

No. 105

FROM: Tokyo August 30, 1941
TO: Washington #517.

Message to Berlin as #776.

In connection with the breaking of the stalemate in Japan-American relations, in accordance with the understanding of the previous Cabinet, Ambassador NOMURA carried on an exchange of opinions with Secretary of State HULL, as you are well aware. Early in July the Japanese Army occupied French Indo-China. As a result, the United States made applicable to Japan legislation freezing funds, which resulted in inability by Japan and the United States to carry on economic endeavors. The relations between Japan and the United States within the two countries became extremely tense. In order that the Empire for a number of reasons could calm the tenseness existing between Japan and the United States, Premier Konoye decided to dispatch a message to President ROOSEVELT. Ambassador NOMURA has transmitted this message to him. It has already been publicly announced by Japan and the United States that such a communication has been conveyed.

Here in Tokyo the Vice Minister and I informed the German and Italian Ambassadors of the situation when they called upon us on other business. Therefore, please advise those to whom you are accredited of the above on the authority of these instructions. Please transmit to Rome. I have already transmitted the above to Washington.

Trans. 9-2-41

No. 106

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #761.

(Part 1 of 2)

On the ----- the Italian Ambassador called on me and asked about Japanese-American relations. I, therefore, limited myself to your #517[a] and to what you have already published and explained that, since the relations have become so extremely critical of late that most influential members of the Congress have begun publicly to declare that the likelihood of a war breaking out is 50-50, we had issued a message for the purpose of lessening the tension. He continued to be very inquisitive and so I said that for the sake of human welfare I would like to see the European war end soon (he expressed a strong agreement to this point); that Japan does not wish to see the United States enter the war; and that it goes without saying that Japan is faithful to the Three-Power Alliance as may be seen from the fact that she is deeply concerned over United States participation. I said also that, if a war breaks out in the Pacific, it will be a long drawn-out affair.

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[a]See III, 105 in which Tokyo tells Washington that the German and Italian Ambassadors have been informed of the message which Premier Konoye has dispatched to President ROOSEVELT.

Trans. 9-2-41

No. 107

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #761.

(Part 2 of 2)

Then I remarked, "Americans not only harbor no antagonism against Italians but are friendly to them. This may be because there are several million people of Italian extraction in the country." The Ambassador replied, "Athough ----- ----- -----, socially we experience nothing abnormal but are on good terms."

In view of the fact that you have repeatedly instructed me to maintain secrecy regarding this question and of the fact that I am quite in favor of doing so, I will handle the matter in the best possible way. However, that is not so easy in that you cannot help others making personal surmises on the basis of our action. I have no way of telling what this country will do in the future as a result merely of your having sent your message, but I notice signs of a temporal lessening of tension.

Trans. 9-2-41

No. 108

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #762.

(Part 1 of 6)

On the evening of the 1st, I called on the Secretary of State and discussed with him the matter of maintaining secrecy referred to in your #518[a] and also that of simultaneous announcement. It seems that this question is being handled by the President himself. The President left on Friday for Hyde Park and is to have dinner with the Secretary upon his return to Washington on the 4th. I think they will be giving us a reply before long. Both men appeared to be interested in the question of the conference. However, the Secretary seemed to be very cautious because of his position and his nature. He seems to be of the view that if the KONOYE cabinet foregoes its militaristic policy and returns to a peaceful policy in the Pacific, KONOYE would be obliged to resign from the cabinet because of opposition of the public, and it also seems that this fear is being talked about by both foreigners and Americans.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 109

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #762.

(Part 2 of 6)

I explained to him that such concern was not in the least called for because Prince KONOYE, who is the Premier, as well as one high in political status, is determined to hold this conference unprecedented in so far as Japan is concerned.

It seems that HULL is being posted on Japanese newspaper opinion by GREW. He said that he would like to see the Japanese Government direct, in accordance with (his?) original ideas, public opinion, influential political leaders, and military men, and lead them to approve of a peaceful policy. (If it were not for the fact that such action would lead to the suspicion that the United States Government was trying to interfere with Japan's internal politics, it would facilitate matters in so far as the United States Government is concerned.)

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 110

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #762.

(Part 3 of 6)

Then he said that China does not want to make peace and, besides, the Chinese believe that a military cabinet will be established in Japan sooner or later, and so I replied that China is America's spoiled child and asks for everything she wants regardless of others. The Secretary states, as usual, that to bring about friendly relations between Japan and China without offending China is indeed a difficult task and that it would be necessary to win the approval of Great Britain and other countries before this could be done. Then he proceeded by saying that of the three pending questions the question of self-defense is not a difficult one and that there must be some way of settling the question of non-discrimination, which is recognized in the recent statement and included also in the Konoye statement.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 111

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #762.

(Part 4 of 6)

I said that the stationing of Japanese and Manchukuoan troops in North China is not based upon a permanent right of military occupation and so these troops will be withdrawn when the circumstances will permit it, and that I believe that the Japanese Government had some definite plan with regard to this matter. I further stated that from a general political point of view there is no reason for any trouble arising between the United States and Japan and that, as it is evident from repeated commitments, Japan aims to maintain peace in the Far East. I strongly emphasized the fact that there should be no doubt on this point and then urged him to arrange the conference soon.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 112

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #762.

(Part 5 of 6)

The Secretary stated that to definitely establish peace in the Pacific would be a fine thing.

Although our conversation did not go so far as to consider where the conference should be held, I understand that (Hawaii ?) is 3,400 miles away (Juneau 3,800 miles away) and the climate is good even in the autumn. I believe when this matter is to be announced, the place of the meeting should be given as somewhere in the Pacific (midway between Japan and the United States).

If I may, incidentally, state briefly the present situation with regard to this country, I might say that upon entering the third year of the European war, the anti-Axis powers have recovered from a desperate defensive position and have come to be about equal with the Axis powers.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 113

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #762.

(Part 6 of 6)

Generally speaking, the United States herself, seeing that the prospect is bright is building up her defense, planning to supply her allies with more materials (the newspapers have printed the dissatisfaction of the British) and is, on the other hand, warning people against laxity. While she realizes that Germany's fighting power is as magnificent as ever, ----- ----- that the war will be carried over into next year because of the tremendous waste of man power and materials on the Eastern front.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 114

FROM: Washington September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #777.

(In 5 parts—complete)[a]

Oral statement

Strictly confidential

Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government communicated on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States that there be held as soon as possible a meeting between the responsible heads of the government of Japan and of the government of the United States to discuss important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area in an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the President of the United States, in which the President assured the Prime Minister of the readiness of the government of the United States to move as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting and suggested that there be held pre-

liminary discussions of important questions that would come up for consideration in the meeting. In further explanation of the views of the government of the United States in regard to the suggestion under reference observations are offered, as follows:

Part 2

On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations which were entered into by the Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State referred to four fundamental principles which this government regards as the foundation upon which all relations between nations should properly rest. These four fundamental principles are as follows:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means.

In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to make it clear that in the opinion of the government of the United States Japan stood to gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these principles than from any other course, as Japan would thus best be assured access to raw materials and markets which Japan needs and ways would be opened for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States and other countries, and that only upon the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which would be effective in establishing stability and peace in the Pacific area.

The government of the United States notes with satisfaction that in the statement marked "Strictly Confidential" which was communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28 there were given specific assurances of Japan's peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the government of the United States has long been committed and which were set forth in detail in the informal conversations already referred to. The government of the United States understands that the assurances which the Japanese Government has given in that statement exclude any policy which would seek political expansions or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages or preferences by force.

Part 4

The government of the United States is very desirous of collaborating in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government has made reference. The government of the United States believes that it is all-important that preliminary precautions be taken to insure the success of any efforts which the government of Japan and of the United States might make to collaborate toward a peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the course of the conversation to which reference has already been made, the Secretary of State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked "Oral, Unofficial and without commitment" which contained a redraft of the Japanese Government's proposal of May 10, 1941. It will be recalled further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there were certain fundamental questions with respect to which there were divergences of view between the two governments, and which remained unreconciled at the time the conversations were interrupted in July.

Part 5

The government of the United States desires to facilitate progress toward an inclusive discussion, but believes that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese government with regard to the fundamental questions under reference.

It goes without saying that each government in reaching decisions on policy must take into account the internal situation in its own country and the attitude of public opinion therein. The government of Japan will surely recognize that the government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which would not be in harmony with the principles in which the American people—in fact all nations that prefer peaceful methods to methods of force ----- believe.

The government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of the Japanese government on the matters above set forth.

Trans. 9-6-41

[a]Part 3 not indicated.

No. 115

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #766.

(In 2 parts—complete)

Foreign Office Secret. Chief of Office Routing.

I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27, which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura.

I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese-American relations.

I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and wish to assure you that the government of the United States, recognizing the swiftly-moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries.

In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made to the principles to which the government of the United States has long been committed and it was declared that the Japanese Government "considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world" and that "such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself".

Part 2

I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I feel constrained to suggest, in the belief that you will share my view, that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance of peace which are mentioned with more of specification in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this suggestion.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 116

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

September 3, 1941
768.

Foreign Office secret.

At his request I am to see the President in secrecy at 5 o'clock this afternoon.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 117

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

September 3, 1941
775.

Met with the President in secrecy at 5 p.m. today. (Hull was also present.) He read a message from him to Premier Konoye and also the United States' reply. (Being sent to you as my message Nos. 776[a] and 777[b].) Shall report on our conversations subsequently. (7:30 p.m.)

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 114.

Trans. 9-9-41

No. 118

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

September 3, 1941
778.

(In 3 parts—complete)

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 3rd, I met the President in secrecy. The President read two memos which I am relaying to you as my message Nos. 776[a] and 777[b]. After doing so, the President said that he and Prince Konoye and I and the Secretary of State wish to make every effort to maintain peace on the Pacific. However, there is a matter of public opinion which exists in both Japan and the United States. He frequently receives telegrams urging him not to change the established policy for the purpose of establishing friendly relations with Japan, he said. He added that he was "very, very sincerely sympathetic" toward Prince Konoye.

At this point the Secretary of State requested information of me as to the present outlook in Japan. I replied that the Premier was determined to proceed with his plans.

With regard to the three points contained in my message # 777[b], I said that two points have been agreed upon in principle, and as to the third, it is because he believes that an agreement can be reached that the Premier is prepared to set out on the proposed trip.

The Secretary of State said that he did have some questions concerning the wordings in two or three places. He went on to say that after all arrangements had been made, the British, Netherlands East Indies, and the Chinese would have to be prevailed upon.

The President said that he made absolutely no mention of the contents of the conferences to revise Japanese-American relations, on the occasion of his meeting with Churchill. It is the custom in Britain for the Prime Minister to submit all matters to the Cabinet for discussion and its decisions are brought to Parliament for further discussion, the President explained. Under such a system it would be exceedingly difficult to maintain secrecy and that was why he made no mention of this matter to Churchill, he said.

With regard to the date of the proposed meeting, the President said that he has an engagement during the latter part of September, but that any other time would meet with his convenience, as far as he knew at present.

As I was taking leave of the President, I told him that much depends upon the President's high statesmanship if peace on the Pacific is to be preserved. The President shook hands with me. The Secretary of State seemed to be very concerned about the general editorial trend of the press and asked two or three more questions.

I relayed the matter pertaining to our issuing a statement to the public to explain our standpoint, as you instructed at the end of your message #524[c]. The President replied that he had no objections whatsoever. The Secretary of State made no comment, but since I am to see him again tomorrow morning, I shall ascertain his attitude then and submit a report to you.

---

[a] Not yet available.
[b] See III, 114.
[c] See III, 119.

Trans. 9-6-41

No. 119

FROM: Tokyo — September 3, 1941
TO: Washington — #524.

Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner.

In the midst of this confusion at home the story in the Herald-Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you can well imagine.

The government is not afraid of the above mentioned confusion; nor does it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are aware that such a policy is not limited to just this case.

Because of the circumstances being what they are, we would like to make all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not convenient, any early date would meet with our approval.)

Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please advise the United States of this plan.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 120

FROM: Tokyo — September 4, 1941
TO: Washington — #526.

Re the last clause in my #524[a].

If it causes misunderstanding of our real intention and results in a failure to arrange the conference in question, this would be contrary to what we wish to see realized. Please, therefore, request ----- to rescind this clause. We also will take similar steps.

---

[a] See III, 119.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 121

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #779.

Regarding my message #775[a].

The "oral statement" which was forwarded to you as my message #777[b] seemed to me to be too lengthy, theoretical, and stilted. The items which the United States is most anxious of having right now is Japan's definite attitude on the matters pertaining to the rights of self-defense, equal trade opportunities, and the conditions of peace between Japan and China. Secretary Hull repeatedly expressed his interest on these points during the unofficial conversations and now he feels that he must be definitely advised so as to assure the success of the "leaders' meeting". Under these circumstances, the United States is not interested in receiving lengthy statements which fail to get to the point, in my opinion.

I shall be able to further ascertain Hull's point of view on the matter when I see him tomorrow, the 4th, but I strongly urge that the above factors be borne in mind in drafting Japan's reply.

---

[a] See III, 117.
[b] See III, 114.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 122

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) September 4, 1941
TO: Washington #529.

(Part 1 of 3)

(To be handled in Government Code)

(Separate Wire)

1. Strictly Confidential.

The Government of Japan undertakes:

(a) That Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations:

(b) That Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indo-China against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying north (?) to Japan:

(c) That the attitude of Japan and the United States toward the European war will be decided by the concepts of protection and self defense, and, in case the United States should participate in the European war, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided;

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 123

FROM: Tokyo September 4, 1941
TO: Washington #529.

(Part 2 of 3)

(d) That Japan will endeavor to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China;

(e) That the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;

(f) That Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific area will be carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination in the international commerce, and that Japan will cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of natural resources in the said area which it needs;

(g) That Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection with above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the foreigner's transactions control regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of reciprocity.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 124

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 4, 1941
529.

(Part 3 of 3)

The Government of the United States undertakes:

(a) That, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavor by Japan concerning the settlement of the China affairs;

(b) That the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (f) referred to above;

(c) That the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific area;

(d) That the United States will immediately reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 125

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 4, 1941
528.

(Part 1 of 2)

Re your # 556[a].

1. What the United States Government proposed as a preliminary to the meeting of the leaders of the two countries were the questions of self-defense, occupation of China by the Japanese Army and equal treatment in trade, discussed during the informal negotiations in the past. The fact is that the recent situation in Japan, especially since the leakage of Premier KONOYE's message, has made it urgent to hold the conference as soon as possible and thereby adjust Japanese-American relations. However, if we continue to argue merely the legal angle of the aforementioned three pending questions as we have been doing, we believe that it would be impossible to be ready, as you have suggested, by the latter part of September. Furthermore regarding what was communicated to us by the United States Government on July 24th and (August ?) 17, we have already expressed our views, in addition to our sending the Premier's message. Since we have nothing more to say on the subject, we have decided to express first of all our viewpoint given in # 529[b] and, after finding out on what points the leaders of the two countries preliminarily and principally can agree, to hold a conference for the discussion of those points and then issue a joint statement at the end (I will wire you our text as soon as it is ready), and thus help create a more wholesome atmosphere between the two countries.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 122-124.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 126

FROM: Tokyo — September 4, 1941
TO: Washington — # 528.

(Part 2 of 2)

And so at 4:30 p.m. on the 4th I asked Ambassador GREW to come to see me, and, upon his arrival, I communicated to him what is in the separate telegram. Bearing this in mind, will you also communicate the same to the Secretary of State.

2. The points in the separate telegram which require special explanation are as follows: (This was promised by the leaders of the two countries today during their conference. Whether it should take the form of a secret agreement or an ordinary agreement will be left to the discretion of the conferees).

1. We expect each of the matters upon which Japan has made her pledge, especially Japan's stand with regard to the Three-Power Alliance, will win the approval of the United States Government.

2. As to the withdrawal of the orders for freezing of assets by both countries, you should avoid giving the impression that this freezing measure taken by the United States had proven to be damaging to Japan.

(a) Explain the fact that if the ----- of this measure is technical and complicated and, furthermore, a halfway step, it will not be understood by the people at large.

(b) Explain the fact that this step which the United States has taken has given the impression to the Japanese people that it was meant to be a punishment for Japan's occupation of French Indo-China.

(c) Consider its spectacular aspect as secondary and emphatically propose that in view of the importance of the pledges made at this time by Japan, the United States must reciprocate Japan's decision even by overcoming a possible strong opposition within the American Government. By the word "immediately" with reference to the time when these orders are to be withdrawn, the time when an agreement regarding the matter included in the aforementioned (1) has been reached by the leading conferees, is meant.

(3) By ceasing to take military measures we mean, for example, to cease dispatching more submarines and airplanes to the Philippines and cease acquiring military bases in the southwestern Pacific area, in China and in Far Eastern Russia.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 127

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 782.

(Part 1 of 3)

On the morning of the 4th, I tried to sound out HULL's views regarding the so-called preliminary talk which he had with the President. HULL began to deal with the four basic principles included in the caption of the oral statement (dated ?) the 3rd, (please refer to the last part of my # 277[a] and reiterated the ideas which he had been cherishing for years, especially his ideas regarding the principle of equal opportunity, I therefore, remarked that it is clear from our reply that the Japanese government has no objection to it in principle and I said

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[a] Principles: (1) Guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all countries. (2) Non-intervention in domestic issues. (3) Principle of equal opportunity including commercial. (4) Non-alteration of the status quo in the Pacific effected by force.

Trans. 9-6-41

No. 128

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #782.

(Part 2 of 3)

that we would like to first of all settle the questions which were left unsettled in the past informal negotiations. HULL replied that it is important to dispose of the basic principles (namely, the aforementioned 4 basic principles) first of all and that the United States Government did not wish to give the impression that by conferring with Japan it was trying to trade off China, Great Britain and other third powers, and also that inasmuch as Japan has made it clear that she stands upon these basic principles, it would be necessary to get the third powers to agree to them.

Trans. 9-6-41

No. 129

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #782.

(Part 3 of 3)

I proceeded, referring to the American proposal, and asked if it might not be better to omit the ----- clause appearing in the said proposal and referring to the attitude of Soviet Russia and Britain toward the European war. But HULL objected to this.

He objected also to our stationing our troops for the purpose of opposing Communism and appeared to be wishing that we would completely withdraw our troops.

At any rate I got from (todays ?) conversation that the American attitude has very much stiffened.

Trans. 9-6-41

No. 130

FROM: Tokyo September 5, 1941
TO: Washington #533.

Regarding my message Nos. 528[a] and 529[b].

At 5:30 p.m., by which time the said conference had been concluded, the only message we had received was your message #768[c]. Your messages Nos. 776[d] and 777[e] are as yet unreceived.

We are, therefore, unaware of the attitude of the United States concerning the proposed meeting of the respective leaders. However, for the purpose of speeding up matters and also to clarify the various issues which have been discovered in the past we made the above referred to statements. Please explain this fact to the United States in order to prevent misunderstandings.

The contents of the two messages referred to in the heading are, in essence, Japan's reply requested by the United States in their reply with reference to "an advance (understanding ?)". Paragraphs b and c are so worded as to make it possible for any person to readily understand them. We did this because we felt that they were very important preliminary expressions of intent of the Japanese Government. We feel that they express the maximum point to which Japan will go to meet U.S. requests and feel that the United States can understand our point of view thereby. Please, therefore, try to convince the Americans along those lines.

We are ready and desirous to proceed with the conference of the leaders, so as to bring about a complete settlement through politics and diplomacy, if the United States has no more questions with regard to details. (We shall not attempt to evade such questions, but instead, shall be delighted to give clear cut and concise replies in every case. However, we fear that there is much danger that to do so would mean further delays which in turn may mean losing the present opportunity. For this reason, will you do everything in your power to discourage such questions. We have fully explained this point to the U.S. Ambassador here.)

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[a] See III, 125–126.
[b] See III, 122–124.
[c] See III, 116.
[d] Not available.
[e] See III, 114.

Trans. 9–8–41

No. 131

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #788.

(Part 1 of 4)

Re your #528[a] and #533[c].

This (?) morning I secretly called on Secretary HULL and ----- handing him the purport of your #529[d] in writing I said:

"This contains what the Foreign Minister handed to GREW previous to receipt by the Japanese Government of the President's message of ----- and his statement. It was drawn up with a view to clarifying the as yet unclear points so that the conversations which we have been carrying on could be hastened and the meeting of the leaders of the two countries could be realized. It explains the ----- of the Japanese Government toward the Presidential message and oral statement on this question.

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[a] See III, 125, 126.
[b] See III, 122–124.
[c] See III, 130.

Trans. 9–8–41

No. 132

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #788.

(Part 2 of 4)

"The views of our Government are as set forth in our communication of August (?) 6th (my #659[a]) and in the Prime Minister's message and papers appended thereto. I believe that recent communication of our Government, as well as "-----" and "-----", would go a long way

towards meeting the desires of the United States Government. In my opinion these show the maximum limit to which our Government could go in compromising (?). I would like very much, therefore, that the United States also take into consideration the present situation and display a high degree of statesmanship to the end of endeavoring to bring about very soon the conference of the leaders."

[a] See III, 6.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 133

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #788.

(Part 3 of 4)

In reply, HULL said that he had perused only a part of GREW's report and was not very familiar with it, but that he would study it carefully during the coming weekend.

Furthermore, he appeared to be very much concerned as to the stability of the present cabinet. He stated that since more people in the United States are expressing their opinions in favor of adjusting Japanese-American relations, he would like to have the Japanese Government also influence public opinion in this direction. Then I emphatically pointed out the indispensability of maintaining peace in the Pacific. Although HULL agreed with me in this, he seemed to maintain a very cautious attitude.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 134

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #788.

(Part 4 of 4)

Re your Nos. 524 and 526[a] inclusive (addressed to me ?).

When (on the 5th ?) I conferred with HULL (my #782[b], I asked him for his opinion. He said, "Since ----- does not want to give a mistaken impression to the third-power countries, I think it would be all right if no more is said than that we are now studying the basis upon which the Pacific question could be solved." However, if ----- should ----- also on the part of the Japanese Government, I would like to negotiate on the premises of ----- ----- and, therefore, (I believe ?) there is no special need of submitting the matter contained in your #526[a]. (I would appreciate your wiring your instructions at once?.)

[a] See III, 119, 120 in which Tokyo wires Washington that if the last clause in 524 causes a misunderstanding to request that this clause be rescinded.

[b] See III, 127, 128.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 135

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 440.

Message to Washington # 71.

KASAI, M.P., Now residing in Washington, gave an interview to the *Daily News* in accordance with special Circular # 262[a]. For him to refer to current Japanese-American negotiations for more amicable diplomatic relations not only aggravates the situation but also is inappropriate when the Tripartite alliance is concerned. Previously a contribution was made by him and inserted in the *Tribune*. We are very anxious of the effect this might have upon Japanese-American negotiations. Therefore, please rigorously caution him.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 9-23-41

No. 136

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 438.

(Part 1 of 3) Strictly secret.

Report of secondary importance.

One of our private spies, -----[a], told me that his old friend, -----[a], who left by clipper on the 4th as a special envoy to the Pope, informed him to the following effect in strict confidence:

1. *a.* ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL in their conference decided definitely on how to carry out measures to assist Great Britain, and they are very anxious, in this connection, to settle the Japanese question harmoniously (according to another report, they agreed that in case such an advantageous agreement could be reached, the American Pacific fleet would be transferred to the Atlantic). The American Government recently sent instructions to Ambassador GREW that he should rally the pro-Anglo-Saxon elements in Japan and foster a tendency toward compromise with the United States among the anti-Axis group.

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[a]DoD Comment, Name withheld.

Trans. 10-2-41(?)

No. 137

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #438.

(Part 2 of 3) Strictly Secret

b. Great Britain and the United States have been directing their officials to emphasize that England and the United States will not relax their jointly vigorous attitude, and they have been endeavoring to force Japan to kneel.

2. The attitude of Premier KONOYE and the attitude of the Government toward the sailing of tankers has recently been mollified, which is taken by Washington officials as an indication of the success of this policy of theirs. They figure that as Japan becomes softer and softer, they can become harder and harder, and finally reach an understanding even on the Siberian question.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 138

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #438.

(Part 3 of 3) Strictly Secret

Nevertheless, they fear that the situation in Japan may in the future become such that if they make immodest demands and take too stringent steps, they might destroy the possibility of an ultimate composure of relations between Japan and the United States.

3. Therefore, President ROOSEVELT, in order to win our Empire over to the American camp, is very cautious, wishing to avoid taking too stringent steps or going too far in his demands. He wishes particularly to avoid doing anything that would jeopardize the cabinet of Prince KONOYE or its political prestige. The government, hence, is considering various angles of the question of sailing tankers. They are thinking of either giving a guarantee that the aid goods will not be left behind in Siberia or shipping them via the south tip of Kamchatka or by the northern detour around Persia.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 139

FROM: Tokyo September 6, 1941
TO: Washington #535.

Secret

I would like to have Minister WAKASUGI return at once. Will you, therefore, request the United States authorities to assist you in making a reservation for him on a Clipper and let me know the results? In case you find it impossible to get this reservation, there is no other ship which he could take except the Terukawa Maru of the Kawasaki line sailing on the 12th. This ship is scheduled to leave Manzanillo on October 1. However, if it is possible to make the aforementioned reservation on an airplane, please bear in mind that we would like to have for use by another party the stateroom reserved for him.

Trans. 9–8–41

No. 140

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 6, 1941
536(?).

Message to Canton # 155.

Secret.

Please inform me by return wire whether there is a ship leaving your city for Hongkong on or about the 15th. We need this information because Minister WAKASUGI is returning to Japan.
Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 141

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 10, 1941
550.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re my # 535[a].

Please make your reply by noon of the 12th (Japan time).
Furthermore, it seems as though the Terukawa Maru will be one or two days late in leaving.

[a] See III, 139, requesting the immediate return of Minister Wakasugi.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 142

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

September 10, 1941
803.

Re your # 535[a].

Although I requested the State Department for assistance in making reservations, it was without result. They told me that, inasmuch as there were no vacant places for several weeks, it was impossible to make reservations.

[a] See III, 139 in which it is requested that Minister WAKASUGI return to Japan at once.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 143

FROM: Tokyo — September 8, 1941
TO: Washington — #538.

1. Shortly the President is going to make a broadcast to the entire United States revolving around the Greer incident. It is not hard for you to imagine the extremely delicate situation within our country insofar as it relates to this incident. There is at present considerable fear that unnecessary and even undesirable results may ensue should any reference be made in this broadcast to Japan-American negotiations. Of course, we have absolutely no intention of interfering in this matter, but in order that there would be no misunderstandings on this point within American Government circles, on the morning of the 8th I had the official in charge of American affairs in the Foreign Office inform the American Ambassador in Tokyo to this effect. However, I would like to have Your Excellency have an informal chat with the Secretary of State about this matter.

2. The Government is deeply grateful for Your Excellency's endeavors during the past several months in connection with the adjustment of Japan-American relations. It is viewed that at long last your efforts are bearing fruit. Now and henceforth too, it is our sincere hope that you will work to the fullest extent of your capabilities.

Trans. 9–8–41

No. 144

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — Unnumbered.

With the instructions you have been sending me regarding the adjustment of Japanese-American relations fully in mind, I have been working hard day and night in hopes of accomplishing something. Will you please get from IWAKURO WAKASUGI detailed information concerning the situation prevailing in this country. I believe there is no longer a single doubtful point on the part of Japan. Recently when a German submarine attacked an American destroyer, the public opinion here was not stirred up in the least; whereas, as you may see from the Gallup poll (Of course, some people say that there is some question as to how accurate the Gallup poll is.), there has been a sudden increase of opinions in favor of preventing Japan's further advance even at the risk of war. The percentage was 51% in July, but it now has risen to 70% and it is apparent that, while the United States Government cannot help but be more concerned than ever over the question of safety of ocean travel in the Atlantic, it is becoming increasingly involved with the Pacific as well. Consequently, it is thought that should an incident occur in the Pacific similar to the aforementioned attack upon the destroyer, the situation would become irreparable. That people do not become incensed over Germany, but over Japan, is in my estimation, attributable largely to the fact that there is a strong sentiment against sending an expeditionary army, whereas there is no need of using the army in case of a Japanese-American war.

The payment for war materials at present exceeds $1,000,000,000 monthly average and production has increased four or five-fold over that for last year.

Trans. 9–10–41

No. 145

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #806.

Report B.

With regard to the speech which the President is expected to make on the 11th, *speculations* are being *made*. Some say that a shooting patrol will be put into effect in self-defense between the United States and Iceland; others point out the fact that Germany had started the shooting and that the real reason for ----- having taken this opportunity shows that her true intention is to seek a showdown with Japan and thereby nip the Japanese-American negotiations in the bud.

Note: Two full lines of text were left out; consequently, the italicized portions are assumptions by the translator.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 146

FROM: Tokyo September 10, 1941
TO: Berlin #800.

(Part 2 of 2)[a]

is apt to stiffen the American public opinion more and more and hasten America's military preparations. In the meantime, while every time anything occurred the United States resorted to stronger measures against Germany, Germany has been maintaining a calm attitude toward the United States. Japanese aim should be to persist in an attempt to keep the United States out of war. Rather than to provoke the United States at this time and cause her people to unite, it would be better to quiet her feelings and work toward her internal disintegration. He said that this also is a way of looking at this matter.

3. At the time the above conversation took place, the ----- Ambassador asked me (a question?) but I went no further in my explanation but -----.

[a] Part 1 not available.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 147

FROM: Tokyo September 12, 1941
TO: Washington #556.

I am sending you for your perusal as separate telegram #557[a], the memorandum which the American Ambassador in Tokyo handed to me the evening of the 10th. (He called my special attention to the fact that it was not a diplomatic note in the strict sense of the word, but he was handing it to me for reference.) We are at present considering how this matter should be disposed of, and so please be informed that there is no need of your taking any steps in regard to it.

[a] See III, 148-153.

Trans. (Not dated).

No. 148

FROM: Tokyo — September 12, 1941
TO: Washington — # 557.

(Separate Wire)

(Part 1 of 6)

The Government of the United States is at present examining the proposals communicated to the American Ambassador by His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on September 4, and also communicated to the Secretary of State by His Excellency, Admiral NOMURA on September 6th.

The American Government has in view an agreement conforming to the principles and methods which it has put forward, an agreement under the terms of which China would receive just and equitable treatment, in which the rights and interests of all Pacific powers would be given due consideration; and which would make a substantial contribution toward the establishment and maintenance of a just, stable and orderly peace. Since the hostilities existing between Japan and China are a basic factor in the problem of reaching a general settlement in the Pacific area, a fair and just settlement of their controversies by China and Japan is an essential condition to any general solution of the Far Eastern problems which might be expected to provide for the future peace and stability of that area.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 149

FROM: Tokyo — September 12, 1941
TO: Washington — # 557.

(Part 2 of 6)

The proposal as originally advanced by the Japanese Government provided for the exercise of good offices by the President of the United States, and the Japanese Government was informed that the Government of the United States was not prepared to suggest to the Chinese Government that it undertake negotiations with the Japanese Government unless the Government of the United States was convinced that the terms which the Government of Japan had in mind were consistent with the principles to which the American Government is committed. A deadlock was reached in the informal discussions between our two governments in regard to these terms as a result of the insistence on the part of the Japanese Government that Japanese troops were to be stationed in Inner Mongolia and North China for an unspecified period, and also because of the fact that the Government of the United States was not able to elicit from the Japanese Government specific assurances that the principles of non-discrimination in commercial relations between nations would be applicable to the program of economic collaboration with China which Japan proposed to adopt.

The Government of the United States has consistently sought an agreement the aim and terms of which shall lead to an all-embracing and durable peace in Eastern Asia and in the area of the Pacific.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 150

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 12, 1941
557.

(Part 3 of 6)

The latest proposals submitted by the Japanese Government, it would appear, seek to break the deadlock, not by responding to the desires of the United States Government on the above points, but by proposing that Japan shall negotiate with China directly, on the premise that, since the good offices of the President are not to be sought, the Government of the United States would not be concerned with the character of the terms of peace which Japan intends to propose to China or with the progress of the conflict between China and Japan. Any such premise as the foregoing passes over or ignores the intention of the United States Government, which has been repeatedly impressed upon the Japanese Ambassador, to confer with the Government of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, etc., before it could agree to embark on any definitive negotiations with the Japanese Government regarding a settlement involving the Pacific area. This intention of the Government of the United States is based on its view that the peace of the Pacific is not a question which can be decided by the United States and Japan alone but is a question in which other powers having interest in the Pacific have a legitimate concern and unavoidable responsibilities.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 151

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 12, 1941
557.

(Part 4 of 6)

Nor would the Government of the United States be prepared to conclude any agreement which would restrict the degree of assistance that it is now rendering or may in the future wish to render to nations which are engaged in resisting aggression. It is possible to assume that the Government of China, to no less a degree than the Government of Japan, desires to effect a peaceful solution of its controversies with Japan, and that, therefore, provided the Japanese Government is ready to propose equitable and just terms to the Chinese Government, the two nations should find it possible to settle their difficulties. In the event of such an occurrence the need for any provision such as that embodied in point (A) of the commitments which it is proposed that the Government of the United States undertake would appear to be eliminated.

In the light of the considerations set forth above it is clear that some further initiative from the Japanese Government is required in order to effect a solution of the above-mentioned difficulties. It would be of assistance to the Government of the United States if an answer could be obtained from the Japanese Government to the following questions which have arisen as the result of the discussions:

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 152

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 12, 1941
557.

(Part 5 of 6)

1. In point (A) of the provisional commitments which the Japanese Government is to undertake it is indicated that Japan is prepared to subscribe to the points upon which tentative agreement had already been reached during the informal preliminary conversations held in Washington. Does the Japanese Government have in mind the points whose formulation as set forth in the draft of the Government of the United States of June 21st are identical to those appearing in the draft which was handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on September 4th or those appearing in some prior draft?

Sould the answer to the first question propounded in paragraph 1 be in the affirmative it would seem that certain of the stipulations contained in the proposals conveyed to the American Ambassador by the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 4th are more limited than are the undertakings provided for in the formulae on which tentative agreement has been previously reached. As an example, in point (F) the Japanese Government undertakes to refrain from discrimination in matters of international commerce in the area of the Southwest Pacific.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 153

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 12, 1941
557.

(Part 6 of 6)

2. With relation to the example above cited affecting point (F), is it the intention of the Japanese Government not to undertake similar commitments in regard to its economic activities in other regions notably in China?

3. In regard to the general question of international commerce, further clarification would be desirable with regard to the meaning of the provisions of point (E) relating to American economic activities in China, namely, the precise meaning of the term "equitable basis" and whether this term is intended to mean that Japan shall be the sole judge in determining what constitutes an equitable basis.

4. Is the Government of the United States to understand that the terms of peace which Japan intends to propose to China will be in conformity with the several points appearing in the, annex to, Section 3 of the draft submitted by the Japanese Ambassador on September 4th which is referred to above? In connection with the formula outlined under point (C) dealing with respective attitudes of the United States and Japan towards the European war, while the American Government considers that this formula does not *fully meet the* (?) requirements of the situation since it leaves Japan free to interpret independently any commitment on this score, the Government of the United States would like to examine the question further before putting forth any suggestions.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 154

FROM: Tokyo — September 10, 1941
TO: Washington — # 553.

Very Urgent.

When Ambassador GREW called on me at 6:00 p.m. on the 10th, he mentioned the fact that you had submitted a proposal to the United States Government on the 4th. This proposal has not been referred to in your # 782[a]. Will you wire me and tell me what proposal is meant?

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[a]See III, 127–129 which tells of NOMURA's conversation with HULL on the 4th at which time HULL dealt with the four basic principles in the Oral Statement.

Trans. 9–10–41

No. 155

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 607.

Re your # 553[a].

Prior to receiving the Imperial Government's reply in your # 526[b], I, on my own initiative, with the view of continuing conversations, as well as to sound out their opinion, made a number of additional revisions to the (original ?) American proposal and presented these to them as my own suggested proposals. However, because of the receipt of the Imperial Government's reply, I withdrew these.

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[a]See III, 154 in which Tokyo wires Nomura that Grew mentioned the fact that he had submitted a proposal to the United States Government on the 4th and asks what proposal is meant.

[b]See III, 120 in which Tokyo wires Washington that if the last clause in # 524 III, 119 causes misunderstanding, request—to rescind this clause.

Trans. 9–12–41

No. 156

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 798.

(Part 1 of 2[a].)

Re your # 538[b].

On the morning of the 10th I called on HULL, and in compliance with the purport of your telegram, I asked that no (reference ?) be made to (questions ?) concerning Japan in the broadcast which the President is to make on the 11th. HULL did not commit himself one way or the other, but said that on the basis of the past ----- regarding maintenance of secrecy, he agreed to it.

I then asked him when a reply to Japan's proposal of the other day may be expected. HULL replied that he had had no opportunity since the (cabinet meeting ?) held last Friday to confer personally with the President and that since he expected to confer with the President fol-

lowing the broadcast on the 11th, he would reply on the basis of that conference. Remarking that the reply of the Japanese Government seems to have very much narrowed down the (scope ?) of the past conversations, he appeared to be dissatisfied.

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[a] See III, 157 in which NOMURA states that he has omitted from his reply the points of agreement and made an extract of the points upon which no agreement had been reached; it also discusses the Greer incident.

[b] See III, 143 in which Tokyo expresses fear that undesirable results may ensue should any reference to Japan-American negotiations be made in the President's broadcast.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 157

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 798.

(Part 2 of 2)

I told him that, as I had mentioned in my reply, I had omitted the points upon which we have agreed and made an extract of the points upon which no agreement has yet been reached.

At any rate, it seems that the United States Government is trying to find out what Britain, China and the Netherlands have to say about the question.

In the course of our conversation HULL said in reference to the discrepancy between the American and German announcements on the Greer incident that while the report of the United States Government is consistent with its past reports, HITLER has time and again contradicted himself and for this reason, personally, he considers the United States report entirely reliable. So remarking, he severely criticized the reliability of the German Government.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 158

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 606.

Separate wire.

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States hereby mutually pledge themselves that the Japanese and the American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In pursuance of this policy, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which Japan and the United States will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and the development of its own economy. They, furthermore, agree to cooperate each with the other, especially toward obtaining commercial, -----, on a non-discriminatory basis, by each of them to supplies of such basic commodities as oil, rubber, tin, nickel, and any other commodity the importation of which is essential to each country for the maintenance of its economic life.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 159

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #804.

(Part 1 of 4)

When I conferred with Secretary HULL the afternoon of the 10th, he said there were as many as four different papers which we had submitted regarding the Japanese proposal given in your #529[a], and since he had some question as how these were inter-related, he would like to clarify the matter. However, I discouraged him from doing so. In the afternoon, at the request of the Secretary, HAMILTON (accompanied by BALLANTINE and SCHMIDT) called on me and asked me to explain the points given below contained in our proposal[b]. I gave them an explanation. Incidentally, they explained their desires. Please ----- -----.

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[a] See III, 122 which gives the text of the Japanese proposal.
[b] See III, 161A.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 160

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #804.

(Part 2 of 4)

1. In (a), in reference to the "undertakings" of Japan specifically what matters are meant by "matters upon which the two countries have agreed during the preliminary informal conversations?" Can the draft of the Japanese-American understanding which formed the basis of the past negotiations be made as it stands the basis of future negotiations? Do the words "without any justifiable reason" in (b) modify the last part of the clause and not the entire clause?

They asked for an explanation of the entire clause (d), but I avoided giving any explanation in view of the ----- of the matter. They appeared as if they wanted to ask questions concerning the point dealing with stationing troops for anti-communistic purposes and also concerning the word "agreements".

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 161

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 804.

(Part 3 of 4)

It appears that Japan in (e), by means of the appendix to the KONOYE message (your # 503[a]), had agreed to the principle of equal treatment in the entire Pacific area, including China. As this clause is written it gives the impression that Japan holds a special position in China. This seems as if it is conflict with the above fact.

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[a] See III, 69–75 in which the Japanese Government sets forth its viewpoint on the communication given to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on August 17, 1941 by the United States Government.

Trans. 9–12–41

No. 161A

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 804.

(Part 4 of 4)

In the beginning of (f) are the words "Southwestern Pacific Area". Why was it limited to Southwestern Pacific instead of specifying the whole Pacific area?

2. Among the (undertaking/s) in (a), things which the United States have done are mentioned. Specifically what things are meant? Relative to this question, is Japan still thinking that the United States will mediate between Japan and China? If so, this clause seems both unnecessary and out of place. What exactly is meant by it?

Trans. 9–12–41

No. 162

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 805.

Re my # 804[a].

When HAMILTON called on me he (again ?) made the request that the entire of Section 5 of the American proposal be revised in accordance with my separate wire # 606[b].

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[a] See III, 159.
[b] See III, 158.

Trans. 9–12–41

No. 163

FROM: Tokyo — September 10, 1941
TO: Washington — # 549.

I have been informed that lately KASAI, member of Diet, has been expressing, on Japanese-American relations and also on the Three Power Alliance, views which have caused arguments and also that he has been talking as if he had an important part to play in the Japanese-American negotiations.

Now if this report is true, will you strongly warn him against speaking in public and contributing articles to newspapers on the present political situation, for, in view of the present delicate circumstances such action on his part might prove harmful to him not to mention of its having generally an undesirable effect.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 164

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 808.

Re your # 549[a].

Yiguti conveyed to Kasai the purport of your message and suggested that in the future he refrain from contributing to newspapers, etc. He agreed to this, but at the same time explained that the efforts he had put forth were with the sincere conviction that they were in the interest of bettering Japanese-American relations; but that it was regrettable that not a few times his opinions had been exaggerated by the newspapermen whom he had met.

[a] See III, 163—If Diet member Kasai is talking out of turn and swinging his weight around, warn him to stop. He may jeopardize the current U.S.-Japanese relations.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 165

FROM: Washington — September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 810.

(Part 1 of 4)

Through my various reports on the progress of the U.S.-Japanese preliminary negotiations, you are aware of the fact that the biggest difficulty being encountered concerns the matter of pertaining to the evacuating of our troops from China, and the garrisoning of our troops for anti-Communism purposes.

The United States insists that it is absolutely impossible for her to recognize the terms of the Tokyo-Nanking agreement because for one thing the domestic public opinion would not tolerate it, and for another, because her obligations to China would not permit it.

In the U.S. note of 21 June, the United States indicated that she desired a new agreement between China and Japan whereby Japanese troops could be removed at the earliest possible moment. Recently, the U.S. attitude along these lines has become stronger. She now indicates that Japan shall complete her evacuation of troops within a two year period subsequent to the resumption of peaceful relations.

(There are indications that this strengthened attitude on the part of the United States is the result of U.S. talks with China.)

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 166

FROM: Washington September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #810.

(Part 2 of 4)

The United States does not indicate absolute opposition to any of the points contained in our latest proposals. I get the impression that we will have very little difficulty with the United States on the various other points.

However, indications are that they are violently opposed to the matter pertaining to the removal of troops. I feel that there is much danger that the negotiations will break down in the final stages on this matter of troop evacuations.

As a means of handling this obstacle, I would like to trouble you for your opinion on the advisability of accepting the lines of the U.S. suggestion and agree to remove our troops within two years after the restoration of peace.

I pointed out in my message #804[a] that this point was thoroughly explained to the State Department official who called on me yesterday. I am very anxious that we make a definite decision on this point immediately so that I may be better able to continue with these negotiations.

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[a] See III, 159 State Department is inquiring further on exactly what our position is. We have given them four notes so far, to their proposals. They are particularly questioning our interpretation of several of the phrases in the notes.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 167

FROM: Washington September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #810.

(Part 3 of 4)

Fundamentally speaking, the matter of evacuating our troops is purely one to be settled between Japan and China. It is only because of our obligations of using the good offices that it is being considered here at all. Let us assume that the Imperial Government accepts these terms and that as a result the negotiations do take place. Considerable time would necessarily elapse from the time that the "leaders" meet until the details of this meeting are agreed upon and further, until the peace conference is called. It is quite possible that this will require a year or more.

Let us further assume that we do, at this time, agree to evacuate our troops within two years subsequent to the resumption of peaceful relations. Much can happen during that time in world affairs which may make it essential that we enter into a new agreement at a subsequent date to extend the period of garrisoning our troops in China. We may be able to prolong the time limit in the name of protecting our nationals' lives and property, depending on the circumstances at the time.

I cannot believe that this point conflicts with any of the salient points of our established national policy.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 168

FROM: Washington — September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #810.

(Part 4 of 4)

I realize of course that from various domestic problems this is exceedingly difficult, but we would certainly appreciate being advised.

It is true that the phrase "stationing of troops to counter communism" would be deleted. However, it may be possible to station some troops "to act in cooperation with the Chinese to counter acts which imperil the tranquility of the nation (non-militaristic in nature).

Taking this opportunity, I wish to say that I have observed that the Japanese press on one or two occasions, have publicly stated that an understanding between the United States and Japan is at hand. In view of the fact that there are such delicate problems as the matter of evacuating our troops still to be settled, we do not believe that such optimistic views are warranted or are to our interest. At press conferences here, Hull himself has denied that there is room for such optimism. Will you please, therefore, offer suitable editorial guidance to the Fourth Estate.

Trans. 9-27-41

No. 169

FROM: Tokyo — September 11, 1941
TO: Washington — #554.

Re your message #771[a].

The text of such notes as were contained in my messages Nos. 502[b] and 503[c] is decided upon after very careful study by all of the various ministries involved. In all of these very important documents we have made it the practice to submit the texts to both the government and the controlling elements of the parties for their approval before they are transmitted. Hence, you can see that we take every possible precautionary measure.

If, however, you note any points in such message, you should make inquiries and suggestions by cable to us before delivering them to the addressees. Much caution will have to be exercised in maintaining liaison with the various departments so please bear that in mind.

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[a] See III, 81.
[b] See III, 67, 68.
[c] See III, 69-75.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 170

FROM: Washington — September 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #822.

Re your #554[a].

There is sound logic behind everything you say. I feel deeply responsible for the inadvertent omissions which were made in the translation.

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[a] See III, 169—Before transmitting such important notes as my reply to the State Department and the reply to the President, various Ministries and organs are fully consulted.

Trans. 9-23-41

No. 171

FROM: Washington September 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #816.

The speech which ROOSEVELT delivered on the 11th was given in a grave tone of voice and without using any strong expressions; it was, in other words, comparable to a clenched fist clothed in a silk glove. In content it was a strong speech, amounting actually to a challenge to war on the seas (in the air, on and in the water). As to detailed information concerning the reactions to this speech, please refer to our special report. Judging from the fact that various newspapers are on the whole in favor of ROOSEVELT, it may be said that he has succeeded in accomplishing what he intended to accomplish.

Furthermore, there are many factors driving the United States straightway into this war. One factor may be said to be the fact that due to circumstances resulting from great expansion of productive and economic organizations undertaken under the pretext of national defense ever since the opening of the war between Great Britain and Germany, these economic and productive organizations must of necessity disintegrate unless the United States joins the war. ----- since they do not agree on ----- -----, such an incident as the Greer incident may be regarded as welcome to ROOSEVELT from the standpoint of quickly turning public opinion in his favor.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 172

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #811.

Following ROOSEVELT's speech on the evening of the 11th LINDBERGH spoke at a meeting of the America First Committee at Des Moines in Iowa saying that England, Jewry and the Roosevelt Administrators composed a three party alliance which was leading the United States into war.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 173

FROM: Tokyo September 12, 1941
TO: Washington #1983/9.

(Circular) (Part 1 of 2)

1. Taking together various information which I have recently collected from Chinese sources with regard to recent Japanese-American relations, I have the following:

(1) Chungking is kept in constant anxiety about the United States' policy because it is prosecuted on the basis of the United States' interests alone and because it has had no effect as yet in strengthening Chinese power of resistance, and consequently Chungking cannot be sure whether preparations for the counter-offensive could be built up again. They regard also that the outcome of the current Japanese-American conversations depends upon how the Russo-German war will turn out, and even in case a compromise is arrived at by the United States and Japan, they think that there is little danger of it being made at the expense of

Chiang. However, actually the Chinese authorities are wondering what will happen. It is said that Chiang had Ambassador ----- propose to the United States Government that in case the question of Japanese-Chinese peace comes up for discussion, the settlement would be made on the basis of President ROOSEVELT's eight-point principles and that to this proposal HULL had replied that the United States would not sacrifice Chungking.

(2) Among those in Chungking, there are many who say that should a war break out between Japan and the United States, it would be to China's advantage. On the other hand, there are not a few who say that should such a war break out, it would prove unprofitable to Chungking, because the United States will have no time to pay any attention to Chungking, and because of stoppage of material aid, China would suffer a severe blow. Recently this question was debated in a conference held by Chungking leaders, but no definite conclusion resulted because these two different views remained irreconcilable.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 174

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 12, 1941
1983/9.

(Part 2 of 2)

(3) Recently an influential official engaged in special affairs duties for the Chungking Government let out his views to the effect that it would not be difficult for the United States to bring Japan to submission but that if, perchance, the United States should seek temporary stability at the cost of Chungking, Chungking will continue her anti-Japanese resistance unaided. SUN FO[a] entertains an even stronger view. However, such views held by important members of the Chungking regime are expressed in accordance with the propaganda order of that government and so cannot be regarded as being representative of the real psychology of that government.

(4) To be sure, the Nanking Government also is interested in the possible development of Japanese-American relations. According to a report made by Ambassador HONDA, most of the important members of that government are of the opinion that since the United States has no intention of fighting against Japan, a war will not break out. Although, generally speaking, no serious consideration has yet been given to what the attitude of the government would be with regard to this question, the officials, greatly exaggerating the power of the United States, seem to think that in case a war breaks out, Japan's defeat would be inevitable, and should this happen, since Japan will have no time to concern herself with the People's Government, the foundation upon which the new government is being built will begin to shake, and maintenance of peace and order in the jurisdiction will become impossible. Being anxious, they seem to be very eager to see the war averted.

[a] Member of the Central Executive Yuan.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 175

FROM: Tokyo — September 13, 1941
TO: Washington — # 561.

Re your # 804[a].

On the 13th we made explanation to Ambassador Grew as per English text of my # 562[b] and you will also give reply accordingly to the United States.

---

[a] See III, 159–161.
[b] See III, 176.

Trans. 9–15–41

No. 176

FROM: Tokyo — September 13, 1941
TO: Washington — # 562.

(In 5 parts—complete)[a]

Chief of Office Routing

Separate message

Part 1

1. (a) The proposed draft of an understanding which has been constituting a basis for informal negotiations between Japanese and the United States Governments will continue to be a basis for further discussions. The points upon which we deem a tentative agreement had already been reached during the informal preliminary conversations in Washington comprise the preamble to the proposed understanding, the concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations, and the matter concerning the good offices of the United States to the relations between Japan and China.

Although it seems that there is a misunderstanding on the part of the United States that Japan does not want good offices of the United States in the settlement of China affairs, the Japanese Government has by no means refused the good offices of the President of the United States and is still, as before, wishing for them.

Part 2

(b) The term "without any justifiable reason" applies merely to the latter part of point "B" of the undertaking to which Japan is ready to commit itself.

(c) For the purpose of preventing Communistic and other subversive activities threatening the safety of both Japan and China and also of maintaining the peace and order in China, Japan and China will cooperate in the form of common defense.

The executive of the common defense by Japan and China will contain the stationing of Japanese troops for a certain period in accordance with the agreements between both countries. The Japanese troops which have been sent to China with the object of executing the China affairs will be withdrawn when the said affairs have been settled.

(d) The reason why the Japanese Government inserted point (E) as a matter to ----- ----- ----- (4 lines garbled ----- ----- wishes to show her intention of not obstructing any just and equitable economic activities of the United States in China. The government of Japan will not only admit the principle of non-discrimination with regard to commerce in China as well as in southwestern Pacific area, but also it fully respects the established rights and interests of the

United States in China. However, it considers that the especially close economic relations between Japan and China natural from their geographical propinquity are the same kind of relations as those which exist between any other two neighboring countries.

Part 4

Indeed, there will be no reason why the principle of close economic relationship owing to the geographic propinquity shall not be applied to Japan's economic relations with China. Accordingly the close and especial economic cooperation between Japan and China within this limit will not establish so-called monopolistic or preferential rights and interests for Japan. Moreover, it is firmly believed such is a natural phenomenon in our human life, and the observance of this new law of nature is not only a factor of bringing about economic prosperity of the world, but the surest way for the firm establishment of the world peace.

Part 5

(e) Since matters relating to China, as has been stated above, are covered under point (d), the matter concerning Japanese economic activities in the southwestern Pacific area was clarified under point (e) in view of the fact that among other areas of the Pacific the United States is most concerned with the southwestern area of the Pacific.

2. The measures and actions referred to in point (a) among the proposed undertakings by the United States are meant to indicate acts of the United States in aid in various forms for the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

As for the "good offices" of the President of the United States they were referred to above.

[a]Part 3 not noted in original.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 177

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 13, 1941
563.

Re my # 557[a].

During my conversation with Grew on the 13th, I explained the meaning of "equitable basis" as per my # 564[b].

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[a]See III, 148-153.
[b]See III, 178.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 178

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 13, 1941
564.

"Equitable basis" means economic activities of a non-discriminatory character which are not monopolistic, exclusive and exploitive, qualified however, by the inevitable natural limitations referred to in e of the reply to questions put by Mr. Hamilton under instructions of Mr. Hull on September 10. Accordingly it goes without saying that Japan is not the sole judge in determining what constitutes "equitable basis".

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 179

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 13, 1941
560.

(In 2 parts—complete)

Re my # 529[a].

(1) According to your # 798[b], the contents of the main message have not yet been considered by the President, but the following points in my message have in reality been "covered" in the ----- proposal that was conveyed to the United States from the Imperial Government: (a) Preliminary parleys have been included in our intentions. (b) But we wish to avoid having such parleys get into a discussion of minutiae and become long drawn out. (c) We would speed up the realization of a conference of the two leaders, (to try to go into a repetition of the reasons among the administrative officials would result in nothing taking shape, and we by all means feel the necessity of a statesman-like consultation between the two leaders). We made the one suggestion at that time that Japan and the United States should come to an agreement that would be reached from the standpoint of the whole situation. (In regard to this, the explanation you made to Hull, as given in your # 788[c], very satisfactorily serves its purpose.)

We therefore would have the contents of my reference message brought to the attention of the President himself with the request that he give some expression of his intentions.

(2) That we are not ----- with the kind of informal talks that Hull suggests, such as we have had thus far is evident from the messages that have been passing and from the whole situation, and it is clear from my reference message that this plan would enlarge the actual scope of the talks thus far held. While we are putting the stress on a settlement from the standpoint of the situation in its entirety, this would necessarily be based upon -----.

We would like to see a conference of the two leaders brought about soon with my reference message as the basis of these conversations, and reducing business and legal discussions to a minimum. Then later the negotiations now being carried on may be resumed as may be necessary.

(3) The United States seem to be asking us to recognize their so-called four principles, but we could not gulp those down as a whole, without having had their reply to the above mentioned reference message. ----- would give the impression that it was due to "pressure" from the United States. The attitude of the United States that they must consult Britain, the Netherlands, China, and other nations, might be interpreted to mean the revival of the nine-power treaty policies, which would hardly be appropriate now. It is very important that we keep it in form and fact a parley between Japan and the United States. Please bear in mind the importance of this point. (Even though as a matter of fact the United States should confer with Brit-

ain, the Netherlands, etc. we are not in a position to prevent this, and in fact it could not be prevented, but this is something of which we would not be cognizant; but what we mean is that we would avoid having this lead into a conference or an agreement of many countries.)

(4) This does not mean that we reject such questions as contained in your #814[d] and my #557[e] but the emphasis would be upon the points in my reference message, and our answer to these two messages will be sent shortly.

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[a] See III, 122–124.
[b] See III, 157.
[c] See III, 131–134.
[d] Not available.
[e] See III, 148–153.

Trans. 9–15–41

No. 180

FROM: Washington — September 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #819.

(In 3 parts—complete)

Re your 561 to 563[a].

Points that have occurred to us here:

(1) Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies once, and that they are as "two in one".

(2) The expression "Communistic and other subversive activity" would arouse their caution, and the words "common defense in China" would give rise to questions, while "agreement" would still leave a doubt as to just what it does mean in concrete terms.

(3) The United States has intimated that it wants to be advised of the peace terms between Japan and China and has further indicated that she would refuse to act as intermediary in the peace negotiations unless the terms were fair and just. Under such circumstances, I feel certain that the United States will not agree to promoting the peace conference if we now avoid outlining our terms.

(4) In view of the national characteristics of the United States and of the President's position, it will be next to impossible to leave the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact up to the "leaders" at the conference, for them to settle from a political viewpoint. In other words, if opinions of both sides do not coincide at the preliminary conferences, there will be no "leaders' conference".

(5) The United States has absolutely no objections to making these talks a Japanese-U.S. affair. Moreover, she has never even suggested the addition of a third power to it. The only thing they want to do is to arrange matters with Britain, China, Netherlands, etc. in advance, so that they will not get the impression that the United States is trading them off. However, I shall, of course convey the gist of your instructions to Hull.

(6) I have been doing everything in my power, however insignificant my efforts may seem, to carry out your various instructions and suggestions concerning the proposed negotiations. I fear, however, that if I were to go ahead and make some disposition of the various points you are discussing in Tokyo, I may find myself going off at a tangent. I should like, therefore, to leave these points alone for the time being and watch developments.

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[a] # 561 (See III, 175).
562 (See III, 176).
563 (See III, 177).

Trans. 9–18–41

No. 181

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 823.

(Parts 1 and 2 of 3)

(1) On 6 August, I said at the White House that of the three main points, both parties were in agreement in principle on two. As for the matter pertaining to our evacuating our troops, I expressed my opinion that it was only because he was confident that an agreement could be reached that the Premier is prepared to attend the meeting. At that time, the Secretary of State said that there were two or three other points that had to be clarified and "brought up to date". When he said that, he was referring to our proposal of 24 June.

Although we are aware of your instructions contained in your message # 397 of 24 July,[a] since the negotiations broke down at about that time, we could do nothing about your instructions of 15 July. The break-down continued, and the talks were resumed only after the recent message was sent.

(2) The "understanding" which was put into words and submitted as a proposal on 24 June, was the culmination of over a dozen conferences between the Secretary of State and myself, in accordance with your instructions of 11 May. The Secretary and I conferred almost up to the moment he departed on his trip in behalf of his health. It is natural that the Secretary feels considerably attached to the proposal, since he had worked on it so hard for so many months.

It is my opinion that the U.S. will be more likely to come to terms at the preliminary negotiations if the general lines contained in that proposal were followed.

Hull (insists ?) that the negotiations be held here.

---

[a] See III, 9—You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined on a definite policy because of the fact that I have not as yet been in office very long. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U.S. Should the U.S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (Such as the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the U.S. of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.

Trans. 9–19–41

No. 182

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #823.

(Part 3 of 3)

In view of the above facts, I believe that it is doubtful whether the preliminary negotiations can be arranged in accordance with only our proposal of 4 September. In any event, our first task is to find terms which are acceptable to both sides concerned, regarding the three points—particularly regarding the matter of garrisoning troops.

According to information from that usual source, the atmosphere of the Cabinet meeting held here last Friday showed considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U.S. conference. There is no mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the preliminary arrangements can be made.

Nishiyama (Financial Attache) says that a very good friend of his told him that Hull said to him (the friend) that the President "went too far" during the talks with this Ambassador.

Trans. 9-19-41

No. 183

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #829.

The following is what NISHIYAMA[a] heard:

HULL said that Japanese-American negotiations do not look as hopeful as they did two weeks ago; that due to so many conflicting opinions within the Japanese Government, it is hard to say what will happen; that the plan of bartering oil and raw silk cannot as yet be carried out; and that there is nothing to do but wait and see for another two weeks.

I have sent the above in hopes that this information will be of some use in judging the attitude of the United States Government.

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[a] Financial Advisor at Washington Embassy.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 184

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #830.

Strictly Secret.

Re your #577[a].

This interview brought out in my #808[b] happened before we met him. Since then, as you are well aware, there are indications that he has been very careful in word and deed. Recently, having been advised of this matter, he is being exceptionally careful.

With regard to KASAI's interview, in reply to questions put to him by newspapermen, he stated that he was, of course, in accord with the statements and arguments of WHEELER and LINDBERGH. These views, he stated, were his own and not the views of this office. Subse-

quently there have been various criticisms made in regard to the activities of M. P. SHINOHARA. In accordance with my requests to the Home Office in my #760[c], I would like to have you arrange to discontinue dispatching to the United States so-called observers, for whom there is no great need.

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[a] Not available.

[b] See III, 164 in which Diet Member KASAI is warned to refrain from contributing to newspapers.

[c] See III, 101.

Trans. 9-23-41

No. 185

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 20, 1941
TO: Washington #583.

(Message to Vichy #821)

On the 19th, a short-wave broadcast from San Francisco publicized a Washington report to the effect that the French Ambassador to the United States made representations to Secretary of State HULL that Japan must be made to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China. Please find out from the government to which you are accredited whether or not this is true. If it is true, file strong representations that we cannot help but regard this as a grave matter.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 186

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #838.

(Part 1 of 3)

Yesterday, for the first time in nine days, I called on HULL and asked him for his opinion on our proposal of September (4th ?)[a], but he did not give me much of a reply. He proceeded to say that since he had received a notice from Ambassador GREW that the Japanese Government was of the intention of making, in a day or two, a proposal that would be acceptable to the United States, he had been hoping that I might bring it to him tonight and that he was waiting for Japan's new proposal.

In response to a question I asked, he said that (on account of differences ?)[a] "the suggestion" with regard to the question of the meeting of the leaders ----- ----- ----- has not yet been made.

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[a] *Translator's note:* Due to garbles the correctness of these words cannot be vouched.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 187

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #838.

(Part 2 of 3) *Corrected Translation.*

I am sending you what I believe to be his views and which I gathered during my conversation.

1. He said that he had no intention of prolonging conversations, and that in so far as the desire for an early consumation of the negotiations is concerned, the United States is as eager as is Japan. This statement of his, however, better be taken as having been made merely for the sake of courtesy.

2. The United States is opposed to a policy which is partly peaceful and partly warlike. While peace reigns over the entire Pacific, Japan will no doubt make great progress and development in pursuit of a peaceful policy. Repeating what he said previously, he remarked that this would be profitable to Japan as well. He once stated that for the sake of peace in the Orient, it is essential that there be a strong Japan; however, he said, it would not be good if a policy is followed which consists of half military aggression and half peace. If a completely peaceful policy could be followed, the Japanese-American question can be settled overnight, and such as the Axis would be ----- -----.

3. He thought Japan's ----- is ----- than that of the United States. He seems to be receiving ----- reports concerning activities in connection with the first anniversary of the ----- alliance. He believes that there are more people in Japan who want peace than those who, together with Germany, want war.

Trans. 9-23-41

No. 188

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #838.

(Part 3 of 3)

4. He understood the point in your #560[a]: That the conversations should be limited to Japan and the United States. However, he pointed out the necessity of keeping in touch with countries whose interest was affected by the Pacific.

In other words, the observation I had given in my Nos. 822[b] and 829[c] was, on the whole, correct.

That the United States is suspicious of Japan is a fact which cannot be denied. Going more to the point, I might say it is the opinion of the United States Government that Japan intends to resort to force while appeasing the United States.

I received this morning your telegram #584 of this date; but please be informed that because of information concerning their attitude and also because of what HULL said, I did not transmit the content of my Nos. 822[b] and 829[c]. It should be noted that the solution of the question depends not on words but on what is actually done.

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[a] See III, 179 regarding the proposed conference between the leaders of Japan and the United States. Japan fears that the attitude of the United States, that they must consult Britain, the Netherlands, China and other nations, might be interpreted to mean the revival of the nine-power treaty policies.

[b] Not available.

[c] See III, 183.

Trans. 9-20-41

No. 189

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) September 20, 1941
TO: Washington #584.

Re my #561 to #565 inclusive[a].

With my conversation held on the 13th with the United States Ambassador here, all questions so far asked by the United States have been answered. Despite this fact the United States Government has not made its views known to us. Judging from past developments, I wonder if they are not waiting for a reply from you. If they are waiting, I would like to have you communicate at once to them the contents of the caption telegrams. In doing this, we shall assist you by negotiating parallelly through you. Will you thus try again to get the reply of the United States Government regarding the conference of the leaders and at the same time -----.

For reasons which you may easily surmise, we find it necessary to hasten this matter (of course you should not give them the impression that we are very much in a hurry about it) and since there seem to be various plans being made to celebrate the first anniversary of the Tripartite Agreement on the coming 27th (?), I would like to see something definite accomplished by that date.

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[a] #561—See III, 175.
#562—See III, 176.
#563—See III, 177.
#564—See III, 178.
#565—Not available.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 190

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) September 22, 1941
TO: Washington #585.

While what I gave in my #584[a] ----- is true, I would like to have you communicate to them the contents of my caption messages. You mentioned in your message about GREW's having spoken of the proposal that is acceptable to the United States. But what is this proposal? I have not conferred with him since the 10th, when I replied to questions asked by him as well as to those which HAMILTON asked you and explained at the same time that Japan had already said all that needed to be said. The American Ambassador (as well as Counsellor DOOMAN) knows this to be a fact, I, therefore, find it hard to understand why they told you such a thing. Will you please explain this to them and give them the contents of the caption messages at the same time and then wire me the results? I also shall inquire about the matter three or four days later. Depending upon circumstances, I intend to give confidentially to them our terms for disposing of the China Incident. It will not be a new proposal but merely an explanation of what we have already made known.

Please reply by wire at once.

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[a] See III, 189.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 191

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) September 22, 1941
TO: Washington #590.

(Part 1 of 2)

To be handled in government code.

Separate wire.

Basic terms of peace between Japan and China.

1. Neighborly Friendship.
2. Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity.
3. Cooperative Defense between Japan and China.

1. Cooperation between Japan and China for the purpose of preventing communistic and other subversive activities which may constitute a menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining the public order in China.

2. Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in the Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred to above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 192

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) September 22, 1941
TO Washington #590.

(Part 2 of 2)

4. Withdrawal of Japanese Armed Forces

The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China for carrying out the China affairs will be withdrawn from China upon the settlement of the said affairs, excepting those troops which come under point 3.

5. Economic Cooperation

(a) There shall be economic cooperation between Japan and China, having the development and utilization of essential materials for national defense of China as its principal objective.

(b) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any economic activities by Third Powers in China so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

6. Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang Ching-wei Government.
7. No Annexation.
8. No Indemnities.
9. Recognition of Manchukuo.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 193

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) September 22, 1941
TO: Washington # 589.

(Part 1 of 3)

At four o'clock on the afternoon of the -----, I requested a visit by the American Ambassador in Tokyo. During the course of conversation the American Ambassador stated that he would transmit the various opinions expressed to his home government.

1. With regard to conversations to be carried on by Premier KONOYE and leaders of both countries, the message addressed to the American President was clear in itself.

2. Furthermore, in the conversations to be carried out between the leaders of both countries, general principles have been decided. With regard to details, they were to be entrusted to negotiations between diplomatic officials. The attitude of the United States was that they intended to come to an agreement with regard to the various points which are now pending.

3. This I reiterated as I have already conveyed to you, that we have gladly answered all of America's (inquiries ?). We have already said all that need be said in regard to our sincerity and our attitude. Having come to this point we are today able to do nothing but wait for America's reply.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 194

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) September 22, 1941
TO: Washington # 589.

(Part 2 of 3)

4. Our proposals which I have tendered to you embrace all points which are now pending. We have made clear our attitude on a broad scope and we have not attempted to "narrow down" the proposals of the United States.

5. I remember that on the 10th a question was brought up by the American authorities, which you put in the form of a (question ?), having to do with mediation between Japan and China. I, in regard to this matter, have confidentially conveyed to you the terms of a fundamental peace between Japan and China. These confidential remarks of mine were not fresh proposals but should be understood as an explanation of our proposals of the 4th of this month. (I conveyed to him the terms of the fundamental peace outlined in my # 590[a].)

6. With regard to the situation in which Japan finds herself, (His or Your ?) Excellency, who is well versed in Japan's affairs, is well aware of the situation. For the past month the situation has steadily grown more critical. (On this point I would like to have you strongly impress the authorities of the United States.)

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[a] See III, 191-192.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 195

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) September 22, 1941
TO: Washington # 589.

(Part 3 of 3)

With regard to Japan-American negotiations, from the time that American newspapers began to editorialize on it, they have become a subject of conversation throughout the entire world. In Japan, too, one portion of public opinion well versed in this matter is greatly concerned. On the one hand within four or five days the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance is to be celebrated. Though the activities of this day of celebration will be similar to those of last year, the Government here is desirous of conducting these celebrations in as calm a manner as possible. Nevertheless, as far as this Minister is concerned there is a group within the country who with this anniversary as an incentive will take the opportunity to threaten Japan-American negotiations. We are extremely anxious for it is hard to say what incidents might be provoked.

7. This being the case, the situation within Japan herself is extremely critical. Therefore, we would like to have the agreement of the American authorities with regard to the conversations at least in principle at as early a date as possible.

The situation is becoming daily more critical. I would like to have you immediately pass on the details of this conversation of mine to the Secretary of State. Wire me his reactions to the above.

Trans. 9–22–41

No. 196

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 839.

(Part 1 of 4)

Currently the feeling here is, as ever, to aid the various countries on the side of the United States in carrying out the ultimate destruction of Germany. Though the Soviet, far more than was expected has been able to put up a remarkable fight, there are many who sense an early defeat. England and the United States render such assistance as is possible in order to make impossible a separate peace or surrender. They are hopeful of being able to maintain her fighting strength in the spring, provided she can weather the winter. Opinion has developed to this point. The United States is putting up an estimated $–0,000,000 [sic] worth of assistance. As a result of this, they plan to encourage the Briton's will to fight.

With regard to submarines, their utter annihilation is recognized to be virtually impossible. But then the American Navy could move directly into the Atlantic in order to protect Atlantic shipping. Furthermore, after the anticipated 6,000,000 "dead-weight" tons of increased construction have been completed by the United States alone during the twelve months of next year, a crisis will arise in the Atlantic. No one is unduly alarmed about the submarines.

Trans. 10–3–41

No. 197

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #839.

(Part 2 of 4)

With regard to the question of the policy toward -----, the people, as a general rule, are extremely happy-go-lucky. Should a war develop between Japan and the United States, "why worry, it's inevitable," is their attitude. There is still a great deal of talk on the comparative merits of the navies of both countries, the gist of which can be summed up as follows: A war between Japan and the United States will be one within the scope of the navy alone; Japan's economic strength cannot stand a long war; the United States excels greatly in its ability to replace warships lost in battle; saying these things, they boast of their ability to win out in a short while. There are only a few who are at all conscious of the danger of a war with Japan. In the field of international diplomacy, they still maintain their age-old policy toward -----. There are many who argue that to reach a compromise with Japan at the expense of China is fundamentally wrong. For example, according to the Hyde Park correspondent writing in the *New York Times*, Sunday edition, at the present time attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States are deadlocked. Because Japan's demands for the continued occupation of territory held by them in China is not in agreement with HULL's categorical denial of the possibility of such continued occupation, Premier KONOYE has requested a direct conference with the President.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 198

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #839.

(Part 3 of 4)

Nevertheless, notwithstanding all that, since the German people's will to fight is stronger than ever before, there are a greater number of people who feel that such a non-aggressive policy as outlined above cannot bring about a successful conclusion.

Many feel that as a result of the discontent of people in occupied lands, Italy will withdraw herself from the line of battle. In addition, many feel that the unrest of people in occupied areas will continue to increase. There are others, too, who pin unfounded hopes that the power of endurance of the German people will crumble within a short space of time.

If the war is to be a short one, one or two years will be required. If it is a long one, it will be protracted from five to ten years. The people generally here are maintaining an extremely happy-go-lucky frame of mind. There are practically none at all who think that as a result of this war the United States will be destroyed. With regard to their will to enter into the war, they feel that naval participation is sufficient. And, aside from the preparations being undertaken by military authorities, there are practically none who anticipate the dispatch of expeditionary forces on a large scale.

However, most recently there has been a sharp decline in the isolationist opinion expressed in the houses of Congress. One group is already going over to the majority group who back up the Government's foreign policy.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 199

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #839.

(Part 4 of 4)

Nevertheless, the President is a person who unceasingly confers with HULL. Today the greater portion of the American Navy is being kept in the Pacific. Japan, in the event of the Russian downfall, might move either to the south or to the north. In such a case there is some fear that a frontal clash might occur at the same time in the Atlantic and the Pacific as well. The President is giving the utmost consideration to this matter.

As for Japan's peace terms, rumors are being circulated that in addition to Japan demanding the treaty ports and the four southern provinces in China, she might go so far as to demand other points of military importance.

Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up forceful aggressions Japanese-American trade relations could be restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render economic assistance to Japan.

The above are the critical observations concerning the trend of opinion in the United States made by KURATUKUHOON,[a] and I think he hit the nail on the head.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 200

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) September 23, 1941
TO: Washington (Koshi) #591.

On the 23rd we had the reasons for keeping troops garrisoned in China placed before the Counselor of the U.S. Embassy, as given below, with the request that this be communicated to the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo and to the Secretary of State; and you will also please inform Hull of the same at once.

The reasons for which Japan deems it necessary to keep troops in certain specified areas, and for such time as may be required, even after the restoration of peace between Japan and China are: 1. For the purpose of cooperating in the building of a peaceful China, and at the same time 2. To contribute toward the protection of the safety of the international situation.

1. The perpetual lack of peace and order within China is something of which history bears witness, and this has especially been true of the disorder arising between the various provinces. This has not infrequently been taken advantage of by outsiders in making trouble between Japan and other third powers, so that time and again internal disorders have purposely been fomented into international strife. It is well known that the activities of the Communist Party have been most unremitting and destructive to the maintenance of peace and order. Such having been the situation there will be repetitions of it in the future, and it is hardly to be expected that ----- to advance the peace and stability of the living conditions of the Chinese people, and therefore it is of prime importance that plans be undertaken for the maintenance of peace and order within China, after the restoration of peace between Japan and China. It is with the desire to see this maintained that Japan would have China bend every energy toward the speedy realization of stable living conditions for the people. While Japan would like to

see China take up this task in her own strength, at present this is recognized as impossible (for reasons given in (2)) and therefore the Imperial Government will cooperate toward this end by keeping necessary military forces in certain areas for such a length of time as may be necessary.

2. Even from the economic standpoint, it is self-evident that the peace and order of adjacent areas would naturally have an important bearing upon the very existence of the Empire to say nothing of the direct and far reaching effects upon the existence of the Empire, that conditions in China after the conclusion of peace will have now, after such large scale warfare has been carried on for four years. It is only common sense to feel that it will not be easy to prevent the development of a serious situation in China as the scene due to causes both inside and from outside of China, at such a time as this, when nearly the whole world is involved in the ravages of war. For the purpose of preventing such a situation, that is, for the safeguarding of the very existence of the Empire, the keeping of troops there is a matter of sheer necessity. To sum it all up, the Imperial Government, for the above mentioned reasons deems it absolutely necessary to keep troops in China as mentioned above. However, it stands ready to withdraw such troops when the necessity shall no longer exist. ----- Japan "vitally" concerned in the maintenance of peace and order in China ----- (several groups garbled).

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 201

FROM: Washington — September 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #842.

(3 Parts—complete)

On the morning of the 23rd, I called on Hull and handed to him the English texts of your messages #562[a] and #564[b], and our terms of peace between Japan and China as contained in your message #590[c].

I took this opportunity to point out the following points: That with these notes, together with the various other statements made by us, we have said all that we can say; that we have nothing further to say to Ambassador Grew, either; that we shall leave all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact, other than the points which have already been brought up and explained, to be decided upon at the meeting of the leaders of the two countries; that the proposals which we now make are not intended to show down the original proposals made by the U.S., but rather are intended to enlarge their scope.

I continued by describing the situation and conditions in Japan in accordance with the contents of your message #589[d]. I added that our government was sincerely interested in having the "Leaders' Conference" materialize at the earliest possible opportunity.

Part 2. In reply to this, Hull said that he was spending much time in promoting the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference". He then said that he had previously expressed his hope that we would guide public opinion to a more favorable one, and inquired if we had been successful in this.

I replied that as I had pointed out on several previous occasions, the government had faced this problem with sincerity, and that it is gradually being improved.

Hull then asked for my own personal opinions on the matter, so I replied that it is the government's opinion that the Tripartite Pact and the improvement of U.S.-Japanese relations can be made parallel to each other. I also said that I was firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen the peace of the Pacific.

Part 3. Hull then advised me that he has received Grew's report of the Minister Toyoda-Grew meeting of the 22nd, and that he is giving it his careful study at the present time. He

said that he is anxious to reply to it at the earliest possible moment. I then tried to have him commit himself to be in favor of the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference", even if in principle only, but I was unable to make him say anything definite.

Hull then went on to say that in view of world conditions, it is not too early even now, for the U.S. and Japan to consider the reconstruction of a peaceful world. He, himself, thinks that Japan and the U.S. are ideally situated right now to lend leadership to the world. At the same time, however, he is not sure whether the caliber of the statesmanship of the two countries is capable of coping with such an undertaking.

I, therefore, said that even from this standpoint, it was essential that the "Leaders' Conference" take place.

With this, out meeting was brought to an end.

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[a] See III, 176—Detailed reply of Foreign Minister to Grew's request for interpretation of various phrases and paragraphs in Japan's notes and statements of intentions in the current U.S. negotiations.

[b] See III, 178—"Equitable basis" is not to be judged solely by Japan. (Refers to open door and commerce in China.)

[c] See III, 191—Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.

[d] See III, 193-195—Grew-Toyoda talk in which Japs again emphasize that all U.S. questions have now been answered and they therefore expect a U.S. reply on the leaders' conference question. The situation during the past month has steadily become more critical and will become more so, due to pro-Axis elements in Japan, if a decision is not reached prior to the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact on the 28th of this month. Tell the Secretary this and wire his reactions.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 202

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #847.

(Part 1 of 2)

I understood most of the ideas you expressed over the telephone just now. However, there are some things about which I am still a little in the dark. As I told you in my #842[a], in accordance with your instructions I told the Secretary of State that we have talked ourselves out and that our government has informed Ambassador Grew that we have nothing more at all to say. He said that he would reply just as soon as possible, so now I am just marking time waiting to see what they are going to do.

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[a] See III, 201 in which Ambassador NOMURA reports to Tokyo on conference with Secretary HULL on the 23rd.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 203

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #847.

(Part 2 of 2.)

I received your #591[a] yesterday. Even if I were to communicate this to them, I could not answer their questions as there are some points in it which I, myself, fail sufficiently to grasp. They might take it as a plan whereby troops could be stationed anywhere at all throughout the length and breadth of China. You spoke to me over the telephone about a written explanation. Will you please send this to me immediately for my own information. As you said, this is the last five minutes, and for my own part, I certainly want to carry out your instructions and do my very best to make things come out all right. (10:30 P.M.)

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[a]See III, 200 in which the Japanese Foreign Minister gives the reasons for which Japan considers it necessary to keep troops in certain specified areas in China.

Trans. 9–26–41

No. 204

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #452.

(Part 1 of 5)

Some days ago, I sent my spies on a secret trip to Washington and had them sound out the American attitude on the question of composing Japanese-American relations. Putting their reports together, I send you the following for your information.

1. Upon the return to power of Premier KONOYE, these negotiations were begun on the initiative of Japan, and seeing Japan's temperate attitude on the navigation of tankers and other matters also, Washington first concluded that this showed that Japan was in a desperate condition and ready to fold up. The officials had an optimistic air. Furthermore, reports of optimistic, though perhaps wishful thinking emanated from Tokyo, and it was estimated that the possibilities were good for binding up the wounds.

Trans. 10–9–41

No. 205

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 452.

(Part 2 of 5)

The subsequent delay, however, was occasioned by the following facts:

a. The suspicion grew that the *arrière pensèe* of Japan might be merely playing for time, waiting for Germany to get the upper hand in the land of the Soviets.

b. The feeling grew that under no circumstances should a compromise be reached at the sacrifice of China.

2. So far as Japan is concerned, America's desire to compromise with Japan concerns Japan, England, the Soviet, and the Far East. In so far as the European war is concerned, she wishes to maintain as, at present, her convenient position of strengthening Allied resistance in the European War. If the Axis powers should win, it would hold grave implications for American national defense. If Germany should get the upper hand of Russia, the United States wishes to be sure that the threat we constitute in the Pacific will be completely eliminated.

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 206

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 452.

(Part 3 of 5)

As a premise to any attempt to amend relations between the two countries, Japan must give up the principle of invasion. If Japan will revise her intent to seize territory, an understanding will not be impossible, but any understanding must be signed only on those terms. No temporary understanding will be reached for expediency's sake. Such is the temper of the American officials. Secretary HULL, who is taking the lead, asserts with assurance that the basis of the question of adjusting Japanese-American relations is in Japan's abandoning the principle of invasion. Thus, despite all parleys and negotiations, the United States is planning to send a military mission to China. This reflects the attitude of the Secretary and his associates. Furthermore, material is being furnished to China at present under the Lend-Lease Law.

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 207

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 452.

(Part 4 of 5)

At present the United States is laying vast plans for the reconstruction and cultivation of China. When this is considered (on this point, see my # 392[a]; please note carefully), it can be easily seen that even in case there were concluded a Japanese-American agreement, such assistance to China would keep up just as ever.

3. The gravest obstacle to undertaking negotiations for the establishment of amity between the two countries is that America's expressed desires do not coincide with Japan's present national policy. In Japan there are, it appears, many who would not approve of negotiations. Similarly, within the American Government there is a strong anti-Japanese wing who scorn making up with Japan and who resolutely say that a Japanese-American *rapprochement* is out of the question because it would involve necessarily the sacrifice of China. Chungking's propaganda to this effect has a strong appeal.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 208

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 452.

(Part 5 of 5)

The opposition of those who support this opinion must be carefully noted (particularly at present, Chungking is in contact with the American society called *The Friends of China* and has begun to cooperate with it in opposing the composure of relations between Japan and the United States. This point also requires attention. *The American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression*, which has been waging a vigorous campaign for economic sanctions against Japan, has begun a program against the President and the Secretary of State, opposing their efforts to settle the question), so there are two lines of thought in the United States, and all will depend upon whether or not it will be possible to harmonize them. As a matter of fact, the outlook is far from optimistic.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 109

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 26, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 2077.

(To be handled in Government Code)

As you are well aware, our country is facing the greatest crisis in her history. Since this crisis cannot be overcome except chiefly by diplomacy both the people and the government are placing their hope in the Foreign Office and are greatly concerned with the activity on the part of foreign office officials. Such being the present circumstances, while I shall gladly receive frank expression of opinions from our officials abroad and from all governmental offices, since any act on the part of ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- inimical to the solidarity of the entire Foreign Office personnel would not only interfere with the execution of our diplomatic policy but also be inexcusably unjust to those who are bending every effort to attain the objectives set before us—though it is hardly necessary for me to ask you this—I would like to have you inspire the members of your office more than ever so that those in and outside of the Foreign Office may as one body achieve the maximum diplomatic efficiency.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 210

FROM: Tokyo September 26, 1941
TO: Washington # 597.

In solving so difficult a problem as Japanese-American relations, Your Honor's troubles and anxieties have always been deeply appreciated by me. I can easily see that, concerning the negotiations, Your Honor's views are not infrequently at variance with mine; but, as I told you in my # 554[a], this is a very serious matter and I am proceeding cautiously and deliberately. Therefore, I wish to caution you again not to add or detract a jot or title on your own without first getting in contact with me. In this connection, please wire me back concerning the following points:

1. Have you communicated to them the contents of my # 590[b].
2. In your conversation with the President, did he not mention a promise on our part that we would avoid and cease any further increase in our troops stationed in French Indo-China for the sake of success in the Japanese-American negotiations? When the President stated with smiling cynicism that he expected we might occupy Thailand while the Premier and he were talking, just as we did French Indo-China while you and the Secretary of State were conferring (see you # 752.[c]), did he not also refer to such a promise? I think he probably di. In view of the seriousness of matters as they stand, although I know the hour is already late, be-

cause of the necessity of keeping records, I want you please to go and question them again. Now when Germany (?) is becoming so aroused, we have no intention of rehashing things which have been gone over in the past. Please, also, (tell this to them?). Needless to say, there will be no changes in my #595[d] of today, so will you please communicate it to them.

---

[a]See III, 169 in which Tokyo tells Ambassador NOMURA that the texts of certain notes are decided upon after very careful study by all of the various ministries involved. If however, he notes any points in such messages, he should make inquiries and suggestions by cable before delivering them to the addresses.

[b]See III, 191 in which Tokyo sends Washington the text of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.

[c]See III, 89 in which Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo of his conference with the President with regard to the meeting between Prince KONOYE and the President.

[d]See III, 213 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9–26–41

No. 211

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #852.

Re your #597[a].

1. I have communicated to them all of your #590[b]. (The words "China affairs" in my #842[c] are an example of the usual way of translating all along but I changed it to "China affair".)

2. No, the President did not mention any promise on our part that we would avoid and cease stationing troops in French Indo-China. He did not even question me as to whether we had many or few soldiers there.

3. Today I will tell Secretary HULL the contents of your #591[d] and #595[e].

4. You should understand without my telling you that I don't add or subtract an iota to or from the instructions you send me, so let your fears be at rest on this score. And in the case of your #591[d], however, the English text differs from the original so after you compose the English text you should have it checked well before sending it.

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[a]See III, 210. Tokyo tells Ambassador NOMURA to again question the Americans and submit to them the proposal contained in #595 III, 213 as there will be no changes made in it.

[b]See III, 191, 192 in which Tokyo sends Washington the text of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.

[c]See III, 201 in which Ambassador NOMURA reports to Tokyo on the conference with Secretary HULL on the 23rd.

[d]See III, 200 in which the Japanese Foreign Minister gives the reasons for which Japan considers it necessary to keep troops in certain specified areas in China.

[e]See III, 213 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9–27–41

No. 212

FROM: Washington — September 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Re your # 594[a].

1. Our attitude with regard to this matter at present—that is, while awaiting the reply from the United States—is exactly that which was so completely expressed by the Foreign Minister. I have received no new instructions regarding this matter today. If there has been any word from the U.S. Government, I would appreciate being advised thereof.

2. We would like to take this opportunity to present a paper which contains the proposals made by the U.S. on 21 June, together with our various notes to the U.S.

The above has not been written up in the form of a treaty or anything like that. Neither has it been so worded as to make it inflexible. The various essential points have been arranged so as to facilitate their perusal. It is not, of course, a new proposal. It was merely compiled for the sake of convenience.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 213

FROM: Tokyo — September 25, 1941
TO: Washington — # 595.

(In 7 parts—complete)

The governments of Japan and of the United States accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific cause of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is the earnest hope of both governments that, by a cooperative effort, Japan and the United States may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage the world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of both governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

Both governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved, to wit:

1. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting international relations and the character of nations.

2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic problems in the southwestern Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Accordingly, the government of Japan and the government of the United States have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy.

Section 1.—(The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting international relations and the character of nations.)

Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the peoples of both countries.

Both governments declare that it is their traditional and present concept and conviction that nations and races compose as members of a family one household, living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

Both governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

Section 2.—(The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.)

Both governments maintain it their common aim to bring about the peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the early restoration of the world peace.

With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration of the world peace, both governments will be guided in their conducts by considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United States should participate in the European war, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.

Section 3.—(Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.)

Both governments, taking cognizance of the fact that the settlement of the China affairs has a vital bearing upon the peace of the entire Pacific area and consequently upon that of the world, will endeavor to expedite a rapid realization of the settlement of the said affairs.

The government of the United States, recognizing the effort and the sincere desire on the part of the Japanese Government concerning the peaceful settlement of the China Affairs, will, with the intention of facilitating the realization of the settlement, render its good offices in order that the Chungking Government may promptly enter into negotiations with the government of Japan for a termination of hostilities and a resumption of peaceful relations, and will refrain from resorting to any measures and actions which might hamper the measures and effort of the government of Japan directed toward the settlement of the China affair.

The government of Japan maintains that the basic general terms of peace for the settlement of the China affairs will be in harmony with the principles embodied in the Konoye statement, and with those agreements between Japan and China and those matters which have been put into effect in accordance with the said statement; that the economic cooperation between Japan and China will be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of nondiscrimination in the international commercial relations and also with the principle of

especially close relationship which is natural between neighboring countries; and that the economic activities of third powers in China will not be excluded so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

Note: (There is appended a draft of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.)

Section 4.—(Commerce between Japan and the United States.)

Both governments agree to take without delay measures necessary for resuming normal trade relations between the two countries.

Both governments guarantee each other that they will, as the first of the measures envisaged in the preceding paragraph, discontinue immediately the measures of freezing assets now being enforced, and that they will supply mutually such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them.

Section 5.—(Economic problems in the southwestern Pacific area.)

Both governments mutually pledge themselves that the economic activities of Japan and the United States in the southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in the international commercial relations.

In pursuance of the policy stated in the preceding paragraph, both governments agree to cooperate each with the other toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which both countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring the goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

Both governments will amicably cooperate for the conclusion and execution of agreements with the powers concerned in regard to the production and supply, on the basis of non-discrimination, of such specific commodities as oil, rubber, nickel, and tin.

Section 6.—(The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.)

Both governments taking cognizance of the fact that it is a matter of vital importance to stabilize promptly the situation in the southwestern Pacific area, undertake not to resort to any measures and actions which may jeopardize such stabilization.

The government of Japan will not make any armed advancement, using French Indo-China as a base, to any adjacent areas thereof (excluding China), and, upon the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area, will withdraw its troops which are now stationed in French Indo-China.

The government of the United States will alleviate the military measures in the southwestern Pacific area.

Both governments declare that they respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies, and that they are prepared to conclude an agreement concerning the neutralization of the Philippine Islands when its independence will have been achieved. The government of the United States will guarantee the non-discriminatory treatment of the Japanese nationals in the Philippine Islands.

Basic terms of peace between Japan and China.

Since the rest is the same as that contained in my # 590[a], we shall not repeat it here.

At the beginning of this message please insert "strictly confidential."

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[a] See III, 191.

Trans. 9–26–41

No. 214

FROM: Washington — September 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 866.

(Foreign Office secret.)

When we presented the English text contained in your message # 595[a], Ballantine stated that the peace terms for the China Incident that were relayed to the State Department from Ambassador Grew contained nine articles, whereas that which we handed to him (that which was contained in your message # 590[b]) contained only the first five articles of those handed to Ambassador Grew. Thinking that possibly they were inadvertently omitted at the time of transmission I request that this message be checked and this office advised of your findings.

When delivering notes such as these, we usually state that since there is always the possibility of errors in transmission, we would like to have them go by similar instruments delivered to them from Ambassador Grew.

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[a] See III, 213. Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U.S. to agree to a "leaders' conference."

[b] See III, 191. Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 215

FROM: Tokyo — September 27, 1941
TO: Washington — # 605.

(In 4 parts—complete)

Translator's note: This is the gist of the off-the-record statement made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew—see Tokyo to Washington # 604[a]—and is written in the first person, Toyoda speaking.

(*Part 1*)

1. Europe has now fallen into a chaotic condition. The flames of war have spread to the Atlantic and they are enveloping the various powers of the world. Fortunately, however, no war has, as yet, broken out in the Pacific. The United States and Japan, alone, hold the key to continued peace or war in the Pacific.

Should the United States and Japan come to blows, the Pacific, too, would be immediately thrown into the chaos that is war. World civilization would then come crashing down. No greater misfortune could befall mankind.

In recent times, there have been numerous and various incidents between Japan and the United States. Relations are at an exceedingly sensitive point, and even the slightest thing must be treated with the utmost precaution.

If, at this time, Japanese-U.S. relations were to be adjusted so as to promote friendship between them, the effects would be felt not only by the United States and Japan, but would indeed contribute greatly to a world peace. The Imperial Government desires the adjustment of Japanese-U.S. relations not only for the sake of Japan and the United States, but hopes that at the same time, such a step would become the opening wedge to bringing about peace throughout the world.

2. Since assuming my post two months ago, I have been working on the matter of readjusting Japanese-U.S. relations even to the extent of almost forgetting to eat and sleep. It is with the same objective that Premier Konoye has expressed his willingness to act as a leader in a conference with President Roosevelt.

(*Part 2*)

3. Japan is connected to Germany and Italy by an alliance. The fact that the Premier of Japan had volunteered to meet the President, in itself has given rise to much misunderstanding regarding her relations with Germany and Italy. Thus, there is proof that Japan is making a supreme sacrifice. Moreover, the history of Japan has no precedence of an instance where the Premier himself has gone abroad in behalf of diplomacy. This fact in itself should clearly show the sincerity of the government of Japan in its expressed desire of adjusting the relationship between Japan and the United States, and through that, of maintaining peace in the Pacific and, indeed for the world.

4. Maintenance of peace is Japan's sole motivating power. Should there be those who believe that Japan was forced to her knees by U.S. pressure, it would indeed be a sad misconception on their part. Japan desires peace; she is not succumbing to outside pressure. Moreover, Japan is not one to yearn for peace at any price.

The Japanese people have a peculiar characteristic of repelling all outside pressures. We have pointed out this fact previously but in view of the general tone of U.S. newspapers in the past, (it is admitted that this has been considerably toned down of late), I feel that it is necessary to repeat this.

(*Part 3*)

5. Japanese-U.S. relations are exceedingly complicated. Hence, it is quite possible that the entire matter cannot be settled in a day and a night. It is quite possible that not all of the difficult problems can be ironed out by a single meeting between the leaders of the two countries. However, the political aspect of such a meeting would have exceedingly far reaching effects. Moreover, those items which have as yet remained unsettled (we do not believe that any of these exist any longer, but assuming that some do) after all of the goings and comings of cables, they could undoubtedly be settled at the conference. It should be unnecessary to point out the turn for the better in U.S.-Japanese relations that this would have.

We are under the impression that in theory, your side is not opposed to the holding of the "leaders' conference." Should, however, in spite of this, the meeting not materialize for some reason, we doubt if another opportunity such as the present would appear for some time to come. Moreover, it is quite possible that there may be some fearsome reactions from such a failure.

6. Japan has already announced the proposals she will make at the meeting. We have, moreover, already submitted for your convenience a complete resume in accordance with the lines contained in the United States' proposal of 21 June. I feel certain, therefore, that the United States is fully aware of the Japanese viewpoint by this time.

7. We have, of course, already decided upon the vessel which will transport the Premier and his party; the personnel of his party, including the generals and admirals, have also been decided upon. We are in a position to start at any moment now.

(*Part 4*)

8. Since the situation is as described above, the Imperial Government awaits with expectations the United States' reply at the earliest possible moment. Any further delays would place the government in an exceedingly difficult position from the viewpoint of the Tripartite Pact. Your Excellency is certainly fully aware that there is every possibility of commemorating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, to strengthen the ties of the three powers.

From the viewpoint of the weather there is considerable danger that it will become unfavorable in the North Pacific and in the Alaska area.

9. From both domestic and external circumstances, time is of paramount importance, as I have pointed out previously. It is essential that the meeting be decided upon at all possible speed and it is with this thought uppermost in my mind that I so strongly insist upon this matter at this time. I would consider it to be of greatest fortune if we were to receive a definite reply at the earliest moment.

From our standpoint if the meeting were scheduled from 10 to 15 October, it would meet with our best convenience.

In conclusion, I would like to say that in a negotiation of this type, it is of the utmost importance that each respect the other's reliability and sincerity. Your Excellency is fully cognizant of Premier Konoye's character and his political position. I hardly feel that I can add anything in this respect at this time. However, as I said before, I doubt if another opportunity to adjust Japanese-U.S. relations will present itself because, at present, the Premier and the entire Cabinet are behind the move. At the same time, it is essential, even under present circumstances, that the leaders meet and confer directly, and at the earliest possible time. I repeat this last point over and over again.

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[a] See III, 216.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 216

FROM: Tokyo — September 27, 1941
TO: Washington — #604.

On this the 27th, at 1630, after completing the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me. Off the record, I talked to him along the lines contained in my separate message #605[a]. I urged him to strongly recommend to his home government to have the "leaders' meeting" materialize immediately. Will you too, therefore, carefully read the contents of my separate wire and secretly do everything in your power to prevail upon the President to have this meeting materialize.

The above is not to be construed as being the absolutely final proposal on our part, nor is it absolutely essential that a time limit be put in force. However, in view of internal and external circumstances of our country, we cannot keep postponing matters forever. Please, therefore, put primary emphasis on the importance of holding the meeting immediately. (I mentioned this point to the U.S. Ambassador, too.)

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[a] See III, 215.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 217

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) September 28, 1941
TO: Washington #606.

(Part 1 of 2)

In connection with my off-the-record communication to the American Ambassador in Tokyo last night, in case you have an interview with the President, the following is for your information:

1. As the last paragraph of that communication makes clear, we do not mean at all that all questions and answers are now useless. However, I wished again to emphasize that the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance is the turning point and that this occasion is all the more grave. If they have any questions, of course, we will be glad cordially to respond (but as a matter of fact, they have not asked us a single thing since the 10th, and I find this very mysterious).

2. The meaning of the statement that yesterday was the turning point and that the occasion is an important factor is that for the last few days a movement to strengthen the Axis has been afoot, and the popular psychology is being adverted toward this trend. Consequently, the tendency to oppose an adjustment with the United States is naturally increasing. Hence, now is the time, if ever, to concentrate on this accord. This does not mean at all that the power of the present government has dwindled or that the advocates of anti-Americanism have strengthened their position.

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 218

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) September 28, 1941
TO: Washington #606.

(Part 2 of 2)

It is true, we shall have to get quicker and better results than ever before from our endeavors for an understanding. It may even be necessary for us to publish them. Nevertheless, once the negotiations are decided upon or once the date of an interview is set, the government of this country is sure that the people will stand united and that the opposition's voice will be quickly drowned in a chorus of approval. Of this we have always been sure, nor has our conviction waned for a moment lately. Notwithstanding, the Premier sent in his message more than a month ago. Nothing has happened; it seems as though it were pigeon-holed. The government is very much worried over this, needless to say.

3. It is true that one influential admiral and one general were included in the Premier's entourage. This made the United States suspect that a hostile military was holding the whip hand over us. I took this action, therefore, to dispel any such fear on their part (I seem to recall that HULL asked Your Honor something about this once).

4. I talked with the British Ambassador the other day and he said, "To speak frankly, the trouble is that the United States is uneasy and lacks confidence concerning the attitude of the government of Japan." Well, the integrity of Premier KONOYE and of the present government ought to be a hundred per cent reliable, and the American Ambassador must have sufficiently advised his government on the trustworthiness of Prince KONOYE.

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 219

FROM: Washington September 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo #865.

(In 10 parts—complete)

(Part 1)

On this, the 27th, I had Matudaira call on Ballantine and had him relay the contents of your message and at the same time deliver the English texts contained in your messages 591[a] and 595[b]. He requested that they be delivered to Hull.

I am taking this opportunity to express my humble opinion on various points which happen to draw my attention in regard to your message #595[b]. I pass them on to you for whatever value they may have.

1. As I have pointed out on several previous occasions while reporting on matters pertaining to this issue, the United States insists that it would be inappropriate to hold the "leaders' conference" until the two nations have come to a complete agreement on all the points involved. At present the United States is allegedly investigating our attitude with regard to said various points. Since, as you said, we have already said all that is to be said, we are not committed to await expression of intentions by the United States.

(Part 2)

If we submit further papers to them in advance of receiving some reply from them, there is a danger that matters would become further complicated and less clear. I am of the opinion that this would tend to hamper the progress of the negotiations.

If, by some chance, some apparent inconsistencies appear in our various papers, it may lead to their becoming suspicious of our sincerity.

(Part 3)

Fundamentally speaking, the United States wishes to proceed along the lines she expressed in the U.S. proposals of 21 June. Judging from developments to date we do not feel that the premises outlined in those proposals are too far afield. Moreover, from the viewpoint of practicability we feel that they are the most concrete. I therefore, hope that you will accept the reasonings embodied therein.

2. The deletion of the item reading "no northward advance shall be made without justification" will no doubt be the point which will invite the most suspicion.

(Part 4)

3. The respective attitudes of the two nations to the war in Europe: As I have pointed out in messages pertaining to this phase, (see particularly my message #540[c], it would be exceedingly difficult from the United States' viewpoint to retain paragraph 1 proposing joint mediation. Recent developments (particularly in view of the President's statement subsequent to the sinking of the U.S. vessel) have further stiffened the U.S. attitude. Therefore, it is my opinion that considerable difficulty will be encountered in securing the U.S. agreement to this point.

(Part 5)

Concerning the matter of self defense as contained in paragraph two: Again, as I have previously reported, all U.S. moves pertaining to the European war are allegedly being made from the basic national policy of self defense as the starting point. Even if the United States does become actively involved in the war, she will do so in behalf of self defense and will not, supposedly, be in any sense an aggressive attack, even though she may have an ample provocation to make it so. In this way, they intend to obviate the necessity of our invoking the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Thus, the United States is very anxious to have the term "right to self defense"

as elastic as possible. (Read Secretary Hull's speech, contained in my message 381[d].) For this reason, they may not be tempted to accept the working of our proposal on this point. The fact that we outline our needs for self defense may unduly arouse their suspicion.

(Part 6)

Regarding the matter pertaining to the settlement of the Chinese Incident: As I pointed out in my message #540[e], the United States has fundamentally speaking, insisted that we outline the peace terms we shall propose to China. She maintains that she will enter into the real negotiations only after a complete agreement as to the contents of the "annex". Therefore, we shall undoubtedly be confronted with the difficult task of coming to an agreement on the matters of garrisoning troops and non-discriminatory treatment. I am of the opinion that in the final analysis, we shall have to agree to the terms offered by the United States insofar as they do not conflict with the terms of the Nanking Agreement. We should word our explanations and counter proposals with this in mind.

(Part 7)

Before we are able to have the United States yield, we shall undoubtedly have to conduct several negotiations even after this. The danger of the negotiations breaking down completely as a result of the matter of our stationing troops, is constantly on the increase. The "non-discrimination" phase is not quite as tickling a problem as the former. In our proposal we state that non-discrimination will apply to the conducting of business between China and Japan only. We add that as long as any third nation conducts her economic enterprises on a fair and even basis, she will in no way be discriminated against. I am not at all sure that the United States will be satisfied with these conditions.

(Part 8)

Furthermore, we will probably encounter considerable difficulty in making the United States swallow, from the standpoint of policy, the new "principle of especially close relations."

Aside from these points, paragraph one is so worded as to imply that the United States and Japan were jointly responsible to settle the China incident. I am not at all confident that we shall be able to succeed in this because it may not give a favorable impression at the time this "understanding" is published. (As I have reported in previous messages, the United States is not in favor of keeping this "understanding" a secret.)

---------- with regard to the contents of paragraph two referring to having the United States use her good offices ----- and the point making the demands, shall necessitate the making of new demands if we are to pursue the lines laid down heretofore, as well as those contained in your instructions of 11 April.

(Part 9)

I also believe that considerable difficulty will be encountered in having them agree to the new matter. In that part referring to peace terms, the following words appear: "Konoye statement and those agreements between Japan and China." I feel that here, too, we shall encounter difficulty in getting their approval. Since President Roosevelt is very interested in taking the mediation actions himself it might be well to insert the word "President" in the sentence.

(Part 10)

5. We have your instructions of 15 July with regard to the matter of trade between the two countries. We would appreciate your basing your proposal on the U.S. proposal of 21 June.

6. With regard to the matter pertaining to the political stabilization of the Pacific, it is said that that part of the U.S. proposal of 21 June referring to it was written by Secretary Hull himself. Since the United States looks upon this phase with the most importance, we would appreciate your allowing that part of their proposal to stand as is. We would particularly appreciate your deleting from the new proposals that part which states that we agree to evacuate our

troops from French Indo-China only at the termination of the China Incident. We feel that it would be more acceptable to the United States if we were to retain only that part which refers to the condition of a large scale peace in the Pacific.

In other words, we hope to wind up all arrangements of the preliminary conference.

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[a] See III, 200—Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China even after peace with Japan is restored.

[b] See III, 213—Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U.S. to agree to a "leaders' conference".

[c] Ambassador Nomura expresses the opinion that based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.

[d] Not available.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 220

FROM: Washington — September 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #867.

During the morning of this, the 29th, (Monday) I called on the Secretary of State, and, in accordance with the instructions contained in your messages from 604 to 606[a], I asked that I be granted a secret interview with the President. The Secretary said that because of death in his family, the President had been in Hyde Park since Thursday. Upon his return to Washington, however, he would see the President, he said and would hand me a memo of the U.S. Government within the next couple of days. He added that he read Ambassador Grew's report yesterday and thus gave evidence of being thoroughly familiar with the situation.

Hull gave indications that he too felt that immediate action was essential. At the same time, however, he seemed to think that it was of primary importance to get public opinion in Japan thoroughly unified in favor of it.

I, therefore, pointed out that though the government, the army, and the navy, were in full accord with the proposals being discussed, considerable time would have to elapse before the entire public could be made to understand them. There are those, for example, who cannot understand why the United States should meddle so deeply in Asiatic affairs when she herself constantly refers to the Monroe Doctrine and who, in actual practice, has seized the leadership of the American continents. Japanese public opinion cannot be made to conform with the every whim of the United States. To wait its doing so would be like watchfully waiting for the century plant to bloom, I said.

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[a] 604—See III, 216—Toyoda-Grew talk held 1630 September 27. Japanese again strongly urge early action on the "leaders' conference", and directs Nomura to do everything possible to avoid further postponement.

605—See III, 215—Gist of remarks made by Toyoda to Grew.

606—See III, 217—Toyoda elucidates for Nomura's information various points of his talk with Grew.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 221

FROM: Tokyo — September 30, 1941
TO: Washington — #614.

(Part 1 of 3)

Re your #865[a].

1. As you say, so long as they do not send us any reply we should avoid presenting them with various written suggestions. I am entirely in agreement with you.

2. I, too, in the beginning was in a hurry to draw up a plan and hurry along the negotiations, that is why on the 14th of July I sent you some instructions, but since you never presented the American officials with them, and in the light of subsequent events, in order to finally evolve a comprehensive settlement, on September 4 I brought forth a proposal. I incorporated this proposal in my #595[b] and did my best to harmonize it with the American proposal. There are no changes to be made in the substance of it and if the Americans so desire I think we might negotiate on the basis there of.

3. My views on certain points which you mention in your message are as follows. In case they question you please answer accordingly:

1. The reason why I left out the expression "As there is no real objection we will make no northward invasion", in part 2 of your message is that if we were to insert this into the body of the text it might only give them the suspicion that we have direct designs against the Soviet. This whole matter, after all, concerns the China incident and the South Seas question. There is no particular problem in the north. In the preface to the clause concerning the stability of the Pacific area, this matter is fully included so I am willing to leave it up to the leaders on both sides and if necessary to clarify this in the minutes. In my proposal of the 4th I made it plain that there was no objection to this statement.

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[a] See III, 219.

[b] See III, 213 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9–30–41

No. 222

FROM: Tokyo — September 30, 1941
TO: Washington — #614.

(Part 2 of 3)

2. The first clause relating to the attitude of both governments toward the European war is all right as it stands so far as I am concerned. Since we say "when the proper time comes" I am sure that this will cover their misgivings.

3. Concerning the second clause of the same article, as you say, they may have something more to say. We will merely wait for them to broach the subject and if necessary not be loathe to consider it again.

4. The part concerning the adjustment of the China incident.

a. We do not mean by the first clause that this is the joint responsibility of the Japanese and the American Governments. All along the United States has insisted that a settlement of the China trouble has a great bearing on the stability of the Pacific. That is why we went so far

as to say that both Governments "will endeavor to bring about etc." We do not mean to discuss this in detail but if they oppose it as it stands we are ready to change it or leave it out.

b. We have been looking forward with expectancy from the beginning to American mediation and so we are not making any new requests such as you mentioned.

c. The insertion of the phrase "a treaty between Japan and China" is merely in accordance with the three principles layed down by KONOYE and there is no special meaning to it. Please explain this to them.

d. There is no objection to requesting that President ROOSEVELT mediate.

Trans. 9–30–41

No. 223

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 30, 1941
614.

(Part 3 of 3)

e. When we come to the question of non-discrimination in economic activities in China, I want you to make it clear to them so that they will not entertain any misgivings that this principle should not apply merely between Japan and China but also to third countries. Advise them, furthermore, that the principle that neighbors naturally have intimate relations is practiced throughout the whole world and is by no means a new theory.

5. The clause concerning commerce between the two countries in my # 595[a] coincides in meaning with the American proposal. Only in the meantime the freezing order has taken place and subsequent developments have modified the situation. We only hope that conditions will soon be ameliorated. Once they eliminate this order we will have no objection to their proposal on this subject.

6. *a.* Concerning the stipulations about the political stability of the Pacific, the stipulations in the American proposal are pet principles of Secretary HULL and the United States sets great store by them. They are merely general stipulations, therefore, we will not be loathe to reconsider them.

b. I transferred the matters concerning the military evacuation of French Indo-China and the settlement of the Chinese incident to the clause concerning the establishment of peace in the Pacific. This will make the clause more harmonious and expand its significance. That is all I meant by this action. If they don't like it, however, we will put it back like it was.

If the Americans present you with an aide memoire today, without any delay wire it on to me. I am ready and eager to make a translation of it. If possible, before you send it, send me a brief summary.

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[a]See III, 213 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9–30–41

No. 224

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #881.

(Part 1 of 2)[a].

Last Monday after a long time I went to call on Admiral STARK. In the middle of our conversation Rear Admiral TURNER joined us. The Admiral said that after all the question of troops stationed in China would do most damage to the negotiations and that unless the China Incident is settled an understanding between Tokyo and Washington will be impossible. TURNER said that he doubted if we would agree to evacuate China, but if no agreement were reached in the preparatory talks any conversations between the leaders of the two countries might be dangerous.

While we were talking about the Tripartite Alliance, the Admiral stated that the United States does not intend to go ahead and strike at Japan, adding that if the United States fights a two ocean war after all she will have to defend herself in the Pacific.

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[a] Part 2 not available.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 225

FROM: Washington September 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo #870.

(In 4 parts—complete)

To Chief of Bureau Terasaki from Iguti.

I realize, of course, that I am being presumptious, but the following are my opinions of the negotiations to adjust U.S.-Japanese relations:

(1) In view of such incidents as were described in our message #866[a], we believe that it would be well if we did not deliver those papers here which have already been delivered in Tokyo to Ambassador Grew. Duplications in this manner are apt to create misunderstandings through transmission errors and through differences in translations. This is particularly true of some vague passages which cannot be made clear without lengthy explanations. (Please see our message #865[b], and others for points which are in doubt.) Under these circumstances, we are unable to make explanations when we are requested to do so by the United States. The Ambassador himself is placed in an exceedingly awkward position. We, therefore, would prefer to put most of our efforts in trying to sound the U.S. attitude.

(Part 2)

(2) We have already said that we have said all that is to be said. To keep submitting notes after notes, thereafter, which do not always run in sequence with the previous note, is not good, for it causes confusion and further delays.

As a matter of fact we were told in confidence that the United States is of the opinion that the scene of the negotiations was shifted to Tokyo by us so as to bring about delays. They think that we are watching developments of the German-Soviet war, and that we shall launch a northward move if indications seem to favor it.

(Part 3)

(3) ----- advises us that a friend of his in Tokyo reports that Japanese governmental circles feel that there is absolutely no reason why the United States should not accept the most recent proposals. The fact that she has not done so, must be due to interference from some Washington source.

For the past six months, we have been holding talks here during which the attitude and stand of the United States has been set down clearly. We feel confident that you are aware, through our various reports on the subject that is exceedingly unlikely that the United States has any intention of backing down from those established stands.

We feel that there must be a tendency in Tokyo to view the United States statements too optimistically. It is imaginable to us that there are those who approach the Premier with a little too much "wishful thinking".

(Part 4)

(4) It is admittedly true that impatience in this matter must be avoided. We realize, of course, that circumstances have made it unavoidable to a certain extent, but even so, it seems to us that we have been urging the United States to reply quite frequently of late. This apparently is giving the impression to the United States that we are overly anxious.

On the other hand, the United States applied the "freezing" order on us, affecting our entire economic structure. Since then, they have been sitting tight, awaiting and watching subsequent developments. The United States does not suffer greatly from that measure; hence they are in no rush.

Under such circumstances, we do not feel that it is to our advantage to show signs of over-anxiety all by ourselves.

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[a] See III, 214—Grew's report of our terms of peace with China differs from what you sent me. Please check.

[b] See III, 219—Long report from Nomura giving his views of current state of U.S.-Jap negotiations.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 226

FROM: Tokyo October 1, 1941
TO: Washington #618.

(In 5 parts—complete)

(Part 1)

To Counselor Iguti from Terasaki.

Re your #870[a].

1. Please refer to our message #613[b] with regard to the matter contained in your #866[c].

2. I feel that you are justified to a certain extent when you complain that after we have stated that we have put all of our cards on the table, we continue to send you note after note, etc. Our note of 4 September was so designed to contain our views of the three subjects which have been discussed hitherto in a very broad light. It was not drawn up with any intention of

"slowing down" the procedure in the sense voiced by Hull. We were of the opinion that there were some points of the preliminary talks which needed clearing up. Thinking that it would facilitate matters if we drew up our proposals in the form that the U.S. proposal of 21 June was put in (my message #595[d]). We further sent you message #590[e], dealing with Japanese-Chinese peace terms and my message #591[f] pertaining to the garrisoning of troops, in the hope that they would supplement and explain our note of 4 September. They were forwarded to your office by the Foreign Minister, as reference material to be used by the Ambassador in explaining our position to the United States. They were sent at the request of the Premier and the military.

Part 2

Putting it bluntly, we were quite unaware of the fact that the Ambassador in the United States had allegedly submitted, for the purpose of further consideration by this office, certain changes in our note of 4 September, (the 1st, 4th—including the supplements—6th and 7th paragraphs were unchanged; paragraph 2 was unchanged with the exception of that part referring to the exchanging of official notes; paragraph 3 was identical to the Japanese note of 15 June; and to paragraph 5 was added the words: "For the production and procurement of national resources" to the U.S. proposal of 21 June), until we were questioned about it by the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo. This allegation came as a great surprise and the Foreign Minister replied that the note of 14 July must have been the one implied. The Minister added that if the Embassy in Tokyo was in immediate need of the English text of that message, he could no doubt obtain it from the State Department, and that we could supply him with the Japanese text immediately.

It was then that that part which appears in parentheses in the preceding paragraph came to light. At the same time, the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had said that the "draft was not official" to the State Department was also brought to light.

Part 3

These conditions have further complicated the already exceedingly complicated negotiations and for that reason, it is indeed very regrettable.

3. It is regrettable that in spite of the fact that the Ambassador in Washington and yourself are putting forth your best efforts and in spite of the fact that we are facing the problems with the utmost sincerity, the United States does not reciprocate our statesmanship. However, there are none here who are underrating the United States or who are looking upon the developments with undue optimism.

4. We fear that possibly you are not completely familiar with the exceedingly critical situation at home. It is only through the clear thinking of the military and the superhuman work on the part of all those officials concerned with domestic matters that we have been able to avert the breaking out of any unfortunate incident subsequent to the 27th[g]. The utmost caution shall have to be exercised in the future to preserve this condition. Will you please obtain from Minister Wakasugi at first hand a description of the situation in Japan. This is, of course, for your and the Ambassador's information only.

Your explanation to the United States should be made along the following lines: "Apparently there are those in the United States who misunderstand the political situation in Japan. These persons seem to be of the opinion that the Konoye cabinet's position is not strong. Therefore, any agreement entered into with that government is in danger of being disregarded by the military or some other strong organization. This is not a correct analysis of the situation in Japan. It is true that there are those who express opposition to the present cabinet but these elements can be easily overruled.

Part 4

"Of course there have been public utterances such as Colonel Mabuchi's broadcast and Nakano's speech, who expressed, judging from the reports, opinions opposed to those contained in the Premier's message. Anyone, however, who knows the characteristics of the Japanese and who are familiar with conditions in Japan, should be able to understand the true meaning of those speeches. Mabuchi placed the most emphasis on encouraging the people while Nakano, pursuing his usual line, need not be looked upon with any importance.

"Unfortunately, however, foreign newsmen stationed in Japan, attached much importance to these speeches. British and American newspapers which place the most importance on 'journalistic interest' played up minor points in an exaggerated manner.

"Those, of course, are causing misunderstandings. We are confident, however, that the people who have spent any time at all in Japan can see the true picture, etc."

We believe that if the situation were explained to them in that manner, they will more readily understand matters. Moreover, it is the truth.

Not only the Foreign Minister but all concerned are as one in this matter, and are willing to meet any without fear. You can readily see, in view of domestic circumstances and in view of external relations, that we are all eager to have the "leaders' conference" take place. This is but a natural development, and if they insist on construing it to be impatience on our part, I guess it can't be helped.

That we intend Washington to be the central locale of these negotiations is as you stated in your recent message and should have been further clarified by the telephone communication between the Foreign Office and the Embassy. Because of some peculiar circumstances, the occasion may arise where some talks are conducted in Tokyo first. That would be done only under unavoidable circumstances. Any who believe that any idea of stalling was behind such a move, thoroughly misunderstands the Foreign Minister's motives.

Time is now the utmost important element. Whether this matter materializes or not has a direct and important bearing on peace on the Pacific and even of the world. The seriousness of the situation must be thoroughly recognized. Please exercise very bit of power available to bring about a favorable conclusion of this matter.

Paragraph 2 of my message #614[h] was meant to point out that we have no objections to using the contents of my message #595[d] as a basis of negotiations if so desired by the United States.

Although there is that matter contained in my message #617[i], we make the above statement anew.

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[a] See III, 225.

[b] Not available.

[c] See III, 214—Grew's report of our terms of peace with China differs from what you sent me. Please check.

[d] See III, 213—Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U.S. to agree to a "leader's conference".

[e] See III, 191—Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.

[f] See III, 200—Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China even after peace with Japan is restored.

[g] First Anniversary of the Tripartite Pact.

[h] See III, 221-223—I agree that we should avoid any more written suggestions to the U.S. until they give us some reply.

[i] Tokyo instructed Washington: "i" as used in "the 'i' of my message #595" in the sentence reading". . . . if the U.S. so desires it, it shall be used as the basis", at the end of paragraph 2, is the "i" of "imi".

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 227

FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Washington #625.

Special intelligence #330 from New York states that an A. P. dispatch declares that the Japanese-American negotiations warrant a pessimistic outlook and that the KONOYE Cabinet will face a crisis in about two weeks, whereupon it will be inevitable that the Cabinet undergo a revision. It seems that this rumor is going around in Washington, but in any case, it is absolutely false and untrue. The situation here in Japan as described in my #618[a] should be known to you and, whenever necessary, will you please enlighten the Americans. Too, Secretary HULL appears to be gravely concerned over public opinion here in Japan. I think that he has questioned you twice on this subject. Well, let me tell you that public opinion is very calm here and we intend to take advantage of the situation. We are merely awaiting their memorandum, and the Government entertains the view that we had better issue a statement on these Japanese-American negotiations at the earliest opportunity. This opinion is growing.

Naturally the substance of this statement will be confined to our side. We can merely refer briefly to matters on the American side. In any case, we will discuss all this with the Americans.

It seems that there have been a number of rumors concerning a statement by the Government, lately. Among them there are many mistaken ones.

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[a] See III, 226.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 228

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #890.

Urgent

(Part 1 of 12)

To be handled in Government code. Separate wire.

Reference is made to the proposals of the Japanese Government communicated on September 6, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, and to statement relating thereto subsequently communicated to this Government by the Japanese Government. Thoughtful study has been given to the communications to which reference is made, and in connection with that study careful review has been made of other communications previously received from the Japanese Government on the same subject. On the basis of this study observations are offered as follows:

1. The Government of the United States welcomed, as affording a possible opportunity for furthering the broad-gauge objectives and principles of a program of peace, the Japanese Government's suggestions made through its Ambassador here in the early part of August that there be held a meeting of the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan and that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two countries to ascertain whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 229

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 890.

(Part 2 of 12)

To be handled in Government code.

Accordingly, in the reply made by the President on August 17, 1941 to the Japanese Ambassador the view was expressed that such informal conversations would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful means—that sort of program would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to to raw materials and to all other essential commodities, and there were described the advantages which would flow to all countries, including Japan, from the adoption of such a program.

In conclusion, it was stated that if the Japanese Government were in a position to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, this Government would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussion and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 230

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 890.

(Part 3 of 12)

To be handled in Government code.

Separate wire.

In the light of the broad purposes and fundamental principles which this Government holds, it was gratifying to the President and the Government of the United States to receive the message of the Prime Minister and the statement of the Government of Japan on August 28, 1941, containing statements expressing Japan's desire and intent to pursue courses of peace in harmony with the fundamental principles to which the people and Government of

the United States are committed. In its statement the Japanese Government gave, with some qualifications, broad assurances of its peaceful intent, including a comprehensive assurance that the Japanese Government has no intention of using without provocation military force against any neighboring nation. The Japanese Government declared that it supported the program and principles which had been briefly outlined by the President not only as applicable to the Pacific area but also as a program for the entire world.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 231

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #890.

(Part 4 of 12)

The Government of the United States, while desiring to proceed as rapidly as possible with consideration of arrangements for a meeting between the heads of state, felt it desirable, in order to assure that that meeting would accomplish the objectives in view, to clarify the interpretation of certain principles and the practical.[a] It has not been the purpose of this Government to enter into a discussion of details. This Government has felt, however, that the clarification sought would afford a means of exploiting our effort to arrive at a meeting of minds. On September 3, 1941, the President in giving reply to the Japanese Ambassador expressed the earnest desire of the Government of the United States to collaborate in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government made reference.

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[a]It is believed that some words were omitted in the original transcription.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 232

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #890.

(Part 5 of 12)

To be handled in Government code.

The President reiterated the four principles regarded by this Government as the foundation upon which relations between nations should properly rest. Those principles are:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

The President pointed out that in order to bring about any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions it was highly important to reach a community of view and a clear agreement upon certain points with respect to which fundamental differences of opinion between our two Governments had developed in the informal conversations; and the President requested an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to those fundamental

questions. On September 6, the Prime Minister of Japan in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo stated that he subscribed fully to the four principles above mentioned.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 233

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #890.

(Part 6 of 12)

The foregoing developments and assurances, together with other statements made by the Japanese Government, seemed to justify this Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive program covering the entire Pacific area. It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the United States that the proposal of the Japanese Government presented by the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for discussion, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 234

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #890.

(Part 7 of 12)

As has already been said, the various broad assurances given by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Government are highly gratifying. In putting forward its attitude of peaceful intent toward other nations, the Japanese Government qualified its assurances with certain phrases the need for which is not easily understood. It is difficult to conceive of the developing under present circumstances in any of the territories neighboring French Indo-China, in Thailand or in the Soviet Union in any aggressive threat or provocation to Japan. The inalienable right of self-defense is of course well recognized by all nations and there could arise in some minds a question as to just what the Japanese Government has in view in circumscribing its assurances of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 235

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #890.

(Part 8 of 12)

In the formal conversations there was tentatively arrived at a formula in regard to economic policy (section of the draft understanding) which provided that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In the Japanese Government, proposals of September 6 and in subsequent communications from the Japanese Government, the commitments contained in that formula were restricted to the countries of the southwest-Pacific area (or the Pacific area as a whole). In reference to China, the Japanese Government states that it will respect the principle of non-discrimination, but the explanation given in regard to this point would seem to be open to the implication that the Japanese Government has in mind some limitation upon the application of this principle occasioned by reason, geographical propinquity to China.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 236

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #890.

(Part 9 of 12)

Obviously, it would not be likely to serve the purpose affirmed by the Japanese Government or by this government if either the United States or Japan were to pursue one course or policy in certain areas while at the same time pursuing an opposite course or policy in other areas.

This government has noted the views of the Japanese Government in support of its desire to station troops for an indeterminate period in certain areas of China. Entirely apart from the question of the reasons for such a proposal, the inclusion of such a provision in the proposed terms of a peaceful settlement between Japan and China at a time when Japan is in military occupation of large areas in China is open to certain objections. For example, when a country in military occupation of territory of another country proposes to the second country the continued stationing of troops of the first country in certain areas as a condition for a peaceful settlement and thus for the withdrawal of the occupationary forces from other areas, such procedure would seem to be out of keeping with the progressive and enlightened courses and principles which were discussed in the informal conversations and thus would not, in the opinion of this government, make for peace or offer prospects of stability.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 237

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #890.

(Part 10 of 12)

It is believed that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indo-China would be most helpful in making known—in particular to those who might be inclined to be critical—Japan's peaceful intentions and Japan's desire to follow courses calculated to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area. With reference to the attitude of each country toward the European war, this Government has noted with appreciation the further step taken by the Japanese Government to meet the difficulties inherent in this aspect of the relations between the two countries. It is believed that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could give further study to the question of possible additional clarification of its position.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 238

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #890.

(Part 11 of 12)

To be handled in Government Code.

In the exchange of views which have taken place between the two Governments in an effort to reach an agreement in principle upon fundamental questions in order to prepare the ground for the proposed meeting of the responsible chiefs of Government, this government has endeavored to make clear that it envisages a comprehensive program calling for the application uniformly to the entire Pacific area of liberal and progressive principles.

From what the Japanese Government has so far indicated in regard to its purposes this Government derives the impression that the Japanese Government has in mind a program which would be circumscribed by the imposition of qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those principles.

If this impression is correct, can the Japanese Government feel that a meeting between the responsible heads of Government under such circumstances would be likely to contribute to the advancement of the high purposes which we have mutually had in mind.

Trans. (Not dated)

No. 239

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #890.

(Part 12 of 12)

To be handled in government code.

As already stated, this government welcomed the assurances contained in the statement of the Japanese Government which accompanied the Japanese Prime Minister's message to the President of the United States that the Japanese Government subscribed to the principles which have long been advocated by this government as the only sound basis for stable international relations. This government believes that renewed consideration of these fundamental principles may be helpful in our effort to seek a meeting of minds in regard to the essential questions on which we seek agreement and thus lay a firm foundation for a meeting between the responsible heads of the two governments. The subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought have engaged, and continued to engage, the close and active interest of the President of the United States, and it is the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions may be so developed that such a meeting can be held. It is also the President's hope that the Japanese Government shares the conviction of this government that, if the governments of Japan and of the United States are resolved to give those principles practical and comprehensive application, the two governments can work out a fundamental rehabilitation of the relations between the United States and Japan and contribute to the bringing about of a lasting peace with justice, equity and order in the whole Pacific area.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 240

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #889.

At Secretary HULL's invitation, I called on him at nine o'clock this morning. He handed me the reply of the United States Government which I have given in the separate telegram #890[a] and said that it is the opinion of the United States Government that a conference of the leaders of the two governments would be a precarious affair unless a (complete ?) understanding could be arrived at thereby and that if peace is to be maintained all over the Pacific, a "patch-up" understanding would not do, but a "clear-cut" understanding would have to be made. I remarked that the Japanese Government will, no doubt, be very much disappointed in such a reply but that in any case I would transmit it.

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[a] See III, 228-239.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 241

FROM: Tokyo October 3, 1941
TO: Washington #626.

We are in receipt of your messages Nos. 889[b] and 890[a]. The former has been read and the latter is at present being decoded.

The Yomiuri's correspondent sent a dispatch to his home office regarding the U.S.-Japanese negotiations saying that in fact ----- -----.

The view of the domestic situation and the matter contained in paragraph 2 of my message #62(5)(?)[c] it is essential that subjects pertaining to this matter be watched very carefully. Will you please make every effort to do so in behalf of the success of the U.S.-Japanese talks.

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[a] See III, 240—Hull-Nomura interview 2 October in which U.S. finally gives Japan a reply on the leaders' conference by turning it down as a "patch work" solution unless basic issues are settled first.

[b] See III, 228–239—Text of U.S. note of 2 October 1941.

[c] See III, 227—Rumors from New York and Washington that the Konoye Cabinet may fall are without foundation.

Trans. 10–6–41

No. 242

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #898.

Today, the 3rd, I called on Secretary Hull,

1. and conveyed to him the gist of your Nos. 520[a] and 623[b] and asked for his cooperation in order to effect a speedy settlement. The Secretary said that properly speaking this matter concerned the Treasury Department and the Maritime Commission and that he was not conversant with the details, however he would see that some sort of an answer was forthcoming immediately.

2. I took this occasion to state that the Japanese government might possibly issue some sort of a "statement" regarding the problem of adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations and that if this were done notification would be duly made. The Secretary took it in good part.

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[a] (See Japanese Naval Intelligence, Part B). The Navy Ministry wants arrangements for a courier from your office to go to Hawaii.

[b] There is now no other way to get U.S. oil than by transferring our funds (unfrozen) in South America.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 243

FROM: Tokyo October 3, 1941
TO: Washington #627.

I described the various problems involving the United States and Japan to British Ambassador Craigie who was scheduled to have gone on a vacation trip to the United States on 28 September. (He had planned to leave from Nagasaki and make connections with the President Coolidge at Shanghai on 4 October. However, in view of illness on the part of the Counselor who

was to have acted as Charge d'affaire in the Ambassador's absence, his trip has been apparently postponed for about three weeks.)

At the same time, we asked Ambassador Grew to also speak to Ambassador Craigie and we understand that they also discussed matters on the same day.

Subsequently, according to absolutely unimpeachable sources, Ambassador Craigie cabled Foreign Secretary Eden and Ambassador Halifax, explaining the importance of having the United States and Japan come to an immediate agreement to hold a conference. The gist of Craigie's opinions contained in those messages is being forwarded to you as my supplementary message # 628[a].

In view of the source, will Your Excellency keep the information contained strictly to yourself only.

---

[a] See III, 244.

Trans. 10–4–41

No. 244

FROM: Tokyo — October 3, 1941
TO: Washington — # 628.

1. With the resignation of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka the chances of turning away from the Axis policy and toward the Democracies, has been considerably enhanced.

2. Among the difficult points in the materialization of a Japanese-United States conference, is that with Japan speed is required. Moreover, she can enter into nothing more, at the present time, than a temporary understanding. On the other hand, by pursuing a policy of stalling, the United States is arguing about every word and every phrase on the grounds that it is an essential preliminary to any kind of an agreement. It seems apparent that the United States does not comprehend the fact that by the nature of the Japanese and also on account of the domestic conditions in Japan, no delays can be countenanced. It would be very regrettable indeed if the best opportunity for the settlement of the Far Eastern problems since I assumed my post here, were to be lost in such a manner.

3. Prince Konoye is sincerely desirous of avoiding the dangers which Japan may face through her connections in the Tripartite Pact and in the Axis for which the Prince, himself feels responsibility. Opposition within the country to the Prince's reversal of policy is fairly strong. Therefore, unless the Japanese-U.S. conversations are held in the very near future, the opportunity will probably be lost. Moreover, if by some chance, meetings fail to materialize, or if they are unduly delayed, the Konoye cabinet will be placed in a precarious position.

4. We realize, of course, that there are numerous very complicated matters involved in the proposed negotiations. However, both the U.S. Ambassador in Japan and I are firmly of the opinion that it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude.

In conclusion, it must be added that until Japan's reversal of policy is concereteley proven—in other words, until the Konoye principles actually materialize—there should be no let up in the retaliatory economic measures by us.

Note: The above message expresses the views of British Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo, as explained in III, 243.

Trans. 10–4–41

No. 245

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 4, 1941
TO: Washington #637.

Re your #890[a].

Please (make sure ?) immediately and suitably the following points:

1. Since the United States Government wishes to get our explanations regarding the fundamentals before entering upon the Japanese-American negotiations, theoretically speaking, as soon as we have satisfied it with our explanation we should be reaching the stage of actually opening the negotiations. As to the details of these fundamentals, we have already exchanged our view and so they should be clear. Now that only those points which the United States Government has pointed out remain difficult of agreement (namely, economic activity in the Pacific; withdrawal as well as stationing of troops, and the question of the Three-Power agreement,) would it be all right for us to assume that the United States Government has a clear comprehension of the other points?

2. Now, as to the approval the Premier has given to the four basic principles, he has merely approved of them in principle. In other words, although in principle he considers them good, there may be differences of opinion when it comes to actually applying these four principles. The Premier stated that he would like to consider these differences at the time of the negotiations. In fact, it is on the presumption of doing so that we have been managing affairs domestically. Since this matter is of a delicate nature in its bearing upon the internal situation, I would like to have you see to it that the United States Government has no misunderstanding of it.

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[a] See III, 228–239—Text of American Government's statement to the Japanese Government.

Trans. 10–6–41

No. 246

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #901.

(Part 1 of 2.)[a]

The tremendous efforts you have been making and the profound concern you have had to have since your appointment are beyond my imagination. I am deeply impressed. It is, indeed, regrettable that things do not turn out as we want them to. Yesterday I expressed myself quite carelessly on the spur of the moment. Please be so kind as to understand that it was the result of no other than a profound concern for my country at this critical moment that caused me to do so.

If I may express my views, I believe that before Japan will be able to become self-sufficient as a result of establishment of the sphere of co-prosperity, economic reorganization of an extremely drastic nature would have to be made. I imagine in actuality we shall find this far

from easy. I do not know to what extent we shall be able to solve this ----- in case we advance northward, but I suppose that if we advance southward we might be able to gain a profitable foothold after several years.

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[a] Part 2 of 2 not available.

Trans. 10–6–41

No. 247

FROM: Tokyo October 7, 1941
TO: Washington #641.

Re my #637[c]

We are not as yet in receipt of your message. We would appreciate your submitting it to them and advising us of the result at all possible speed.

As you are fully aware, the contents of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the captioned message are of the utmost importance in which every second counts. Without the above information we are unable to continue with our consideration of the U.S. memo. That is the situation here.

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[a] See III, 245.

Trans. 10–7–41

No. 248

FROM: Tokyo October 8, 1941
TO: Washington #647.

Re my #637[a].

Until I receive the explanation to the text of my telegram we cannot go with our discussions on the basis of the American memorandum. Furthermore, the internal situation here is such that it would not permit further delay. Will you therefore reply at once.

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[a] See III, 245.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 249

FROM: Tokyo October 7, 1941
TO: Washington #643.

(In 3 parts—complete.)

I requested the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo to call on me on the 7th, and he complied. The following is the gist of our conversation, and I forward it to you for your information only.

"I am in receipt of the U.S. memorandum of the 2nd, and I (the Foreign Minister) assume that you (the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo) have also received notification thereof from your home government. I would consider myself exceedingly fortunate if I were permitted to hear your opinions thereon", I said.

To this the Ambassador replied that he had received a résumé of that memo from Washington, but that was all for that reason he said he had no way of expressing his opinion. I, therefore, said that since the résumé undoubtedly limited itself to the listing of all of the more important points, it should facilitate the forming of an opinion. I added that I was striving to reach an understanding through cooperation, in the same manner as is the Ambassador not so much as a diplomat, but rather as a human being. From that viewpoint, what are the views of the U.S. Ambassador, I asked of him, and also asked him if he had not had some communication from his home government which would tend to explain or express opinions on the above mentioned résumé.

The Ambassador said he had been cabled the résumé only, and nothing more. Without seeing the entire memo, he said, he could not ascertain the tone thereof. He would be very happy if he could be permitted to read the full text, he said. Should, however, he be forced to express an opinion with his inadequate knowledge of the circumstances, he would be inclined to believe that the United States is trying to secure an agreement on the preliminary conditions.

I, therefore, replied that putting things bluntly, from the viewpoint of the sincere efforts we were making in this matter, we were not completely satisfied with the U.S. note referred to at present.

Part 2

By the above I do not imply that we do not trust the sincerity of the United States, I explained, but say so after taking into consideration the domestic and external circumstances of Japan.

The Ambassador then advised me that even as recently as on the 5th, he wrote up a fourteen page, 3000 word report of the various conditions in Japan based on what he had actually seen and heard himself during his many years of service in Japan. In it, he said that he fully described the real efforts that were being made by us in this matter. However, he did not dwell on this phase of the matter.

2. According to the U.S. memorandum of the 2nd, I continued, the Prime Minister of Japan allegedly stated that he "fully subscribed" to the Four Principles referred to during his conversations with the U.S. Ambassador on the 6th of last month. The record of the meeting, however, shows that the Premier stated that he was in accord with them only in principle. To this the Ambassador replied that being fully aware of the importance of every word of that interview, he had reported it absolutely accurately to his home government. I, therefore, said that it was because I agreed with him as to the importance of the matter that I wished to make this point clear. Our notes of the meeting clearly record that we agreed in principle only. The copies of the U.S. memorandum which were sent to various persons concerned for their perusal and study were corrected from "fully" to "in principle" so as to coincide with the original. We have already requested the Ambassador in the United States, I continued, to notify the United States of this correction. I am reporting this matter to His Excellency, I said, because I felt that he was concerned. The only reason we mentioned this matter to Ambassador Nomura was because this memorandum had been handed to him for delivery. There was absolutely no other motive in doing so, I said.

The U.S. Ambassador seemed to be thoroughly satisfied with my explanation and expressed his thanks for reporting it to him.

Part 3

Continuing, I said that though I had no intention of being too argumentative, there was one item I would like to question the Ambassador about. I pointed out that in doing so, I did not want the friendly relations between himself and myself to be altered in any manner.

After thus prefacing my remarks, I said that fundamentally speaking the Prime Minister's message was a private message addressed to a private party. How, then, I lightly pressed, was it that passages therefrom could be quoted in the memorandum which is an official note?

The Ambassador replied that he could see our point clearly and added that it must have been due to faulty handling of the various papers in the State Department. He said that that was entirely an on-the-spot assumption on his part. He went on to say that he would now be able to definitely state that the Prime Minister was in accord "in principle".

3. Returning to the matter concerning the "fully subscribed" quotation, the Ambassador started to say that he seemed to recall that when that matter was first brought up, Ambassador Nomura had accepted the "Four Principles" unconditionally. I, therefore, said that if there is some misunderstanding on the part of the United States through erroneous handling of some papers by our representative, it may become necessary to correct it at some future date. To attempt to do so now, though, I said involves the danger of needlessly confusing the issue. (I referred to "Ambassador Nomura's draft incident of 4 September as an example) and for this reason, I said that I thought it would be better if nothing were done about it at present.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 250

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) October 8, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Message to *Berlin* # 873 Part 1 of 4.

Re my # 708[a].

1. The Japanese American negotiations began under the conditions described in my aforementioned message during the Administration of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. There was, however, a rupture caused by the occupation of French Indo-China. We hope by the penetration of French Indo-China to hasten the end of the China trouble; to break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense; and to procure raw materials. It is a measure taken in self defense. But England and the United States brought to bear against us measures equivalent to an economic blockade. Japanese-American relations deteriorated extremely and our internal situation was perilously affected. In the meantime, the European War took the trend of a protracted struggle. The fight between the Reich and the Soviet Union contrary to the calculations of Berlin reached a deadlock. Now the Soviet is going over to the Anglo Saxon camp and we must make ready to cope with this situation. Moreover commerce is disrupted between Europe and Asia and liaison between our country and Germany and Italy is for the time being severed.

[a] See II, 204 giving the statement of the policy and views of the Imperial Government.

Trans. 10-8-41

No. 251

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) October 8, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Message to Berlin # 673. Part 2 of 4.

All the while England and the United States were strengthening their net about us and we could see no means of concluding the Sino-Japanese affair. It was under these conditions that the Imperial Government suddenly decided upon diplomatic negotiations to terminate their struggle with the Chinese; to establish an area of co-prosperity in East Asia; and to conserve our national resources in preparation for the future. We feel that it is necessary to open the way for a compromise in our relations with the United States.

2. When we concluded the Three Power Pact, we hoped while maintaining amicable relations with America, and to tell the truth through this very means, to conclude the Chinese trouble; to win the Soviet over to the Japanese-German-Italian camp; to have Germany use her good offices between Tokyo and Moscow (STAHMER said that Germany would be an honest go-between and would be sure to bring about the solution of our troubles with Kremlin and OTT sent us a letter to the effect that he himself was going to work for an understanding between Japan and the Soviet); to guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy who, in turn, were to give us mechanical and technical assistance. But since then times have changed and unexpected events have taken place. All that remains unchanged is Japanese-American relations and that is about the only thing that could be patched up.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 252

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) October 8, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Message to Berlin # 873. Part 3 of 4.

At the time Germany stated that she would not spare any effort to prevent a clash between Japan and the United States and that she would even do all she could to improve relations between the two countries (this was during the MATSUOKA STAHMER talks). Then Japan and Germany felt the need of preventing the United States from entering the war.

3. The objective of the Japan-German-Italian Three Power Pact was to prevent the expansion of the European war, to restrain the United States from participating, and to establish universal peace. Statements exchanged at the time make this perfectly clear but now the war covers the face of Europe. The only placid expanse of water on earth is the Pacific. Under these circumstances, it is felt that it is up to both nations to probe into the causes of the trouble between their respective governments and to assure the harmony of the Pacific. It is further felt that this coincides with the spirit of the Three Power Pact.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 253

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) October 8, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Message to Berlin # 873. Part 4 of 4.

4. It was with this view that the former cabinet began negotiations with Washington and still today we feel the necessity of continuing them. On the very occasion when Tokyo and Washington were arguing over our occupation of French Indo-China, Prince KONOYE was moved to reopen negotiations and messages were exchanged between him and President ROOSEVELT and ever since the respective Governments have been endeavoring to lay the groundwork for the opening of parleys through an exchange of opinions. We got our latest answer from Washington on the 4th of October and we are studying it now. It is not that we are divergent from our relations with the signatories of the Tri-Partite Pact but we are continuing our negotiations hoping to end the China affair. (The three principles of KONOYE envision a conclusion of hostilities with China through a basic treaty and the use of the United States to coerce the CHIANG regime, to establish an area to co-prosperity in greater East Asia, to procure materials, to prevent the expansion of the European war, to seal peace in the Pacific area and to prevent the United States from entering the war. Of course, however, we expect our ups and downs.) This is for your private information.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 254

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 907.

(Part 1 of 4)

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)

Re your # 637[a].

I will tell you more about this after I interview the Secretary of State a little later on. However, my views at present are as follows:

(1) According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Americans realize that there is unanimity on the various principles and fundamentals which they have stuck to. However, they are dissatisfied because you did not express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The Americans believe in the four principles as the basis on which relations between the two countries must be adjusted. The Americans consider that it is necessary to achieve unanimity on the various questions which have been fundamentally explored by both nations in the unofficial talks held so far in order to settle the Pacific question. They have always felt that if conversations between the leaders of the two countries are to be realized immediately, it must be definitely understood that these principles are to be applied to the concrete problems in the Pacific, and they desire a further clarification of our views.

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[a]See III, 245 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to immediately clarify with the U.S. Government two points.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 255

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #907.

(Part 2 of 4)

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)

Thus, they hope that we will make ourselves clearer on these points. In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We limited the area to which the principle of non-discriminatory treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact. These points you probably already know.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 256

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #907.

(Part 3 of 4)

(To be handled in government code.)

Judging by the impression I got from the above mentioned facts and my contacts with them so far, they figure on first bringing about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which our two countries have so far failed to see eye to eye, and then gradually to turn to the other matters. They evidently feel that so long as there is disagreement on the aforementioned points it would be vain and futile to discuss the various other problems, therefore, up to now the United States has done no more than express her opinions on the other matters in the proposal of June 11. (As I have wired you, some changes were made in the last clause.)

In their proposal of June 21, they made it evident that they were going to stick to this as the basis for negotiations. The latest reply of theirs shows, I am sure, that they are entirely disregarding our own proposal of the 25th. This shows that they are going to stick to their ideas as they stand; however, it will still be necessary for us to talk through certain matters concerning, A. The matter mentioned in the annex of the clause concerning the China incident. B. Discontinuing activities designed to help CHIANG. C. The stipulation concerning Nanking Treaty in the clause concerning the China incident (an agreement between Japan and China); joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning our attitude toward the European war; the question of eliminating the annex to the clause concerning commerce between the two nations.)

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 257

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #907.

(Part 4 of 4)

----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----. Concerning the four principles mentioned in (2) during the conversation mentioned in your #634[a], the American Ambassador talked as if I had already reached an understanding with Secretary HULL on this. As I have told you in various messages, they shelved the question in both letter and spirit, but on April 16 when Secretary HULL presented me with these four points (see my #277[b]), I certainly was in no position to accept such a proposal before getting instructions from my home government, nor would I give the impression that we would accept them. Please note that. Nevertheless, these are very abstract principles, and I figured that there would be some elasticity in their application. This country applied them with prudence to other foreign nations; for example, in peace conferences, discussions of principles are extremely circumlocutionary, so I do not think you need to be troubled over this.

[a]The number is apparently wrong, as the subject matter of this message mentioned is unrelated.

[b]See Vol. I, April 16 in which NOMURA gives his views on the attitude and policies of the United States Government, and the four basic points which the United States advocates.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 258

FROM: Washington October 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #915.

Re your #637[a].

This morning, the 9th, I called on Hull and relayed the matter contained in your instructions, and at the same time brought up the points discussed at the White House on 3 September. The Secretary, in reply, merely repeated that non-discriminatory treatment should extend over the entire Pacific area. He added that geographical proximity, etc. could be interpreted in many ways. He said that he would have Ballantine and others make a detailed reply to me later after the papers I submitted were carefully perused and studied. (Hamilton and Ballantine are supposed to call on me this afternoon).

Referring to the matter of evacuating or stationing of troops in China, I carefully and in detail described the political situation in China from the Japanese viewpoint and pointed out that stationing of our troops in certain parts of China was absolutely essential. I requested that this point be given a reconsideration in this light.

I also stated that the Prime Minister had stated that he was in accord with the "Four Principles" in principle only, but Hull indicated that he was already aware of this fact.

[a]See III, 245—Re the U.S. note of 2 October it is assumed there is agreement with the U.S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by the U.S. and expected to iron out their application in conference.

Trans. 10–13–41

No. 259

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #917.

(In 2 parts—complete)

(For official code handling. Secret outside of department.)

Re my #915[a].

On the 9th, Hamilton (accompanied by Ballantine and Schmidt) called on me on instructions of the Secretary of State, and I tried, on the basis of your #637[b] and along the general lines of your telephone conversation, to ascertain their intentions. They went into minute explanations pointing out that the U.S. Government's attitude is made plain in the memorandum of October 2nd, namely that this government is seeking to promote peace in the Pacific on the basis of the so-called Four Principles, and that the views of the United States in regard to such problems as Japan's forced advances northward and southward, indiscriminatory treatment in the Pacific, withdrawal of troops in China, and the Tripartite Treaty, have their origin in a fundamental concern with regard to the future. They stated that these principles apply to the entire Pacific area, and that there is no reason for applying different principles in the various areas of the Pacific. In reply to my question as to whether or not the United States is satisfied with our explanation in regard to all other points aside from those pointed out in the memorandum of the 2nd, they replied that they would like to have this ascertained from the basic attitude of the U.S. Government which is indicated in the memorandum of the 2nd, that this memorandum was given careful study by the U.S. Government and that this represents all that the U.S. Government has to say and that therefore there is nothing more for them to add. They emphasized the fact that they think that the U.S. Government does not now desire to enter upon any more discussions in regard to details, and that if there is a "meeting of minds" between the two nations in regard to the interpretation of the four basic principles, the other questions will find a natural understanding; but they avoided giving much in the way of definite replies to my questions.

Of course, they did state that there might be points in the proposal of June 21st which would need revision because of subsequent changes in the situation, but that in its larger aspects there has been no change and added further that after having studied these four basic principles, if Japan should reconsider the September 6th proposal and submit a second proposal, the United States stands ready to give it careful consideration.

With the situation as thus stated, I think we might as well proceed on the assumptions mentioned in my #907[c].

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[a] See III, 258.

[b] See III, 245—Re the U.S. note of 2 October, it is assumed there is agreement with the U.S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by the U.S. and expected to iron out their application in conference.

[c] See III, 254–257—In reply to Tokyo query whether the U.S. agrees to all points except "evacuation from China", Nomura explains in detail his ideas of the U.S. position and reasons for refusing the leader's meeting. Japan has equivocated and limited her agreement to the Four Principles the U.S. insist must be the basis of an understanding.

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 260

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 10, 1941
TO: Washington #650.

Re your #915[a].

1. Slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has reached the decisive stage. I am doing my utmost to bring about a decision on them and the situation does not permit of this senseless procrastination. The difficult points must be clarified now. My #637[b] and related messages were sent you for that reason. What I wish of you now is to find out as soon as possible the opinions of the United States concerning the matters mentioned in those messages. (Otherwise, as I have told you two or three times, it will be impossible for me to decide upon our policy.) Yes, I know you have told me your opinions quite sufficiently in a number of messages, but what I want is the opinions of the American officials and none other.

2. In your caption message you do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with these parleys. You do not tell me how HULL answers. You do not tell me anything else I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire me in detail and immediately the minutes of these conversations, what they say and the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you interview HULL or the President of the United States, please take WAKASUGI or IGUCHI with you and please send me without any delay the complete minutes of what transpires.

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[a] See III, 258.

[b] See III, 245 in which Foreign Minister TOYODA asks Ambassador Nomura to clarify immediately with the United States Government two points.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 261

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #923.

I have read your #650[a].

What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and they claim that our policy is semi-pacific and semi-aggressive. They say that our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements, and that it will be out of the question to agree on any preparatory talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition, to the three matters mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many other objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do not understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance with the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. I am sure that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a conference of leaders so long as we do not make that compromise.

In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of their answer of the 2nd.

I tnink that you fully realize the situation I described in my #917[b] yesterday. However, I am sending you this for your information.

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[a] See III, 260.
[b] See III, 259.

Trans. 10–11–41

No. 262

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 12, 1941
TO: Washington #654.

On the afternoon of the 10th I asked Minister GREW to call on me. For your private information I spoke to him as follows, and as I have asked you before, I want you to continue your efforts to lead the United States officials to present us with a clearcut proposal:

1. "On the 3rd we received the American memorandum of the 2nd and have given it most cordial consideration. It is a little difficult for us to grasp the important points of it, but as best we can make out, they are (1) garrisoning and evacuating soldiers; (2) the English, Japanese, American attitude toward the European war; and (3) non-discrimination in commerce in China.

2. "Now we wish to put all our cards on the table and to proceed with negotiations. If the United States has any misgivings on those three points, or on any others, I am sure it will be possible for us to straighten them out. I would like to present to the treaty officials a proposal having some possibilities of adoption. Concerning those three points there is also a question of time. There is no use in exchanging official letters, notes and other documents as we now are. If we would only start out with a conference of leaders, such difficulties as exist may fade away automatically."

3. The American Ambassador said "The United States is a free country and we have to carefully consider public opinion." I retorted "Well, it is none the less so with us. It is true that we are under the thumb of public opinion, but if we can agree with the United States on a conference, public opinion will, of itself, calm down and no such unrest as now exists will continue. If we go on this way, it will be hard to say what the extremists may do."

4. I passed on to the Army Your Honor's communication concerning French Indo-China, but so far I have received no reply. I expect it soon.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 263

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #924.

From Wakasugi to the Foreign Office.

At 5 p.m. the 13th I am scheduled to confer with Under Secretary Welles, during which I plan to ascertain in detail the attitude of their side. Welles also has expressed a desire to have a long chat with me at that time. This much for the time being.

Chief of office routing.

Please convey this to the Foreign Minister also.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 264

FROM: Tokyo October 13, 1941
TO: Washington #657.

Re your #924[a].

We shall cable our instructions with regard to the talks referred to, subsequently. Please be so advised.

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[a] See III, 263.

Trans. 10–13–41

No. 265

FROM: Tokyo October 13, 1941
TO: Washington #658.

Re my #657[a].

I presume that your talks with Welles will cover the U.S.-Japanese negotiations in toto. We are particularly anxious to be advised as soon as possible, as I have mentioned in previous messages referring to this subject, on the points listed below. (The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis and it is becoming absolutely essential that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of Japanese-U.S. relations is to be accomplished. I cannot go into details now, but please bear this fact in mind.)

1. May we assume that the United States has no particular disagreements other than the three points which are under consideration at the present time?

2. Submitting by the United States a counter proposal to our proposal of 25 September. (As you are well aware, our proposal of 25 September embodied our claims in the form submitted by the United States as their proposal on 21 June. Should the United States be reluctant to

submit a clear-cut counter proposal to ours referred to above, we should request that they submit a basically new proposal immediately.)

Of point 1 set forth above, we are particularly interested in being advised of what the United States exactly desires concerning the matter of evacuation or garrisoning of troops.

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[a] See III, 264—"We shall cable our instructions with regard to the talks referred to, subsequently. Please be so advised.

Trans. 10–13–41

No. 266

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

October 13, 1941
663.

Re my # 658[a].

I pointed out in my message referred to in the heading that circumstances do not permit even an instant's delay. Please, therefore, submit a report on the rough outline and the general tone of the conference between Wakasugi and Welles immediately, and dispatch a cable giving the details, subsequently.

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[a] See III, 265.

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 267

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

October 13, 1941
939.

(In 3 parts—complete)

The details of the Wakasugi-Welles conversations will be reported in a subsequent cable[a], but in the meantime, I shall submit this which concerns the two points on which you requested information in your message # 658[b]. In view of the fact that the talks lasted for over two hours, will you please await the subsequent message for the details of the tone, etc. of the talks.

In general, the tone of the talks was friendly and frank. Welles said that there is no change in the President's expressed desire of meeting with the Premier if the three points can be agreed upon. He added that Secretary Hull is in full agreement on this point, too.

(1) As far as he knew, Welles said, there were no obstacles to the materialization of the leaders' conference, other than the three points. Wakasugi said that he got the impression that Secretary Hull was of the opinion that there would be one or two more points which would have to be cleared up when the preliminary arrangements were brought up to date, and asked Welles about that. Welles replied that he had not been advised by Hull of those points but that he would ascertain them and then advise us.

(*Part 2*)

With regard to the matter of withdrawing or stationing troops in China, Wakasugi said that the U.S. attitude had been made clear in her proposal of 21 June and again in her oral state-

ment of 2 October. We have no intention of arguing about that point any further, Wakasugi continued, but that he would like to ask one question about it. This question was his own personal one as an individual and was not instigated by or put with the knowledge of either the Government or the Ambassador.

So saying, Wakasugi said that when a nation had been sending fighting forces to another over a long period of years, it was exceedingly difficult, from a practical standpoint, to suddenly evacuate them. Even if such a program were to be carried out, years and months would be required before its completion, Wakasugi said, adding that Welles, who has had long years of experience as a diplomat should well understand that.

Moreover, Wakasugi continued, the matter of whether troops were to be removed or not was a matter involving Japan and China. Should, therefore, the United States be assured the withdrawal of troops by Japan, would the United States be willing to leave the details up to Japan and China to decide?

(*Part 3*)

Welles replied that that would depend entirely upon Japan's sincerity. If Japan is truly sincere in her assurance of troop evacuation there no doubt would be ways of coming to a successful agreement as to ways and means of carrying it out.

1. The United States has no intention of making any counter proposals other than those she has already submitted to Japan on 21 June and the Oral Statement of 2 October. The above two proposals were the result of careful and thorough consideration. However, it is in the realm of possibility that if the objectives contained in those proposals are kept intact the wording may, under certain circumstances, be altered. The United States objections to the Japanese proposals of 6 September and 25 September are based on the fact that they considerably restrict the terms contained in the two U.S. proposals—which incidentally, contained the terms of the earlier Japanese proposals—referred to above.

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[a] Available, See III, 269. (A 6 part message, only Part 4 available at present.)

[b] See III, 265—Since the situation at home is fast approaching a crisis, in your talks with Welles cover the entire subject of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, and in particular, just what the U.S. wants reevacuation or garrisoning of troops in China.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 268

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo #940.

Re my #939[a].

The telegram regarding the Wakasugi-Welles conference should be sent as separate telegram #941[b], however, in view of the urgency of the situation, it will not be set up as a Chief of Office Routing telegram, but please handle it as such.

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[a] See III, 267.

[b] A 6-part message, only Part 4 available at present, see III, 269.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 269

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo #941.

(In 6 parts—Part 4 only available)

5. Of the three points, please be advised of the matter pertaining to withdrawing or stationing of our troops in China, by my previous report.

6. Wakasugi, therefore, said that in the final analysis, the stumbling block lies in the fact that whereas the United States is interested in agreeing upon basic principles first, Japan is insisting that the matter of primary importance is the clearing up of the outstanding differences first and then to discuss the generalities such as basic principles, etc. The truth of the matter is, Wakasugi continued, it is indeed rarely that a basic principle can be carried as such to any satisfactory degree. Moreover, he pointed out, without agreements or concrete factors, an agreement on principle is without meaning.

To this, the Undersecretary said that the basic principle should first be agreed upon, after which the actual problems can be fitted to it for individual agreements ----- (2 lines missed)—(Waskasugi pointed out that) our proposal of 6 September expressed a willingness to sacrifice a practically unanimous desire of the people of Japan for a northward and/or southward military move, for the sake of an adjusted relationship with the United States. This was indeed a bold stroke and probably one which a subsequent cabinet, regardless of its nature, would not dare to duplicate.

In view of this daring step, wouldn't the United States be willing to display some boldness in behalf of great statesmanship, Waskasugi asked.

The Undersecretary said that he fully appreciated our moves and that the United States felt considerable encouragement therefrom. However, the United States has experienced disappointing reverses he said, pointing to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, even after matters had progressed to the point of the United States submitting the 21 June proposal.

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that the occupation of French Indo-China had a direct bearing on the China incident. He explained that, with a view to our security, we took this step with the agreement of the Government of France.

Trans. 10–21–41

No. 270

FROM: Tokyo October 13, 1941
TO: Washington 〒 662.

We have made the necessary arrangements for a telephone connection between Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, Terasaki, and Minister Wakasugi, for noon (Japan time) on the 14th. On this occasion, the following passwords and codes will be used.

U.S. attitude is reasonable	MARIKO OTAKU NI ASOBI NI KURUYU (Is Mariko coming to pay you a social call?)
U.S. attitude is unreasonable	MARIKO ASOBI NI KO NU (Mariko is not coming to pay a social call.)

General outlook of the negotiations	SONO-GO NO KOSI NO KENKO (The health of the Minister since then).
The Four Principles	SITIFUKUJIN NO KAKE MONO (Japanese scroll of the Seven Luck Gods).
Will they stick to it?	KI NI IRIMASITA KA (Did it meet with your approval?)
Is there some way through it?	KI NI IRIMASEN KA (Did it not meet with your approval?)

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 271

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #943.

(Part 1 of 2.)[A] (To be handled in Government Code.)

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

[A] See III, 272.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 272

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #943.

(Part 2 of 2)

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the Isolationists.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 273

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #959.

(Part 1 of 2)

On the evening of the 15th TERASAKI was invited to the home of Admiral TURNER, who, as you know, is a most trusted friend of Admiral STARK. In the course of their conversation TURNER said:

(a) "If HITLER gains control over Europe, it will constitute a direct threat to Central and South America, and America must certainly fight this. Therefore, it is the present policy of the United States to prevent the enfeeblement of Great Britain's national resources (including the Far East) by assisting her in stopping Germany."

(b) "It is said that the present Japanese cabinet is a strong one; however, it is doubtful whether it has the support of the Army, and if the Military finds itself at variance with the opinion of the cabinet, the cabinet might be overthrown at any time. Therefore, the United States cannot help feeling a little trepidation in broaching any negotiations with the Japanese Government under these circumstances."

(c) "It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis of a fifty-fifty compromise between Tokyo and Washington." (TURNER does not think that we are compromising.)

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 274

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #959.

(Part 2 of 2)

TERASAKI explained that some Americans had already questioned him about the permanence of the present cabinet but that this was beside the point because to broach the Japanese-American negotiations while doubting the permanence of the cabinet was putting the cart before the horse. He said that at present when mutual doubts were rife, particularly in the United States, the United States ought certainly to exercise statesmanship, and continued, "The United States is exceedingly idealistic concerning the Far East. Aiding China might be

called a question of principle, but if I may say so, this talk of principles is a sort of hobby among the rich. If it's not a question of principle, all I can conclude is that you all are determined to make us fight with China until we are exhausted. On the other hand, you have followed a very, very realistic policy in Central America. Forgetting the history of Panama for a moment, we can find plenty of present examples proving what I say. Well, China is not an over-simplified question of principle with us Japanese. It is a question of our life. We have already fought there for four years. You went to Japan on the *Astoria*. I am sure you know something of the temperament of the Japanese. Once a Japanese is in a corner, he will forget all interest in life and death and fight back with fury. I know that we are much poorer than you Americans in material things. I don't know what the result of Japanese-American war might be, but even though we lost, I can tell you we would put up an awful fight. If we do not achieve what we are trying to do, it may come to that. Now if you Americans would only extend your hand in friendship to us a little, you could have our lasting amity; otherwise, we may turn out to be permanent enemies.

Trans. 10–22–41

No. 275

FROM: Toyko — October 15, 1941
TO: Washington — #667.

Regarding your #939[a] and #941[b].

Your message has clarified many points regarding the situation and the matter can be charged up to Welles' state of agitation. However, as I feel that further conversations with Wakasugi might be continued, please maintain contact and also bear the following points in mind:

(1) If we quibble over the argument set forth in paragraph 6 of your message #941[b], it may give them an opening to insist on having the Four Principles included in the text proper of the agreement.

However, since not only have the so-called basic American stipulations been omitted from the preamble of the American proposal of June 21st, but the reference is made in the final clause to the effect that the principles (stipulations) contained in the proposal of June 21st are also included in the document of October 2nd. We wish to hold to this and should take advantage of the American desire to use the proposal of June 21st as the basis of negotiations and continue our conversations on the basis of the same proposal, without taking up the Four Principles independently.

(2) Our proposal is nothing more than our proposal of September 16th incorporated into the American proposal of June 21st. However, there is no need for us to make any further move until the other side decides that it is impossible to clarify the concrete proposal any further. Therefore please discuss the points of variance between our proposal and that of June 21st and ascertain the United States' intentions regarding the various points involved in the concrete proposal, and reply results.

(3) Due to the nature of this negotiation we wish to have it handled between Wakasugi and Welles, for the time being, and should progress warrant, to transfer the whole negotiation to be handled between you and the Secretary of State.

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[a] See III, 267.
[b] See III, 269. A 6 part message, only part 4 available at present.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 276

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #950.

Chief of Office routing.

Regarding your #667[a].

Tomorrow afternoon (16th) Wakasugi is expected to confer with Welles. Yesterday (14th) "$\overline{O}$" is said to have conferred with the President and also with the heads of the Far Eastern Affairs. (For your information.)

The Military Attaché here has been instructed by the headquarters in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an inch in our stand regarding the question of the evacuation of troops. They are apprehensive that we have not emphasized enough our stand regarding it and urge us to lay special stress on this point.

It goes without saying that we fully understand our country's stand regarding this question and both Colonel Iwasa and I have repeatedly informed the other side of this.

However, when Wakasugi conferred with Welles on the 13th, he purposely did not go deeply into the subject of the evacuation of troops because it happens to be one of the three major questions which have been gone over many times before and the purpose of the above conference was to clarify certain points in the United States' proposal in order to ascertain their intentions. You may be assured that we do not intend to minimize the importance of this question nor to effect any compromise.

At tomorrow's conference we intend to bring up this question for discussion once again.

Should you have any inquiry from the Military regarding this matter please explain the above in order to avoid any misunderstanding. I have already explained the situation as stated above to our Military Attaché.

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[a] See III, 275.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 277

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 16, 1941
TO: Washington #671.

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movements for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT administration continues to attack the Asia Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it

necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 278

FROM: Tokyo October 16, 1941
TO: Washington #672.

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

Trans. 10–16–41

No. 279

FROM: Tokyo October 17, 1941
TO: Washington #682.

The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts you have made.

The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of the makeup of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated. There shall be no changes in this respect.

Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.

Trans. 10–18–41

No. 280

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #962.

(Part 1 of 5) (Extremely Urgent)

By previous arrangement WAKASUGI, HULL and WELLES had a conference lasting two hours beginning at 5:00 p.m., on the 16th. The substance of their talk was as follows: (Probably because he had received news of our Cabinet's general resignation, WELLES said that he would like to talk with WAKASUGI in the presence of Secretary HULL. He led WAKASUGI to HULL's room and they talked together.)

1. HULL asked the circumstances of the Cabinet's general resignation and wished to know what the outlook for the new Cabinet was. WAKASUGI said that all we had received was a public announcement of the general resignation and as yet no detailed news had reached us. WAKASUGI continued, "No matter what sort of Cabinet it is, however, it is impossible to leave Japanese-American relations in their present state. The world being in its present condition, particularly faced by the China problem, our people cannot continue undecided as they now are in the face of American opposition. They demanded a Government that would take a definite stand either to the right or to the left. There is no mistake about that. If no unanimity can be discovered between our two nations, it would be hard to say in which direction the wind will blow. I wanted to talk with the Under Secretary today and see if we could not find some points of agreement between your proposal of June 21st and our proposal of September 25th. That is why I came."

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 281

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #962.

(Part 2 of 5)

HULL spent half an hour recounting the substance of his conversation so far and then went on to say, "The United States is certainly not playing along with a policy of procrastination. I earnestly wish to see peaceful and normal political relations reestablished between Japan and the United States. In Europe HITLER is trying to set up a new order by force of arms. Now, if you Japanese also are attempting to set up a new regime in the Far East by force of arms, this world is becoming cramped indeed. We cannot stand by and approve this course of events with equanimity. We stand for non-discrimination in trade and for freedom of the seas and are opposed to all of these militaristic policies. One of the hardest things to reconcile in Japanese-American relations is the fact that, while proclaiming the maintenance of peace, Japan actually carries on a military invasion. There are so many military expansionists now among the Japanese people and among influential people there that I doubt if it would be possible for Japan to cooperate on a new peaceful policy." WAKASUGI then said, "It is true that there are those who advocate expansion northward or southward; however, ever since we have been a naval power foreign nations have lined up our neighbors as colonies of theirs to oppose us. Recent events show how this economic pressure has again brought us to grief. All we have done is to follow the trend necessary for the national security and existence of our people. As a measure for self preservation we had to get necessary materials. Do not think that we deliberately embarked on a military campaign with any joy.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 282

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #962.

(Part 3 of 5)

"The United States seems to have an idea that in order to establish an understanding with Japan on these important questions, she must stop military moves northward and southward, but unless the United States ceases measuring everything by her own yardstick and understands Japan's peculiar position, and unless she shows a friendly attitude in lifting the limitations on the settlement of the China question which faces Japan, as well as commercial limitations, the situation will inevitably continue to grow worse."

3. WELLES urged HULL himself to continue an explanation of the three points he had made, and HULL repeated that the present object of the United States is to defeat Hitlerism; in short, (a) to abolish all militarism, and (b) to bring about equality of treatment and opportunity throughout the whole Pacific area, including China. He showed quite a bit of understanding of Japan's position with respect to the Tripartite Alliance. He seemed, however, loath to go too deeply into the question of peace between Japan and China because he has always been an advocate of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other powers. He asked if there was not some Chinese with whom he (WAKASUGI) could discuss these matters directly. WAKASUGI, however, said that although he knew both AMBASSADOR HU SHIH and SOONG TSE-WEN, he was not able to discuss the relations of the two countries with them. HULL seemed to understand this and said that in any case this would have to be worked out between Japan and China.

Trans. 10-20-41

No. 283

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #962.

(Part 4 of 5.)[a]

WAKASUGI then went on to say that it would be very difficult for us to evacuate China. He told them it was very necessary to keep troops there. He went on to explain the activities of the Communist forces in the north as described in your messages and by the Naval Attache. He told them that the Communists were like a cancerous growth on the development of China. He explained that we had to keep forces and to protect the lives, property, and commercial interests of both Japanese and foreigners. HULL then asked, "Well, if you did not take your troops away and left them there for a long time, how would the Chinese take it?" WAKASUGI said, "What the Chinese are most interested in is the safety of their lives and a guaranteed livelihood." He went on to say, "So far as the maintenance of peace is concerned, the Chinese do not care in the hands of what people it is. It is apparently being reported to the President that the Communist Party is engaged merely in educational activities. However, this is a tragic error. What the Communists are trying to do is to destroy Chinese society and industry at the very roots. All the Chinese fear this exceedingly." HULL, however, countered by saying, "In the past we, too, stationed some soldiers in Central America and left them there as long as ten years, but the results were bad, and we brought them out. Since then we have found it more profitable to practice the "Good Neighbor Policy." He did not appear to wish to discuss this matter any further, and seemed to think that this should be thrashed out between our-

selves and the Chinese. WELLES then asked, "Well, have you any other questions besides those three which you wish to discuss?" and HULL answered, "None in particular."

4. WELLES told HULL the desire of WAKASUGI to look into the differences and points of agreement in the Japanese-American proposals. HULL immediately agreed. He was all in favor of having the officials concerned in this business convene and work out the details immediately, but WAKASUGI said that when the officials concerned on both sides had met before, all they had done was waste their time in arguments without any results. He said that the time would not permit of such procrastination and that he would, for the time being, like to confine his discussions to important questions only and to discuss them with the Under Secretary alone.

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[a] Part 5 not available.

Trans. 10-20-41

No. 284

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #966.

Wakasugi met and talked with Hull and Welles for about an hour and a half, from 4:30 p.m. on the 17th. The following is the gist of their talk.

1. Wakasugi stated that he would like to further discuss the three points involved in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations with the understanding that neither side commit itself to what is said here in view of the fact that we were not in receipt of instructions from the new cabinet as yet. Hull expressed his agreement to this proposal and then inquired what the outstanding points were in the respective proposals.

In reply, Wakasugi read those paragraphs pertaining to the right of self-defense under the terms of the Tripartite Pact as contained in our proposal of 25 September, and the U.S. proposal of 21 June. He went on to explain the features in accordance with the various instructions from Tokyo, pointing out that we had made the right of self-defense on which the U.S. placed much emphasis, a mutual right. Did that not satisfy the U.S. demands?, Wakasugi asked.

Hull replied that during the tenure of the former Foreign Minister it was loudly broadcast that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to prevent the United States from entering the war. Since the United States may be forced to enter the war for self defense purposes, the United States could not help but have doubts as to Japan's true motives. The United States has no intention of taking military aggression against any nation; her only intention is to consider ways and means of defending herself, he explained repeatedly.

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that fundamentally the thing called "right of self-defense" was put in motion in the direction it is intended to be used by the state which invokes its use. Therefore, it is natural that depending on the intentions of another, we should restrain ourselves from fulfilling our duties under the terms of an agreement.

That is why we definitely established the fact in our proposal that our intentions are strictly self-preservation and that application of any phases thereof, would be absolutely on behalf of self-preservation. Self-preservation, as we have used the term, implies that Japan and Japan alone shall determine the means of carrying it out without depending on any foreign country whether it be Britain the United States or Germany, or any other. There are no other implications or interpretations to the phrases from our viewpoint.

Fundamentally, Wakasugi continued, wasn't it a self-evident fact that political agreements such as the Tripartite Pact cannot limit the signatories to any political commitments against a third country?

In the light of the Imperial Rescript published at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the spirit and the aims of said Pact should be evident. In the final analysis, that Pact's real mission is the contribution to world peace and does not support any intent of aggression and aggrandizement.

Hull listened carefully to Wakasugi's detailed explanations. Apparently the Secretary suspects that, basically, the nature of the Pact could be twisted at will to suit the needs of either a Japanese cabinet favoring military aggression or a cabinet favoring peace. Wakasugi, therefore, asked whether it was not true that unless suspicions were allayed, it would be impossible to come to agreements with any country. Was it not true, he continued, that when viewed through eyes of suspicion there would be much that could be questioned even in the so-called defense measures of the United States?

In any event, it was agreed that both of the proposals in question shall be given careful study after which a reply would be submitted.

2. Hull places the most emphasis on matters pertaining to non-discrimination in trade. He urged that we listen carefully to Welles' explanation of how Japan would actually profit by such a system. Hull then went on to point out that materialization of the non-discrimination in trade matters has been his main objective since his assumption of the post many years ago and described the progress he has made in various quarters. As an example, of the success of his program, he pointed to the recently signed trade agreement with Argentina. He seemed particularly proud of this accomplishment and added that even the self-interested British appeasement policy had been prevented in Central and South America. (What was meant exactly by this was not made clear.)

Hull went on to say that if this policy were limited merely to the southwest Pacific area, it would not be of much value. Unless this principle is applied to the entire Pacific area (including China) the contribution it would make toward peace would be negligible. There is more probability that world peace, under present world conditions, can be attained through adjustments in trade relations than through adjustments of political relations between nations, he claimed.

It cannot be doubted for a moment, he continued, that if Japan adopts this basic policy and applies it in the Far East, that she will have the advantage over all countries in her area because of her geographical position, her race, and because of her business acumen. He urged repeatedly that the concrete and positive advantages be pointed out to our government.

Will you please therefore, he thoroughly advised of this phase and let us know your opinions thereof.

Wakasugi then said that he would admit that the various principles set forth by the United States were indeed fine and as guiding principles no one could possibly find fault with them. The cold facts are, however, that different means have to be used by each individual nation in order to survive. In spite of this fact it is the United States' custom to measure the others needs by a ruler which measures the needs of her own country, which is the most blessed from the standpoint of nature, of any nation in the world. The fact that the position and circumstances of other countries differ from those of the United States apparently is not taken into consideration by the United States, Wakasugi said.

Japan occupies only a small corner of what is known as the Far East; moreover, she has been occupied for over four years with the China incident. She has, therefore, a number of circumstances which are peculiar to herself. So though she may want to comply with all of what the United States suggests, it is impossible for her to immediately do so. For example, for obvious and unavoidable reasons, Japan has established various organs and put into effect various systems in China to cope with temporary conditions and circumstances. Even if we tried to

comply with the basic principles advanced by the United States, we could not do so overnight where these are concerned. It would be an absolute impossibility from a practical and actual standpoint.

If the United States' principles are to be applied to the world at the end of the war, it is indeed a worthy undertaking and merits serious consideration. However, it is not in the realm of practicality to attempt to apply these principles at a time when the whole world is in a chaotic condition. It is asking too much of Japan to expect her to accept these principles under such world conditions, and to expect her, in turn, to apply them immediately to the Far East area which has been undergoing particularly unfavorable conditions.

Therefore, Wakasugi continued, the immediate need is to discuss matters which Japan is capable at the present time of carrying out. These actual problems should be worked out to the maximum point of possibility under present circumstances and in this manner, the first opening to the road of joint and cooperative action should be found.

Hull replied that he well understood Japan's position and the circumstances in which she was involved. However, he continued, the United States also has to cope with the domestic problems. For example, there are complaints from U.S. business men in China who have been squeezed out or whose activities have been curtailed because of the monopolistic attitude Japan has assumed in the China trade. When these complaints are voiced, because of the make-up of the United States, they cannot be left unnoticed.

Returning again to fundamentals, it is an unalterable fact, the Secretary continued, that the United States' basic principle is advantageous to Japan. For this reason he desired acceptance of it by Japan, the Secretary repeated.

He agreed to compare the two proposals on this point, too, and to submit a reply after so doing.

In conclusion Hull asked what the conditions were in Japan. Wakasugi replied that the general public were very strained. The government is being forced to take an immediate and decisive turn to either the right or the left. The people are apparently ready to jump at a chance for an understanding with the United States and because of the sensitiveness of the Japanese people, the tension will no doubt be immediately relieved if there is the slightest gesture on the part of the United States to warrant it.

Although it may be true that more time will be required before an agreement can be reached on the weighty items, however, there would be made favorable reactions if even minor matters, such as the following, were cleared up: releasing of the Itukusima Maru and the Syoyo Maru which have been tied up in San Francisco for over a month because the money with which to pay for their fuel has been frozen; releasing of funds with which to pay for fuel for those ships which are coming over here at present. (There is some interference from the Treasury Department in this instance.)

As Wakasugi mentioned these items, Welles took down the names of the vessels and other pertinent facts and promised to take the matter up with bureaus concerned.

Trans. 10–21–41

No. 285

FROM: Hollywood (Nakuchi) August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #156.

Re my message #151[a].

1. The St. Claire took on a cargo of 95,000 barrels of aviation gasoline and left port for Vladivostok on the afternoon of (date). The Fitzsimmons is in the process of taking on a similar cargo of 75,000 barrles at Erusegundo[b]. Aside from these two, three other ships are scheduled to leave port carrying similar cargoes. All of them, it is understood, are under charter with the Maritime Commission.

2. All of the above mentioned ships are to rendezvous at some point in the Pacific. It is understood that a number of United States destroyers are on maneuvers at the present time. Rumor has it that they are bound for Vladivostok.

3. The crew of the St. Claire, mentioned above, ----- ----- -----.

Relayed to Washington and San Francisco.

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[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 286

FROM: Seattle (Sato) August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #91.

(Secret outside the office)

According to a spy report, the English warship *Warspite* entered Bremerton two or three days ago.

Trans. 10–4–41

No. 287

FROM: Seattle (Sato) August 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo #93.

The Russian ship *Vladimar Mayskovsky* arrived one or two days ago and entered dry dock for repairs which will require a week or more. The present movements of the ship are ----- -----, but as soon as it is repaired, it is going to California to load on freight for Vladivostok. The *Minsk* has left harbor as previously stated. The *Patrovsuky* is still in dry dock.

Trans. 8–25–41

No. 288

FROM: Tokyo August 21, 1941
TO: Berlin #749.

Re your #1045[a].

1. America appears to have begun the transportation of oil to Russia using American, Russian and neutral ships. There are also reports to the effect that perhaps several hundred airplanes have been transported. In spite of the fact that we are keeping everything under strict surveillance up to the present not one American vessel has entered Vladivostok.

2. I have warned the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo in line with my #739[b] and I have conveyed a similar warning to the American government through Ambassador Nomura. However, it is very difficult to effect any actual restraint through such steps.

The above is for your information.

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[a] Not available.

[b] See Japanese-Russian Section, Volume III. Report of conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, in which both insist the Neutrality Pact is being strictly observed; Japan warns against third power's acquiring Russian territory in East Asia; extension of third power's military movements to East Asia; and shipment of U.S. munitions to Vladivostok.

Trans. 8–26–41

No. 289

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) August 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #183.

The Russian freighter Yakut (1500 tons) which had been undergoing repairs here left on the 24th[a] for Vladivostok loaded with gasoline, shoes, socks and small arms. On the 20th[b] the Russian freighter Minsk arrived here from (?) and on the 23rd[a] the Russian tanker *Dombas(?)* arrived here from Los Angeles.

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle, & -----.

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[a] Approximate dates.

Trans. 9–4–41

No. 290

FROM: Seattle (Sato) August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #92.

Re your circular #1788[a].

The large planes to be sent into Alaska may be flown from Spokane, McChord or, after being transported to Portland by rail, from the latter city. The planes now in Alaska may be used to supply Soviet Russia. In order to ascertain this, I sent a member of the office to Tacoma, but gathering of information of this nature is an extremely difficult thing. According to what the member reported, ----- Field is about 60% completed, and already the troops had arrived; there were also two large four-motored planes there; at ----- Field also, considerable number

of troops are tenting; although there are several two-motored medium sized planes, judging from the fact that each has an insignia of the United States Army on it, they are probably not intended to be used for aiding Russia.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–27–41

No. 291

FROM: Rome August 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #547.

On the 6th all of the local newspapers printed a dispatch dated the 25th from Shanghai to the effect that the United States Government had recently made representations to the Soviet Government to permit the sending of American Naval advisors to Vladivostok. The Soviet authorities apparently at this date have not permitted the setting up of military establishments within their realm. This dispatch continued by saying that, should such military establishments be set up, it would be a threat against Japan. However, until American demands become much more stringent, there is little fear of these establishments being permitted by the Russian authorities, and the Japanese Government should make thoroughgoing and secret investigations on the spot to see that such a thing was not carried out.

Trans. 8–30–41

No. 292

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 28, 1941
TO: Washington #1899.

(Part 1 of 2) (Message to Moscow, Part 1 of 2, #835)

In the event that supplies for the assistance of the Soviet, exported from the United States, are imported by the Soviet through Japanese waters and from Vladivostok to the Soviet, the position of Japanese diplomacy, which is based on the Tripartite Alliance, will become extremely delicate. I believe that Your Excellency has already advised the government to which you are accredited of this on the basis of representations to you by former Minister MATSUOKA and myself. According to recent intelligences which have come to hand, seven American, Russian, and neutral ships are already undertaking the transportation of material aid for the Soviet in the form of airplane gasoline. Already they are on the high seas bound for Vladivostok. I believe that you are aware of the gravity of the problem which this provokes and of the arguments to be invoked. The Imperial Government at this time believes that it must strongly insist upon the caution of the Soviet Government not only from the point of view of the legal arguments of international law, but also from the viewpoint of the general world situation.

Trans. 9–15–41

No. 293

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 28, 1941
TO: Washington # 1899 (Circular).

(Part 2 of 2) (Message to Moscow # 835, Part 2 of 2)

In the spirit of the neutrality agreement, the Imperial Government is interested in the maintenance of excellent relationships between the two countries. The Imperial Government feels that the Government of the Soviet is already sufficiently aware of the fact that Japan greatly hopes that the European war will not mushroom into the Far East, and to this end she will bend every effort. In the event that the Government of the United States in her program of material aid to the Soviet sends her ships through Imperial waters, the effect upon the general opinion within our country, as well as the reaction of Germany and Italy to this, will be, indeed, terrible in the extreme. It has become of the utmost importance that the Soviet Government give due consideration to the increasing difficulty that it is for us to condone the development of such a situation as I have mentioned above. Therefore, we would like to have you make representations to the Government of the Soviet to acquaint them sufficiently with these developments. Furthermore, with regard to the importation of American goods, it is necessary that we insist upon their government giving most particular consideration to the routes over which these imports are received and the routes by which they are secured. As soon as you have communicated the above to the government to which you are accredited, I would like to have you make such reply as you deem fitting.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 294

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 191.

1. The Donbasu[a] took on a load of 80,000 barrels of aviation gasoline September 8[b] and left immediately for Vladivostok.

2. According to various newspaper reports in addition to the four American tankers bound for Vladivostok, tankers of the General Petroleum Company too are to be dispatched on the direct shipping route to Vladivostok.

Relayed to Washington, -----, -----, ----- New York.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

[b] Apparently an error in the date of loading, made either by the Japanese encoding the dispatch, or by operators in transmitting it.

Trans. 9-19-41

No. 295

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) September 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 520.

The Naval authorities have made the following request of us. They would like to have you insist at this time upon a member of your staff going to Hawaii in the capacity of a courier. Now,

as to the most opportune moment, in the light of Japan-American relations, they would like to have this matter left up to your Excellency's discretion.

According to what the Naval authorities have to say on the matter, your Embassy staff is well aware of this situation. If this is indeed the case, direct application should be made from Washington rather than from the Home Office. Based on a similar request by the Naval authorities, a courier is being sent to South America. This is for your information.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 296

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #762.

Re your #520[a].

Naval authorities here have filed still another request. Inasmuch as courier KUGA is returning to Japan by way of the United States and has booked passage on the President Taylor sailing from San Francisco on the 6th, the matter to which you refer is no longer necessary.

Please advise ——.

[a] See III, 295.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 297

FROM: Seattle (Sato) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #105.

(Part 1 of 2)

1. According to a statement by the President of the Boeing Company to the Senate Committee inspecting military industries, the lack of progress in the production of his Company was not due to lack of material but to changes in design and also to the unprecedented large expansion of the plant. The Company has stopped the manufacture of *planes for England (?)* and although it is four months behind in the manufacture of planes for the American Army, it will catch up by the end of the year. The number of employees of the Company is 16,500.

2. According to an announcement by the 4th Army Commander, Lieut-Gen. DeWitt, the 90,000 men of his army will be increased to *120,000 (?)* men. There is at present being built along the coast five barracks, which will be ready by the end of September, capable of accommodating 30,000 men. One mechanized division, about 10,000 is *to be (?)* located at Meadowford, West Yellowston, *(?)*, Fort Huachuca and Marysville.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 298

FROM: Seattle (Sato) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 105.

(Part 2 of 2)

3. The 39th Bombardment Group (44 planes), the 89th Observation Squadron (15 planes), and the 310th Signal Company, all of Spokane, left August *23 (?)* to take part in the September maneuvers in Louisiana.

4. The planes (number unknown) which the 54th Bombardment Group at *(?)* near Everett are to get are *Republics (?)* or twin-motored *Lockheeds (?)*.

5. The Naval Air Base at Dutch Harbor was opened on the 2nd. W. N. Updegraff has been named Commandant *as has been previously reported (?)*. The Naval supply base at Port *Andrews* (?) was opened on the 4th, according to reports.

6. The *steering apparatus (?) (diameter 8 inches, double cylinders (?), gear ratio 410 to 1 (?)* for the 312 10,000 ton freighters to be leased to England are to be manufactured in two factories, one in Everett and one in *New York (?)*.

Trans. 9–10–41

No. 299

FROM: Seattle (Sato) September 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 38 (Circular).

Message to Tokyo # 104.

Re my # 10.

Two Soviet planes arrived at the Navy air field, Sand Point, at 5 P.M. on the 4th. The party is putting up at a hotel in the city. It is reported that their mission is to confer with the American authorities concerning the degree of aid the Soviet may be able to obtain from the United States.

Trans. 9–8–41

No. 300

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 170.

The Russian Air Mission inspected the B–19 heavy bomber at March Field on the 2nd, and on the 3rd came to Los Angeles where they are inspecting various airplane factories.

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco and Seattle.

Trans. 9–11–41

No. 301

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 4, 1941
TO: San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle # 263.

Message to Tokyo # 780.

Strictly secret.

Possibly the United States is preparing now for the eventuality when a considerable bombing force will have to be transferred to the (Siberian ?) area. Please secure intelligences on this matter.

1. Please investigate the state of affairs and the possibility of the Russian Military Commission, now in the United States, flying American planes via Alaska when they return home. (They have given their greatest consideration to large size Consolidated military planes and amphibions.)

Trans. 9–29–41

No. 302

FROM: Seattle (Sato) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 121.

Re my message # 107[a].

The two Russian hydroplanes left Sand Point on the 19th (?) for Moscow via the same route on which they came. Of the forty-seven members of the mission, ten of them returned with the hydroplanes (five on each ship). The remaining thirty-seven members are staying in the United States to study the production of airplanes.

Returned to ----- and Los Angeles.

---

[a] See II, 452.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 303

FROM: Seattle (Sato) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 124.

Re the latter part of my # 121[a].

Of the Russians remaining behind, 19 (?) of them are receiving training in bomber operation (?) at Spokane. The others (number unknown) seem to be staying in Washington and Los Angeles.

Relayed to ----- and Los Angeles.

---

[a] See III, 302.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 304

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 198.

The Minsk, having completed its repairs, left here on the 6th loaded with 8,000 drums of aviation oil, airplane engines, machine guns, ammunition, snow plows, etc.

Trans. 9–13–41

No. 305

FROM: Tokyo September 11, 1941
TO: Hsingking Cir. 1983.

Message from San Francisco # 1–6 on the 8th.

Ship (Minsk ?) which ----------, left port on the 6th destined for -----. She is said to be carrying 18,000 drums of aviation gasoline besides airplane motors, machine guns, ammunition, ----c etc.

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle and Portland.

Trans. 9–22–41

No. 306

FROM: Tokyo September 9, 1941
TO: Hsingking # 569.

Message from Seattle # 109 on the 6th.

Since it is not customary to publish information concerning entrance and exit of (ships ?), there is no way but for us to watch, and sometimes when it is raining we lose track of them. In order to make sure of the presence of *Vladimar Maykovsky* and *Deabrist*, we approached the docks, pretending that we were fishing. We found four ships in port, but they all had their names obliterated. Of these, we were able to identify three by their flags. They flew the flags of the United States, Great Britain, and -----. Judging from the appearance of the ship hands, one seemed to be *V.*, but we were not able to find D. It may be that the latter, finding no cargo, had proceeded to San Francisco.

Trans. 9–22–41

No. 307

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 217.

The Russian freighter Mejinski entered port here from Vladivostok on the 17th (?). The American tanker L. P. St. Clair, which is en route returning from Vladivostok, is expected to arrive on the 19th (?), according to reports.

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, and Seattle.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 308

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #218.

According to a spy report, the English warship *Warspite* arrived here from Bremerton on the ----- and is at present moored near the (naval arsenal at Mare Island?). It has been determined that it requires two more months for repairs at Liverpool (my message #187[a]).

Relayed to -----, Los Angeles and Seattle.

[a]See II, 771.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 309

FROM: Seattle (Sato) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #123.

1. The following warships are now at Bremerton:

The Warspite (repair work continuing. The upper part of the bridge and the port side of the bow spotted here and there with red paint).

Maryland class—one ship (the bridge, turrets and other main armaments have been painted red. Also, they seem to be constructing mountings on the foreward main deck for ten anti-aircraft guns).

Saratoga class air-craft carrier, 1 ship (tied up alongside the pier).

One ship which appears to be a cruiser (it has two smoke stacks but we were unable to distinguish anything else).

One other ship just arrived for repair.

2. The New Mexico class ship mentioned in message #101[a] has departed.

[a]See II, 855.

Trans. 9-27-41

No. 310

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) October 2, 1941
TO: Washington #222.

Message to Tokyo as #230.

1. One Oklahoma class battleship has arrived in port and is moored in front of the Bethlehem ship-building yard. No reconstruction work is going on on the outside but a great deal of repair work appears to be in progress within the ship.

2. It has been announced by the local headquarters of Naval District # (?) that the Hunters Point shipyard, which was bought last year and which has been undergoing repairs, will be taken over formally in the near future in advance of expectations. (Refer to confidential letter # 216[a] of last year.)

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle and Honolulu.

[a] See II, 745.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 311

FROM: San Francisco — October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 243.

Re my # 217[a].

The Russian freighter, MEJINSKI, is now in the process of docking. The IGARKA is three days out of New York, the NANTES 7 days from Vladivostok, and the MICHULIN 10 or 12 days from Vladivostok.

The NANTES is loaded with a large quantity of wheat, 20,000 barrels of fuel oil, and also some machine guns, tanks, etc.

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland.

[a] See II, 29.

Trans. 10–23–41

No. 312

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) — October 12, 1941
TO: Washington — # 48.

Message to Tokyo # 202.

Re my # 185[a].

The Russian ship, Kiev, now in port here, will take on its load of war materials as soon as repairs are completed and proceed to Vladivostok when orders are received. For this purpose, it is equipped with a 500 watt radio for the reception of orders and war news from Moscow.

Relayed to -----, Seattle.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–22–41

No. 313

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 16, 1941
TO: Seattle # 2187 (Circular).

Henceforth, I would like to have you refer in your reports to the movement of warships as follows.

1. As long as there are no great changes in the movement and basing of warships, report on them at least once every ten days. In the event of priority intelligence, report such on each occasion.

a. The arrival or departure of American flagships of the fleet or scouting force.

b. Should more than ten vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at one time.

c. The arrival or departure of warships of countries other than the United States (give as detailed a report as possible on the class of -----).

2. Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes, report it at once.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 314

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 121.

1. The Douglas B-18, the Martin B-17A bombers, totaling 100 planes, as well as a number of heavy Boeing 24's which have been stationed at Albrook Field in the past, completely disappeared about two weeks ago. I am attempting to find out where they went.

2. I have heard that approximately (35 or 45?) two-motored bombing planes are stationed at the newly constructed Agua Dulce Air Field in the province of Cocli.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 315

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 120.

Report on observations:

1. Ships moving through the Panama Canal toward the Atlantic:

August 15th Four U.S. submarines (number -----)
August 16th Two U.S. freighters
August 17th One U.S. freighter

2. Moving toward Pacific:

August 15th One U.S. freighter
One DeGaullist Government destroyer (Triomphant) (now anchored at Balboa)

3.

August 17th One U.S. destroyer anchored at Balboa.
One warship which appeared to be a cruiser was seen to arrive.

Recently five large-size destroyers have been in port (taking on fuel, rations and other supplies).

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 316

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #123.

1. Please refer to *(?)* of my message #120[a]. The Triomphant left Balboa for Tohita on the 17th according to report.

2. On the 19th two United States freighters and 1 British freighter were observed to transit the Canal toward the Pacific.

[a] See II, 1036—Panama reports movements through the Panama Canal.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 317

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #173.

Ships passing through the Canal between the 17th and 21st are as follows:

1. Pacific bound:
   1 American Tanker
   4 American Freighters
2. Atlantic bound:
   2 American Tankers
   4 American Freighters
   1 English Freighter

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 318

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) September 28, 1941
TO: Washington #49.

Message to Tokyo #184.

Re my #183[a].

Recently the Diomede Class is understood to have had the upper section of the mast cut off. The British operate two vessels of this type as well.

---

[a] See III, 289.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 319

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) September 30, 1941
TO: Washington Circular #51.

Message to Tokyo #188.

On the (29th ?) two (French ?) warships left port bound for the Pacific. One vessel of the Omaha class left port on the night of ----- for an unknown destination. In spite of the rumor that the raider is in the neighborhood of the Galapagos, rumors are circulating that it is in water adjacent to the Canal.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 320

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #191.

Between the 30th and the 2nd, three American freighters and one English hospital ship transited the canal to the Pacific, and nine American freighters and one American liner transited the canal to the Atlantic.

Trans. 10-18-41

No. 321

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #194.

Re my message #193[a].

One vessel left for the Pacific at 11:00 A.M. on the 3rd.

From the 3rd until the morning of the 4th, three American freighters and one French steamer moved out into the Pacific. During the same interval, seven American freighters, the "Union tanker", one destroyer and two British freighters went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic (one of the two British freighters was of the 10,000 ton class). All of the vessels bound

for the Atlantic went through the Canal successively. The two cruisers, which I mentioned in my caption message, accompanied these vessels as far as Balboa. Therefore, it would seem indicated that their entire cargoes were made up of military supplies.

Relayed to Washington.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–18–41

No. 322

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 190.

(2 parts—complete)

1. Since the recent shift in military aviation efforts to the Pacific Area the "Panama Air Depot" located at France Field was transferred to Curundu Heights (immediately adjacent to Albrook Field).

2. Rear Admiral SADLER, Commander of the 15th Naval District, since the extensive activities on the Pacific end of the Canal, made public on the 1st a statement to the effect that because of the increase of naval supplies a four-story warehouse built on pier 18 (it will be completed the middle of November), the ammunition unloading pier (west of pier 18) consisting of 32 buildings, and the existing buildings in the neighborhood of the Balboa dry dock would all be taken over as warehouses. Furthermore, the petroleum supply tanks at Boca on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope (the railroad junction from which the line branches to Colon and Ft. Randolph) on the Atlantic side (recently it is believed that these tanks have been camouflaged) have been taken over.

3. There are intelligences at hand concerning the construction of a good storage depot at Corozal which would contain sufficient foodstuffs to supply the Canal Zone for a six-month period, even though shipping routes between this point and the United States are severed.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 323

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 194.

The result of my investigations, as I reported in my secret letter # 142[a], are as follows:

1. The airplane bases which the United States is constructing are located at La Chorrera in Panama province, (please refer to part 4 of my # 149[a]) Chitre in Herrera province, Mensabe[b] in Los Santos province and at Remidios and Las Ra-Hasu in Chiriqui province.

2. The Panamanian airports already constructed which will be converted into military establishment are the ones at David in Chiriqui province and Paidonya[b] outside the limits of Panama City.

3. Airports which have been surveyed but because of the poor condition of the terrain have not been constructed, are the airports at Guarare in Los Santos province and at eight other projected points.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 324

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Manila

August 9, 1941
254.

Re your # 415[a] and # 451(?)[b].

Please make secret investigations regarding the name of the ship and ----- and subsequent conditions and wire. According to reports from doubtful sources the British battleship Warspite entered Manila on the 17th and sailed on the 18th for the west coast of America for repair of damages sustained. Please make secret investigations regarding the truth of this and wire result.

By the way the British cruiser Leander of the 7000 ton class resembles the Warspite from a distance.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Dated July 28, 1941. Reports departure of British cruiser from Cavite.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 325

FROM: Manila (Nihro)
TO: Tokyo

August 12, 1941
507.

Re your # 254[a].

(1) At the time a non-commissioned officer of the American Navy told me confidentially that the ship mentioned in my # 414[b](8?)[b] was the Warspite and I took this to be reliable information. This British ship, however, had its name painted over. Some spies who viewed the ship when it docked report that it was something like a 7,000-ton vessel. It was further reported that this ship moored at Cavite pier on the __th. Now, considering the shallowness of the water there, I do not see how it could have been the Warspite. (When the Cincinnati approaches that dock, it gradually lets out water ballast.) Judging from its shape, I would say that it was a light cruiser of the Leander class. (According to another report it was an 8,000-ton craft. This seems rather accurate.) (2) Among the members of the crew who came on shore there were some with such names as YORK, GEORGE, etc., on their hatbands and we also have a spy report to report to the effect that some forty-eight soldiers wounded in the Mediterranean were being accommodated. (3) I know nothing of the movement of this ship after my # 451[c]

Lately no British ships save this has entered port here (that is aside from the Taggubwno(?) mentioned in my #494[a].

[a] See III, 324.
[b] Not available.
[c] British cruiser which was anchored at Cavite for several days departed for _____ on the 27th.

Trans. 8-16-41

No. 326

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #517.

1. Ships now in port are six *pasu* (3 of type 190 and 3 of type 170) and ----- (all these came in on the 15th).

Those of type 170 each had on deck a rectangular box-like thing four metres long and two metres high.

2. Both the army and navy airplanes have come increasingly to be painted in dark blue.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 327

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo #527.

Re my #523[a].

The floating dock was not seen in the vicinity of Mariveles on the 18th. We are investigating its destination.

[a] See III, 328—Re sighting some vessel (or dock) off Mariveles.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 328

FROM: Manila August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #523.

Re your #262[a].

Since I have ----- ----- that it was cited off Mariberu[b] on August 6th, (however, it is not certain whether this (deck?) is that of Crongapo[b]), I told the First Engineer of the Nitian Maru (a ship chartered by the Mitsui and scheduled to arrive at Kobe on the 17th) to report the matter to the Naval authorities upon arriving at Kobe. Please, therefore, get the details from him. We have made arrangements to investigate this matter further. I am reporting this much at this time.

The address to which your caption telegram should have been transmitted was given as Batavia, but should it not have been Davao?

---

[a]Not available.
[b]Kana.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 329

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #575.

Re my #527[a].

Subsequent investigations revealed the following:

1. What was given in my caption telegram was an error on the part of the witness. We have ascertained the fact that the floating dock is still located at a point about one mile southeast of Mariberesu.[b]

2. This floating dock had been moved early in July from Olongapo[c]. Together with it, the technicians and the workers were moved. I understand that there have been of late hardly any ship movements in or out of Olongapo.

3. For some time, it was reported that barracks were being constructed near Mariberesu to imprison the Japanese. It seems that these barracks were being constructed to house the technicians and workers employed on the floating dock. I understand, however, that these people are experiencing considerable difficulty because of enormous swells in the neighborhood of Mariberesu. We have witnessed near the floating dock ten cylinders (about 30 meters in length) which seem to be ship building materials.

---

[a]See III, 327—Floating Dry dock not seen at Mariveles the 18th. We are investigating further.
[b]Kana spelling for Mariveles which is in Bataan Prov., Luzon, P.I.
[c]In Luzon, P.I.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 330

FROM: Manila August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #532.

Re your Circular #1793[a].

I am reporting to you below information which I have been able to get, though it may be somewhat incoherent.

1. There are many tall buildings in the city, to the upper stories of which admittance is forbidden. It is thought, therefore, that anti-aircraft guns have been placed in them. It is fairly certain that guns have been placed on the Great Eastern Hotel (some have actually seen ten disguised machine guns on top of it.) the (Hitchcock ?) Avenue Hotel (this is the former Marco Polo Hotel), and on the Insular Life and the Trading Commerce. Besides these, I presume guns have been placed on top of the Capitol, the Municipal Building, the post office,

etc. (I believe that the army and the navy both have in their possession a map giving the locations of the tall buildings in the city.)

2. A person has seen during the evenings in the latter part of July, 36 anti-aircraft guns being transported to Camp Murphy.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 331

FROM: Manila — August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 533.

(Report of Primary Importance)

Last March work was begun on the reparation of the airplane base south of Darurakku[a] on the way to San Miguel. For a time, however, the work was stopped. Lately it seems that the undertaking has been resumed.

Eye witnesses say that they are using about 300 employees and are hurrying the work along. I understand that at present the gliding ground is being prepared.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 332

FROM: Davao (Kihara) — August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 104.

(Intelligence of Primary Importance)

Because too much time would be required to fill in the paddy fields as orginally planned in the construction of a new air base, it is rumored that these plans have been changed. Construction is to begin on an air base which will be laid down between the sea and the paddy fields where now stands a cocoanut grove. In order that bombing planes can use this air field, four concrete runways are to be constructed. It is understood that some 2,500 recruits from among the local populace will be used in this construction enterprise. Four or five hundred wheelbarrows which will be used in this construction work have already been unloaded onto the pier. When I last visited this area and made an investigation of the land they planned to use, it seemed to me that they would have to use more than three feet of dirt to fill in these paddy fields. A great deal of work will be entailed, I observe, in the cutting down and removal of the cocoanut trees in the grove.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 333

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 30, 1941
TO: Manila #277.

According to intelligences obtained by naval authorities, the Houston was observed on the 20th or there about to pass through the harbor entrance but since that time they have not been able to learn where it went. Please investigate the waters in and around Manila for some trace of this warship and then make your report.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 334

FROM: Tokyo September 1, 1941
TO: Manila #279 (?).

Strictly confidential.

In regard to the points you were to note, from now on in case there is no special change, report once a week, but report each change of the following as they occur:

1. Arrival and departure of Houston.
2. Arrival and departure of more than 5 or 6 destroyers or submarines.
3. Arrival and departure of naval ships other than American; (report in detail the particulars and relationships involved).

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 335

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #564.

Re your #277[a].

The Houston arrived the 5th of last month, and took on a large amount of food supplies at the naval pier and left on the 7th, I observed, (my #484[a] and #501[b]).

However, judging from the fact that Admiral Hart attended the ceremonies of the launching of the Q boat attached to the Philippine Army on the 10th, it must have been in the vicinity till the 10th at least. Its course from then on is not clear but we will investigate.

---

[a] See III, 333.

[b] Available, not translated. Dated 11 August. Reported departure of Houston for Zamboanga.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 336

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #590.

On the 7th, the *Houston*, and two destroyers entered port.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 337

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #595.

The *Houston*, which we reported having entered on the 7th, has been alongside the pier loading fuel and stores until today when it left for unknown destination accompanied by two submarines and two destroyers.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 338

FROM: Davao (Kihara) August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #107.

1. During the middle of July a number of American destroyers entered the harbor of Jolo. We have intelligence to the effect that they came to this port from Hawaii, but we have no evidence to substantiate it.

2. During the last ten days of July, 6 American destroyers entered the ports of Jolo[a], Kabunko[b]. (Please refer to part 3 of my #32[c].) While in the area of these three ports, they engaged in target practice with live ammunition.

3. During the middle of August, one large airplane capable of carrying 26 persons landed on the water in the vicinity of Jolo and was tied up there for a number of hours.

4. It is understood that there are approximately 2,000 drums of airplane gasoline stores within the military establishment at Jolo.

Furthermore, reports on the movements of war vessels in and out of the port of Jolo are prone to be delayed because of the existing conditions. Do you want me to wire this sort of delayed information by urgent wire? Please wire.

---

[a] Town on the island of the same name, one of the southernmost islands of the Philippine Island group.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 339

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 543.

1. Ships in port on the 23rd.
A. *Manila.*
Transports 6.
HON
PISU (Arrived the morning of the 23rd.)
B. *Cavite.*
Destroyers 1. (Arrived from Manila on the 21st.)
Transports (GORUDOSTNA (entered port about a month ago and is now under repairs.)
2. The oiler TORINIRCIC left harbor on the 22nd headed for Tarakan in order to take on oil.
3. Recently several destroyers and submarines have been stationed in the vicinity of Mariveles. We are investigating the number stationed at present.
4. Brig. General Cragette arrived here on the 20th apparently on the Dutch ship TIBADAFKY and had a conference with McArthur on the 21st.
5. According to newspaper reports the CHANTO (formerly the Hilda Maersk) arrived here the 20th after having been repaired at Olongapo and her sister ship the KABARUNDO (formerly the Gertrude Maersk) is at present being repaired there. Hence the floating dry dock must have been there formerly, however we will continue investigations.
6. On the 16th a ship which appeared to be the MADDO and two destroyers arrived in Cebu and all left that same night.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 340

FROM: Manila August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 559.

(Primary Intelligence)
1. Warships at anchor in this harbor on the 30th:
(1) In Manila, 3 destroyers of the Bell class; 6 submarines (submarines left port on the 27th but have returned). Furthermore, the tanker Trinity came to this port on the 27th and dropped anchor here (please refer to Part 2 of my # 543[a]).
(2) One destroyer (undergoing repairs) Corundusu.
2. A large portion of the submarines, according to intelligences, which have come to me, are now in the Ringaon area.
3. 500 American soldiers arrived here on the Cleveland the 29th. Furthermore, on the same day the Migak entered this harbor. (Though details of this ship could not be ascertained, it is understood that she is loaded to capacity with military equipment.

---

[a] See III, 339 regarding boats in harbor at Manila.
[b] Lingayan on the west coast of the Island of Luzon.

Trans. 9-2-41

No. 341

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #562 (?).

The MARBLEHEAD returned to port on the 31st. Two destroyers left port on the 1st.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 342

FROM: Manila September 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo #601.

1. Ships in port on the 13th:
   BUKKU (Black Hawk?)
   2 destroyers
   BERU
   1 submarine
2. On the 13th an American cruiser of the Brooklyn class entered port and is taking on supplies. It is said to have come from Hawaii. I am investigating names of ships and other details but am sending this much on for the present.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 343

FROM: Tokyo September 15, 1941
TO: Manila #296.

It is reported that an American aviation company is using Legaspi on the island of Luzon as a port of call. Please ascertain the facts and advise by return dispatch.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 344

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #606.

Re your #296[a].

The recently inaugurated service of the Philippine Aerial Taxi Company between this city and Adbu[b] uses Nequasupyi[c] as an intermediary station. There has also been a report (dated the 16th of last month; please refer to my report #764) that the Pan-American Airways are planning to build a landing place at Takuroban[d] in the state of Reite,[e] but it does not appear that they have as yet realized this plan.

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[a] See III, 343.
[b] Probably Cebu.
[c] Probably Legaspi, city on Luzon Island.
[d] Tacloban.
[e] Leyte Province.

Trans. 9-19-41

No. 345

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #605.

Re my #604[a].

They left the harbor early on the 16th loaded with food supplies. On the stern three seaplanes (single wing) were observed. Designation is as stated in my previous message. It is also reported that they (arrived here?) by way of Australia but whether this is true or not I don't know.

---

[a]See III, 346—I have secret information that the ST. LOUIS and three other ships are leaving for Singapore and that they apparently have ammunition on board.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 346

FROM: Manila September 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #604.

Re my #601[a].

According to secret information received, it is the ST. LOUIS, with three other vessels (names unknown), said to be starting for Singapore. Bow waves of indicating speeds of 24 to 25 knots were observed. Also, apparently ammunition is being handled (red flags are hoisted).

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[a]See III, 342.

Trans. 9–18–41

No. 347

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #618.

The boats anchored here the 20th, are:
PHOENIX
BUKKO[a]
_____ a chartered boat (12,000 to 13,000 tons, number of crew unknown) carrying (?) approximately 200 sailors.

The PITASU[a] (Peters?), which entered the harbor on the 18th, is reported to have carried 500 soldiers.

---

[a]Kana spelling.

Trans. 9–27–41

No. 348

FROM: Davao (Kihara) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #135.

Upon my arrival to take up my post here, I heard the following report concerning Zamboanga:[a]

Since last August American destroyer tenders, destroyers and submarines enter that port from the South Seas every Saturday. After they have lain at anchor for one or two days they leave again for the South. In summing up the statements of members of the crews of these boats, it appears that these warships ply the waters from Jolo[b] to Tawao[c] on the island of Borneo.

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[a] A city on the island of Mindanao.
[b] Name of the island connecting the main Philippine group to Borneo.
[c] Town in British North Borneo.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 349

FROM: Davao (Kihara) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #136.

Re your #60[a].

The LANGLEY, 11,500 tons, 540 feet, has accommodations for 33 flying boats. These airplanes carry from five to seven persons and have a cruising range of 30 hours. They are two-motored "PBY's" long-range flying boats.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 350

FROM: Manila (Nihro) October 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #654.

Message to Singapore #8 on the 2nd.

The American Cruisers, ST. LOUIS and PHOENIX recently docked here and sailed on the 16th and 22nd respectively. Now, I have received a spy report that their destination was Singapore. What I want to know for sure is if they have arrived there or not, also I am very much interested in checking on the accuracy of this spy report. Please investigate and wire me back immediately.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 351

FROM: Shanghai — October 2, 1941
TO: Net — Circular # 860.

Message to Tokyo # 1804.

The newspapers here reported the fact that the United States Army transport HENDERSON left this port on the 20th for Manila carrying 50 Marines from Tientsin and about 100 Marines of the 4th Marine (Corps?) stationed here. According to an explanation given by the naval authorities, 30 of those who have come from Tientsin are retained here, making the maximum number here 70 persons.

Relayed to -----, Peking, and Tientsin.

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 352

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — October 4, 1941
TO: Manila — # 318.

I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc. Also, please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.

Trans. 10-8-41

No. 353

FROM: Manila (Nihro) — October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 685.

On the afternoon of the 13th, the HOUSTON, the MARBLEHEAD, the HOH[a], five destroyers, and two mine layers left port. Their destination is unknown.

The following ships are tied up in this harbor at the present time: The BLACK HAWK, the PAS[a], four destroyers, 10 submarines (the submarines are of classes 170 and 190), and the GOLD STAR (all of the above-mentioned submarines are tied up on either side of the GOLD STAR and are taking on supplies).

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 354

FROM: Manila — October 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 691.

Reports of reliability A.

On the afternoon of the 17th the
TON
MADDO

HON
4 destroyers
5 submarines (140 class)
BERU
1 minelayer and
oiler TRINITY
entered harbor.

In addition to the above ships in port at present on the 18th are as follows:

A. Manila.
The same as my #685[a].

B. Cavite.
REI
2 minelayers
----- (4 groups missing)

3. Large scale barracks are being constructed at NUEBA ESIHA between Cabanatuan and Laur (about 131 kilometers from Manila).

4. It is said that mechanized maneuvers are being carried out between Laur and Aguilla.

---

[a] See III, 353.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 355

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) September 22, 1941
TO: Washington Circular #38.

Message to Tokyo #173.

Re my message #166[a].

A ----- destroyer left port on the 16th bound for New Caledonia. Naval Captain G. T. GARGENLIEU, High Commissioner for Pacific territories under the jurisdiction of the DeGaulle Regime, and Commander G. CABANIER, Commander of Defense, took passage on this destroyer to take up their new posts.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 356

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 24, 1941
TO: Honolulu #83.

Strictly Secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, bouys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 357

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) September 29, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 041.

Honolulu to Tokyo # 178.

Re your Tokyo's # 083[a].

(Strictly secret)

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (the repair basin referred to in my message to Washington # 48[b]); KS.

2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (the Ten Ten Pier); KT.

3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV.

4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively).

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

[a] See III, 356.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 358

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 184.

On the 1st, an American steamship entered port from Australia (?). Although its name was not announced, it may be the Matson Steamship Company boat "MONTEREY." In addition to the ordinary passengers, it had on board approximately 600 Australian and New Zealand air corps troops under the command of Wing Commander AXEL RICHARDS. The troops were allowed to land in uniform in order to go on an excursion. The English language newspapers on the 1st, stated that this was the first instance of an American ship being used for the transport of English troops.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 359

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 29, 1941
TO: Rio #78.

(Strictly Secret)

Please make an investigation of the plans for landing fields on the islands within your area and inform us at once.

Trans. 3–19–41

No. 360

FROM: Rio (Ishii) October 6, 1941
TO: Washington #26.

Message from ----- #25, dated October 4.

According to intelligence, the United States, in stepping up aid efforts for Bathurst in British Gambia, is dispatching two large planes a week, each capable of carrying 62 persons. Plans are being prepared for the dispatching of several thousand technicians (according to other intelligences) (it is thought likely that this number includes military officers) to that port by planes. These planes leave New York at 3:00 (a.m. or p.m.) arriving here two days later at 1:00 or 2:00 (a.m. or p.m.), leaving this point at 4:00 o'clock on the same day for Natal.

Trans. 11–8–41

No. 361

FROM: Tokyo September 29, 1941
TO: Berlin #854.

(Cape Town to Tokyo #47.)

No. 47 from Cape Town to Tokyo.

One 30,000 ton British transport and four 20,000 ton transports accompanied by one 7,000 or 8,000 ton cruiser put into port on the 11th and sailed the 14th. They had on board about 8,000 British soldiers (including a few aviators) and their destination appeared to be Iran.

Furthermore as part of the aid to Russia program, Britain is sending aeroplanes to the eastern front. However, since the manufacture and construction of the aircraft of the two countries is radically different it is necessary for England to send aviators along with the aircraft and not only that but also extra parts, gasoline, repair material, technicians, etc., everything in fact must be sent from Britain. Since it is very difficult to transport these directly by air, part are sent by the northern route via the White Sea and Murmansk and part are sent by the Cape route via Iran. It appears that the above transports have some aviation gasoline and parts, etc. on board.

Trans. 10–3–41

No. 362

FROM: Tokyo September 29, 1941
TO: Berlin #853.

(Cape Town to Tokyo #53.)

No. 53 from Cape Town to Tokyo.

Movements of British transports.

1. One 20,000 ton and one 30,000 ton ship entered port here on the 16th and left on the 18th.
Four 20,000 ton class ships entered port on the 17th and sailed on the 19th.
One 30,000 ton class ship entered port on the 19th and sailed on the 21st.
The above appeared to be returning to Britain.
2. A camouflaged cruiser (of the seven or eight thousand ton class) entered port on the 18th and sailed on the 20th. It appeared to be headed for *Iran* (?) and a number of soldiers embarked.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 363

FROM: Tokyo September 4, 1941
TO: Hsinking #547.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Vladivostok to Tokyo #394.

The action of ships is about the same. Most of the Russian submarines seem to have taken their positions as still we see no submarines which resemble style "L".

The principal style seen are "C" and sometimes "S" and "M". The minesweepers are still around and have strenuous practice daily.

A minelayer resembling "A" type with one red funnel is at the #31 pier. The one mentioned in my cable #376[a] with two red funnels seems to be under repair at pier 39.

The ship mentioned in my cable #376[a] under item 2 was the PARUTIZAN, as I was able to see the name clearly when it sailed at 6 a.m. on the 29th. It was flying the ship's flag showing it is attached to a fleet. There also seems to be one being refitted at the #39 pier.

On September 3rd, at 6:30 a U.S. tanker headed for the #1 port arrived from the "BO" straits. It was about 4500 tons, was flying a flag at the stern, although due to bad visibility, it could not be well designated but might be the same as one seen at pier #4 on the 23rd.

[a] See Vol. II, 705.

Trans. 11–29–41

No. 364

FROM: Tokyo October 15, 1941
TO: Berlin #883.

Cape Town to Tokyo #59.

Successive reports and intelligence in regard to the transportation of armament are to the effect that if, to the transports that call at this port, are added those that do not call here but go on to Durban or Laurenco Marques to take on fuel, the total will reach an immense amount of shipping. Aid to Russia by way of Iran is proving tremendously difficult due to the lack of docking facilities in the Persian Gulf and also to the inefficiency of the Iran railways in regard to transportation. As a result of a secret conference between the technicians of Britain and Russia, it was decided to appoint the British Director of Railways and Harbors in British Kenya-Uganda, Rhodes, as Director of Transportation in Iran in order to obtain smoother operation of the transportation facilities, it appears.

Trans. 10-18-41

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

No. 365

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #667.

Regarding my #533[a].

Although I am aware of the conversations which took place when HOOPER called on IGUCHI in Korea, I have been informed that in view of the present American-Japanese relations the home office of the missionary society is disposed to have 13 of their people leave Korea on furlough if agreement to this can be obtained from SHIBUCAWA. (Naturally if he won't agree neither can the society consent.) It seems that in private talks RAINER has told this to SUWA and others of the foreign department.

Please convey this information to the office of the Governor-General for appropriate action.

---

[a] See II, 314.

Trans. 8–11–41

No. 366

FROM: Washington (Uawrk) August 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Summer) (Vice-Chief, General Staff) #159.

(Parts 1—3)

1. Britain and America, joining forces in opposition to our advance into French Indo-China (that is, our southern (advance)) have frozen (Japanese) funds and taken other retaliatory measures, and are, further, attempting to rouse Siam to resist our entrance into that country, and are strengthening the defenses of Singapore and the Philippines at full speed.

Again, there are rumours, now making the rounds, of a Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on the Atlantic.

Part 2

Such then is the present situation and considering it and two or three incidents in the behavior of important governmental, political, and financial figures, I believe that an armed invasion of Siam by the Empire would immediately convert Amercia's attitude vis à vis Japan into one of acute hostility, and might very well lead eventually, to armed conflict with America and Britain.

Since the beginning of the Russo-German war American interest in Siberia has grown by leaps and bounds, and the U.S. is making it quite clear that she cannot permit Japan or Germany to invade that region. At the same time she is strengthening war defenses in the Alaskan Aleutians and attempting to achieve a closer accord with Russia.

Part 3

She has already exchanged notes with the Soviets on aid to Russia, and we see that plan on the point of full realization. In view of these and similar circumstances I believe that, should the Empire occupy Siberia by force of arms, America's attitude vis à vis Japan would immediately become intensely hostile, and I envisage as quite possible under those conditions,

America's breaking off economic relations with us, then severing diplomatic relations, and, eventually even starting a commercial war against us.

DoD Comment: See III, 367 for Part 4. Note this message was read in *1945*.

Trans. 5–4–45

No. 367

FROM: Washington (Uawrk) August 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Summer) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) # 159.

Part 4

3. I believe that if the Empire were to wait, calmly watching developments until the collapse of the Russian Forces were certain, and then to seize the opportunity thus offered to carry out these measures, America's attitude toward Japan would be less intensely hostile than it would be in the event of the contingencies discussed in the preceding two paragraphs.

However, should the European, particularly the Russo-German war, continue for a great length of time, there would be a possibility of Britain, America, and Russia's joining forces to take a strong stand against Japan, and trying to encircle and destroy the Empire. Therefore I think that before we take any action we should perfect plans for dealing with the most disadvantageous contingencies.

Trans. 5–2–45

No. 368

FROM: Washington (UAWRK) August 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Summer) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) # 158.

The reason why America in sending aid to Russia, dispatches 4 tankers to Vladivostok lies in the fact that she is experiencing great difficulty in finding any other route by which to send aid.

In the future in sending aid directly to Russia we think she will use principally the route via Nikolaevsk,

It is thought that high-class shoe making machinery, etc., will be included in the list of goods sent.

Trans. 1–30–45

No. 369

FROM: Washington August 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 677.

Re your (Circular) 1718[a].

1. Special secret funds for propaganda and intelligence: $17,424.99
2. Special secret funds in the name of the councillor: $20,556.25.
3. Subtracting one half of the $95,500 for the purchase of the adjacent land from the $70,000 from San Francisco received in December, 1940, leaves $22,250
4. Secret funds in *San Francisco (?)* from February, 1939: $5,000
5. Amount on deposit in San Francisco July, 1941, $47,000

6. Amount on deposit in New York at the same time, $54,606.47
Further we plan to pay for the grading and building expense out of paragraph 3.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8–14–41

No. 370

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 12, 1941
TO: Washington # 469.

The army has requested that (diplomatic status ?) be obtained for Intendance[a] Colonel KENKICHI SHINJŌ, Intendance[a] Major (HINKAI ? KO) and Intendance[a] Major (EITA ?) YOSHIOKA, all on duty in the United States. (This for your information.) As the request has been approved, please inform the government to which you are accredited that they have been appointed assistant military attaches.

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[a] Supply Officers.

Trans. 8–19–41

No. 371

FROM: Tokyo August 13, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

Gogai.

Peking to Tokyo # 487, 28 July.

According to reports from our armed forces in the North China area, the Harada Corps, garrisoned in Kaifeng, has had information to the effect that the Chungking faction has ordered the assassination of U.S. citizens in this area in the hope that that will provoke the United States into entering the war. Being forewarned by this intelligence, every precaution is being taken to guard against any such mishaps.

In spite of this, on 16 July, threatening notes in the form of hand bills allegedly signed by the Honan Province (Rice Commission ?) were scattered around the entrances of all the Christian churches in Kaifeng operated by Americans.

During the night of the 12th, five persons apparently belonging to the assassins' group, broke into the Baptist Church, and threatened Americans there with pistols and made away with cameras, papers, and other articles.

The Harada Corps is at present investigating these incidents, and at the same time, is offering protection to all Americans in its jurisdiction.

Since the 12th, there have been instances of applications from Americans for permission to travel to the Shanghai and Tsingtao areas, allegedly in connection with their mission work. It is believed, however, that in actuality, these persons are making preparations to evacuate this area.

Copies of this message were sent to Nanking, Shanghai, Hsinking, Tsingtao, Tsinan, Suchow. (From Peking on 28 July as # 487.)

Trans. 8–14–41

No. 372

FROM: Washington August 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 690.

(In 5 parts—complete.)

(English text.)

Recent cases of interferences with American rights and interests in Japan and in Japanese-occupied areas of China.

Information received by the Department of State from American diplomatic and consular offices in Japan and in Japanese-occupied areas of China indicate that the Japanese authorities and Japanese-sponsored authorities have recently undertaken widespread and expanding activities of arbitrary nature against American official establishments, American officials, and American rights and interest.

In North China the travel of Americans, including American consular officers is being stopped, severely restricted, or delayed by a system of travel permits set up by the Japanese military authorities and by refusal of permits or delay in their issuance. At Chingwangtao, Americans embarking for Shanghai are required not only to have a permit for rail travel to Chingwangtao but also a landing permit from the Japanese naval authorities which requires at least one week to obtain. (It is assumed that similar requirements are in force at Tientsin and Tsingtao.)

At Peitaiho, where a large number of Americans and other foreigners pass the summer, transportation of baggage of Americans to the railway station is forbidden and the railway refuses to receive baggage for checking. Travel of American citizens in Japan has been restricted so that Americans desiring to proceed to Shanghai to obtain available accommodations for travel to the United States have been unable to proceed.

At Tsingtao the mail of American citizens, including the official mail of the American Consulate, is apparently being held up and censored, American firms are being prohibited from moving their stocks and carrying on business and are not permitted to draw funds from Japanese banks to pay their staff salaries. The premises of the Standard-Vacuum and Texas oil companies and of the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company have been occupied by Japanese gendarmes. Protests against the smoking of cigarettes by Japanese sentries in the oil installations of American companies have been without avail. Garages have been forbidden to furnish taxicabs to American citizens, including the American Consul, or to do automotive repair work for American citizens. It is reported on good authority that the restrictions imposed by the Japanese authorities on Americans there include, in addition to some of those listed above, a prohibition of coal deliveries to American citizens and the withholding of American Red Cross famine relief wheat from distribution to refugees by the International Relief Association. Chinese have been intimidated and instructed not to sell food products to or engage in other transactions with Americans if the products exceed in value, or the transactions involve more than, twenty local dollars, and orders have been issued for the cancellation of American insurance policies. At Chefoo mail addressed to Americans is being held up and registered mail received by the American Consulate has shown evidence of having been opened by censors. The stocks of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and the Texas Company have been placed under the control of the Japanese special military mission; sales may only be made by per-

mit and the proceeds must be handed over to the Japanese; and American firms cannot withdraw funds from the Yokohama Specie Bank to meet their pay rolls.

At Hwanghsien, Shantung, the Baptist Mission is being picketed, no American is allowed to move his personal effects, the American members of the mission are restricted to the immediate vicinity of the compound and are prohibited from using their automobiles, as well as being prevented from traveling to Chefoo.

At Tientsin, American firms are unable to make rail shipments and the post office in one instance refused to accept a registered letter addressed by an American firm to the United States.

At Foochow, two policemen visited the Consulate stating that they had been instructed by the Japanese authorities to see that "nothing passed in or out" and asking to be given quarters in the Consulate. (The policemen departed upon being asked to do so by the Consul.) Similar activities were undertaken by the police with more success against American firms and missionary institutions.

At Hsinan, a virtual blockade of Cheeloo University (Anglo-America) and Cheeloo Hospital (American) has been established, no foodstuffs or other articles being allowed to enter those two missionary institutions.

At Kobe, the telephone service of the Standard Oil Company was cut off because the Company was unable to draw funds to pay the telephone bill.

At Swatow, unwarranted interference by the Japanese with American firms engaged in the linen drawn work trade has occurred and shipments have been obstructed.

In Japan, by the restrictions on the use of the English language over the telephone, American diplomatic and consular offices are denied a facility which is essential to the proper functioning of those offices.

At Mukden, control over the movements and activities of Americans has been rigid.

American Catholic mission sisters at Fushun were permitted by police to visit the Consulate for passport service only on the condition that they would guarantee to return to Fushun the same day. Long distance telephone calls have been restricted to the Japanese or Chinese languages and when the Consulate at Mukden attempted to telephone to the Consul at Dairen, it was informed that it "had better cancel the call".

At Dairen, consular officials are under police surveillance and are followed in all their movements, persons entering and leaving the Consulate are stopped by police and questioned, the Consulate's messengers are stopped by police and the mail and telegrams in their care taken for scrutiny, and in general the conduct of the Dairen authorities toward, and their interference with the legitimates of, the American Consulates seem to show a desire by those authorities to make the position of the Consul untenable.

Trans. 8–18–41

No. 373

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

August 13, 1941
686.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Recently the German Chargé d'Affaires Thomsen called on Iguiti and requested that the latter meet one Malcolm Lovell, a New York banker who is an exceedingly close friend of the Chief of the Foreign Section of the Chungking Government, Kuo Tai Chi. (Thomsen explained that he became acquainted with Lovell when he came to discuss relief work, with German permission, in occupied France.)

Iguti complied with the German's request and Lovell came to call on the 13th.

"Kuo and I", Lovell told Iguti, "both attended the University of Pennsylvania and for a period of four years there, we roomed and boarded together. Our close friendship has continued ever since".

"I, personally," he continued, "am a Quaker, and as such, place peace above all else. Recently when Kuo came here en route home from England, I asked Kuo if something couldn't be done to terminate the war between Japan and China, Kuo told me that ceasing of hostilities would be welcomed under certain conditions.

"If my services can be of any use as a link between Japanese-Chinese peace overtures, there is nothing that would make me, a Quaker, happier.

"According to Kuo, the Japanese peace feeler apparently did not reach the big men in the Chungking Government at the time. Because of my very close relations with Kuo, I am able to speak to him without reserve.

"I would therefore appreciate being advised as to the Japanese attitude on this subject."

Iguti in turn asked him how he expected to get to Chungking. He also told him that from past experiences, we have learned that there is much difficulty in coming to any agreement because the Chinese make such demands as the complete evacuation of our troops, etc.

In reply to my question, Lovell said: "I have many friends in New York newspaper circles, and I am sure that I shall be granted a permit by the State Department as a special correspondent of one of those papers. I could establish contact with the Japanese at some point such as Hongkong.

"I am fully aware that considerable difficulty shall be encountered in finding terms acceptable to both sides. However, I feel confident that I shall be able to convey the respective opinions of the Japanese authorities and those of Kuo to the other. And what if I do fail? Since I shall be doing this entirely on my own, there should be no inconvenience or embarrassment to Japan. Moreover, I have no intention of accepting any expenses", he said.

Since I am not fully acquainted with the very recent conditions in the China area, I am unable to judge whether any use can be made of the services this man is offering or not. Since, however, he was kind enough to make the proposal, I would greatly appreciate it if you would advise me as to what disposition I should make.

Please refer to the "Who's Who in America" for this man's personal history. He is on the board of directors of many firms and Thomsen advises me that he is a thoroughly reliable character.

Trans. 8–19–41

No. 374

FROM: Tokyo August 15, 1941
TO: Washington #479.

There was a message from Financial Attache Nishiyama to the Minister of Finance regarding the resuming of sending Japanese ships and the said Minister contacted me in regard to it, however such problems should be dealt with by your Ambassador or the Consul General in New York. Not only that but as I have already wired you previously, in order to prevent secrets from leaking out to America, even telegrams concerning merchants are handled through embassy code telegrams, therefore in the future please maintain closer relations with Attaché Nishiyama and have him make similar requests through your Ambassador or the Consul General in New York.

Trans. 8–18–41

No. 375

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #694.

Re my #580[a].

Judging from the manner in which the matter is being handled, until the general agreement suggested in your #473[b] is concluded between the two countries, it would be possible neither to draw from government deposit nor to pay the salaries which are remitted. Will you, therefore, postpone remittances for the time being. The salaries of the staff members will be paid out of cash on hand. I expect to send HOSIDA to New York to discuss the matter with the Yokohama Specie Bank.

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[a] See III, 375A.
[b] See III, 376.

Trans. 8–18–41

No. 375A

FROM: Washington (Nomura) July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #580.

Since remittances for future dollar accounts have been completely frozen, please discontinue sending remittances until you receive a report from me. Please handle without delay those now in the process of being sent. There are no objections, however, to your sending the salaries of the staff members.

Trans. 7–30–41

No. 376

FROM: Tokyo August 14, 1941
TO: Washington #473.

Re your #670[a].

By means of an aide memoire dated the 9th, the United States Ambassador in Tokyo has informed us that under the principle of reciprocity the United States intends to offer every facility to the Japanese diplomatic and consular organizations in the United States to draw funds for the maintenance of their offices and the subsistence and traveling expenses of their personnel. As is the established procedure, the United States would like to exchange documents with Japan outlining the arrangements and giving the customary guarantees, and request our opinion as to the best way this may be accomplished.

Since I believe that the above is the same note sent to you by the State Department, described in your caption message, I am omitting the details. When you have made certain of this, please give it your attention and wire me your ideas as soon as possible.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8–15–41

No. 377

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #688.

Re your #459[a].

It would, indeed, be fine if we could find a way of making the freezing order ineffective, but as I have pointed out in my successive telegrams, we can neither expect much in this direction, nor can we hope that they will apply the frozen funds to pay for oil. There seems to be no way but to pay for it by importing raw silk.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-18-41

No. 378

FROM: Washington August 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #701.

Re your Circular #1788[a]

We are making investigations in cooperation with the army and navy men, but to date we have been unable to definitely determine whether they are being supplied. On the 15th, the New York Times, reported that not even British and American military observers were permitted to watch the war. Therefore, a true picture of the German-Soviet war could not be obtained. If there are any indications that the Soviet Union is being defeated, the Russians shouldn't be supplied with aircraft, etc. for they would probably fall into German hands eventually.

I report the above to you for whatever value it may be. We are giving our careful attention to the matter referred to.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 379

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) August 16, 1941
TO: Mexico City #164.

(Part 1 of 2.)[a]

(Message to Tokyo #171.)

My opinions on suggested steps having to do with the Japanese resident under my jurisdiction are as follows:

1. First-generation Japanese who are farmers, first-generation Japanese who have established themselves to a considerable degree, second-generation Japanese who are registered for military service, their parents, and second-generation Japanese who have never returned to Japan have expressed themselves as being anxious to remain here even though there is a

break in Japanese-American relations. There seem to be no indications of unrest, even when such persons as those mentioned above heard that Japanese ships on regular schedule were no longer going to operate to the West Coast. Though other first-generation Japanese and second-generation Japanese who are not likely to be registered for military service are maintaining a calm on the surface, there are many who actually are wavering in their intentions. We are, therefore, undertaking the encouragement of these Japanese through our subsidized newspapers and Japanese organizations.

2. We will evacuate all persons at the present time engaged in branches of banks and companies with home offices in Japan, and those who as a result of the freezing legislation are doing nothing more than completing unfinished business. It is imagined that Japanese residents here who have become attached to the land will be dealt quite a blow when such an evacuation takes place. Therefore, we are doing all that we can to make this blow as easy as possible on them.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 380

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 157.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re my # 142.[a]

Each of the local NYK, Yokohama Specie Bank, Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi branch offices were visited by four to seven Treasury Department inspectors on the afternoon of the 16th. Their inspection lasted until late at night. (The inspection of the NYK and the Mitsui offices lasted for ----- days.) The permanent staff of each of the branch offices involved cooperated with the inspectors. Thorough and detailed inspection was made in each branch office, even to the extent of inspecting the drawers of all desks. Explanations were requested with regard to various account books. (Japanese and English encodement books ?), circular letters from the Bureau of Communications, and relationships with customers. They went even so far as to "check" letters of private individuals. Photostatic copies were made of several thousand documents. The Sumitomo office forbid the photostating of codes.)

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 381

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 157.

(Part 2 of 2.)

Though this inspection was under the pretext that it had to do with the investigation conducted in conjunction with the freezing legislation, it seemed as though it was an investigation

to determine the existence of "subversive acts". They were particularly cautious regarding any relationships with military persons. Included among the personnel making the above mentioned inspectors were F.B.I. men.

Furthermore, not so long ago Treasury officials had wax seals placed on the Yokohama Specie office from 6 in the evening until 8:30 in the morning and official employees have been forbidden to enter or leave the office during that time in order to prevent the burning of documents. The bank was opened in the morning and closed at night by the inspectors themselves. It was necessary to secure the approval of the inspectors on all telegraphic communications received or dispatched.

Relayed to San Francisco, Washington, New York and -----.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 382

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

August 19, 1941
485.

Re your # 667[a].

We communicated your message to the Governor General of Korea and on the 15th received the following telegram:

"I have done my utmost to reach a solution of this problem and used every means at my disposal in spite of the delay. On the 14th as a result of contacting all departments concerned the executive committee of the mission in Keijo approved the return to America and it appears that the other committee members will agree also. As a result of this a meeting of the executive committee is to be held here on the 18th. I will keep you informed as to developments.

---

[a] See III, 365.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 383

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

August 19, 1941
714.

Regarding your Circular # 1767[a]

During the past several years, you have sent general instructions such as were contained in the captioned message, at fairly frequent intervals. We are of the opinion that the reason they bear so little fruit, is because they do not take into consideration the general world situation, and hence miss the essential points. They are thus easily cheapened in the eyes of our men on the scene.

May I suggest, therefore, that the various matters be turned over to the investigation section, and, after it has contacted the heads of the other sections concerned, classify them under about two headings: (a) not needed; and (b) to be carried through. After this is done, the men on the scene can get right down to business and dispose of the matters in order of their urgency.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 384

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

August 20, 1941
487.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re the last part of your # 705[a].

We cannot, of course, predict what the outcome of the Russo-German war will be, but this does not preclude our anticipating the fact that in case Soviet Russia loses and as a result the Stalin Regime disintegrates, Far Eastern Russia will be thrown into political confusion. It is a self-evident fact that Japan is pressed with the necessity of taking precautionary measures for the sake of maintaining peace in the Far East as well as for the sake of Japan's national defense and security, in view of the actuality that that part of Soviet Russia is adjacent to Japan and Manchukuo. Furthermore, since, due to the Russo-German war, there is a possibility of the influence of a third power being implanted in Far Eastern Soviet Russia, as for instance of Soviet Russia resorting to such unfriendly act as to allow the establishment of ----- and military bases in the Martime province of Siberia or in Kanchataka, and consequently of the security of both Japan and Manchuokuo being threatened, we need to prevent such a thing from happening.

The Japanese Government has decided to increase the Japanese forces in Manchuokuo to the minimum number necessary to cope with such a possibility. On the other hand negotiations are being carried on in Tokyo with Soviet officials in order to arrive at a friendly solution of various matters having to do with this area. I understand that the Soviet officials have been instructed by the party leaders to be cautious in their attitude toward the forces stationed in Manchuokuo. This is solely for your information.

---

[a] See III, 34.

Trans. 8-19-41

No. 385

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

August 20, 1941
487.

(Part 2 of 2.)

If ----- the United States Government asks you questions concerning the increase of Japanese troops in the North, will you explain to them suitably as your own view of the matter what I have pointed out above. Impress upon their minds that the movement of the troops has for its objective purely preventive precautions against unforeseen emergency and that by it we will be able to forestall any possibility of peace in the Far East being disturbed.

Recently when the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo inquired about this matter, I replied that so long as the Russian Government lives up to the treaty Japan also will be faithful to it. The Ambassador was very much pleased to hear this, saying that my statement had clarified the matter. This is solely for your information.

If it become definitely known that the United States is shipping iron, airplanes and other materials by way of Japanese coastal waters to assist Soviet Russia, this fact would unnecessarily provoke the feelings of the Japanese people, and it cannot be said that it will not have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting Japanese-American relations—a question which is at the present stage a very delicate one. We would like, therefore, to see the United

States refrain from such action. Will you take a good opportunity and tactfully call the attention of the United States authorities to this fact. Today I personally called the attention of the American Ambassador to it.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 386

FROM: New York (Morishima) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #415.

To Ottawa as Circular #67.

Re #161[a] from San Francisco to Tokyo.

It happened here, too, that when I transmitted my #411[b] to Vancouver, apparently because code messages from the Consulate have been prohibited, the Western Union Telegraph Company returned the message. Since it must be that requests for transmittals have been received from our Consulates in Canada, please find out exactly what the situation is.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 391

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #730.

According to Finance Official NISHIYAMA, both HULL and Vice President WALLACE said that Japanese-American relations will change one way or the other, depending on what attitude Japan takes, and that the next ten days are the most important.

Trans. 8-23-41

No. 392

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 718.

Strictly Secret.

Re your # 489[a].

Your instructions (machine message), as a precautionary measure, were carefully paraphrased and then encoded. We sent them as per your directions. Although I know that you are very busy, I would like to ask you to please be more careful about matters of this nature.

---

[a]Tokyo requests information regarding United States' treatment of Japanese officials on duty in the United States in connection with mail, telephone and telegraphic communications, asset freezing, interference with travel, surveillance of diplomatic and consular officers, etc.

Trans. 8–27–41

No. 394

FROM: Tokyo August 23, 1941
TO: Washington # 497.

From Financial Attaché Nishiyama (# 70).

1. American inspection of Japanese firms and banks comes closer to being a search for "subversive acts" rather than an inspection connected with the freezing order. There was a marked difference in the Japanese inspection of American banks. Influential persons in the Specie Bank are much concerned and desire an investigation to ascertain just what the real purpose of the American officials is. Furthermore, the National City Bank is arranging for the Kobe and Yokohama branches to unite with the Tokyo office and is closing out the Dairen office. According to Curtis's explanation the above move is dictated by economic policy as was the case in the Osaka amalgamation and that there is no other reason for the move. Two or three young Americans will be left in the Tokyo office and the others will be returned home.

2. A proposal has been received from the British-Dutch Bank to exchange commodities for commodities in order to liquidate the bank's accounts and this matter is being pressed by the head of the London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank. However officials in the foreign office do not look with favor upon pushing negotiations to the solution of this one problem when there are so many other questions pending between Japan and Britain. Also the immediate conclusion of such an agreement would exert an unfortunate influence upon the leadership of public opinion hence orders have been issued not to ratify such an agreement.

(This item is for your information only.)

Trans. 8–30–41

No. 395

FROM: Tokyo — August 25, 1941
TO: Washington — # 500.

Re my # 492[a].

There have been the following developments since then:

On 31 July, our forces found that the church in question had taken in 16 wounded enemy troops and many enemy spies and communistic elements and hid them in the church premises. Moreover, there were ample indications that undercover reports were being sent to the enemy from this source and in other ways were participating in enemy-like activities.

Having ascertained these facts, nine persons, including missionaries, were placed in a house on the property belonging to the church hospital, and were kept under surveillance.

Upon receiving the report of the above, the military command feared that in view of the critical times due to the "freezing" order, etc. the above action might give rise to undue agitation. In the hopes of avoiding unpleasantness, the military command decided to act with special leniency. James N. Montgomery, who was responsible for the Americans, was asked to sign a pledge that the Americans would not take part in any similar activities in the future. Upon which they were released, and the watch removed.

In spite of this expression of friendliness on our part, there are indications that the said church officials are circulating rumors to the effect that a certain Chinese patient who died of illness in the hospital, was murdered by the Japanese military.

There is much that is very distasteful about the actions of these Americans.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 396

FROM: Tokyo — August 25, 1941
TO: Washington — # 498.

To Financial Attaché Nishiyama from Chief of Financial Bureau.

With regard to the request made by Ambassador Nomura in the United States, concerning U.S. bonds being held by Japanese banks there, we are of the opinion outlined below. If you have no objections to it, will you please so notify Ambassador Nomura.

1. Bonds whose ownership is known to U.S. officials could be disposed of without loss of title to them by their owners, if they are secretly turned over to the Financial Attaché, Ambassador, or Consul. The Japanese official shall issue a receipt listing the name of the bond issue as it is generally accepted internationally, serial number, face value, coupons (giving information as to maturity dates, etc.), etc., which will unmistakably establish them. If these certified lists are sent to Japan (the Finance Ministry) we are prepared to make yen payments of principle and interest in Japan on them. (Deliveries of said lists to Japan will have to be made without the U.S. officials being made aware of them. For example they could be sent by Foreign Office couriers.)

2. Since there is a danger that considerable trouble may arise from some minor incident, the above procedure cannot be carried out for those bonds whose whereabouts are known to the U.S. officials. For those, there is no other way than to receive interest payments and expose

said payments to being "frozen". We do not believe that there is any other special course, that can be pursued.

In the event that the procedure outlined in the first paragraph is pursued, the chief of the office which issues the certified receipt, shall keep a copy of said certified list.

Trans. 8–28–41

No. 397

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Net

August 25, 1941
Circular # 1885.

From Harbin to Tokyo as # 123.

From Tokyo to Manchuria as # 105.

"A" reports:

Report from the Soviet Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs on August 15th to the various offices in the Orient.

At the time of the Roosevelt-Churchill conference, Churchill, citing Britain's exhaustion and the anti-war sentiment in the dominions and among the laboring classes, requested positive aid from America. Roosevelt said that in order to insure the support of American public opinion it would be necessary to clarify the war aims. Great Britain agreed to this and America made the following promises:

1. American military aid in case Japan attacks Australia, Burma, or the Netherlands East Indies.
2. American aid in the Near East in case Germany invades the Caucasus.
3. A grant for military aid.
4. Expansion of the economic war against Japan.
5. American participation in the war against German submarines.

Trans. 8–27–41

No. 398

FROM: Rome
TO: Washington

August 25, 1941
No number.

Rome to Tokyo # 549.

Local American newspapermen seem highly pleased with the recent developments in the international situation and say that American aid to Britain and Russia will gradually strengthen the encirclement of the European continent. At any rate the German and Italian armies in North Africa will be cut off from their home countries. Further that American aid in the future will go by way of Dakar, Bathurst in British Gambia, and the Suez, Basra, and Singapore. Again that British American policy toward Japan is becoming complicated and England and America are uniting in their policy toward the South Pacific area and will nail up Japan in a half completed condition, etc.

Trans. 8–30–41

No. 399

FROM: Helsinki (Sakaya) August 30, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

(Message to Tokyo # 260.) (Part 1 of 3.)

The other day the American Minister here invited me to a luncheon, and I took that opportunity to ridicule the attitude of the United States in sponsoring Great Britain, Chungking, etc. I said that it was peculiar that the United States should back up the Soviet which is diametrically opposed to the democratic principle. The Minister said that he had not received any detailed reports from Washington on the present attitude of the government but he imagined that his country considered it essential to back up Russia against a greater threat. As for Bolshevism, he said that the view of the United States was that because of what the Soviet has been through for the past ten years, Bolshevism cannot possibly constitute a very great threat to other nations.

Trans. 10–13–41

No. 400

FROM: Helsinki (Sakaya) August 30, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

(Part 2 of 3.) (Message to Tokyo # 260.)

I said, "Well, don't you think it would be a good idea to have all nations get together and make peace?" and he replied, "Yes, I agree with you." I then pointed out how ridiculous it was for the United States to meddle in Europe and Asia and at the same time cling to the Monroe Doctrine. He replied, "In general, I might be inclined to agree with you; however, we have to face changing situations. In any case, I think this is only a temporary state of affairs. In general, there is a mistaken idea throughout the world concerning our Monroe Doctrine. By it we forbid any foreign country to seize control of any part of the American continent, and at the same time we imply that we do not wish to control any other country. I do not know what Germany intends to do with Europe. However, it would seem that she is contravening the principle of self-determination, thus shattering the foundations of peace between the old and new worlds. This would upset the economic equilibrium, and the United States intends to prevent any such thing."

Trans. 10–13–41

No. 401

FROM: Helsinki August 30, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

(Message to Tokyo # 260.) (Part 3 of 3.)

I said, "Well, be that as it may, the American attitude toward Japan isn't doing the world situation any good. Just like the Asama Maru incident last year. American shipments of material for Russia via Vladivostok are inciting the Japanese people and officials exceedingly, so the United States had better watch out." The Ambassador answered, "Well don't you think that the present bad blood between our two countries is only a passing phenomenon? As long

as our leaders continue to talk things through, I think that naturally there is a good chance for a composure of relations between our two countries. My present feeling is that it is important that we get along well to avoid a world disaster."

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 402

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) August 26, 1941
TO: Washington #66.

(Message to Tokyo #163.)

Re your #489[a] to the United States.

1. Newspapers and magazines sent from Japan to private individuals here have on many occasions either been delayed or not received. Newspapers to semi-officials were received during August. Furthermore, there are clear indications that printed matter is being censored.
2. There is no actual proof.
3. As I told you in my #157[b], on that occasion, photostatic copies were made of (his) private letters and diary.
4. No examples have occurred.
5. In connection with the Tachibana incident, Naval officials were trailed and kept under surveillance as a matter of course. Since then too, persons having to do with the Army and the Navy have continued to be under surveillance. Capatain ISHIKAWA and Commander SASAKI of the Navy, who returned home on the tanker Otowasan Maru, underwent an examination by Customs Officials before boarding the steamer. Nevertheless, the F.B.I. subjected them to a rigorous examination.
6. No actual proof.

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[a]Tokyo asks Washington for information with regard to the method in which the United States handles cases involving Japanese there. This is to be used as reference material in drawing up a reply to the United States' protest of Japan's decision to control the business of foreigners in Japan.
[b]See III, 380, 381.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 403

FROM: Tokyo August 27, 1941
TO: Washington #508.

(In 3 parts—complete.)

Re my #473[a] and your #693[b].

On the 27th I handed the following as our answer to the American Ambassador in Tokyo and when the occasion arises please get in touch with the State Department concerning it.

1. Under the principal of reciprocity it is necessary in investigating the transactions of foreigners to exclude the American Ambassador, Consul, and employees together with the employees of other government offices resident in Japan from the other foreigners. (This arrangement is at present in effect between Japan and England, Australia, Canada and Holland. This arrangement exempts only personal accounts and does not include public funds and inasmuch

as the official in charge of receipts and disbursements as well as the other employees are exempted it is not only convenient in practice but also moneys in the bank (?) are also exempted.)

2. Inasmuch as American practice does not follow the above we are adding the following revisions to the American proposals before accepting them.

(1) In regard to paragraph (a) of the above memorandum, concerning the nature, and object of the payments of official accounts permission shall be given for ----- for actual running expenses as telegraphic expenses, salaries of employees, rents, entertainment expenses, etc., it being mutually understood that the investigation of details be omitted. However in the matter of the purchase of office equipment or major repairs request be made for each occasion as it arises.

(2) That a permit not be required for each case of the receipt of money transferred to official accounts.

(3) That permit be granted for the embassy and consulate and other government offices to pay in to their national treasury the balance on hand of current operating expenses and funds arising from the disposal of assets as well as income received by the consulate in the conduct of its business also that employees be allowed to remit money to their home countries.

(4) In regard to paragraph (c) personal living expenses and travel for which permits are not required shall be 1500 yen a month in Japan and $500 a month in America, that is the standard for Japanese employees $500 and for American employees 1500 yen for personal living expenses and travel only. Permits shall be issued for the above amounts reciprocally and employees permits shall be granted as follows: Both Japan and America shall grant to their Ambassadors the sum of $2000 a month or its equivalent. To the Financial Attaché $1000 or its equivalent. To the Counselor and the Military and Naval Attachés $1500 each or its equivalent. To the First Secretary $1000 or its equivalent. To the Consul and the Second Secretary group $750 or its equivalent.

When circumstances render necessary an amount greater than those indicated in the above the Ambassador shall make application for permit for each occasion as it occurs.

(5) The grants for employees above the rank of clerks of the Japanese Embassy and Consulate shall be sent by the Japanese Foreign Office direct to the individual concerned through the Yokohama Specie Bank and the American Government shall give the above-mentioned bank a general permit covering the above payments. (A list of the employees above the rank of clerk shall be furnished to the State Department by the Japanese Embassy in Washington.) Furthermore when the travel expenses, etc., remitted by the Japanese Foreign Office through the Yokohama Specie Bank shall exceed the $500 a month limit established in paragraph (4) above, permit for payment shall be granted upon request of the Embassy.

3. Furthermore, when I presented the memorandum I gave my opinion as follows:

(a) As far as Japan is concerned the above arrangement includes only the Japanese Empire, however if America for her part will promise to facilitate the clearing of dollar remittances to Japanese offices and employees in South America and Europe through New York and do her utmost to remove any obstacles, if in the future conditions should arise to permit the use of such funds by the aforesaid offices and employees, then I will recommend that the Manchurian Government and the Nanking Government accord the same treatment to American offices in Manchuria and that part of China that is occupied by Japanese forces as is accorded them in the Japanese Empire itself.

(b) In regard to the operating expenses mentioned in paragraph (1) under paragraph (2) above the actual amount concerned is at present the subject of investigation and it is desired that a reciprocal report be made when the actual figures have been arrived at.

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[a] See III, 376.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 404

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) September 2, 1941
TO: Washington #521.

Re my #485[a].

As the result of subsequent negotiations by the Korean Governor General's office with the missionary authorities in Keijo[b], all thirteen of them have consented to evacuate. As a consequence, the Governor General's office has dismissed all pending litigation on record in the Public Procurator's office. This is being done with the view of settling all questions.

These missionaries are sailing for Shanghai on Japanese boats departing August 26 and September 16. They will board American vessels in Shanghai for the United States.

Furthermore, with regard to the settlement of this matter, as well as the Ōasa incident mentioned in a previous wire, much has been accomplished through the personal endeavors of Governor General MINAMI. The above is for your information.

---

[a] See III, 382.
[b] Seoul—capital of Chosen.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 405

FROM: Washington (UAWRK) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) #179.

(Parts 1 and 2.)

Part 1

In spite of the efforts of the American authorities concerned and other leading parties, it is easy to see that America's ardor in aiding Russia is less than in the case of Britain, which goes without saying, and very much less than in the case of aiding China.

Therefore in as far as we can go without injuring America's prestige, I think it would be proper for us to show our opposition to the sending of aid to Russia via Vladivostok, and as emergency measures to prevent this, we will, for example, place emphasis on the fact that our Navy will hold maneuvers in that area, that is in a mined area and set forth the case of the sinking of the TERUKUNI MARU, etc.

Part 2

But it is a fact that if we use actual power[a] in preventing the (?passage of?) the above mentioned aid, America's pressure on us will be still further increased and eventually it can[b] result in the rupture of diplomatic relations and the opening of a warfare of commerce destruction.[c]

---

[a] JITSU RYOKU.
[b] KANŌSEI NAKI TO SEZARU.
[c] TSŪSHŌ HAKAISEN.

Trans. 1-30-45

No. 406

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #774.

(Part 1 of 2.)

To the Minister of Finance from the Finance officer.

1. In regard to funds for petroleum purchases, I have read your #77[a].

2. We cannot permit the continuance of such abnormal diplomatic relations as have been in existence between Japan and the United States in recent months. Sooner or later the situation will inevitably become either favorable or unfavorable. Should the situation become worse it will be impossible for us to conduct trade relationships between Japan and South America. Any attempts to preserve our deposits will become meaningless. However, should the situation brighten considerably it will be possible for us to send sums of money from here to South America. In either case it would be advantageous for us to heed America's current demands so that we might secure petroleum.

3. With regard to devising means of making payments, I, as well as others, in accordance with your wire will make representations according to the following lines: to the State Department, the Treasury Department and the Foreign Fund Control Board. Since the freezing legislation went into effect the portion for South America, which Japan has sent, has been converted into funds for the purchase of South American goods. Though dollar deposits have already become impossible, I would like to have that portion of the funds being sent to South America to be applied against our exports and which is at face value of "yen currency" accumulated in the various countries in gold and transferred to funds for the purchase of petroleum. However, in regard to this, it will be necessary for us to secure permits from each of the Exchange Control Organizations of the various countries. For this reason, therefore, please acknowledge this wire.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 407

FROM: Washington September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 774.

(Part 2 of 2.)

5. We would like to do our best to reach a settlement roughly along the above line.

6. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- to offer dollar currency ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----.

7. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- had worried, thinking that it would have a ----- effect ----- -----; however, actually it is the contrary. The United States Government is prepared to effect freezing of the funds in the related banks at any time in order to place an obstacle in the way of Japan's policy towards South American countries. The reason for its not yet having done so seems to be that it has taken into consideration the Japanese-American negotiations now going on; therefore, for Japan at this time to give in to United States demands would help to lessen the ill effects which the South American countries will have to suffer.

8. Ambassador NOMURA is in full accord with the above-explained proposition. Furthermore, since it seems to me that such a step would contribute towards lessening the tension in this Japanese American crisis, I would appreciate addressing your instructions to Washington as soon as possible.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 408

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 781.

Re my # 677[a].

The money in my keeping for New York is $20,606.47. I have transferred it to that office.

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[a] See III, 369.

Trans. 11-25-41

No. 409

FROM: Tokyo September 5, 1941
TO: Washington # 531.

Please advance $5000 from the special secret funds held by the Counselor to Nanjo, resident in Cuba, to be called special secret funds and held by him as cash for emergency use. The disbursement of said funds to be made only upon orders from me. Please transmit this telegram to Cuba as my orders.

Trans. 9-9-41

No. 410

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #789.

Strictly secret.

I would like to have TERASAKI go on an official mission to Chicago in order to make secret contacts with members of the "America First" Committee residing in that city. Please send authorization. At that time, I would like to have him make a study on the spot of the matter concerning ŌYAMA mentioned in your #154[a].

Furthermore, TERASAKI was not able to make an official tour to Los Angeles and San Francisco in line with your #349[b] because he went south to Mexico. At this time should you permit him to stop off at San Francisco, Seattle, and Los Angeles, it would be exceedingly convenient from the standpoint of the work at hand.

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[a] Not available.

[b] Discusses plan for TERASAKI's visit to Mexico to confer with Japanese Minister there for the development of plans pertaining to the establishment of an espionage net; the focal point of this net to be Mexico City carrying out activities in the United States as well as South America. See III, 410A.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 410A

FROM: Tokyo July 10, 1941
TO: Washington #349.

Secret outside the Department.

(To be handled in Government Code.)

Re #18[a] from New Orleans and #244(?)[b] from Mexico to this Foreign Minister.

We wish Consul ITO to go to Mexico City. Lately the offices housing the German and Italian Consulates were closed and their intelligence net broken. Intelligence activities in the Americas and suitable liaison are now essential, so we wish Secretary TERAZAKI also to go to Mexico to confer with our Minister there, in order to realize our plans in a concrete fashion based on the policy described in previous messages. We want Secretary TERAZAKI, and him only, to stop off at Quito, Los Angeles, San Francisco, etc. In this connection the points which we would like to bring to your attention are as follows:

1. We will have three routes to Mexico from the United States, consisting of Laredo, Ciudad Juares and Mexicali. Mexicali in particular is a convenient point for us on the west coast. In case we need more personnel, we can get them from our Ministry in Mexico.

2. We will establish a Chile route from Mexico by way of Mansanillo and a Brazil route by way of Vera Cruz.

3. Various officials in the United States and Mexico will work out all the details of their own espionage nets, correlate them, and develop a concrete plan for making contacts and exchange on the border.

4. In order to succeed in this objective, ways and means for keeping in contact through telegraphy, telephones, memoranda, and word of mouth will be decided upon and put into effect.

5. These routes are to be established against the day of evil and, while all is calm, nothing must be done which would jeopardize their security; therefore, at present investigate only the feasibility of circulating over them.

6. The expenses are to be paid by the several offices.

Because of its geographical position, Mexico is the main point for intelligence work in Brazil, Argentina and Chile, as well as in the United States. Therefore, before we think of relying too much upon Brazil, Argentina and Chile, let us concentrate on Mexico. However, the other three bases are different. In case the United States joins the war, they would inevitably come under her control, but so long as Mexico does not officially join the war, we can continue our intelligence schemes there. Paralleling these plans of ours, if you can also work out a plan for establishing a liaison net with Brazil, Argentina and Chile, it would be excellent groundwork for the establishment presently of an intelligence net. Please transmit this to Mexico City and take with you to New Orleans.

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[a] Not avialable.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 7-25-41

No. 411

FROM: Tokyo — September 6, 1941
TO: New York — # 201.

We have received an invitation from the War Ministry for RYUKICHI WATANABE (father of the recently deceased JUNICHI WATANABE, First-Class Private in the Infantry), who is living in your city to attend, as a relative of the deceased, the ceremony to be held from October 15 to 21, inclusive, at the Yasukuni Shrine. Will you, therefore, please confidentially transmit this invitation to the above, and in the case of this man's participating in the ceremonies, please accord him facilities along the line given in my communication # 1174 ----- ----- ----- of last year.

Please do not make public the name of the deceased until the end of September.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 412

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) — September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 169.

The local immigration office has gradually undertaken the arrest of Japanese who are in possession of illegal passports. In Los Angeles approximately 50 and in the entire state of California, roughly 100 persons are understood to have been taken into custody. All of them have borrowed money to cover bond.

When boats become available approximately half of them will be given the opportunity to return home should they so desire. It seems that this sort of round-up will be carried on in the future as well.

Relayed to Washington and San Francisco.

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 413

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #202.

Message to Shanghai (?) as #2.

Couriers KUGA, WATANABE and TACHI; Engineer NISHINA; former Manchurian Railroad Director NAKAJIMA: Diet Member HASE: Ministry of Justice Secretary KIYOHARA: Home Ministry officials, KUGE and ITŌ; University professors HAMADA and TANABE; Chief editor of the KOKUMIN newspaper Satsuma (all holders of diplomatic passports) and MITANI BUSSAN employee, KOTO (Holder of official business passport) left here on the 9th for Japan via your place on the President Taylor. Please make suitable reservations for them to Japan.

Relayed to Tokyo and Berlin.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 414

FROM: Rome September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #575.

MYRON TAYLOR, President ROOSEVELT's personal emissary to the Vatican, returned to his post on the 9th after a whole year's absence. Various rumors are being made concerning his mission. Reports differ; for example, one says that he had come to request the Vatican to mediate between Japan and the United States in settling the Far Eastern question. Another says he came to discuss with the Pope the question of having the Catholics, for the time being, give up their anti-Bolshevik propaganda in the two countries, following the joining of Great Britain and the United States with Soviet Russia. Another says that he had come to discuss the questions affecting Catholics and Catholic missions in the United States and Britain and in the territories in the Far East under the control of these two countries, and also the question of the Vatican's attitude. Still another says he had brought a peace proposal with him. However, all of these reports are merely speculations. The return of TAYLOR to his post, in fact, is merely indicative of the United States President's gesture, in view of the present delicate international situation, which he is making to Catholics in the United States, in Central and South America, and in Europe, or is indicative of his policy of conciliation. It is not thought that TAYLOR has been entrusted with any specially important mission.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 415

FROM: Madrid (Suma) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #123.

(Part 1 of 3.)

American Special Envoy to the Vatican, TAYLOR, who left the United States on the 4th flew here by clipper stopped in the Barcelona on the ----- where he met and talked with the American Ambassador to France, LEAHY, and the American Ambassador to Spain, WEDDELL, in a three-cornered conversation which lasted the entire day. On that occasion TAY-

LOR's remarks centered around America's attitude toward Europe. From the same source who gave me the information contained in my #117[a], I learned the following details concerning America's attitude as expressed in these conversations by Special Envoy TAYLOR.

1. At the same time STALIN questions the motivation of British and American aid to the Soviet, he greatly fears the collapse of the Soviet Regime. At times it is thought he plans to ----- ----- with Germany. In addition the German authorities too consider these possibilities as evidenced in recent HITLER-MUSSOLINI conversations (see my #124[b]). Depending upon the terms offered STALIN might accede. In order to avoid such a pass there are those who insist upon America's early participation (principally within Naval circles), but in order that she may hold aces up her sleeve to combat possible German-Soviet peace moves, until such time as a major incident develops America's participation does not seem likely. (Judged in this light it would seem that TAYLOR considered the GREER question of minor importance.)

---

[a]Not available.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 416

FROM: Madrid (Suma) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #123.

(Part 2 of 3.)

As far as the United States is concerned she is anxious to avoid, as long as possible, waging a war in the Pacific and the Atlantic at the same time. At such time that a campaign in the Pacific seems unlikely she will participate in the war in Europe.

It is viewed that Japan is timing her attitude until she is able to discern the trend of the German-Soviet conflict. Naturally there are slight chances of ----- ----- -----. In view of the consequences of Japan remaining in the Axis the United States is sure to take care that conversations do not evaporate.

Furthermore as far as the United States is concerned it is to be expected that she will make no clear commitment. However, she has hinted to Britain and China that should Japan decide upon a course such as, in truth, to alienate herself from the Axis there is much room for the consideration of "sizable concessions."

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 417

FROM: Madrid (Suma) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #123.

(Part 3 of 3.)

As far as England is concerned it would be harder for her to bear the thought of contradicting even to the slightest extent the eight points upon which she guaranteed the dissolution of the world crisis than to be defeated by the Axis. China, too, would present many stipulations, the basis of which would be the withdrawal of all Japanese armed forces from China.

Further, England having moved armored troops from (Australia ? India ?) to Malay schemes for the opening of a joint British and American campaign. In my opinion the United States at the present time, waiting until she sees results of the matter mentioned in Part 2, is not likely to (go so far as to ?) render "military assistance."

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 418

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 10, 1941
TO: Washington #551.

Major HOTSUE ISHIKAWA of the army, stationed in the United States, has been appointed to your office as of the 9th, as Assistant Military Attache. Lt. Col. SUZUKI is relieved as Assistant Military Attache.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 419

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #446.

(Part 1 of 5.)

(Strictly secret outside the Department.)

We are laying particular stress to espionage and ----- activities. We are now endeavoring to realize these points in accordance with the policies laid down by the home office. The following methods have been set up for the operation of civilian organizations for the development of intelligences.

1. Proposed Reorganization. Our policy has been that in order to set up an effective organization we must:

(a) Immediately dismiss all persons of little value and those who are no longer required.

(b) Transfer to the Cultural Institute the most effective persons or groups in our employ (the Culture on Wheels Library and the group handling the distribution of films) to the Cultural Institute.

(c) To divert the most capable persons in our employ being used in the dissemination of propaganda into intelligence collecting and espionage activities.

Though we hold these three points to be our principal objectives, since our decisions were reached on this matter, the freezing legislation went into effect. Consequently, with the change in the situation, we have found it necessary to dismiss such persons as we have classified under (b) above in the same category as those in (a) because it is now apparent that we cannot realize our aims under (b). In view of the expectation of increasing financial difficulty due to the scarcity of funds available for distribution to civilian personnel, this applies also to those in espionage and ----- activities. We are now doing our best to make temporary reductions in expense funds and salaries.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 420

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 446.

(Part 2 of 5.)

2. Plans of Readjustment.

(a) *The Living Age.*—About the time that we bought this magazine, we had authoritative information that the State Department and the F.B.I. were going to take strong measures, as they were aware of the Japanese backing that this magazine had. Early in July, by means of a letter to this magazine, inquiries were made as to whether or not registration would not be required. Since, should it continue as heretofore an untoward incident might arise, publication was stopped after August. At the present time, though we are making a search for a purchaser, should none be forthcoming by the end of September, we shall announce its bankruptcy. After a settlement has been reached, we plan to dissolve the whole organization.

(b) *Foreign Observer.*—Publication was discontinued after (June?).

(c) *The Culture on Wheels Library.*—We stopped operation of the Library after July. We are at the present time studying how best to dispose of the automobile and books. After this has been done, we plan to dismiss the operator.

(d) -----.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 421

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 446.

(Part 3 of 5.)

(e) *Orient ----- Foreign Service.*—We discontinued publication after July.

(f) *Distribution of films.*—As soon as our contracts have expired, we will suspend our distribution of films through the Y.M.C.A. office and other distributing agencies. Furthermore, KELLERMAN Pictures we plan to use after transferring them to the Cultural Institute.

(g) *World-Over Printing Enterprise.*—We have decided to discontinue publication of books for propaganda purposes which we have planned to have printed in conjunction with the *World-Over Year Book* being published for the *Living Age.*

(h) *English edition of the Japanese-American.*—Since freezing legislation went into effect, because of the scarcity of funds for employees, we plan to suspend publication temporarily after the early part of September. Money only for the maintenance of the staff will be required.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 424

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 453.

(Part 1 of 2.)

1. For some time we have been conferring on and considering, in connection with the questions of adjustments to be effected among civilian intelligence organs, the various pending questions relative to the activities of the Cultural Institute. However, with the coming of a new crisis, following the freezing of funds, the execution of a more aggressive policy became, even from the economic standpoint alone, impossible and we have had to curtail the activities of the Institute. We have therefore planned the following:

1. To carry on future activities of the Institute on the basis of a revised plan which will be within the scope of the funds on hand.

2. With this in mind, to hold a conference with civilians once a month for study and discussion.

3. To continue to ----- for the purpose of ----- and collection of intelligences by civilians.

We are now directing its activities along these lines. However, because of the fact that our propaganda work in this country is now placed under great handicap, we do not believe that it would matter very much if a man of ----- ----- was employed as a secret agent.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 425

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 453.

(Part 2 of 2.)[a]

Though matters are as I have outlined above, we in this office are complying with your instructions but in my opinion in view of the fact that the employees are evidencing a critical attitude, I think that the question of a complete shake-up within the office should be postponed for a little while.

Accompanying the worsening of the attitude toward Japan, the "library on wheels," since the latter half of last year, has maintained a route hardly worth mentioning. I believe, however, that the distribution of pamphlets for enlightenment purposes will supplement this activity. Though the "library on wheels" will be taken over by the Cultural Institute as long as there are no great changes in the situation I do not believe that much effectiveness can be expected of its work. Therefore, in line with the effects of the freezing legislation we do not plan upon the continued engagement of -----[b], who drives the "library on wheels" and who had been showing a none too pleasant attitude in the Cultural Institute. We have arranged to cancel all his unfinished business arrangements. (Please refer to my # 446)[b]. This truck and the books which go with it as well as other things, we plan to place in the custody and under the name of Cultural Institute.

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[a] See III, 424.
[b] DoD Comment: Name withheld.
[c] See III, 419-421.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 426

FROM: Washington (UAWRK) September 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) # 187.

(2 Parts—Complete.)

The U.S. President's speech is generally praised and supported, but some men of the isolationist faction, namely LINDBERGH, NYE, GILETTE, CLARKE, etc., are showing an attitude of opposition to the speech.

Part 2

The course which U.S.-Germans relations will take chiefly depends on Germany's behavior. However, it is judged that in all likelihood, this incident on the sea will make the U.S. take another step toward direct entry into the war.

Trans. 2–14–45

No. 427

Roosevelt Orders Navy to Shoot on Sight, from Facts on File, September 11, 1941

President Roosevelt announced in a Washington broadcast that he has ordered the Navy to destroy on sight any Axis submarines or surface raiders found "in the waters which we deem necessary for our defense." Citing the attacks on the *Robin Moor*, the destroyer *Greer*, the *SS. Sessa* and the *Steel Seafarer* as proof that Hitler "has begun his campaign to control the seas by ruthless force," with the ultimate design of attacking the Western Hemisphere, he declared: "Normal practices of diplomacy—note writing—are of no possible use in dealing with international outlaws who sink our ships and kill our citizens. . .

"No act of violence, no act of intimidation will keep us from maintaining intact two bulwarks of defense: First, our line of supply of materiel to the enemies of Hitler, and second, the freedom of our shipping on the high seas. No matter what it takes, no matter what it costs, we will keep open the line of legitimate commerce in these defensive waters of ours. . . We cannot bring about the downfall of Nazism by the use of long-range invective. But when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. These Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic. . . . The time for active defense is now. . . Upon our naval and air patrol. . . falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas—now. That means . . . that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships—not only American ships but ships of any flag—engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. . . . .

"It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the seas that are vital to American defense. The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense. But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril. The orders which I have given as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policy—at once. The sole responsibility rests upon Germany. There will be no shooting unless Germany continues to seek it."

Trans. 0–00–00

No. 428

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 184.

Strictly Secret.

(Part 1 of 2.)

An outline of airplane production in the various factories of Southern California (up to date):

a. Orders placed with each company (40% of total orders in the Los Angeles area and 10% centers around San Diego).

Company	*Amt. of Orders*	*Employees*	*Monthly Salaries*
Lockheed	$371,000,000	32,791	$5,287,000
Vega	120,000,000	7,364	1,201,000
Douglas	491,000,000	31,818	4,749,000

(for subsequent data on orders placed in the various factories of Santa Monica, El Segundo and Long Beach, see my # 147[a])

Company	*Amt. of Orders*	*Employees*	*Monthly Salaries*
North American	$385,000,000	11,443	$1,976,000
Vulte	86,000,000	9,720	1,579,000
Northrop	49,000,000	2,549	461,000
Consolidated	540,000	2,000	———

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 429

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

(Part 2 of 2.)

b. Types of craft on order in the various companies:

Company	*For Britain*	*For American Army*
Lockheed	Hudson bombers	P-38 Interceptor pursuit planes
Vega	Vega "Ventura" bombers	B-39-E heavy bombers
Douglas	Bombers	DC-3 transport planes. B-39-E and B----- heavy bombers A-20 bombers
North American	B-medium bombers Mustang pursuit planes	(Same as for Britain)
Vulte		"Valiant" primary pursuit planes "Vengeance" high-speed bombers
Consolidated	B-type heavy bomber(?)	B-type heavy bombers(?)

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 430

FROM: Tokyo — September 17, 1941
TO: Washington — #572.

Re your #690[a].

We immediately made inquiry of the departments concerned in regard to the items mentioned in the representation made by the United States, and at the same time urged that wherever any injustice or anything in the nature of interference had taken place that there be adjustments. However, according to subsequent reports the items enumerated by the Americans can practically all be classified as: (1) items of misunderstanding for which there is no basis of fact, (2) conditions, which for the time due to certain circumstances did exist as they have described them but which have now been restored to normal (3) conditions, which because of the present state of things of necessity will exist as they have described them, but which we are considering restoring to normal as soon as their continuance is no longer necessary. And concerning the eight items which have been ascertained you will please be informed that we immediately on the 16th send a note to the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo with the request that it be transmitted to the Secretary of State. The main points of the reply we have made in regard to the items in the U.S. reply that seem to have been most emphasized in the United States were as given in my #571[b], and therefore you may make such use of these as you deem best.

The Americans made allusion to our freezing of assets, because purportedly the Standard Oil Co. had had telephone service suspended because of their not being able to draw out funds necessary for the payment of telephone charges. However, while at first in the enforcement of the freezing order, those concerned were unaccustomed to the procedure, and some inconvenience was experienced in connection with the drawing out of funds, these conditions are gradually being eliminated, and the Finance Ministry has been liberal and prompt in the granting of permits for paying out on deposits in specified banks, and also in excess of the limits from other than certain specified banks. And in the case of individuals besides the permission to secure and dispose of 500 yen freely since 23 August, the restrictions have been eased up to make it possible for foreigners other than certain specified banks, to withdraw funds deposited in their own names, to the amount of 1000 yen per month for living expenses and other expenses consistent with the same. Please bear these facts in mind.

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[a] See III, 372.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-23-41

No. 431

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #827.

For the past week the 4:30 A.M. JUP broadcast has been so weak as to be hardly heard, and this morning we were unable to hear it at all. Please consider changing the wavelength.

Furthermore, reception of 4:00 to 7:00 A.M. Domei broadcasts over JAP have been excellent but lately has become weaker until today it faded out completely.

We have been able to get the 8:30 A.M. broadcasts with difficulty up to about 9:00 o'clock. But today static increased to the point where we could not understand anything.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 432

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 18, 1941
TO: London, Rio, Buenos Aires, Berlin #281.

(Circular.)

(Message to Tokyo #825.)

Re official letter, ordinary, #336[a], dated June 26.

The following are the points which deserve attention and which appeared in the second report (August, present) with regard to the Lend-Lease Act and the use of funds amounting to $7,000,000,000 (the details will be sent in official letter).

1. Although out of the $7,000,000,000 the amount which has been alloted was $6,200,000,000, the actual payment has not exceeded $390,000,000. Defense materials already transferred amount to $200,000,000, but of this $190,000,000 worth have been exported and, since $118,000,000 of it was for agricultural produce, the amount for war materials so-called was not more than $72,000,000. As you may see from the above, some progress was made in the actual aid given when compared with the first report; but what has been accomplished has not measured up to expectations; especially for planes, tanks, machine tools, arms and ammunition respectively but $6,000,000 was provided by the Government, (however ----- ----- ----- ----- $4,000,000 for bombers).

2. Amount of defense materials exported:

(1) Arms and ammunition	$ 35,000,000
(2) Airplanes and materials	6,000,000
(3) Tanks	28,000,000
(4) Ships	2,000,000
(5) Others	100,000
(6) Agricultural Produce	118,000,000

Of these, the greater part has been shipped to England, Central Asia, Africa and to the American countries. In the case of (1), (3), (6) ----- ----- ----- $4,000,000 ----- ----- ----- to other places.

3. Allotments and payments of appropriation:

	Allotments	*Payments*
Arms and ammunition	$1,422,000,000	$16,000,000
Planes and materials	2,027,000,000	19,000,000
Tanks	394,000,000	9,000,000
Ships	699,000,000	109,000,000
Military Outfits	112,000,000	6,000,000
Facilities and Equipment	501,000,000	41,000,000
Agricultural and industrial products	975,000,000	152,000,000
Testing and transportation of defense materials	130,000,000	32,000,000
TOTAL	6,281,000,000[b]	$389,000,000[b]

4. The reason why the program has not come up to expectations is that the production process is still in the stage of development; but the shortage of ships is also given as one of the reasons.

5. As to the United States policy for aiding China, what has appeared in the same report will be sent in the separate telegram #826[c].

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[a] Not available.
[b] Translator's note: error in calculation appears in the original.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 9–26–41

No. 433

FROM: San Francisco — September 18, 1941
TO: Washington — #62.

1. All except those included in paragraph 4 (please refer to the amounts required by this office as given in my #61[a]) of #566[a] addressed to you by the Minister, I believe, should be reported as the $500.00 granted in Ze Ra #11. For your reference, I am listing only the present salaries of mine as well as of the other members in this office (your portion of the amount for the Trade Promotion Office has been remitted once every three months in a lump sum as office expense, and no special remittance is made as salary expense.

Myself	$758.14
Consul INAGAKI	419.71
Vice-Consul TAKAHASI	350.05
Secretary SATO	267.09
Secretary IMAI	292.35
Secretary KURATA	238.38
Interpreter HASIZUME	215.34

The bank which is handling my as well as the other members' money is the San Francisco branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank, and the account for each is a checking account.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–27–41

No. 434

FROM: New York (Morishima) — September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #451.

Resident representative TAGUCHI of the local Japan Cinema several days ago sent me the following communication:

"A certain exchange film sent from our Home Office to the General Ufa via San Francisco and Buenos Aires was held up by the San Francisco customs. At the request of our Home Office, I got a permit from the Washington officials, but this was voided. I do not know what their reason was, but among some films which I was sending home in July by this route the American customs officials discovered certain documents and this was played up greatly in American movie magazines. I suppose, therefore, that the customs officials had it in for me. I imagine that the American officials will continue to spite us in this manner, so, therefore, will you please advise the Home Office of the Japan Cinema to stop shipments via this route."

I think that this would be advisable, so will you please see to it.
Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 10-8-41

No. 435

FROM: Washington (UAWRK) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) # 196.

(Parts 1-6—complete.)

Answer to your wire # 949[a].

A. Today, the 20th, I conferred with the German Attaché. We exchanged opinions in a roundabout way, without making direct statements. His ideas are more or less as follows:

1. Britain would probably actually welcome a Japanese attack on Russia, as she would think that it would lighten the heavy pressure on her south. Nevertheless Britain and America would probably continue their aid to Russia (of which the quantity is very small). In case of a northern advance by the Japanese Army, he feels America's attitude would be more or less as you estimate in 1 of your wire.[b]

Part 2

2. 2 of your wire tallies with the German Attaché's opinions. He even goes on to say that even though the Japanese Army should invade the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore, America would probably not force even a political or commercial war with Japan, provided that the Japanese Army does not directly attack the Philippines or block the shipment of tin, rubber and the like from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

Part 3

He continues, if Japan should reserve these products like tin and rubber for her own exclusive use, America might declare war against us with little delay, but it is more probable that even in this case America would hesitate for a long time, giving Japan an interval which we would have to use for the assiduous collection of materials of war such as, for one, gasoline.

3. 3 and 4 of your wire coincide with the opinions of the German Attaché.

Part 4

B. My opinions on the foregoing:

1. America is maintaining her traditional far-eastern policy, devoting her best efforts to upholding and augmenting her power in the Far East, particularly in the South Seas, and to insuring the transport of war materials to England from the South Seas, Australia, and India. Therefore, if the Empire should drive southwards I doubt that America would look on unconcerned.

Part 5

I mean, as I have set forth in previous wires, # 159[b] and others, that although America would not force Japan into a decisive war, she would, quite possibly, sever economic relations, or start a commercial war, or take some action along that line.

2. The greater part of your wire # 949[a] coincides with the views which the German Attaché has frequently expressed to us. The German Councellor and Naval Attache also agree that an invasion of the Dutch East Indies by the Imperial Forces would probably not occasion a Japanese-American war.

However, German and Italian, especially German, estimates on the U.S. are almost always over-optimistic and, at times are of such a nature as to make one think them deliberately planned for the purpose of impelling the Imperial Forces into a Northern or Southern Drive.

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[a] In process.
[b] See III, 367, 368.

Trans. 5-2-45

No. 436

FROM: San Francisco — September 20, 1941
TO: Washington — # 208.

(Urgent.)

(Tokyo to San Francisco # 126.)

We are at the present time considering the early dispatch of a special vessel in line with the question of Japanese-American ----- -----; consequently, I would like to have you wire me immediately an approximation of the number of Japanese under the jurisdiction of your office who have to be evacuated. 1. Persons having relationship with governmental offices; 2. Persons engaged in business, and 3. destitute Japanese are the only ones to be considered. As I have told you before we will not evacuate the Japanese whose living is dependent upon their remaining where they now are and those who have no difficulty maintaining their livelihood, even though economic relations with Japan seem just about impossible. I would like to have you calculate the number of persons that come in the above categories, quickly and secretly.

Furthermore, wire me on the above, as well as, on the possibility of evacuating some on American ships and the number of persons who could take advantage of such a possibility.

To -----, New York, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland, -----, Honolulu. ----- to Washington, Ottawa, -----, New Orleans.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 437

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) — September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 191.

Re your message to San Francisco # 126[a].

In round numbers, the following Japanese in the jurisdiction of this office are waiting to be evacuated:

1. 4 government employees (5 others have their applications in at the steamship company in San Francisco).
2. ----- (40 ?) merchants.

3. 300 destitute persons (not really destitute but those who are unable to finance transportation for themselves, families and employees).

The above is a very rough estimate, and the figures may be somewhat lower or larger.

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[a] See III, 436.

Trans. 10–3–41

No. 438

FROM: Portland (Oka) September 22, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 4.

Message to Tokyo as # 26.

Re your message to Washington # 506[a].

1. and 2. There are none here who come under these categories.

3. There are four or five who have no objection to being evacuated in accordance with the situation as it applies to them individually.

Relayed to Washington and San Francisco.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–7–41

No. 439

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 24, 1941
TO: San Francisco # 26.

(Message to Tokyo # 455.)

At the present time only three or four students, a member of the family of the Director of the Cultural Institute, two newspapermen, six railway and tourist bureau officials are the only persons who have decided to leave the country. (However, please refer to San Francisco wires for the number of New York residents who are now waiting on the West Coast to embark for home.) When conditions seem on the point of getting extremely critical, roughly (160 or 180) businessmen and thirty students hope to return home, increasing the figures which I have given you above by those amounts.

With regard to their evacuation by American steamers, according to investigations which we have been making locally, it looks as though such evacuations are virtually out of the question.

Trans. 10–18–41

No. 440

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 22, 1941
TO: Washington #586.

A Domei dispatch of the 19th from your place (by NOSHITA) states that a Tokyo dispatch of the same date declares that a number of members of the Russian Embassy in Tokyo and their families, making up some fifty people, have been evacuated. This will doubtless give people over there the impression that relations between Moscow and Tokyo are very critical, and that a wholesale evacuation is on the way. As a matter of fact, all that left were the Ambassador's wife and children, together with several members of the staff. Two or three weeks ago they had hoped to leave, but shipping facilities being what they are, they had to wait. Recently they asked our good offices in helping them get away.

Not long ago a number of our Embassy people left Moscow when the war broke out between Germany and Russia, so I cannot see anything extraordinary at all in these few people quitting the Embassy in Tokyo.

Trans. 9–26–41

No. 441

FROM: Hollywood September 24, 1941
TO: Washington #76.

(Part 1 of 2.)

(Message to Tokyo #194, Part 1 of 2.)

OZAMOTO and others who have conducted an investigation on the location and operation of the NBC listening post in this area from the point of view of its connections with the correspondents of various newspapers in the vicinity, have found out the following:

1. Because the NBC short-wave receiving station in Bellemoor, Long Island, New York, has not been able to listen in satisfactorily on Far Eastern broadcasts, they have established a listening post in the private residence of one of the NBC technicians residing in North Hollywood. Using six or seven RCA receiving units, they have begun listening in on broadcasts from Japan, China, the Netherlands East Indies, Malay, Thailand, and (Siberia or French Indo-China?).

2. Five persons, technicians, translators of Japanese, Russian, etc., (adding these to those attached to the New York office makes a total of 22 persons) listen in 24 hours a day. The translators work from 11:00 ----- to 7:00 -----. Should the latter not be on duty, the technician records the broadcasts for them. At the present time, this office is on an experimental basis and has been established as a branch of the New York office, but should ----- ----- develop, the record made by this organization will be studied and then the listening post will be put on an independent basis.

Trans. 10–3–41

No. 442

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #194.

(Part 2 of 2.)[a]

3. *a.* They listen in on uncensored broadcasts from the various countries in the Far East. More frequently than not, they scoop the newspapers. Principally, they supply newspapers and radio news services with information secured, but when they are of the opinion that the material is of importance from a military point of view, they transmit this information to New York by teletype.

b. They are concentrating on the reception of Japanese broadcasts, especially Japanese overseas short wave broadcasts to the South Seas and various Asiatic coast stations, as well as Manchurian, Chinese, and Palau broadcasts to Japan. It seems that they are giving consideration to methods of reception because of confused atmospheric conditions.

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[a] See III, 441.

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 443

FROM: New York (Morishima) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #457.

To trade Commissioner TASHIRO:

An examination of recent telegrams from firms in Japan to their branches in this country leads me to believe that the former are viewing the present conversations between the two countries with rather too much optimism. For example, the Yokohama Specie Bank is using the upward price trend of Japanese securities held here as a barometer indicative of a favorable turn in Japanese-American relations. Again, the Osaka Steamship Company, in anticipation of the removal of the freezing order, appears to have telegraphed their branches to go ahead and meet their ordinary expenses and that, if they find themselves short, supplementary funds will be sent.

This sort of optimism is premature and I think commercial firms and banks should be advised to await the actual turn of events before going ahead in this manner.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 444

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #835.

Strictly Secret.

Urgent.

To the Chief of the Exchange Bureau in the Finance Ministry from the Finance Official.

Re the matter of payments for petroleum.

On the 20th of this month I called on the Chief of Bureau in Charge of Foreign Funds. At that time he made the statement that there were difficult points arising from the matter of making transfers of funds from South America. In accordance with your wire, I undertook negotiations with him, but the proposal of using Japanese funds was rejected completely and no questions were presented by it. With regard to proposals for the payment in gold bullion and dollar payments, he stated he would give them consideration. However, he said he could make no decisions because his office had charge of operations rather than policy. It is understood that he will put this matter before the liaison committee between the various offices either Tuesday or Wednesday of next week, after which a decision might be reached. Therefore, he went on to say, "I cannot clarify this matter until after Thursday of next week."

The following is for your information: With regard to funds in South America, the reason given is that, as a result of the closure of the Panama Canal, approximately ten scheduled foreign freighters had to sail upon unloading freight bound for Japan.

With regard to payment in American dollars, they explained that the Yokohama Specie Bank has accumulated much in purchases from Chinese and Japanese firms.

Trans. 9–23–41

No. 445

FROM: Tokyo — September 26, 1941
TO: Washington — #601.

From the Chief of the Exchange Bureau to Finance Official NISIYAMA. (Financial message #90.)

Since we have reasons to hasten the matter, please find out the opinions of the United States authorities regarding the methods of paying for petroleum and let me know by wire.

Trans. 9–27–41

No. 446

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #878.

To the Chief of the Exchange Bureau of the Treasury Department, from the Financial Attaché.

Up to the 30th I have learned nothing at all concerning the matter of money with which to purchase petroleum, nor is there any prospect of a date for this decision. Unlike past instances, this time they give me no assurances. From the way they talk, it would appear that the committee men are arguing among themselves and can reach no decision. Week before last, the matter was presented, and after that every time I have made an inquiry, their attitude has appeared a little more unfavorable. Consequently, I judge that the negotiations are not proceeding smoothly. The proposal that we transfer funds from South America was at their suggestion, and once I accepted it, they merely cancelled it and proposed another plan. It merely gave them an excuse for more delay and refusals. There is nothing more I can do. YAMADA.

Trans. 10–3–41

No. 447

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #879.

Re my #851[a]

Though we take into consideration the remarks made on the 30th by Treasury officials to Finance Officer NISHIYAMA (please refer to the Finance Officials wire #878[b] for further details), for the time being at least, there seems to be no possibility of releasing funds for the payment of petroleum prices.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 446.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 448

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #875.

Re my #864[a].

URGENT.

The opinion of my legal advisor (formerly legal advisor at the State Department) is as stated in separate message #876[b], but I believe that in the case of private lines application may be made to ship baggage ahead of time and that the authorities cannot do anything to stop this.

Regarding your message #610[a], since the United States Government attaches a great deal of importance to the matter of allowing Americans in Japan to leave, please consider from the very beginning determining the number of persons (according to ADAMS there are still about 140 or 150 applicants for first and second class passage) and grant them permission to embark. (In any case it will be impossible to get accommodations for all Japanese and Nisei in this country to return to Japan.)

Relayed to all Consuls in the United States, Ottawa and Honolulu.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Ambassador NOMURA discusses the question whether or not in an Admiralty Court of the United States a private merchant ship could be attached or libeled for the purpose of obtaining compensation.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 449

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #682.

Re your #603[a].

By the current accounts of the Yokohama Specie Bank do they mean the accounts which the Yokohama Specie Bank maintains in other banks (as you are aware these funds too have been frozen)? Now, if this is the case, these deposit banks are the ones which should be granted permits not the Yokohama Specie Bank. Will this agreement cover these banks? Is it your un-

derstanding that they will grant permits in any case if applications are made to the American authorities for these permits? Please wire me on these points for my information.

Now the branches in which the Yokohama Specie Bank handles its own current accounts are those branches in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Manila. New York and Seattle branches do not handle such accounts.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 450

FROM: Washington (Nomura) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #873.

Superintendent MAEDA tells me that an American connected with the Girls' School in (Tokyo ?) informs him that the Philadelphia Christain College sent $6,500.00 in American money to the Girls' School, but that it was frozen. Now I think that this sort of institution ought to be allowed to send money freely. I think if you will discuss this matter in Tokyo along these lines, we can have remittances between cultural institutions handled without freezing.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 451

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 2, 1941
TO: Washington #620.

Part 1 of 3.

Re your #864[a].

There is no chance of settling the question of sending ships as long as they refuse to promise not to detain our ships there on the grounds that they cannot interfere with legal claims.

As companies with no freight to send home hesitate to send passenger ships, we are considering commandeering ships, but since these would be called evacuation ships, we wish to avoid it as far as possible.

However, from a humanitarian standpoint we should not ignore forever those waiting to be evacuated and we should also consider the possibility of sailing permits for Americans if space permits, so whether or not there is freight for the first ship, we want you to visit the State Department authorities personally although there may be legal and technical difficulties.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 452

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 2, 1941
TO: Washington #620.

(Part 2 of 3.)

In regard to shipping left-over freight, it seems that a second ship will be more than sufficient. There are many requests about the possibility of sending a ship at once, and we would like a cabled reply after you have made every effort to get a permit. Now, if they insist on claims for evacuation, cable us at once on the following two points.

1. If there is goods to be shipped from here, they should arrange for it, and give permits for releasing goods to be sent here.

2. If special ships are sent by Japan, they must be completely excluded from all legal claims and be treated as an arrangement between the two governments.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 453

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 2, 1941
TO: Washington #620.

(Part 3 of 3.)

Is it the intention of the justice authorities to handle this matter in an entirely separate manner? Because this matter was referred to me by -----, I have taken a great deal of interest in it, and I am doing my utmost to settle it. Please be so informed. I expect you also to do your best.

Relayed to New York.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 454

FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Tsingtao, Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin Cir. #2110.

(Part 1 of 3.)

Message to Peking #564.

The following is the kind of treatment being given Japanese diplomats by the Pan-American Airways in Central and South America.

1. While on his return trip from -----, where he had presented his credentials, MIURA, our Minister to Mexico, was asked on the 15th by the Pan-American Airways for permission to examine, on the grounds of safety, his baggage and that of interpreter FUKUSHIMA and was told that unless he would consent to the examination, they would not be allowed to board the plane; and so they consented to it (the inspectors did not, of course, touch any sealed documents).

2. When Minister YAMAGATA in Chile was about to return from ----- where he had been visiting, he inquired of the Pan-American Airways about examination and was told that although hand baggage would have to be examined, the bags containing diplomatic documents need only be sealed.

3. When Secretary TERASAKI in Washington was leaving on his trip to Port of Spain (British Trinidad, etc.) the Pan-American Airways examined all of his baggage, saying that regulations required it. The Secretary told them that the Japanese air transport companies might do likewise. To this, the company officials replied that they had no objections.

Trans. 10-20-41

No. 455

FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Tsingtao, Nanking, Shanghai, Tientsin Circular # 2110.

(Part 2 of 3.)

Message to Peking # 564.

Furthermore, there were the following instances relative to Japanese leaving the United States:

1. Early in August when the Heian Maru left Seattle, the American officials submitted the Japanese passengers to physical examination by stripping both men and women to their underwear.

2. Early in August when the Asama Maru left Los Angeles Japanese passengers were stripped of their clothing and submitted to physical examination. Facts relative to this matter and having to do with the United States and Central and South America are, as I have given them above. Both the incidents concerning the passengers boarding the Heian Maru and the Asama Maru occurred immediately following the issuance of the order for freezing of our funds. Following these incidents there have been no instances of Japanese ships leaving American ports. However, at the time some Japanese left San Francisco on September ----- on board the President Taylor they were not submitted to such a physical examination. Furthermore, at the time Japanese evacuees from the Philippine Islands left port on August 18th, on board the French liner "Joffre" no special physical examination was given and the passengers were treated quite leniently.

Trans. 10-20-41

No. 456

FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Tientsin, Peking, Nanking, Shanghai Circular # 2110.

(Part 3 of 3.)

Message to Peking # 564.

It seems that the experiences which the Heian Maru and other ships had was due to the fact that they were not familiar with how the freezing order was applied and also to the fact that there was a rumor of these ships carrying away cash in United States dollars. Furthermore, in view of the fact that recently an understanding was (exchanged ?) between Japan and the United States whereby the two countries mutually agreed not to examine the baggage of evacuating diplomats or to oblige them to submit a list of contents, I think that we had better not do as you suggested; namely, to submit Americans withdrawing from south China to physi-

cal examination (the central military authorities are of the same opinion regarding this point, and they expect to wire their opinion to the Japanese army in South China).

Trans. 10-20-41

No. 457

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 200.

I have been informed that all Japanese under my jurisdiction who reach the Japanese draft age in 1942 must have their registrations in by this November 30th. Since the mails are so uncertain, I am afraid there will be some who will not be able to report in time, but I consider this beyond my control. However, if you know of any steps I can take, please let me know.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 458

FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 663.

Message from Vladivostok # 442, dated Sept. 30.

The American Consul called on me on the 29th. During the course of the conversation, we touched on the question of aid to the Soviet. I made the following statement, "Disregarding the application of a petroleum embargo against us by the United States, don't you think that the supplying of large quantities of the fuel, which we so badly need, to the Soviet is a most unfriendly course of action?"

The Consul replied, "The only American tankers which have come to this port to date are the *Fitzsimmons*, the *Associated*, and the *St. Claire*. There are not more than two or three others scheduled to come to this port in the near future. Furthermore, the date of arrival of these other vessels is uncertain -----. The current negotiations being carried on by England and the United States, with regard to aid for Russia, are viewed to be the firm and fixed national policy by these two powers. In the event that the United States becomes embroiled, foodstuffs and meat products will have to be supplied through Siberia. Aid to Britain and aid for the Soviet through Iran will be diverted to Siberia, first, because of the shortage of vessels and, second, because of the difficulty in dispatching ships to Iran."

He continued talking to me in the same vein.

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 459

FROM: Tokyo October 4, 1941
TO: Washington #636.

Re your #872[a] and #893[b].

1. Please immediately present requests for the money mentioned in lists *a* and *b*. Also please request permits for the living and returning expenses of the Chiefs of the Tourist Bureaus and their staffs in New York and Los Angeles. The above is for your information.

2. I want you please to list the following four men as government officials (please note, however, that the names of YAMAMOTO and HAYAKAWA are not to be included because they could not be called government officials:

(1) GOROO FUKUYAMA, Assistant Professor at the University of Hokkaidō, majoring in forestry, Attaché to the Consulate General in San Francisco.

(2) SHIGERU NISHIO, Assistant Professor at the Tokyo Imperial University, studying engineering at California State College at Berkeley, International House.

(3) KENTARO SHIMIZU, Assistant Professor of Medicine of Tokyo University, Attaché to the Consulate General at Chicago.

These three men are to be paid by the Department of Education.

(4) SHIZUO KAKUTANI, Assistant Professor at the Osaka Imperial University, studying at the Princeton Institute for Higher Study in New Jersey, paid by the Princeton Institute for the Study of Higher Mathematics.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 460

FROM: Seattle (Sato) October 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #138.

Re your message to Washington #631[a].

Since the evacuation of Japanese businessmen from this area, (Vancouver and Portland are included) the number desiring to return has increased by approximately 400 persons.

In the event a ship is dispatched to this port, it is thought likely that the number will increase still further. However, should these additional persons all be sent to San Francisco, a number of difficulties and problems will arise to say nothing of the inconvenience that will be caused. I discussed the question of transporting Japanese now resident in Canada to San Francisco for evacuation purposes with the Chief of the local Immigration Office. He told me that should such a transfer take place permission would have to be secured for transit through the United States from the Central authorities in Washington first and then transported in one group in the custody of immigration officials from the time they crossed the border until they reached their destination. There is no other way that this transport can be handled. As this sort of transfer would be by a train resembling a convict train, there is danger that newspapers might play it up jingoistically.

Should these persons board vessels for their return to Japan at this port and providing you permit, as I suggested in my #132[b], the dispatching of the Heian Maru for this purpose, this office could take care of the actual evacuation with little difficulty. However, the baggage of the

evacuees will more than exceed the capacity of one ship. Therefore, please arrange it so that a second ship, the Hikawa Maru, can be dispatched to this port at as early a date as possible.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-8-41

No. 461

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

October 7, 1941
#642.

Re my #631[a].

We have not had a reply from you since then and this matter of this temporary scheduling of ships demands haste. It is necessary to secure a guarantee from the American government regarding the first ship, the Tatsuta Maru, and those to follow and to notify the prospective passengers and arrange for the departure of the ship. Until this is done it is impossible to arrange a fixed schedule. In view of the scarcity of vessels it is highly improbable that a new schedule can be arranged in case this present schedule cannot be carried out. We can not leave things in this present state of uncertainty so please wire immediately.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-8-41

No. 462

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

October 11, 1941
#925.

Re your #649[a].

I reported this to the State Department on the 10th but the State Department took the attitude as reported in my #812 that until the fundamental problem of national relations was adjusted there was no use trying to reach a settlement of such subsidiary problems. And this matter of trying to arrange for the exchange of special ships to move the freight would only complicate the issue, so I did not bring it up.

Furthermore, in regard to American freight from Manila and also American freight that has been paid for in Shanghai, etc., the State Department stated that they were waiting for a detailed report from Grew. Please get in touch with him and take suitable steps in the matter.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 463

FROM: Tokyo — October 6, 1941
TO: Washington — #639.

Re your #682[a].

The Yokohama Specie Bank's frozen accounts (I do not mean the current accounts. Please refer to my 603[b]) include all accounts held by the bank. When appropriate monthly transfers are made from these funds to diplomatic office funds, permits can be expected in each case. Therefore, insofar as the Yokohama Specie Bank's deposit banks are concerned, permits should be granted to them as well. (Please refer to the points in my #630[b] as well as paragraph 2 and 7 of my #566[b] having to do with the mistaken impression held by the American Embassy in Tokyo as of September 9.) Furthermore, as you are well aware, settlement on this point has for its purpose making more feasible the acquisition and disposition of funds to cover the traveling and living expenses of employees as well as the operating expense accounts of the offices of the other country within the limitation of fixed amounts. This being the case, Japan and the United States together should give special consideration to this question in order to achieve the objectives in mind. Currently, in Japan, in view of the fact that the local National City Bank already virtually has exhausted its funds, we have held conferences with the competent authorities and are having the Yokohama Specie Bank through its branch offices in the United States present a proposal covering the transfer and circulation of Japanese funds as a condition for the consideration of a like sum for the National City Bank. In anticipation of an actual settlement of this matter, should the American authorities take such measures as would indicate that they do not agree with the above objective, I would like to have you request of the State Department that they make definite revisions in the regulations now in force.

---

[a] See III, 449.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 464

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — October 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #902.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Re your #636[a].

It appears that a basic agreement has been established in regard to the reciprocal exemption from this freezing order, however in view of conditions since that time and particularly in view of America's attitude, it is evident that things are not going to go as we desired, namely, that permits for the office expenses and allowances of embassies and consulates would be granted automatically. It appears that the State Department is arguing about the various points concerned even to the amount involved (whether it is large or small). Even though over two weeks have elapsed since the request was made there has as yet been no report concerning it. In the future even though there should be a basic agreement reached its application will not be a simple affair, partly due to the fact that we refused their request in regard to occupied China and also from a general standpoint due to the stiffening of the attitude of the administration to the whole question of regulation of Japanese-American diplomatic relations, and hence

there appears to be no other way than to make application for permit for each separate occasion as it arises. Hence it would be well to make the negotiations for the minimum requirements at this time. From this standpoint we should undertake the revision of the amounts for the so-called government organs, whether they are recognized by the government or not and also of those recognized by the government, and since it would be inexpedient for a delay to occur in the permit for foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates there is no other way than to arrange to have all those whose business has ceased and those who have no further necessity for residing in America return to Japan at once, with the exception only of those who have to remain in America, and to arrange in some way for their fare home.

Also since request cannot be made for those connected with the Tourist Bureau whose business has been suspended, referred to in your caption telegram, and those studying abroad under the Department of Education, (in the future it will be impossible to say that this is a government organ simply giving as a reason that these are government officials), we desire to have the same steps taken regarding them after contact has been made with the departments concerned. And since we wish to make the request for the allotment for the foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates after the departure of the above mentioned persons please bear this in mind and take steps accordingly.

---

*See III, 459.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 465

FROM: New York (Morishima) October 8, 1941
TO: Washington #81.

(Circular) Message to Tokyo as #478.

In the past few days the editor of the locally published "Asia" magazine has been distributing among Japanese in this country and Americans sympathetic with Japan a pamphlet entitled "Hitler Intends to Destroy Japan" written by ALTON PETTENKOFER under the pseudonym of ELSE WEIL. (This is expected to be printed in the November issue of the magazine.)

I think that this is part of the propaganda program of the Committee to Defend America which has been working so assiduously to alienate Japan from Germany.

Relayed to -----.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 466

FROM: Tokyo (WOTNS) (Head, General Affairs Section) October 8, 1941
TO: Washington (RIKUGUN) #272.

When you are in receipt of the installment of the "Army Directory" for March of this year and afterwards, and the "Tables of Organization, Infantry Units" (as advertised on the inside cover of the August issue of the INFANTRY JOURNAL), please forward them.

Trans. 1-16-45

No. 467

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #914.

The money order covering staff salaries for August has just been received, and advice of September's allotment having been sent by cable is also here, but thus far permission has not been granted for payment on either, and we have been compelled to advance salaries out of secret funds on hand in this office. For the payment of these salaries $9000 each month and for travel expenses, wages for people employed by us, and other unavoidable expenses, about $60,000, in cash will need to be paid out by the October pay day. The funds of this office are just about exhausted, and even though the negotiations mentioned in my #848[a] should be successfully concluded, there would be various difficulties connected with the securing of this large amount of cash. Therefore, I wish the accounting section director could arrange to send enough American paper money to cover the October, November, and December salaries of the staff by courier. (If possible by the Tatsuta Maru. We would have Hosida contact him at San Francisco.) Please advise by return dispatch with the amount of money you could actually have sent.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 468

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 16, 1941
TO: Washington #670.

Strictly secret.

Recently, there has been an increase in Japan of demands for United States paper currency and so will you please arrange to have the returning Japanese bring as much as possible of United States paper money instead of sending their money by means of drafts.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 469

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #919.

Re #1206[a] from Berlin to Your Excellency.

While in Buenos Aires on his way home from Europe, Admiral SAKAMAKI told TERASAKI that Germany opened hostilities against Russia without any previous demands or negotiations whatever. Therefore, I put no credence whatever in the intelligence in my #869[b]. That is why I made it a report of secondary importance. However, (a) in case the contents of an intelligence report have a bearing on Japan (my #869[b] is this sort), or (b) in case it is desirable to check the trustworthiness of a spy report, I will hereafter continue to wire you this sort of intelligence report.

Let me point out something to you: For the past several years, not only have astounding reports been circulating, but astounding events have taken place. I mean to say that things which we could not by any manner of human logic foresee, have happened. Who could have

imagined HESS flying to England? Likewise, it would not at all seem logical for Germany to make a brazen attack upon the Soviet without any negotiations. In other words, in this day and time now news is really news, and any report that we get which might correspond to (a) or (b) above, I think ought to be investigated from every angle possible, preposterous as it may seem.

---

[a] Regarding an intelligence report on Germany's attack on the Soviet and a report that RIBBENTROP is operating a spy agency.

[b] An intelligence report which names three demands HITLER made of Russia and states that RIBBENTROP advised HITLER that the destruction of the STALIN regime would be exceedingly simple matter and so had fallen into disfavor with HITLER.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 470

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #916.

From the Financial Official to the Chief of the Exchange Bureau in the Finance Ministry.

Concerning payment for petroleum.

1. We have decided to go back to the proposal for releasing the funds in South America, but because we had at one time rejected this proposal, when Ambassador NOMURA had an interview with the Secretary of State on October 3, he informed the Secretary to that effect. I then returned to New York City and had the three firms get in touch with San Francisco, decided on the quantities assigned to the respective ships, and also the amounts. At the same time, I decided the channel through which the remittances by the Yokohama Specie Bank should be made and then I returned to this city. While I was making preparations to submit an application to the American government, I was surprised to be informed by the Mitsubishi Office in New York yesterday, the 8th, that the licenses for the allotments for that firm and for Asano had been cancelled.

2. Investigation showed that export licenses which had been issued to the Japanese firms prior to the freezing of funds had been cancelled at the time the order was issued, because it was found to be impossible to ship the goods. At that time, allotments for the petroleum in question were likewise affected though the licenses in this particular case were of a different kind from those issued prior to the freezing and were granted on August 21st. It seems that the American authorities, not knowing this, thought that these permits were issued as a result of an oversight in handling such matters. At any rate, I think we had better take suitable measures after first coming to an agreement on the method of payment. I have discussed this matter with the Embassy officials.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 471

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #955.

To the Minister of Finance from the Finance Official.

Re the matter of payment for petroleum and silk thread:

When DE called on the Vice-President and a State Department official the other day, the State Department official is understood to have said, "The reason the Secretary of State is advising temporary postponement of activities in this connection is that we are giving due consideration to the changes taking place in the Japanese Government. As soon as Japan's political situation has crystallized, we will decide immediately upon a course."

Trans. 10-20-41

No. 472

FROM: Washington (UAWRK) October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #201.

In line with instructions from General Staff Headquarters, Major YANO is making an official trip to your place, in order to make preliminary arrangements concerning anti-American espionage.

He leaves Washington by plane tomorrow, the 11th, at 9:00 p.m. and is scheduled to arrive at your place at 12:30 p.m. (Mexico time) on the 12th. He is bringing code books with him.

I leave everything to your discretion.

Note: This appears to be an information copy to Tokyo, since the context apparently refers to the Japanese espionage ring being established in Mexico.

Trans. 3-17-45

No. 473

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 12, 1941
TO: Washington #652.

1. Tatsuta Maru will leave Yokohama October 15th and arrive in Honolulu on 24th same month; leave Honolulu the 25th and arrive San Francisco on the 30th; will leave San Francisco November 2nd.

2. Nitsuta Maru will leave Yokohama October 20th and arrive in Vancouver the 31st and Seattle November 1; will leave Seattle on the 3rd.

3. Tai yō Maru will said from Yokohama October 22nd, arrive at Honolulu November 1st and will leave Honolulu on the 4th.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 474

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #239.

To New York and Chicago (?) as Cir. #237.

(Part 1 of 2.)

We have decided upon the following as our policy with regard to the evacuations of persons who are now waiting for ships to return home at various ports. This decision was reached through conversations with the local N.Y.K. branch manager and the Seattle Branch Manager in line with your message to this office #136[a]. Should you have any suggestions to make or should there be information at hand from other sources that would apply in this matter, please wire me immediately.

1. We are planning to evacuate, through the New York office, Japanese nationals from Chicago and New York, now in the latter city, 130 first-class passengers (of these 40 will go on the Hikawa Maru and 90 on the Tatsuta Maru), 64 second-class passengers (30 of whom will go on the Hikawa Maru and 34 on the Tatsuta Maru), who wish to return home. The 127 persons now resident in Chicago and in touch with the agency there who wish to return home should contact the New York Office.

2. We plan to evacuate 38 first-class passengers, 23 second-class, 200 third-class persons desiring to return to Japan who are now waiting for steamers in Los Angeles and under the jurisdiction of that office. (Should the situation warrant, we could increase the number of persons taken on in Los Angeles by approximately 250.)

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–29–41

No. 475

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #239.

To ----- as Cir. #237.

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. In addition to taking on evacuees from New York, the Hikawa Maru will take on persons desiring to return to Japan, now waiting for steamers in Vancouver, Seattle and Portland and under the jurisdiction of the consular offices in those cities. After these evacuations have been made, should there be any who still remain who might be anxious to return to Japan, we hope that they will contact this office.

4. In addition to those mentioned above, the Tatsuta Maru while in this port will take on employees on the N.Y.K. I would like to have all consular offices who have persons within their jurisdiction wishing to return to Japan contact this office.

5. I believe that it will be perfectly satisfactory to handle the matter of order and procedure of evacuations in accordance with part 5 of the Ambassador's wire to the Foreign Minister #938[a].

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-28-41

No. 476

FROM: Tokyo — October 13, 1941
TO: Washington — #655.

Re your #871[a].

Please wire the State Department's reply by noon of the 14th (Tokyo time).

In case the answer should be further delayed please wire your opinion regarding having those concerned embark on the ships for which special arrangements are being made.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 477

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — October 14, 1941
TO: Washington — #664.

Re your #936[a].

These are people whose reentry permits have expired and who have left wives and children in the United States or who wish to return with their children, and their plight is indeed pitiful; so, if possible, we should like to return them on the present trip to the United States. With this in mind, will you therefore once again plead with the State Department to the following effect and wire me back the results:

(1) Those whose permits expired between July 18th and October 15th (60 of them in the meantime embarked on the Asama Maru but as many were turned away and so there are many who have stayed overtime) could not by any means help it, so we would like to have their permits validated in order that they can return by the next ship. We hope that this special treatment will be granted them.

(2) If such special treatment is possible, they might get visas under Article 4, Clause B, of the Immigration Law but, in any case, we would like to have the American Consul in Tokyo wired that people who come under (1) may have visas without any question.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 478

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #944.

(Extremely Urgent.)

Re your #664[a].

Upon receipt of your message, I made a special trip to the State Department to tell them what it contained. There I was told the following:

"This question, in addition to being a problem most difficult from a legal point of view, has considerable bearing also upon the question of permitting American citizens in Japan to leave the country." (Telephone reports to newspapers have been to the effect that American persons find it necessary to secure nine different permits before they are allowed to leave the country. Because this takes considerable time there are many who wish to return to the United States who are not permitted to board steamers for home.) "Therefore, though they expressed the desire to reach some sort of an arrangement in accordance with expectations they stated that they would have to delay reply until they have discussed the matter with the competent authorities.

"Therefore, I would like to have you go to the trouble of advising me, if you are putting any restriction on American citizens endeavoring to leave the country. Should there be exceptional cases I would like to have you make the manner of handling such cases as brief as possible and also please arrange for as many as possible to board steamers for their home."

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[a] See III, 477.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 479

FROM: Tokyo October 15, 1941
TO: Washington #668.

Re paragraph 2 of your #944[a].

As explained in my Circular #1819[b], the regulations regarding foreigners leaving the country are being applied to all foreigners alike and not merely to Americans only. Particularly at this time when Americans are desirous of utilizing the ships that are being arranged at this time we have talked to the departments concerned about making the red tape as simple as possible along the lines you suggested. However, the Americans who have remained up to the present time will require at least two or three weeks simply to dispose of their effects and make preparations after they have decided to return home, hence, many of them will not be ready for the boat this is being arranged now.

This is a problem that is in no way connected with the leaving the country permit problem. Also, the American Ambassador resident in Tokyo should be fully cognizant of this situation.

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[a] See III, 478.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 480

FROM: Tokyo — October 13, 1941
TO: Washington — # 659.

Re your # 921[a].

The interests of Yugoslavia in Japan have been taken care of by France ever since 1919, but recently we had a note from the British Embassy in Tokyo to the effect that from now on the care of Yugoslav interests will devolve upon the said Embassy. Oral reply was made by the official in charge here that inasmuch as Japan has already recognized the Croatian nation, and does not recognize the existence of the Yugoslav nation, such a representation could not be acknowledged.

You will please make reply accordingly in case any representation is made to you by the Yugoslavian Minister there or by the U.S. Government.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 481

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 945.

Request was made by the State Department on the 14th in an "Oral Statement" regarding fuel oil for heating and hot water for the Tokyo embassy and the Yokohama Consulate General. The Embassy and Consulate General made request for a permit to import this oil, but it was refused. Inasmuch as this concerns the efficiency of the work of the above two offices, the State Department requested that I make telegraphic request to the Japanese government for permit for the immediate importation of said fuel oil. While I realize that it will be difficult to accord special treatment to the American diplomatic establishments only, there is the problem of the supply of bunker oil to the Tatsuta, Hikawa, and Taiyo Maru to consider, and so I request that after due consideration arrangements be made to grant the above permit.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 483

FROM: Washington — October 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 947.

On the 14th, the U.S. War Department announced orders issued to requisition for aid to Russia a shipment of light bombers which the Peruvian government had purchased in Canada, but whose permit for shipment had been withdrawn by the United States.

The above (planes) appear to be 18 Douglas light bombers, for the most part completed two years ago. It is not entirely clear whether these will be shipped directly to Russia, or via England.

Trans. 11–20–41

No. 484

FROM: New York (Morishima) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #481.

Re your #222[a].

AOYAGI is desirous of returning home at once for family reasons, though there is no telegraphic reply to my wire #39[a] regarding his appointed time. Since we are making preparations for his boarding the Tatsuta Maru, I plan to have AOYAGI take the ashes of WATANABE and one suitcase full of WATANABE's personal effects. Kindly arrange for these pieces to be taken through customs.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-27-41

No. 485

FROM: New York (Morishima) October 16, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires, Lisbon Circular #82.

Message to Tokyo #483.

Re message from Rio to you #425[a].

The documents of this office have been sent by Courier KOGA (sailing from San Francisco on September 9 on return to Japan via Shanghai).

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-31-41

No. 486

FROM: Shanghai October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1909.

"WA" report.

I had a secret agent get from the United States Naval wireless station here the original text (in plain text) sent on the 11th by Secretary of State HULL to the Consul General in Shanghai. It is a telegraphic reply to the appeal sent by the American Chamber of Commerce in this city for relaxing the export license system and the control now being exercised over exchange. The gist of it is given in my separate telegram #1910[a].

I have transmitted this message together with the separate wire to Nantai.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 487

FROM: Ankara
TO: Tokyo

October 17, 1941
210 (in 3 parts, complete).

Re your Circular # 2148[a].

While I accede to what you say concerning Japanese-American negotiations, my views, based on the situation obtaining here and other circumstances, may be found at variance, much as it is to be regretted; however, in view of the extreme gravity of the situation I make bold to submit my humble opinion without reflecting on the presumptiousness of it.

1. The gist of what you said may not be entirely clear to me, however as I see it, the head office, by obstructing America's entry into the war through Japanese-American negotiations, is attempting to prevent the spread of the European war to the Far East, which would inevitably result in Japan being forced to participate in the war, and is turning its attention to the carrying out of a national policy which has as its objective the effecting of a solution of the China incident, but is there not danger that this policy may have just the opposite effect at this time, and make Japan's position increasingly more difficult.

2. I realize of course that in order to solve the present crisis and carry out our fixed national policy, it is absolutely essential that first a basis be found for the solution of the China incident. But as you are well aware, the progress of the China incident has shown little advance up to the present. Not only that but unless we change our passive attitude of attempting to avoid friction with England and America by continuing the permit of the existence of foreign concessions and extraterritoriality there is no hope of our ever being able easily to settle the problem. To manifest a further disposition to negotiate with America which has taken decisive action in oppressing Japan through the freezing order and other injustices is to further display our hand, and will result inevitably in the further encirclement of Japan and strengthening of aid to Chiang Kai-Shek, who, strengthened by this, will naturally dream of ultimate victory with the help of Britain and America and we will have to make up our minds that the solution of the incident by our own strength will be more and more difficult.

3. Next, in regard to your desire to hinder America's participation in the war through Japanese-American negotiations and so prevent the spread of the European war to the Far East, I am wondering from my observations here as to whether that is not impossible of realization. I fear that there may be a slight difference of opinion but it goes without saying that it is America that has primarily been the ringleader in the policy of encirclement of Japan in the Orient and of preventing Japan from carrying out her national policy. America recognizes the absolute necessity of aiding England in order to overthrow Germany, hence the basis of her foreign diplomacy is related to the question of the European war, I believe. Therefore, I do not believe it is going too far to say that American participation in the war will be conditioned more by the future trend of the European war itself rather than by the surrender of our rights growing out of the state of Japanese-American relations, as long as we continue to take the present attitude. Especially, if we continue to manifest this apparent desire to cling vainly to Japanese-American negotiations, America will no doubt come to the conclusion that there is no will to fight in Japan, and I do not believe that it is impossible that American attitude toward Germany will eventually stiffen and America will find herself participating in the war. On the one hand I wonder if America's recent drastic steps have not been the result of Japan's attitude. (It appears that Germany and Italy are very displeased. Not only that but I hear frequently the remark that Japan's attitude as viewed from here is that of an enemy.) As a matter of fact if we really have the determination to fight I think it would be best to terminate these negotiations immediately and manifest a resolute attitude.

4. To sum it all up, to continue negotiations with America in view of the situation existing in the world today would not only result in the bringing of incalculable harm to the settlement of the China incident but would have the exactly opposite effect of actually enabling America to participate in the European war ----- (50 groups missing) -----. Moreover, unless we are prepared to make important concessions there is no use to expect big things of Japanese-American negotiations. And it is also very evident that, even though we assume that a certain degree of understanding might be worked out in Japanese-American relations through the exercise of diplomacy, this understanding would be powerless to prevent German-American relations from growing steadily worse and eventually lead to war, and in the event we also would be forced into war from the standpoint of moral principles. ---------- and it cannot but be my most ardent wish that the above negotiations will be terminated and that we will adhere to the spirit of the Tripartite Pact and in harmony with our fixed national policy devote ourselves wholeheartedly to the establishment of the New Order in East Asia.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 488

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) August 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 122.

Chief of Office Routing.

Re your # 65[a].

We encountered considerable difficulty in finding a person to whom we could entrust the diagrams[b] for delivery. We did give a copy of the explanatory notes only to Colonel Yamamoto (Assistant Attaché in Washington) who passed through here en route home during the middle of last month. By the end of this month, we plan to have it, together with findings of subsequent investigations and the diagram, taken out of here. They will be transferred to the Legation in Peru, undoubtedly.

Translator's note: Last sentence garbled—contents guessed at.

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[a] See III, 492.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 489

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) August 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 133.

The six members of the House of Representatives Military Affairs Committee who have been inspecting defenses in Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Antigua, Trinidad, and Georgetown arrived here by plane on the 23rd. They have made arrangements with the high command to spend a week inspecting military defenses, new equipment, condition of progress and fortifications on

both the Atlantic and the Pacific in the Canal Zone, after which they will return via Nicaragua, -----, and Mexico.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 490

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #138.

I completed the presentation of my credentials on the 28th.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 491

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 10, 1941
TO: Panama #72.

You are appointed Minister (?) to Costa Rica in *addition to your present post* (?) as of the 10th.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 492

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) September 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #154.

Re my #119[a].

To be handled in Government Code.

When I arrived here to take up my duties, I found that Consul IZAWA was attending to ----- (in charge of accounts) and Vice Consul HARA to -----. Under the present political circumstances and in view of the advisability of the whole staff working cooperatively for the country, I believe it is necessary to clarify the following points:

1. Are the duties which IZAWA is performing here since he has been sent here to be considered in the same light as duties performed by one who has been formally stationed here? If it is to be so considered, what reason is there for not making him the head of the Consulate? At present IZAWA is responsible for collecting intelligences in the Canal Zone and for making contacts with outsiders. However, since the local officials do not (recognize ?) because of regulations, the qualifications of any official below the rank of a Consul, we find it quite inconvenient in the performance of duties. We need, therefore, to make matters clear to the Panamanian officials and at the same time bring about order within the office.

2. As I understand it, since about 1937 Vice Consul HARA has been chiefly engaged in commercial duties and for this reason he is not supposed to be the head of the Consulate. There is need of deciding who should be held responsible for such duties which are being performed by persons acting instead of HARA, namely such matters as -----. receipt of visa fees and fees connected with sending of telegrams for non-official purposes, which necessitate contact with foreign ----- and foreign persons. Should such duties be performed by someone representing HARA or by IZAWA who is in charge of accounts?

3. Does HARA's appointment to Panama as a Foreign Office official mean that the aforementioned ----- of Commerical Attaché in 1937 has become invalid after HARA -----? If ----- ----- ----- is to be responsible for ----- as well, is there any reason why he should not be placed in charge of both offices as a Vice Consul who had been appointed to his post in Panama?

4. In my opinion it would be well to have IZAWA take up his duties here as suggested in my caption telegram and to have HARA placed in charge only of commercial duties. In consideration of the circumstances described in ----- telegram # 4, I am wiring this for your reference.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 493

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.

Re your # 74.

Before I took up my post MIZUSAWA spoke to me about this matter. However, I do not understand it as having been definitely settled. Are you of the intention of keeping IZAWA here as I have suggested in my # 154[a]? When is ----- NAKAYAMA arriving here? Are you in favor of having HARA attend only to commercial matters? These questions are still not clear to me. NISHIKAWA is not yet eligible to ----- because of his limited linguistic ability. Furthermore, I have received as yet no reply concerning the question of a typist which was dealt with in my # 146[b]. Under the circumstances and in view of the fact that an employee cannot be found here, we need OGAWA because of his knowledge of languages. (He is ?) able to contact the United States and Panamanian authorities just as well as any permanent resident here. For these reasons, to remove from this office at your whim without your wiring me about the aforementioned points and without waiting for my request would, at this critical time, do serious harm in that it would cause confusion of duties which had finally been assigned satisfactorily and the intelligence organization in this office which is operating smoothly. My intention, therefore, is to keep the (personnel ?) unchanged until I have received your reply to the aforementioned points. I would appreciate your wiring me your reply.

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[a] See III, 492.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 494

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) September 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 156.

The Panamanian Government has made the following announcement concerning the ship "Sessa":

1. In August the German Government demanded the withdrawal of Panamanian Consuls from European nations under German occupation. Therefore, the Panamanian Government

issued an order for the withdrawal of its consuls not in the occupied countries only but also in Germany.

2. With regard to the sinking of the Panamanian ship "Sessa", for the purpose of deciding what attitude the Government should take, Panama has ordered its Minister in Washington to investigate whether the attack on this ship was made in belligerent waters or not, since, if it was made in belligerent waters, the Panamanian Government should ignore the question. (According to a presidential order issued on February 19th of this year, the Panamanian Government has declared itself not responsible, but only the shipping company responsible, for any risk taken by a ship of Panamanian registry sailing in belligerent waters of Europe or in belligerent waters of any other part of the world and for the damage suffered in consequence of such action.)

Trans. 9–16–41

No. 495

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 182.

In regard to President ROOSEVELT's announcement concerning the sinking of the *Pink Star*, the *Tribuna* said on the 25th that since the arming of the ships of Panamanian registry would be done at the expense and responsibility of the owners, the Republic of Panama would not be responsible therefor.

Trans. 10–1–41

No. 496

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 162.

(Part 1 of 2.)

The principal points of the conversation which I had with the Foreign Minister yesterday, the 15th are as follows:

1. As to passage of Japanese ships through the Panama Canal, according to a treaty between the United States and Panama, when the United States has declared an emergency and informed Panama to that effect, it becomes a duty of Panama to cooperate with the United States, regardless of what measures the latter takes in the Canal Zone, and Panama cannot offer any objection.

2. The Panamanian Government, attaching much importance to the question of whether or not shipments to Panama and from Panama to Japan will be held up in the Canal Zone, has gotten a promise from the United States Government that no interference will be made in transporting shipments. Therefore, over this point there is no reason for Japan to be concerned.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 497

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #162.

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. With regard to cooperation among the American countries, general principles for their safety were discussed at the Mexico Conference, but no decision was made concerning the detailed steps to be taken in the individual countries. The stationing of the United States troops and the building of bases in Panama have been carried out after consulting the Panamanian Government in each case.

4. It seems that Panama is obliged to cooperate with the United States for the defense of the canal and she is also duty-bound to join the war in case the canal is attacked, but that in case the United States itself enters war, Panama is not obliged to automatically do likewise.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 498

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 20, 1941
TO: Panama #77.

You are assigned to Nicaragua in addition to your other posts as of the 20th.

Trans. 9–24–41

No. 499

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #169.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Since taking office, I have made a special study of the attitude of the United States and also of the nature of the people and topography of this section; and as a result have made the following estimate of the amount of money needed for enlightenment and propaganda purposes. This amount is necessary in making contacts for intelligence purposes, and already some expenditures have been made. I know that this will be "hard to take," but beg of you that you will consider the matter carefully and wire me the result (all per month expenses):

1. (a) Bonuses for officials or spies residing at some distance from the Canal who go at night to observe the movement of warships ---------- $ 70.00
(b) For those who from time to time give warning ---------- 150.00
2. Money to supplement the activities of the Kyōwa Company in this country ---------- $100.00

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. Running expenses of our broadcasting office ---------- 50.00
4. Money for special spies ---------- 50.00
5. To follow the principle of paying well those who try as well as those who accomplish results ---------- 100.00
6. For maintaining contacts with newspaper reporters and other agents ---------- 130.00
7. Costs of making arrangements ---------- 30.00

8. Money for spying in other countries to which I am accredited ---------- 50.00
The above are for the current fiscal year.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 500

FROM: Buenos Aires — September 23, 1941
TO: Panama — Circular # 146.

Buenos Aires to Tokyo # 416.

(Strictly Secret) C.O.R.

When Minister Yamagata[a] was in Panama he was asked by the Italian Minister there to deliver some maps and charts of the Panama Canal Zone for him, which he did. Since then, we had Usui go to Chile to take charge of those maps and upon their arrival here they were delivered to the Italian Ambassador. At the same time, we requested that we be given copies of the maps.

Recently, these copies were delivered to us. (At the time of this delivery, Assistant Attaché Kameda and Usui were present to ascertain that they were exact copies of the originals.) And we entrusted them to our Navy's courier Tatuma who is returning home on the Buenos Aires Maru.

The Italian Ambassador here requests that upon the arrival of these papers in Tokyo, we notify the Italian Government to that effect through (our Embassy in Rome ?).

Minister Yamagata has already advised Chief of Bureau Terasaki regarding this matter. The Navy has also sent a report.

---

[a] Minister to Chile.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 501

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) — September 30, 1941
TO: Washington — # 50.

Message to Tokyo # 180, September 24, 1941.

Since the right of Japanese ships to enter the port of Panama was abolished, Japanese merchants have been unloading their merchandise at Callao. From there the merchandise was supposed to be forwarded to this place, but because of the fact that Callao shipping firms have been told that they must secure permits from the U.S. for all Japanese shipments to Panama, and that if they bring in such cargoes without permits they will not be allowed to leave port, it seems that none of them will undertake the job. This, I believe, is an example of the practice described in my # 175[a].

Relayed to Lima.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 502

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 4, 1941
TO: Panama #83.

1. In case these commercial and industrial restrictions go into effect, some of our people will be able to shift for themselves; others can get along through cooperation; some can turn to agriculture; while others still will have to go to other countries. Please wire me the number of those who will be left over.

2. There will be no way for those bereft of means of support to remain there; so, considering the number and the actual situation there, please also wire me where we can best transplant them.

Trans. 10–18–41

No. 503

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #196.

Re your #83[a]. (Strictly Secret.)

Although negotiations are now going on, the prospects are gloomy; moreover, as there are frightened persons who seize on the present situation as an excuse to return to Japan, I will cable promptly.

[a] See III, 502.

Trans. 10–18–41

No. 504

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 8, 1941
TO: Washington #56.

(Message to Tokyo #206.)

In regard to the circumstances back of the present step taken by the Panama Government and especially considering that it has become the subject of discussion in the United States, a certain high government official replied to the official newspaper, "La Tribuna", that the above step definitely was not taken in cooperation with any country and especially not with a certain friendly neighboring country. He said because ships sailing under the Panama flag have repeatedly been the object of attacks, in order to protect the majesty of their flag they were compelled to adopt a firm, unyielding attitude. I send this just for your information.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 505

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #212.

Re my #207[a].

1. According to statements made to me by the official in charge within the Foreign Office, there will be no formal ceremony on the occasion the president assumes his office. It is understood that the diplomatic corps will merely be advised that he has assumed office.

2. The recent change in the political situation, putting aside the question of ulterior motives, on the surface is nothing more than one of the frequent cabinet shakeups typical in Latin-American countries. Neither is the constitutionality of the question given any consideration. Therefore, as soon as is convenient, I would like to dispatch a statement of acknowledgement in the name of the Imperial government. Please wire me your opinions on this matter.

Furthermore, Germany and Italy, too, intend doing the same thing.

3. The new cabinet in its political practice is opposed to the Nationalist principles which have governed the previous cabinets. A statement has been issued to the effect that it will place primary emphasis upon democratic principles and personal freedom and at the same time work in close cooperation with the United States. It seems that it is virtually a puppet in the hands of the United States.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 506

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #483.

By virtue of the regulations calling for the freezing of funds, the unrest brought about within the minds of the people has gradually quieted down and become more peaceful, but because the coming of Japanese ships to this port is gradually ceasing, this unrest has been radically revived. The situation is not helped by the fact that many people have come into Manila from the outlying districts after having previously closed up shop, packed their bags, and applied for passage on the Ganges Maru. The funds in their possession are being dissipated by their enforced stay here. Already there have been 1,000 from Manila and another 700 from Davao who have requested various shipping companies for accommodations for their evacuation. The greater part of these are women and children who have applied for third-class accommodations. The applications for these are allowed to ride. Consequently, much confusion is being brought about. For myself, I am doing all that I can, at every opportunity, to discourage their departure, and though I intend to follow this policy in the future, at the present time the women and children, of course, and others who have no special business here, I believe it advisable to have evacuated at as early a date as possible. Looking at it from the point of view of our relations with the United States, this might act as a deterrent to their policy and, therefore, in my opinion, it will have a good effect. After you have given due consideration to the following, I would like to have you go to the trouble of dispatching ships immediately. Please wire me what results are forthcoming.

1. After the freezing of funds here, I do not anticipate any major question arising from the entry or departure of Moji-bound vessels unless some unforeseen incident occurs in the future.

2. Though an old vessel might be satisfactory, I hope that you will send a passenger ship, especially one which has a large number of third-class accommodations. One plan would be, should the necessity arise, of filling the entire ship with third-class passengers.

3. If you are able to send one or two ships, it might be possible to ferry passengers between the Philippines and Formosa. At any rate, at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you arrange so that as large a number as is convenient can be sent back to Japanese territory.

4. It would seem that there are not a few here who in their inmost hearts would like to return to Japan because of the present situation and the current poor business conditions, who have as yet not applied for passage home. Should you be able to dispatch ships here, evacuations could be arranged immediately for the 1700 persons mentioned above.

5. The use of American or French ships.

Though there are some American and French ships travelling between this port and Shanghai, only the small portion of the people able to purchase first and second-class passage could use these vessels. Furthermore, American and French ships are --

6. For the third-class passengers who are -----, it is understood that the local ----- ----- is at the present time negotiating with the Everett Company for accommodations to Shanghai on the KOLAMBUGAN[a], a vessel of the ----- ten class. As long as Japanese ships cannot be utilized for such transportation, this course is inevitable. Though we are -----, should it be at all possible, I would like to have you instruct a Japanese vessel to stop at this port. Furthermore, should you have no hopes for the successful conclusion of such negotiations ----- -----.

7. Even after regulations calling for the freezing of funds go into effect with regard to Japanese-Philippine trade, it will be necessary, as I have told you in successive wires, for us to get comprehensive permits. (Please refer to Part 7 of Washington's #588[b] to the Foreign Minister.) We do not anticipate any questions arising with regard to loadings.

I have wired this to Davao.

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[a] English spelling.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 507

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #499.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re your #253[a].

As you are well aware, the attitude of those who have taken up residence here from outlying districts have, on the whole, definitely made up their minds and, in comparison with the Filipinos, are maintaining a calm which is astonishing to Americans and Filipinos alike. However, with regard to the women and children who voluntarily expressed their desire to be evacuated, not only they, but others as well, feel that it is the responsibility of the Imperial Government, even though it may cause inconvenience. Since the forbidding of Japanese passenger ships'

entry into this port has greatly increased their unrest, I would like to have you by every means possible bring about the realization of the requests made in my # 483[b].

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 506.

Trans. 8–12–41

No. 508

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 500 (?).

(*Abstract*)

From the Manila office of the N.Y.K. the Consul General learns of the suspension of overseas shipping. He is concerned about the safety of Japanese in the Philippine Islands in case of war with the United States, especially in view of the inadequacy of the police system. Consequently he urges that ships for the evacuation of Japanese be kept available for prompt use.

Trans. 9–16–41

No. 509

FROM: Manila August 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 505.

While calling on the President on the 10th, Kihara[a] inquired whether unofficial plans had been decided upon as to offering protection to Japanese residents in the Philippine Islands in the event of war between the United States and Japan. If such plans have been drawn up, Kihara said as a feeler, he would appreciate being advised of them for only his own information.

The President replied that the former commander-in-chief GURUNAA, has no influence whatsoever on the High Commissioner. Moreover, the President himself couldn't get along harmoniously with him.

Depending upon the characteristic of the person selected as the commander-in-chief of the Far Eastern forces, Japanese residents may be forced to experience considerable hardships, the President said, adding that that possibility had given him many anxious moments. However, the appointment of MacArthur had dispelled all of his worries, for he knew that they could work in solid harmony.

Of course, if war does actually break out, he and his Cabinet would have to be subordinated to the United States. However, it would still be essential that the United States cooperate with the President, he said.

When he saw MacArthur the other day, the President continued, he brought up the fact that it was imperative that the Philippine Islands, which is shortly to be granted its independence, be permitted to take into consideration the maintaining of friendly relations with various foreign countries, particularly those countries which are in the vicinity. For this reason, the President said he told MacArthur he was particularly interested in giving foreign residents every possible protection.

It is quite possible, he replied, that the United States will deem it to be necessary to place those persons in concentration camps. However, he said, in his own opinion, he thought it

would be better to let the Japanese residents continue to live and work as they had been accustomed to doing, just as long as they caused no trouble.

Kihara, therefore, told the President that both he and the Consul General in Manila had been urging our nationals to remain calm and patient. They will not cause any trouble, as long as they are not subjected to undue pressure. Recently, however, due to U.S. propaganda, the attitude of the general public, particularly of the laboring class, is becoming exceedingly anti-Japanese. Under the present conditions, if war broke out, we cannot guarantee that the residents will not take some measures to defend themselves for reservedness and the Philippine officials alone could not possibly preserve their safety.

In his opinion, Kihara continued, it would be better if the Japanese were not only permitted to, but were actually urged to congregate in school, business, club buildings, etc. for the purpose of facilitating their protection by the Philippine officers.

The President agreed with Kihara saying that such a plan would be mutually beneficial.

He added that though this was a matter which would terminate with the end of the hypothetical war or until such time that the Japanese forces took the area over, there was a need to store about a six months supply of food for these people. He said that he would cooperate to the fullest extent in obtaining this stock. He also added that at the first opportunity he would confer with MacArthur concerning this subject.

Copy of this message cabled to Washington, and another copy sent to Davao.

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[a] Japanese Consul at Manila.

Trans. 8–15–41

No. 510

FROM: Manila — August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 486.

1. There is a connection between the conditions in the Far East, the restriction of Philippine exports and the suspension of the export duties supplement with the American demands. Recently, the question of reviewing Philippine independence has come up in the American Congress. (I am not sending details as they are available to you there.) In connection with this, up to the present time only General AGUINALDO has come out in support of a democratic altruism as expressed formally in ----- newspaper reporters. Not only will the American Government pay not attention to this expression, but the influential politicians here keep a united silence.

2. Several guesses have been made regarding the reason for this political attitude. It was felt that at the time the American demand proposal was accepted there would be a likelihood of postponing Philippine independence. As was expressed in my letter # 549 of May 31st, regarding passage of a resolution guaranteeing Philippine independence, the Philippine Government and Congress were of the feeling that the definite policy of granting Philippine independence in 1946 was a suitable one. (Whether this was an expression of true intention or merely a public promise is another question.) As I told you in # 663 of July 19th, OSMENA[a] has been attacking the resurvey of Philippine independence.

3. According to newspaper comment, no matter what crisis in Philippine economics might occur, it would have no bearing on the question of independence. Philippine political independence is already a "closed" question. It may be said that even though conditions in the Far East are becoming critical, with the coming Philippine independence there is a feeling that conditions will have somehow adjusted themselves by the time actual independence has been reached.

4. Reviewing the conditions at the time of the TA MA Act[b], the United States would have followed the policy of retaining the Philippines if it had been strategically or politically necessary. (In spite of the fact that MCNUTT's speech of July 7th is diametrically contradictory to Philippine independence, American preparations in the Philippines are becoming affected step-by-step and recently propaganda in the form of drawn posters of Philippine-American cooperation having the motto "Keep 'Em Flying!" have appeared in great numbers. This perhaps is an indication of America's attitude.) Recently a member of the United States Congress said that he had heard directly from the President that ERISARUDE[c], a Filipino official in the United States, had expressed that the movement for a Philippine Independence resurvey was gradually becoming stronger in the United States Congress and the American Government. The Military was advocating abandonment of the Philippines because it would be impossible to protect them. He also said there was the possibility that the question of revising Philippine independence would come up in the 1944 American-Philippine Conference which is stipulated in the TA MA Act. I believe it necessary to pay full attention to the attitude of the United States from now on.

Relayed to Tokyo.

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[a] Philippine Vice President.
[b] Probably the Tydings-McDuffie Act.
[c] Kana spelling—possibly ELISALDE.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 511

FROM: Manila — August 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 496.

General Intelligence.

1. There was a fairly strong reaction in the general public opinion here when the agreement with French Indo-China was concluded. In general, however, the people take it for granted that Japanese occupation of Thailand cannot be prevented. The majority seem to be of the opinion that this will take place after about two months. (They base this belief on the assumption that about two months will be required for Japan to solidify her occupation of French Indo-China.)

2. In connection with the above much is being made of British movements in the Far East. These include the reports that Britain has completed construction work and installations of equipment in Burmese airports; British warships being dispatched to Thai waters; strengthening of the British Far Eastern air force with deliveries of U.S. planes, etc.

Though much is being made of Britain's stiffened attitude, it is not generally believed that the U.S. attitude is so strong. For substantiation of this belief, they point to the speedy settlement of the Tutuila incident. (Translator's note: Three lines completely garbled, cannot decipher) ----- general impression.

3. Recently, when he passed through here, a U.S. journalist stated that depending on developments in the French Indo-China incident, war between Japan and the United States was a possibility. However, war may be avoided if the matter is settled in the form of an agreement. Local newspapermen are of the opinion that the same will hold for Thailand.

4. Although there are rumors of hostilities along the north Manchukuan borders, it is generally believed here that the probabilities of these clashes become large scale ones depend greatly upon, (a) developments of the German-Soviet war; (b) amount of assistance given by

Britain and the United States to Chiang Kai-shek; (c) the amount of difficulty encountered in occupying Thailand.

For these reasons, the majority are of the opinion that Japan will not war on the Soviet Union in the very near future.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 512

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo 514.

Re my #509[a].

The following data is for your consideration:

1. *Principal purchase goods:*

a. The tendency is to cut out iron ore, as well as parakare[b] and for the present to stop deals involving other minerals. Thus, great reductions are taking place. Many unfortunate problems are arising. Important people here are gradually being aroused and I think that the fact that they are giving us licenses for iron ore proves that our ships would not be detained. However, if they were, we could use this to make the Filipinos think that the United States is trying to break up our relations with them. This would be a very good trick. If you still wish assurances, I might get important Filipinos to try to obtain them and, in case the United States refused to grant them, we could simply stop trade. In this case we could make it quite clear to the Filipinos that the United States had caused us to stop doing business with them. That would make them angry and do the United States no good. Of course, in case we got this assurance, we would have to be ready to route ships to get the materials. The yearly amount is 900,000 tons which can be bought in monthly installments. We can take care of this much I think so long as no sudden unforeseen financial collapse takes place.

b. *Hemp.*—At present the O.T.C. is withholding permits. It seems that the United States is trying to prevent the export of this commodity to Japan by offering the maximum price. Thus, the market is unstable and deals are at present at a minimum. However, there are quite a few Filipino companies who suspect that the United States will set the maximum price after the bottom has fallen out and they are said to be trying to get permits for exports to Japan. I think that we will get at least as much of it as America shall not consume.

c. Our yearly molasses purchases have amounted to about 15,000 tons. (The present price is 167 pesos per ton, f.o.b.) In fact, we have been their chief molasses consumer. They have an annual exportable amount of 50,000 tons. This is not on the license list. In view of such a surplus, I doubt if the United States will include molasses among quota goods. In any case, we can continue our purchases for the time being. (Still, I think that these deals ought to take place in such a way as to be as inconspicuous as possible.)

2. *Exports to the Philippines:*

Our exports to the Philippines consist of cotton cloth and notions and, to maintain an equilibrium, we have to get a monthly income amounting to about 1,000,000 yen.

3. *Other Matters:*

a. We cannot estimate beforehand just how much money will be involved each month. Of course, both Japan and the Philippines will have temporarily to open the way to circulation of funds. However, if a treaty is concluded on this matter, it would invite the meddling of the United States and cause no end of trouble. I think that the best thing to do would be to get the Philippine National Bank to float securities for checks for our various deals.

b. Now, if it continues that no ships at all are routed hither, the Filipinos may become antipathetic toward us or in the meantime evil American propaganda may do its work so that if we ever do wish to resume our purchases of such things as iron ore, we might find ourselves unable to do so. If you wish, therefore, to maintain trade, send ships immediately to get the iron ore and other quota goods, and endeavor at the same time to get permits to bring in a corresponding amount of our own goods.

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[a] See III, 514.

[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8–16–41

No. 513

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #50–.

According to a report handed me by industrialists here, it is understood that not only Japanese companies making their headquarters here, but also foreign companies with offices in Japan, equally are affected by this regulation. The blow to Japanese companies by England and the United States in this instance is not a trivial one. General permits are being issued to Americans in the conduct of trade between Japan and the Philippine Islands; therefore, I would like to have you arrange to exempt these American companies from the application of this regulation.

Trans. 8–15–41

No. 514

FROM: Manila August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #509.

1. In accordance with our policy of freeing ourselves from the yoke of England and the United States, I understand that we plan to cut down insofar as possible our imports from this country. As a result of the regulation calling for the freezing of funds, Japan-Philippine trade has fallen off to a marked extent. Therefore, at the same time that the Philippines suspended purchases of our goods, we ceased securing supplies from them. It may even become necessary for all trade between Japan and the Philippines to be shut off.

Nevertheless, the Philippines are destined to play a role in the future as one nation within the great Far Eastern sphere of co-prosperity. Therefore, it behooves us to continue into the future relations of economic cooperation with this country. Furthermore, by severing trade relations with them now we stand to lose much of what it has taken years of labor to gain. Our rights, were we able to even measure the losses that will be incurred, such as, for example, by Japanese retailers who will find it extremely difficult to reestablish their positions in the future, can never be regained. Therefore, after you have given due consideration to the following as much as possible, please try to maintain our purchases of Philippine products, and, as a parallel policy to this, I would like to have you grant export permits. Furthermore, please do your very utmost so that we can expect the dispatching of the ships necessary to the carrying on of our trade here.

1. With regard to Philippine-Japanese trade, in spite of the regulation for the freezing of funds, comprehensive permits are obtainable.

2. I believe there is little danger of their seizing our ships.

3. About 600 Japanese retail companies are principally selling our goods. A stoppage in the export of our goods can only result in the closing down of these retail companies. Furthermore, the textile industry looks to Japan for raw materials. Any order calling for the stoppage of this business will endanger the existence of many of our factories.

4. Permits can be secured for the export of iron ore. We have already secured permits on hemp and we have at the present time 24,000 bales which as yet have not been loaded onto ships. No export permits are required on molasses.

5. There is a great danger that our stoppage of purchases of Philippine export quota goods will have a bad effect upon the attitude of the Filipinos toward us.

6. Japan is but a few days distant by sea from the Philippine Islands.

7. Because of Government-imposed restrictions on the quantity of timber to be cut, the lumber industry has been afraid that the Government might withdraw lumber exploitation rights. As a result of this, it is gradually becoming more and more difficult for them to keep going.

Trans. 8–13–41

No. 515

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #511.

As you know, the families of Japanese in residence here can secure permits to send funds to their families in Japan between 200 and 400 pesos. I understand that persons in Japan receiving these drafts from the Philippines must secure permits to receive these sums of money. Therefore, before the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan can make payments on these drafts they must make an investigation as to whether the recipients are relatives of the senders of these drafts. Now, should this method be continued and permits required, it would not only be most inconvenient, but great anxiety will be felt by Japanese resident here for fear that after they have secured permits to send these drafts the recipients will not be able to secure permits to receive them. In view of the small amount of money involved, I would like to have you use your influence so that permits will not be required.

Trans. 8–15–41

No. 516

FROM: Manila August 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #506.

(*Abstract*)

Kihara conferred with "A" and "KE" at this office on the 8th and 10th. The gist of their statements is:

(a) It is necessary to explain that the recent events in the Far East, affecting the Philippine Islands, are finally taking shape, after long postponement.

(b) The situation affects the future of the Islands and the time is ripe for agitation against the "landlords".

(c) Pursuant to the instructions in your telegram, Kihara has made arrangements for regular activities.

Great concern is felt in the Philippines over the international situation and its increased pressure upon them, with increasing complications.

"A" is resigning his post. ARUNAN, Secretary of the Interior, is changing positions. The Japanese Government's policy regarding this case should be determined promptly, and secret instructions issued. In my opinion, we should take a firm position.

Trans. 8–18–41

No. 517

FROM: Tokyo — August 15, 1941
TO: Manila — # 26– (?).

Re your # 506[a].

Please drop negotiations regarding this item for the present and endeavor to maintain the status quo and to have them take a friendly attitude in regard to this case until a solution can be reached on the main problem. Also please do your utmost to continue profitable relations with ARUNAN ----- -----.

Please relay this to Davao.

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[a] See III, 516.

Trans. 8–20–41

No. 518

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — August 16, 1941
TO: Manila — No number.

(Strictly Secret.)

On the 19th, on the occasion of President QUEZON's birthday, we plan to have General RIKARUTE, a political refugee in Japan, discuss in Spanish Japanese-Philippine relations for a ten-minute interval beginning at 10:50 P.M., Japan time, on a South Seas broadcast (wavelength 15166 kcs.). After acquainting yourself with this, make whatever arrangements are possible.

Trans. 8–20–41

No. 519

FROM: Manila (Nihro) — August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 516.

Re your # 256[a].

A great majority of people connected with ----- companies and with mining have already returned to Japan since it became impossible for them to engage in their work. Some others are expecting to sail home in the near future and there are only a few remaining here. The members of the Kinyō Kai[b] here have unanimously voted in favor of sending NAGAO and

others home, partly for the purpose of making a report, and of having them sent out again later when the political situation has become more stable and future prospects more certain. I think, therefore, there is little need of being concerned as to their position in relation to the other members. For the sake of convenience in the matter of steamships, both NAGAO and UYENO will return on board the French steamship "Marshal Joffre" sailing on the 18th. Will you please inform the Association to get a detailed account of the situation from them.

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[a] Not available.
[b] Name of Japanese Association.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 520

FROM: Shanghai — August 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1537.

(Message from Manila # 4) on the 16th.

We have been trying to keep the Japanese residents as calm as possible, but due to recent developments in international relations, there are now many among them, especially women and children, who wish to withdraw. We are not keeping those who wish to withdraw from doing so. Because one Japanese ship after another which touched at this port has been taken off the route, there are as many as 370-odd Japanese who have applied for passage on the French steamer *Marshal Joffre* which is sailing on the 18th. Among these, about 300 are either third or fourth class passengers, and about 200 of this number have no connections in your city. You may easily imagine that they will find it difficult to find enough lodging places while they are waiting for the next ship (because of freezing of funds, they are permitted to carry out no more than 25 pesos), and much as we hate to trouble you with this matter, would you be so kind as to explain to the Japanese resident groups in your city the above state of affairs and ask them to arrange to provide for these passengers lodging facilities in primary schools and other buildings. We would appreciate your also considering reserving staterooms on ships bound for Japan.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 521

FROM: Manila (Nihro) — August 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 538.

Points of interest in a conversation between Salisbury[a] and one of our officials are as follows:

1. With conditions as they are at present no basis seems to have been found for a regulation of the relations between America and Japan. America seems to have no intention of altering its policy for the Orient. America's attitude conveys the impression that there is nothing to do but wait for the impoverishment and ----- of Japan, who is expending all her strength and breaking her spear in French Indo-China and Thailand.

2. It goes without saying that there is great dissatisfaction in this country regarding the aid to Russia program. However America's objective at the present is the destruction of "Naziism" and for this purpose it is necessary for the present to extend aid to Russia but after the overthrow of Germany there will be an immediate change in American-Soviet relations. Attention here is focused on what steps Japan plans to take in regard to American shipment of materials to Russia.

3. ----- "merry-go-round fiasco -----.
4. In case conditions get worse -----.

Note: Paragraphs 3 and 4 too badly garbled to read.

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[a]L. E. Salisbury:—State Department aid to U.S. High Commissioner.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 522

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

August 22, 1941
727 (Message to Manila # 17).

(Urgent)

As you know through my # 543[a] to the Minister, present Japanese-American relations are being handled as political problems, and this is not a simple procedure. Under the present situation which does not allow negotiations for such things as Filipino cotton goods agreements, even though handled by the leading American business men, since there is no hope of my concluding any agreements, I want you to handle the question of formalities for entering the Philippine Islands as you think best.

Relayed to Tokyo.

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[a]Washington says the matter of not permitting Japanese ships to pass through the Panama Canal is purely a political move to bring pressure to bear on Japan. See III, 522A.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 522A

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

July 22, 1941
543.

Washington to Manila as # 014, 19 July.

Re your # 388.

I have urged this matter several times both directly and indirectly through Murchison, but the State Department always has the excuse that no reply has been received from the Philippines. Of later, the State Department seems inclined to regard this seemingly "routing matter", as well as the question of international merchant's visas, as a domestic matter and to have no intentions of finding a solution. (And even in case they do settle it they will drag it out to the very last.)

It is very evident that the matter of not permitting Japanese ships to pass through the Panama Canal, and the putting of our business firms on the "black list", are purely political moves calculated to bring pressure to bear in trying to hold us in restraint. I expect that as apprehension increases over southern advances of our armed forces, the freezing of capital and all kinds of oppressive measures will be undertaken.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 523

FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #539.

The order for freezing of funds has been applied as follows:

1. Investigations of banks are carried on in a very lenient manner. The authorities demanded that the banks submit statements of balance as of present, August 11th. Although they examined the frozen accounts rather minutely; even so they have no objection to doing no more than showing ----- in so far as business amounting to less than 2,000 pesos is concerned. I understand that they were extremely cautious in how they conducted the investigation, fearing that they might interfere with the banking business. They did not bother with frozen accounts of small amounts, but paid attention chiefly to banking business in which 5,000 or more pesos are involved. It seems that they attempted to do nothing more than to ascertain how well the Japanese have applied the order and continued in their businesses.

2. As for remittances necessary for paying family expenses, they have permitted the issuance of comprehensive licenses by applying Rule #32 even in case of frozen funds. I understand that, believing that it would be unjust to classify as "block nationals" those who have visited Japan although they had been living in the Philippine Islands since some time prior to June 17, 1940, they are considering including them among those classified as "general license national." Regarding this matter, the High Commissioner's Office addressed an inquiry in writing to the Yokohama Specie Bank and the ----- Bank as to those Japanese who correspond to this classification. The two banks are now preparing to submit a report in the way of applying for license.

3. They have permitted also operations for selling drafts for the payment of the balance resulting from Japan-Philippine trade, in accordance with Table #64 for comprehensive licensing. As regards also trade carried on without remittances, they have permitted the practice without application for license so long as commercial evidence is submitted. (There is no special regulation governing the form to be used.)

4. They have also said that they had no objection to furnishing money as heretofore for another month to the Japan Associations. They are going to consider anew the question of ----- in this matter, but even in that case they will probably handle it in a lenient way. Regarding the Chambers of Commerce, no special permission is required for payment of money to them if done in the customary manner as they are considered to be a group to which Rule #65 for comprehensive licenses is applicable.

5. They have permitted remittances to newspaper correspondents. (License has already been granted for remitting 2,000 yen to AOKI of the Osaka Mainichi and 1,500 yen to NAKAYAMA of the Domei.) However, the High Commissioner's Office would not allow this to be a permanent license; in other words, they intend to issue licenses from time to time.

6. Heretofore, it has been possible to have Rule #32 for comprehensive licensing applied in case one wished to leave the country and accordingly to carry from 200 to 400 pesos in cash. However, as a temporary measure, it has been decided to allow travellers to carry from today, the 22nd, up to 400 pesos.

7. We have endeavored to be as efficient as possible in applying for licenses and have been able to have licenses granted, except in cases of large sums, within three or four days.

8. In case of Chinese businessmen, the authorities have decided to exempt them from the submission of reports mentioned in (5) of Paragraph 7 and in Paragraph 6 of my telegram #498[a]. I have requested that the same treatment be accorded Japanese businessmen; whereupon they replied that they would consider our request, provided that we notified them of the figures involved by listing the amount involved in each case. I believe that it is difficult to

get them to accord the Japanese the same treatment that they accord the Chinese. However, I also believe that they would consider the question favorably in the case of small businessmen.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-29-41

No. 524

FROM: Manila
TO: Tokyo

September 1, 1941
560.

(*Abstract*)

Referring to my # 506[a] and # 519[b].

Commerical negotiations: Negotiations are being held up during President Quezon's confinement to his home, so that interview with him or Aquino is impossible. The date fixed for putting this agreement into effect will depend upon the convenience of the firms concerned, and the availability of steamers.

The gist of this message was transmitted to Davao.

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[a] See III, 516.
[b] See III, 512.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 525

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Manila

September 6, 1941
285.

Re your # 560[a].

Secret outside the Department.

I think you had better establish contact with the President and the new Secretary ARUNAN with regard to this question since you might have to approach them every time a question comes up or when negotiations lag. Will you, therefore, participate whenever five persons concerned are meeting.

---

[a] See III, 524.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 526

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #565 (?).

A fast ship is arriving for the purpose of loading molasses, but it has become necessary to secure a new export permit. In spite of the fact that today the 1st is an American holiday, and hence it is impossible to see the high commissioner, the merchants are optimistic regarding the permit. Should it prove impossible . . . . wish to continue materials from the Philippines. Furthermore, I will investigate the extent of the lumber and wire.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 527

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #566.

Re my #562[a].

According to information which Philippine dealers are said to have obtained from a source considered to be reliable, a proposal is now under discussion for preventing export by applying the export license system to all goods to be shipped to Japan and French Indo-China.

In hopes of ascertaining to what extent the license system would be applied to lumber, Japanese lumber dealers inquired of NOBLE, the chief export control official, concerning this. He replied that he could not give a definite answer because the details were unknown to him, but he believed that the system will be applied to logs and to all kinds of soft wood. Furthermore, when Philippine firms requested permission for exporting molasses, saying that all arrangements for loading had been completed with the shipment placed in lighters, he gave no definite reply, saying that the matter is now being referred to Washington. I have made a suggestion in my #565[b], but I believe that under the circumstances it would be better to have the Kaisoku Maru wait for awhile. I am sending this much for the present.

---

[a] Not avialble.
[b] See III, 526.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 528

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #567.

Re my #566[a].

I called on WUYIROBII[b] to ascertain the matter. He said that he expected that information concerning items coming under the enlarged scope will be arriving in about a week and that he will not have a clear idea of it until he receives instructions from Washington as to how the system will be applied, but he believes no cancellation will be ordered for items already permitted, barring, of course, that no unforeseen incident breaks out in the meantime. I told him that all preparations had been completed for loading the Kaisoku Maru and requested that permit be issued immediately. However, he did not say whether he would issue a permit or

not, but merely asked that I have the dealers file an application. I believe the information in the first part of my caption telegram is somewhat exaggerated.

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[a] See III, 527.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 529

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #576.

Re my #542, Paragraph A of section 7[a].

According to what I have heard from Japanese who arrived here from Shanghai on the 2nd, I understand that, in the physical examination required for their entrance into this country and other investigations, the authorities were extremely lenient and particularly in the investigation for venereal diseases their leniency was noteworthy.

This is all for the time being.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-9-41

No. 530

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #582.

When Japanese leave this country as a result of legislation for the freezing of funds and laws regulating exports, considerably stringent investigations are made. In addition, upon entry into the country, stringent examinations are conducted. In order that, ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----, we are doing our utmost, and there are definite signs of some improvement. However, on the 2nd, a local English language newspaper made the statement that the officials in Japan and Shanghai were extremely rigorous in their treatment of a group of students sent out by the Philippine Government who recently returned from the United States to their homes in the Philippine Islands. This article evoked the attention of all. As a consequence, there is great fear among Japanese here that it may have a decidedly ill effect upon their treatment of our nationals. Therefore, after you have duly considered the fact that there are a great many more Japanese coming and going from these islands than there are

Americans and Filipinos passing through Japan and Shanghai, I would like to have you make such arrangements for more lenient handling as circumstances may permit.

Furthermore, in regard to the above, should there be anything of which you wish to advise me, please wire.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 531

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #583.

Message to Shanghai #10 (?).

For the Mainichi newspaper in Shanghai to make such statements as appeared in that paper on the 23rd and 28th of last month, to the effect that because of the pressure of American and Philippine authorities Japanese residents here were much incensed and that they are within the limits of loyalty doing what is possible against the American and Philippine authorities, are far from the truth. Then, too, an editorial comment in that paper to the effect that Japanese fishing boats are banned because of the antipathy of the Filipinos and other statements of that kind are far from the truth, causing much embarrassment on the part of Japanese attempting to do business on these Islands.

I would like to have the authorities in Japan exert their best efforts so that such uncalled for statements as these will not be made. I would like to solicit your caution also so that such editorial comments as are described above will not be printed in the papers in Shanghai.

Trans. 9-9-41

No. 532

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #584.

Re my #566[a].

We have been notified of the decision that the loading of molasses will not be permitted. As a consequence, I have demanded WUYIROBII's[b] reconsideration. With regard to their wire to Washington, giving all the circumstances, since a definite reply has been received, there is nothing else for them to do but to wire again. Since this situation is inevitable, please arrange for the Kaisoku Maru's return.

Furthermore, with regard to the iron ore for which export permits have already been arranged, since it is classed as "non -----" WUYIROBII has the authority to cancel these permits, as I told you in my #567[c], but as long as no incidents of major importance break out, I have his word that he will not cancel these. I believe that there is practically no instance when loading has been made impossible. Therefore, I would like to have you exert your best efforts so that a ship will be dispatched at as early a date as possible.

(In spite of the fact that since the institution of the export quota system molasses was included in ----- export, it is not a permit item.)

---

[a] See III, 527.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] See III, 528.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 533

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #589.

Re your #284.

Because of the reasons given in my #584[a], even if the request concerning this matter is submitted to the High Commissioner's office, we could hardly expect that it would do any good; and so we are now making arrangements to have interested Filipinos apply for permission. Even so, I think the possibility of our success is very small because this matter, it seems to me, has to do with the United States' present political and economic policy, and also because it is a usual thing with most Filipinos that they "pull in their necks", so to speak, when the necessity of American-Philippine cooperation is explained to them or when they are asked if they intend to revise the policy of the United States. In case this attempt results in a failure, we are intending to use the incident for propaganda purposes.

---

[a] See III, 532.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 534

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #592.

Re my #589[a].

We tried to get the operators to work on the shippers, but ----- because the British Consul General has been watching the recent increase of exports to Japan, and called the attention of the Americans to the matter of a shortage of fuel, as the refusal of permits is final, we feel it would be out of the question to ask for reconsideration and it seems arrangements are being made for resale, and there is nothing we can do. As there is considerable demand within the islands, I think there is nothing to do but give up the idea, and ----- passed on elsewhere (?).

---

[a] See III, 533.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 535

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo #586.

Re part 4 of my #530[a].

Since many of the Japanese here are feeling concern because they do not know the state of things in Japan due to the fact that they have had no mail from home because of the irregularity of the freighters, please arrange with East Asia Bureau to have mail for here routed by Shanghai. (French ships arrive frequently from Shanghai.) Because mail will go on foreign ships, and also because of what I said in my #435[b] and #542[c], please examine the contents before sending from Japan.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] The Japanese Consul General at Manila reports that conclusive evidence has been produced indicating that the fishing vessels on which some Japanese escaped are at Hainan.

[c] Not available.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 536

FROM: Tokyo September 9, 1941
TO: Manila #289.

Strictly confidential.

Re your #586[a].

The Bureau of Communications is also giving study to the matter of transportation, but according to its investigations the French ships go from Shanghai to Saigon by way of Hongkong and then from there on to Manila and then in order to go to Manila they have to go through inspection in Hongkong, hence, the above route is not a desirable one for us to use. However, please wire us as to whether you know of any French ships sailing directly from Shanghai to Manila or not.

Furthermore, the above bureau is giving consideration at present to the matter of using Japanese ships from Shanghai to Saigon (the round trip is about 20 days) and then using French ships from Saigon to Manila.

---

[a] See III, 535.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 537

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #596.

(Also #591.)

Urgent.

Retransmission of my dispatch of the 11th #591, which was wrongly enciphered.

Regarding #743[a] from Ambassador in Washington to the Foreign Minister.

Subsequently we expected that with the funds on hand we could make out somehow or other for perhaps two months in the expectation that by borrowing as much again as we had from other funds in our custody we could carry on the work of the Consulate General even if the negotiations on this matter continued a long time.

However it now appears that the negotiations will continue for a much longer period than we anticipated, in which case we will not be able to make out. Please wire me the present status of the negotiations.

Furthermore, according to some reports, the branch office in New York of the Tourist Bureau is shortly to be closed. Since the branch here has funds to carry on for not over one month, it is clear that if it is desired to keep these people here indefinitely the Tourist Bureau will have to decide on the means for doing so soon. Please have them wire their decision.

Relayed to Davao.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 538

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #600.

Re the last part of my #558[a].

I had the decision mentioned in my caption telegram passed in order that we may avoid difficulties which might arise from the United States authorities noticing the bustle which would result from competitive activities among the Japanese firms concerned and also in order that we could have the ships dispatched in the most effective way. In accordance with this decision, we have been forbidding the respective firms from wiring to Japan. However, recently there has been rumor to the effect that the Mitsui had secured permission to export without cash remittance and consequently there were firms eagerly requesting that we send a telegram for obtaining a like permission. However, if this is done, it might complicate the question and interfere with well-regulated shipments. Therefore, we would like to have the Government at home adhere to the policy of forming a pool for the firms and to impress this fact firmly upon the interested firms and thus keep them from competing. At the same time, we would like to see appointed one company which would handle the business, as is the case in importing hemp, for all the firms importing lumber and to have the company alone send telegrams. Will you please make arrangements for this purpose and wire an explanatory telegram to the appointed company.

Furthermore, I am sending you the following information concerning this question for your reference.

1. I explained to UYIROBYII[b] that in case of lumber both capital and purchase price will be paid in advance and that according to my understanding no license is required in case of non-remittance exports. To this he replied that the export in question will be covered by a general license.

2. It is not yet clear whether the license system will also be applied to logs. I understand that all papers pertaining to this matter should be in hand by next Monday. However, if the matter is not clarified even then, it was agreed that an inquiry should be wired to the High Commissioner's Office. I will wire you as soon as the matter is decided. Some firms here are receiving telegrams of inquiry from their home offices, but I have forbidden them to reply to them and so will you please arrange to have the contents of this telegram communicated to them in a suitable manner.

3. When a legal advisor to the Mitsui addressed a written question of the same nature to the High Commissioner, he gave an affirmative reply couched in such implicatory words as "but would appear that." It may be that the rumor that the Mitsui had succeeded in obtaining export license refers to this matter. It does not mean that they had actually secured the permission. The fact is that the question of securing license has never had anything to do with this question.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling (may be Willoby ?).

Trans. 9-19-41

No. 539

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #580.

Re my #348[a].

1. Although a local convention was to have been held on the 27th of last month in the "Jyu" election district, on the day previous to its opening, the Governor belonging to the Opposition party, seeing that if the meeting were held "Jyu's" chances would be very good, inadvisedly suspended the Chairman of "Jyu" faction and the supporters of the local convention. This resulted in a controversy. (The "Jyu" faction submitted a protest, with the result that the opposing Governor was suspended by the President.) On the 3rd, it was decided that this election district should not have officially recognized candidates but should be open to free political competitors.

2. YŪRŌ[b] strongly opposed this man's entering the campaign, but KESON[c] raised no objections because of the fact that he had run during the previous year, and rejected, furthermore, on this ground, protests opposing UY's participating in the campaign.

3. An assistant official here reminded him lately about his submitting political information, to which reminder he replied that on account of his preoccupation with the election he had been negligent about the matter but that he would pay more attention to it and would submit a report in writing within the next two or three days.

4. I understand that through KAKIAGE, who had recently returned to Japan, "Jyu" had requested YENOSAWA to have 5,000 pesos raised in his support in case his election district becomes a free competitive district. (I gave the warning to the effect that such a thing is dangerous even if the district was limited to officially recognized candidates.) It seems that there

are about 30,000 to 40,000 pesos which have not yet been handed over. (Since sending my caption telegram, we have expended some money so that he would devote all his energies to the local convention.) It is clear that he will be in need of funds when the election approaches. It seems advisable, therefore, that we should reply that we had received a telegraphic report from YENOSAWA ----- ----- ----- to the effect that it is at present impossible to raise the necessary funds, but that he would somehow try to raise it by the time the election day is very close. Will you, therefore, please get from YENOSAWA necessary information concerning the circumstances and ascertain whether he has any objection to our giving such a reply, and then will you let me know the results by wire.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Probably YULO, Secretary of Dept. of Justice and Chairman of National Assembly.
[c] Manuel Quezon.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 540

FROM: Tokyo — September 13, 1941
TO: Manila — # 294.

Strictly confidential.

Re your # 580[a], paragraph (4).

It appears that a written request has come to Kakiage as a reply from Enoshima to the effect that he has difficulty raising funds now. In addition to that there is no way of making remittance, and also he does not comply with our wishes. There is the expense mentioned in my # 146[b] also and in the future there will be various *candidates (?)* and we do not feel that we can extend any further aid. In view of this please make suitable reply.

---

[a] See III, 539.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-23-41

No. 541

FROM: Manila (Nihro) — September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 608.

On the (4th?) of this month an incident arose in which a Filipino ruffian attempted to kidnap ----- ----- -----, Secretary of the Kō Mon Kai. It appears that the Nationalist Party instigated it. The incident has created a sensation among the Chinese residents. According to spy information, this incident resulted from an attempt on the part of WO SEN SHO, SE YITSU SEI and GI--- NEI GYO, staff members of the local branch of the Nationalist Party, to murder YŌ.[a]

It was found that they had placed on their black list, in addition to YO, PI KAN SHO and KYO SI HOKU, officers of the Tōa Simpōtō (affiliated with the Yo Gon Kai) as well as some fifty members of the Nationalist Party.

Those on the side of the Simpōtō are preparing to retaliate by force and so relations between these two groups are at present very critical. Furthermore, it is reported that the Chinese Consul claims that he is not familiar with the details of the incident.

Relayed to Hongkong. Relayed to Nanking, Shanghai, Amoy, Canton, Taihoku.

---

[a] Kana spelling

Trans. 9–20–41

No. 542

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 22, 1941
TO: Manila #307.

(Message to Saigon #299.)

To Vice-Consul TANI. Referring to the Manila wire #608[a] to the Minister here.

The problem of the conflict between the Ko Mon Society and the Nationalist Party is felt to be a question of greater importance that the differences in the negotiations at Manila. In order to help the Kō Mon Society and to limit the disturbances so that the conflict shall not be aggravated, please wire Manila at once. The main objective of the negotiations is to get control of the Kō Mon Society and to allow them to work out their own ideas.

---

[a] See III, 541.

Trans. 4–8–42

No. 543

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo #615.

Re my #560[a].

On the 17th Alunan[b] advised Morokumo that Aquino[c] is at present away on a trip, but that he had already ----- in regard to the land problem and that having also had instructions privately from the President, he would give us an interview himself. Therefore Kihara, Morokumo and I met him and Alunan stated that on the basis of an understanding ----- he understands that it was agreed that the status quo would be maintained until 1946 when the time arrives when the two countries, Japan and the Philippine Islands, can openly negotiate in regard to the land problem.

Kihara thereupon, for the sake of making it clear, presented a memorandum containing the substance of my #560[d] which explains in brief the understanding regarding the preservation of the status quo that was reached in the interview with the President and Aquino, and at the same time prepares beforehand by soliciting their opinion with regard to the future. Alunan read it carefully, and then said that though he is not very well informed regarding the particulars of the negotiations, he would like to take the memorandum, as he would be seeing the President the next day. We let him take it.

After his meeting with the President on the 18th, Alunan left on urgent business for a trip into the country, but he did telephone Morokumo that there was no reason why Kihara should not return to his post. While there seems to have been no opportunity to inquire as to the results of his interview with the President, Alunan ----- that he confirms the idea of the maintenance of the status quo as per the above statements. Judging from Alunan's manner of conversation it would seem that the President took no exception to the memorandum, and we have therefore decided that Kihara will return to his post, leaving here the 21st.

During his last talk with Kihara and Morokumo the President avoided making it definitely 1946 in the -----, as I already reported. On this point there is a discrepancy in the statements of Alunan and Aquino. However, it was understood that it would be better for us to (not ?) have it plainly specified that it was till 1946, and therefore the stating of it was purposely avoided.

Have relayed this to Davao.

---

[a] See III, 524.
[b] Secretary of the Interior.
[c] Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
[d] See III, 516.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 544

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #627.

Re my #615[a].

ARUNAN[b] who returned on the 22nd reported on the character of the conference with the President and the essential points of the memorandum that he gave to the President on the 18th. At that time, the President replied to the effect that he confirms it.

This has been transmitted to Davao.

---

[a] See III, 543.
[b] Kana spelling. ALUNAN, Secretary of Department of Agriculture and Commerce.

Trans. 9-27-41

No. 545

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 22, 1941
TO: Manila #304.

Re your #615.[a]

It appears that nothing was demanded of them in the way of a written promise giving recognition to the memorandum which was submitted to us; therefore, the mutual agreement is no more than a verbal promise. Although it is not that we have no faith in what ARUNAN[b] or the President have said, in view of the important nature of the question as well as the fact that the settlement will be postponed until 1946, and in the meantime those at present concerned with the question might be changed, and of the fact that even if they do not change, there is a possibility of the Philippine authorities violating this understanding for some reason, and of our

finding ourselves powerless to do anything about it, will you—although we are well aware of the delicate relations existing between the Philippine authorities and the High Commissioner—get from them some secret paper or get ARUNAN's signature on the copy of the memorandum in our possession in order by either means to underwrite the agreement which has been made after a great deal of effort.

---

[a] See III, 543.
[b] ALUNAN, Secretary of the Interior.

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 546

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #609.

Re my #600[a].

Lumber is not included in the recently enlarged list. I was told at the High Commissioner's Office that they think, at least for awhile, the export license system will not be applied to this item. That does not necessarily mean that there is no indication of a possibility of the license being applied without warning and, therefore, I believe ships should not be dispatched all at once but made to come to the Philippines one or two at a time. When you have decided on dispatching ships, since it would be necessary to make arrangements for customs procedure, we would like to have the names of the ships and the date of their arrival wired to the traders in the Philippines as soon as possible.

Furthermore, will you so direct ----- ----- ----- ----- that there will be no exchanging of telegrams between them.

---

[a] See III, 538.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 547

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #624.

Re my #609.[a]

On the 20th, the list of materials not covered by the ----- export control was published by the High Commissioner. The articles in this list in which Japan is interested are as follows:
1. logs, lumber.

Although in Manila some had made application for hemp exports, in all cases no permits have been granted. There has been no change in those to whom permits had already been issued.

---

[a] See III, 546.

Trans. 9-27-41

No. 548

FROM: Manila (Nihro) September 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo #616.

It is only natural that we proceed with the loading of iron ore. However, if it is not decided to send ships here soon there is danger of discouragement. Also, the funds resulting from exports to the Philippines in the past are very plentiful. If these funds are not utilized they will merely serve to increase the frozen funds. Therefore, please arrange to dispatch ships immediately and wire the merchants to that effect.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 549

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 26, 1941
TO: Manila #310.

Soon the *Hakone Maru* (the name to be kept secret) will call there. In connection with assignment of accommodations, determining expenses and preparations to be made, please wire back the number of Japanese withdrawing from your district.

Relay to Davao.

Trans. 9–30–41

No. 550

FROM: Tokyo September 29, 1941
TO: Manila #313.

(Strictly confidential.)

Re your #603[a].

1. I took up the matter of getting an estimate on the Fuyo No. 1 with the authorities of Okinawa province, as a result of which they said there were prospects of selling the ship and accessories for around 29,000 yen. Will there by any objections if I go ahead and dispose of it at that figure?

2. In case I do dispose of it at the above figure, two thirds of the sale price will go to the owners remaining in the Philippines and one third to those who come with the boat. Then should I send 6,000 pesos to the Philippines immediately from the share that the owners there are to receive?

Please wire an answer to both these points.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10–3–41

No. 551

FROM: Tokyo October 7, 1941
TO: Manila #320.

Re your #653[a].

This individual was punished for violation of the exchange control act (collecting dollars in Japan to sell for yen in Shanghai).

Also those punished for the same offense were Raphael Aquino (3000 yen) (a nephew of the former director Aquino); Juan Aquino (300 yen); Riserio KASUTORO (150 yen).

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 552

FROM: Tokyo October 10, 1941
TO: Manila #323.

Request message.

Re #320[a].

Although RAFAEL AKINO requested on the 3rd that his father, GONSARO[b] AKINO, send him 3,000 yen with which to pay his fine, no remittance has been received yet. Consequently, you are requested to immediately find out the circumstances from his father, preferably working through the Japanese Association in the Philippines. Find out the character, etc., of this man, and, as it has been decided that it would be best for his son to return home, suggest that the father advise him to return.

[a] See III, 551.
[b] Kana spelling, perhaps GONZALO.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 553

FROM: Tokyo October 13, 1941
TO: Manila #326.

The new system is to be used entirely for secret messages and not for personal messages.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 554

FROM: Mexico — August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #318.

Request message.

The following is for Taiheiyo Sekiyu (Pacific Petroleum): To company president KUBOTA from OKUMURA (Confidential).

#33.

1. In case manufacturing permits are *not granted* (?), I obtained the understanding of (the) three officials and believe that there is no other way than that to be carried out as mentioned in your #37[a]. In withdrawing from the country, I desire to leave with the other businessmen.

2. There is no way other than *taking the machinery out too* (?). After studying *whether it could be used there* (?), answer immediately.

3. Funds on hand as of the 5th are as follows:

(a)
Money entrusted with the Legation:
In pesos, 1,100,000.
Gold, P23,920.

(b) On hand:
In pesos, 296,573.74.
Gold, P10,000.00.
Dollars, $564.53.
Bank Deposits, P1,000.

Note: Parts of message badly garbled.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8–9–41

No. 555

FROM: Mexico — August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #323.

MEGURIGAMI in Honduras has requested his home office for permission to return home because the outlook for Japanese-Honduras trade is dark indeed, owing to the fund freezing regulations. Although his home office has authorized this, they have wired me in order to find out what my opinions on the subject might be. Now with regard to this matter, please wire me immediately as to whether or not they have had any direct contact with the foreign ministry.

Trans. 8–11–41

No. 556

FROM: Tokyo — August 14, 1941
TO: Mexico — # 180.

Re your 323[a].

The association has gotten in touch with the home office and the commerce office and made all preliminary arrangements.

[a] See III, 555.

Trans. 8-18-41

No. 557

FROM: Mexico — August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 324.

Re my # 300[a] and # 301[b].

1. The Banco de Mexico here has informed us that in order to effect collection of exchange certificates, it may be necessary to obtain permits from the American authorities through the New York Yokohama Specie Bank. Please reply if it is best to make remittances to New York in connection with these collections.

2. It would be extremely inconvenient to obtain separate permits for each of the transactions as would be required by the above. The best arrangement for the telegraphic fund and other bank monies is that given in our caption message. As money on hand is becoming low, please reply immediately, giving your views.

[a] See II, 443.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 558

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) — August 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 325.

Reporting subsequent developments in our campaign for securing Mexican commodities in exchange for rayon, and my own observations, as follows:

(1) This Presidential order is something that was forced upon them by Washington, and very strict watch is being kept on it, and therefore the Mexican government would hardly dare to ease up on it, or to take the teeth out of any part of it so soon after its promulgation.

(2) Consequently the efforts that were secretly being made by the various firms connected with the rayon and mercury business, through their respective channels have all ended in failure, and the maneuvers of the companies are now entering the second stage, where they are beginning to work in the open and with ----- methods, and the ----- articles might be said to be the precursors of this. Since then there have of late been articles running every day in regard to the rayon question, and especially the last day or two when they have been reporting that it has been decided by the rayon textiles dealers to send influential representatives of

their guild to make direct representation to the President, and also to send telegrams to the Senators. (It would be possible for us to get quite a campaign underway, but there is a danger that this might react upon us with unfavorable results, and because of the necessity of thoroughly understanding the actual facts, we are refraining from taking part in it.)

(3) Therefore the question now is, when will the U.S. Government sacrifice civilian or even military necessities in order to supply Mexico's emergency needs. Afterwards we can make our request that the information we have secured be shown to be altogether negated. The U.S. Government formerly promised they would give consideration to this matter, but since then no expression of their intention seems to have been given. When at last it becomes apparent that the U.S. Government does not intend to do anything about it and the present existing stock in Mexico is really exhausted, then the second stage of the campaign mentioned above will bring about a turn in the main question involved.

Relayed to Washington. Washington will please contact New York.

Trans. 8–19–41

No. 559

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) August 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #326.

Re my #325[a].

On the 2nd DOENIYASU called at this office, and told us that the plans (see my #282[b]) for "barter" of rayon and mercury, purportedly as goods already contracted had to a certain extent begun to show hopeful developments, but because of the announcement of American's intentions, these plans now have to be given up. However putting together all the information he has, he thinks that it will be absolutely impossible for America to furnish them rayon, and therefore when the Congress meets on 1 September, he intends to begin his campaign among the Senators. Because of the fact that the Finance Minister stands in a difficult position between the industry and the Presidential order, even though he is an upright gentlemanly person, it would be out of the question for him to "push" the Foreign Minister of this country to risk his position with the United States by neutralizing the Presidential order, so soon after this expression by the United States. Therefore it is his plan to make contacts with the influential Senators to bring about a change in the present situation. But in order to promote a favorable atmosphere for this he would like to have us make an effort to secure export permits for at least some of the rayon already contracted for.

(2) Following this on the 5th DO called again, accompanied by Senator OSORUNIONYEI (Chairman of the former session) and GURIYA (Chairman of the Committee of the Administrative section of the Senate ?) and made a similar suggestion as the above.

(3) I told him we very much desire to do all we can in this direction, and that we would give study to the matter of export permits for goods already contracted for, but that (a) the 3000 boxes on the Heiyo Maru should be enough by way of a "gesture" from Japan, (b) to increase the "stock" of rayon at this time might possibly have adverse results, and (c) that I understand that the Japanese government has the impression that the said Presidential order was promulgated because of external forces, and that, if this should be true, then unless it be made clear that the granting of a permit for the export of already contracted goods, shall have

a bearing on this "key point" and contribute toward the solution of the problem, it would be difficult to influence the attitude of the Japanese government.

---

[a] See III, 558.
[b] See II, 434.

Trans. 8–20–41

No. 560

FROM: Mexico (Miura) August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #327.

Re your #142[a].

The lowering of the price for Japanese full width artificial silk can be used as a forceful tool in future trade treaties. We have now adopted a policy of waiting for a proper opportunity. With reference to my #325[b], at present our problem is not one of price. Please keep this in mind.

---

[a] See II, 441.
[b] See III, 558.

Trans. 8–14–41

No. 561

FROM: Mexico August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #328.

Re your #148[a].

1. As brought out in our #325, there is no question of price in relation to the persons concerned and manners of carrying out the bartering of artificial silk for fluorspar, but it is a problem of becoming stuck on the fundamental question.

2. Although TSURU[b] appears to have been making arrangements for barter of artificial silk for fluorspar through influential circles after the Presidential Order, he asked me concerning a plan and he agreed with my explanation of the foregoing. TSURU, on the 5th, in finding out exactly the position of the President and the Economic Minister through a person close to the President, General BANIEROSU[c], received the reply that any movement whatsoever at this time would be futile and that one should wait for an opportune moment. This report is confirmation of my previous conjecture.

3. TSURU feels that the Japanese Government should give due consideration to the materials to be requested if conditions should change, giving possibility of success. I also explained that I did not believe the offering of artificial silk to be a proper counterpoise for the furnishing of shipping facilities, together with suitable prices in the purchase of fluorspar in satisfactory amounts.

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[a] Not available.
[b] A well-known leader in Japanese oil, mining, construction and other enterprises in Mexico; apparently he is now in Japan.
[c] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8–18–41

No. 562

FROM: Mexico
TO: Tokyo

August 12, 1941
329.

Re my # 328[a].

I believe that TSURU's plan and that of guaranteeing the fluorspar mines through action of the Fluorspar Association in Japan, are related to your # 148[b]. There should be a reserve of fluorspar accumulated here to be sent to the Association as soon as the Presidential Order is lifted. It may be said that the Government should permit the monopoly of certain amounts of artificial silk in order to "cover" the investments in these mines up to the present time (as well as the expense necessary to protect the rights in same).[c]

TSURU's plan of exporting fluorspar and mica came to a standstill with the proclamation of the Presidential Order. Now, as the petroleum industry shows a dark future, it should also receive attention because of its critical state. In any case, it is desirable that we follow the policy of giving it aid. You realize that artificial silk is the only instrument we have in guaranteeing acquisition of Mexican materials. All this is nothing more than a control put into effect to alleviate the critical conditions occurring during the first part of the year and I must be definitely opposed to any breakdown of the present artificial silk control as is suggested by TSURU. Please give this your careful consideration.

---

[a] See III, 561.
[b] Not available.
[c] It is not plain which Government is referred to or whether this monopoly would be in the hands of TSURU or not.

Trans. 8–18–41

No. 563

FROM: Mexico (Miura)
TO: Tokyo

August 12, 1941
331.

(Request Message.)

To the Heiyo Sekiyu (Pacific Petroleum) as follows:
34.
To President KUBOTA from OKUMURA. (Confidential)

Referring to your # 22[a].

As the Rakuyo Maru is not touching port, and it appears that no ships for the time being will be assigned to these routes, and considering the fact that it may be impossible to evacuate, the procedure as given in # 32 will be followed.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8–14–41

No. 564

FROM: Tokyo — August 15, 1941
TO: Mexico — # 151.

Re your # 318[a].

It is recognized that it will be absolutely necessary to discontinue operations and contact has been made with the military and naval officers, so please carry out the following steps under the direction of Okumura. (We have contacted the heads of the various departments concerned.)

1. ----- (missed).

(Please wire your opinion as to the amount of money necessary to finance this.)

2. In regard to the evacuation of the staff we recognize the judgment of the three officials there.

3. The return of all machinery for mining and well drilling. (We will wire later about shipping space for this.)

4. The order of importance in shipping:

(1) GAN PAAFUOREETAA[b].

(2) All physical mining equipment.

(3) ----- (garbled).

(4) Tanks and pipe.

((1) and (2) are absolutely necessary. (3) comes next. If there is sufficient shipping space send (4) also.)

5. Funds for this will be sent to the Minister. (Please investigate the possibilities of remitting funds to the various Central and South American countries and wire results.)

---

[a] See III, 554.

[b] Probably Kana for "gun perforator", or pneumatic drill.

Trans. 8-18-41

No. 565

FROM: Tokyo — August 15, 1941
TO: Mexico City — # 153.

Request message. From Pacific Petroleum Co. to Okumura, as follows:

47. The Foreign Minister has already sent instructions by cable to Minister Miura in regard to arranging the business of this firm, and you will confer with the three officials and carry out the said decisions strictly.

(1) Place all moneys on hand in the care of the Legation at once.

(2) When it comes to evacuating you will of course consult with the three officials in regard to arrangements. Also have a good understanding with Tsuru and ARUMASAN and after studying carefully the items and the terms that this company ought to take care of please cable at once. We will cable further such items as may occur to us.

Trans. 8-19-41

No. 566

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Mexico City

August 15, 1941
161.

Re my # 154[a].

Please arrange to have the following loaded on the Azuma Maru inasmuch as it is a request from the chief of the Fuel Bureau. (This has been taken up with the Navy and it has been arranged to change the schedule so as to have the said ship leave Yokohama September 5th and arrive in Manzanillo on the 24th.)

1. (A) One machine for drilling at an angle (with instructions for its use).
   (B) One tractor.
   (C) One caterpillar.
   (D) Powder for the gun perforator.
2. Also please arrange to purchase through the local branch office the following parts for the No. 145 WAUKSHA multi-fuel engine, Diesel engine, purchased previously from America by the Imperial Petroleum Co., for well drilling and if possible arrange to have them also loaded on the Azuma Maru. (This has been taken up with the Pacific Petroleum head office.)

2 governors.
1 carburetor.
2 magnetos.
30 ignition plugs.

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[a] See III, 567.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 567

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Mexico

August 20, 1941
154.

Re part 3 of our # 151[a].

It is planned to send the Azuma Maru chartered from the Nippon Yusen Kaisha which is to sail from Yokohama on the 28th (to arrive at Manzanillo September 15th). Please arrange for the loading on this ship of the mining machinery and gan paafuoreetaa[b] mentioned in part 4 of our caption message. Also, in as far as you are possible, as the Navy has consented, load the important part of the well-drilling machinery also.

For your information, the Japanese Government considers this boat to be in official use but other countries regard it as an ordinary commercial vessel.

---

[a] See III, 564.
[b] Probably Kana spelling for "gun perforator" or pneumatic drill.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 568

FROM: Mexico City — August 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #338.

Your instructions in your #151[a] received.

I conferred with the two attachés and Okumura and then called in Tsuru and told him of the purport of the instructions. As a result Tsuru on the 20th submitted a counter-proposal to a meeting of the directors of the Mexican companies, as contained in my separate message #339[b]. However, we soon after this received your message #154[c] and we again called together those concerned and it was agreed that the original proposition outlined in my #340[d] should be conveyed to the central authorities.

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[a] See III, 564.
[b] See III, 569.
[c] See III, 567.
[d] See III, 570.

Trans. 9-6-41

No. 569

FROM: Mexico City — August 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #339 (Separate Message).

The gist of the counter-proposal of the Mexican firms.

(1) The Pacific Company's main office will continue their actual prospecting as at present, on the principle of live-and-let-live which is the basic idea of the permanent developments being undertaken together with the Mexican firms, and the machinery on the ground will remain as it is.

(2) Drilling will be carried out as planned as soon as drilling permits are issued.

(3) The Mexican firms will carry the expense of maintenance of the mining lots, and also all expenses connected with the Mexican firms. (983,000 pesos annually.)

(4) In regard to the funds now held on the ground by the Pacific Company, even if worse comes to worst (and the Legation is evacuated) the custody of the funds will not be turned over.

Trans. 9-6-41

No. 570

FROM: Mexico City — August 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #340 (Separate Message).

Original proposal.

(1) The Mexican firms will carry out Articles 3 and 4 of the counter-proposals.

(2) The Pacific Company will continue prospecting on a minimum limits scale, and bear the expense thereof. (Practically speaking of the three prospecting areas work on only one will

be continued, and some way will be worked out for meeting the monthly expense of 15,000 pesos needed for it.)

(3) The Pacific Company's set-up on the grounds now, will be continued as is. (This does not apply to the office staff and their families.)

(4) Of the "gun perforator" and other prospecting equipment, all but that involved in (2) above will be shipped to Japan. (In regard to all items from (3) of paragraph 4 of #151[a], the approval of the naval authorities is requested.) As it would be unfortunate to let the excellent technicians go, an effort will be made to use them in Japan as far as possible.

(5) The Mexican companies will try again to secure operating permits.

(6) The Mexican companies will do their utmost to collect guarantee funds for the purchase of petroleum.

(7) After the operating permits have been secured, the two companies will confer together and determine the time for beginning operations, taking all circumstances into consideration.

In case the guarantee funds of Article 6 are collected, operations can be begun regardless of the preceding Article.

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[a] See III, 564.

Trans. 9-6-41

No. 571

FROM: Mexico City — August 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #341.

Re my #339[a], paragraph 3.

The Mexican merchants estimated yearly budget is as follows: (Unit is peso):

Mining area maintenance expense,	657,000
Rayon expense	181,000
Office and miscellaneous,	24,000
Secret expense,	120,000
Emergency,	983,000.

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[a] See III, 569.

Trans. 9-6-41

No. 572

FROM: Tokyo — August 30, 1941
TO: Mexico — #163.

Re your #338[a].

1. As far as we here are concerned, there is no room for reconsideration.

2. The Pacific Petroleum Company has temporarily stopped operations. Because a far too large a sum of money is required for the preservation of the company's rights, (According to current calculations, an annual allotment of $30,000 is possible. With regard to the arrangements for mining; sums of money for this work have been further reduced.) to the extent that the money on hand will permit, we would like to have you watch the development of the situ-

ation and try to preserve such rights as are possible. Regarding the loading of mining equipment and nationals to be evacuated, please immediately take the steps in accordance with the instructions contained in my #151[b] and #154[c]. (We have already conferred with the competent chiefs.)

[a] See III, 568.
[b] See III, 564.
[c] See III, 567.

Trans. 9-2-41

No. 573

FROM: Mexico (Miura) August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #342.

Re my #274[a] and your #131[b].

I heard from the NYK branch office here that the Akagi Maru is scheduled to stop at Manzanillo on September 13. As you know, this ship left that port on July 17 after the Presidential order for embargo had been issued on July 15. I would like to have you so arrange that this ship will not return to this country since it would be bad, indeed, considering the present situation, if on arriving at the said port, a dispute should arise because of the Mexican Government on some pretext forbidding unloading or the sailing of the ship.

This matter has already been discussed with the Naval Attaché.

[a] Not available.
[b] See II, 428.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 574

FROM: Mexico City September 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #351.

To the head office of the Pacific Petroleum Co.

Funds on hand in August,

Deposited with the Legation	1,105,000.00
Deposited in the bank	1,000.00
On hand	3,769.76
	1,109,769.76

In addition to this, we have gold (held by the Consulate to the amount of P91,870.00 and also $4,000 American dollars, held by the Consular and $1,072.00 on hand.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 575

FROM: Tokyo September 2, 1941
TO: Mexico # 165.

Re your # 347[a].

1. Because of the strict control followed out by the Ministry of Finance together with the freezing order of the United States, there will be a delay in the remittance of salary expense after the second period. We are not neglecting to study the methods to be used in making remittances to you after this freezing order. The matter mentioned in your # 257[b] is being gradually worked out as explained in your # 164[c]. It has become possible to make direct remittances at this time.

2. As the suddenness of the American freezing order prevents remittances from the home country you may either use the special secret fund now being kept at your office or properly make temporary expenditures from the funds kept there. I do not believe that you will be in straitened circumstances because of a delay of a month or two in remittances.

3. Please telegraph which method you follow.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See II, 423.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 576

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 354.

(In 3 parts—complete.)

(1) Thus far I have had no hint from you as to what is being done about the shipment of rayon on the Azuma Maru, although it is a long time since you expressed your approval of it, and it seems that you are now following the policy of advancing with your head covered with a towel. But in what way do you expect me to cover my head here on the scene?

(2) At present the great problem confronting the industrial world of this country is none other than the rayon problem. If at such a time, suddenly, without any previous word, a cargo should arrive on a special ship (the Mexicans would realize that it is not of the regular liners), what kind of a "sensation" would be created in this country, and what kind of surmises would naturally be started, and then, if unfortunately, the actual facts should be brought to light, how do you think we would be able to meet the situation?

(3) If there should be an announcement by the Mexican officials regarding the securing of rayon from the United States, Japan would immediately become the butt of ridicule, with such puerile observations as that Japan's bluff had been called, which, of course, would mean loss of prestige to our country. And, it would also follow that the Mexican officials and people would again come to entertain great suspicion regarding this matter. If you think they will not associate this unusual shipment of rayon with the thought of a method of paying for mercury, you are mistaken. And, if through one foolish move our scheme should become known, it would bring disgrace upon our country before the whole world, and be an irreparable calamity.

(4) It is well understood by everyone under the sun, that exports of rayon to this country require the recommendation of the Japanese Minister and permission of the Japanese Government, and, therefore, no matter how much the business authorities in the Foreign Office in

Tokyo try to cover their heads with a towel, it will literally be (as the proverb has it) hiding the head with the buttocks out, as the action will be looked upon as the action of the Japanese Government by practically all.

(5) For the Navy to think this can be carried out as a commercial deal by civilian business firms, with the Foreign Office taking a non-cognizant attitude, or to try to be ready with a solution to the situation, is merely to harbor a hallucination that is born of ignorance. But, that is no reason why the Foreign Office business authorities who understand the situation, should blindly submit instead of trying to correct the serious lack of understanding on the part of the Navy officials. Frankly, one cannot but doubt their sincerity.

(6) In this present time of extreme emergency, even I am well aware that the Foreign Office must cooperate with the military, and thus far I have been doing my best (little though that is) to do this, which fact the Naval authorities well know. However, even among military essentials, there are major and minor items, less important and more important, as well as circumstances to remember, and when the plans of the military are wrong, due to a lack of necessary understanding, it is not genuine cooperation to merely shut one's eyes to ways that the world knows are right and agree with the military.

(7) In other words, this scheme for securing materials involves some danger, but if it is worth taking a "chance", it should be done in such a way that the government can assume the attitude that it knew nothing of it, in case worse comes to worst; and it is absolutely imperative that any procedure be avoided that would make it evident that the government was responsible for it. The Navy people say "any results arising from future dealings will have to be taken care of by the Foreign Office officials at the time, and the Foreign Office understands this." This might be possible in the former instance, but in the latter it is impossible.

(8) This plan is naturally a very dangerous one to carry out, and as it is absolutely impossible to say whether it will succeed or not, and, therefore, whether or not it can be continued in the future, it is much more important now that every effort be made to assure its safe execution, than for us to provide funds today for the future, and I must say that the idea of employing such an extraordinary method and then of using the same vessel to ship rayon seems to me the height of folly. Please read carefully secret messages 271, 176, and 279 from the Naval Attache at this office, and give this matter further consideration.

(9) If just one misstep is taken in such a plan, it might well give rise to international complications that would seriously affect the prestige of the Empire, and also break down the basic policies thus far maintained by the Empire. It is beyond my power to comprehend why in such an important matter, no inquiry has been made concerning actual conditions here and the opinions of those on the ground, why not once has any information been given to me, the one who bears the responsibility in this place, and why I am put in the position of having to take action based upon a dispatch sent to the Naval Attache who is under my direction. I earnestly request a clear explanation from Your Excellency, the Foreign Minister.

(10) Moreover, if in the face of my sincere counsel, the original plan is insisted upon and carried out, I will resign with a good grace from the standpoint of the honour of my country, and I request that you immediately order my return home.

Trans. 9-9-41

No. 577

FROM: Mexico City — September 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #357.

Re your #167[a].

Conditions have greatly changed from the time of the request of my #257[b] to the proclamation of the Presidential order of today. And not only that, but as I just reported in my #354[c], the making of the arrangements necessary to dispatch officials to a government which at this time is keeping the development of our machinations under observation would be too conspicuous. And worse than that, there is danger that it would unnecessarily arouse suspicions in this government which is very carefully scrutinizing our movements. Therefore, I wish to defer action on this item at least until some favorable opportunity following the outworking of the above policy.

I have conferred with the Naval Attaché regarding this.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See II, 423.
[c] See III, 576.

Trans. 9–11–41

No. 578

FROM: Tokyo — September 6, 1941
TO: Mexico — #171.

Separate wire.

1. Japan is lifting the ban on exports of artificial silk and is guaranteeing Mexico a minimum supply of 10,000 boxes for the next six months.

2. Mexico is allowing us the various accommodations necessary for our ships at the three ports of Manzanillo[a], Acapulco[a], and Saline Cruz[a], and is providing us with 30,000 tons of fuel oil for the next six months. Six months after the enforcement of this agreement, parties from both the Japanese and the Mexican Governments will confer on the continuation of this agreement.

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[a] Ports on the southern coast of Mexico.

Trans. 9–9–41

No. 579

FROM: Tokyo September 6, 1941
TO: Mexico #170.

1. On the 5th, the Mexican Minister called on the Chief of the Trade Bureau and, saying that he was speaking under instructions from his home government, proposed that Japan ship rayon, which Mexico needs at present, as far as Manzanillo in Japanese ships, and that Mexico in exchange supply fuel oil to these ships. He asked that for the time being Japan supply Mexico with 2,000,000 kilos of rayon thread.

2. With regard to this question, toward the end of last August, a member of the Mexican Ministry made an informal proposal to the officer in charge of the matter. Although it is true that Japan has revoked the order for controlling trade in order to counter Mexico's anti-Japanese pressure and, as a result, export of rayon silk to Mexico is at present forbidden, in view of the fact that we are pressed with the need of dissolving the difficulty we are experiencing in getting oil for our ships assigned to Central and South America and are having an indescribably hard time in purchasing fuel oil, and also in consideration of the fact that this negotiation would help us to attain our purpose and may even contribute toward lessening Mexico's pressure against us, we have decided to take up the discussion of this matter. With this in mind, the proposal contained in the separate telegram #171[a] was drawn up. In response to the formal proposal submitted by the aforementioned Mexican Minister, we gave him some idea of this proposal; whereupon the Minister remarked that although to him, personally, the proposal seems quite appropriate, he would, first of all, seek instruction from his government and will submit a reply one way or the other based on the instructions.

I understand, furthermore, that the said Minister said that because of Mexico's relations with the United States, he would like to come to an agreement on this matter quickly before any interference is made.

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[a] See III, 578.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 580

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) September 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #359.

Re your message Nos. 172[a] and 173[a].

1. We are fully cognizant of the fact that under present world conditions, the adoption of some extraordinary measures with regard to this matter, may be quite unavoidable. Hence, it should be obvious that we are not unconditionally opposed to them. The content of the two messages referred to in the heading of this message shows some indications that you misunderstood us on this point.

2. As a matter of fact, I merely enlarged upon your suggestions, in my message to you. At the same time, I suggested that you avoid making any shipments of rayon in such a manner as to bring about a disaster in the event of an unfortunate crisis.

According to your message #170[b], a barter transaction between rayon and petroleum will shortly be agreed upon. We are of the opinion that it would be to our interest all around if rayon shipments were made subsequent to the signing of said agreement.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 579.

Trans. 9–12–41

No. 581

FROM: Mexico City
TO: Tokyo

September 9, 1941
#360.

(*Abstract*)

Mexican Government announces it will demand that diplomatic parcel post be opened in the presence of customs officials whenever it deems that it be necessary. Explains that it is not intended to be a means of applying the pressure on Axis nations.

Trans. 9–13–41

No. 582

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Mexico City

September 13, 1941
#177.

Re your #360[a].

It should be considered objectionable from the point of view of our international relations alone.

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[a] See III, 581.

Trans. 9–15–41

No. 583

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Mexico

September 10, 1941
#174.

There are no objections to granting visas for entering Japan to the below-named five Germans:

ARTHUR JESST	50 years old
PAUL MAX WEBER	31 years old
CARL MEINSHAUSEN	43 years old
HASSO (?) OPITG (?)	37 years old
FRANZ MIGHEL	40 years old

As they wish to leave Manzanillo the 16th on the Heiyo Maru, please accord them such assistance as you see fit.

Trans. 9–16–41

No. 584

FROM: Mexico City — September 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #366.

(1) On the 12th the chief of the political affairs section told a member of our staff who had called in response to the request of the section chief, that on the instructions of the Foreign Minister they would like to secure visas and the cooperation of Japan for passage on the Heiyo Maru for five Germans whom they wish to deport, but that they could hardly divulge the names of the five until the consent of Japan has been secured.

(2) Inasmuch as it would be necessary for us to insure against propaganda being made of the fact that Japan had cooperated in the banishment of these persons, we secretly got into touch with the German officials, and then on the same afternoon had our staff members make reply to the section chief, to the effect that in granting visas for subjects of belligerent nations to go to Japan it is necessary in each case to first seek instructions, that in regard to this request of Mexico's for our cooperation too it would be necessary to seek instructions from our home government, and that we would like to be advised of the names and the reasons for deportation by the evening of the 12th, otherwise instructions would not reach us in time for the departure of the Heiyo Maru. After the section chief had conferred with the Foreign Minister he said they would inform us of the names, etc., in strict confidence. However, though it is now the 13th no further information has been received.

(3) The German Legation people say they are at a loss to know what this means, unless it is the five persons mentioned in your #174[a]. Judging from the atmosphere around the Foreign Office here, it seems as if they are quite determined in their efforts to get rid of some important personnages, and I am reporting this situation at once for your information.

---

[a] See III, 583.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 585

FROM: Tokyo — September 10, 1941
TO: Mexico — #175.

Courier HARADA MASAYUKI, who is an official, and MORINO MASAYOSHI, who is a special employee, are aboard the Terukawa Maru. They will enter Mexico at Manzanillo. (They expect to arrive toward the end of September.) About one week after their arrival, they will leave for Washington by train going by way of Laredo. Please arrange for them to pass through customs easily. Furthermore, since the documents that they are carrying with them are large, I want a member of your staff to be sent to meet them at Manzanillo.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 586

FROM: Washington — September 15, 1941
TO: Mexico City — # 21.

Re your # 54[a].

Inasmuch as the clearing of customs is involved please wire immediately in detail the schedule of couriers Harada and Morino, as soon as they arrive there.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 587

FROM: Tokyo — September 16, 1941
TO: Mexico — # 180.

Minister WAKASUGI will sail from (Yokohama ?) on board the Terukawa Maru of the Kawasaki Line and arrive at Manzanillo about October 4. After spending the night there, he plans to proceed by plane to Washington by way of Brownsville. I would like to have you make reservations for him on the plane and also send a member of your staff as far as Manzanillo to attend to customs procedure.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 9-19-41

No. 588

FROM: Tokyo — September 13, 1941
TO: Mexico — # 178.

Re your # 359[a].

On conferring with the Naval authorities the following measures have been determined upon, and you will please have this in mind and direct the Naval Attache accordingly, doing your best to see that our objectives are accomplished:

(1) The Azuma Maru will leave on the 14th.

(2) The rayon had already been loaded and as there were reasons why it could hardly be unloaded again, it has been shipped, and we are leaving its disposal on arrival at your end to your good judgment. (If the "barter" arrangements mentioned in my # 170[b] have not been effected by the time the Azuma Maru arrives there, it will be all right to stop this rayon from being unloaded, and send it back.)

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[a] See III, 580.

[b] See III, 579.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 589

FROM: Mexico (Miura) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #369.

(Secret)

The Navy has requested a special liaison man. Please give your approval for official KAIBARA to leave the 22nd on an official trip to Colombia (at Navy expense).

Trans. 9-20-41

No. 590

FROM: Mexico (Miura) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #370.

Re your circular #1906[a].

1. There are no government organizations, news agencies or newspapers receiving (Domei reports) in Mexico.

2. The Domei Office here was receiving its transmission from the San Francisco office in June. This service was offered to the newspapers here and the "Excelsior" printed a good number of the reports but with the cementing of relations between Mexico and the United States publication (of these reports) was discontinued. Because of this the transmission (from San Francisco) has been discontinued since (the beginning of ?) September.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-20-41

No. 591

FROM: Mexico (Miura) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #371.

Re your #151, part 4[a].

1. Regarding the present shipment of the machinery, the Military Attachés, OKUMURA and TSURU, conferred earnestly and decided that due to the fact that the machinery is scattered and that it is now the rainy season shipment would not be easy. Not only this but even brushing aside these difficulties a shipment of all the machinery at one time would not only be conspicuous but would cause undue perturbation among the employees. As a result of great effort the following machines have been shipped here to be sent at one time.

1. Gun Perforator
2. Two Torsion Balances
3. Two Radiometers and two Gishirunii[b]

4. Keishabori[b] machines (inclined-digging machines).

2. However, all of this machinery requires permits for export. Although applications for permits are made at this time it is evident that it will be difficult to obtain them. As Legation property these would pass customs without inspection. The articles under heads 1–3, inclusive, have been packed in wooden boxes weighing (all together) 700 kg. The machinery in item 4 is packed in 10 large and small sized metal boxes and weighs 2½ tons. Because of its dimensions it is quite obvious. Since the presidential order "nerves have become sharpened" regarding export smuggling and the people in this country are suspicious. If this (treatment of the shipments) should leak out it would give rise to a very unexpected problem. As it is impossible in any manner to export this machinery all at one time the conclusion has been reached that there is no other way than to have holders of diplomatic passports take a part of this machinery with them as personal baggage (whenever they leave).

3. It is desired that that part of the coal mining machinery which is to be shipped follow the same procedure. The above described conditions preclude shipments from Tampico[c] of that (machinery ?) mentioned in part 3 of your 4 part caption message. The approval of the Naval Attaché has been given in the preparation of this telegram.

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[a] See III, 564.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] Seaport city, SE Tamaulipas State, Mexico, on Gulf of Mexico.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 592

FROM: Mexico (Miura) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #372.

Re your #161[a].

1. Please refer to our #371[b] regarding the set of Keishabori[c] (inclined-digging-machine).

2. As the caterpillar is of American manufacture the businessmen handling it would be reluctant to sell if it were known that the caterpillar were to be sent to Japan especially if this were known by the United States government which would view their action discreditably. In spite of the efforts of MITSUBUSHI here f.o.b. Manzanillo will not be allowed. Nevertheless the Taiheiyo[c] (Pacific Petroleum Company) insists upon making payment after it has been put on board and does not take responsibility of putting it on board. (They) are expected to assume liability in case it cannot be loaded, or it cannot be shipped if payment and transference does not take place here.

3. The steam engine owned by the Taiheiyo[c] (Pacific Petroleum Company) is not the Martei[c] fuel engine you mention. It could be shipped from Tampico[d] but it is impossible to transport it to Manzanillo and it would be difficult to ship the parts and accessories as you desire. Furthermore, export permits would be necessary for the shipment of this steam engine. Nine times out of ten it would be impossible to obtain such a permit.

The Military Attache has helped with the preparation of this telegram.

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[a] See III, 566.
[b] See III, 591.
[c] Kana spelling.
[d] Seaport city, SE Tamaulipas State, Mexico, on Gulf of Mexico.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 593

FROM: Mexico (Miura) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #373.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re your #179[a].

1. Mitsui was hurriedly making a (cover-up?) contract in view of the possible executive embargo, contracting 580 bottles of mercury on June 5 with Esutaaniya[b] (the company next in importance to Credito Minero). TAKATA of Mitsui and NAGABUCHI reported, on September 8, that as a result of working through RAKOONA[b] of the Upper House in making contact with MAXIMINO CAMACHO, PADILLA, the Foreign Minister, on the 7th of September, approved this export. MAXIMINO CAMACHO demanded 15,000 pesos as remuneration (in payment?). They requested that this be reported to the foreign office and through same to the Mitsui Home Office.

2. Also a few days previously Kato who is negotiating with DOENIASU[b] reported that (see my #282[c]) he believed the consent of MAXIMINO CAMACHO would be obtained in the barter of 20,000 boxes of artificial silk for 10,000 bottles of mercury. (The payment for the mercury would amount to 1,000,000 pesos and the artificial silk would be offered at a 10% discount of the contracted price. It was expected that the price paid for the mercury would be that in effect previous to the embargo order.) He also said that direct negotiations were being made at this time.

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[a] Not available.

[b] Kana spelling.

[c] Mexico wires Tokyo the progress made with regard to negotiations for securing mercury and other materials in exchange for rayon.

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 594

FROM: Mexico (Miura) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #373.

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. Furthermore, I particularly impressed upon Mitsui and KATO that this is to be kept secret. Because it was highly desirable that this plan be successful, they affirmed that from now on they would put out their greatest efforts in this respect. Even though MAXIMINO CAMACHO is backing these two plans there are still doubtful points[a].

a. The plan of Mitsui for importing merchandise (artificial silk, etc.) amounting to only 150,000 pesos, in connection with grade, amount, price, and etc., has no bearing whatsoever upon our concrete agreement.[b] As the executive order upsets this plan it is doubtful that approval will be obtained. We cannot be sure of this as long as collaborating approval is not given by PADILLA, the Foreign Minister.

b. Although an understanding may be reached regarding the Doeniasu[c] plan on the basis of previous contract, it is desired that the purchase of mercury as well as the purchase pay-

ment be entirely in Japanese hands. In addition there is the troublesome point that PADILLA, the Foreign Minister, has given no indication whatsoever whether he will approve this. Anyway, either plan is still immature especially as in any case, due to intermediaries, no pledge can be obtained directly from MAXIMINO CAMACHO. In view of the explanations given concerning the aims of the foreign officials regarding relations with the United States (my #273[d]) Mitsui and Kato both believe that a prudent policy should be adopted. At least a certain balance is being maintained by affecting the understanding with MAXIMINO CAMACHO. One should not try to hurry things up until above-board conversations can be carried out. Mitsui does not believe that this has progressed far enough to warrant telegraphing.

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[a] The translation of this sentence is doubtful due to garbles.

[b] *Translator's note:* This probably refers to the definite proposal made by Japan to exchange artificial silk and mercury. See III, 599.

[c] Kana spelling.

[d] Not available.

Trans. 9–29–41

No. 595

FROM: Mexico (Miura) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #374.

Re my #373[a].

1. The Mitsui representative here has received definite instructions from the home office to work in close collaboration with this Legation in all matters concerning the question of mercury, etc. Contrary to the contents of my caption message the Mitsui representative here has telegraphed the home office through San Francisco and Shanghai. It is requested that you caution, at this time, the home office of Mitsui as well as have them send instructions for their representative to adopt a very prudent attitude as this is a question of national policy and not one of merit to be handled by Mitsui as a company or as individuals. Also, please pass my caption message on to the Navy.

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[a] See III, 593–594.

Trans. 10–1–41

No. 596

FROM: Mexico (Miura) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #375.

Three trunks containing official documents to the home office as well as a sealed package from the Military Attaché were given to the captain of the Heiyō Maru which left Manzanillo on the 18th. Your attention is called to the fact that trunk "A" contains $100,000.00 in American currency (in two paper-wrapped packages) belonging to the German Legation.

These three trunks, after being locked, were securely sealed and entrusted to the captain of the ship.

Trans. 9–23–41

No. 597

FROM: Mexico (Japanese Ambassador) September 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #377.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Mexico is a unique city in that it has been developed by American and other foreign capital, hence the standard of living is above that of the middle class. Particularly do the foreigners ape the American and European standard of living. Hence, the necessities of life with the exception of a very few articles all have to be imported. I think that the allowance for this office as in the past should at least be equivalent to the ordinary European standard. However, since the outbreak of the present war, European imports have been cut off and all the imports necessary for daily living are now the comparatively more expensive American imports. Prices in general have been pushed up by this until at present the staff have found it increasingly difficult to live. Also, since there is no possibility of an exchange allowance, we have to suffer a double distress. The sharp advance of prices in the U.S. occasioned by the scarcity of materials caused by the armament program is immediately reflected in this country. Particularly since the establishment of the American-Mexican treaty in July of this year, Mexican dependence on American economy has become more and more definite and prices have advanced accordingly. The advance at present amounts to 40% or 50%. Viewed from the standpoint of commodities, Mexico has become merely an extension of the U.S. At present, it has become very difficult for the staff to keep up appearances and maintain their prestige. As foreigners, there is very little elasticity in their means of subsistence. It is extremely difficult for them to restrict their living in harmony with the advance in prices of commodities. Nevertheless, in view of the times, it is necessary to consider our authority here in this country, in its relation to America. It is difficult for us to live so miserable an existence. Also, the standard of living for Japanese merchants of all the firms is the same as that of the middle class in New York. It is necessary to keep things in balance. Therefore, I believe that it is absolutely necessary immediately to effect an increase in the allowance of the staff of this office (including all allowances), until it reaches the level, at least, of other diplomatic establishments across the Pacific.

Please take up the discussion of the matter of granting the above increase by some method or other, and wire the conclusion reached.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 598

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 24, 1941
TO: Mexico #191.

Re my #190[a].

Although urgent instructions are expected at any time the Mexican Minister has not received any in connection with this matter, possibly due to the technical study involved. Please go to the Foreign Office Under Secretary and request that urgent instructions be sent. As the Azuma Maru will soon be leaving port please wire any suggestions you may have.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-27-41

No. 599

FROM: Mexico — September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 378.

Re your # 191[a].

I visited the Under Secretary of the Foreign Office on the 21st. I first mentioned that, in accordance with instructions received from the home country, the Mexican Minister in Tokyo had made representations to the Japanese Government regarding the barter of fuel oil for silk. As the Imperial Government had approved this idea, a concrete proposal had been submitted. Since the Mexican Government had made no reply to this, I had received instructions to approach them in order to speed developments. I stated, furthermore, that, according to the explanation given by the Mexican Minister, the general principles of this question had been approved by the Mexican Government but that the delay was caused by the technical study involved. Upon my asking confirmation of this, the Under Secretary said the Minister in Japan had received no instructions to make a barter proposal. This Minister, upon observing the need for silk and, in accordance with the tenor of his instructions had submitted his own proposal, advising the Home Government of his action. After this the Japanese Government had submitted a concrete proposal and as the Mexican Government is making a complete study, no instructions have yet been sent to the Minister in Tokyo to express acceptance or refusal of the general principles involved. He answered that it would not be possible to make a definite decision regarding the general principles until a study of the amount, price and method of payment, etc., had been made as this matter was essentially commercial. Consequently, I told him that I believed there must be a misunderstanding regarding the scope of representations made in this matter. At any rate, the Japanese had accepted the Mexican proposal and submitted a concrete proposal. Furthermore, the Mexican Minister had originally shown interest in settling this proposal and I said I thought the Japanese Government had arrived at a satisfactory settlement. Also, there is the question of shipping facilities. When I told the Under Secretary that a boat already loaded with silk would arrive in Manzanillo during the first part of October and that a settlement of this matter was desired before it reached port, he said the Foreign Office did not have much of an opportunity to arrange the matter on such short notice as the various officials concerned were still studying the question of payment, marketing, production, etc. In view of the conditions, he said he would accelerate study of the problem in order to evolve some sort of a plan in as far as regulations permit and would let me know as soon as possible.

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[a] See III, 598.

Trans. 9-27-41

No. 600

FROM: Mexico City — September 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 379.

Re your # 177[a].

I made inquiry of the Foreign Office and of the diplomatic establishments of the principal nations. The representations made to the diplomatic establishments were all uniform in text, and most of them have already replied. All of the nations have handled it as a simple routine matter. The Germans reported it to the home government. The Italians and most of the others

merely replied that they have received it, but not one has protested. This is a matter that is already being enforced as an emergency measure in other countries, such as Switzerland, as I told you in my #60[b]; and the Foreign Office has explained that the measure applies only to parcels addressed to diplomatic officials as individuals, contents of which are not clearly indicated, and does not apply to such as are addressed to diplomatic offices. Therefore for us alone to protest might only lead to results contrary to our expectations, as in the case of Germany's protest against the black list (see my #306[c]).

For these reasons, notwithstanding your instructions, I merely replied that I have reported it to my home government, the way the Germans did, thinking it best to wait and see how the matter will actually be handled, leaving room for further consideration in meeting the situation then. Please instruct me again as to whether this procedure is approved.

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[a] See III, 582.
[b] See III, 581.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 601

FROM: Tokyo — September 29, 1941
TO: Mexico City — #196.

Re your #379[a].

No objections.

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[a] See III, 600.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 602

FROM: Mexico City — September 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #385.

Re #223[a] from Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro.

At present there are none here waiting for evacuation. However, we are now making investigation in the various quarters as to the number of persons who will have to be evacuated and also as to the number of women who desire evacuation.

There are 7 persons connected with the Pacific Petroleum Co. who will have to return to Japan in the near future.

Also, in case worse comes to worst, there are, in addition to this office (staff 11, families 17, employees and their families 11, and various attaches 14), the employees of Assenjo, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi as well as twenty odd other persons whom I think will have to be evacuated and accorded the same treatment as this office receives.

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[a] See III, 603.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 603

FROM: Rio (Ishii) September 20, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires Circular # 267.

(Message from Tokyo # 223.)

With regard to Japanese residents in various areas, as I have repeatedly instructed, we will go on the principle that we will not evacuate Japanese residents who, though their economic relations with Japan are severed, can still maintain livelihood where they now are, as well as those whose income and livelihood is purely local. We plan to evacuate to Japan the persons with official status or who have relations with Japanese industrial concerns, their families, and those residents who are destitute.

In order that we may do this please immediately wire me approximate figures of those persons who will have to be evacuated in the future as well as the number of persons who are now waiting to embark for Japan.

Relay to -----, -----, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Lima, -----, Bogota, Panama, Mexico.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 604

FROM: Tokyo September 29, 1941
TO: Mexico # 197.

Request message.

From Mitsui Co. to their resident member.

The Kato firm has a plan for importing one shipment of 10,000 flasks of mercury to be paid for by a shipment of 20,000 cases of rayon thread, the company to offer 10% of the price of the rayon to the *same (?)* high officials in the government. As the authorities are urging that there be an understanding with Kato and that it be handled in the name of one firm, we expect to confer with Kato on the 29th. We think that 10% of the rayon is too much as remuneration. What is your opinion? Also judging from the amount produced in Mexico we think it would be impossible to secure the 10,000 flasks Kato plans on. Therefore investigate the present situation and advise. We have sent 15,000 pesos; use it for furthering the maneuvers of other firms besides Kato's, and see that no stone is left unturned.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 605

FROM: Tokyo September 29, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 198.

Re my # 178[a].

The Mexican Government's telegram to their Minister resident in Tokyo was received on the 27th. The content was similar to your # 378[b]. However, it appears that a decision cannot be reached on this matter before the Azuma Maru reaches Mexico. Inasmuch as arrangements for this ship are concerned also, we wish to understand fully as soon as possible the method of

handling the rayon problem, so please wire immediately your opinion regarding the Mitsui-Kato problem.

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[a] See III, 588.
[b] See III, 599.

Trans. 9–30–41

No. 606

FROM: Washington (UAWRK) September 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo (WINTER) (Head, Gen. Affairs Sect.) # 198.

Army Technical Headquarters.

Lt. Colonel NAKANO and resident official Major OMORI are scheduled to leave aboard the AZUMA MARU 7 October from Manzanillo, Mexico and head for Japan by a direct route from the southwest coast of the United States. They are due to arrive in Japan 21 November. Colonel OKA is waiting for the departure of a tanker in San Francisco. When we decide upon a sailing date we will let you know.

Please transmit to the director of the Military Service Bureau Air Service Headquarters, and Army Technical Headquarters.

Trans. 3–10–45

No. 607

FROM: Mexico (Miura) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 387.

The Minister of Communications, General JESUS DE LA GARZA belonging to the Portes Gil faction resigned on the 29th. General MAXIMINO AVILA CAMACHO, brother of the President, was appointed as his successor. The appointment of MAXIMINO AVILA CAMACHO to the cabinet has been a problem since the beginning of this administration, and is now a step toward solidifying the policy of the inner part of the government. It is seen that this action at this time will, perhaps, be of great importance with the appearance of an anti-cabinet movement, etc., on the part of labor.

Trans. 10–6–41

No. 608

FROM: Mexico (Miura) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 388.

Re your # 198[a].

1. The question of the obtaining of a visa for the Mexican Consul in Japan is concerned in the matter of this shipment of rayon, and it has caused them to take a harsh attitude with reference to bartering their Mexican petroleum. They know that we fully realize how hard up they are for rayon, and if we have it sent back, it will render our position here impossible. It will have a disastrous effect upon our relations with this country. This coincides with the opinion

you expressed in your #178[b]. Looking at it from the point of view of the activities of KATO and MITSUI, such a thing would never do. In spite of all this, I regret to say that you have never yet given me any intimation as to why this was allowed to be loaded on the *Azuma Maru.*

2. Subsequent developments will determine how this rayon will be distributed. For the time being, I think we should use the explanation given in my #378[c] and completely conceal its relation to our special activities. I think we should have the branch offices furnish this rayon to the concerns which have already contracted for it, in equitable amounts, in order to satisfy the market and to improve relations between Japan and Mexico. Although I know that as a result of the non-establishment of the barter system, the stuff ought to be shipped straight back, the dire need here gives us a good opportunity to win favor. (However, in order to protect our special activities, no one save those concerned should ever be given this explanation, and under no circumstances should it be broadcast.)

3. Will you please wire the captain of the Azuma Maru to unload at Manzanillo and wire me who the shippers and recipients are, together with other pertinent data.

4. Well, I feel forced to speak frankly. All this has happened from the first according to some scheme of the Navy. If our department issued instructions, seeing through that, they certainly made asses of us all, I must say. If they issued instructions, knowing nothing about this, it was unspeakably ignorant, and I would say that those entrusted with matters concerning trade with Mexico had better examine themselves.

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[a] See III, 605.
[b] See III, 588.
[c] See III, 599.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 609

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #389.

Re my #388[a].

The Mexican Minister, acting on instructions from his home government, should call on the Foreign Office. However, please do not hold an interview with him until you have perused my #390[b] which will immediately follow this.

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[a] See III, 608.
[b] See III, 610.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 610

FROM: Mexico City October 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #390.

Re middle paragraph of my #388[a]. I called on the Vice Foreign Minister on the 1st and told him of your suggestion in reply to my #378[b]. The Vice Minister stated that as a matter of fact he was wanting to see me, and that while the Mexican government had given careful consider-

ation to the matter, he regretted very much that they had come to the conclusion that in view of the amount of petroleum produced and because of contracts already made, there was little prospect of any agreement being reached, but that inasmuch as the rayon has already been shipped, if possible they would like to purchase it for cash, and that instructions had been sent today to the Minister in Tokyo to take the matter up with the Japanese Government. I told him that the proper thing for the Japanese to do would be to ship it back, but while I had had nothing to do with making the "barter" or with shipping the rayon ----- I would dislike to see the rayon returned, and that I would immediately advise my home government to comply with his request.

Of course, I told him we would like to know if the Mexicans were thinking of purchasing this rayon as applying on the original contract, or whether they intended to purchase it as a separate independent deal. The Vice Minister said that he would need to confer with the Finance Minister, and after talking with him by direct telephone connection, he replied that while they would prefer to purchase on the contract previously made, if this is impossible, the government would consent to its being handled as a separate matter.

I told him that there would be quite a difference in price between buying on the basis of the contract already made, and buying at the current market price, and that the Japanese could present sufficient reasons for not recognizing the contract that was made; however, from the standpoint of Japan's sense of ethics, and from the standpoint of Japanese-Mexican relations in general, I thought it would be well to comply with their wishes and deal on the basis of the contract, so I told him that I would also pass this point on for consideration by my home government. The Vice Minister thanked me and repeated his request that this matter be arranged.

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[a] See III, 608.
[b] See III, 599.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 611

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 391.

Re your # 151[a].

Under the direction of OKUMURA, a full agreement was finally reached. Under date of September 30, memoranda were exchanged between OKUMURA and TSURU regarding the cessation of operations (the three officials (concerned) have approved).

Please inform each Chief and the Taiheiyō.[b]

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[a] See III, 564.
[b] Pacific Petroleum Company.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 612

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #394.

On the 1st, Foreign Minister PADILLA in an ordinary newspaper interview declared to the effect that recently he has been negotiating with the State Department through Mexico's Ambassador in Washington with regard to the solution of pending problems between America and Mexico. Also today, Minister of Finance SUAREZ had departed for Washington in order to confer over these very same problems. In the near future, he said, he would inform his people of the united friendship that exists between the two countries of America and Mexico. He intimated a speedy solution of the problem in question, and prior to the departure of the Finance Minister he recommended to the Petroleum Labor Union that the party wait for their requirements until the conclusion of the Mexico-American negotiations. The labor union authorities are anticipating a speedy settlement of their problem in question.

Now, according to a United States dispatch, the American authorities have approved a loan of from 8,000,000 to 30,000,000 American dollars to Mexico. With this loan, Mexican money will be stabilized, and at the same time, they intend to pay silver bullion to the expropriated American oil companies. They have already consented to the deposit of $9,000,000. The Minister of Finance reported that it was for the purpose of negotiating this loan that he had gone to America.

The above is for your information.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 613

FROM: Tokyo October 4, 1941
TO: Mexico #205.

Re your #390[a].

1. On the second, the Mexican Minister visited this Ministry in accordance with instructions received, informing the official in charge that it might not be possible to favorably consider the barter of fuel oil and artificial silk, especially in the case of artificial silk unloaded from the Azuma Maru. The official in charge said that it would be necessary to get the opinions of the Chiefs concerned and the Minister of Mexico. For the time being a reply was withheld. After that, with the receipt of your telegram, the Mexican Minister was called to this Ministry on the 3rd. The Head of the Commerce Ministry said that although the Mexican Government had made proposals concerning the exchange of artificial silk manufactures for fuel oil and that corresponding negotiations had been initiated, no decision had been reached. As a result of the efforts of the Minister in Mexico regarding the disposition of the silk question and because it might be difficult for the Mexican Government to come to an agreement regarding fuel oil, it had been decided to unload the silk, in view of general Japanese-Mexican relations, making disposal of same through cash sale or otherwise and requested that the Home Office be properly informed as it was necessary that fuel oil accommodations be available.

The Mexican Minister expressed his thanks for our fine feelings in this matter and said that in connection with the fuel oil, a friendly word would be given directly to the General Administrative Chief HIDALGO and that it would be proper for the progress (of the matter) if you put in your word. I am deeply concerned because the present negotiations with Argentina and Peru regarding a supply of fuel oil may not be carried out in time. Please keep this in mind and exert yours accordingly.

2. The Naval officials have agreed at last with the arrangements which Mitsui, KAWASAKI and the Military Attache have especially arranged for supplying fuel oil to the Terukawa Maru, as explained in the message from the Naval Attache to the Naval Ministry. As we have indications that supplies of fuel oil will be available to some extent in the future, please make investigation.

[a] See III, 610.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 614

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 396.

Secret.

Re paragraph 2 of your # 205[a].

At the request of the German Naval Attaché in Tokyo, Military Attaché HAMANAKA on the 16th of this month, after conferring with the German Minister here, arranged for the loading of petroleum products now at Manzanillo (gas-oil, 15,000 barrels, and a mixture of gas-oil and Diesel oil, 7,500 barrels) as bunker oil in the space available on Japanese boats which touch that port. After arriving in Japan, the unused remainder will be turned over to our authorities and the German Naval Attaché for disposal. In order that this secret plan does not (fail ?), NYK and KAWASAKI are exerting themselves to obtain fuel oil. Although there were some misunderstandings, at last, under the direction of the Naval Attaché, everything was arranged.

[a] See III, 613.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 615

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 397.

Secret.

1. On the evening of the 5th a special A.P. correspondent, as a result of a telephone call informing him that the customs officials at Manzanillo had discovered smuggled exports of mercury, etc., to be shipped on the Azuma Maru, approached me for my opinion in the matter. I replied that I knew nothing whatsoever about the incident.

2. The newspapers here on the 6th printed reports regarding this matter as is given in my # 398[a]. A great deal of attention has been aroused. It is requested that the Navy be informed of the details.

[a] See III, 616.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 616

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 398.

Excelsior

A large amount of mercury and lead to be loaded on the Azuma Maru as smuggled exports was found at Manzanillo. The wool has been pulled over the eyes of Custom Officials and international agreements have been violated. Manzanillo was to have become a base for supply of materials to the Axis powers.

The English and American Consuls had definitely interfered in the matter. All this has been a "sensation" in the districts around Manzanillo. According to the group of officials now making an investigation at Manzanillo the mercury was "camouflaged" in all sorts of commercial shipments, being contained in bottles weighing 76 pounds each.

Universal

Quicksilver and lead bound for Japan on the Azuma Maru has been discovered at Manzanillo.

Nobedades

The Customs Officials at Manzanillo have discovered amounts of quicksilver and lead which were to be loaded on the Azuma Maru. Elements (including a part of the Customs Representatives) continuously working for the extreme radicals have been endeavoring to establish Manzanillo as a supply base for the Axis countries. The Ministry of Hacienda (finance) and the Department of Interior officials have jointly initiated an investigation.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 617

FROM: Tokyo October 8, 1941
TO: Mexico # 207.

(Secret; request message.)

From ----- to the representative in your city.

I understand that you are experiencing difficulties in getting fuel oil (for the Terukawa Maru). Hereafter, please keep in close touch with the Naval Attache in dealing with such matters.

Trans. 10–9–41

No. 618

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 402.

(Secret) (Request Message.)

To the home office of the Pacific Petroleum Company, from OKUMURA, as follows:

44

To Company Chief KUBOTA—Confidential.

Two torsion balances, two radiometers, two *gisshuruunii*[a], two gun perforators, as well as seven light wooden boxes, as baggage belonging to Military Assistant TAKITA who is being

transferred, were loaded on the Kawasaki boat, *Terukawa Maru*, which left Acapulco October 6. Arrange for the Foreign Office and the Naval Ministry to unload this shipment after arrival in Yokohama. Have this machinery insured there for the value of $17,300.00.

Handle this shipment with great care, as it is precision machinery.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 619

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #403.

Re your #205[a].

When I visited the Foreign Office Undersecretary on the 7th I told him that Japan had decided to sell the amount of artificial silk already contracted for in view of the general trend of Japanese-Mexican relations. The Undersecretary in response reaffirmed his unending thanks regarding the Japanese desire in this matter.

Even if it were difficult to come to an agreement on the "barter" of fuel oil for artificial fibre, as was discussed by Japan, I asked if it would not be possible to give favorable consideration to supplying fuel oil to Japanese ships touching port. The Undersecretary replied that in spite of the fact that Mexico, since the beginning, has been in need of artificial silk, a "barter" arrangement could not be followed due to there being no supply surplus in accordance with existing contracts. He personally was of the opinion that fuel oil should be supplied to boats going from Manzanillo to Yokohama, but he thought that fuel to Valparaiso or to Valparaiso and back would be impossible. He said if the reason for this must be known, that such an understanding, amounting to the same thing as approval of a barter agreement, is precluded by certain agreements. As I knew that it would be difficult for Mexico to supply (10/30,000 ?) tons over a six months' period as was contemplated in the barter proposal, a reduction in the supply of fuel oil could be effected either through a decrease in the number of ships to Mexico or enlarging the organization for purchase of oil. Upon my inquiry as to the way in which the Mexican Government might desire to supply fuel oil, the Undersecretary who, from the beginning to the end, showed disapprobation and reluctance, answered me by saying that the Petroleum Bureau should be questioned in that respect.

(Change the messages #340 & 341, sent from this office on the 7th, to 400 and 401, respectively.)

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[a] See III, 613.

Trans. 10–11–41

No. 620

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #404.

Re my #403[a].

The Foreign Office Under-Secretary informed me unofficially that the Minister in Tokyo, AMEZCUA, had simply sent a telegram expressing the desire the have details from me regarding this matter and he also informed me that no reports concerning the attitude of the Japanese Government had been received. At the same time, just before being visited by the Under-Secretary, his confidential secretary pressed me for an answer. The answer given by the Under-Secretary to me regarding the transmission of the gist of my answer to the Economics Ministry infers that there was no mistake (on their part ?). I received the impression that they had definitely received no information regarding the desires of the Japanese government. Reflecting upon the fact that a grave mistake was made by the Minister (in Tokyo) regarding the details of the joint barter question, I am of the opinion that the Home Office (Japanese Foreign Office) should use utmost discretion in dealing with him.

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[a] See III, 619.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 621

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #406.

Re my #390[a] and #403[b].

I received the impression that even though the United States had or had not instituted a practical embargo of petroleum products to Japan, Mexico would not dare contract or pledge supplies to Japan. Therefore, in this type of thing, we should not follow open diplomatic means, but should effect a settlement of this practical problem. Of course, I realize that this is very uncertain and insecure, but there has been no lack of oil for Japanese ships when purchases were classified for use in the ships themselves. Even in the case mentioned in my #396[c], no questions were raised. I am of the opinion that it would be well to not be too fastidious about this matter and leave it in the hands of our representatives. (The Naval Attaché is of the same opinion.)

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[a] See III, 610.
[b] See III, 619.
[c] See III, 614.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 622

FROM: Mexico (MXMRK) October 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Summer) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) # 176.

Yesterday (the 7th) Lt. Colonel NAKANO and Major OMORI left MANZANILLO aboard the AZUMA MARU.

Trans. 4–25–45

No. 623

FROM: Mexico City (MXMRK) October 9, 1941
TO: Washington (RIKUGUN) # 174.

Yesterday (the 7th) WAKI, UCHIDA, YOSHIOKA, KANEKO, and MORIMURA (five men) arrived in Mexico City. They are awaiting further orders. On the same day Lieutenant-Colonel NAKANO and Major OMORI sailed from Manzanillo harbor aboard the AZUMA MARU.

Trans. 4–25–45

No. 624

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 410.

Re my # 398[a] concerning the mercury incident.

The "Excelsior" for a few days after the incident published accurate reports as "top news." Besides gathering general current ideas, the "Universal", "Novedades" and "La Prensa" each published vindictive articles, saying that the true character of the Military and Naval Attaches of a certain eastern country had finally come out. On the 12th, the Excelsior published the comment that if foreign diplomats were at the back of this incident, the Foreign Office here should protest or request their withdrawal. Again on the 14th, this same paper brought out that it was the opinion of the Foreign Office officials that should the investigation being made by the prosecutor and finance (Hacienda ?) officials establish definite proof, even though it would injure the feelings of a certain country, their withdrawal as *persona non grata* should be requested. According to Naval investigation, the recent enemy "drive" *expose* was a result of suggestions and guidance offered by the American Embassy which is well informed in this matter.

[a] See III, 616.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 625

FROM: Mexico City (Miura) October 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo #414.

Re my #410[a].

The same papers stated on the 15th that Foreign Minister Padilla had stated to a press conference on the 13th that either the Military or Naval Attaches of a certain Far Eastern country, or the Commerical Secretary, had participated in the affair.

In reply to a question, he stated the Procurator's investigation is completed, and the case now comes under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, that the rank of the persons concerned is regrettable, but that light must be shed on the case and the guilty parties punished severely. The Foreign Minister stated that the Mexican Government will take a firm stand in the settlement of this affair.

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[a]See III, 624.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 626

FROM: Mexico City (MXMRK) October 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff) #179.

(2 parts—complete.)

According to the impression I received as the result of the conference of attachés and advisers in America, it is expected that war will break out between Japan and the United States. In order to gather operational intelligence in preparation for that, it is thought necessary that the attaché's office in the United States (because of the withdrawal from New York) be now given at least two more advisers (particularly air and technical specialists).

Part 2

If you consider the limitations to the espionage which can be carried out against the United States by the attaches in South America, you will see that they will be able, after the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States (and before that too, of course), to do no more than learn of general, easily discovered activities. It will be particularly difficult to get intelligence concerning the details of military operations. Also, we in Mexico will be able to get only a small amount of intelligence. Consequently, we must work, before the withdrawal of our attache in the United States, to increase our facilities for gathering intelligence. Thus, the general situation is like that in the United States, in regard to an insufficiency in attaché's office personnel.

Trans. 5–3–45

No. 627

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #415.

Part 1 of 3. To be handled in Government Code.

To Vice Minister AMAU.

As to the matter of my being forward in expressing my own opinions, you know I would not act in a presumptious way. If my #408[a] created such an impression, I am most regretful. The message in question emanated purely from the interest I have in my country's welfare. If you do not read it from that point of view, it will not make sense. In my opinion, the present negotiations between Tokyo and Washington have now reached the grave stage where they will determine the fate of the Japanese empire. Not only do I hope that you will keep us foreign emissaries secretly advised on such matters by some special code, but that you will also let us know to some extent just how critical the situation is. I hope you will let us have some fresh knowledge of the real state of affairs.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 628

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #415.

(Part 3 of 3.)

To speak frankly, I was not the only man who, upon reading that message of yours, could not help feeling outraged. If from some source or other you government officials cannot learn how we feel, the government will be in a real predicament, won't it? Thus, having my government's welfare at heart, I merely sent you my frank opinion.

You may accuse me of being reckless in my choice of words, but, at least, Sir, I will not stand for you to accuse me of forwardness.

Relay to Washington, Ottawa, ------.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 629

FROM: Mexico (Miura) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #415.

(Part 2 of 3.)

As I look upon the state of affairs at the present pass, I know that the time is ripe for us to decide whether it will be peace or war. We must do so now before it is too late for us to get all the odds and ends of our affairs taken care of. Nor in so doing would we be acting rashly. At the present stage only by a final decision of peace or war could we get things in order. Already we have taken custody of the Imperial portraits. Isn't it the urgent duty of our nation to allow its officials in the field to make their final preparations?

In Circular # 2148[a], it is stated (1) that we are carrying on negotiations with the United States and (2) that these negotiations are approached on the theory that they can be reconciled with the Three-Power Alliance. As for (1), everyone under heaven knows that it is a flop. So that we may be well advised, therefore, at such times as are necessary, it is absolutely essential that the foreign emissaries be secretly advised as to the facts by some Government code. Nay, not to do so is actually to deceive us. How can we be expected to keep the staffs advised and to guide our resident nationals? Furthermore, in our contacts with foreigners, we might make some irretrievable miscalculations.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–25–41

No. 630

FROM: Mexico City
TO: Tokyo

October 17, 1941
417.

Re your # 211[a].

In this country which has a unique language situation, it goes without saying that an official interpreter is needed. Fukushima principally has charge of such business as is connected with the Foreign Office, and information items, and I must also use him for all my important conversations. However, the chief of the bureau of ceremonies is of rather high rank not only in the Foreign Office but also in the government. The business he has charge of is important and also of wide scope. Most of the business of our office goes through his hands. The director himself has the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, and for this reason if one who has a knowledge of Spanish does not also have the standing of official interpreter he would not be given audience.

Fukushima has been intimately acquainted with this director and also the director of the political affairs bureau, and with many others in the Foreign Office, and thus is an indispensable person for making contacts and for smooth and prompt handling of business. On the other hand, as you well know, this country absolutely will not allow diplomatic and consular duties to be carried simultaneously by the same individual. With present conditions as they are in this office it would be out of the question to have any of the other staff members who have any knowledge of the Spanish language take the place of Fukushima as you have suggested.

With Japanese-American relations now reaching a very tense stage, business in this office will be getting more and more complicated and delicate, and it would truly be an unbearable situation for us to have Fukushima transferred elsewhere. I understand full well the situation you face in the main office, but in view of conditions here I wish you would have his transfer postponed for the time being at least.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–21–41

No. 631

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 8, 1941
TO: Panama #27.

Naval Attaché in Argentina, SHIGEHIRO, left Miami on the 9th by plane for Cali via Balboa. Please accord him every convenience.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 632

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 8, 1941
TO: Santiago #1.

Naval Attaché in Argentina, SHIGEHIRO, will arrive at your place from Colombia by Panagra on the 11th. Please accord him every convenience.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 633

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) August 12, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires Circular #58.

Message from Tokyo as #99.

(Part 1 of 2)

In order to take on the products of various countries along the South American west coast, we are at the present time planning to dispatch the Rakuyo Maru, the Akagi Maru and the Sakido Maru. Just as these boats were about to sail, the America announced the freezing legislation, as a result of which it has become impossible to make payments for our purchases. Henceforth, we may have difficulty importing the products of various South American countries. Therefore, in order that we might secure products which Japan most urgently needs, I would like to have you go into conference with the Yokohama Specie Bank representative in your city in order to determine what we can do and what we can expect. As soon as you have ascertained the most feasible steps which we might take in arranging for payment for goods exported from those lands, please let me know. The sailing of the Noto Maru depends on the methods which you are able to develop through continued private conversations with the companies with whom we wish to do business. Therefore, please let me know the results of your conversations at once.

We are planning to send silk, cotton goods, woolen goods, porcelain ware and staple fiber on the Noto Maru with a total valuation of 15,460,(000?) yen.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 634

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 18, 1941
TO: Panama, Bogota, Lima, Santiago, Buenos Aires, & Rio de Janeiro Cir. #246.

Secretary TAKAGI is going to your place as a diplomatic courier by Panagra plane on the following schedule:

23rd—Miami, Balboa, Cali
24th—Cali, Quito, Lima
25th—Lima, Santiago
26th—Santiago, Buenos Aires

Please make arrangements to have him accorded the necessary conveniences upon entering and leaving the country to which you are accredited.

Trans. 8–23–41

No. 635

FROM: Washington (UAWRK) August 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo #164.

1. Lt. Col. SUZUKI and Lt. Col. ITŌ will leave on 20 August (check 20–8) on the ARGENTINA and should arrive at their posts in your (?city?) on 10 September (check 10–9).

2. Please understand that the *MOYURŪ ŌZORA*[a] has been lent to the San Francisco *HEIMU SHAKAI*[b] until the end of September (check 9) and so it will be difficult for Lt. Col. SUZUKI to bring it.

3. I am considering the matter of reservations on the ship mentioned in your wire #25[c] (check 25). Please obtain the details from Lt. Col. SUZUKI.

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[a] Literally "The Burning Heavens". This may be a book.
[b] "Military Affairs Society".
[c] Not available.

Trans. 2–28–45

No. 636

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) August 20, 1941
TO: Rio No number.

Re your message #8[a].

The Sakito Maru will leave the port of Coquimbo about the 25th of August. The Asuka Maru will leave Valparaiso about the 30th of August. The Norfolk Maru will leave Valparaiso about the 15th of September. All of these boats are freighters and their accommodations are extremely limited. Details are unknown concerning other than those mentioned above.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 637

FROM: Rio (Ishii) August 8, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires Circular # 237.

Secretary TERASAKI and Diet Member SHINOHARA expect to arrive in Buenos Aires on the 9th by Pan-American Airways, in Santiago on the 13th, and in Lima on the 17th. Please make hotel reservations for them.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 638

FROM: Santiago August 18, 1941
TO: Washington # 3.

SHINOHARA, member of Diet, I understand has already requested your office to make arrangements for him to enter Germany and for a reservation on an airplane going to Lisbon. He has asked us if it would be possible to enter Germany and has requested us to get from the State Department permission for his reentering the United States if it is possible to go to Germany. We have been persuading him to return to Japan on board the Heiyō Maru sailing on the 23rd. We would like to have you reply by wire by the 22nd, since it is necessary for him to make plans.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 639

FROM: Washington (Nomura) August 20, 1941
TO: Santiago # 2.

It is almost impossible to obtain seats on the plane to Lisbon.

As for permission for the Diet member to enter the United States, I received his application through Ambassador TOMII and immediately submitted it to the State Department but have not yet received permission. Therefore, please explain the above to him and recommend that he return to Japan on the Heiyō Maru.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 640

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) August 30, 1941
TO: Washington # 40.

Diet Member SHINOHARA expects to return to Japan on the Heiyo Maru leaving Manzanillo September 20th. However, as he intended to visit your place before he returns, he applied to the American Embassy in Peru for an entry permit which he has not yet received. Please request that the permit be sent at once to the American Embassy in Panama.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 641

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) August 30, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro #2.

Diet Member SHINOHARA wishes to leave from your place for Rome by Italian plane on Monday, September 15th. Please let me know at once if reservations can be made.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 642

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) September 10, 1941
TO: Panama #4.

To SHINOHARA, M.P.

There are seats available on the Lati plane leaving Recife on the afternoon of the 15th or the one leaving the 16th. For which plane shall I secure reservations? Please wire immediately.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 643

FROM: Santiago August 22, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires #62.

(Part 1 of 3) (Message to Tokyo #230)

From TERASAKI[a].

The results of my conference with the Ministers to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and ----- are as follows:

1. We propose an (intelligence) set-up in Latin America in order that we might secure intelligences on the public opinion of the United States, her situation militarily and diplomatically. The method by which this is to be accomplished is roughly as follows:

a. We propose the establishment of spies within the United States. From these *we shall obtain* secret *intelligences*.

(1) This set-up shall perform the duties of collecting and evaluating information obtained from the offices and personnel of American ministries in Latin America.

(2) It shall study the effectiveness of the propaganda contained in American and Latin American printed matter and radio broadcasts.

(3) It shall collect and evaluate intelligences secured from persons with whom they are in close contact, as well as the offices of third-powers in Latin America.

(4) It shall collect and evaluate intelligences secured from individuals and government offices in Latin American countries.

2. Though we plan for the organization of an intelligence net and the distribution of agents necessary for the operation of these proposed steps, in the light of current affairs when anything of great importance arises, we, of course, will put every detail into operation with the effectiveness with which it is carried out in spy stories.

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[a] HIDENARI TERASAKI, 2nd Secretary of Emb. Washington. He is head of espionage in the U.S.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 645

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) September 2, 1941
TO: Lima #10.

From Naval Attaché SHIGEHIRO.

The naval inspection party, which was scheduled to leave on the Heiyō Maru, will be unable to make connections. Therefore, please cancel their reservations.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 646

FROM: Rio (Ishii) September 6, 1941
TO: Lima Circular #262.

Secretary KUDŌ of this office wishes to make a trip of observation to the country in which you are serving. Please accord him every possible assistance. His schedule is as follows:
September 10—Leave Rio de Janeiro.
September 12—Arrive at La Paz *via?* Corumba[a] and Santa Cruz.
September 16—Leave La Paz arriving Lima same day. (All the above by Panais plane.)
September 20—Leave Lima for Brazil via Chile and Argentina.

---

[a] Commercial town on the Paraguay River, Matto Grosso, Brazil.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 647

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires #191.

Couriers MIZUKAWA and KOSAKA (telegraphic officials) are scheduled to arrive at your place October 15 on the Tōa Maru carrying secret papers and (a machine? machines?) for your office. A small safe for your office (1 wooden box) has been entrusted to the captain of the same boat. Therefore, please take steps to facilitate (customs inspections?), etc.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 648

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Santiago #121.

Strictly Secret.

Courier KOSAKA is expected to arrive in Valparaiso on the Tōa Maru on the 6th of October (?), carrying important secret documents. Please extend to him all facilities and, in order that all offices may be advised promptly concerning the messages he carries, have all your telegraph men come to your post at once.

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 649

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #366.

Because of his intelligence duties EBIZUKA has not left yet. I want him to leave for his new post on the Tōa Maru.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 650

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Rio #211.

Message to Buenos Aires #195.

KUSANO, who is on the Tōa Maru carries a passport as a diplomatic courier since he is assistant to telegraphic official KOSAKA (courier) and also as he has to go to Peru and Chile. I do not necessarily want you to put him on your diplomatic list but I do want you to make such representations to the Government, to which you are accredited, so that they will permit him to be on duty at your office.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 651

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Rio #209.

Strictly secret.

One large-type safe (one wooden box) has been sent for the use of your office on the Tōa Maru arriving at Rio October 13 (?). Also, on the same ship are Couriers KUSANO and KOSAKA with secret documents for your office and all offices in Brazil and in North America. Please take steps to have these two officials receive the (treatment due their rank ?). As KOSAKA wants to continue on to North America, please make steamship reservations for him and contact Washington to have his passport visaed and to have him receive the (treatment due his rank ?). For other necessary arrangements please consult with KOSAKA himself.

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 652

FROM: Santiago September 17, 1941
TO: Washington #65.

(Circular.) (In 3 parts—complete.)

Santiago *to Tokyo* #261.

(Separate wire.)

Regarding paragraphs 1 to 3- a of my message #231[a].

All of our offices in North America should give their immediate attention to the selection of spies. They should choose only those who are best qualified for the job and have them

go to work on collection of information and, if possible, liaison. The offices in Latin America shall accept those reports from them in which they can place credence. If it is possible to obtain the services of an informant who has been a seaman, it might be a good plan to try and get him a job in a steamship company. (There is one who falls in this category in New York. It would be very much to our interest if a job could be found for him in some steamship company which has a North American service.)

It must be borne in mind, of course, that it is exceedingly difficult to select individuals who can be reliably utilized. Moreover, it is very difficult to check any information from a foreign country. Therefore, it is of primary importance that we make up our minds to spend vast sums of money.

It is a known fact that the F.I.B. (F.B.I. ?) is making a practice of trying to get its men into the confidence of those in the offices of the Axis nations. Please note this point carefully and exercise the utmost caution in making the selections.

The matter contained in (b) of the above referred to section, would be next to impossible to put into effect. However, if there is one with whom very close relations have been maintained in the past, it may be that he could be utilized.

With regard to (c) of the same section, each office should be equipped with good radio sets of the middle wave band. They shall be used to listen to domestic broadcasts in the United States. The central listening post shall be located, let us say, in Brazil, where one who is proficient in shorthand of English shall be on duty at all times.

The leading U.S. newspapers and magazines shall be subscribed to now in the name of some foreigner. These shall be thoroughly perused (even to the society columns) and carefully analyzed.

The intelligence officers referred to in section 4 of the same message shall be stationed in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, (the last mentioned is looked upon as a very important post by our Army and Navy, with a view to obtaining information about Panama, as you are already aware), and Mexico.

To fulfill all of these duties, the telegraphic section of all of those offices concerned will have to be considerably enlarged. This is at present the most important actual step to be taken.

As sources of supplies for the above mentioned intelligence personnel, the present sources of Domei news agencies and others of our special correspondents shall be utilized. We shall also make indirect use of the Spanish and Portuguese language correspondents.

Since it will be of interest to keep abreast of the economic conditions in the United States, we shall maintain close contact with our merchants who in turn will keep themselves advised through local native merchants who have access to the information in the United States.

Should the German and Italian diplomatic officers be ordered out of a country before the Japanese, we shall make arrangements to take over their informants.

The informants referred to above shall not be limited to Latin Americans but shall also include those who reside in Spain and Portugal. (Should, for example, Mexico get into the war, our informants in Mexico shall relay their information to those in Spain and Portugal who in turn shall pass it on to Japan.)

Relayed to Washington.

Mailed to Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 653

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) September 26, 1941
TO: Washington #15.

Re #261 sent from Chile to the Foreign Minister.[a]

According to what specialists say ----- broadcasts do not reach any point beyond 1000 (miles ?). I understand that even with a good receiving set it is impossible to listen in here or in Rio to broadcasts made in the United States.

---

[a] See III, 652.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 654

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 4, 1941
TO: Rio #203.

Strictly Secret.

My message #202[a] repeated as follows:

We have been requested by the German and Italian Embassies to transmit 15 parcels of documents to their ministers in Rio (#1 to 6 by the Italian, #7 to 15 by the German). These are being sent by Secretary INOUE, who is on board the Tōa Maru. When received, please turn over to them secretly.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 655

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) September 18, 1941
TO: Santiago Circular #138.

(Message *from Tokyo* #204)

Re your message #379[a].

Strictly secret.

1. We shall make our contacts between Japan and Chile by Japanese steamers and by couriers. (Diplomatic pouch mail (thus transferred will be dispatched ?) to Brazil.) Permit has been secured for the dispatch of one courier each month between Brazil, Argentina, and Chile; therefore, please contact the competent offices at as early a date as possible.

2. We have entered into a reciprocal agreement with Germany and Italy recently with regard to Axis diplomatic material and documents. Axis mail between South American diplomatic offices and ----- will be transferred as Japanese diplomatic material; between ----- and Europe it shall be considered as German and Italian material and documents.

Having thus set up mutual arrangements for the dispatch of this material, please take note of these plans. Please consign diplomatic material emanating from South American diplomatic offices or en route to Europe to the German and Italian Embassies in your respective cities after you have removed therefrom all secret and strictly secret documents.

Relayed to Rio and Santiago.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 656

FROM: Rio (Ishii) September 20, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires Circular # 267.

(Message from Tokyo # 223)

With regard to Japanese residents in various areas, as I have repeatedly instructed, we will go on the principle that we will not evacuate Japanese residents who, though their economic relations with Japan are severed, can still maintain livelihood where they now are, as well as those whose income and livelihood is purely local. We plan to evacuate to Japan the persons with official status or who have relations with Japanese industrial concerns, their families, and those residents who are destitute.

In order that we may do this please immediately wire me approximate figures of those persons who will have to be evacuated in the future as well as the number of persons who are now waiting to embark for Japan.

Relay to -----, -----, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Lima, -----, Bogota, Panama, Mexico.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 657

FROM: Caracas (Ohgimi) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 79.

Re # 223[a] to Brazil.

All the Japanese investigated in this country, both those who are now awaiting embarkation and those for whom transportation is still required, are anxious to continue living here. There are no destitute people among them.

---

[a] See III, 656.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 658

FROM: Sao Paulo — September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #106.

Re your #223[a] to the Ambassador in Brazil.

Persons who will board vessels in order to return home number a total of 38. This figure can be broken down as follows: 2 officials, 21 destitute persons, and 15 teachers sent out from Japan who are now returning home in accordance with my wire #99[b]. Furthermore, in the event that the situation becomes more critical, 180 persons will have to be evacuated. This latter number is made up as follows: Officials (Overseas Affairs Ministry and Trade Commission employees), 24; governmental officials, 100; leaders of subsidized organizations (----- and Japanese hospital staff members), 10, and others.

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[a] See III, 656.
[b] See III, 659.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 659

FROM: Sao Paulo (Hara) — August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #99.

Re your #85[a].

We have decided to abolish the subsidy for itinerant teachers by the end of September. The final installment for indigent Japanese in this country has been approved for the latter part of September. Therefore, please wire us immediately 4,600 yen.

Our expenses are roughly two months behind our original estimates. Though we have increased all accounts by 70 conto, we will have to make adjustments in the salary fund of 149,803 yen, as well as the general retirement fund for use in foreign countries. Please wire these requirements immediately.

Furthermore, please arrange to appropriate sufficient money, because it is apparent that in 1942 our expenses will more or less come up to our current demands. I am mailing concrete proposals immediately.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 660

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) — September 22, 1941
TO: Mexico — Circular #270.

Message from Tokyo as #225.

(Part 1 of 2)

According to a report from Ambassador to Germany OSHIMA, although their trade balance with South America was continually unfavorable before the war, Germany plans to secure

funds by the following means, since there are considerable funds in branches of the Reichsbank all over South America which could be used to defray the expenses of public officials and offices:

1. Requisition the accounts of private German citizens living in South America.
2. Borrow on interest when necessary from the funds maintained in South America by ----- ----- and ----- to cover the import of raw materials.
3. Exchange the currency of the various South American countries in secret transactions and send it abroad through suitable channels.

(There are many examples of this as a result of the exchange control all over South America. According to a report from Minister to Portugal CHIBA, in Lisbon the currency of Brazil, Argentina and Chile can be obtained at about 10% under the fixed rate.)

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 661

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) September 22, 1941
TO: Caracas Circular # 270.

Message from Tokyo as # 225.

(Part 2 of 2.)

4. Obtain funds by selling German-owned bullion in South America. (Before the freezing of her credits in the United States, Germany deposited bullion and foreign currency in the international bank (at Geneva ?); then by paying the necessary rate they were able to obtain much bullion in South America through the same bank.)

Since the fourth of the above sources amounts to a large sum, Germany appears to have on hand a considerable surplus, and I think there is a possibility of our obtaining Germany's permission to make use of these funds to pay our own official expenditures in South America by sending money through Germany if we approach them properly.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 662

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) October 5, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires Circular # 275.

Message from Tokyo as Cir. # 2121 on the 4th.

Under date of the 4th, two orders were issued, namely, the temporary order for postal control (Governmental order issued in accordance with paragraph # 8 of the Constitution) and a related Communications Department order.

1. *The Governmental Order (to go into effect on the date of issue).*

The Minister of Communications has the authority in time of war (including time of a calamity tantamount to war), if he deems it necessary for the purpose of protecting national defense interests, to issue an order for the (a) prohibition or restriction of mailing; (b) censorship (sealed mail matter to and from Japan and in the country is expected); and (c) prohibition of delivery.

2. *Departmental Order (to go into effect on Oct. 20).*

For prohibition of:

(a) Mailing matter, using codes and ciphers, abbreviation codes, ----- secret ink and other methods of secret communication. Also, prohibition of Braille, private postal cards and of mail matter destined for foreign countries using double envelopes.

(b) For requiring the indication of the sender's address.

(c) Mail matter destined for foreign countries should not have stamps on them, but should be accompanied by necessary postage stamps when mailed at the Post Office. (Mail matter destined for Manchukuo and China is expected.)

3. Mail matter to and from foreign diplomatic offices, as well as officials on the diplomatic list in Japan, shall be excepted from this order.

4. A request should be submitted relative to mail matter sent to or from Japanese diplomatic offices in the countries in which censorship is in effect for the discontinuance of censorship and, in case this request is not complied with, the exception to this order shall no longer be in effect. Therefore, please inform the authorities.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 663

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 9, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro Circular # 2148.

In 4 parts, complete.

Rio Circular # 279 to Mexico, Caracas, Bogota, Panama, Havana.

The fixed policy of our country is the effecting of a settlement of the China incident, the establishment of the co-prosperity sphere in East Asia and the establishment of peace in East Asia followed by the establishment of peace throughout the world. Japanese foreign diplomacy is founded on this point of view. The Japanese, German, Italian Tripartite Pact also was founded with the one purpose of preventing the spread of the European war and establishing future world peace. The Imperial Rescript which was handed down recently contained a sincere appeal for the restoration of peace, etc. The cabinet also in its official announcement came out clearly for peace.

However, the war has spread to all Europe and the Atlantic, and now only the Pacific area is free from it. And it is in accord with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact that study be given to the matter of removing the causes for war between Japan and America.

Well, the three countries, Japan, Germany, and Italy are pledged to continual cooperation. However, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of this cooperation under the Tripartite Pact, it is necessary for each country to make the most of its national strength in its allotted sphere. Merely acting in concert is not necessarily all that is meant by cooperation. To recapitulate, it goes without saying that while acting in unison for the attainment of the same ultimate and mutual confidence, specific action will be conditioned by the changes of time and circumstance. Recently the European war has taken on the characteristics of a long war, in the German-Russian area the war has bogged down, and communications between Germany, Italy and Japan have been cut off. Again British, American, and N.E.I. encirclement of Japan has strengthened. The China incident appears no nearer of solution. Hence, it has become necessary for Japan to take up negotiations with America in order to prepare the national strength for the future establishment of the co-prosperity sphere in the East Asia through the settlement of the China incident.

It was from this angle that the Japanese-American negotiations were undertaken. It was felt that if the whole problem of the causes which might result in war in the Pacific area were studied, the spread of the war to the Pacific and the consequent involvement of America might

be prevented. Talks were commenced during the time Matsuoka was acting as Foreign Minister in the second Konoye cabinet. However, in July, Japan entered French Indo-China, America made economic reprisals and the relations between Japan and America became strained as a result of which the talks were temporarily suspended. Later on, the conversations were resumed and late in August messages were exchanged between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt, on the basis of which talks were resumed for the purpose of finding a basis upon which negotiations might be opened.

As far as Japan is concerned, she is making no change in her attitude toward the Tripartite Pact, she is attempting to settle the China incident, to establish a co-prosperity sphere in East Asia, to prevent the spread of the war, to insure peace in the Pacific area, and at the same time to prevent America's participation in the war. However, the future course of the negotiations may be subject to many vicissitudes.

This is for your information.

Relay to Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Mexico, Panama.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 664

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 10, 1941
TO: Lima # 159.

Re your # 258[a].

According to a report from an interested trading company, we hear that Bolivia, following the example of Peru, mentioned in your # 252[a], is now considering an agreement with the United States to supply her exclusively with all kinds of metals. If this is a fact, it should not be impossible for us to forestall the American-Bolivian agreement and protect our own supply of metals by encouraging the Mitsui Company to negotiate with the Bolivian government for a barter arrangement. Therefore, let us know at once the details of the American-Bolivian talks and the prospects for establishing such an agreement.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-15-41

No. 665

FROM: Rio (Ishii) October 16, 1941
TO: Buenos Aires Circular # 286.

Message from Tokyo # 247.

The regulations require that those eligible to military service during the seventeenth year of Showa (1942) must register with the local authorities at the place where the family register is maintained before November 30. I believe that many of these persons subject to military duty now residing abroad are concerned over the question of reporting in time due to the uncertainty of and time needed for regular mails to go abroad to the home country at this time. Please consider the proper position to take, keeping in mind that the army officials have accordingly (warned ?) that this registering cannot be postponed. Transmit or inform the diplomatic estab-

lishments in South America of the above. Mexico is expected to telegraph or inform the establishments in Central America.

Trans. 10–30–41

No. 666

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) August 16, 1941
TO: Santiago Circular # 118.

Message to Tokyo # 336[a].

Various matters of grave concern have come up since the investigation commission got together and the representatives of foreigners of Axis affiliation (including the Japanese) are suffering a bad attack of nerves.

We know, of course, that the local telephone company makes transcriptions of all conversations transmitted between Japan and Argentina, but lately it is a fact that a business concern in Japan has been telephoning matters to its branch in this country which it would be very unfortunate to have leak out to the outside.

It is much more difficult to control telephone conversations without danger of leakage than telegraphic communications and I think that in the case of governmental communications as well as private, something should be done to forestall the leakage of secret information.

Relayed to -----.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–7–41

No. 667

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) August 20, 1941
TO: Washington # 124.

(Message to Tokyo # 347.)

CASTILLO[a] on the 12th made a speech during the graduation ceremonies of the University of Jurisprudence in Buenos Aires and said that it is necessary for Argentina to be on guard against such men who have recently come to the fore as JUAN MORIINA[b] and others of his ilk (these persons are viewed as having connections with the German Embassy here). He continued, however, by warning those present who were in accord with the pro-British and American faction and members of General JUSTO's party against the use of force against such persons. Then again -----, of General JUSTO's party, on the 17th, the occasion of the anniversary of Semaruto,[b] said in a speech that "The life of our country can only be saved through democratic principles." The *Prensa* and the *Nacione*, as well as other newspapers of British and American backing, opposed the Acting President's speech as being merely one to arouse confusion in the minds of Argentinians and that such an attitude could only bring about a diversity of opinion among the people.

Furthermore, the 83 boxes which arrived here on the Hana Maru and which were addressed to the local German Embassy were confiscated as printed propaganda material by virtue of the exposures made by a lower house committee investigating Nazi activities.

---

[a] Acting President of Argentina.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 668

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) September 18, 1941
TO: Rio #137.

(Circular) (Part 1 of 2) (Message to Tokyo #404, Part 1 of 2.)

The United States have been persistently endeavoring to win Argentina over to the Anglo-Saxon camp. The other day, a mass meeting was held under the auspices of the Argentine labor groups advocating the preservation of democracy. A bill was presented in the Lower House, requesting the government to support the ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL program, and the American Congress invited the Argentine Lower House to send a group of representatives to the United States. All this shows what sort of activity is going on. Well, as you know, it is election time in Argentina, and the party out of power is bringing up international questions condemning the pressure brought to bear upon their country by the United States. Furthermore, it says that the Fascist Party as well as leaders in economic and military affairs are being softened by the "dollar diplomacy" of the United States. The Government itself wishes to obtain military implements from the United States and is anxious to increase its exports thither. Consequently, it is quite opportunistic in maintaining great amity for that country.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 669

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) September 18, 1941
TO: Rio #137.

(Circular) (Part 2 of 2) (Message to Tokyo #404, Part 1 of 2.)

The situation is rather delicate. However, Acting President CASTILLO resolutely stuck to a neutral policy through thick and thin. The Argentine Minister of War, however, who recently visited Brazil to attend an international celebration, returned on the 10th, and on the 12th left to attend a similar celebration in Chile. It seems that this Minister was exchanging opinions with the governments of these countries for an A.B.C. unified policy. It is not known yet what the nature of it is, but the guess is ventured that it is to maintain peace in southern South America and to bring about cooperation between these three countries and the United States. This is also admitted by those close to CASTILLO, who is endeavoring to maintain neutrality.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 670

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) September 20, 1941
TO: Washington Circular # 140.

To Tokyo as # 406; part 2 of 2[a].

The daily operations of the commission investigating Nazi activities as well as all of the details concerning the progress of Naziism has attracted wide publicity among all people. Many people consider that the situation insofar as anti-German activities is concerned will become much worse in the future. However, it is not thought likely that feelings toward Italy or Japan will worsen to a like extent.

---

[a] Part 1 of 2 not available.

Trans. 10–1–41

No. 671

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 415.

(In 3 parts—Parts 1 and 2 only available.)

Re my # 298[a].

Strictly Secret. C.O.R.

We understand that Naval Attaché (Yukimori ?) is bringing a wireless transmitter on the Toa Maru which is to be unloaded here. Upon hearing this we inquired of the Naval Attaché stationed here as to the motive of this move. At first the Attaché said that it was in hopes that it could be used once or twice subsequent to, and in the event of a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and Argentina.

We continued to question the Attaché, using every means at our disposal to do so and obtained from him the explanation that it may be utilized in the future for commerce destruction warfare. From the manner in which he replied, however, I got the impression that the Navy plans to put it to other uses as well.

I have already advised you in the message referred to in the heading, as to the utilization of transmitters here. It should not be difficult to imagine that should war break out between the United States and Japan and, if Argentina remains neutral, Argentina as well as all other South American countries will be even more dependent on Britain and the United States than at present.

In view of the strides made in science, should an emergency arise and the transmitter is put in operation, it would be discovered only after it had been used once or twice by Argentina, Britain or the United States. In such an event, it will undoubtedly give rise to a grave diplomatic incident on the grounds that a belligerent nation was using a neutral nation for a base of military operations.

(*Part 2*—badly garbled)

It should not be difficult to visualize the fact that such an eventuality would have an exceedingly grave bearing on the relations between Japan and Argentina. (The circumstances would be entirely different from those in occupied China.)

Since the incident involving the Nazis, the customs officials here have become very strict. Even assuming that we succeed in getting the machine into the country, we would face constant danger in its safekeeping. When these points are taken into consideration one can see what grave diplomatic consequences this project may have.

Did the Navy discuss this matter with the Foreign Office before attempting to carry it out? Will you please give all the points given above your careful study and advise me of your opinion. ----- (few more lines unreadable.)

(Part 3 not available.)

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 672

FROM: Buenos Aires — September 30, 1941
TO: Santiago — Circular # 150.

(Message to Tokyo # 429.)

(Part 1 of 3.)

1. On the 23rd a conspiracy centering around certain air force officers stationed at Cordoba and Paruna was discovered. The Government immediately arrested Lt. Col. SUSTAITA[c] and Maj. MENENDEZ, directors at Cordoba and Paruna respectively, together with a large number of other officers, at the same time posting emergency guards at their establishments. The plot did not amount to much and on the following day it was announced that national tranquillity had been maintained.

The Commander in Chief of the Air Force, General SUROAGA[a] was ordered suspended on the 25th. He was regarded as being the man behind the scene in the affair. Nationalist Gen. JUAN MOLINA, Republican Gen. MENENDEZ and the two Admirals REINARUTO[b] and SURATSO[c] were also connected with it. It appeared to be principally a movement among naval and military men.

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[a] Kana spelling. ZULOAGA
[b] Kana spelling. RENALDO ?
[c] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 673

FROM: Buenos Aires — September 30, 1941
TO: Santiago — Circular # 150.

(Message to Tokyo # 429) (Part 2 of 3.)

These fellows have lately come out in candid controversy against the Government. They resent the existence of Anglo-American influence in administrative circles. They have planned

darkly to stop the establishment in their country of military bases for the joint defense of the western hemisphere. They have plotted to overthrow the present Assembly and to set up a military dictatorship. The military section also has absorbed many of these ideas and so the Anglo-American wing in the present government, together with the Minister of the Interior, etc., are much concerned over the present conspiracy and have issued strict orders that those implicated shall be punished severely.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 674

FROM: Buenos Aires — September 30, 1941
TO: Santiago — Circular # 150.

(Message to Tokyo # 429) (Part 3 of 3.)

2. The party out of power is dead-set against Governmental interference in the Gubernatorial election in the state of Buenos Aires to be held at the end of the year. They are also wrought up about the question of whether the German Ambassador will have to go or not. In the last ordinary Assembly they opposed an emergency meeting of the Argentine Assembly and fought the Government bitterly. They have been consistently hostile and critical concerning the Government proposals related to the financing of the purchase of agricultural products to the extent of 5,000,000,000 pesos and the purchase from the United States of $110,000,000 worth of arms. The Government, however, on the 26th requested the Assembly to consider these proposals immediately. So, it seems that there will be more or less wrangling before the Assembly winds up its business. Before the next ordinary session opens next June, without calling an emergency session the Government will do everything in its power to turn elections of every sort to its own advantage. The administration claims, with respect to the question of the German Ambassador, that diplomatic prerogatives belong to the Government alone, and influential circles in the Assembly share this view. The Administration claims the right to handle these matters as it pleases. Thus, political strife in this country is over a variety of problems and is gradually growing sharper and sharper. This report is based principally on the investigation of one of my spies.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 675

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) — October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

When CASTILLO, the Acting President, attended a religious ceremony in Rosario[a] on the 6th, he spoke at the Chamber of Commerce there. In his speech he asserted that as the patriotic character of the Argentine people was something distinctly Argentine, the various external and internal problems must be settled by keeping in mind the object of complying with the needs and interests of the Argentine people. To assure this plan, a definite policy in support of neutrality had been developed by the Government. The connections of foreigners resident in Argentina with various belligerent countries was not questioned as long as Argentine laws, as well as the development of Argentine traditions, religion and racial manifestations were respected. He said that he believed it was the natural duty to preserve this

(position). He furthermore stated that an immovable policy of neutrality had already been definitely established. He especially pointed out the numerous anti-German movements of the English and American circles and the party out of power, particularly the committee of the lower house investigating Nazi activities.

---

[a] Argentine river port in Santa Fe Province.

Trans. 10-20-41

No. 676

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) September 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #427.

Re your #213[a].

I think you understand the attitude of the Argentine authorities in regard to our sending ships from my wire #426[a]. The Tōkai Maru is here now and there is plenty of freight, but I wonder if we may not have difficulty in getting even enough fuel to go one way. Please give us a schedule for loading and fueling the host here; also send us as soon as possible details on the Tōa Maru sailing from Yokohama September 1st.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 677

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #441.

Part 1 of 2.

Re my #332[a].

The head of the trade bureau told me on the 8th that Argentina has not yet settled on a definite policy with regard to import and export, and considering that the emergency is becoming more severe as time goes on ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- affecting somewhat the exports of all countries, Argentina is finding difficulty in obtaining supplies of tin, tinplate and other materials used in industry and national defense. (The same department head told NAKAMURA several days ago of difficulty in obtaining aluminum, antimony, iron plate, jute, silk thread, and rayon.) Because of the restrictions on the importation of fuel oil and the shortage of power, some factories have had to close. The government is making every effort to obtain these supplies and, if Japan is having similar difficulty in obtaining raw materials, a future conference ----- ----- ----- -----.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 678

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #441.

Part 2 of 2.

He believes there is need for a conference in the exchange of necessary goods. The trade of both countries depends chiefly on shipping service and in the present shortage of ships, if Japan can continue some sailings, even though Argentina is suffering a fuel shortage, they should share a part of it with Japan. It will be necessary to work out some kind of a plan with the minister of the Navy, but, if meetings are held with him, he believes the results will be favorable.

The above is all from the head of the trade bureau, and agrees in principle with what I have often said before. This is just for whatever use you can make of it.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 679

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #448.

Part 2 of 2[a].

Because of America's freezing laws and this country's currency control, even if a letter of credit were issued as in paragraph 4, it could not be cashed in banks here, so we finally advised him to consult Shanghai. Until they have a definite plan which takes care of details, we do not want to commit ourselves.

For your information.

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[a] Part 1 not available.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 680

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 12, 1941
TO: Sao Paulo #77.

To be handled in Government Code.

The Maruouchi Police Station is detaining MITSUURA of the Asahi newspaper on suspicion of being a (Leftist ?). It is understood that they have found it necessary to investigate as material evidence a letter written by this man to SUKE—ONAGA living at #26 Rua Necondesuraze—[a]. Now, should it be your opinion that upon receipt of this letter ONAGA would refuse to hand it over to you, or that he might refuse to tender it on the basis that it might compromise TADAO MITSUURA, then I would like to have you take such steps as are necessary to make representations to the competent authorities of the country to which you are accredited so that they will release this letter into your keeping prior to its delivery to ONAGA. Upon receipt of this letter, please dispatch it immediately to us.

Furthermore, this letter is written on five or six sheets of ordinary stationery and is enclosed in a square Marunouchi Hotel envelope. This letter dated ----- is understood to have been deposited in the Central Post Office on ----- day.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 681

FROM: Santiago, Chile (Yamagata) August 26, 1941
TO: Rio #18.

(Message from Tokyo #110.)

Colonel NAOKATA UCHINOMIYA (43 years old) is going to his new post as Military Attaché at the Embassy in Brazil on the Tōa Maru. Please make reservations on the plane from Valparaiso to Rio on the same schedule as Secretary INOUE. (See my message #106[a].)

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 682

FROM: Rio (Ishii) August 28, 1941
TO: Washington Circular #225.

(Message to Tokyo #368.)

The matter of the sale of German, Italian, and Danish ships tied up in Brazilian harbors to the Brazilian Government is as reported by the local Domei communication. According to the confidential statement of the German Ambassador, Germany, in regard to the price, is presumably holding out for payment in foreign money.

Furthermore, President MOORE of the Moore-McCormack Steamship Company recently came to Brazil and is understood to be conferring with Brazilian officials here. In addition, the president of the United States Export and Import Bank hurriedly flew to this city, and it is believed that his being here has some connection with this matter of the sale of these ships.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 683

FROM: Tokyo (TIXNS) (Head, General Affairs Dept.) September 16, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro #873.

(2 parts—complete.)

Part 1

1. Reference your wire #35[a].
It will be all right to include all types of diamonds.
2. Reference your wire 38[a].

In regard to the purchase-money for diamonds, since, according to an investigation made by the Yokohama Specie Bank, the MITSUI amount has already been remitted, and since the War Ministry is sending you 150,000 yen, please make your acquisitions within those limits.

Part 2

Please report to the War Ministry the amount of money necessary for acquiring high grade mica and quartz as well as the advisability of remitting it.

3. Reference your wire # 41[a].

Return passage has been engaged for on the AZUMA MARU which leaves Iquique on October 24th.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 3-21-45

No. 684

FROM: Rio (Ishii)
TO: Tokyo

September 12, 1941
394.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re your Circular # 1906[a].

1. Special correspondence agency, The "Agencia Sur Americana." (It is a subsidiary of the Stefani.) Recently an agreement was reached between Domei and the Director of the South American newspaper Bureau, and now, based on that contract, we are negotiating with the ----- bureau for permits with regard to Domei report reception.

2. There are no objections to the wave length and the time as they actually are now, but there are times when the sensitivity is weak, and we requested strongly for an improvement in the -----.

3. Other than this, everything is to remain as it is now.

4. Of course, most everyone understands that English texts are for home consumption, but as far as Japanese texts are concerned, there is very little appeal to the subscribers around here. Hereafter, we will broadcast only different types of reports to the other areas (the ----- American relations as soon as possible). At the same time, we want a special commentator to explain the current ----- question.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 0-00-00

No. 685

FROM: Rio (Ishii)
TO: Tokyo

September 12, 1941
394.

(Part 2 of 2.)

I have had the radio bureau listen in on Japanese text propaganda, and besides applying it in this area, I am taking steps to have it disseminated through official channels to our Nationals

living in the interior who are under the jurisdiction of this office. What is more, this same propaganda is published in translation in the San Paulo "Correo Paulistano" and the Brazil Asahi. Until we arrange for permission from ----- special correspondent concerning English text propaganda, we are supplying the various newspapers with Stefani wires; but this Agency has low business funds and its sphere of influence is not very extensive, and up to now we have not made very great use of it.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 686

FROM: Rio (Ishii) October 10, 1941
TO: Lisbon Circular # 280.

Message to Tokyo as # 423.

Part 1 of 2.

Based upon secret reports, the German Ambassador has turned over to me the following information:

1. A few months ago, the Portuguese Government made representations to the Brazilian Government requesting that the latter assume the "protection" of the Portuguese Atlantic possessions in the event that Germany or the United States threatened to occupy them or should Portugal herself be invaded by Germany, causing the government to flee to Brazil.

2. The Brazilian Government replied that due to their relations with the United States they would be unable to accept this responsibility in the event that the United States took over the islands. However, should Portugal be invaded by any other power, protection of the islands would be undertaken through Pan-American cooperation with Brazil being assigned the role of "symbolic protection."

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 687

FROM: Rio (Ishii) October 10, 1941
TO: Lisbon Circular # 280.

Message to Tokyo as # 423.

Part 2 of 2.

3. Up to the present the Portuguese have made no definite response to the above and no progress has been made in the negotiations. The German Ambassador stated further that although the meaning of the phrase "symbolic protection" is not clear, he supposed it meant that the flags of Portugal and Brazil would be flown side by side.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 688

FROM: Tokyo (WOTNS) (Head, General Affairs Section) August 16, 1941
TO: Washington (RIKUGUN) # 374.

If it is possible to send out of the country the short-wave radio set and the BUICK car for the use of the Chilean Attaché's office, after you purchase them, please request that they be forwarded to Chile by (?steamship?). Then please wire the freight charges for this shipment and the time required for the trip by sea.

We would like you to wire us again if you decide to make the purchase. The plan is to have the purchase-money entrusted to Colonel WAKE when (?he visits?) America.

Trans. 4-25-45

No. 689

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 228.

The firms and kaha[a] in this country have of late begun to demand strict advance payments for exports of copper ore. Thanks to the efforts of the Argentine Government and to -----of German banks, we finally managed to get enough money to conclude a contract. It is impossible to purchase other ores and wool unless we raise $250,000. We are at present negotiating for ----- -----, but we cannot tell whether we shall succeed or not. Furthermore, I would like to get $100,000 from a German bank at once, with the Yokohama Specie Bank furnishing the guarantee. Would it be all right to commence negotiations for this purpose? Please reply at once.

All the important persons I have contacted take a friendly attitude towards Japan, but say that they could not lend money at Chile's risk. The attitude of the Foreign Minister is the same. If we are going to purchase products from Argentina, we would have to take the risk and have Japanese products shipped into the country. Will you therefore, at once arrange to have the Noto Maru sail.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 690

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 247.

(Part 1 of 3.)[a]

The enlightenment of newspapers published by civilians has shown ----- ----- results, carried on as it has been through newspapers, radio, motion pictures, lectures, and printed matter. Fortunately, unlike other South American countries, this country has not done anything like instituting an anti-Japanese embargo and has been friendly in its attitude toward us. Therefore, we need on the one hand to help this feeling on, and on the other hand to make use of the advantage this country enjoys in being an exporter to the United States of copper

(----- tons); iron; nitrate (----- ----- tons) and other important materials, and to take advantage also of the undercurrent of anti-United States feeling and thus endeavor to create an atmosphere favorable to maintenance of neutrality and opposition to the United States. This, you are already aware of -----.

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[a] For Part 2 of 3. See III, 691. Part 3 of 3 not available.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 691

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #247.

(Part 2 of 3.)[a]

Therefore, in order to get the greatest results at comparatively small cost, we would like to carry out the following new plan from September by intensifying the work, which, by nature of the country, should be carried on unremittingly. We would like to have you consider the plan to increase by 15,500 yen the funds requisite for the seven months, and arrange to have it sent together with the second installment. Furthermore, we intend to wire you the plans for interception work as soon as they have been completed.

1. An increase of 500 yen a month resulting from transference of daily (radio?) broadcasts to the newly established ----- ----- broadcasting station (this is said to be the highest powered broadcasting station in South America, capitalized to a large extent by ERASURISU[b] and KURUCHAGA[b], a former speaker of the Upper House).

2. An increase of 900 yen a month for reprinting in the morning paper, el Chileno (a newspaper maintaining an anti-United States attitude), the Domei news which has hitherto been published in the evening paper, El Imparcial.

---

[a] Part 3 not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 692

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) October 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #274.

As a result of the recent story, since there is a chance to interest "Diario Illustrado" and El Chileno" in relaying a series on impressions of Japan, will you please arrange for dispatches from Domei about once a week and cable us beforehand the time and wave length.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 693

FROM: Santiago (Yamagata) October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #281.

Re your message #143[a].

Re my message #279[a].

Reply wanted. As we have had no more contacts through recorded broadcast we tried this morning (10th) but with unsatisfactory results. (Are now trying another time.) Now, instead of the simple statement in the local papers by the U.P. correspondents ABURUTO and IGLESIAS that friendly talks have been started, wouldn't it seem more appropriate to publish full details in a special message as I suggested in my telegrams #274[b]?

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-20-41

No. 694

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Santiago #122.

Secretary KAWASAKI is ordered to Japan.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 695

FROM: Santiago (Sakamoto) October 14, 1941
TO: Bogota #10.

Courier MATSU (mo ?) to (Passport #------) a courier from this office, carrying secret documents, plans to reach there, the -----.

Trans. 10-29-41

No. 696

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #133.

I returned home from Ecuador, the country to which I am also accredited, on the 16th.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 697

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #134.

Strictly secret.

We have discovered a telegram which a Tokyo commercial concern sent to its representative here in plain text (a message of the 14th from Tokyo Asano concerning the purchase of platinum). Now, this message is the same as a code message we handled for them some days ago. If this sort of thing keeps up, not only will it damage the imports of our concerns at home, but it will jeopardize the good names of myself and the Naval Attaché. We must protect the secrecy of our codes. If this sort of secret leaks out, under the delicate circumstances of today no longer will we be able to make purchases of this product. We have to look out for the future. Please advise the dispatchers of such messages to be more careful and have them to get in closer touch with the censors.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 698

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) October 1, 1941
TO: Mexico City #027.

Regarding Item 1 of your cable #24[a].

(1) SUGANAM of Bogota received on the 20th a cable from Mitsui of New York. This included orders for our ----- plan. The cable not only included detailed explanations of this plan, but the instructions were definitely wrong.

I believe that it is not safe to wire between New York, Tokyo and here regarding this matter, and so ask you to request the Navy Department to order Mitsui to watch their step in this matter.

(2) Due to local press comments calling attention of the public to the suspicion of large amount of ----- being secretly exported from this country to Japan and Germany, the government here is sending secret investigators around the country to check on things. For this reason, I believe Japan should watch its step even more carefully at this time.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 699

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) October 7, 1941
TO: Mexico City #028.

To Naval Attaché.

We have been continuing to have good luck in obtaining them and for that reason our funds are running low. Please bring a suitable amount with you when you come here.

Trans. 10-25-41

No. 700

FROM: Lima (Sakamoto) September 10, 1941
TO: Bogota #10.

There being no vacancies on the plane, WATANABE and MAKIZAWA will leave Callao by the Santa Luisa on the 11th, and, after landing at Guayaquil, will go to Quito by train.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 701

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) September 18, 1941
TO: Washington #13.

(Circular.) Message to Tokyo #158.

The President of Ecuador, having had the following very confidential report from Quito concerning Martinez, talked to me fully about it and because of its extreme interest I am telegraphing it on to you:

1. There is plenty of cause for belief that Peru's aggression upon Ecuador is being incited by the Standard Oil Company which possesses vested interests in the southern part of Peru and which wants to grab the interests held by the Shell Company in the Cuenca and adjacent areas of Ecuador.

2. The United States has sold Peru fifteen bombers but when Ecuador tried to place an order for five planes it could get no response. (Due to the failure of the United States to ship military supplies, Ecuador is unable to purchase any.)

3. The above attitude on the part of the United States has brought Ecuador to the depths of despair and Ecuador cannot therefore subscribe to the American plan of solidarity. Although it appears that a meeting for this purpose will soon be called, as long as the border question between Peru and Ecuador is not settled, Ecuador will find it impossible to send a representative.

Relay to -----, Mexico, Buenos Aires and Santiago.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 702

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) September 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #159.

Re my #149[a].

Regarding the matter of the return of the Japanese experts to Ecuador, MARTINEZ and N----- had both told us that their return was not necessary for the present but the report also reached us that the Government was tired of waiting for them. NAGUMO then pressed the Foreign Minister for a definite decision with the result that the Minister promised to have MARTINEZ (who is very intimate with the President) make a special report to the President on the matter.

This was done and I understand that the President's attitude has undergone a great transformation, that he was very polite and said (1) that he entertains only the highest regard for the Japanese Company and that all suspicions formerly directed against the Japanese experts had been dispelled, and (2) that owing to the unstable conditions existing both within and

without the country perhaps the return of the experts is a bit premature but that possibly by the end of this month he may ask them to come.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–9–41

No. 703

FROM: Havana (Nanjo) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #64.

Strictly secret.

The following is confidential information given me by the Peruvian Minister here relative to the (dispute?) between his country and Ecuador.

At present negotiations are being carried on between the United States and Ecuador for a 99 year lease of the Galapagos. However, unlike the other South American countries, Ecuador is not in a position to withstand United States pressure. Therefore, realizing that the Islands will be grabbed in any case, the Government is intending to make best use of the matter along the following lines:

1. By creating a border dispute between Peru and Ecuador to engineer the most advantageous solution by seeking United States aid in the name of hemisphere cooperation. Mere (local?) settlement, for various reasons, would not be profitable to Ecuador.

2. To take advantage of the incident in order to get the United States to lend her (war materials ?) and arms.

As to 1, although there was an unpleasant action on the part of Argentina, because Brazil, seeing what the motive of the incident was, withdrew from mediation, the situation as it stands remains disadvantageous to Ecuador.

(WELLES summoned the Peruvian Ambassador in Washington and made a dark threat by not referring to mediating in this incident but by simply stating that it had been decided to give Ecuador two destroyers and thus he invited the ire of the Peruvian Government.)

Please transmit ----- of this message from the Foreign Office to interested offices.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 10–3–41

No. 704

FROM: Lima (Sakamoto) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #259.

Re my #257[a].

(I have heard that the Azuma Maru is under the control of the Navy ?) so please contact that Department regarding the possibility of having that ship touch port in this country on the return voyage (to pick up accumulated shipments ?). It is expected that it will be possible to load 2,000 tons (in addition to ?) the amount previously decided upon. Please (send a tele-

gram ?) to IWAI (telling him about this ?). Please send an immediate reply regarding the results.
Relayed to Buenos Aires.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–23–41

No. 705

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 10, 1941
TO: Lima # 160.

Re your # 243[a].

We are sending to the Finance Minister an initialed set of European style eating vessels to accommodate 24 people specially manufactured by "Nagoya China". We are sending his chief assistant five Cloisonne flower vases. Tell them that we present them with our compliments and maybe we can get what we want from them more easily this way.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11–5–41

No. 706

FROM: Lima (Sakamoto) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 268.

Re your # 162[a].

According to what someone in contact with Itō Chū[b] tells me, the retailer, Rothchilds, have no objections providing the Peruvian government's approval is secured. Since negotiations with the Peruvian government seem well nigh impossible, let's let the matter drop for awhile.

[a] Not available.
[b] A company.

Trans. 11–6–41

No. 707

FROM: Lima (Yamagata) October 14, 1941
TO: Panama # 15.

Secretary MATSUMOTO (passport ——–) plans to leave this office carrying secret documents, arriving in Cristobal on the Imperia on the 12th.

Trans. 11–6–41

No. 708

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 14, 1941
TO: Lima # 17.

Please reserve a place for one on the Terukawa Maru as MATUMOTO desires to sail on that ship.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 709

FROM: Lima (Sakamoto) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 267.

Re your # 17 to the Consul[a].

There is difficulty in the remittance of travel expense for Secretary KIHARA, successor to Secretary MATSUMOTO, causing postponement of his sailing. Please give this your consideration so that he may sail immediately.

---

[a] See III, 708.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 710

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 14, 1941
TO: Lima # 164.

Re your # 262[a].

1. There is now space for 135 tons of cargo on the Terukawa Maru for the 300,000 sol each of wool and -----. Will you, therefore, arrange to have these materials purchased at once?

2. Although the proper procedure with regard to these materials is for you to receive them from the Peruvian Government and have the related firms handle them, we have decided to have the respective firms import them and to issue the firms letters of credit for the purpose. I would, therefore, like to have you have our firms there handling the materials transfer to you the purchasing price and to have you carefully supervise, so that there may be no misunderstanding, the settlement of the price between the Peruvian Government and the sellers on the one hand and our firms handling the materials on the other.

3. Since there is, at present, no prospect of assigning a ship for the importation of salt, (there is no space on board the Alabama Maru because this ship must take on other important materials), will you get the Peruvian Government to promise 250,000 sol worth of salt by telling them that we shall load it on a ship as soon as we can assign a ship for the purpose. (One method would be to have IWAI sign a contract with the Peruvian government.) We would like to remit the price each time we import the salt.

4. I would like to have you encourage the dealers to sell sugar in Peru and for you by all means to secure a supply.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–27–41

No. 711

FROM: Bogota (Yanai) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #180.

I heard a rumor from the Argentine Ambassador to the effect that the *Terukawa* wishes to take aboard ----- freight at Callao but that because of difficulties it was not yet decided whether she would stop there. If it can at least be definitely arranged that the boat come into harbor there, or if there is a possibility of obtaining an official permit from -----, I want to report the above fact beforehand to the Argentine Ambassador and ----- ----- -----.

Trans. 10–28–41

No. 712

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 14, 1941
TO: Bogota #90.

Re your #174[a].

I am very sorry to say that the Terukawa Maru will not be able to touch at "Be". Please have a talk with the Ambassador with a view to having him take this ship, for instance, by having his baggage transferred at Callao.[b]

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Chief seaport of Peru.

Trans. 10–27–41

No. 713

FROM: Tokyo August 6, 1941
TO: Canton #138.

Message #396 dated August 3, 1941 from Hongkong to the Foreign Minister.

Because it looks as though the British were going to enforce freezing legislation, the Japanese here believe that in the future Japanese ships may not be permitted to touch at this port and it is causing great unrest; consequently, they are living in a state of mortal fear and have come to this office many times to request the evacuation of their families. Since there are many among the Japanese who are anxious to be evacuated, when can you arrange to send a Japanese ship to this port? Please wire at once.

Trans. 8–12–41

No. 714

FROM: Tokyo August 6, 1941
TO: Canton # 137.

Message to Hongkong # 189.

Re your # 396[a].

The Communications Bureau for the time being fears the occurrence of a disturbance in official circles and for that reason is understood to have stopped the entry of Japanese ships into your port. Therefore, at the present time they are studying the securing of guarantees from the British in regard to the departure of Japanese ships from Hongkong. In your place alone I would like to have you investigate the possibility of securing such guarantees. Please wire me the results.

Furthermore, please consider the possibility of evacuating Japanese in Hongkong by way of Canton.

The caption message has been wired to Canton, as well as your message referred to above.

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[a] See III, 713.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 715

FROM: Tokyo August 12, 1941
TO: Canton # 144.

Message from Hongkong # 406 on the 8th.

1. With regard to the detention of Japanese ships by the civil administration here, though we have not been able to secure a declaration that they would not issue such an order, I believe that we should take this opportunity to try to get some assurance with regard to their future steps. With regard to the safe departure from this port of our vessels, for the time being at least I do not anticipate any questions arising. At present the Shirogane Maru is leaving the port of Canton without any obstructions being put in her way. Currently the Takuun Maru of the Japan Aquatic Products Company is now in port. No question has arisen with regard to her departure from this port.

2. As a result of preliminary investigations, 110 persons, made up of the families of staff members and the womenfolk of Japanese resident here, are to be evacuated. However, all of the mail steamers leaving Canton are filled to capacity and we do not anticipate another passenger steamer during this month. Should you have no objection to instructing the Kamo Maru leaving the port of Kakao on August 20th bound for Tokyo to touch at this port, I would like to have you arrange with the competent bureaus that this ship be so instructed and to discharge these evacuees at Nagasaki or -----. This ship could load 500 tons of steel, sheet and bars for the Mitsui. With regard to this cargo, I have already arranged with the civil authorities here to issue export permits in the event it is decided to load the material upon this ship.

3. After you have agreed to send the Kamo Maru, please arrange to have the following ----- done with regard to this vessel:

a. Please take appropriate measures with the full expectation of detailed inspection of the cargo by the civil authorities here.

b. See to it that appropriate preparations are made so that it will not be necessary to load fuel, water and other supplies in the harbor.

Trans. 8–15–41

No. 716

FROM: Tokyo August 10, 1941
TO: Canton # 136.

(Message to Hongkong # 186.)

(Strictly Secret.)

From the Chief of the East Asia Bureau.

In view of the present critical situation, I think it is advisable to evacuate as soon as possible the Japanese women and children who live under your jurisdiction. However, if it is made known that this instruction originated with me, it would have a bad effect. Will you, therefore, issue a secret order for the withdrawal of women and children as if the withdrawal is being carried out upon their own initiative and give them proper directions. Will you also have the male subjects under your jurisdiction withdrawn with the exception of those who find it absolutely necessary to remain. Will you see to it—although this is a matter which I need not point out to you—that at the time of their withdrawal they will not cause a noticeable congestion and that they will be extremely careful of what they say and do. You had better, if necessary, get the Consul-General in Canton to cooperate with you in this.

Trans. 8–12–41

No. 718

FROM: Tokyo August 23, 1941
TO: Singapore # 227.

Re your # 451[a].

There was a news dispatch from your place on the 16th to the effect that Japanese in the vicinity of Johore had been ordered to evacuate. We are already aware of the mountain climbing incident through your caption telegram but if the above report is true what Japanese are meant and what will be the effect on ----- and what steps have been taken preceding and following the event. Please investigate and wire details.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–16–41

No. 719

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador) August 20, 1941
TO: Panama #1.

Lieut. Col. (or Commander) NAKANO, Assistant Military (or Naval) Attaché at this office; Commander (or Lieut. Col.) YOSHII, Assistant Naval (or military) Attache at this office; HASEGAWA, Domei Special correspondent; NAKAMURA, Asahi special correspondent; and two other persons will arrive in Trinidad the latter part of *September (?)*. They wish to return to Japan via your place and *(?)* . Please *inform this office (?)* if there is a ship going to *(?)* around the middle of October (?). Also, please telegraph your opinion concerning the advisability of their returning via your place in view of their status and of the present situation.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 720

FROM: Tokyo August 15, 1941
TO: London #251.

Re your #*565*(?) (or #*564*) (?)[a].

The question as to whether the Imperial Government should accept this proposal or not (the exchange of commodities for commodities, i.e. barter) is profoundly related to the political problem. These two problems must be considered judiciously in regard to their bearing on each other. England, who by freezing funds and abrogating treaties, etc., has herself caused the stoppage of trade between the two countries, now suggests such patch work measures and since we do not immediately evince interest in them, she makes this proposal. To jump at these proposals immediately without sufficiently investigating them would be to expose our hand, unduly. After considering the various points carefully there seems to be no objection to "take up" this proposal as a method of settlement of the various banks' financial problems. Therefore please communicate our intentions to Kato and through him arrange negotiations with the British and N.E.I. banks.

At the same time please sound out the other party in regard to the following points and when you have ascertained their real intentions please wire that together with your opinion of the matter, (having made contacts with the departments concerned).

1. This proposal seems to be concerned primarily with payments. If this were put into effect just what British commodities do they intend to supply us with, (as far as we are concerned this is the important point). Again what commodities are they expecting from us.
2. Just what is included in British colonies. (For instance, what about Burma?)
3. If this exchange of commodities proposed is put into effect just to what extent does Britain intend to facilitate the use of Japanese ships.

In regard to the accounts of foreign diplomatic establishments, while we have no objections to putting this into effect if it is to be limited to England proper it will be very disadvantageous to us; therefore, if possible please arrange to have it include the whole British Empire.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 0-00-00

No. 721

FROM: Tokyo August 18, 1941
TO: Hsinking #502.

(Part 1 of 2.)

(Message from Iran to Foreign Minister #176, Part 1 & 2 of 4.)

The following is the gist of information obtained by the Head of the Mitsubishi Branch here from an Iranian, HOROMUSHAHARU[a] of the Mitsubishi Branch in connection with his trip to Basra[b].

1. At present the British are landing a great number of Indian and Australian troops at this port, (an average of 5 ships daily). Together with the previous number of 90,000 the present total reaches 200,000.

There is a daily increase in the number of ships; for example, a few days previous 27 ships arrived (among these 7 American ----- ships) 180 military trucks were landed. In addition there were transported 100 B.I. speed boats equipped with bombs (depth bombs?) and machine guns.

2. Although at Basra they are using 28 cranes (from 5 to 50 tons) for rapid unloading, a large number of British boats are waiting in the outer harbor to be unloaded.

3. The British army has cornered practically all of the lighters[e] in Basra (from 20 tons to 100 tons numbering between 350 and 400) and have put on plank covers. This is soon to be preparation for landing in front of the enemy.

4. They are now using the railway which has been completed from Basra harbor to Koweit[c] and it also appears that connections will be made with Bahrein Island[d].

5. The head of the Mitsubishi Branch obtained the information from a relative of a newspaper owner, an influential member of Parliament, MOBANGAARU, that the British connected Imperial Bank has recently employed a great number of Jews in the collection of information. Also the director (of this bank?) has been attacking MOBANGAARU because of the increasing pro-German attitude of the general public. Moreover MOBANGAARU on the 5th at the commemoration of the promulation of the constitution stated to the Parliament members that England and the Soviet were pressing Iran unbearably and emphasized that it was necessary to make great preparedness.

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[a] Kana spelling.
[b] Seaport in Eastern Iraq on Persian Gulf.
[c] Sultanate under British protection south of Basra and the capital of the same name.
[d] British controlled Island lying 20 miles off the central part of the Southwest coast of the Persian gulf.
[e] A barge-like vessel used in loading or unloading ships.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 722

FROM: Tokyo August 18, 1941
TO: Hsinking #502.

(Part 2 of 2.)

(Message from Iran to Foreign Minister #176, Part 3 & 4 of 4.)

I went to the German Minister here for confirmation. He did not believe this as the numbers were much too large and treated it lightly as English propaganda even though the Mitsubishi

Head has known these two men, previously mentioned, for a long time and affirms that they are not persons to be used in British propaganda.

Since the beginning of the Russo-German war rumors have been very prevalent here in this country with the growing critical condition. A few days ago there was the rumor that Great Britain had requested the transport of troops through this country (this was denied by the foreign office). There was also the rumor circulated that the American Legation on the 5th secretly advised the withdrawal of Americans living in Iran. It would be a hasty conclusion to judge that the feeling of uneasiness centering around (the ?) Bazaar would be a sign of British movement against this country. Also Russia is feared. It is only a matter of time before the Germans will have disposed of the Russians and will then encroach upon the Northern border of Iran. At this time Great Britain, as heretofore has been the practice, will take the opportunity of forming a "buffer state" of Iran for the protection of India (it is seen that the statements of Secretary of Foreign Affairs, EDEN, against the German Fifth Columnists is only an excuse). It is hardly possible to say that there is no danger of the English making the first move in the protection of English oil companies. In this respect the German Minister in this country is (with the prospect of drawing Iran into the Axis alignment, should the English make a movement causing a clash with the Army, which therefore, would allow the Germans to come in to help the Iranians) trying to follow at this time the policy of not irritating the Iranians in any manner.

Please transmit this to Manchuria.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 723

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Singapore

August 25, 1941
233.

We understand oppressive measures are being taken against Japanese business by the police. Kobayashi has talked with them. He might file appeal with help of Japanese Association and your office. The Kobayashi firm has been registered at the courthouse for the past three years and has been doing business by virtue of permits each year based on this. We desire this firm to continue, but to meet the control measures of the authorities, we wish to have books, etc., put in order, and then be able to face the future without fear of oppression, and in a way that will not aggravate their oppression. We will therefore lodge strong protest with Ambassador Craigie and strengthen control of British propaganda in Japan. You will also report without delay any further move on their part.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 724

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: London

August 26, 1941
273.

Re your # 593[a].

At the cabinet meeting of the 26th, it was decided to continue the conversations in this matter along the idea of your Part 5. After immediately studying this, please wire instructions.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-29-41

No. 725

FROM: Tokyo August 27, 1941
TO: London # 274.

Re my # 273[a].

1. Conditions are as you have stated in your successive telegrams and as England has specifically pointed out, this agreement is a business agreement for the purpose of liquidating the trade balances between the banks.

The negotiations should be carried out between the Yokohama Specie Bank and the British Dutch Bank and it is only natural that there should be no public announcement of them during the negotiations nor after an agreement is reached.

2. Inasmuch as the actual transportation will be effected largely by the use of Japanese ships and inasmuch as the exchange of goods for goods will be impossible unless England agrees to supply the necessary fuel for the ships and also to extend the use of all necessary facilities to our ships please have Kato present in writing this proposal. (In order to facilitate the import and export of British and Japanese goods the two countries concerned do mutually agree that for Japanese ships entering and leaving British ports and for British ships entering and leaving Japanese ports the country concerned under the terms of reciprocity shall furnish said ships with sufficient fuel for a round trip and all other necessities) to the other party and have them concur in it. There should be a telegram from the Specie Bank to Kato in regard to the terms of the business agreement.

Furthermore we desire assurance that Britain also will take precautions to see that there is absolutely no official announcement of it to the public.

---

[a] See III, 724.

Trans. 9-2-41

No. 726

FROM: Tokyo August 27, 1941
TO: London # 275.

From Specie Bank main office to Branch Manager Kano in your city.

In the matter of the "barter" payments agreement between Japan and Britain, it has been decided that this bank will do all the negotiating. Therefore you will receive directions from the Embassy and take matters up as you deem best. It has been decided to accept the agreement practically as they submitted it, but you should insist on the following: Revision of articles 4 and 1. Eliminate "at later stage" of article 6. Substitute "shall be arranged" for "is not excluded". Article 1 ----- after 26 July will include moneys exchanged for exports from Japan. Article 3, as result of above this article will be eliminated and the following will be substituted. As a basic principle Japanese accounts in British-Netherlands banks will -----. When it is necessary to have an overdraft suitable measures will be taken by both banks.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 727

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 26, 1941
TO: Singapore #232.

Re my #231[a].

Is it true that the editorial in question was published? If it is, please be more careful in how you direct the operation of this newspaper.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 728

FROM: Tokyo August 28, 1941
TO: Net Circular #1917.

(Message from Singapore #480.)

Re your #232[a].

1. Today when competition is so keen between the two countries in the matter of political education, there is a great deal of difficulty and inconsistency involved in the operation of the *Herald* and in the publication itself of its daily editorials. This newspaper has been informed of the policy it should follow in editorializing; namely, that it should avoid provoking the British authorities; that it should understand that Japan's policy aims at establishment of peace in the Far East and, therefore, does not conflict with the rights and interests of the British; and that the paper should not discuss the European problem too much. Since to direct them how to write each editorial involves the danger of Japan's real policy eventually becoming known, in this matter the editorial writer has been allowed to exercise broad discretion.

2. The editorials are written by an Englishman by the name of JONES. He writes in a clear style and at times criticizes the British policy by mercilessly analyzing it. By thus pouring cold water upon British dogmatism, the newspaper is attracting a considerable number of readers. A month ago the British authorities here, finding this distasteful, had SCOTT, the former Chief of the Far Eastern Section, hint to JONES that it was not a good idea to work on a newspaper in favor of Japan and requested the broadcasting Bureau here to regard him as -----. At that time, I urged JONES to decide freely what he should do in consideration of his position and future, but he let it be known indirectly that he wished to remain on the *Herald*, and he has been on this newspaper ever since.

3. The editorial in question is as given in separate telegram #481[b]. The Reuters Agency here wired only those parts in it which could be used in propaganda for separating Japan from Germany. It is regrettable that we gave the British material for their propaganda.

4. If anyone finds the editorial distasteful, please remind him that is was not written under Japanese direction and that it is not wise to take an editorial in a local paper too (seriously ?).

[a] See III, 727.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 729

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) August 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #154.

(Message to San Francisco #4.)

Re your #1[a].

On the 26th I had a member of my staff call upon the official in charge in the ----- office who, until today, had been out of town on official business. The Foreign Minister's wire to San Francisco #106[a] was given to him in abstract, and he was questioned about the truth of the matter. The official in charge replied, "Code and clear text telegrams between Canadian and American consular offices are absolutely not prohibited, provided the name of the sender and of the recipient are clearly marked 'Japanese Consul'. However, since the entry of this country into the war, orders have been issued that in the event of the sender's name or recipient's name being that of a private individual, regardless of whether it is an official wire, the clearance of such wires should be prohibited. Though we do not know how much inconvenience this will cause, you should so advise the various offices in these areas. Henceforth, only official wires between consular offices of the Japanese Government in Canada and the United States should be clearly marked to and/or from the Japanese Consul or Japanese Consul General."

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 730

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #161.

(Part 3 of 3.)[a]

Local papers have printed a wire from Chungking to the effect that the Canadian Government and the Chungking Government have decided upon an exchange of ministers. In regard to this matter, the papers have stated that the authorities here have refused to make a comment on it, but when I questioned KI[b] concerning this matter, he stated that for many years the two countries had been discussing the matter. He continued, saying, "Overtures along this line have been carried on between China and Canada through the British Ambassador in Chungking. At the present time, the only thing which is to be regretted is that no decisions have as yet been made." KI, having expressed himself in this manner, I replied, "At this date, no decisions having been reached, and relations between Japan and Chungking being what they are, there is no need for any statement. However, should it appear that a decision is to be reached in this matter, I would like to impress you with the necessity of making a prior statement to us unless you wish to deal a severe blow to the public opinion within Japan.

[a] Parts 1 and 2. Not available.
[b] KING (?).

Trans. 9-20-41

No. 731

FROM: Tokyo — August 28, 1941
TO: London — #276.

Re your #599[a].

After receiving your wire, the British Ambassador called requesting permission and facilities for the entrance of a British vessel into a Japanese harbor for the purpose of taking off British residents in the near future. These representations were made on the basis of guarantees given to Ambassador SHIGAMITSU on the occasion of conversations having to do with the Fushimi Maru. They also requested permission for the vessel to leave port when it was ready to depart from Japan. Later, after having discussed this matter with the competent authorities, we made the statement that we would in no way obstruct the passage of a British steamer into Japanese ports or its departure from that port. Furthermore with regard to this British vessel and the British subjects leaving Japan on board her, we made an oral statement that we would grant the same facilities as those which were granted by the British authorities on the occasion of the evacuation of Japanese from Great Britain on board the Fushimi Maru.

2. Please make representations to the British authorities that we expect them to grant similar facilities with regard to the evacuation of Japanese from the British Empire city of Karachi[b] and that we would like to have similar guarantees such as are mentioned above granted to us. Please do your very utmost to make the immediate realization of these guarantees possible so that our ships can navigate to such purpose.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] In British India.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 732

FROM: Tokyo — August 29, 1941
TO: London — #281.

Re your #607[a].

I had an official of this office inquire at the British Embassy and found that the British had reached the hasty conclusion that we intended to have the BVY[b] Maru, which is in Durban, go to Mombasa for the purpose of evacuating the Japanese and also to use the Matsumoto Maru now in Calcutta. I explained that the former ship was returning direct to Japan and that the latter ship had accommodations for only six or seven passengers and hence was out of the question, also that the Hokane Maru, as I wired formerly, was ----- and hence it was necessary to dispatch two Japanese ships for the evacuees. The other party at last agreed to this. Please explain the above to the British authorities there and negotiate for guarantees for two ships to be dispatched for evacuees.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Japanese place name (?).

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 733

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 30, 1941
TO: Singapore #236.

With regard to the *Hakone Maru* now on its way to Bombay en route home, we have been conducting negotiations with the British Ambassador here in Tokyo for -----, the extension of facilities as well as safe transit through the Persian Gulf. The British authorities replied that they were sending vessels to Japan and China to evacuate British and nationals of their allies resident in those areas and that they would give the same guarantees and facilities to the *Hakone Maru* that the Japanese Government would grant British vessels. Since accommodations on the *Hakone Maru* alone are utterly insufficient for the evacuation of Japanese resident in Europe, England, as well as in India and Malay, they have given instructions for guarantees of safe transit to be granted as well as the extension of facilities for two Japanese vessels in addition to the *Hakone Maru* (one vessel would be used for the evacuation of Japanese from the European continent). The British authorities said that provided the Japanese authorities would comply with their representations, they would grant facilities to the *Hakone Maru* in Bombay and permit the embarkation of Japanese nationals at that port. The two other vessels being an absolutely separate issue, fresh representations should be made, they added. They stated that they would be glad to give due consideration to them upon their receipt.

It has been decided that the *Hakone Maru* is to lay over in Bombay according to schedule. The British authorities have decided to retract their demands insofar as this vessel is concerned.

With regard to the two Japanese vessels mentioned above, they have given instructions to issue guarantees of safe conduct if at all possible. After we have received such guarantees, we will give further consideration to the question of Japanese vessels calling at your port. As soon as decisions have been made with regard to the schedule of the return voyage, we will wire you more in detail.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 734

FROM: Tokyo September 4, 1941
TO: Nanking #382.

Message to Shanghai #910.

Recently, the British Netherlands Bank in London attempted to sound out the attitude of the London Branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank regarding the possibility of establishing a settlement account. The Yokohama Specie Bank proposed that, as a preliminary condition to the establishment of the account, a list of materials upon which negotiations may be carried on between *Japan and Britain* should be made and they are at present negotiating for this purpose. This Ministry wishes that some method could be found to actually open trade with British territories and colonies by using as bait for the purpose miscellaneous goods and cotton goods which are lacking in these areas and thus do away with some of the difficulties which have resulted from the freezing of funds. However, in your area, cotton goods are not included among the items which were declared unexportable on April 7th, and exportable on August 1st. This omission is likely to weaken our position in pursuing the aforementioned policy and, so, regardless of the various reasons you may have because of the peculiarities of the economic circumstances in your area, it is necessary that cotton goods be added to the

list of the items which are exportable and thus for us to be prepared to cope with future developments. If you have any opinions differing from the above, please wire them at once.

Furthermore, in the application of the export permit system, please bear in mind the aforementioned points and for the time being ----- ----- ----- in a suitable manner. As an emergency measure ----- ----- in the future, that ----- with the occupied areas and include within the scope of the aforementioned policy. I intend to make a separate study of issuing permission for export of ----- ----- French Indo-China and Thailand.

The negotiations for the establishment of a settlement account ----- ----- are in some ways a delicate matter. This is for your personal information.

This message has been transmitted to Nanking.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 735

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

September 2, 1941
#781.

London to Tokyo as #611 dated 29 August 1941.

Re my (London's) #552[a].

(1) According to subsequent information received, the eight points statement originated with Roosevelt, and Churchill hesitated in the matter of a statement at this time setting forth peace aims, because of the fact that to touch upon the question of the territories of the various European nations would involve very delicate relationships. However, it is said that Roosevelt insisted that inasmuch as the Americans have assumed an increasingly heavy burden of taxation, etc., in connection with giving aid to Britain, and that there would be some dissatisfaction over making such sacrifices and then becoming involved in the war as well if this is only for the sake of Britain, therefore, it is necessary that there be a statement explaining that the European war is not merely Great Britain's problem, but that it is a serious problem involving the restoration of world peace. Upon this, Churchill agreed to it and the statement was adopted practically as presented by Roosevelt.

(2) This eight points statement was immediately sent to the governments of the European countries (the Allies) with a request for their approval, but as expected, it has given rise to a good deal of argument over territorial problems, and it seems that many questions are coming in from the various governments, especially the Soviet.

(3) In Great Britain it is felt that America's attitude toward Japan offers much more leeway than that of Great Britain's, that they have not yet reached the point of despair in regard to relations with Japan, and that accordingly, it is the United States that is putting the "brakes" upon Japanese-British relations. (This is from ----- source.)

(4) In connection with the invasion of Iran, Britain from the first realized something of the effect a conquest by force would have upon neighboring nations, and the difficulties to be encountered in the preservation of peace and order after the conquest, and, therefore, she planned that, after advancing to a certain extent, she could realize her objectives by means of negotiations with the Iran Government. The developments in Iran have lined up with these expectations, and the British are about to stop the further advance of their troops, however, they are now troubled over the fact that the Soviet troops are not yet falling into line with this program, and show no indications of stopping their advance. Furthermore, as the British have already secured the oil fields and the southern part of the trans-Iran railway, the Soviet forces plan to secure the northern end of the railroad and an area adjoining the Caucasus, and

then cease operations for the time being. Neither of the armies have sent troops to Teheran, and it is said that an effort is being made to take up negotiations with the Iran Government.

(5) The Vichy Government has become dissatisfied with General Weygand and General Huntziger has been put in command of all the African forces, (however, as Weygand still enjoys great popularity, he could not be dismissed and has been made second in command). Huntziger in the past has looked up to Weygand as his model, and has even been considered his protege. The Vichy Government, therefore, by this move, are thought to have forestalled any danger of the independence of the African colonies, by getting Weygand and Huntziger to working together.

The British think that if any move is made for the independence of the French African colonies the Germans will immediately send troops into Spain, and, therefore, they have refrained thus far from pushing a movement for the independence of the French African colonies.

Relay from Berlin to Rome.

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[a] See III, 15.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 736

FROM: Tokyo — September 3, 1941
TO: Hsingking — # 542.

Teheran to Tokyo # 207.

Re my (Teheran's) # 189[a] and # 187[b].

The German Legation burned their general documents and made preparations to flee but due to the lightning-like advance of the British and Soviets, the roads have been blocked and in case worst comes to worst and this city is occupied, many Germans will either be captured or go under cover and carry on anti-British and Soviet activities in various places as they did in the previous war and wait for aid from the German army. In either case, if Iran capitulates, the Germans will be in a bad way, British-Soviet occupation will become an accomplished fact and the route to the Caucasus will be open.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 737

FROM: Tokyo — September 5, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 570.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

London to Tokyo # 620, 5th.

Reports of reliability A.

1. Canada's Premier King, who is at present in England, made a long-winded speech at an informal dinner party held by the Mayor of London, the gist of which was that in order to found a new world order based on freedom, it was absolutely necessary for England and America to become one unit in cooperating to that end. King, who has attracted attention by his advocacy of America advancing a step forward from aid-to-Britain to all out cooperation for the attainment of a common objective, has, since his arrival in Britain, emphasized the above without reserve, but on this occasion with the backing of Churchill he made his strongest appeal.

2. Tanner, the head of the Amalgamated Engineers Union, pointing to a statement made by Moore-Brabazon, the Minister of aircraft production, recently in which he said that it was desirable that Germany and Russia fight to exhaustion during which time Britain could step up her production of war materials and take a hand in Europe, attacked him in a trade union meeting in Edinburgh the 2nd (Air Minister Atlee and Economic Warfare Administrator Dalton were present) and caused a political problem, the course of which will be given careful attention during the coming session of Parliament.

3. Relations with Iran (including Turkey). On the occasion of the British-Soviet demand for the expulsion of Germans from Iran, the sympathies of Turkey and Egypt were with Iran. However, when finally it came to the matter of actual invasions both Iran and Turkey, inasmuch as they had not invited (?) Russia, requested that in case Russia invaded Iran, Britain would also enter in order to prevent Russian occupation of Teheran and outraging the populace and King. Were this step not taken the effect would most certainly be unfortunate on the Mohammedan countries and would furnish an excuse for the Turkish military men (most of whom are pro-German) and other elements to collaborate with Germany. It appears that Eden also was in full sympathy with this view. Furthermore, the return of Germany's Ambassador to Turkey, Papen, to his country was widely heralded as a preliminary step to German invasion of Turkey, however, Papen presented no special demands before leaving. Also, in case of a German invasion of Turkey, it would not be easy for Germany to break through the plains of Anatolia, and a failure here might have some bearing on the fate of Germany, hence, it is not expected that Germany will risk this danger at this time.

Moreover, for an Italian squadron to invade the Black Sea, the danger of occupying the Dardanelles Straits still remains. Further, the visit of the German Admiral, Raeder, to Bulgaria (?) is explained as a preparation for an attack on Turkey. However, a well informed person said that this was for the purpose of negotiating the use of Bulgaria's harbors in case of a war in the Black Sea.

4. The Franco-German reconciliation problem. In spite of the story that final peace negotiations are in progress between Vichy and Germany, Italy's claims on French colonies in Africa, Corsica, Nice, Savoy, not to mention the cession of Alsace Lorraine to Germany, is having so great an effect on French public opinion that even Vichy does not dare at present to think of ratification and so there is nothing to do but postpone the peace negotiations. Furthermore, the resignation of Admiral La Rocque (?), Vichy's director of naval strategy, together with the demotion of General Weygand, was caused by the fact that German and Italian supplies to Libya were open to attack by the British fleet, hence, a route to Libya through the harbor of Bizerta in French held Tunis was contemplated and Weygand and La Rocque (?) opposed this, so first there had to be a shake-up, it is said.

Trans. 9–12–41

No. 738

FROM: Shanghai (Horiuchi) September 2, 1941
TO: Singapore Circular # 673.

Message to Tokyo # 1428.

Much attention is being attracted by a San Francisco U.P. dispatch dated the 1st, to the effect that the British Naval Attaché to the United States has stated that in case the United States enters the war she will, of course, have use of Singapore, and also by the following Reuters dispatch from Chungking dated the 1st, both published in the English language newspapers:

"English and Chinese authorities are avoiding statements concerning their collaboration. It is believed that there is no special treaty or agreement between the two countries; nevertheless, there can be no room for doubt that there exists close understanding and cooperation between them. Especially is it clear to the world that the military authorities of the two countries are maintaining close contact. Ambassador KERR says that the relations between England and China are closer than is generally supposed by the world, etc."

Relayed to Nanking, Hongkong, Singapore and Rangoon.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 739

FROM: Tokyo September 10, 1941
TO: Nanking and Shanghai Circular # 2069.

(Part 1 of 2)

Message from Rangoon # 365, Part 1 of 2.

The spy in Lashio was dispatched to the Manshi[a] and Namukamu[a] in order to investigate the distribution and quartering of troops. On the 6th, he arrived here. His report is as follows:

1. The Military conference of British and Chinese military leaders is being held at ----- tsukai[a], thirty-eight (miles/kilos?) from Lashio. Since July, they have met regularly twice a month. That place is filled with Chinese soldiers at the present time and has become a military headquarters. Some few days before, a detachment of Chinese ----- troops had arrived.

2. At Nasikikai[a] six (miles/kilos?) from Lashio, the 2nd -----, British, Kachin[a], ----- (mountain artillery) and Chinese troops are holding maneuvers.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 740

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking and Shanghai

September 10, 1941
Circular 2069.

(Part 2 of 2)

Message from Rangoon # 365, Part 2 of 2.

Chinese troops stationed in Muse[a] and Namukamu[a] (please refer to my # 330[b]) have arrived about 1,000 strong from Zen-----. Chinese troops were seen moving between Kiyutukoku[a] and Wanten[a] by truck, but as they proceeded from the border in the direction of the Teitan[a] region, they did not take the fork of the road which would lead from Lashio to the main highway but proceeded south.

4. No large detachment of troops could be seen to be stationed between Wanten[a] and Shahō,[a] but it is understood that a detachment is to arrive from Kunming during the last ten days of this month. At the present time, around 10 kilometers from Shaho[a] they are constructing a number of military barracks. In Shahō[a] and Bōshi[a] they are constructing ammunition dumps. These are being constructed thirty feet underground and cannot be well observed from the sky. These places are 85 kilos to the east of Wanten.[a]

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[a] Kana spelling.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-19-41

No. 741

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking, Shanghai and Peking

September 24, 1941
Circular 2065.

(Message from Rangoon # 358.)

Spy report.

Total number of trucks moving toward Yunan during August:

Gasoline	3,299 (or 3,289)
Arms and ammunition	2,139
Cotton	332
Miscellaneous equipment	303

As usual, the gasoline is headed for (Wanten?).

Since the 16th, the arms and ammunition has for the most part been going toward Fushan.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 742

FROM: Nanking — September 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #645.

(In 3 parts—complete.)

Singapore to Nanking #2

(Abstract)

The British authorities, becoming nervous over our varied activities, have begun tightening up controls on entry into and travel in this country, and upon speech, newspapers, etc., making it very difficult for us to carry on our propaganda for the Chinese here. Strict censorship is practiced; and any Chinese thought to have any connection with Japan are watched by the police. As a result of suppression of the Communist party by the British authorities, in many cases the activities of Communist elements who have been feigning anti-Japanese feelings have been stopped. Mail from Chinese in occupied territory is opened and censored, so their real thoughts cannot be expressed. Some very suitable propagandists should be sent into this area. The attitude taken by the Chinese here at the time of the outbreak of the China incident, has softened up considerably.

Furthermore, the National Government of China should be led to establish a broadcasting station at once, with Japan's cooperation, to carry on radio broadcast propaganda, setting forth how well established the new National Government has become, how well governed the occupied areas are, the futility of continued resistance to Japan, and that the present National Government is the legitimate successor to the Nationalist Party established by Sun Yat-sen. (The Chinese here are great worshippers of Sun Yat-sen.) There are many Chinese here who listen in on the Chinese broadcasts from Japan.)

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 743

FROM: Shanghai (Horiuti) — September 10, 1941
TO: Rangoon — Circular 806.

Message to Tokyo #1692.

According to a U.P. telephonic report from Shanghai on the 9th, giving information gathered from a reliable source in that city, the British authorities have been looking for British subjects in Hongkong, Shanghai and North China who can understand the Chinese language, since the authorities wish to employ them with the British forces in Burma. The report is that within the last two days ten such candidates have been appointed in Shanghai.

Relayed to Nanking, Peking, Hongkong and Rangoon.

Trans. 9–17–41

No. 744

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — September 4, 1941
TO: Singapore — #243.

If direct remittance of funds for the operation of mines by Japanese in the Malay is not to be permitted, there is no way but for us to negotiate with Britain in order to appropriate the

necessary funds. Will you, therefore, wire me at once for my reference matters which, upon investigation, you believe should be taken into consideration in connection with the following:

1. Number of Japanese employed in the respective mines and their salaries (monthly salary given in Shanghai dollar).

Native employees (including the Chinese) and their salaries.

Minimum figures on taxes, etc.

2. Monthly minimum cost for operation and maintenance of equipment in the respective mines.

3. The amount of cash in possession of the respective mines.

4. Monthly minimum remittance necessary for operation of the mines calculated on the assumption that these mines will continue to be operated.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 745

FROM: Nanking
TO: Peking

September 5, 1941
Circular 273.

Nanking to Tokyo # 617, 5th.

(Strictly confidential.)

Recently JO, the chief of Foreign Affairs, told a member of the staff that the local British Embassy was showing signs of tension and that it appeared that all important documents had been burned. I am passing this on for the present just as I heard it.

Relayed to JKV.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 746

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Singapore

September 10, 1941
251.

Re my # 236[a]

The Fusō Maru is to arrive at this port on the 22nd. After she has taken on coal for her return trip, she is scheduled to sail on the 24th. There is room for approximately 700 passengers on this vessel. Please make arrangements as might be necessary for the evacuation of those who wish to return to Japan.

[a] See III, 733.

Trans. 0-00-00

No. 747

FROM: Teheran (Ichikawa) September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #219.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #305[a]

British and Soviet forces have reached Teheran. Though negotiations for peace are progressing there are approximately ----- ----- Germans still residing in Kazvin.[b] With regard to the manner which German persons are to be handled much difference of opinion is being expressed. The German residents here are insisting that Persia handle their immediate transfer to Turkish territory, however, the German authorities are very much opposed to the gradual development of the situation to the point that it is now tantamount to their being prisoners of the British. Should the worst possible situation develop they are resolved that they will all retire to the Ministry compound as they were in the past.

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[a] Not available.
[b] A city in Northwest Iran.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 748

FROM: Teheran (Ichikawa) September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #219.

(Part 2 of 2.)

With regard to this matter, I called on the Foreign Minister on the 3rd and requested that he lend his assistance to the realization of their plans for transfer to Turkey. I found that the Foreign Minister is at the present time negotiating with Turkey but because of the increased pressure of the British this seems extremely difficult. I then made earnest pleas to British and Turkish authorities with a view of persuading them. Then again ----- ----- ----- -----. Later, I contacted the American Minister. He said that he was doing his utmost with the British authorities. However, should German residents here be allowed to remain within the Ministry they would have to remain there until the conclusion of the war. It is on this account that great anxiety is felt.

Furthermore, the Russian Army has increased its holdings of occupied land. Taking advantage of the situation, they have moved in the west to the Mashhad area and in the south to the Mazanderan[a] area and seem to be headed for the neighborhood of Teheran. Fighting is still going on. ----- ----- -----

No. 749

FROM: Ottowa (Yoshizawa) September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 168.

Re my message # 148[a].

The Prime Minister returned home by plane on the 7th. At a press conference in Montreal we understand he said that it was not only profitable for Canada to maintain diplomatic relations with Vichy but that the policy also harmonized with that of the British home government and is also in accord with the wishes of Mr. Churchill. The proposal for the British Imperial War Cabinet should not become a question in the future, it being unnecessary.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 750

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 10, 1941
TO: Teheran Circular 1975.

Anglo-Japanese understanding having in substance following contents is expected to be reached shortly.

1. No obstacle be placed in way of Japanese leaving United Kingdom, India, Burma or British Colonial or mandated territory or in way of British subjects leaving Japan.

2. In particular, British and Japanese authorities will do utmost to expedite issue of exit permits and execution of all other necessary formalities. Issue of permit not be delayed without explanation more than fortnight after submitting application.

3. British and Japanese authorities will provide all necessary facilities to enable ships carrying evacuees arriving and departing evacuation ports agreed between them and will not obstruct navigation of these ships.

4. Detailed arrangement for reciprocal treatment in matter of travelling expenses and remittances for evacuees will be settled between British Embassy Tokyo and Japanese Finance Ministry.

5. Japanese Government will use good offices in ensuring that evacuation of British subjects leaving Manchukuo or China under Japanese occupation will not be obstructed.

6. British Government will use good office in ensuring that evacuation of Japanese leaving British Dominions, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Abyssinia or East Africa under British or Allied occupation will not be obstructed. The understanding will not be published.

Repeat from Calcutta to Bombay, Kirachi and Colombo.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 751

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 12, 1941
TO: Teheran Circular 1990.

1. It has been decided to dispatch the Nichie Maru (Hiye Maru ?) to evacuate Japanese who live in India, the Near East, and East Asia, and the following schedule has been decided upon:

September 22nd—Leave Kobe
October 6th —Stop at Bombay (to take on fuel)
October 7th —Leave Bombay
October 12th —Arrive at Bandarshapur
October 13th —Leave Bandarshapur
October 21st —Arrive at Mombasa (to load 10,000 "byo" of cotton)
October 24th —Leave Mombasa
October 31st —Arrive Bombay (to take on evacuees)
November 1st —Leave Bombay
November 20th —Arrive Yokohama

2. The above schedule will not be changed except through act of God. Therefore, please arrange for all passengers to be on hand when the ship reaches your port. Furthermore, get in touch with Iraq in plenty of time so that the residents in Bagdad may be evacuated.

3. Passenger accommodations are as follows:

1st class—76
2nd class—69
3rd class—86

Since there are a large number of evacuees, it will not be possible to give them all the accommodations they desire. Therefore, second class will be put on an equal footing with first class, and you will take steps to give preference in the following order:

(a) First and second class accommodations for the sick, expectant mothers, the aged, and for small children with their mothers.

(b) Remaining accommodations as far as possible according to correct usage (for example, women should be given preference over men, seniors to juniors). Furthermore, please get in touch with Yamaguchi in order that an equitable division of space be received for evacuees from the Near East and India.

Trans. 9-20-41

No. 752

FROM: Hankow July 23, 1941
TO: Net Circular 068.

Action Tokyo as # 234.

Re my # 232[a].

According to information available at this office on the 16th the British Consul General here reported that even the British Ambassador in Chungking reported that the "Central China Post"[b] dispute was instigated by the Japanese, the Municipal government and the Nanking regime. As it is difficult to solve this here I asked to have it communicated to Japan through the Ambassador here. On the 7th the Ambassador replied that there was not sufficient

importance for an Ambassadorial investigation and that the problem had better be handled locally.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] British controlled English language newspaper in Hankow.

Trans. 7–25–41

No. 753

FROM: Hankow
TO: China Net

September 12, 1941
Circular 81.

(2 Parts—complete.)

Action Tokyo as # 277.

Re my # 234[a].

A group of the strikers settled down in the offices of the Central China Post, and refused to give up. The British Consul-General stated to this office that this case involved those responsible for local peace and order, and that the removal of the strikers by the appropriate Japanese authorities was desired.

We repeatedly stated that if the handling of this affair should have the object of forcing the suspension of that newspaper, the Japanese had, so far as the British were concerned ----- (garbled out) -----.

Any request from us would be absolutely futile at present -----. We are taking no action in the dispute, as intervention by the Japanese authorities would have no weight at present, and a satisfactory solution should be left to the local authorities. Our only desire is to place no blame for the incident and to see it closed. The British Consul-General consulted the local authorities on the 7th regarding this case, and requested their assistance.

However, the strikers remained in the Central China Post Building in spite of efforts made to move them out, and the strike continued as before.

The British Consul-General called at this office again to discuss the situation. So far as this locality is concerned -----, there is no other way of removing the strikers and because of reprisals against the Central China Post and the Japanese newspapers, this would not be suitable. Since Chinese are directing the movement, legally a protest should be received from the British Embassy. The group behind the strike is clearly working to impede the establishment of the New China, and in view of the avowed policy of this paper, it would in the future be a focal point, and its suppression is aimed at.

However, it is not desirable that the local authorities should intervene in this strike, and bring it to an end; such might have an adverse effect on the direction of future social movements in China. This affair should, I think, be allowed to run its natural course.

Please inform me of your wishes in this case.

---

[a] Japanese Ambassador to Nanking directs that the "Post Office" incident in Hankow involving British and Jap authorities be settled locally.

Trans. 9–24–41

No. 754

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

September 10, 1941
1688.

(To ----- & Hankow Circular 803)

The printing of all newspaper articles and information, other than that published by the proper authorities, were prohibited in Shanghai regarding the problem of creating the "National Policy Corporation." (On the 11th the Secretary informed me.)

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 755

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

September 13, 1941
1709.

Shanghai to Hankow # 89.

Re my Circular # 803[a].

We desire to have it prohibited at your place also.
Relayed to Tokyo.

---

[a] See III, 754.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 756

FROM: Canton
TO: Net

September 15, 1941
123 (?).

Action Hongkong as # 123.

Re your # 134[a].

According to the Army's reply there is no truth in the British statement regarding air transportation (?). Further there is absolutely no truth in the ----- destroyers. The Japanese blockading squadron has always respected Hongkong's territorial waters. Please convey the above to the British there in an informal way.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-23-41

No. 757

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

September 15, 1941
#952.

(Abstract)

The Japanese authorities in Shanghai are instructed to investigate the British seizure of the Egyptian steamer "Star of Egypt" carrying cotton and glycerin, and to undertake negotiations for its release.

Trans. 9-23-41

No. 758

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

September 16, 1941
#1728.

Re your #952[a].

Among the cases handled by this office to date, there have not been any applications such as you mentioned. (There is the one instance in which we did not grant a permit on the application of the China Trading Company for 15 tons of glycerine to be sent to Hongkong.) Probably they are ones which are to be applied for in the future. If we make stipulations as you have suggested in your wire, it is to be seen that Japan will profit greatly, since it is our intention not to object to granting of permits. Bearing all this in mind, please make negotiations. Furthermore, please wire me the ascertained facts and the gist of the other party's request for application.

[a] See III, 757.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 759

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

September 22, 1941
#622.

Message to Berlin #841.

Message from London #651 on the 18th.

Intelligence report of primary importance.

1. All along the British Military has been most keenly interested in the war in the southern Ukraine. In view of the fact that the Soviet's Black Sea fleet is short, the German Army has laid plans to cross over from Bulgarian and Rumanian shores and land in force in the Caucasus where they will wage land warfare. If Germany should succeed in invading the Caucasus, Turkey's position will be rendered critical and Iran and Iraq as well will be in danger. The British are, therefore, strongly arguing that they should send their fleet into the Black Sea and forestall such a German expedition. It seems that the Foreign Office has been urged to negotiate with Turkey to have the latter in self-defense permit British ships to traverse the Dardanelles. (In case the German forces attack Turkey, the British intend fully to

have their fleet break through the straits at any cost, but the Germans know this full well and will consequently refrain from attacking Turkey. The preparations on the part of the German Army in Bulgaria are regarded as aimed at the Caucasus.)

2. Great Britain would really and truly like to go easy on Persia. When she recently invaded Iran she did not intend to enter Teheran because she wanted to be circumspect. Urged on, however, by the incitement of Moscow, she did finally enter Teheran. Furthermore, there were rumors that the British and Soviet forces had agreed to take joint possession of the city and oust the ruler. This, however, produced such a furor that they decided that rather than have trouble they had better wait and see how the new potentate would act before making up their minds. The Soviet, nevertheless, is still definitely determined to march on Teheran and to dispossess the ruler. England is, therefore, much worried.

3. The United States is sure to use North Ireland to protect American merchant ships. It is only a question of time. Furthermore, the United States has begun negotiations for the Bay of Eire. In order to bring about a British victory over Germany, the United States is thoroughly determined to give Russia the maximum assistance. Before long assistance to Moscow will certainly come under the Lend-Lease Law, or so it is understood. (I got this from an American source here.)

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 760

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Singapore

September 17, 1941
260.

Re your # 528[a].

This understanding has not been accepted by the *Foreign/Finance (?)* Office or -----. However, as I have already wired you, it is to be expected that the treatment accorded the Fuso Maru will correspond to that accorded the ANHUI. As I have wired you successively we are extending every convenience to them and also in the matter that they are the most concerned about, i.e. fuel and water, we are arranging to supply as much as they desire. I have already stated the details through the *British (?)* Embassy and FEIHAA has also explained the gist of this that we are going to provide every facility so in the event that they do not accept this we will take what steps we deem appropriate toward the ANHUI.[b]

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[a]Not available.

[b]ANHUI—British ship fitted for oil. Owners: China Navigation Co., Port of Registry, London.

Trans. 9-27-41

No. 761

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Singapore

September 17, 1941
261.

Re my # 257[a].

1. Fares on the Fuso Maru will be:
   1st class, *67 (?)* dollars
   2nd class, 66 dollars
   3rd class, 22 dollars

(These are fares to Kobe in U.S. dollars.)

According to the British Ambassador the above fares are to be collected by you and held by you in a special account and final settlement will be made upon agreement between Japan and Britain. Please arrange with the local office there to convert the U.S. dollars into the equivalent of Straits dollars. Please pay the coal, water, docking and customs expenses of my caption message, (1), from the above fund.

2. The British Ambassador and the Finance Minister are negotiating regarding remittance of funds by evacuees but in regard to baggage, permission is to be given for evacuees to carry with them an amount that accords with their social status. In regard to departure permits and exchange permits it has been arranged for these to be issued together. Again, in regard to customs inspection Britain for her part will arrange to have this commence three days before the ship enters port and she wishes you to extend the same convenience there.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 762

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 18, 1941
TO: Singapore #267.

(Strictly Secret.)

Re my #264[a].

I understand that today, the 18th, the British Commercial Attache called on the Chief of the Trade Bureau and said that in response to instructions from London, CRAIGIE had wired to the Governor-General in your city that he would like to have both the cotton and machinery handed over in exchange for license to export glycerine (please refer to my #952[a] addressed to Shanghai). (I understand that in consideration of CRAIGIE's face, the Chief purposely avoided mentioning the fact that the officials in your city had promised to hand over the material unconditionally.) Of course, it cannot be said that the officials in your city might not devise pretexts for not transferring the said glycerine until permission has been given. However, according to a telegram from the Consul-General in Shanghai, the authorities there have no objections to issuing license for the export of the said glycerine and, in fact, had already done so. I believe, therefore, even if the loading of the cotton and machinery is more or less delayed, these materials will be taken over. Will you arrange to make use of the (Fuso Maru?).

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 763

FROM: Tokyo September 18, 1941
TO: Shanghai #966.

(Secret)

Regarding my #267[b] addressed to Singapore, the Chief of the Trade Bureau has given the Commercial Attache the contents of your #728[a] and advised that with regard to securing export license for glycerine, it would be quicker and more convenient if the British Consul-General in your city requested you directly for it. The Commercial Attache has agreed to do so, and if the Consul General brings up the matter, please arrange to issue the license at once.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 762.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 764

FROM: Vancouver (Kawasaki) September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #100.

Inasmuch as we are unable to arrange passage home for Japanese in Canada, one of the disastrous consequences of the fund freezing operation has been the cutting off of remittances from Japanese in this country to their wives and children in Japan and also remittances from their homes to young people studying over here.

Although it may be a difficult matter to handle, please do what you can with the Canadian Government in securing an amelioration of this situation.

Trans. 10-8-41

No. 765

FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #177.

(Abstract)

(Two parts—complete)

Re message to San Francisco #4[a].

I took your protest in regard to the rule against consulates sending dispatches in code to the Canadian authorities and explained how troublesome it is to have to transmit our messages through the embassy net. From what they said, I got the impression that what they particularly wish to prohibit is the exchange of code messages between Vancouver and San Francisco. They were very positive in their refusal to permit this, and since this is war-time and the people in Vancouver seem to be getting quite excited about it all, I think we had better let the matter rest for the time being.

Relayed to ----- and San Francisco. Mailed to Washington and New York.

---

[a] See III, 729.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 766

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

September 25, 1941
985.

Re my # 966[a].

I recieved a telegram from the Consul General in Singapore to the effect that the Fusō Maru (which should have arrived yesterday, the 24th) was finding it difficult to load half of the cotton in addition to the machinery and that the local authorities were holding back on issuing a permit, giving as a reason the fact that all of the cotton was not being loaded. Therefore I had the director of the Bureau of Commercial Affairs negotiate with the British Commercial Counselor today, the 25th, as a result of which the Counselor said that the China Soap Co. at your place had made request on August 4th for a permit to export a part of 120 tons of glycerine, namely 50 tons, and that this request had been refused by the maritime customs. However, at present the Japanese Consul General desires to make arrangements for permission for the 50 tons and this intention has been conveyed to the British Consul General and he in turn is to wire the Governor General in Singapore immediately. Also there is to be a telegram from the British Embassy in Tokyo to the Consul General regarding permission for loading of the Fuso Maru. Furthermore in regard to the remaining 70 tons he is to ask if at the same time permission cannot be granted for this also. If provisional agreement can be arranged for loading the remaining half of the cotton on a second ship permit for the above 70 tons can be arranged through the good offices of the Japanese Consul General, he said. The above Counselor said he was of the same opinion and that telegrams to this effect should be sent to *SMG (?)* and Singapore.

Please wire immediately in regard to your reporting the matter of the permit for the 50 tons of glycerine and the provisional agreement regarding the 70 tons.

(Please relay to Singapore.)

[a] See III, 763.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 767

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

September 27, 1941
993.

Re my # 985[a].

The Singapore authorities seem inclined to guarantee the permit for export of glycerine at your place but are scheming to delay granting a permit for loading cotton, etc., on the Fusō Maru. In view of your # 1728[b] please use your good offices to secure a permit immediately and wire the result.

[a] See III, 766.
[b] See III, 758.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 768

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 27, 1941
TO: Singapore (Riyoji) # 287.

Re your # 567[a].

1. Mitsubishi's and Kaniti's "ML" were sent to your branch of Mitsuibishi and Kanti, and the official text was sent by air on the 20th of this month. Please investigate.
2. In regard to the Consul-General in Shanghai, please make arrangements immediately for this issuance of the permit for the export of the glycerine.
3. In regard to freight charges between your place and Japan, go ahead as you suggested with the loading. Hence, there will be no necessity of payment being made at your place, and the matter will have to be taken up by the British Embassy. Therefore, you will refuse all their requests.
4. There is no objection to delaying the departure of the Fuso Maru. Please arrange for it to remain at anchor till all scheduled loading is completed.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 769

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 30, 1941
TO: Singapore # 291.

Re your # 591[a].

The English Embassy sent a telegram to the Governor General in the afternoon today, the 23rd. Moreover, the English Embassy (is sure) the message from the Consul General in London to the Governor General must have arrived already.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 770

FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Shanghai # 1010.

Message to Singapore # 296.

Secret.

Re your # 596[a]. Re my # 291[b].

CRAIGIE sent a telegram directly to the Governor General on the 30th and I believe that the British Consul General there (Shanghai) has sent a telegram directly to the Governor

General. It is urgently desired that the sailing of the Fusō Maru be postponed.

For your reference a special telegram was sent to Consul General HORIUCHI[c].

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 769.
[c] Consul General in Shanghai.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 771

FROM: Tokyo — October 2, 1941
TO: Shanghai — # 1012.

Re your # 1781[a].

From the Bureau of Communications.

The Commercial Attaché transmitted the gist of your message mentioned above and CRAIGIE sent a telegram directly to the Governor General on the 30th. Although the British Consul General there must have received a telegram, no telegram in answer has been received as yet. As the Fusō Maru is unable to load cotton, etc., she will unavoidably have to sail on the 2nd. Please contact the British Consul General there regarding the export of glycerin. If such is possible, please telegraph. Also telegraph the results of your conversation with him.

Relayed to Singapore.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 772

FROM: Shanghai — October 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1829.

Re your # 1012[a] and my # 1781[b].

1. On the 3rd, I questioned the British Consul General, and at that time he had not, as yet, sent the wire. He gave the following two reasons for not having done so:

(a) My official note, as contained in my caption message, cannot be regarded as sufficient guarantee with regard to the shipment of the freight in question.

(b) He has not had the permits for the glycerine sent.

2. I merely said that I was not in the position to interfere where the authority of the Maritime Customs is concerned and promise formal export permits, but that Japan has no objections to the shipment of the 120 tons for export, as contained in the note; but the British authorities, in spite of their awareness that this would suffice, had not wired. Several days passed, and their having raised objections to the text of the note shows clearly that they wanted to create a delay purposely.

Now, permits for 50 tons of glycerine were issued on the 3rd, and, furthermore, on the 3rd, 10 tons were petitioned for, and the permit was issued on the 4th.

3. This being so, at the time we had thought that this question was practically settled, but they came complaining as if the question of permission for British naval tugs and motor launches bound for Suez and Singapore, which were in the process of being applied for, were connected with this matter. But the permits for the tugs, etc., had already been in the hands of the Customs Investigation Committee, and had just been given to the British authorities.

4. On the 4th, I again called on the British Consul General and proposed the above points 1 and 3, and enlarged on the first point even as I have indicated. At the time that I urged that they go as far as to guarantee us that ships would not be stopped from leaving port for reasons of taking on cargo other than glycerine, and for other reasons as well, I reminded him that if he is going to propose certain qualifications, then Japan too would demand similar conditions, and there would be no end to the negotiations. I urged him to separate this problem from that of the tug boat question, and that it would be well to settle only the glycerine question once and for all. On the other hand, I pointed out that he might be at ease, as a matter of fact, concerning the safe departure of the ships carrying glycerine, and the issuance of permits for the departure of the tug boats.

Relayed to Singapore.

---

[a] See III, 771.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 773

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

September 30, 1941
653.

284 from our Minister in Helsinki to this Foreign Minister.

I heard that the British Government, in a memorandum dated the 24th presented to the Finnish Government through the Norwegian Minister here, informed the Finns that if they planned to carry their war against the Soviet beyond their borders, Great Britain would regard them as a belligerent, hostile nation, but on the other hand, if they would stop their belligerent acts concerning the border question, London is ready to study the possibility of improving relations between Finland and Russia. So, on the following day, the 25th, I went to call on the Foreign Minister to ask him for the facts. He confirmed the report, and I then asked how Finland intended to answer. The Minister said that although he considered this as probably merely a British gesture of assistance toward the Soviet, in any case he was seriously considering the memorandum. From the way he talked, I judge that his reply will be to the effect that Finland is fighting for her rights, and for strategic reasons it would be impossible to give a definite promise. I asked him why it was that England presented the memorandum through the Norwegian Minister instead of through the American Minister, who is supposed to be looking out for British rights in Finland. He replied that it was true that the advice did not come through the usual channels, adding that he did not know whether it was that the United States merely refused to take the trouble or not.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 774

FROM: Teheran (Ichikawa) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo Unnumbered.

Sending and receiving of code telegrams forbidden 29th. French Legation received same treatment. Repeated to Turkey.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 775

FROM: Tokyo October 6, 1941
TO: Shanghai # 1028.

Strictly secret.

Re part 4 of your # 1829[a].

As a result of your explanation to the British Consul General, has he not already wired the Governor General in Singapore and the British Ambassador in Tokyo to the effect that he has succeeded in getting export permits for glycerine? After making sure of this fact with the Consul General, please wire me at once.

Furthermore, although permits for two shipments of 50 tons and 70 tons were already issued, actually we want you to take suitable steps so that the above mentioned two shipments will not be exported until we have finished loading the raw cotton and machinery.

Relay to Singapore.

[a] See III, 772.

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 776

FROM: Shanghai October 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1835.

Re # 610 from Singapore to Tokyo[a].

As stated in our # 1829[b], we have tried very hard to put into effect the Japanese-British understanding reached in Tokyo, but since the British Consul General has delayed sending the required telegram (it seems that he finally dispatched it on the 6th,) I think we should either:

(1) Indicate our dissatisfaction by delaying all future export permits to the British; or

(2) Demand of the British Consul General that he guarantee that the British authorities will not offer any objection to the shipment of the cotton in question now in Singapore.

The first plan offers effective counter measures against the British, but since it may result in the complete cutting off of business relations, I would suggest the second alternative. Please let me have your reply as soon as possible.

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 777

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Singapore

October 7, 1941
012.

Shanghai to Tokyo # 1840.

Re your # 1028[a] and my # 1835[b].

In regard to the first part of your telegram it appears that the British Consul General dispatched the requisite telegrams on the 6th as per my telegram, and as a method of carrying out the latter part of your telegram there are the following two possibilities.

(A) The rescinding of the permit issued by the customs inspector.

(B) The restraining of the issuance by our navy or gendarmerie.

I think that both of these steps go beyond the limits of the matter under discussion. Not only that but at the time of the conference on the 4th I gave the British Consul General assurance that we would put no obstacle in the way of the export of the glycerine. This was not wise. Perhaps it would have been better to have used one of the methods suggested in my caption telegram. Please wire back something regarding this immediately.

---

[a] See III, 775.
[b] See III, 776.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 778

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

October 8, 1941
1032.

Re your #1835[a] and # 1840[b].

We wish to do as you have suggested; that is to say, instead of forbidding the export, we shall get a promise from the British in Singapore and Tokyo that they would not only not interfere with the loading of raw cotton and machinery but also accord facilities to the ships carrying the cargo. Therefore, will you get at once from the British Consul-General in your city a memorandum to the effect that he had informed by wire the Singapore Governor-General and Ambassador CRAIGIE of the fact that export license had been issued for the shipment of the glycerine in two lots of 50 tons and 70 tons respectively.

---

[a] See III, 776.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 779

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

October 9, 1941
1861.

Re your # 1032[a].

I inquired of the British Consul General here and he said that the telegrams in question had been sent as ordinary telegrams on the 6th to Craigie and the Singapore Governor General. However, I said that it was necessary for me to transmit them immediately and he said that he would bring the required memorandum tomorrow morning.

---

[a]See III, 778.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 780

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

October 13, 1941
1045.

Re your # 1861[a].

Please wire immediately the complete text of the British Consul General's office communication.

---

[a]See III, 779.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 781

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: Washington

October 2, 1941
80.

(Part 1 of 3[a].)

Message to Tokyo # 667.

1. In CHURCHILL's report on the current situation to Parliament on the 30th, he said that Germany's attempt to overrun the whole of Russia has given the British some time to deliberate upon their own situation but that on that account there must be no let-up in vigilance. He warned the people against the feeling of safety which has pervaded the country since the outbreak of the Russian hostilities, emphasizing the fact that the efforts of the whole people must be redoubled. However, he indicated that the feeling of optimism on the part of the government, although always great, was greater than ever and thus attempted to bolster the morale of the people at large.

2. This feeling of optimism, he said, was inspired by the unexpected power of Russia's resistance. If this continues, even though Leningrad may fall, Moscow and the Caucasus should hold out through the winter and the German occupation of the Ukraine stopped.

In the meantime, British and American support is clearly forthcoming. Month by month as indicated by the experience of the past three months, shipping in the Atlantic is becoming

more and more safe, and soon the supply of food will be abundant. German attacks on disembarkation points will, in the near future, gradually become more difficult. For example, Germany may start such attacks, but the British Government is confident that in time these will all be completely disbursed. (Coast defenses and the disposition of troops are becoming more efficient month by month.)

[a] See III, 782–783.

Trans. 10–7–41

No. 782

FROM: Tokyo — October 6, 1941
TO: Berlin — Cir. # 2125.

(Part 2 of 3[a].) Message from London # 667.

3. The British authorities claim that should the objectives of the war against the Soviet be attained, Germany will not undertake an invasion of England but rather defer that action with the view of conquering the Near East. For this reason, more than ever before, she is exerting ever-greater pressure against Turkey. England, however, knowing the difficult position in which she stands, is well aware of the risks involved. Not wishing to go too far through economic and other schemes in her attempt to inveigle Turkey on her side at the same time that she consolidates her position in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, she is undertaking the increasing of her forces in the Near East. (Her allied strength in the Near East is understood to be in the neighborhood of 750,000 men. Recently, she dispatched additional troops from the British Isles. Only two divisions of the 14 or 15 divisions stationed in northern Ireland remain there now. The others have all been sent to the Near East. It is thought likely that she has even more troops in that area.) It would seem that she had entered upon a course of pulling Turkey into her camp by impressing that country with the number of troops she maintains behind the line of battle.

4. Then again, in preparation for the need that might develop, she is having WAVELL prepare for joint British and Soviet action in the Caucasus area (an indication of this might be the recent flight of WAVELL to London and the conferences held in Baghdad and Teheran). First of all, increasing her armed forces in Iran by dispatching troops from the Near East and from India, it is thought that WAVELL is preparing for the eventuality when he will move into Russia. It would seem that they were endeavoring to prepare for defensive warfare in that area.

[a] See III, 781.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 783

FROM: Tokyo — October 6, 1941
TO: Berlin — Cir. # 2125.

(Part 3 of 3.) Message from London # 667.

5. In order to do this, even though Germany on the eastern front has been and will continue achieving a considerable number of victories, England will continue hostilities through aid

from Britain and America (*sic*). Though they realize that it will take a long time to put Germany under control and that it will take a much longer time than imagined for German's losses through exhaustion to weaken her, their continued action will have a great effect upon the total strength of Germany. I can believe it will increase the difficulties that Germany will face in bringing peace and order to the various countries that she has overrun. In opposition to this, if we compare the England of last year, immediately following the evacuation of Dunkerque -----. At the present time, she possesses 80 divisions of armed forces (of these, 37 divisions are believed to be armored divisions). Her air strength, too, as a result of calculated German losses in the German-Soviet conflict, put her practically on a par with Germany (recently, making no distinction between day and night, she has been stepping up her bombing attacks over Germany and the occupied lands controlled by Germany). England considers with great admiration the situation prevailing in occupied countries at the present time, and it would seem that most recently her confidence in ultimate victory has become stronger. The people, high and low, have confidence in the war leadership of CHURCHILL and believe him to be a man of dynamic force (with regard to the distribution of effort, there are many who criticize the government's position, but there is no likelihood that any obstructions would be placed in the way of the prosecution of the war).

6. The general feeling toward Japan is even now becoming exceptionally critical. The confidence of the British in regard to the war has increased remarkably, rapprochement with Japan seems a long way off, and their attitude is actually in opposition to us. They are expressing the opinion in the papers that they are dissatisfied with Japan-American conversations. The attitude of the government is purely negative, and though they say that they will do their utmost in order to avoid war with Japan, they are not at all anxious to consider taking any direct steps for the improvement of relations. They seem decided on saying "No" to all suggestions for negotiations, even on minor points of the freezing legislation. The British Government has lately quieted anti-Japanese feeling in deference to Japan-American conversations or possibly the hope that Japan has decided against any direct action. The Government seems to be waiting for a full development of the situation. I have transmitted this to the United States.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 784

FROM: Beyoglu — October 6, 1941
TO: Rome — # 200.

(Part 1 of 2.)

1. Former Premier GAILANI of Iraq since the last of July has been allowed to remain here in political exile on the terms that he not engage in political activities or leave Turkey. He hopes, however, with the assistance of Germany to return soon. As a matter of fact, Turkey has already assured him that she will overlook his departure with a mere wink, and through the good offices of Germany he is soon due to start to Baghdad.

2. GAILANI tells me, in connection with the recent political shakeup in Iraq, that the country's political stability is very hard to maintain, beyond any doubt, and that the politicians who will soon return there with Germany's backing will by no means be in an enviable position. This is probably one reason why the upheaval took place.

Trans. 10–30–41

No. 785

FROM: Beyoglu
TO: Rome

October 6, 1941
200.

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. GAILANI, speaking of British strength in the Near East, says that Britain boasts of 8 divisions in Syria, 5 in Iraq, and 12 in Iran, making a total of 25. He says, however, that this is a gross exaggeration, and, as a matter of fact, there are not more than 4, 6, and 4 respectively, making a total of 14. As for WAVELL's forces preparing to defend the Caucasus, that is merely bluff, he says.

Relayed to -----.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 786

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

October 9, 1941
1037.

Action Bangkok as # 659.

For the Navy to make purchases using the HOHEI (Chungking currency ?) is a sort of strategic move, but it is absolutely necessary that this be done in strict secrecy, and if too much investigation is done on the spot it will surely leak out and give rise to suspicion. Therefore, headquarters desires that there be full contact with the Foreign Office so that any sudden rise in prices or disturbance of the markets due to such purchases might be avoided, and that no further investigations be made at the scene. I know you will be careful about watching the procedure of the military in making the purchases, but have the above in mind and do your best.

Have relayed to Shanghai as instructions of this Minister.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 787

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking

October 2, 1941
329.

Message to Tokyo # 1807.

Re my # --6.

1. Recent developments are as follows:

(1) Early in September KISHIMOTO informed MAZE[a] that unless the LAWFORD[b] question is settled before the end of September, Japan would refuse to make payment of expenses for the period running as far back as June.

(2) On September 20, LOCKHART[c], who called on me on other business, asked me about the prospect of this question and so I replied that since MAZE himself thinks that the Japanese request is a reasonable one, the prospect of its solution was good.

(3) On September 27, MAZE called on me and told me that he had heard from the United States Government that should a Japanese be appointed to head the customs in Shanghai, the United States would submit a protest to Japan: that although he had expressed the fact that an appointment of a Japanese was not a contravention of either the rules or the convention of the customs, the United States had not yet expressed their approval, and that he had sug-

gested that someone from a neutral country be appointed for the time being. I, however, explained that such a thing could not be thought of and that the attitude of the Tokyo Government was very strong, having refused to pay any attention to the protests submitted by the United States and Britain on several occasions. Then I urged that this matter be settled by MAZE himself assuming the responsibility for making the change (the ----- ----- is the reason for favoring the wishes of the United States and Britain).

2. I would appreciate your sending at once information concerning the protests submitted by Great Britain and the United States and the Japanese Government's reply to them, since this information is necessary in directing MAZE.

---

[a] SIR F.W. MAZE, Inspector-General of Shanghai Customs.
[b] An official of the Shanghai Customs.
[c] An American Counselor.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 788

FROM: Nanking — October 14, 1941
TO: Tsingtao — Cir. # 306.

Message to Tokyo # 721.

Re message from Tientsin to you # 336[a].

To have Japanese customs inspectors send in reports on the character and standing of customs officials would not only be of doubtful value, but might lead to chaos in the southern China customs. We have a confidential understanding that collections and supervision will come within the province of the Central government, and, therefore, if we overstep this agreement we might get into trouble. I think that we had better follow the Shanghai proposal whereby both the People's Government and the Japanese Army send in reports (even though these reports be frequently at variance). If we find that the system is too corrupt, the only thing we can do is put Japanese in charge of all the customs.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 789

FROM: Shanghai — October 15, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 345.

Shanghai to Tokyo # 1895.

Re your (Tokyo's) # 1042[a].

It seems evident that MAZE[b] is watching developments with hopes that on this second protest of the American Ambassador in Tokyo, there might have been a backing down at headquarters for reasons connected with the present Japanese-United States negotiations. It is, therefore, essential that headquarters take a firm attitude in pushing ahead with these undertakings.

In the reply, I think it would be well to merely state that, "the Japanese authorities on the scene have had various requests to make in the past, but these have all been for the purpose of complying with the needs of the present situation in the Chinese customs and for reducing as much as possible any "friction" with the Japanese and in the end bringing about a satisfactory functioning of the Chinese customs, and the Foreign Office is supporting the Japanese authorities on the "scene", and not to go too much into a discussion of particulars.

I have conferred with Chancellor Ando on this.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] Sir Frederick Maze, Inspector General of Customs.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 790

FROM: Tokyo — September 27, 1941
TO: Singapore — # 289.

Re first part of my *# 283 (?)*[a].

In regard to the matter of importing currency into Japan, a permit is required for even one yen bills. The Finance Minister is trying to check as far as possible the bringing of currency into the country.

In regard to the above, evacuees should change all their funds into remittance drafts, or if this is impossible ----- the Finance Minister, while leaving the currency deposits there for ready availability to the depositors.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 791

FROM: Tokyo — October 1, 1941
TO: Singapore — # 292.

Re your # 590[a].

We will endeavor to prevail on the Finance Minister here. However, inasmuch as this matter concerns the liquidation of accounts between Japan and Britain, you will do your utmost there to see that yen notes are discarded and exchange drafts are carried instead.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 792

FROM: Tokyo — October 7, 1941
TO: Singapore — #304.

Re your #617[a].

Application has been made for current expenditures. In regard to secret funds there is no objection to your going ahead as you planned. However, we would like to have a wire giving the approximate amount you will have to borrow.

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 793

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — October 8, 1941
TO: Singapore — #307.

Departmental secret.

Strictly secret.

Re your #599[a].

The amount of money which we anticipate sending you during the coming year is roughly 600,000 yen. We are not specifying how it is to be sent. After you have figured the approximate monthly allotment, please make your report to us by return wire.

Furthermore, please bear in mind that the above-quoted figures does not include travel expenses or any other extraordinary expense monies.

Expense fund	200,000 yen
Salaries	50,400 yen
Subsidy fund	20,000 yen
Fund for dissemination of intelligences	300,000 yen
Secret fund	6,000 yen
Entertainment fund	1,200 yen
Grand Total	577,600 yen

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 794

FROM: Tokyo — October 4, 1941
TO: London — Cir. #2120.

(Part 2 of 2[a].)

We requested them to voluntarily discontinue distribution in Japan. It is not yet clear what their attitude toward this request is. Should they disregard the request and send any by mail, the matter will be confiscated by the Post Office authorities or by the Police. Our intention is

to give the belligerent countries outwardly an equitable treatment in this matter, but inwardly this office and the Bureau of Information will give the Axis powers ample facilities for their propaganda.

Relay from Berlin to -----.

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[6] Part 1 of 2 not available.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 795

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Singapore

October 9, 1941
Unnumbered.

You are scheduled to be recalled to Japan in the near future, however, in view of the situation obtaining there, the order is being withheld for the present. In view of this, it is felt that there is no necessity of your making an official trip to Bangkok, hence request has not been made.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 796

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

October 13, 1941
693.

In 6 parts—Part 1 of 6.

Singapore to Tokyo as # 630, October 9th.

Summary of general intelligence.

1. In comparison with February of this year when a critical situation arose in the Far East, the recent outlook in this area shows some outstanding changes. The British government looks upon Japan as an enemy nation in this area now, and as such has been applying pressure on Japan in an ever increasing amount. As a result, various interest, built up over the past fifty years by our nationals with untold amounts of hardships and sacrifices, notably the interests in mining and in other business enterprises, are being destroyed practically overnight. Moreover, under the guise of preventing our alleged policy of southward expansion, they have been proceeding with great speed on not only the accepted national defense measures, but also in making preparations for wartime food production, industry, and propaganda. Already, they have shown much advancement in these various subjects. Apparently, the offices concerned have, in comparison with a few months ago, become much more confident, for anti-Japanese acts and expressions are becoming much more pronounced. (It must be said here, however, that there are indications that much of this apparent confidence is a bluff.)

Another item which should not be overlooked here is the fact that the general attitude of the people is very much more stabilized than before. With the above general picture in mind, I feel that the following points are worthy of noting.

(1) That the defense set-up with Singapore as the center, is nearing completion.

(2) That the general situation in Europe, in view of the German-Soviet war, has become more favorable to Great Britain. The United States by making an all-out effort to aid Britain, is giving the people in this area confidence that the final victory will be England's.

(3) The general impression in this area is that Japan has weakened herself to the extreme, because of the war in China during the past years and because of the freezing order, Japan has had to throw herself to the mercy of the United States. The bureaus concerned here have concluded that under these circumstances it will be impossible for Japan to carry out her southward expansion program.

(4) The officials here judge from the freezing order issued by the United States subsequent to Japan's occupation of French Indo-China, that the United States is prepared to take strong measures against any southward expansion moves by Japan in the future.

(5) It was generally believed that subsequent to the conclusion of the war between Thai and French Indo-China with Japan mediating, that Thailand's relations with Great Britain would be estranged and that she would attach herself to Japan's sphere. That subsequent developments showed this assumption to be wrong considerably eased the minds of local officials.

(6) Since his arrival here, Duff-Cooper has been very active. He has been widely expressing his confidence of the ultimate British victory. At the same time, he has been pursuing a strong policy against Japan.

Part 2

2. The following are some concrete instances proving that the general situation is as described above.

(1) Strengthened national defense measures:

Branches of the Ministries of Economic War and Propaganda were established here for the purpose of preparing for war. Volunteers were asked to serve in the fighting forces from the general public. Air raid drills are being conducted. In these and in other ways, the people are speedily being prepared for living under war conditions. Since the arrival of Commander-in-Chief Popham in this area last November, the army, navy, and the air force in the area east of India has been placed under his command. I have already reported that all preliminary defense measures are rapidly being completed. Recently, health corps and transportation groups have been organized, and other behind-the-line groups are at present being organized. This would seem to indicate that all defense measures are fast approaching fulfillment.

The local newspapers prominently reported the arrival of Australian troops and modern airplanes in the Singapore area, and commented along such lines as "with the arrival of strong reinforcements, the British air force in the Far East is in a very favorable position", and "the arrival of Australian troops should throw fears into the hearts of the Japanese". In this manner, they made much of those things last February. In spite of the fact that troops are still arriving from Australia and India only very minor mention is made of it now. This would seem to indicate that although in February exaggerated reports were essential to give confidence to the people, now that defense measures have actually reached adequacy, there is no longer any need for doing so.

There are indications, however, that available power on the seas is still inadequate, and this apparently is the source of much anxiety.

Parts 3, 4, and 5 not available. Part 6 available, too garbled for translation.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 797

FROM: Shanghai — September 24, 1941
TO: Net — Cir. # 853.

(Message to Tokyo # 1773.)

"WA" report.

According to information coming from the British General Consulate, it is expected that DUFF-COOPER will arrive in Shanghai during the first week of October. The members of the British armed forces there have formed a reception committee. DUFF-COOPER's mission this time is said to be very important, and he has been given power to negotiate foreign affairs. His staff includes, among other, Colonels HALL-PATCH, SCOTT, and CHAMBERS, and Lieutenant-Commander NEVILLE. In Shanghai all the publicity organs are to be assembled, and a conference is to be held with United States officials participating. They are expected to discuss propaganda machinery and policy with regard to Japan and the Nanking Government with a view to bringing about Japan's withdrawal from the Axis. I understand that Major-General PIGGOTT, British Military Attaché in Tokyo, as well as BECKER, a lawyer, will participate.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 798

FROM: Tokyo October 15, 1941
TO: London # 333.

Arrangements have been effected for the exchange by the "barter" method of Japanese merchandise for Spanish quicksilver and also for the carrying through of a few business deals with Portugal by utilizing the Asama Maru. The Mitsui Trading Co. has made request for "navicerts" for the above commodities to the British embassy in Tokyo but they have not been received as yet. These business deals have been arranged principally between Mitsui and the Spanish Department of Commerce and the merchandise (to the sum of about 3,000,000 yen worth) has already been loaded on the Asama Maru and the Asama Maru is just about to sail. Inasmuch as these transactions all concern neutral countries within the British sphere of influence please make arrangements immediately with the British ----- for carrying them out and wire the result by return dispatch. This Asama Maru problem has been communicated to the British Ambassador in Tokyo, but it appears that he has no authority with respect to the above-mentioned cargoes.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 799

FROM: Tokyo October 16, 1941
TO: London # 335.

Sometime ago the Finance Ministry ordered as an emergency measure, with regard to the disposal of Japanese bonds backed by foreign money which are in possession of Japanese residents in England, that the bonds be listed and after the list has been approved and signed by the Finance Official the bonds be either redeemed or temporarily cancelled in the presence of the said official. I understand that in the case of such bonds which were not disposed of in this manner prior to the withdrawal of the Finance Official, the London Branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank had cancelled them in the same manner.

We have been asked with reference to those which need to be cancelled in the future that whenever a list is submitted to you for your signature, you will see to it that the bonds listed are actually in existence and then sign the list. Hereafter, I would like to have you forward the

list to the Finance Ministry each time you sign one. If you have lists which have already been signed please send them at once.

Trans. 10–20–41

No. 800

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 6, 1941
TO: Berlin Circular # 1775.

Message from Vichy # 450.

With regard to recent German-French relations.

In connection with the pros and cons of the publicized explanation made by Ambassador BRINON in Paris on the 5th which brought about a great conflict of rumors, I had conversations with the local Spanish ambassador who had confidential conversations with BRINON. The gist of his remarks as I heard them I am passing on to you for what they are worth.

Germany, with regard to the granting of Tripoli (?) to France, demanded the leasing of the harbor of Bizerte. France not only refused to grant this, but in order that representations could be made for separate German-French peace conversations, Chancellor HITLER recently conducted conversations with DARLAN in Berchtesgaaden. These conversations were a great disappointment to HITLER, and it is understood that he ordered Ambassador ABETZ in Paris to discontinue conversations with the Vichy Government.

Trans. 8–11–41

No. 801

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 435.

(Part 1 of 4.)

Message to Berlin # 708.

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular 1590(a). Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new

situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.

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*Not available.

Note: The system used in this message is considered to be of the highest type of secret classification used by the Japanese Foreign Office.

Trans. 8–4–41

No. 802

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington #433.

(Part 2 of 4.)

Message to Berlin #708.

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Trans. 8–4–41

No. 803

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington #433.

(Part 3 of 4.)

Message to Berlin #708.

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the

Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her own military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 804

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) July 31, 1941
TO: Washington # 433.

(Part 4 of 4.)

Message to Berlin # 708.

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 805

FROM: Berlin (Osima) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1001.

(Strictly Secret.)

(Part 1 of 3.)

Various rumors have been going the rounds to the effect that the war in Russia is not turning out so well for Germany. Today, the 6th, however, public statements by both sides have just about clarified the true situation. I sent a member of my staff to see Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP's man on the 5th. I am wiring you what he found out.

1. When the war began, Russia's total European military strength was about 2,000,000 with another 1,500,000 in reserve. However, Russia's losses have been tremendous. Prisoners have already reached some 900,000, and the dead double that figure. Totalling the prisoners, the dead, and the wounded, the staggering figure of 3,500,000 casualties is reached. In the meantime the Soviet Army moved some of its troops in Siberia and other places to Europe so that now, as a result of transferences and conscription, they have in the neighborhood of 4,000,000 men. What is left of the Soviet Army is very low in quality, beyond any doubt. Soviet military units have already received an irremediable blow, and the fragments of which the present units are constructed are certainly nothing to boast about. They contain the laborer, the farmer, and all such people who could be speedily rallied and clothed in uniform. They are, for the most part, not real soldiers. Their leadership is bad, and instructors lack training themselves. They are, in short, quite an ineffectual army. Only in the southern Ukraine, however, are there left some forces which still have some relatively strong striking power. Germany is now blasting at them, and soon the area south of Kiev will be cleaned up. As for the Red Army waging war within Finland, nothing more fantastic was every imagined.

2. The distance from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea is 2,400 kilometres, and since Germany is using the pincer strategy all along the line, her front is, in fact, 7,000 kilometres long. German strategy in routing the Soviet Army has been to encircle such Soviet units as it could in the most propitious spots. This has been helped along very much by the fact that the Soviet troops, even in hopeless predicaments, put up quixotic resistance. This renders German encirclement movements fairly easy. However, in order to make minimum sacrifices, German strategy has been to use artillery and bombing. Thus, she has succeeded in destroying many of the enemy by encircling them cautiously and unhurriedly.

Trans. 8–15–41

No. 806

FROM: Tokyo August 7, 1941
TO: Berlin #721.

(In 2 parts—complete.)

Re your #969[a].

1. As you are well aware, we are encountering considerable difficulty in disseminating European and American intelligence to many of our offices abroad. We try to write up a summary of events and developments based on reports from your office and others, for distribution to those offices. However, because of the code systems we are compelled to use to dispatch these summaries, we cannot touch upon any confidential matters. Please bear in mind also that for the above reasons we are unable to keep those offices advised, at times, of our policies. (Exercise caution to avoid including excerpts from dispatches given the "Chief of Office Routing" in ordinary dispatches.)

2. We are not by any means convinced that a German invasion of England is an impossibility. We are aware, moreover, that Germany is bent on concluding the war in as short a period of time as is possible. However, the fact that Germany herself is making all necessary preparations for the eventuality of a long term war, indicates that there is at least a chance of its developing into a prolonged affair.

Judging from the recent outlook on the bombing and blockading of England, defense organizations of the British mainland, the morale of the British people, etc. the possibilities of this war's being carried over into the next year seem to be considerably enhanced, from this point of observation.

3. With the recent outbreak of the German-Soviet war, the Russian people are convinced that this is a racial war against them by the German people. This is especially abhorrent to the bulk of the Russian people who have, for the past twenty some odd years, been given an education in communism. Moreover, the Russians are traditionally people of the soil, which they love. The Russian farmer feels a great attachment for his land, and will not give it up without a struggle. These thick headed and obstinate Russians are convinced that if their land is turned over to those who preach a different doctrine than that in which they have been indoctrinated, their positions will become hopeless.

Russian history has shown us that these peasants will, when all resistance fails, resort to the scorched earth policy before they will turn over their beloved land to another.

Even if such a policy does not hamper German military operations, it is believed that the invaders will encounter some difficulty in the mopping up operations and in the administration of the conquered areas because of the vastness of the area involved, poor transportation facilities, and the severe winters.

4. It is an undeniable fact that the German army will conquer all of European Russia. However, if the German forces advance at the present pace, the Stalin regime will be given opportunities to slowly retreat to the Ural Mountains or even beyond. Under such circumstances, it would be exceedingly difficult to throw the Stalin regime into confusion and chaos as was hoped.

If the Volga or the Ural Mountains become the boundary along which a large force of Soviet and German forces will have to stand guard, the chances of a large scale revolution or disorder would be very slim. Moreover, it would be difficult to organize a political party which could stand up against the Stalin organization under such circumstances.

Unless, therefore, the German invasion takes on a more "blitz"-like characteristic we believe that the Stalin power will continue to exist in the Far East, and in the area to the east of the Urals including Central Asia.

However, it is quite possible that with the continuance of warfare and with the approach of winter accompanied by the fear of food shortages, there will be some disturbances in the Stalin political organization.

5. It is true that the United States has, to all practical purposes, left the ranks of a neutral country and that she is practically a belligerent. One of the reasons that she has not officially become a belligerent is the avoidance on the part of Germany and Italy to declare war on her. Another is that the United States does not believe that the British intent and ability to resist is wanting. Still another reason is that the United States is able to give all the aid to Britain that she could if she were a belligerent, without officially declaring war.

For these various reasons the United States has been avoiding the formal declaration of war which would necessarily plunge Japan into the war. We believe that their doing so will be put off until they have had an opportunity to complete their war preparations.

As for the actual worth of U.S. aid to Britain, up to now it has not been much, as the United States has been undergoing an industrial reorganization to put it on a war time basis. However, they have been engaging in patrol duties with ships and planes, and have sent troops as far as Iceland. It is, moreover, well within the realm of possibility under certain circumstances that she will attempt to occupy Dakar, the Azores, and Cape Verdes. It is also believed here that by next Spring U.S. industry will be humming at top production of military supplies.

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[a] See II, 600.

Trans. 8-9-41

No. 807

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

August 9, 1941
1014.

(Chief of Office routing.)

Supplement my message # 1006[a] with the following:

Although we are in full accord with the intent contained in paragraph 6 of your message # 708[b], we feel that considerable caution will have to be exercised in executing it. On occasions almost too numerous to count, we have issued statements or advised Germany to the effect that "the Tripartite Pact is the foundation" and "we shall not veer away from its aims and spirit", etc. Once the Tripartite Pact was signed, the above should be taken as a matter of course. However, unless we clarify the means by which we plan to materialize them, they are ineffective and at times, they give the impression of being excuses or apologies to the other parties.

There is some truth to the statement that there is cooperation since strenuous efforts are being made by each in his jurisdiction. However the full fruits of cooperation are not to be attained through individual exertion of effort alone.

Earlier, during the first stages of the China Incident, a certain element in German economic and military circles put up the argument that it would be to Japan's interest to have a strong Germany in Europe. If Germany were to cease arms sales to China, Britain and the United States would do the supplying instead of Germany. Therefore, for the purpose of making an economically strong Germany, arms sales to China should be sanctioned, they paradoxically argued. Through direct action by Fuhrer Hitler, however, this argument was silenced.

It is quite justifiable that Japan should desire to strengthen herself in East Asia. It is also an undeniable fact that it is of the utmost importance to the Empire that we take steps to do so right now. However I am convinced that it is of greater importance to make certain that we do not lose sight of the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, not with the intention of "playing up" to Germany and Italy, but simply with a view toward the future benefits to the Empire.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 801.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 808

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

August 14, 1941
1027.

(To be handled in government code.)

On the 9th, when I called on DEI to discuss some other matter, "DEI---" said that he had been at the General Headquarters until the previous day and that when the question of the United States came up in the course of a conversation, HITLER had said that if a clash occurs by any chance between Japan and the United States, Germany will at once open war against the United States.

In view of the fact that my meeting with "DEI" was not a prearranged one, I don't believe this conversation was premeditated.

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 809

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

August 9, 1941
1015.

(Chief of Office routing.)

Re my message # 976[a].

1. Up to the present, Germany has not gone beyond the stages where the main objective is the annihilation of the entire field forces of the Soviet Union. Already, however, she has decided upon the general disposition of European Russia, and has set up a gigantic organization headed by Rosenburg which will administer the conquered territories. As I reported in my message referred to in the heading, this organization is going steadily ahead with its preparations.

2. With the outbreak of this phase of the German-U.S.S.R. war as the starting point, Germany will undoubtedly strive to make a disposition of all of the Russian domains which stretch across the continents of Europe and Asia. As I have reported in previous messages regarding this subject, both Fuhrer Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop have expressed their hope that the Empire will cooperate in the future to remove the scars of the past to completely destroy communism at its source. This coincides with our interests.

To make this an actuality, however, it is essential that Japan and Germany closely and unconditionally cooperate. Moreover, in the interest of harmony in the far future arrangements should be made as to the area where the jurisdiction of the one contacts that of the other so as to prevent unfair distribution.

It is essential that Japanese-German negotiations be conducted as soon as our aims and policies have been determined.

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[a] See III, 810.

Trans. 8–11–41

No. 810

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

August 12, 1941
472.

(Part 1 of 2, part 2 not available.)

Berlin to Tokyo # 976 dated 1 August.

Re my # 975[a].

German plans for European Russia after occupation are in part as follows:

1. The Soviet intelligentzia are either communistically inclined or so old that they do not amount to anything and hence cannot be used in the administration of the occupied area. There is no other way than for Germany to take direct control of affairs for at least ten years.

2. The occupied area will extend to the Ural mountains and Rosenberg has been appointed as Minister of State in the new administration. He has received full powers in regard to this and has already made preparations to establish his office. The three Baltic countries and a part of White Russia will be united to form the Baltic district under the leadership of Rose, regional director of Kiel. The Ukraine (a large part of White Russia will be added to the present Ukraine and this will indeed be a large area) will be under the leadership of Kaufmann, present director of Hamburg. The Caucasus will be under the leadership of SHIKKEDATTU, until now acting director of Rosenberg's office. The remainder of Russia will be under the leadership of

Koch, at present director of East Prussia. However Rosenberg will have his office in Moscow and will have charge of the whole administration.

3. Finland in addition to regaining her lost territory will receive the Kola peninsula and the Karelia area. (Leningrad will remain in the new Russia.) Roumania will recover the lost territories of Bessarabia and Bukovina. Hungary will receive a small area and in exchange will have to cede a portion to Slovakia. General GUUBERKNUMAN's territory will be expanded to old Poland but there will be no change in the former policy toward Poland.

(Second half missing.)

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[a]Intelligence report, from reliable German source, of German gains in her operations against Russia. (Not available.)

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 811

FROM: Hsinking — August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 541.

Strictly secret.

(To be handled in government code.)

According to confidential information from a "Tokyo Nichi-Nichi" correspondent here, the Department of Home Affairs told the Nichi-Nichi main office that the Imperial Japanese Government recently filed representations with the Soviet Government, and that they wanted this statement printed in the newspapers; but, shortly thereafter, the Department of Home Affairs said that the Government had once more changed its policy, and informed the paper to postpone the printing. It seems that this secret information was given to the same correspondent by the main office, and some of the news reporters here believe that Japan has made the representations to the Soviet.

Now according to confidential information from a staff member of the German Legation here, we realize that the German Minister believes these representations to be true.

For your information.

Trans. 8–15–41

No. 812

FROM: Tokyo — August 12, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 729.

Re your # 1005[a].

I quite understand your point of view, but, in the light of the present internal and external situation, it is necessary for the time being that you remain at your post. We are most anxious that you continue your service at your post for the sake of the Empire.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 8–13–41

No. 813

FROM: Berlin August 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1035.

Yesterday the 14th, Ambassador Starmar called and told me the following concerning the recent trend of events in the Russo-German war:

1. Germany's announcement on August 6th of a generalized war communique was due to the fact that she recognized that the first phase of the war had been concluded during which a knockout blow had been dealt to the enemy troops concentrated at the borders, the greater part of Russia's aeroplanes and tanks destroyed, and a victory won over the Russians that would prevent their being able to stand and fight again. The second phase of the war will be the occupation of the DONBASU area, and the industrial areas of European Russia, Moscow, Leningrad, together with the annihilation of the Soviet army. This will be comparable to the war on the Western Front where the first phase was marked by the conquest and occupation of Flanders, followed by the next phase, the conquest of Central France. Similarly at present the army is being organized and new detachments added.

2. In the north, Leningrad has been completely encircled, and the northeast area occupied. Advance along the center has been correlated with the progress of the advance in the south. In the south, Odessa has been invested and the main force is advancing from Kiev along the Dnieper river toward Dnepropetrovsk and the BUION?WI army west of the Dnieper river must be largely destroyed. The Soviet's largest power plant is in Dnepropetrovsk and supplies power to the Soviet industries in the DONGASU area. If this area is occupied Soviet industry will have been dealt a staggering blow.

3. German losses in the six weeks since the beginning of the war have been unbelievably small. As I have already reported the number of killed is only 30,000. This is the figure given me upon inquiry at the Imperial Headquarters and is so small as to be almost incredible. These small losses can only be explained by the German method of attack in which first the mechanized units are employed, then the motorized and last of all the infantry, and thus the costly assaults are eliminated and the enemy is surrounded by bombers and various types of -----. (As a result of personal investigation of the battle field I am convinced that in general there is no mistake regarding the above.)

4. The Soviet's trial air attacks on Berlin and also Britain's daylight bombing attacks are both aimed to create the impression that Germany does not have aerial supremacy and that she is being embarrassed by the present Soviet war. This is purely a political move and is not related to actual conditions. Germany will not again for the time being make a detailed statement on the progress of the war, so be careful in regard to Russian-British propaganda.

Trans. 8-19-41

No. 814

FROM: Berlin August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1022.

Re my # 572[a].

On the 11th, by means of a diplomatic note, we were advised by the Foreign Office that though when diplomatic officials in the occupied areas of France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, and Norway were evacuated on instruction from the German Government, consuls were permitted to continue residence from the time being, recently it has become necessary to discontinue their residence in those areas. Hereby they were instructed to close their consular

offices by September 1 of this year. All competent staff members (with the exclusion of honorary consuls) were requested to evacuate the occupied areas in which they are residing. At the same time that this diplomatic note was handed over to us, Minister SUMENTO, Chief of Protocol, told me confidentially that this communication had been promulgated to affect all countries, but he wished me to be advised that they did not plan to make this applicable to Japan. This is for your information.

Relayed to Vichy.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 815

FROM: Berlin (Osima) August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1038.

Recently we sent Consul IMAI to Brussels in order to bring the Imperial portraits which had been given to the Consulate in Antwerp. Today, the 16th, we have enshrined them in this office.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 816

FROM: Rome August 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo Unnumbered.

From Consulor of Embassy to the Vice Minister:

I am acutely aware of the necessity of strengthening our position so that we may have freedom of action in the future, in the face of increased tenseness in Europe. I understand that you are arranging to have a vessel sent to the European area to evacuate those persons who are planning to leave said area. Connections between Europe and Asia are exceedingly ----- (incomplete).

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 817

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 16, 1941
TO: Berlin Circular # 1831.

(Strictly Secret.)

As I have wired you before, we have now put into effect a license system applying to foreigners leaving this country. Although ordinarily this system is not being put into effect insofar as members of foreign embassies, ministries, and consulates and their families are concerned, inasmuch as we wish to apply the system to those from any country in which a similar system is being enforced, will you wire me at once how the government of the country (countries) to which you have been accredited handles the matter, referring to (1) whether or not there is such a system, and, if there is, a general idea of the regulations and the manner of their

application, and (2) whether or not it is applied to members of ministries and their families and employees, and, if it is, the extent to which it is applied.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 818

FROM: Tokyo — August 12, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 485.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re your # 524[a].

Because of the present situation, it is almost impossible to continue to supply soy beans to Germany. However, if we should make the Russo-German war as the only pretext for discontinuing the shipment, the Germans will probably counter with the argument that the matter of overland transportation is not for the Manchukuoans to worry about and they might bring up the question of returning the unpaid credit. This will have not a small effect on the question of Manchukuoan payments to Germany, and in turn, on various questions pending between Japan and Germany. Therefore, I believe it would be better to explain frankly the actual situation prevailing in Manchukuo and leave some room for compromise in the notice to be given them and so handle the question that we need not unnecessarily provoke the Germans.

The War Ministry should already have wired the Kwantung Army to the same effect. Will you also, with the same idea in mind, direct the Manchukuoan authorities so that they will negotiate along the following lines with the German Minister, and have them do this in the spirit of friendly conversation.

In view of the facts which I have set forth in my # 449[a], this question will probably be taken up by WOLTHAT. It is our intention to offer WOLTHAT an explanation of the same nature as that which Manchukuo is to give Germany, and so I would like to have you wire me immediately upon the Manchukuoans' having done so:

1. The provisional agreement concluded at the end of last May was one which we agreed to, despite tremendous difficulties, for the sake of maintaining trade relations between Manchukuo and Germany. Manchukuo has ever since been endeavoring to carry out the terms of the agreement. However, due to the sudden changes brought on by the Russo-German War (you might have them mention verbally the fact that Japan is adopting emergency measures in the north for the purpose of cooperating with Germany) and due to consequent increasing demand for soy beans, both in Japan and Manchukuo, it has become impossible to live up to the agreement as it stands.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 819

FROM: Tokyo — October 8, 1941
TO: Hsinking — #676.

Message to Berlin #869.

1. According to the agreement governing shipment between the Far East and Europe the freight for the eastern zone of unpaid shipments destined to Germany should be paid by the German railway to our Railway Ministry and to the Manchuria Railway Company upon the arrival of the shipment at its destination in Germany. However, inasmuch as shipments made since March of this year, and which were in the Russian zone at the time of the outbreak of the Russo-German war (excepting materials which have been shipped back to Japan), will not reach Germany because of confiscation or loss, the freight on such shipments will not be paid for the present at least by Germany. An investigation made by the Railway Ministry showed the freight for shipments which come under this classification and which total 9,439 tons for the Japanese zone and amounts to $68,000. (This includes the freight between Tsuruga and Vladivostok plus the reshipment cost) and those handled by the Manchurian railway company, namely, 4,600 tons for the zone between Harbin and Manchuli amounts to $147,000.

2. However, since the aforementioned agreement makes no special provisions for what happens in case of war, we are not in a position to ask Germany to pay for the freight cost of this nature. On the basis of it, however, inasmuch as the price of the shipment itself is f.o.b., Japan the consignees should pay it regardless of whether the shipment has reached Germany or not. The railway authorities would like to have your assistance in ascertaining whether the aforementioned freight would be paid as the original cost of the shipments are paid by Germany.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 820

FROM: Tokyo — August 14, 1941
TO: Tientsin, Peking, Tsingtao, Nanking and Shanghai — Circular #1808.

(Also sent as Circular #1807.)

According to a message sent to this Minister from the Hopeh Liaison Office dated August 8th, because of the fact that German firms in the Tientsin concession are reported to be taking advantage of the freezing of assets in order to purchase American and British real estate, namely, such facilities as piers, storehouses, and others which should be placed under our control, they had decided to purchase them with Japanese frozen assets in China and are now taking steps in strict secrecy in this direction on condition that the property-owners should first consult their home authorities. So reporting, the official in charge attached to the said office has brought the matter up for us to consider and so we have replied to him that we have no objections to their trying out their policy. Since it is a question as to how far the Germans are working towards making such purchases, I would like to have you investigate and wire me your reply. Furthermore, depending on what attitude the Germans will take and to what extent their policy progresses, we may have to request the German Government's cooperation in regard to this question through either the German Ambassador here or WOHLTHAT.

Trans. 8-16-41

No. 821

FROM: Tientsin — August 18, 1941
TO: Nanking and Shanghai — Circular # 204.

Message to Tokyo # 271.

Re your Circular # 1807[a].

At the time we communicated the last part of my # 270[b] to the German authorities, OKUMA in a casual way inquired about the matter. I understand that their answer was to the following effect: "As I have just told you, we think that we are giving ample support to Japan's policy of freezing British and American assets. We don't know of any German firm or individual who is doing business with Britishers and Americans in real estate or articles. German merchants are now purchasing eggs and egg products in large quantities, but these purchases are not being made from Britishers and Americans, but entirely from the Chinese. However, recently the Japanese authorities in Peking (I understand that they do not know whether it was the army authorities or civilian authorities) informed us that the German firm of Meruchaasu was suspected of doing business with Britishers and Americans. At that time we went so far as to warn the firm against such a practice. At any rate, I believe the German authorites are cooperating in every way with the Japanese. If any actual incidents are found, we would like to have you inform us about them inasmuch as we would like to deal with the matter as it should be dealt with."

On the same occasion ŌKUMA inquired about activities on the part of Germans of Jewish extraction. Their reply to this was, "The German Jews here are engaged in business and manufacturing. Socially their credit is very high, but none of them has much economic influence. You need not be concerned about the German firms here at all, for not one of them is Jewish."

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[a] See III, 820.
[b] Not available.
[c] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-22-41

No 822

FROM: Berlin — August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1650.

Re your Circular # 1243[a].

In the light of the reports made by our consuls in my jurisdiction, I have found the following to be true.

1. Places to which distribution is effected include honorary consuls, libraries (63 throughout the country), universities (15), newspaper and magazine publishers (21), besides Government offices, the party, and individuals. At school libraries, the materials are at the reader's free inspection, and from time to time articles and photographs are being reprinted in newspapers and magazines.

2. This office handles various kinds of material amounting to 100 copies in all. While the material is insufficient in number for propaganda purposes, it is very well received by the general public because of the growing interest in Japan and because of the scarcity of reading

matter on Japan. Especially well spoken of are the German text and the photographs in *Nippon*; the political articles in *Contemporary* Japan; and articles on economics in *The East Asia Economic* and *Japan Trade Monthly*.

3. As I have previously informed you by telegram, there has been of late a sudden surge of interest in Japan, and demand for materials on Japan is increasing. Therefore, I would like to have as much material as possible sent here. Furthermore, with the exception of *Nippon*, these publications are printed in English and French, and for this reason they are not suitable for propaganda purposes. I wish very much that their German language editions will be published at this time in view of the fact that the German language will spread more and more in Europe. (In this country the monthly magazine *Signal* is printed in 17 different languages.) Furthermore, good photographs stimulate the reader's curiosity, and so I would like to have many copies added.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 823

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

August 20, 1941
1052.

(To be handled in government code.)

Re my # 1006[a] and # 1015[b].

1. I have not yet received your explanatory instructions since I have requested them but only the telegram giving an account of your conference with SUMETAANIN,[c] OTT[d], and others. It is impossible to know the real intention of our government on the basis merely of questions and answers exchanged between you and foreign officials. I would like to have you reveal to me at once for my personal information even a general idea of our policy.

2. Also, as regards the question of Japanese American relations, the newspapers report no more than that it is in a critical state. In addition, the interview Minister WAKASUGI gave in Los Angeles was reported here and inasmuch as Germany is very much concerned over this question and since it has an important bearing on the Tripartite Agreement, I would like to be informed by wire at once what developments have been taking place in respect to the negotiations between Japan and the United States and what policy Japan is following in the matter.

3. The matter referred to in the 4th paragraph of my # 1006 has to do with a past event, and so I naturally expected you to reply at once, but I have not yet received your reply. Will you, therefore, include this matter in your reply.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 809.
[c] SMETANIN, Russian Ambassador to Tokyo.
[d] German Ambassador to Tokyo.

Trans. 8–23–41

No. 824

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

August 20, 1941
1053.

(To be handled in government code.)

Concerning Japan's foreign policy, I have been given by wire not more than (1) a general account of the principal points relative to the policy; (2) what was in your telegram # 1708[a]; and (3) your statement addressed to the German and Soviet ambassadors to other diplomats. (1) is merely an outline of the policy. On the basis of it alone it is impossible to know what exactly is our government's plan. (2) is in the nature of an explanatory description and so, if I may speak frankly, it does not by any means go to the point. (3), being your statements addressed to foreign officials and, therefore, having been spoken for the purpose of diplomatic haggling as well as for the purpose of giving favorable impressions, of course, cannot be said to have conveyed our government's ideas to Japanese diplomats abroad. And yet, since you do not wire replies to questions I address to you, I find it impossible to know what the real intention of our government is. If in the present great crisis the right kind of diplomacy should be carried on with the officials at home and abroad acting as a unit, that the officials abroad should be well informed on the policy the government is following is a prerequisite. Judging, however, from the fact that no clear-cut information has come to me as yet, I cannot but think that either you are afraid that secrecy will not be maintained, or a definite policy has not yet been decided upon. If it is the former, it is naturally to be expected that every person, at the risk of his life, will maintain secrecy because of his sense of responsibility; and if it is the latter, I would appreciate your letting me know, even if it is no more than what you yourself are thinking over.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-23-41

No. 825

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

August 13, 1941
1024.

1. On the evenings of the 9th and the 10th, Tokyo broadcast Tass reports to the effect that on the 7th and 8th Soviet planes raided Berlin, dropping many bombs and causing great damage, and also that the number of German killed and wounded in the present Russo-German war was 1,500,000. However in regard to the first point, as a matter of fact, on the night of the 8th 12 or 14 planes attacked but were all repulsed before reaching the city. Again the number of Germans killed in the five or six weeks since the opening of the war is not more than 30,000. (The above two items were stated to me as indisputable facts by Ambassador Stahmer.)

2. You are well aware of the way in which Japan has been annoyed since the beginning of the China incident by Reuters and Tass propaganda. And for Japan to broadcast Tass reports at present is equivalent to Germany broadcasting Chungking reports as facts. In the face of present Japanese-German relations this is something that cannot be understood. Recently for the first time we foreigners here were permitted a tour of inspection. Outside the city of Berlin the German Foreign Office is constructing a large receiving station by which they will be able to listen minutely to the broadcasts of the whole world. (See my # 973[a].) The important points will be communicated immediately to the Fuhrer, Marshal Goering, and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. This will also be printed and distributed to the important high officials. All important

officials will thus know just what is being broadcast and it is very clear that their feelings toward Japan will be outraged; therefore in the future please control such broadcasts or take positive direction of them.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 826

FROM: Berlin August 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1025.

To the Director of the Department of Communications from Administration officer Yamagishi.

Since the outbreak of the Russo-German war, Japan in her foreign news broadcasts to Europe, has been continually paralleling reports from Germany and Russia in regard to the war situation. This strikes one as being very strange coming from Japan, a country which is allied to Germany. Furthermore in the opinion of one who is at the scene of action Soviet reports are such that it is almost impossible to place any confidence in them. For instance, in the broadcast from Japan on the evening of August 10th it was stated that Soviet planes were bombing Berlin every night and causing great damage, while as a matter of fact about all that happened was that the alarm sounded. Such reports not only cause misunderstanding among Japanese living in various places outside of Berlin but they also cause needless displeasure to the allies Italy and Germany, and there is danger that they will injure the veracity of Japanese overseas broadcasts. Therefore please consult with the broadcasting department and take suitable steps regarding the regulating of broadcasting reports originating in Russia.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 827

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 22, 1941
TO: Berlin #757.

(Strictly Secret.)

Re your #1024[a].

All along we have been handling broadcasts to the world at large objectively and impartially. Therefore, people are now eagerly listening to us throughout the South Seas and the near East. If we reported only one side of the picture, our listeners would lose confidence in us and tune us out. (For this very reason, German propaganda power in China and the South Seas is at about zero.) Our broadcasting company, working in unison with all its branches, is completely supporting our policy of upholding the Axis and is keeping in constant contact with us always. Therefore, you may be sure that such examples as you complain of are extremely rare. If you do not believe me, just listen in for a while, say, over a period of a few days, and you will see. In your message you mention news about the raid on Berlin. Well, we used a London Domei dispatch in that case, adding "Damage not known." As for the German losses, we employed a Domei dispatch from Vichy. In other words, the Foreign Office is keeping ever in touch with

the Intelligence Bureau and the Communications Department, and wishes to prevent the dispatch of identical telegrams.

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*See III, 825.

Trans. 8-25-41

No. 828

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

August 23, 1941
1061.

The following is what a certain very reliable German told a member of my staff on the 22nd:

1. The German-Soviet war is showing the most favorable development in the southern area. Budenny's forces have been dealt a crushing blow. A very strong German force ----- has made a crossing of the Dnieper River at a point south of Dnepropetrovsk and is advancing toward a certain point.

Translator's note: preceding sentence garbled.

In the central area, an advance is being made in a southeasterly direction from Smolensk and Bryansk.

In the northern theater the forces have reached the outskirts of Leningrad. While the surrounding of Leningrad is being completed, the Ladoga Lake area will no doubt be attacked.

2. At the time of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, the Soviet forces were composed of about 170 divisions. Considerably over half of this force has been now destroyed. It is true that about 45 divisions have been organized since the outbreak of the war. However, the quality of these divisions is very inferior and this fact, combined with the fact that the Russians have suffered enormous tank and plane losses, has considerably lowered the fighting ability of these forces.

3. German losses have been about 50,000 men and have had about 400 planes shot down. (This figure must be raised to between 800 and 900 if losses due to accidents and damage are included.) These are exceedingly small losses in view of the vastness of the campaigns and when compared with Soviet losses.

4. It is true that instances of destruction of food stuffs by the Soviet forces are slowly being discovered. The greater part of the grain, however, was found to be intact. Shipping of foodstuffs to those towns and villages which destroyed theirs, is being strictly prohibited. (Germany is strongly publicizing this fact. Moreover, the Germans have been carefully carrying out their advance threats.)

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 829

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

August 24, 1941
1063.

(Strictly Secret.)

On the 23rd, at Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP'S request, I flew to the General Headquarters. There I accompanied RIBBENTROP to lunch and we talked for four solid hours.

Then RIBBENTROP called in Field Marshall KEITEL and I talked with him for one hour. I am wiring you in a separate message these conversations.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 830

FROM: Berlin — August 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1066 (6 part message).

(Part 1.)

Regarding my 1063[a].

The German-Soviet war as described personally by Marshall Keitel follows:

1. The Soviet losses and condition of remainder of Soviet forces.

The total number of Soviet casualties, including wounded, dead, and captures, is estimated at between five and six million. It is definitely known that Soviet prisoners number about (1,250,000 ?) and it is certain that the dead number over two times that figure. The total casualties, therefore, are positively not below five million.

The man power of the Soviet forces which have made an appearance on the battlefields to date total about 260 divisions. The majority of these have now been destroyed, and only the equivalent of about sixty divisions still remain. Much of these, however, were slapped together haphazardly so that their military efficiency has dropped very low. The fact that the quality of their equipment has become very low further handicaps them. It has been estimated that the armed strength of the Soviet Union has fallen to one third of its original. It is true that about 40 additional divisions are now available. However, in view of the fact that the men for these were called to arms about ten days to two weeks subsequent to the launching of this war and have received only a few weeks training as reserves, they add little to the actual fighting strength of the Soviets. These were the reserves who were between 16 and 40 years. Moreover there are practically no artillery units and the infantry have little more than machine guns. Apparently there is an acute shortage of equipment and officer material, for it has been noted that in some cases a sergeant was in command of a battalion and in others, a lieutenant was in charge of a regiment. Judging from the population, it will undoubtedly be possible to organize about 20 more divisions. However, that will practically exhaust the source of supply, it is believed.

With the exception of training ships, there are apparently about 100 to 2000 first class planes remaining. However, since these are being destroyed at the rate of about 100 a day, the Soviet air force need no longer be taken into consideration.

Tank and mechanized divisions numbered about 50 but the majority of these have been lost and the remainder has been taken over by the infantry to augment its fire power.

The PU division has as yet to be employed and is still in Moscow. Female battalions have already made an appearance.

Summarizing the above, it may be said that the Soviet forces still are rich in number of remaining man power. However, they no longer are equipped or trained to fight with any degree of efficiency.

----- (this part unfinished) -----

[a] See III, 829.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 831

FROM: Berlin August 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1066 (6 part message).

(Part 2.)

2. German losses.

The total losses to German man power, including the dead, wounded, and lost, were, up to very recently, less than 160,000. The dead to date probably reach about 40,000. Thus number was 35,000 on August 10 when an accurate survey was made.

Because the total might of artillery fire and artillery men could not be put to use in forest warfare, German losses were comparatively heavy. Through experience gained in fighting since the Polish campaign a very complete repair corps makes repairs to tanks right on the scene of battle. There is very little damage to German tanks from enemy fire and because all mechanical trouble is speedily repaired by the repair corps, the mechanized divisions have maintained, at all times, a 75% full fighting strength. The total number of tanks supplied to offset losses have amounted to less than one year's output in Germany.

3. Present outlook of the war.

a. Southern front.

Odessa is now definitely and completely encircled. However, since that city is a strongly fortified base, no attempts are being made to rush it. Instead, it is being subjected to long range heavy gun fire in the accepted manner of fighting fortifications. Although Dnepropetrovsk is located in a field warfare area, it is very strongly fortified. Germany is, therefore, subjecting it to sufficient artillery warfare before making any direct in-fighting attempt. The enemy has some feeble newly recruited forces along the left bank of the Dnieper river from Dnepropetrovsk to Kiev. In order to avoid the damage resulting from suburban warfare, Kiev at present is being subjected to destruction of buildings by artillery fire. This is to be followed up shortly by infantry attacks.

There were sudden and rapid developments in the Ukraine sector which enabled the Germans to annihilate the greater part of all of Budenny's forces. Because of the speed with which the campaign is being conducted, practically all of the grains and other goods were left intact. German forces are scheduled to push on across the Dnieper river to HARIKOHU (Kharkov ?) and DONBASU. However, because the mechanized equipments have been in use every day, some repair work will have to be made on them before proceeding.

(Part 3)

b. Central front.

The forces which had reached a point east of Smolensk halted their forward march so as to enable them to keep close contact with both flanks. Strong units from this force have been diverted to the southern theater while a portion of the mechanized divisions were sent up to take part in the northern front.

The former forced the retreat of strong enemy forces which had been entrenched in the area north of KOROSUTEN, and, according to plans, will be destroyed in the area to the southeast of Gomel.

The latter group has already reached an area to the southeast of Leningrad and have joined the forces in that area.

c. Northern front.

The Leningrad-Moscow railroad has already been cut at Chudovo, north of Novgorod. The German lines ----- (one line missed) ----- roughly follow the line from ----- along the Narva river to the Gulf of Finland. The Germans were employing seige tactics here, too, in conjunction with artillery warfare, but have completed this phase and are now in the process of attacking the city itself. Its capture is expected very shortly. According to reports which

were intercepted, Marshall Voroshelov has already abandoned Leningrad. In Estonia, Revel (Tallin) is the only unconquered area. Here, again, the German forces are avoiding rushing tactics, and instead are resorting to various types of heavy artillery fire tactics. Because the forces in the north are concentrating on pushing further to the north, the Soviet forces attempted a counter attack on a grand scale from the Khalm area, but it was suppressed.

(Part 4)

d. Finnish forces.

The Finnish forces, cooperating with the Germans, have advanced to the area to the west of Lake Ladoga and to the west of Lake Onega. For the purpose of seizing the Murmansk area, General DIITORU (Dieter?), famed for his defense of Narvik, is arriving from Norway with his forces via sea.

4. Aims of the German forces.

In view of the above described showings of the various German armies, they are now being organized in the field for the second phase of the war. This second phase will shortly be launched. The goal of this phase is the capture of the entire region from DONBASU (Rostav-na-Donu?) to Moscow and the industrial area around Leningrad. At the same time, the remnants of the Soviet field forces will be mopped up. According to plans, these campaigns will call for the continuance of action until about the middle of October or early November. The Caucasus area is also to be seized, according to plans, but since military campaigns may be conducted in that area even during the winter months, it is possible that this will take place as late as in December.

As to whether there will be a necessity of sending any strong forces as far as the Ural mountains, and as to whether weather conditions will permit such maneuvers, will be decided after the conclusion of the second phase which is about to be launched. Also, it would depend greatly on the time and weather conditions at the time this second phase is concluded. For these reasons, no definite prediction can be made as to the above point.

The German military, however, is of the opinion that the second phase will be concluded by the end of October, by which time practically the entire Soviet field forces will have been destroyed, and her main industrial areas vital to supply her armed forces, will have been lost to her, leaving absolutely no possibility of her being able to rise again. Therefore, it is likely that with the exception of small occupation forces, the bulk of the German army will be returned to Germany, it is believed.

(Part 5)

5. Other items.

a. The Soviet forces have been weakened to the extreme. The military tactics of the commanding officers are very poor. On the other hand, the will to resist of the general masses is exceedingly strong. The utter abandon of all military reasoning with which these people put up resistance, has not been duplicated by any of the military forces of the western European nations. Their campaign tactics completely disregard the value of human life, and in all other aspects is conducted with the utmost cruelty. Factory workers and even women are sent into the battlefields, and hence, the number of people they are employing is colossal. The Germans find that it is not an easy matter to determine the disposition of these great masses. Wherever possible the Germans are avoiding the use of firearms in an attempt to minimize useless destruction.

b. From the beginning of the war, the German forces have been aiming at the annihilation of the Soviet forces. For this reason, the German forces have avoided making direct frontal attack on areas in which Soviet forces are concentrated. Instead, these areas are being completely surrounded.

c. To avoid unnecessary losses, no power attacks are attempted on old fortifications and against metropolitan areas. Instead, the accepted means of fighting fortifications are made use of against them.

d. For the above reasons, more days are required in carrying out a maneuver, but losses suffered by the German forces have been brought down to a minimum, thus making the eventual victory more fruitful. As a matter of fact, the Germans never expected such favorable results as they have gained, before the campaign was launched.

e. Because the battle area is so vast, there is considerable variance in weather conditions. This, sometimes, presents unexpected difficulties from the viewpoint of coordinating the campaign. In general, it may be said that good weather conditions have prevailed in the northern area; the central area followed that in favorable weather conditions, while the southern forces have encountered much difficulty due to much rainfall. The rains in the last mentioned area have made it exceedingly difficult to carry out the scheduled tactics. Very recently, however, weather conditions have become favorable at last, which enabled the Germans to carry out their plans.

(Part 6)

f. In a battle front which extends for more than two thousand kilometers, it is impossible to shift general troops from one part to another as campaign strategy and battle developments require from time to time. However, Germany accomplishes this feat with ease by utilizing her crack air and mechanized forces.

g. Of course, it goes without saying that the mechanized forces played a major part in carrying out the lightning advances made since the outbreak of the war. In the final analysis, however, it is the infantry advance that counts in the long run, and no credit can be taken away from them for the part they have played.

h. Because preparations to do so were made before the war broke out, the wide-gauge Soviet railroads have been transformed into narrow gauge tracks with no loss of time. This had made possible the lightning advances of the military forces. Conversion work on the tracks has already been completed as far as the Smolensk-PUSUKOV line.

i. To date, the Soviet forces have made absolutely no use of germs or poison gas in the war. It is presumed that they will not resort to those tactics in the future.

Being of the opinion that the material contained in this dispatch may have some value as reference material for the Imperial Army, I am reporting it in some detail. Please relay the information contained herein to the Army and Navy.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 832

FROM: Berlin — September 2, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 2.

Re your # 572[a] to the Foreign Minister.

It seems that the German Government sent in the agreement about LI SHENG-WU on the 1st. Ambassador LI will still be delayed for a very considerable length of time because of the present state of traveling facilities, and, in the meantime, Chinese residents here, among whom there are many depraved anti-Japanese rascals, will keep up their adverse propaganda. So, I think for the time being we had better appoint an honorary consul in Berlin, supported and advised by Japan, and let him deal with them.

I also think it would be quite appropriate to continue this sort of consular service even after Ambassador LI takes office. I went to the German officials and told them that it was my own idea and that Nanking knew nothing about it, and asked them what they thought. They

said that the German Government was thoroughly in accord and, if Nanking wished, they were ready to pick out three or four Germans zealous for the New Order and, of course, not anti-Japanese, to help the Nanking representatives to work out a good basis of cooperation between Japan, China and Germany. If Your Honor agrees with me on this, please negotiate with Nanking and arrange to realize this plan as soon as practicable.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 833

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

September 1, 1941
#780.

The German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo requested the use of Japanese ships from Tokyo to South America in transporting documents to the foreign office. We accepted this, but at the same time, made the reservation that in the transporting of documents between Japan and Europe, Italian aeroplanes be made available for our mail between Italy and Rio de Janerio or Santiago. Therefore, in the sending of documents that do not require secrecy or are not confidential in nature, we desire to make use of the above mentioned aeroplanes.

Relay to Rome.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 834

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

September 2, 1941
#783.

For sometime past, we have been negotiating with the German Commercial Staff here in Tokyo in order that we might draw from German peso funds in Argentina the equivalent of 7,000,000 yen to apply against our purchases of cow hide in Argentina. (As compensation we are offering petroleum and other goods as well as foreign money.) At the present time, we understand that the Commercial Attaché in Tokyo has as yet not heard from his home government concerning this matter. Therefore, I would like to have you take steps to urge the Ministry of Economics so that they will, at as early a date as possible, wire their approval. German representatives here are understood to have already communicated the details of these negotiations to their superiors in the Ministry of Economics, but inasmuch as two of our ships are at present in South American waters to load this cow hide, until these negotiations have been settled, please most especially make every effort to bring about a settlement of this matter at once.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 835

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

September 5, 1941
1110.

Re your # 577[a].

It is very difficult to make the distinction here between official and civilian, and urgent and non-urgent goods. Further, the Army and Navy attachés here have wired the Army and Navy Departments regarding the amounts and classification, so please have the head office contact the Army, Navy, and other departments concerned. Furthermore, in the future, please take particular care to have such investigations as classifications that can be made in Tokyo and those that cannot be made outside of Tokyo made at the head office.

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[a]Directs that 27,000 tons of accumulated freight for Japan be divided in to four categories and the number of tons in each be reported.

Trans. 9-9-41

No. 836

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

September 6, 1941
1114.

(Part 1 of 2.)

The following are the principal points of the information which KOMURO gathered during his inspection of economic conditions in the Balkan states (details will be sent by courier):

1. Germany's economic control of the Balkan states (excepting Turkey) is predominant. The power to decide on economic matters is also gradually coming under control of the German authorities.

2. Because Germany has imported petroleum from Rumania and a large quantity of foodstuffs from the Balkan states in general, Germany imports are in excess of exports. (This is especially noticeable in her trade with Rumania.) In order to adjust this, Germany has resorted to changing the exchange rate in her own favor. (For example, since April 1st the Rumanian exchange for 1 mark has been raised from 450 up to 600.) In addition to this, Germany has exported large quantities of arms to these countries and by thus strengthening herself militarily, as well as adjusting her trade balance, she is killing two birds with one stone.

3. A five-year or a ten-year plan has been worked out and put into effect in order to increase production in the related Balkan states and with a view of instituting large-scale cultivation, as well as improving agricultural technique. People generally are entertaining an optimistic view, expecting that this policy would in the near future double agricultural production in these states. However, agriculture in the Balkan states is at present in an extremely primitive state in that the farms are small in size, under small-scale operation and dependent entirely upon manpower and animal power. For this reason, the immediate problem is to prevent the reduction of agriculture production caused by drafting of manpower and animals for war purposes. Even if implements and fertilizers necessary for agricultural development are supplied by Germany, it would take a considerable length of time before the farmers will be able to master new agricultural technique, and therefore, it can hardly be expected that there will be a general, radical increase in agricultural production within the next two or three years.

Of course, depending on Germany's endeavor in this direction, it might be possible to increase by 50,000 tons or 60,000 tons by ----- such oil-bearing crops as soy beans, the ----- of the crops.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 837

FROM: Berlin — September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1114.

(Part 2 of 2.)

4. Throughout the Balkan states this years' agricultural crops are heavy. Even if damage caused by war is included in the calculation, the exportable quantity is expected to be larger than it has been in the past years. (The exportable margin has been about 3,000,000 tons.) In every state strict control is being exercised over exports of agricultural produce in order to insure its supply to Germany.

5. The tendency towards inflation in the Balkan states is quite noticeable. There is an increasing scarcity of materials and growing hardships. In order to cope with this tendency, every state is exercising greater and greater control over distribution of materials. However, an increased supply of foodstuffs due to abundant crops will help to lessen this tendency to some extent.

6. There is one thing about Germany's economic control of the Balkans that should not escape one's notice and that is the development of the water route of the River Danube. If petroleum, grains, lumber, etc., are to be shipped in large quantities without interruption, it is absolutely necessary that the River Danube is connected with the Rhine and that the construction of river harbors are completed. Whether this work is completed or not is an important factor in judging the future commercial and economic prospect in Europe.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 838

FROM: Berlin — October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1244.

Re my #1049[a].

From MATSUSHIMA:

For your information, I am sending you the results of a survey of German economy over the Balkans. (Countries surveyed: former Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland[b].)

1. The activities of the German Army in the Balkans this spring had very little effect on the sowing and reaping of harvests in those nations. The harvests were actually better than during a normal year. Now, under the leadership of the Germans these countries are gradually turning to a policy of collaboration with the Reich. Even Yugoslavia, which was the theater of much warfare, produced an excellent harvest and bids fair to do better next year.

2. Under a produce pact Germany is furnishing these nations with farm tools, medicines, notions and war materials, and in return accepts the national produce. Slovakia is doing better agriculturally than Rumania and it would not appear that German requirements will cause any inconveniences to these nations in the future.

3. Under this produce pact foreign exchange is not used. The mark is stipulated as the convenient unit of exchange and trade transactions between the Balkans and the Reich take place in the Berlin Verrechnungskasse (Exchange Control Bureau). Furthermore, lately it has been decided that trade between the Balkan nations themselves can also be based on the mark and can be regulated in the aforementioned Exchange Control Bureau in Berlin. In these business deals reciprocal loans will not be made. All loans will be made directly to Berlin and settled for through trade between Germany and foreign nations. (Refer to the Bulgarian-Rumanian trade pact signed the second of July of this year, the text of which I am sending you by mail.)

4. Thus, Germany has brought about a real produce pact and now she is letting the Balkans have machines, chemicals, manufactured goods, etc. In addition to that, she is letting them have textiles from the Italian factories, together with goods of various sorts from her protectorates. The outline of a strong, completely isolated Balkan trade block tantamount to economic sovereignty has been successfully set up. After the war, this will become even more solid, which will be of no little assistance to us in the establishment of an economic block in East Asia.

5. Germany is now getting more arms from the Balkans and taking them over safe routes, incurring none of the losses undergone on unfree routes. However, there has been a decline in exchange rates in the banks of from 2 to 5 per cent; in Rumania alone, from 4 to 5 per cent. Still, when Germany has succeeded in defeating the Soviet and secured the rich stores of the Ukraine, this situation will improve remarkably.

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[a] Not available.

[b] *Translator's note:* He probably means "Slovakia" instead of "Switzerland".

Trans. 10–16–41

No. 839

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

September 3, 1941
544.

(In 3 parts—complete.)

Moscow to Tokyo # 1112.

Observations on the condition of the Russo-German war. (Article 4.)

1. After the capture of Leningrad, one part of the northern German army will advance along the line of the Leningrad-Sverdlovsk railroad; the other part, the main force, will advance toward Moscow and vicinity and there will act in concert with the main central army in the capture of Moscow. Again the German army in the vicinity of Gomel will either advance on Moscow, or else unite with the southern army in effecting the occupation of the Ukraine accompanying the reduction of Kharkov and capture of Keiv.

2. Should Russian resistance prove stronger than anticipated, the total German losses might perhaps cause a delay in the development of the original plan. However, in view of the fact that German infantry is continuing to advance without interruption, it is safe to predict the fall of Moscow and Kharkov during the month of October. -----. If the Germans are successful in dealing the Russians a knockout blow in Leningrad, Moscow, and Kharkov, the war from then on will be very easy and it will not be impossible for them to reach the Volga river in a very short time. In the area of the Don river and north of the Caucasus, the winters are not severe

and here the German army will be able to continue operations during the winter. Even if it is not possible to reach Baku, the oil fields in the vicinity of Grozni at present -----.

3. In regard to the Soviet army, they will lose the greater part of their important positions in the withdrawal from Leningrad, Moscow, and Kharkov. This will amount to 4/5 of their war industries. If they should also lose the Caucasian oil fields, movement would become impossible. The present Russo-British operations in Iran are related to this oil area, and it is certain that a share of the operations through the winter and into next spring will be concerned with this area.

4. The Soviet government outwardly appears calm but there are very clear indications from within. There are as yet no signs of collapse in the national army, and it is putting up a more stubborn resistance than was anticipated and they seem to think they have the strength to carry on a long war. However, looking at the picture as a whole, in view of the brilliant achievements of the Germans, it is not impossible to predict that the strength of the Soviet army will rapidly deteriorate and that in September or October the fate of the Soviet army will be determined and that because of this, America and England are very much concerned.

Translator's note: Last paragraph somewhat garbled.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 840

FROM: Berlin (Osima) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1106.

(Secret)

(Part 1 of 2.)

The following is what a reliable German told a member of this office on the 4th:

1. The encirclement of Leningrad was completed with the occupation of SHURIYUSE-RUBURUGU[a]. Previous to this, several thousand workers withdrew from a part of the arms factories as well as the city. Among the prisoners captured during the fighting in the neighborhood of this city were armed citizens as well as workers operating tanks. Since it is clear that the entire citizenry of this city has been armed, the city will inevitably be completely demolished by attacks. The plan is to avoid street fighting and depend principally upon shelling and bombing. As to when the city will fall, it is still a question.

2. Liaison has not yet been established between the BOKKU[b] forces advancing in the southwesterly direction and the RUNDSHUTEDDO[b] forces advancing in the direction of HARIKOV[c]. However, it is clear that the Soviet forces to the east of Kiev can no longer retreat. Mopping up operations in this area will probably be completed sometime next week.

3. The German forces have crossed the DONIEPURU[d] River all along the line from DONIEPUROPETOROUSUKU[e] and the area to its south, and they are gaining steadily.

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[a] Slusselburg.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] (Kharkov ?.)
[d] Dneper.
[e] DNEPROPETROVSK.

Trans. 9-9-41

No. 841

FROM: Tokyo — September 8, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 555.

170 from the Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Minister.

Re the first paragraph of the Ambassador to Germany's wire # 1081[a] to the Foreign Minister.

1. According to investigations conducted by Attaché TEISHI, connected with this office, who recently made an official trip to Bulgaria, there are not more than eleven Bulgarian divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. German troops stationed there, taking everything into consideration, do not number more than five regiments. It is very difficult, therefore, for us to believe that the army under LISZT could be stationed there. The local Bulgarian Minister also disavows the existence of such a military force.

Then again there is the rumor suggesting the possibility of a number (7?) of divisions of German troops being stationed in what was Yugoslavia. We wonder whether or not the above-mentioned troops have entered Bulgaria again.

2. The Eastern area being as quiet as it ever was, it is generally believed here that Germany will not be inclined to hurry her negotiations with Turkey until the war on the Eastern Front has been brought under control.

Furthermore, we have been informed that the German delegates headed by CLAUDIUS[b] plan to go to Turkey for the German-Turkish trade negotiations which are to begin around the 2nd of September. This, however, we are informed has no direct bearing on the political questions.

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[a] Not available.
[b] Commercial representative of German Foreign Office.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 842

FROM: Berlin — September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1119.

At the invitation of the German Government, I intend to leave here on the 9th on a tour, lasting for about ten days, in order to inspect the occupied territories in Belgium, the Netherlands, and northern France. Please be so informed.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 843

FROM: Tokyo — September 10, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 800.

(Part 2 of 2)[a]

is apt to stiffen the American public opinion more and more and hasten America's military preparations. In the meantime, while every time anything occurred the United States resorted to stronger measures against Germany, Germany has been maintaining a calm attitude toward the United States. Japanese aim should be to persist in an attempt to keep the United States out of the war. Rather than to provoke the United States at this time and cause her people to

unite, it would be better to quiet her feelings and work toward her internal disintegration. He said that this also is a way of looking at this matter.

3. At the time the above conversation took place, the ----- Ambassador asked me (a question ?), but I went no further in my explanation but -----.

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[a] Part 1 not available.

Trans. 9–15–41

No. 844

FROM: Berlin — September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1161.

By means of my # 1006[a] and # 1086[a] I repeatedly requested your reply concerning our Government's real national policy, but I have not received any explanation. What is more, you have not informed me a single fact regarding the motive and the nature of the Japanese-American negotiations which affect the fundamental principle of the three-power agreement. What you have given in your # 800[b] was no more than an explanation which might be given to a Foreign Ambassador. If that is the only report you intend to make to me. I find it impossible to know the truth regarding our Government. Although outwardly our Government claims that the aforementioned negotiations do not violate the spirit of the three-power agreement, I find many reasons to believe that such is not the case.

Ever since the principal points of our national policy were decided on July 2nd, 1941, I have been performing my duties in a fog, so to speak, not knowing a single thing about our Government's policy during this period of critical international relations. Under such circumstances, I find that I cannot perform my duties satisfactorily and my conscience does not permit my going on in this manner.

(Last four groups of message too badly garbled for translation.)

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[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 843.

Trans. 9–23–41

No. 845

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) Vice Chief, Gen. Staff — September 20, 1941
TO: Washington (RIKUGUN) — # 949.

(Parts 1–5 of a 7 part message.)

Part 1

The following estimate of the current situation was recently sent to our attaché in Germany from the German National Defense Ministry, with the comment that it was a report from the German attaché in America. Since we suspect that the schemes of the German National Defense Ministry may be involved in this matter, please make a discreet investigation of the German attaché's real opinions.

1. If Japan attacks Russia, England will probably (? decide to ?) continue to help Russia.

Part 2

So long as Japan does not attack the Philippines and does not menace American transport routes from—1U—[a] and Manila, the American people will not decide to go to war with Japan. Moreover, the American government will probably have no desire to pull chestnuts out of the fire for Russia.

2. If Japan goes into Siam and gets bases from which to attack Singapore or make judicious demands of —1U—[a], I believe that England will take no decisive action whatever. —1U—[a] will merely be intent on the defense of her own soil.

Part 3

Russia will probably rejoice that Japan has taken no military action against her. America will be faced with the increasingly difficult dilemma of deciding whether to make war against Japan, with the aid of England and the Netherlands East Indies, or to lose all (? prestige ?) in the Pacific and permit Japan to advance still further —1G— capture Singapore and occupy part of the Netherlands East Indies. Even in that event, so long as Japan does not attack the Philippines or menace American importation of raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies and Manila, it will be difficult to push the American government and people into war.

Part 4

Whatever may be done, it seems vital that America always be kept in some dilemma concerning Far Eastern problems.

3. If Japan loses this opportunity and goes on procastinating, British and American naval strength will be combined and increased, and Japan will find that she has lost an excellent prize by chasing the sun. America, with her policy of delay, is trying to avoid a decisive naval battle for some time, while making a great show of naval and air strength in order to push back Japan.

Part 5

4. The American fleet is divided between two oceans, and lacks strength; the airforce and army have not yet reached full strength, and, moreover, have been stripped of their power in order to reinforce England and Russia; the troops which America could use for herself are of an extremely low caliber. Concealing these weak points from view is the prime object of America's war time policy. Her boasted economic pressure is no more than a trick, somewhere between a bluff and a threat. It is, rather, another proof of the great anxiety which she feels toward the real power of Japan.

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[a] Southwest Pacific place name —V.

Trans. 7-21-45

No. 846

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) September 20, 1941
TO: Washington (RIKUGUN) #949.

(Parts 6 and 7)[a]

Part 6

Recently, in order to boast to Japan of her unlimited economic strength, America has extended export permission to include even foodstuff, fibres, finished articles, etc., from

the Philippines. However, from an overall viewpoint, whether or not a certain amount of goods leaks out of the Philippines into Japan is a question of no great importance. Finally, as a device to bluff Japan and to conceal her own lack of power, there has recently been a great deal of editorializing in American newspapers on the question of sending aid to Russia via Vladivostok.

Part 7

The opinion is widely expressed that it would even be all right to risk war with Japan by shipping via ports other than Vladivostok—for example, (?Amur?) River ports. However, this seems to be merely a device for testing the mettle of the American people. Since 1918 the American Government has depended chiefly on a policy of bluff and intimidation. Even today, it believes that it can mask the actual facts of America's handicaps, but this is a great mistake.

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[a] Parts 1–5 same number See III, 845.

Trans. 7–23–45

No. 847

FROM: Tokyo August 15, 1941
TO: Berlin #741.

Re your #1028 (?)[a].

On the 15th I had an interview with Ott and told him that I planned to call a special meeting of the Privy Council in September at which time we planned to abolish the Japanese Embassy in Poland and repudiate the Polish Embassy in Japan.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–16–41

No. 848

FROM: Tokyo October 1, 1941
TO: Berlin #857.

Re your #1195[a].

I placed the matter of abolishing the Japanese Embassy in Poland before the Privy Council today, the first, and I expect them to give approval following their metting on the 3rd.

Furthermore, in regard to the abolition of the Policy Embassy in Tokyo, this will be considered at the same meeting, and then the Polish Ambassador will be notified immediately.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–13–41

No. 849

FROM: Tokyo — September 11, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 580.

(Message from Berlin # 1119, September 8.)

On the 8th I called on Vice Minister WEIZSACKER and asked him about the Greer incident. His explanation was as follows: When a German submarine saw a warship whose identity was not clear and tried to approach it, the submarine was suddenly attacked with explosives, and so it dove under water. The attack continued for two hours. After waiting until it was over, the submarine raised its periscope above the surface and saw the warship in question, and then for self-defense it released two torpedoes.

I then asked him what the German Government intended to do about this question, and WEIZSACKER'S reply was, "I don't know what HITLER will decide to do about it, but my own view of the matter is that I do not believe there is any need of Germany's making a big affair of it. According to information I have received, President ROOSEVELT seems to be using the incident to stir up the warlike spirit of the people. I don't believe that the United States would make this an excuse for joining the war, for, so far she has not taken any diplomatic steps with regard to the question. Of course, newspapers in both Germany and the United States are making much of the incident, but I believe that this matter will be carried no further.

Trans. 9–15–41

No. 850

FROM: Berlin — September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1126.

Re your # 792[a].

At present Germany has large sums of money in the various South American countries as accounts of branches of the Reich Bank, etc. For the time being, Germany is providing for the expenses of her diplomatic establishments from these funds. In Germany, trade with South America before the war was a continued excess of imports over exports, and by the following methods she wishes to secure these funds:

(1) Funds realized by the sale, when necessary, of gold held by Germany in South America (before the regulations freezing currency in America, Germany offered gold or foreign currency to the banks for the liquidation of national debts, and paid the required commission and received a number of accounts from these banks. The head office of the Specie bank should be well aware of the details of these gold accounts payable on sight).

(2) accomplishing the transfer through the payment of ----- out of the funds held in South America for the purchase of raw materials -----

(3) Affixing of funds held by Germans in South America.

(4) The purchase of the currency of the various South American nations by "boot-leg" (literally, "dank" transactions), and sending it by suitable means to foreign countries. (Exchange control in the South American countries is strict. Since the remittance of foreign currencies is prohibited it should be posible to carry currency outside the country and dispose of it at a reduced rate. However, where said currencies can be procurred is the question. As soon as I ascertain this point, I will report it.)

Of the above methods, (1) will involve the largest sums.

Germany has a lot of leeway in funds on hand, and in the future there are reasonable prospects of German's accepting a proposal, should we make one, of using the above funds to provide for the expenses of our diplomatic establishments in South America.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-19-41

No. 851

FROM: Berlin (Osima) September 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1151.

Re my #1126[a].

According to a telegram from Minister Chiba, transactions are being made now in Lisbon in the currencies of the three countries, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, at 10% under the market price, it appears.

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[a] See III, 850.

Trans. 9-27-41

No. 852

FROM: Berlin September 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1147.

Re your #794[a].

We have discussed the matter of neutral shipping to Japan on the Asama Maru, with the Army and Navy and the local Japanese Merchants. Inasmuch as it will take considerable time to transport the freight to Lisbon we would like to be advised on the following points as soon as you have reached a decision. Please wire immediately for our information.

1. Is the word neutral to be interpreted simply to mean freight manufactured in Switzerland, Sweden, etc. or are there stricter limitations attached?

2. Is the transportation of *arms (?)* and agricultural machinery included or are there limitations on the kinds of freight?

3. Is it necessary to secure "navicerts" for the transportation of the freight? If "navicerts" are required it will be necessary to start the procedure immediately particularly in regard to freight from Sweden. Does Britain approve of the issuance of said "navicerts"?

4. In regard to the route of the freight we wish to have it all collected at Marseilles and then shipped by water to Lisbon. We do not wish to use the Spanish railroads because of their inefficiency. Have you Britain's understanding on this point?

5. Will there be an official inspection of the freight by the British en route? If so what will be the extent of it? (Depending upon the degree of inspection we were considering the possibility of sending some of the courier's baggage along.)

6. What is the limit on the amount of new purchases we may plan to make for neutral freight (mercury, potassium, chemicals, etc.)? Also if there are items included in 1 to 5 concerning which a decision has not been reached we would like to have at least an outline of the trend of the negotiations with Britain regarding them.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–23–41

No. 853

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

September 15, 1941
1139.

Re my # 1135[a].

Latest reports that have come to my ears on the war situation are as follows:

1. The investment of the east side of Kiev is almost completed. According to German estimates the encircled area is about the size of *ZAKUSEN* and contains about 1,000,000 Russian soldiers.

The Russians are becoming desperate and are attempting to break through the encirclement, a procedure which merely results in the capture or annihilation of the greater share of them. The fall of Kiev is imminent.

2. In the Leningrad area the suburbs have been reached and the Russians have commenced the demolition of the city.

3. In the Black Sea area the sudden invasion of Crimea was a success but during the operations General SHŌBERUTO was killed by a projectile.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–17–41

No. 854

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

September 16, 1941
596.

(Message from Berlin # 1124 dated Sept. 10.)

(Part 1 of 2[a].)

SUMMARY:

1. The extent of damage caused by bombing does not compare to that of London. It has been possible to make immediate repairs.

2. Manufacturing the communication organizations have from time to time been damaged but with little interruption in their operation.

3. Air defense, especially anti-aircraft guns and camouflage have been quite *effective (?)*.

4. The people have taken on their different bombing duties, such as watching for fires (little damage resulting from fires). In spite of English propaganda the damage has been small.

5. About one third of the bombs (250 kg. and 500 kg. *of which (?) fish shaped (?)* ones have been few) have not exploded. Recently, as the pilots have not been experienced, there have been no group bombings, instead there has been ----- bombing.

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[a] See III, 855.

Trans. 9-23-41

No. 855

FROM: Tokyo — September 16, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 596.

(Message from Berlin # 1124 on September 10.)

(Part 2 of 2[a].)

6. The outstanding points are as follows:

1. I inspected the harbor after the Hamburg bombing and there was little damage. Ship construction is going on full force. I saw four submarines under construction (it is said one ship a week *is finished?).*

2. Although incendiary bombs were dropped on the large I.G. factories (of ? at ? belonging to ?) Kerun Redaakuzen[b] there was no damage. In the day light bombing of August 12 by the English of the large Kunappuzakku[b] factory, district (taking in a power plant, nitrogen factory, foundry, etc.) 30 bombs were dropped in the inner harbor area (12 did not explode). There was no serious damage to the nitrogen factory, only a part of it being damaged and all of the work continued without diminution. Since the beginning of the war there have been only two employees killed and several slightly wounded. Even though the Central Station was the object of the main English attack, only the baggage department was injured and other than that, damage within the city was slight.

3. Manheim Castle sustained heavy damage. Work was resumed in the Daimōraa Bentsu[b] factory which suffered serious damage in May but which has been completely restored in two months.

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[a] See III, 854.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 856

FROM: Tokyo — September 17, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 600.

Relaying # 1142 from Moscow to Tokyo:

The Soviet Government has already ordered the compulsory removal of 600,000 Germans living in the Volga Area to Siberia and Turkestan (this was not reported in the local newspaper). However, more recently it appears that people of German origin in this vicinity were banished with only 48 hours notice (some of these were sent to LORUIMA (Kulema ?)).

It has been reported to me that the populace in general, and mainly the Germans, on their part have replied with counter propaganda to the effect that they have shown hospitality to the populace in the occupied area, and supplied their needs as to food, and have taken them to places of shelter in the Eastern part. The people are at last beginning to hear from the lips of the refugees themselves the attitude of the German Army, and so now it appears that there are few who believe this Soviet propaganda about German atrocities. Hence, recently articles relative to German atrocities have become so numberous as to be conspicuous. For example, on the 13th PURACCA ran an exaggerated article about German atrocities, featuring a picture of the village of SUMIRAROFU, brought by a peasant refugee from SUMOHAIYEH-KU. This seems to be one outlet for the Soviets, who are at last becoming impatient with the unfavorable war situation.

Trans. 9-19-41

No. 857

FROM: Madrid (Suma) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 138.

(Part 1 of 2.)

The following are the highlights of the conversation I had with General FRANCO in the Parudo[a] Palace on the 29th:

1. Of late Great Britain has been collecting letters on the situation in and out of respective countries from various sources. FRANCO believes that Great Britain is thus endeavoring to find out the situation now existing in the principal countries with a view to emphasizing diplomacy because she has come to realize that she will never be able to destroy Germany.

2. So far Germany has succeeded in destroying more than half of the Soviet Army. The military phase of the war with Russia will end in about a month's time; thereafter, activity on the northern front will cease and mopping-up operations will be continued in the south. However, due to the fact that the policy of scorched earth is being carried on thoroughly by the Russians who are so completely permeated by Communistic ideology as to have no sense of private property and due to their solidarity, should Moscow fail, they are likely to withdraw into the Turkestan region to continue resistance. At any rate, the possibility of a compromise with STALIN cannot be thought of. After all, Germany would have to completely annihilate the Soviet Army.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 858

FROM: Madrid (Suma) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 138.

(Part 2 of 2.)

3. He thinks that landing of British and American troops from Gibraltar or in Portugal cannot be expected. The former is too narrow for concentration of a large number of troops. Besides, it has been completely isolated from Spain by the latter having sufficiently fortified the adjacent coast. Although Portugal still maintains connection with Britain, she will be

wiped out by the ----- Spanish Army should she give any chance to Britain and the United States. Keenly aware of this danger, she is cleverly playing up to both Britain and Spain.

4. WEYGAND's Army in Morocco has the upper hand in numbers, but the (African ?) native troops are poorly equipped and so in case of trouble they will not be an enemy to the Spanish garrisons. However, watchful care should be taken against the danger of the United States occupying Dakar and Cape Verde preparatory to her participation in the war.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 859

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo (WINTER) (Head, General Affairs Section) # 875.

To Section 18.

FROM: Colonel HAYASHI

1. Since I plan to leave on the 26th, I would like to receive before that date an outline of how you are going to send the British INTER (messages) and the earliest available wire of this type. (I have asked Major NISHI to deliver material to the Germans during my absence, but unless we get a clear idea from you of how you are going to send the wires, it will be impossible to handle this matter.)

2. Today I received (some) decrypted INTER (messages) from the Germans, but I am not going to wire them to you. Also, I suggest that you stop sending me the messages you have decrypted.

The Germans have expressed their deep gratitude for the material they recently received.

3. Please convey to Lt. Colonel KAWAMURA and his group and to SUEYOSHI my heartfelt congratulations on the success of their (cryptanalytic) work.

Trans. 3-1-45

No. 860

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Autumn) (Head, General Affairs Dept.) # 877.

(2 Parts—complete.)

Part 1

Lt. Col. SCHOLZ of the German OKW ABWEHR previously received the Order of the Rising Sun 4th Class because of his meritorious services in the case of the Axis. As you know, SCHOLZ has been in charge of communications of this attache office with the ABWEHR ever since OSHIMA was attaché. He has taken the initiative whenever problems have arisen and has proved thoroughly helpful. Furthermore, in the matter of German-Japanese joint cryptanalytic work, he has been sparing no efforts in acting as intermediary between the two men in charge.

Part 2

SCHOLZ's record is not inferior to that of KEMP, who is in charge of codes, and therefore we would like to have SCHOLZ awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure 3rd Class at the same time as KEMP is given his commendation.

According to what a certain ABWEHR Major told one of our advisers in confidence, Lt. Col. SCHOLZ has served Japanese relations meritoriously with the ABWEHR and moreover, his German decorations —4G— foreign decorations.

The awarding by Japan of only the 4th Class is thought to have had a somewhat adverse effect.

Trans. 3-7-45

No. 861

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) September 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff) # 201.

If you were planning air operations in British Malaya, I think the following preparatory steps would be necessary:

1. The thorough—going re-enforcement of the (?air?) units in Saigon, especially the dispatching of the best Imperial technicians to Saigon.

The accurate utilization of the detailed intelligence already collected and the establishment and utilization of new (?and efficient?) spy networks.

2. The execution of wind-speed observation with balloons having radio-sounding equipment, twice daily, in at least five places—Saigon, Hanoi, *SHINNAN*[a], Pin-Tung (Heito), and —IU[b]—. The systematization (of these stations) by means of specially established wireless network.

Please communicate the above to the Air Headquarters.

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[a] SHINNANGUNTŌ—The New Southern Islands.
[b] Far Eastern Place Name A.

Trans. 2-12-45

No. 862

FROM: Bern (Mitani) September 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 99.

As a result of the difficulty of maintaining communications between Japan and the various stations in Europe and in view of the increase in importance of the general reports intended as foreign propaganda together with estimations on conditions within the country, I am reporting in detail the following points that have been called to my attention regarding the editing of the above, and the changes in the office, and I request your consideration.

1. In view of the increase of the news and its quick distribution one broadcast would be too long and too fatiguing on the announcer, hence we are dividing and increasing the time to two periods around 6 and 11 p.m. (Tokyo time) with broadcasts from 40 minutes to an hour each.

2. In harmony with the above object we will increase the content of the broadcast but at the same time we will be careful in selection and endeavor to avoid repetition.

3. (a) We will give explanations of new place names and personal names (particularly those relating to China) and idioms so that there will be no mistake in reading them.

(b) Arrange for an immediate change in wave length.
(c) Distribution of reference material.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 863

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 22, 1941
TO: Berlin #758.

Re your #943[a] and #1012[a].

Concerning the agreement:

(a) It is the opinion of the authorities that it would be a good plan, because of various circumstances involved, to have the technical arrangements made by the officials of the Broadcasting Companies of both countries. Therefore, I want to support our original plan as much as possible.

(b) Paragraph 5.

The high officers of the Broadcasting Company liaison staff, are making it easy to conclude the agreement from the technical point of view. With regard to the participation of the Embassy, in case the German authorities request it, we have no objections to entering the statement that the liaison officers will attend to the business of contacting the Broadcasting Company according to instructions from the Ambassador. After bearing in mind the fact that I want to avoid the personal meddling of foreign officials in such private organizations as broadcasting companies, and since at my request it has already been proposed in the contents of the original plan for the agreement, please wire me the results of your investigations.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 864

FROM: Berlin September 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1095.

Re your #758[a].

I took the matter up with the Germans and they said that in view of the remarkable advancements made in radio broadcasting of late, it had become an important function of a nation. Already, they said, the Germans have established a post of Radio Attache in Tokyo and in other of the more important capitals throughout the world, as diplomatic representatives. (FIKKARUTO has been appointed for the post in Tokyo.) The Germans are still desirous of making this an issue of inter-governmental agreement. They insist that the basic principles should be agreed upon between governments and that it is essential that the functions (of radio) be given recognition as being an integral part in the functions of a state.

They have no objections to leaving the details of the programs, etc., up to direct negotiations between the respective broadcasting companies. Furthermore, they have no objections to the exchanging of representatives of the respective broadcasting associations to maintain liaison. However, they wish to have the government retain the right to have the final say in all matters having political implications, such as, for example, the selection of speakers, etc.

Germany has no intention of interfering with the organizations in foreign countries which have been specifically established to conduct this work.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the matter at hand will have to be arranged and settled in its entirety through governmental negotiations or have the governments enter into agreements covering the general points and leaving the details up to negotiations between the broadcasting associations.

Please give this matter your immediate study, and advise us your decisions.

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[a] See III, 863.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 865

FROM: Tokyo — September 12, 1941
TO: Berlin — #814.

Re your #1095[a].

In consideration of the operating conditions of the previously established exchange radio agreement between Japan and Italy being based on a sincere understanding between the radio bureaus of both countries, it is important to effect these exchange broadcasts at as early a date as possible. It is considered, from the political point of view, that such things as the broadcasting of the actual completion of agreements gives expression to matters of national importance, but if the German authorities, as a matter of Government policy, press for an understanding re this agreement beforehand, it is our opinion that we would like to have it confirmed by an exchange of notes. Bearing this in mind, and after negotiating once more, please wire me the results.

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[a] See III, 864.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 866

FROM: Berlin — September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1163.

Re your #814[a].

I had the matter taken up again with the German Government and they agreed that this agreement should be concluded between the two broadcasting associations and that the governments of the countries concerned should give recognition to it by exchanging memorandums. In such a case in reference to clause #5 they propose that: (a) It is necessary that those engaged in the work of broadcasting should reserve to the Government the ultimate right of censorship in matters of political importance; and (b) a clause should be included, as the Japanese Government proposed, to the effect that officials engaged in exchanging broadcasts should follow instructions given by the Ambassador. However, they insist upon deleting these conditions, giving as their reason the fact that since the agreement is one existing between the two broadcasting associations, these conditions have no binding power and

are inconsistent as a matter of form. I understand also that they insist, even in case the 5th clause is to be made effective, that the agreement should be one concluded between the two governments. Since a great deal of time has already been spent in discussing this matter, it would be well to put the plan into practice at once by compromising on this point. Please discuss the matter with them and wire me your reply.

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[a] See III, 865.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 867

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

September 25, 1941
846.

Re your # 1163[a].

I have taken this matter up with the authorities concerned as a result of which it has been decided to (1) conclude the agreement between the broadcasting associations of the two countries based on our proposals regarding the exchange of broadcasts between Japan and Germany, and (2) to exchange a memorandum between the governments of the two countries in order to validify the above, also to eliminate Clause No. 5 of the proposals. However, the broadcasting association here desires, if there are no objections, to have the signing of the agreement take place in Tokyo. If this meets the mind of the Germans we plan to appoint Komori the head of the broadcasting association here as the representative of this broadcasting association and we would like to have the Germans select their representative and notify us. Further if Tokyo is to be the place of signing then the memorandum will be exchanged between myself and Ambassador Ott. Please ascertain Germany's desires regarding this and wire. Please be informed that the above memorandum will be patterned after the official document exchanged between Minister Arita and the German Ambassador resident in Tokyo on June -th 1939 in connection with the Japanese-German medical science agreement.

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[a] See III, 866.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 868

FROM: Bucharest (Tsutsui)
TO: Tokyo

October 6, 1941
183.

Part 1 of 2[a].

Report on the situation.

1. The salient points in the Rumanian official announcement of the 5th are as follows:

Rumanian Alpine and Cavalry forces are fighting with the Germans between the Dnieper and the Sea of Azov[b].

The enemy in the region of Odessa bringing tanks, etc., from Crimea and the Caucasus, counterattacked but were routed.

Since the beginning of hostilities, Rumanian forces have captured 60,000, killed 70,000 and wounded 100,000, as well as repulsed 502 airplanes and captured a large amount of arms and material. The Rumanian losses were: 20,000 dead, 15,000 missing (half of which are thought to be prisoners and half slain), and 76,000 wounded, 80% of which recovering. Airplane losses—120. Some of the enemy tried to land in parachutes and others tried to flee, but more than 90% of them were captured without any losses on our part. There was not a single troop train, warehouse, bridge or factory that was not destroyed by aerial bombing. The fire at the Ploesti Petroleum works did not amount to any more than 300,000,000 lei.

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[a] Part 2 of 2 is not available.

[b] Part of the Black Sea, northeast of Crimea.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 869

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

October 2, 1945
#635.

Message from Berlin #1206.

Re your #856[a].

That this intelligence is the most ridiculous fabrication, I believe will be made clear should you compare this with my successive wires prior to and since the beginning of the German-Soviet conflict, but if I were to expound briefly proving this to be the case, it would be as follows:

1. Germany, prior to the beginning of military operations, filed absolutely no demands with the Soviet, nor were negotiations attempted at any time. Germany's motives in the war against the Soviet were for the purpose of consoldiating her eastern front for the war against England. In order to do that, it was necessary to annihilate the Soviet field troops and to overthrow the Communist regime. It is clear that such objectives could not have been discussed over a conference table. Therefore, Germany, giving up fresh gestures of compromise, fell upon the Soviet with dispatch and decision. These circumstances outlined above have oft been reiterated by Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP to me.

2. The war against the Soviet is exactly as I have outlined above. It isn't as though Chancellor HITLER had been persuaded to take this course at the insistence of Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP, for it all emanates from the deep-rooted convictions within Chancellor HITLER himself. With regard to the future of the STALIN regime, VON RIBBENTROP from the beginning has been saying that it would be absolutely impossible to predict its future course. Therefore, it isn't as though they were overly optimistic. It is an utter fabrication to say that Germany is now reaping the mistake of last June in turning against Russia, even though it is true that the Soviet is putting up a fight far more obstinate than Germany imagined possible. VON RIBBENTROP, as ever, is in the closest confidence of Chancellor HITLER, helping and advising daily at the Supreme Headquarters. Therefore, there is no truth in the statement that he is operating his own spy agency or anything else like that. Such things as these which are being circulated in the United States are pure nonsense and only for the purpose of driving a wedge between Japan and Germany. (This should clarify such a question as *c* under *1* in your message.) In the handling of intelligences such as these, I would like to have the home office be very careful as to the credence placed in them.

Furthermore, the need for maintaining the secrecy of my wires written around the time covering the opening of German-Soviet warfare is becoming less important. Therefore, I believe that it would be a good thing for competent authorities to peruse those wires as one bit of evidence.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 870

FROM: Berlin — October 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1218.

According to reports received from the German High Command through their Foreign Office, the following are the division designations of the Russian Far Eastern forces which have made their appearance in the German-Russian hostilities since the middle of September. These had already ceased to exist as organized divisions since the middle of August, and in addition to those listed, two other infantry divisions have since arrived.

Furthermore, according to the Germans, it has been observed that recently the Russian forces have been successively transferred westward.

This information is being sent you in view of the intense propaganda which is being sent out by the British and Americans regarding the strength of the Soviet forces in the Far East:

40 (3rd, 108th, 63rd, 99th Inf., 60th Art.)
32, 39 (50th, 65th, 199th, 254th, Inf., 22nd, 205th Art.)
104 (124th, 217th, 273rd Inf., 290th, 502nd Art., 163rd Recn. Btn.)
92 (88th, 753rd Art.)
22 (2nd, 872nd Inf., 75th Art.)
26 (28th, 30th Inf., 26th Art.)
105 (Belonging to the First Special Army)
54 (82nd, 118th, 244th, Inf., 41st Art., 58th, 86th Independent Art.)
34 (4th Inf., 256th Art., belonging to 2nd Special Army)
57 (13th, 74th Inf., belonging to the Baikal District Army).

Trans. 10-8-41

No. 871

FROM: Berlin (Osima) — October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1229.

(To be handled in Government Code.)

In connection with my wire # 1224[a], having to do with the German-Soviet military situation, I met with army and naval attachés today in joint conference to collate impressions received by them at the time of their recent tour of observation on the eastern front as well as to discuss various intelligences. We gave considerable thought and made numerous critical observations on all phases.

The campaign against Moscow has opened with dispatch and success. If they are able to keep up at this rate and can dispose of the Russian troops in Moscow and in the neighborhood of that city, it is thought that the eastern front can be consolidated before long.

Though it would seem that in England and the United States they are publicizing propaganda to the effect that Germany, immediately after the fall of Moscow, will offer peace to the Soviet, just as I reported Chancellor HITLER to have told me in my #924[a], such a thing as that could never come about. As far as Germany is concerned, her principal strength in the future will be directed toward the war against England. But, on the other hand, she will not weaken her aggressive attack on the Soviet until the Communist regime has been overthrown; that much is clear. The situation outlined above puts the lie to British and American propaganda that the war between Germany and the Soviet has been stalemated, and Germany's military strength exhausted. As far as the Imperial Government is concerned, utmost caution should be taken not to believe such statements as those. It is self-evident that the fall of Moscow would be a tremendous blow to the STALIN regime. The fall of Moscow, too, will have an enormous effect insofar as the Far East is concerned. In my opinion, I believe that it is absolutely imperative that the Imperial Government should give due consideration to the various phases of the situation as I have outlined above, and without the slightest hesitation decide upon its counter-policies. I have incorporated my humble opinions in this dispatch.

Please transmit this message to army and naval officials.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 872

FROM: Berlin (Osima) October 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1237.

Part 1 of 5.

I have already in successive messages, expressed myself in regard to developments in the European war situation and in regard to the measures we should take to meet them. But after having conferred with Vice Admiral Nomura and the military and naval attaches, in view of recent developments, I would submit my further opinions as follows:

1. In the German-Soviet war, the Soviet army having been found to possess far greater weapons than was imagined, and the entire nation having been aroused to stubborn resistance, the German army has not attempted the impossible in attacking them, but has been planning their annihilation by more deliberately considered methods of warfare. Therefore, it cannot be denied that in point of time it has taken longer than the German army planned. However, on the other hand, the resulting losses, not only to the Soviet army, but to the entire Soviet Union, have been much greater. Up until the beginning of the recent large operations, with but very small losses to themselves, the Germans had already wiped out 5,000,000 Soviet troops (of which 2,500,000 were prisoners).

Now they are beginning the large scale siege of Moscow which I mentioned in my #1224[a]. Timoshenko's troops, of which but few remained after the siege of Vyazma and Bryansk, will again be given a terrific beating, and the fate of Moscow can be said to be settled already.

Thus the Germans have dealt a devastating blow to the Soviet forces before the real winter sets in, as per plan. They have seized the larger part of the Soviet's raw materials, and will soon reduce Russia to a condition from which they will be unable to rise again. While it cannot be said that this brought the war with the Soviet to a conclusion, there is no doubt that the success of the operations in these parts can be considered one stage in the developments,

preparing the way for the removal of the main strength to the northwest (i.e. of Europe) and the beginning of the next operations.

[a] Not translated.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 873

FROM: Berlin (Oshima) October 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1237.

(Part 2 of 5.)

2. It goes without saying that Germany's principal objective in this war is the overthrow of Great Britain, and from frequent statements made to me by Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, it is very clear that there is not the slightest change even now in this basic policy.

In order to attack England, Germany will first increase her air attacks and submarine warfare, but with the present high war spirit in Britain, Germany will not be able to bring her to her knees by these means alone, and it is recognized that in the end landing operations will have to be carried out.

I am confident from my frequent conversations with Chancellor Hitler and other German leaders that the Germans have plans developed for decisive action in landing operations, but I imagine because of weather and other conditions involved that the time for this will likely not be before spring. When it comes to the question of their success or failure, the British seem convinced that it will end in failure, but as I told you in my # 1177[a], the preparations of the Germans at present have already assumed large proportions, and with the cooperation of all the war industries of Europe more and more will be accomplished. Furthermore, considering the excellence of their supreme command and the quality of their warriors, one cannot but conclude that their chances of success are large. When one considers what the German army accomplished in the Norway operations and in breaking the Maginot line, which were considered by everyone as impossibilities, it is beyond the powers of imagination to know what they might do.

The Germans themselves are calmly awaiting the hour with the greatest of confidence.

3. Before attempting the said landing operations, Germany will complete the operations in the Caucasus and then take the Near East and Egypt. However, Germany looks upon this as a side war, and in view of the inferiority of the British forces in the Near East (Germany considers Britain's claim of 750,000 men in the Near East as a great "bluff" and pays no attention to this), does not deem it necessary to move large forces there. Accordingly, it is still thought that her main forces will be concentrated on the landing operations in England.

Furthermore, as I have stated in frequent messages absolutely no thought is being given to any such thing as coming to terms with Britain, and all, from Hitler down, are determined that unless Britain surrenders unconditionally she must be brought to her knees by force of arms.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 874

FROM: Berlin (Oshima) October 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1237.

(Part 3 of 5.)

4. The possibility that, in the event of Germany's conquering England proper, the British royal family, government, and navy will flee to overseas possessions and continue resistance with American cooperation, might be admitted as a theoretical possibility, but both the material and spiritual blow that successful landing operations would be to the British empire and the moral effect this would have upon the world, would be beyond comprehension.

But even leaving that out of the question, there would be no hope of victory, and it is seriously to be questioned if resistance could be continued if the British leaders and the navy fled overseas and left 40,000,000 subjects to die. (You are, of course, aware of the fact that Germany has repeatedly made the statement that she assumes no responsibility for feeding the people of occupied areas.)

Personally, I think there is almost no chance of any such eventuality, (i.e. British withdrawal overseas and continued resistance). Naturally, the question of whether the United States joins in the war, would make some difference in the situation. However, in the first place there is very little possibility that the United States will be in the position of being formally at war with Germany early next spring, and in the second place, if after having put Britain proper down, Germany by means of an economic supremacy taking in Europe, Russia, Northern Africa and the Near East, should go right on with the accomplishment of the plans for a new order in Europe, even the United States would hardly be able to do anything with it.

On the other hand, considering the fact that Germany also would not be able to attack the United States even though the United States should have entered the war, before long a way would be found for a compromise and peace between Germany and America. Even though Germany and the United States should continue in future to be opposed to each other, my judgment would indicate that a state of war between them would hardly be likely to continue a long time.

The British and Americans seem to be placing much hope on disturbances breaking out in the German occupied areas in the event of a long war, but at present this is not being given any concern, and it goes without saying that Germany is not making conditions after the conquest of England a cause for worry.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 875

FROM: Berlin (Oshima) October 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1237.

(Part 4 of 5.)

5. In this present war, Germany plans first of all to overthrow the British empire throughout the world, and this is the reason the cooperation of Japan is needed. Depending on the attitude Japan takes, Germany might have to be satisfied with merely driving Britain out of Europe, and having to consider the possibility of concluding peace with her. Also as

between Germany and the United States, even though the advance of the United States into Europe should be restricted, a settlement might be reached along lines that would give the United States a "free hand" in the Far East. In such an event, the power of Britain and the United States could be gotten into one hand, and, needless to say, we would be in a difficult position.

On the other hand, in thinking of the future of our Empire, in order to bring about a speedy settlement of the China incident which has continued these four years, it is absolutely essential for us to make sure of the resources and markets of the south. The Great Objective in the concluding of the Three Power Treaty was really this very thing[a].

The realization of our objectives, and destiny of the Empire for a thousand years now hangs, as a matter of fact, upon the success of Germany and Italy in Europe.

However, judging from England's policies of late, they expect us to be taken in by British and American propaganda regarding the European war situation, and to continue to get along under the unbearable present economic difficulties.

Thus, even a victory for Germany and Italy in Europe alone would profit the Empire nothing, but would rather be likely to give rise to unfavorable results, as I have stated previously.

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[a] Ambassador General Oshima unquestionably speaks with authority in this regard, since he is the man chiefly responsible for bringing Japan into the Axis.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 876

FROM: Berlin (Osima) October 11. 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1237.

(Part 5 of 5.)

6. In view of the above outlook, Japan should, at this time, speedily reinstate the true aims of the Tripartite Pact. In that light, she should establish a definite course with regard to the war in Europe, so as to bring about the materialization of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. We should forget all else in the interest of attaining this goal. As one means, we should, as I suggested in my message # 1229[a], make use of the confusion at the time of the fall of Moscow to eliminate the threat to us in the north.

At the same time, we should make every necessary arrangement to make possible our southward penetration to coincide with the German invasion of England next spring. All obstacles in the way of launching this program when the time comes should be swept away in the meantime. The military of our country should keep the German and Italian commands advised in advance so as to enable them to act in cooperation and so as to enable us to have a guarantee from them that we shall have a free hand in the disposition of the Far Eastern area.

In view of the fact that the matter contained here has an important bearing on the future of our Empire, I have gone to great length to describe it to you. In so doing, I did not give consideration to the fact that I may not be suitably qualified, nor have I avoided repetitions where they seemed appropriate.

Please convey the contents to the Army and Navy. I have sent copies of this message to Italy, France and Turkey.

[a] See III, 871.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 877

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

October 11, 1941
879.

Re my # 2120[a].

The popular dissemination of the shortwave wireless news that constitutes the material for the "Bulletin" is prohibited in our country. It is furnished to the diplomatic establishments of other countries with the understanding that it is not to be announced to the outside, hence the editing and publishing of such news for the purposes of distribution clearly constitutes an abuse of this special privilege. In view of the necessity of counteracting the anti-Axis propaganda of Britain and Russia which has conspicuously stiffened since the outbreak of the Russo-German war, the above method is recognized as being indispensible, and hence we cannot approve of even Italy and Germany using the bulletins for popular distribution. Instead this is intended for the use of the Intelligence Section of the Foreign Office. Again, the Vice Minister explained to Ambassador Ott how a strengthening of the cooperation between Axis reporters and Domei reporters would result in realizing a more advantageous position for even the German embassy in the future. And at the same time he arranged for an interview between Ambassador Ott and Ito, the head of the intelligence bureau. On the 10th, they met and discussed the holding of future informal meetings. They decided to suppress the publication of all pamphlets other than the bulletin and in regard to the exhibition of propaganda films those of Britain were ruled out, and feeling that more from Germany and Italy would be desirable they set the machinery in motion to get permission in our country for the publication and exhibition of such propaganda films.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 878

FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

October 13, 1941
1236.

The Trans Ocean from Tokyo on the 8th carried an editorial by Domei to the effect that Germany should stop the war with Russia and concentrate all her energies on the attack on England for a long war would be disadvantageous to the Axis countries, which are not in a position to sustain it, but would result to the advantage of countries like England and America, which are in a position to sustain it. Again, on the same day the Moscow foreign broadcast presented a Domei dispatch from Ankara, stating that Hungary had lost 40% of her total army in the present Soviet campaign.

For the above I was cautioned by the German Foreign Office.

The above Domei editorials on the 8th were used by Boston and other foreign broadcast stations in their propaganda work directed at Japan, Germany, and Italy. As I have already explained in my #1118[a], Domei is regarded not only in Germany but in all European countries, as reflecting the opinions of government circles. Hence, such editorials as the above, besides serving to arouse the displeasure of the Axis powers are of no value whatever.

Please make strict representations to the head office that in the future such reports and editorials, etc., must be absolutely eliminated. I have already wired you twice in regard to the publishing of editorials, etc.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 879

FROM: Tokyo October 13, 1941
TO: Hsinking #694.

Ankara-Tokyo #20. Relaying #203 from Turkey to Tokyo.

#203.

Today the 9th, the commercial treaty between Germany and Turkey was signed, said treaty to be effective for one year and a half, i.e., until March 31, 1943. The total amount of exports and imports to be 200,000,000 marks each, (100,000,000 lira). Germany is to supply manufactured goods of all types including military equipment and Turkey is to supply agricultural products and ores. The above figure comprises about 40 or 50 % of Turkey's total exports.

In regard to the controversial problem of chrome ore this year's and next year's output which had been contracted for by France, was handed over to Germany subject to France's approval and the total output after April 1, 1943, will go to Germany.

Great Britain is greatly concerned over the Turko-German understanding of the 8th of my #220[a] followed by the agreement signed today.

Relay to Berlin.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 880

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) September 25, 1940[a]
TO: Berlin #?.

(To be sent in official code.)

(Part 1 of 4.)

Three Power Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.

The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have

decided to stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and to regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.

Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend cooperation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be included to put forth endeavors along lines similar to their own, in order that their intimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

(Part 2 of 4.)

Article I

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article II

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article III

Japan, Germany and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

(Part 3 of 4.)

Article IV

With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Commissions the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy will meet without delay.

Article V

Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia.

Aritcle VI

The present pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

(Part 4 of 4.)

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the high contracting parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its removal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in triplicate at _____, the _____ day of the _____ month of the _____ year of Showa, corresponding to the _____.

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[a] Note date.

Trans. 10-28-40

No. 881

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

October 1, 1941
1198.

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity, I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this respect to you.

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop, who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. However, we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretense that there is no change her feelings toward Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany, there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting Japan.

Please convey this to the army and navy.

Relayed to Rome.

Trans. 10-18-41

No. 882

FROM: Berlin (Oshima)
TO: Tokyo

October 2, 1941
1205.

I had a talk with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP a day or so ago, and RIBBENTROP said, "I have a report that Japan has approved the sailing of American ships straight through Vladivostok. Can this be true?" I replied, "Well, I have no report on this from Tokyo,

but I certainly do not believe it to be a fact." Please wire me back what has happened along this line, because I want to know the truth.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 883

FROM: Tokyo — October 9. 1941
TO: Berlin — #875.

Re your #1205[a].

It is not true that Japan has approved the entry of American ships into the harbor of Vladivostok. On the contrary, Japan has taken the stand toward America and Russia that this trade cannot be tolerated from the standpoint, not of international law, but of the whole political situation obtaining at the present time. However, America says that trade between America and Russia is a political matter between the two countries and should cause Japan no uneasiness. To Japan's charge that this is an unfriendly act toward Japan and will have to be viewed as such, America invokes the freedom of the seas and says that she cannot tolerate interference by a third country in her foreign trade.

However, the number of American ships that have entered Vladivostok from the middle of August to the present is five tankers and each one is believed to have carried between 60,000 and 95,000 barrels of oil.

The number of Russian ships that have operated between America and the Soviet during the the same period is nine and the cargo was principally oil, (a total of about 300,000 barrels is estimated), and a small number of aeroplane engines and parts, etc.

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[a] See III, 882.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 884

FROM: Berlin (Oshima) — October 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1235.

(Request message.)

From Hidemaro Konoye[a] To Premier Prince Konoye:

Excuse my long silence. How are you? I can imagine how hard you are working with the many problems both at home and abroad, and I am praying for your health.

No doubt you have already heard about it, but of late the atmosphere here in regard to Japan is not too good. While the key persons are saying nothing, the Germans who have more than ordinary sense about political affairs are not pleased over reports that American vessels are able without hinderance to unload war supplies at Vladivostok.

As long as Japan has not formally renounced the Three Power Treaty, it causes the Germans much irritation to have the Tokyo Information Bureau make daily announcements that intimate progress in negotiations between Japan and the United States ----- (21 groups missed) -----. Before the atmosphere becomes worse, have some responsible stateman make a frank

statement to the Germans as to the real situation in this matter, to the effect that any negotiations with the United States that are not in harmony with the spirit of the Three Power Treaty would be merely a political scheme, and that there is absolutely no change in Japan's policy.

I am well, and doing my little bit in the Red Cross, and in visiting sick and wounded soldiers.

Am sending Akiko home on the Asama Maru[b].

---

[a] Younger brother of Premier Konoye. He is a prominent orchestra conductor and was stranded in Europe while on a concert tour to Scandinavia and Germany this spring.

[b] About to start a trip to Lisbon to carry supplies and Nanking envoys to the Axis countries, and evacuate several hundred Japanese.

Trans. 10–16–41

No. 885

FROM: Berlin — September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1159.

Re my # 1098[a].

Since then KASAI, in the United States, is understood to have made anti-German, pro-American statements in newspaper interviews. Therefore, please be advised of the steps suggested in my secret letter.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–23–41

No. 886

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — September 22, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 838.

(Strictly secret)

Re your # 1159[a].

I understand that the American Ambassador here was keenly interested in what KASAI said. However, the German Ambassador put in a complaint and, in view of what you said in your # 1098[b], we sent our Ambassador in Washington instructions to warn him vigorously against such conduct. He, I understand, promised that he would be more careful hereafter. On the 11th a certain Washington newspaper printed some statements by KASAI and he was asked immediately in no uncertain terms to stop making this kind of statement or return to Japan. This, however, was before we had warned him and we have in the meantime received

telegrams to the effect that strict tab has been kept on him and he has been very much more careful.

---

[a] See III, 885.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 887

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

October 13, 1941
1242 (?).

----- (incomplete, first part missing) ----- that the Tripartite Pact also was worked up secretly by Foreign Minister Matsuoka and the people in general were not in harmony with it. Again, on the same day, the Cincinnati radio broadcast that the above member of Parliament had said at a meeting of the foreign correspondents' club on the 8th, that if Germany and America went to war it would be Germany's fault and that America would not fight unless war was absolutely unavoidable.

Again, on the occasion of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Chicago University the above individual ----- that the German-Japanese union anticipated Japanese-American relations. -----.

In spite of what you said in your # 838[a], the above individual shows absolutely no signs of a change of heart, hence, we earnestly request that he be returned to Japan at this time, whatever the consequences. We repeat the request.

---

[a] See III, 886.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 888

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

October 14, 1941
882.

Re your # 1236[a].

1. On the 8th, the Transocean dispatch made reference to a Domei comment. As this was a mistake, it being a Hōchi editorial, the Domei notified the AP and DNB of the correction to be made.

2. No steps whatsoever were taken previous to the war, contrary to the gist of a reputed Domei report from Ankara, as given in a foreign broadcast by Moscow on the 8th.

3. In view of the fact that recently American and British circles have been using details of the Domei broadcasts, and so that they may exercise proper care that nothing will be turned against them, I have been trying to have them exercise prudence such as having them not "carry" any comments from the Japan News Week or articles by TEEICHI MUTO of Hōchi. It is believed that England and America, as described in points *1* and *2*, have intentionally fabricated facts with the object of separating Japan and Germany. However,

with the Germans taking the position of exceeding nervousness and doubt regarding my sincerity as a result of English-American propaganda to divide us, should the Germans make strong protest, I would not find it enjoyable, so please explain it to them.

---

[a] See III, 878.

Trans. 10-18-41

No. 889

FROM: Berlin (Osima) October 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1239.

Re your # 720[a].

Up to the present, there has been no particular difficulty in making payments for orders made by the government out of the fixed exchange allotment, (at least the Navy's part was sufficient). However, when it comes to the matter of civilian orders, the orders that cannot be paid for are so large that even though the government places new orders, (payment to be made year after next), the manufacturers will not accept them. In view of the present regulations requiring immediate settlement for orders placed by civilians the placing of orders by the government has become difficult. Now, if the further granting of exchange for the payment of orders for civilian goods is impossible, then I think that there is no other way left, according to talks between the Japanese and German governments, but to have Germany make credit available and then to make use of that. How are the conversations with Wohlthat going now in regard to credit in general? I think that one solution to the problem might be to have credit established temporarily for the payment of civilian goods only. Please wire instructions in regard to these items.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-18-41

No. 890

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 16, 1941
TO: Berlin # 886.

(Secret)

Re your # 1259[a].

1. Among remittance allotments for payment of non-military goods, those for which permits have been issued amount to no more than 8-----, ----- yen. These consist chiefly of allotments to pay for orders given by commercial firms. When payment is to be made for such articles as machinery the time for the delivery of which is indefinite, it is made without going through the procedure of applying for remittance permit, for, there is danger of such questions arising as that of immobility of funds lasting for a long period and that of sharing the risk and the expense accruing in the course of custody. The Government authorities are at present studying means for the solution of such questions (although it has been proposed

that the business be conducted by the Government, at least for the time being, issuing an order for importation, it is impossible to apply such an order unless the German authorities take upon themselves the insurance of those goods the prospect of shipping which is very indefinite).

2. I understand that the payment which we must make to Germany by the end of March next year exceeds 80,000,000 yen. (According to an investigation made by the German authorities, the amount is 14,810,000 marks.) This amount, I expect, will be somewhat reduced since among these articles there may be some for which contracts will be voided as well as those the completion of which will be postponed. They have made it clear that they are willing to purchase materials the amount of which is roughly the same as the amount we must pay and to do this in order to facilitate our making payment to Germany. At present we are negotiating for a provisional agreement covering the purchasees as well as payments by both sides for the period up to the end of March.

3. The articles which we intend to supply Germany and which apply towards our payment to Germany, are roughly as follows: We intend to ship these articles, beginning with those for which agreements have been reached.

(1) Whale oil 15,000,000 yen (Re my #855[b]).

(2) Raw silk 5,000,000 yen (The brands as well as the grades, which the Germans want are being checked up.

(3) Cotton thread 5,000,000 yen

(4) Other articles 5,000,000 yen (We are now trying to get the Germans interested in purchasing these).

(5) Articles already contracted by Germany in Japan—20,000,000 yen. (There may be among these, those for which the Germans will request cancellation of contract because of difficulties involved in storing and there may also be those for which we will not issue export permits. For these reasons, this amount may be considerably reduced. We are at present making a detailed investigation.)

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[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 891

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN) (War Office, Senior Adjutant) #680.

(Parts 2—7.)[a]

1. If it is a matter of paying such a large sum as 2,000,000 marks, as the *RU*[b] Company proposes, without even importing technicians, it seems better to have a civilian manufacturing company study the matter in Japan. However, in case it is possible for technicians to be trained at small expense, it would be advisable to hire Germans or to send Japanese technicians for factory training, etc., in order to speed up the research in Japan.

2. Reasons for the Navy's decision:

(1) These steel castings surpass forged materials in stress (?resistance?) and are superior, from the standpoint of design, for particularly complicated —2G— parts. For parts which require milling, —3G— (?compared with?) forged parts, particularly advantageous from the standpoint of mass production. Consequently, it seems that this type of product will be

increasingly important in the manufacture of general munitions as well as aircraft. It is absolutely necessary that Japan produce it.

It does not seem to be absolutely necessary now to learn from the *RU* Company about the general steel castings which can be finished by lathe or planer. Specifically, investigation of the actual practice of the *RU* Company in regard to the molds for the material used in the special products, as mentioned in paragraph 1, in general, concave molds —2G— parts which can be machined by lathe, planer, etc., —3G— if they are convex —2G—. These castings from the standpoint of machine operations, are economical of milling, and, in comparison with other machine worked parts have the convenience of the casting method. It is believed that if we adopt the policy of changing the present method of manufacturing steel casting equipment and expend some time and money for research, we can put it into production in Japan.

3. For the above reasons, it is necessary to give full consideration to the matter of spending 2,000,000 marks as proposed. It seems possible, without going to this expense to purchase complete additional equipment, to produce it in Japan by carrying out research, at small expense, in Japan. However, to judge from actual operation at the *RU* Company, for the inspection of finished goods —3G— aside from consumption goods, rejected goods come to about 50%. The (?price?) of the finished goods is not believed to be ever less than that of forged materials. It is believed that if research is carried out the future price for these castings in Japan will be low, and that if it is not decided to spend a considerable sum in purchases it will be quite possible for civilian companies to produce this material in Japan. Opinions at the attaché's office in regard to the Navy's viewpoint:

They are absolutely in accord in regard to both the point that the production of this sort of material would have considerable influence on the design of superior planes in the future and the point that there would be marked economics in milling and —1G— operations, from the standpoint of mass production. However, in view of the process of research at the *RU* Company and the history of failures, they differ with our opinion that producing castings of this sort in Japan could be done in a short time. For this reason, they think it would be all right to make the purchase. However, I believe that they, taking the long range view, would like to have the Japanese government send personnel and carry out technical liaison between Europe and Asia in order to be able to utilize present technical knowledge in a civilian run factory.

However, the 2,000,000 mark expenditure is not a definite matter. There is still time for study of the methods of importing technicians. For the details, please consult (?naval?) Engineer ŌTANI, who is now returning to Japan via South America. Please communicate with us in regard to the matter of planning to import technicians —1G— manufacture of (?heavy?) guns and general ordinance by this casting method as well as in regard to the advisability of making the purchase mentioned above.

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[a] Part 1 not available.

[b] First syllable of the Japanese spelling of a German firm name (unknown).

Trans. 4-21-45

No. 892

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIJUGUN SHO FUKKAN) (War Office Sen. Adjutant) #687.

(Part 1[a].)

Please transmit this to Air Headquarters.

The negotiations for the purchase of the JUNKERS propellers for the HAMAMATSU Musical Instrument Co., are progressing nicely.

Explanation by the JUNKERS Co. technicians and the obtaining of a large amount of data has enabled us to complete our investigation of the mechanism and characteristics of this propeller.

The SV-11 type, as compared with the SV-5 type, shows a great deal of change, and I think it is well worth purchasing. However, this has not been included in these (?present?) negotiations. As it has been decided that when this is taken up the Embassy here will, upon notification of the Foreign Office, take up the special consideration —2G—, so please send me instructions as to what I should do, as soon as possible.

[a] Part 2 not readable.

Trans. 3-22-45

No. 893

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) October 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN) (War Office, Sen. Adjutant) #926.

(Parts 1 and 2 complete.)

Please communicate to Air Headquarters.

On the matter of the propeller-purchase by the HAMAMATSU GAKKI Company.

According to Air Headquarters Wire #112[a] the company learned of the rise in price, but nevertheless it was decided to buy. However, the home company's instructions to the HAMAMATSU representative as yet have not given a clear indication of the degree of the price rise. Therefore in the present situation the representative, still being under the necessity to negotiate for a reduced price, finds it impossible to declare his intention of buying immediately and to ask for the preparation of data and materials. Consequently there is little prospect for effecting a contract providing (for shipping) which will be in time for the ASAMA MARU sailing for Japan on 20 October.

Part 2.

As I see matters here the transfer of the manufacturing rights originally was not a German proposal. Something they did not want was being forced upon them by the Japanese. Therefore it is thought that for the present the Junkers Company will not agree to the reduction in price. In this regard please make arrangements with the company for a contract that will provide for the sending of the materials by other methods in case that, by some chance, the company's decision to buy and the consignment of the purchase-money are not in time for the ASAMA MARU.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 3-29-45

No. 894

FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY) (War Office, Sen. Adjutant) August 30, 1941
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN) #937.

(2 Parts Complete.)

Part 1

Air H.Q. wire.

1. The Tokyo Aircraft Gauge Co. has already purchased patent rights for the ASKANIA manufactured automatic pilot through MITSUI BUSSAN. The matter of the (?factories?) in the contract has been completed but negotiations are still continuing on the number of men.

2. According to the Company authorities, they want to have 1 technician and 1 mechanic join the company in the future. Also, they want to have an exception made and have Engineer YOSHINARI join the company if possible.

Part 2

Reply to Germany wire #735[a].

3. At present, it is just about impossible to send personnel from Japan and it is very urgent that we learn the techniques. Therefore, we would like you, in negotiating with the ASKANIA laboratory as regards the first sentence of paragraph 2 of this wire, to have them understand that we will send at least 1 technician, from the Tokyo Aircraft Gauge Co. to join the Company, and we would like to have YOSHINARI take the place of the other man.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 4-26-45

No. 895

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) 6 October 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN) (War Office Sen. Adjutant) #923.

(In 3 parts complete.)

Part 1. Please transmit to Air H.Q.

We have the following questions on the matter of SIEMENS electric gauges.

1. The SIEMENS COMPANY electric (?gauges?) are standard German airforce equipment but many of these excellent articles have never been introduced in Japan under the agreement for acquisition of technical developments. Since they would be very valuable from the point of view of study, etc., we would like exchange currency of about 8,000 yen to purchase samples.

(We suggest that technician YOSHINARI pick out the list of articles.)

Part 2.

2. In the summer of last year, FUJI Electric ordered from SIEMENS for (?JU?) use 10 automatic pilot compasses and JINKŌSHIKŌKI[a]. However, exchange currency permission for only 1 set was given and the rest were held in custody for us by SIEMENS. That company has requested us to settle this matter (the purchase price is 33,000 marks). It seems as if FUJI Electric made (?commitments?) to the SIEMENS COMPANY and therefore keeping future considerations in mind, let us know what to do after you've handled this as you see fit.

Part 3.

As regards the purchase of these 2 articles, we would like to ship them by return YANAGI. Therefore, please let me know what to do at once since we must negotiate with the German authorities.

Furthermore, in reference to the 10 JINKŌSHIKŌKI[a] which you wish to purchase according to the agreement on acquiring of technical developments don't they duplicate the FUJI Electric contract goods mentioned above.

4. The automatic pilot apparatus in this agreement aren't being manufactured in wartime by order of the German airforce and therefore, purchase is impossible.

---

[a] Meaning doubtful—perhaps "artificial direction apparatus".

Trans. 3-21-45

No. 896

FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY) September 5, 1941
TO: (Vice Minister of War) No number.

(Parts 1 and 2.)

Part 1.

Committee wire # 44.

Re: (?Your wires?) # 46[a], 51[a], and 55[a].

1. There has been no change in our resolution to acquire the "IG" process. However, since we don't know Germany's conditions for the transfer of patents concerned in this matter, we cannot proceed in our studies in regard to payments, etc., and find it extremely difficult to make suggestions in regard to the application of the (?terms?) of the economic pact. Since this is the situation, please refer to paragraph # 2 and then begin negotiations through the ambassador—and please be sure at least to try to get Germany's fundamental approval and to sound her out on the conditions which will be imposed.

Part 2.

2. On August 29th the following requests were made to WOHL TAT—3G—:

(a) The Japanese Army is extremely anxious, even after so many years, to acquire the "IG" patent rights and to have set up a 100,000 kilolitre per year installation. Please give us your immediate aid in arranging this matter with your country.

(b) We would like to know the conditions under which Germany would permit the transfer.

Part 4 same number; part 3 not available.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 4-5-45

No. 897

FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY) (Vice-Minister of War) September 5, 1941
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN) # 393.

(Part 4[a].)

He replied: "Although I suppose it is because it was merely added that Lt. Col. YOKOTA, who is in Berlin will handle the matter, there has been no report that he has been chosen as negotiator. We are in accord in regard to the "IG" transfer; however, there is the fact that, just as Japan feels about America, Germany, for her part, does not wish to goad (?her enemy?).

4. Since we are still studying the question of acquiring synthetic oil materials, we will wire you later in that regard.

---

[a] Parts 1 and 2 same number; part 3 not available.

Trans. 4–5–45

No. 898

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 157.

Please transmit to the Chief of the Mobilization Plans Bureau.

The German SCHMIDT mentioned in our previous wire # 140[a] has since been making use of 100,000 bahts, sent from Shanghai via the Yokohama Specie Bank to camouflaged (?Chinese?) companies, to buy up rubber and tin, and there are signs of market disturbances due to his activities. Please let me know at once whether there is some understanding between Japan and Germany on this matter.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 2–12–45

No. 899

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) September 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN) (Vice Minister of War) # 838.

(Two parts complete.)

Part 1

Committee wire # 60.

Since we can get quick delivery on the special universal drills from the Swiss Rumer[a] Company under the agreement with Germany for the importing of technical material, schedule # 5 (ck5) dated 10 March, (ck 10 Mar.), as soon as you have placed the order please make arrangements for payment so that we can send (the goods) to you by return mail.

1. Each 10 gross piece (per gross) diameter 0.26 millimeters, length 3 (ch3) millimeters—337 (ck 337) Swiss francs; diameter 0.28 millimeters, length 5 millimeters—337 (ck 337) Swiss

francs; diameter 0.30 (ck 0.30) millimeters, length 4 (ck4) millimeters—365 (ck 365) Swiss francs. Payment at time of placing order.

2. Delivery date—from 10 (ck 10) to 12 (ck 12) weeks.

3. In addition to the above, this company manufactures various drills ranging from 0.10 (ck 0.10) to 2 (ck 2) millimeters in diameter. If you intend to buy any of these please make the additional arrangements.

---

[a] RU-MA.

Trans. 4-26-45

No. 900

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) October 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN) (Vice-Minister of War) #948.

First. We have made a purchase contract through the SHOWA Trading Company as per your committee wire #53[a], for 5 precision circumference practice graduating machines[b] of Swiss manufacture and 1 special boring machine for use with nozzle. It would be impossible for us to negotiate a contract at present for the jig boring machine and the 3 universal spur gear-cutting machines.

Second. The "medium trimming machine" listed in my committee wire #64[a] is corrected to read, "graduating machine" and the "micro reduction machine" to "screw reduction machine" (the catalog number as to the former wire). Committee wire #73[a].

Third. In view of the situation outlined in paragraph 1, please give your approval since we have begun to negotiate purchase contracts for the tools in our committee wire #73[a].

---

[a] Not available.
[b] SEIMITUENS YUMEMORIKI.

Trans. 4-25-45

No. 901

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) October 10, 1941
TO: ? No number.

(?Reply?) to your committee wire #53[a].

(?1?). I have had the SHOWA TRADING Company make a contract for the purchase of five precision circular calibrating machines and one special drill press for (?nozzle boring?).

I can obtain one jig drill press and three universal gear cutting lathes.

2. In our committee wire #64[a] please charge the designation of the trimming machine to graduating machine and micro-*Gentō Ki*[b] to screw-*Gentō Ki*. (The catalogue numbers are the same as in our former wire.)

We are endeavoring to make a purchase contract for (? the other ?) machines.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Meaning unknown.

Trans. 3-24-45

No. 902

FROM: Berlin (Osima) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1251.

(Part 1 of 2[a].)

Secret. Re my #1250[b].

The following is the state of war between Germany and Soviet Russia.

1. The Germans will not press hard upon Leningrad. After leaving the minimum amount of troops necessary for observation purposes, the main part of the Reebu[c] forces has advanced toward the encirclement of Moscow. Although the Russian forces in Leningrad have repeatedly come out for attacks, the German forces have thrown them back. Nothing but annihilation faces the Russian forces in that city.

2. The mechanized German troops which advanced to the north of Moscow reached Kalinin last week and have already proceeded as far as Yaroslavl (approximately 250 kilometers northwest of Moscow). They are at present continuing their eastward advance. In this district, already the first snow has fallen. As a result the ground is frozen, facilitating the movement of troops. (Please keep especially secret the fact that the Germans have reached Yaroslavl.)

Furthermore, ----- ----- divisions have reached Kalinin. The German Army has kept the occupation of Kalinin secret for a long time. The Russian army, not knowing that the city had fallen, continued to transport troops for 48 hours with the result that the Germans made prisoners of them all. This, it may be said, shows how ignorant the Soviet army is of the actual war situation.

3. Around Moscow there is a permanent beton belt of fortification extending roughly for 100 kilometers. Following the outbreak of the war the Russians reenforced this by field fortification. However, the German forces have already broken through this line at several points west of Moscow.

4. To the south of Moscow, infantry regiments have already arrived in Tula. Mechanized troops are extending an encircling wing eastward of Moscow. Because of the fact that snow is thawing in this area, added to the fact that the area consists principally of forests and swamps, these troops are experiencing difficulty of movement and naturally their advance has been somewhat delayed.

5. Around Karkov, the German forces extend from Beylgorod, approximately 100 kilometers north of the city; along the west side of Karkov; and as far as Rozowaya[c], situated approximately 160 kilometers south of that city. Some of the German Mechanized detachments are now completing the encirclement eastward of Karkov. However, there are no longer any large detachments of Soviet troops in the vicinity of this city.

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[a] Part 2 of 2 is not available.
[b] Not available.
[c] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 903

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

15 August 1941
739 (Separate Message).

At the time of my conversation with Ambassador Smetanin the other day, I mentioned our desires in regard to the full realization of our rights and interests in Northern Saghalien and also the removal of danger zones in the waters of the Far East. Since then, we have been asked by the Soviet as to the attitude of Japan toward the German-Russian war; to which we have replied that there has been no change in our intentions of continuing friendly relations between Japan and Russia, that thus far we have maintained an attitude of observing the neutrality pact, and that it is still our desire to continue this in the future, but, that whether or not we can continue thus is a question that depends on the way in which the Soviet Union responds to this. For instance if (a) any of the Soviet Union's territory in East Asia should be ceded, sold, or leased to a third power, or offered as military bases, (b) The Soviet Union should take any steps that would cause the sphere of any third power's military movements to be extended into East Asia, or should conclude with a third power an alliance that might have the Empire as its object, we certainly could not overlook the threat that this would be to our nation.

To this the Soviet Ambassador replied, that the Soviet government is rigidly observing the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, and that as far as the above mentioned two points are concerned he could give assurance that there has been nothing of the kind and that there will be none in the future.

I furthermore took this opportunity to call the attention of the Soviet to the fact that of late it is persistently rumored that the United States will be shipping munitions to the Soviet via Vladivostok, and that if this should be true, Japan would have to take a serious view of it, as it would involve the three power pact relations.

In regard to the Japanese Government's attitude to the German-Russian war, I reiterated that there has been no change in our foreign policy, which has as its keynote the spirit and the objectives of the three power pact, even as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had communicated to the Soviet Government 2 July, and that this point is well understood by the Soviet.

Trans. 8–19–41

No. 904

FROM: Rome
TO: Washington

5 August 1941
No number.

(Message to Tokyo # 512.) (Part 1 of 3.)

(Strictly Secret.)

Re: your Excellency's # 702[a] to Berlin.

1. Your caption message makes the attitude of the Imperial Government, as well as your own opinions, quite clear on the exercise of our national policy as laid down on July 2. I, too, needless to say, have great hopes of seeing this policy materialize. Let me point out, however, that since our forces occupied French Indo-China, Great Britain and the United States have tied in still more closely with Chungking, and their relations with CHIANG are more intimate than ever. The United States, while avoiding physical violence with us, is, nevertheless, meddling in our affairs and strengthening her policy of economic oppression, beyond any doubt. It is true that

in the United States there is opposition to assisting the Soviet government or abetting her military forces, and those who wish to tie up with Russia are keeping in the background, but with the passing of time, this hostility may become weaker, and the United States may use supply bases in the Far East to help Russia and to cause her to complete the encirclement of Japan.

[a] Which outlines the Imperial Government's policies and views with regard to helping Germany against Russia.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 905

FROM: Tokyo August 15, 1941
TO: Berlin #740.

On the 15th I told the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, confidentially, of my recent conversations with the Soviet Ambassador along the lines of my separate message #739[a]. Ambassador Ott expressing a desire to understand the basic problem, said that according to the notice sent to the German Government of 2 July, he understood that the possibility of Japan's participating in the German-Russian war was not precluded, but asked if, now since the Soviets have given assurances regarding the two points which Japan considers vital, to the effect that there has been nothing of the kind and will not be in the future, the Soviets do not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war. To this I replied that, in view of the military expansion the Empire is at present effecting, I think under present existing conditions the above-mentioned arrangement with the Soviet is the very best means of taking the first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet, which will be undertaken together with the German Government, that this is entirely in harmony with the spirit and objectives of the Tripartite Treaty, and that I hoped that the German Government would fully understand this point. Ambassador Ott thereupon asked if it is proper to understand that this present arrangement is the first step toward future measures that are to be taken against Russia, that this is merely a temporary arrangement, in other words that it partakes of the nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed. To this I replied in the affirmative.

Please relay to Rome together with the separate message.

[a] See III, 903.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 906

FROM: Hsinking August 18, 1941
TO: Washington Circular 189.

Re my Circular #103[a].

Since the beginning of its investigations last June 27th in the region concerned, the mixed commission for the demarcation of boundaries between Mongolia and Manchukuo in the

Nomonhan region has made good progress under favorable conditions; and entirely completed it on the 15th of August. Furthermore, on the 22nd of September it will sign in -----, all the records related to the issue. Problems here, since the Nomonhan incident, have all been completely solved. Now it is scheduled on the coming 20th to publish in Tokyo. Hsinking, Moscow and Ulan Bator[b] a joint Manchukuo-Mongolian communique with regard to this matter.

This message is addressed to London, Berlin, Washington, Peking, Nanking, Shanghai and Hongkong.

I have sent this to the Minister.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] City or Urga in Mongolia.

Trans. 8-25-41

No. 907

FROM: Hsinking — September 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #614.

(*Abstract.*)

My 606[a].

The Japanese army favors DORUGI for the site of the Manchuria-Mongolian border conference instead of Harbin or Manchuli. The Mongols want to hold it at Ulan Bator (Viga). The conference should be concluded promptly and the results issued in a joint communique. In addition to being useful to our side in this conference, the Manchurians should publish the official proceedings of the conference as one of their official documents rather than have the Japanese Government do it.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 908

FROM: Tokyo — September 19, 1941
TO: Hsinking — #625.

Re your #614[a].

There are no objections here. However we wish to consider separately the method of announcing the related material.

(This has been taken up with the Army.)

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[a] See III, 907.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 909

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

October 1, 1941
#660.

Re my #615[a].

The policies to be adopted toward newspapers in connection with the Harbin conference are as follows (approved also by the military):

1. A joint Manchu-Mongol communique ----- particularly in conformity with Tokyo ----- (6 lines garbled) -----.

3. News releases in connection with the forthcoming boundary settlement should be limited to the simple factual statements of the exchange of notes. The subject is to be mentioned only in general terms, though stress should be put on the fact of successful conclusion of the Harbin Conference.

4. An official government statement should be published, but a press ban shall be placed on publication of any documents in connection with the matter.

In other words, new general maps for public sale should represent in only the vaguest manner the areas involved, while any form of printed matter describing details of the new boundaries shall, in the public interest, be suppressed.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–16–41

No. 910

FROM: Hsinking
TO: Tokyo

October 3, 1941
#645.

Re my #641[a].

----- the general arrangements were concluded. With the exception of a few changes of phraseology the original Manchurian proposal was passed. A copy will be sent by air mail as soon as received.

---

[a] Re Manchukuo-Mongolia border commission.

Trans. 10–16–41

No. 911

FROM: Hsinking (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, London

October 10, 1941
Circular #207.

Re my circular #189[a].

Per schedule, on the 30th of September, a conference met in Harbin to draw up documents concerning the work in the place in question. These documents, it appears, will be completed by the Manchukuoan and Mongolian representatives by the 14th of this month, thus approxi-

mately 300 kilos of the Manchukuoan-Mongolian border including Nomohan will have been definitely settled. Simultaneously with the signing of the document to this effect, a communique and a statement of the Vice-chief of the Foreign Bureau will be prepared for your information.

[a] See III, 906.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 912

FROM: Hsinking October 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo #653.

Your 660[a], part 1.

The Manchukuo Government has stated its proposals in a joint communique along the following lines:

"The Empire of Manchukuo and the Union of the Mongol People have set up a mixed commission to determine the boundaries between the two countries. This commission has been meeting in Harbin and at boundary locations since September 23rd. The conferences have met under favorable conditions until October -----, and the plenipotentiaries have completed a certified written report of the results of their efforts. Having done so, the plenipotentiaries have entirely fulfilled their duty."

[a] See III, 909.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 913

FROM: Tokyo October 13, 1941
TO: Hsinking #689.

Re your #667[a].

Our opinions are as follows: (Have conferred with the military.)

(1) We think it best to limit any statement of the developments from June of last year up till the time of the signing of the protocol, to what has already been made public in the joint communiques that have been issued, and we would rather have no reference made to the war situation in connection with the Nomonhan incident.

(2) As the expression "we yielded those points that should be yielded" might give occasion for slight misunderstanding, we wish to revise it to read "the attitude of mutual concession has never been forgotten".

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 914

FROM: Helsinki (Sakaya) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #266.

According to a Finish High Command comminique dated the 3rd, Finnish troops in the central parts of the Karelian Isthmus have crossed the old Finnish-Russian border and entered into enemy territory. Not only that, but Finnish troops in the southeast of the Karelian Isthmus have wrought great casualties among the enemy troops. All of the territory ceded to Russia has now been restored with the exception of the Hango leased territory, a great number of small islands, and the far northern fishing areas on the northern peninsula. These will be restored in time. Therefore, avoiding sacrifices, the Finnish troops are not hurrying. After invading enemy territory, Finland is only interested in the restoration of all territory upon which she has historical claim. One chapter in the Finnish-Russian war has been concluded.

Furthermore, recently the President of this country in an interview given to foreign newspaper correspondents, stated that Finland would not demand the restoration of more land than had been hers in the past. However, the diplomatic corps here believe that territory west of the Murmansk Railroad will be ceded to Finland.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 915

FROM: Tokyo September 5, 1941
TO: Hsinking #549.

Moscow to Tokyo #112.

Relaying #1112[a] from Moscow to Tokyo.

5. Due to the fact that German aircraft have not appeared over Moscow for quite a few days, the populace is beginning to take heart, however, the fate of Leningrad and Kiev appears to be hanging in the balance. Army losses are great (?) and the appearance (?) of aeroplanes on the front lines is decreasing. According to rumors from pickets and other sources, an intense propaganda campaign regarding the superiority of the Soviet army is being carried on. A feeling of discontent and contempt toward the present regime is at last beginning to manifest itself to undermine this confidence. However, in this country, which is controlled by the O.G.P.U., there is no freedom or liberty and there is very little likelihood of anything like an anti-Soviet revolution taking place, (though I think the Germans are secretly trying to foment such a revolution). There are things that make one believe that the grasp that the present regime has on the people is exceedingly strong.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 916

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1174.

On the evening of the 23rd from 9:00 to 12:00 German planes bombed the city. In Leningrad in the southern part of the city fires broke out and several houses were demolished.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 917

FROM: Tokyo September 30, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 652.

I am transmitting # 1176 addressed to the Minister from our Ambassador to Moscow.

Re my # 1165[a].

It seems by simply announcing the fall of Kiev and by not giving any further information about it, the Soviet Government attempted to divert the attention of the people from the subject. However, since the incident occurred when the people, kept ignorant of the facts, had not been expecting the downfall of the city, it gave them a feeling of disappointment as well as of having been betrayed. This disappointment seems to be gradually changing into a feeling of mistrust toward the government.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 918

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Washington No number.

In regard to the matter of the Soviet Government sowing floating mechanical mines in the northern waters of the Japan Sea, the Imperial Government has pointed out the ever worsening difficulties they have presented to the peoples of the Empire and the increasing damage wrought to property. In spite of the fact that we have made representations for their withdrawal on three occasions, the Soviet Government has not shown the slightest sincerity of attitude, consequently, an extremely dangerous situation seems about to develop.

On the 25th while Japanese fishermen were drifting in the southern ----- of the Japan Sea they found one floating mechanical mine. On the 28th in an off shore fishing area (in the northern section of that area) Japanese fishermen observed a floating mine drifting on a (10 knot current ?). On August 3rd another mechanical mine was observed drifting in the shore fishing area in the western portion of the fishing zone. At dawn on September 1st a 60 ton fishing boat, sailing in waters along the western fringe of the fishing zone, came in contact with a drifting mine and was sunk. According to intelligences which are at hand, more and more floating mines are being observed and all of them seem to be of Soviet manufacture. There is no doubt that there are many more mines drifting around than have been seen. We have no recourse but to forbid the dispatch of sailing vessels to northern waters.

The Imperial Government has handed the Soviet authorities an extremely rigorous protest outlining the terrific losses that have and will be brought about. In addition to demanding damages in the event of loss, the Imperial Government is insisting upon the removal of all mines floating in these waters.

Japan lays great importance on the calmness and the normality of the situation in the Japan Sea. In this connection, too, we feel that the Soviet Government, as a matter of course, should also be desirous of the same situation. Therefore, it is essential that every one of these mines be removed immediately in order that no additional loss be sustained by Japanese or third country vessels through contact with these mechanical mines.

In regard to this matter, the Imperial Government not only expects a sincere answer from the Soviet Government, but also anticipates guarantees of the safety of Far Eastern waters in the future. To this end the Imperial Government reserves the right to take appropriate measures.

Trans. 9-15-41

No. 919

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

September 6, 1941
537.

Re my circular # 1952[a].

It would be bad if any one of the American ships sailing in the neighborhood of Vladivostok should strike a mine in question and accuse us of something we did not intend to do. Will you, therefore, submit to the American government for its reference the gist of the warning we have given to Soviet Russia?

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 920

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Washington

September 22, 1941
Cir. # 2053.

Message to Moscow # -----.

Re my # 872[a].

On the 22nd Ambassador SMETANIN asked for an interview with this Foreign Minister. I was too busy so the Vice Minister interviewed him. SMETANIN said that he would give us an idea of the Soviet reply and proceeded to state that the Soviet adheres in spirit to the Hague Convenant of 1907, although she is not a signatory; that in laying mines she takes care not to jeopardize the vessels of neutral nations and, if Japan stays away from belligerent areas, none of her ships can be sunk; that, therefore, the protest of the Japanese was groundless and that his country could not agree to pay any indemnity. Thus, he turned us down flat. The Vice Minister, however, answered him back, saying that we would wait for the formal reply before deciding on what appropriate measures we would take, and stuck to his guns.

So it seems that the Soviet reply will soon come to us in writing and I will wire you the details when we get it.

Relayed to Washington, Hsinking and Vladivostok.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 921

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

September 29, 1941
#647.

(Vladivostok to Tokyo #432.)

Relaying No. 432 from Vladivostok to Tokyo.

Re my #426[a].

According to the story that the captain and purser of the Hanoi Maru (which arrived the 26th) told me, the above ship sighted a floating mine at 8 a.m. on the 23rd in the vicinity of SEISUIRA about 17 nautical miles from the TAMAGO light and picked it up and delivered it to RASHIN. On the same day at about 4:30 p.m. while proceeding from RASHIN to Vladivostok another floating mine was seen and this also was picked up and taken back to RASHIN and delivered to the government office, it appears.

The above facts were attested to by Vice Consul Nei and couriers Shibuya and Tanaka as well as many other passengers (including about 60 evacuees from the Soviet Legation in Japan). Particularly since the first mine had written on it in Russian:

P 96
IB 382
ZER 1940
T. MTO 1941 7
MINR 72
C.TK.

The purser called this to the attention of clerk Iwanofu of the Russian Embassy in Tokyo and said, "There is no question but that this is a Russian mine." To this the Russian clerk could make no reply.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 922

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

September 29, 1941
#869.

B Intelligence. Foreign Office Secret.

1. Prior to his war against the Soviet Union, Hitler made the following three demands of Stalin:

(1) Access to the oil and grain in the Ukraine. (By this was meant the occupation of that area for the duration of the war against England.)

(2) Joint operation of the Siberia Railroad and the right to establish military bases in the Far East, including the Vladivostok area.

(3) Place German representatives in the Soviet military general headquarters.

Stalin agreed in principle to the first two points but flatly refused to comply with point (3).

2. At this time Ribbentrop told Hitler that according to information he had obtained through his own intelligence organization, should Germany strike at the Soviet from the outside the church faction and the bougeoisie which had not been thoroughly crushed by the Soviet regime, would immediately rise up. The destruction of the Stalin regime would then be an exceedingly simple matter.

On being advised thusly by Ribbentrop, Hitler launched his attack against Russia. Since the Soviet resistance has been surprisingly stubborn, Ribbentrop has fallen in Hitler's disfavor. The intelligence system that Ribbentrop headed has either been disbanded or taken over by the military.

(The above is the gist of what our New York informant related to Terasaki in Washington. He got his information from Hauptman who until recently was in Italy, engaged in the intelligence business, and who is well versed in European matters. He expressed much confidence in the veracity of this information.)

----- This message was relayed to New York. ----- Trans. Note: Above message was sent on 1 October from Tokyo to Berlin, verbatim, except that last two paragraphs were omitted.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 923

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

September 30, 1941
651.

I am transmitting # 1164 addressed to the Minister from our Ambassador to Moscow.

The following is the gist of an account given by a Russian who recently came from the Volga region. Refugees from the fronts extending from Gorki and Saratov on the east side of the River Volga, as far as the Ural are moving inward to the tune of four or five million. Roaming from city to city in search of food, they present an indescribable scene of confusion. Among them were those who were employed as trench diggers but who had to leave their property and withdraw as they then were after about one hour's notice had been given them. All these refugees steer clear of Moscow. Those from Leningrad and its vicinity are being transported by way of Vologda. Discontentment and resentment against the government is increasing among them.

Furthermore, the districts around Berumi[a] and Sverdlovak are being reserved for escaping member of the privileged classes in the government and the party and are closed to refugees in general.

---

[a] Probably Perm.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 924

FROM: Harbin — October 7, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 129.

Harbin to Tokyo # 155.

According to an Intelligence report from "A" (reliable) of October 5th, a telegram from Moscow to the Soviet Ambassador in Japan states that the Russians have endured many sacrifices and that in view of the Anglo-American intention to render effective aid, a surrender should not be thought of. Russia must maintain a firm attitude in the Far East. In view of Japan's isolation, the Japanese Government should continue to maintain its present position, and when the period of the present agreement expires, a provisional agreement is desirable.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 925

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) — October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1210.

(Part 1 of 5.)

Re your # 909[a].

To be handled in Government code.

1. When it comes to making peace, it is Germany's practice to take a relentless attitude toward conquered nations and her terms for Russia will doubtless be hard. Not only would she bring the Ukraine, White Russia and the three former Baltic nations under her sway, but also the Caucasus, thus putting an end to Bolshevism. I think Germany would banish the leaders of the present regime and set up a Fascist order. Thus, if the Soviet makes peace by complete surrender, the Communist Socialist principle will in all probability completely vanish.

2. But, to tell the truth, the Soviet could even undergo a disastrous defeat and still retire behind the formidable barrier of the Volga and use her vanquished troops again. Her agricultural resources in the basins of the Ural and Ob are great, and with the supplementary arms she obtains from Great Britain and the United States beyond a doubt she might find it possible to rise again and continue her existence.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10–23–41

No. 926

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) — October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1210.

(Part 2 of 5.)

If next spring she is again attacked by the German forces, the Soviet may gradually retire to the Far East. Now, if Japan stands by as a mere onlooker, there is no saying but what the Russian forces in the west may retire to an area where they will be in close contact with the eastern troops. I cannot imagine that we Japanese would stand by, watching the results of Germany's war on

England and the United States and finally having to suffer the humility of submitting to whatever cruel terms may be dictated to us. Don't you know that would be self-destruction—suicide?

3. Of course, Germany would welcome an end of her fighting in Russia, based upon her own terms dictated to a conquered people, but if Russia does not relinquish her intention to fight on to the end, Germany might possibly have to yield a point and concede the continued existence of Bolshevism. I do not think Germany would consider this, but, of course, you cannot be too certain. In any event, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the Reich may move the whole theater of war elsewhere. You know the wintertime would have no effect on an attack on England.

Trans. 10–23–41

No. 927

FROM: Moscow (Tatekawa) October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1210.

(Part 3 of 5[a].)

Germany may face toward the southern coasts of the Mediterranean and invade Egypt. She may endeavor to obtain a base for striking at the British forces and at the same time gain control of the eastern Mediterranean, rendering the battle of the Near and Middle East an easy matter. Considering the difficulty of land transport, it will be impossible for either side to use large forces. The addition of about 20 mechanized divisions and ordinary infantry divisions would be sufficient. Now when the Red Army is, for the most part, done for, it would be a fairly simple matter to transfer that many troops. Thus, I do not think it would be necessary to make a patched-up truce before complete victory has been won. Then, when spring comes, Germany can finish up the Red forces in short order, proceed to take over the Caucasus and simultaneously with her campaign in Egypt, proceed with warfare in Iran and Iraq—such would be my guess.

Mark this: The Soviet forces in the Ural, when attacked by Germany may escape a decisive encounter and gradually recede in our direction toward the east.

---

[a] Parts 4 and 5 not available.

Trans. 10–24–41

No. 928

FROM: Tokyo October 16, 1941
TO: Hsinking # 706.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Part 1 of # 1200(?) addressed to the Minister from our Ambassador in Soviet Russia.

Newspapers in this country have not, until today, mentioned a word about the German general offensive. Since the first of the month compulsory military training, mentioned in my # 1155[a], has been carried on.

On the 3rd, not only those born in 1922 but all of those who had previously been deferred were enlisted and on the 5th, the authorities in charge of primary schools ordered the parents of children under 12 years of age to remove the children to Chelyabinsk[b]. (There have been a

considerable number who had evacuated in the middle of July but who have returned to the city later.) (It seems that few are responding to this order.)

On the 6th, ----- system was put into effect for milk for infants and for eggs and cream. On the other hand, fortifications are being built in the suburbs giving one a sense of the impending crisis.

On the 8th, the newspapers all of a sudden announced that severe fighting was going on at Vyazma (243 kilometers from this city by rail) and at Bryansk (272 kilometers from this city).

---

[a] Not available.

[b] City, SW Ural area in Soviet Russia.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 929

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking

October 6, 1941
706.

(Part 2 of 2.)

Today, the 9th, the desertion of OREL (?) (387 kilometers from this city) was announced. That this news was a severe shock to the people in general is unmistakably evident. Both the "Pravda" and the "Isvestia" printed tragic editorials on the 9th, strongly emphasizing the fact that the present war is a struggle as a result of which they would either overthrow Facism or become its slaves; that if they do not wish to lose the war and become victims of German aggression, they can do no other than fight to the finish; and, therefore, the people should unite as one body and strive to overcome the crisis. However, this editorial has no appeal to the people at large, for, among other reasons, they are resentful towards the government leaders who have kept themselves shut in the Kremlin and have brought about this defeat. It seems that anxiety and restlessness are growing more than ever among the people.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 930

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)
TO: Santiago, Buenos Aires, Quito, Lima, LaPaz

October 17, 1941
Cir. # 290.

(Received from Tokyo as Circular # 2149.)

Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow and most of his staff evacuated Moscow on the 16th, leaving only a few staff members, together with the diplomatic corps. Their destination is not definitely known yet. Send no code messages to that office.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 931

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

August 6, 1941
516.

Since the occupation of French Indo-China, the activities of the empire have attracted the general concern of this country. All papers carried news of this activity and gave it preemin-

ence, especially insofar as it applied to the press campaigns of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet, and emphasized the strength and arms of Japanese Empire. This state of affairs, as you are aware, I told you repeatedly in my wires and special communications. The expectation is strong that Japan will take new and direct measures. This trend is being correlated with British and American propaganda in regard to rumors of a compromise with the United States and the weakness of Japan's economic condition. Officially they are controlling rumors of an estrangement between Japan and the Axis.

All the newspapers in this city have been editorializing at length contradicting the apparent strength of England and the United States by saying that under the surface they are taking pacific measures and have no intention of arousing Japan suddenly. They hope to do this gradually. Should Japan take the initiative and exert her full might, Britain and America's pressure upon Japan would be no problem at all. Being by very nature impulsive, they are impatient for Japan to come out and take the offensive against England and the United States suddenly from the dark.

In addition, they say that should the United States effect assistance to the Soviet by way of Siberia, they would force Japan into a war against the Soviet. It would seem through their editorial comment, that all people here are impatient in their hopes of the current situation revolving into a general war against the Soviet. On the other hand, they are impetuously wishful in their desires for another strong hand in this fight and hope that Japan will take the initiative.

Relayed to Berlin.

Trans. 8-8-41

No. 932

FROM: Rome August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 526.

According to a spy report, HITLER and MUSSOLINI will meet somewhere in South Russia in the near future. If this is true, it is to be construed as a counter-action to the recent meeting of ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL on the sea.

Relayed to Berlin.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 933

FROM: Rome August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 540.

During a broadcast of general news on the 12th, it was reported as special news of that day from Shanghai that negotiations for the final draft of a treaty of mutual aid had been completed between Soviet Russia and the CHIANG regime. Now if this is true, I believe we could use it as an effective warning in our propaganda by accusing Soviet Russia as thereby having violated the Japan-Soviet Russia neutrality agreement. Will you please wire me for my information the truth of the matter.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 934

FROM: Tokyo — August 27, 1941
TO: Rome — # 234.

Re your # 540[a].

The above was a newspaper report and its veracity is being investigated at present. There is also the relation mentioned in paragraph 8 of my Circular # 1587[b]. However, at present the authorities are not making use of this propaganda material.

[a] See III, 933.
[b] Worldwide propaganda campaign will be initiated along with occupation of French Indo-China.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 935

FROM: Rome — August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 550.

(Part 1 of 3.)

Re my # 514[a].

The party of Japanese newspapermen who were on their way to Croatia (Kanakura, a semi-official attached to this office, accompanied them) left here on the 9th and was warmly welcomed at many places. They had an opportunity to interview Prime Minister PABERATTI[b], Foreign Minister RORUKOBITTI[b], and other important personages and then returned on the 25th. Their report of their trip was roughly as follows:

1. Peace and order in the country is gradually being restored under the leadership of PAB-ERATTUTI[b] who is backed by the UUSUTASRA[b] (which corresponds to the Fascist Party). Although the influence of the MACHEKKU[c] faction is still strong among the peasants, MA is on good terms with PA (on the 10th the MACHEKKU[c] faction (peasant party) members united the UUSUTASHA[b]) and is now giving increasing cooperation to win them over, the Mohammedans around Saraebo are more and more acting in unison with this party. Strict vigilence is being exercised as ever over the action of the Serbians (about 1,000,000); however, about two months ago an agreement was made with Germany to exchange about half of this number of Serbians with the Slovenes in the Serbian territory and this agreement is already being put into effect.

2. The country is rich in such resources as forestry, live stock, agriculture, mining, etc., and the Government has appropriated 4,000,000 naaru for public work and 2,600,000,000 for agricultural reconstruction. Thus, the Government is endeavoring to develop natural resources and build up the country. The cities were found to be clean and the cultural level of the people fairly high. Their self-confidence is so strong as to amount to being faith.

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] Matchek.

Trans. 0-00-00

No. 936

FROM: Rome August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #550.

(Part 2 of 3.)

3. Antagonism which the people harbor against Italy is beyond one's imagination. They resent strongly Italy's attitude in presenting them with exorbitant demands regardless of the fact that Italy had not given Croatia any military assistance to enable her to achieve her independence, and in treating the country as if it were a more vassal state; nor do they find any good reason for Italy's taking possession of Dalmatia, which is a region hardly Italian in any respect. In fact, some Croats go so far as to demand the return of the lost territories of Fiume[a] and Zara[b].

4. At the beginning when PABERITTUTI assumed his post, Italy's demand was for the cession of the entire region east of the line extending from Ogulin to Mosutaaru[d]. However, the Croatian Government having refused to comply with this demand, a compromise was finally made with the ----- of the harbor of Supretto[e] as the line. More recently Italy demanded the right of political control over the region extending from Kaarobattu[f] to Sosutaaru[g] and submitted an ultimatum giving 11:00 p.m. of the 17th of this month as the hour for reply and thus forced them to grant her the right to place the coastal region on the Adriatic Sea under the control of the Commander in Chief of the Italian forces in that region.

On repeated occasions the Croatian authorities appealed to Germany with regard to the Italian pressure. However, it is said that Germany is allowing the matter to remain fuming, saying that Croatia should wait until the Russo-German war is over.

Furthermore, between Italy and Croatia are various pending questions, such as the question of marking the national boundary and the question of trade. Italy has early sent representatives to Croatia to discuss these questions, but the Croatians are resorting to delaying contacts. It is said that this attitude is due to German advice.

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[a] Prov. Venezia Giuliae Zara Dept. Italy.
[b] Prov. Venezia Giuliae Zara Dept. Italy on Dalmation Coast.
[c] Comm., Sava Co., Yugoslavia.
[d] Mostar, Comm. S.E. Primorjo Co., Yugoslavia, on Narenta River.
[e] Spalato (also spelled "Split") seaport city, capital of Primorjo Co.,
[f] Karlovac—Comm. W. Con. Sava Co., Yugoslavia.
[g] Probably Susak, seaport, Comm. W. Sava Co., Yugoslavia.

Trans. 0-00-00

No. 937

FROM: Rome August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #550.

(Part 3 of 3.)

5. The German forces are encamped mainly on the side facing Hungary from the line extending between Zagaburia[a] (approximately 10,000) and Saraebo[b] (approximately 9,000). The Italian forces are encamped along the region extending toward the Adriatic Sea on one side of the line extending from a point about 15 kilometers south of Zagaburia[a] to Mosuuru[c]. They have roughly 6,000 to 7,000 in Raguza[d] and 10,000 in Supakaato[e]. The standard of the Italian forces is far below that of the German forces, and this has contributed to the Croatians' contempt

of Italy. At the time of the recent outbreak of a rebellion in Montenegro, the Italian forces were encircled at Bokka-de-kataro[f] and at other points, and it is said that the Italian Minister in Zagaburia[a] had to appeal to Croatia for aid.

6. The general feeling toward Germany is excellent. The people tend to depend on Germany as the only country which could restrain Italy. The Croats have recognized by a broad interpretation of Croatian laws, the autonomy of some 150,000 Germans residing in the country and have gone so far as to permit these Germans to form a citizens' army. The boundary line between Serbia, now under German occupation, and Croatia has already been fixed, with the river Dorina as the border, in an agreement between Germany and Croatia.

7. The incident of Hungary's taking advantage of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and occupying the oil regions of Muru[g] has caused considerable indignation on the part of the Croats, who regard it as a second Fiume incident. Naturally their feelings toward Hungary are very bad. This is why they have listed the Hungarians along with the Slovakians and Italians on the top of their listing of enemy countries.

8. They are now using some 60,000 men, including the Army, Navy and air forces in the Russo-German war. The Navy, displaying the Croatian flag on three German warships, is taking an active part in the Black Sea.

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[a] Zagreb.
[b] Serajevo.
[c] Kana spelling.
[d] Ragusa, a seaport W. Zeta Co. Yugoslavia.
[e] Spalato or Split.
[f] Probably Boka Kotoraka.
[g] Mur (?).

Trans. 9–2–41

No. 938

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

August 30, 1941
556.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re my # 512[a]. Strictly secret.

1. I have since been watching the attitude of the Japanese Government as it appeared to me here, and have received the impression that Japan is endeavoring principally to restrain Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia and has neither the intention nor the power to break immediately the encirclement of Japan by these countries. If preparations in Japan have been completed to carry out her magnificent policy, it is a matter of congratulations. However, if on the countrary, preparations are not being carried out as intended, a war of nerves based principally on restraining other countries serves to sharpen the attitude of vigilance on the part of those countries, as well as to strengthen their counter policy. It would help only to hasten their preparations against us and in turn cause us to pay a greater sacrifice when the time comes for us to take up arms as a last resort in order to break the encirclement. Furthermore, if, as a result, the war becomes an indecisive one, it cannot be said that there is no danger of our being obliged to engage in a lengthy struggle which would be unprofitable to us.

2. Of course it is clear that in breaking this encirclement and pressure against Japan there are methods varying in their degree of urgency and difficulty. We should select the method most in accord with our national strength and the development of the international situation; but to carry out boldly at this time our policy of southward advance and to invade Thailand with our armies—this is absolutely essential;

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[a] See II, 679-681.

Trans. 00-00-00

No. 939

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

August 30, 1941
#556.

(Part 2 of 2.)

for, today when Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia have not yet fully joined hands, this action will not lead to a clash with Great Britain and the United States. I believe it is becoming increasingly imperative that from this point we quickly demolish this front in the east and then deal with Great Britain and the United States.

Although Germany's war against Soviet Russia may not progress in the manner anticipated by Germany, Germany will probably, generally speaking, succeed in occupying the most important sections of European Russia within the next two months or so. I believe that Japan's attitude will have a great deal of influence upon enabling Germany to concentrate her power in attacking Britain. It goes without saying that should Germany concentrate her attention to attacking Britain, British forces in the south will be greatly increased.

3. If it is that Japan can complete her work of establishing a new order in the greater East Asia and maintain at the same time her security merely by a policy of restraining other countries, it might be well. However, if in the meantime the British and American encirclement of the European Continent gains in strength, and Germany's offensive power against England weakens, and in turn United States pressure on Japan increases, Japan will have to face what she fears most; namely, lack of petroleum and other necessary materials and she, in utter desperation, will have to fight. This would be a serious thing for Japan, indeed.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 940

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

September 4, 1941
#561.

On the 3rd, incidental to his offering CIANO congratulations for his recovery from illness, I had ANDŌ[a] confer with ANFUUZO[b]. ANDŌ asked him what impression he had received of the Eastern Front at the time of the recent meeting of MUSSOLINI and HITLER. His reply was this: "I was on the Ukraine front for only three days. The war on that front is progressing very well. Both the German and the Italian Armies were in good spirits and in perfect cooperation with each other. All along the line, the Russians put up a stiff resistance. However, we are sure of victory. The Russian Army has already lost 8,000 planes. It is estimated that there are but 2,000 or 3,000 left. The quality of the Russian planes has already greatly deteriorated, judging from the discarded planes. At present, the German Army is progressing in the

direction of Harikofu[c]. I believe the German Army will reach Caucasus by the end of this week. The Volga region is the last defense line in European Russia, and by the time the German Army reaches that line, the Russian Army will suffer much damage, and as a result, its power of resistance will be out of the question."

ANDŌ then, remarking that he understood the two leaders to have discussed political questions as well as the question of food supply, asked what were the main points of the discussion. ANFUUZO's reply was that they had talked about their fighting until they won. They had also discussed the general question of justice in that they agreed to overthrow the Bolsheviks and drive the Anglo-Saxons out of Europe.

ANDŌ said he had heard rumors to the effect that a conference of European nations will be called in connection with the much-talked-of question of the new order and asked if the leaders had discussed this question as well. ANFUUZO replied that he had heard nothing about it and that he thought there was no need of such a conference. Incidentally, ANFUUZO inquired about conditions in Japan, and, I understand, ANDŌ gave him a suitable explanation.

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[a] Counselor at Japanese Embassy in Rome.
[b] Probably Director of the Maritime Commission.
[c] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9–6–41

No. 941

FROM: Rome — September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #627.

Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in the mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance appears to them to be faithless. Recently the newspapers have been growing more critical in tone where we Japanese are concerned. Official comment, too, has been none too complimentary. As for Italy's attitude toward the recent celebration of the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude of the whole Italian people. I mean to say:

1. The Propaganda Department told the press to confine itself to a mere mention of the present anniversary and to turn its attention mainly to other things, refraining from discussion of the bearing of this alliance upon the present international situation.

2. The ceremonies attendant upon this anniversary were carried out half-heartedly or even less by the Italians. It would even seem that this was done to spite Japan and Germany. At Villa Madama there was a reception held for CIANO, but certainly no festivities worth mentioning took place. At a reception held for the press, at first the German and Italian flags only were hanging in the hall. A Japanese reporter mentioned this, and then they pulled them all down.

3. When asked about felicitations and ceremonies, the Propaganda Department always replied that this was not a good time to be ostentatious.

Furthermore, the other day PRUNAS told ANDŌ that word had been received from Ambassador INDELLI that when he inquired of the Japanese Foreign Office officials concerning the negotiations between Japan and the United States, they were very reserved and

uncommunicative, showing that their erstwhile fervor for the Axis was not as glowing as in days gone by.

All this shows how dissatisfied the Italian people are. All I can say is that the exercises held in Tokyo on the 27th, and the Minister's speech, together with the messages from the Premier and Minister, saved the situation perhaps to some extent.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 942

FROM: Rome October 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #630.

In 2 parts complete.

Re my #627[a].

Today, the 1st, Ando had an interview with AREKISANDORINI, at which time AREKISANDORINI said as far as the Italian people were concerned the Tripartite Pact was not merely an arrangement whereby the contracting parties could pursue their material benefits. It has a far higher ideal which is expressed in the daily lives of the people themselves and it is the earnest desire of the Italian Government to foster this confidence of the people toward the above pact. However, it has come about lately that a certain section of public opinion is beginning to entertain certain misgivings toward the Japanese attitude and so in the future it will require particular pains to guide public opinion. Again even in diplomatic circles the trend of Japanese-American negotiations, etc., is not well understood and his position, as one who is supposed to be well versed in Japanese problems, of not being able to answer questions put to him by government authorities, is extremely unfortunate from the standpoint of guiding public opinion. He thought he understood the Japanese position farily well and he explained that the Japanese attitude did not necessarily imply a withdrawal from the Axis. However, he would consider it a great favor if he could be given clearly to understand just what the position of Japan is at the present time. To this Ando replied that in regard to recent Japanese-American negotiations even the Ambassador himself didn't firmly believe that there is no change in Japan's fundamental policy of adherence to the Tripartite Pact and also we believe that Japanese-American relations are being conducted along the line and we are harboring no doubts and it is unthinkable that even if the talks take definite shape that this could result in any harm to the Axis powers. As for my personal impression, I believe that it is only natural that there should be many economists and others who, from the standpoint of Japanese economy, desire to see Japanese-American economy maintained on its ordinary basis. However, in view of the international political situation that exists today, it will be impossible to revive the regular Japanese-American economic relations through such persons and so in order to impress upon them the fact that it is of prime importance now for Japan to devote herself wholeheartedly and without reserve to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Prosperity program, it is necessary that Japan, in view of the present internal political situation, once more exhaust peaceful means in order to try to come to an understanding with the United States. I think that in case the government should be forced to make some important move that this political phenomena will be particularly required in order to obtain national unity.

Again Japan has for the past four years expended almost all of her efforts to seek a solution of the China incident and if circumstances should require military action in the north or in the south it goes without saying that Japan would steel herself for an all out war and make the necessary preparations. To do otherwise, i.e., to rush into war without preparations,

would be foolhardy and there is danger that Japan would be faced with the same difficulties that you have previously told me that Italy was faced with when she was suddenly embroiled in the war without opportunity to complete her military preparations. I think it is necessary for you to view Japan's present attitude in the light of the above points.

To this "A" replied that he had taken the same view and had made the same explanation to the authorities and that he had full confidence in Japan's attitude.

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[a] See III, 941.

Trans. 10–7–41

No. 943

FROM: Rome — October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #643.

(Report of secondary importance.)

We have reports from the Vatican to the effect that MYRON TAYLOR visited the Vatican the other day and sounded out the Pope on the possibilities of negotiations with Soviet Russia for the restoration of the Catholic Church, declaring that this was a matter of grave significance to England and the United States in the pursuit of their policies. He did his best to convince the Pontiff, who replied, however, that he might be willing to negotiate for the revival of the Catholic faith in territories occupied by the German and Allied forces, but as for the Soviet Government, he could never trust them on religious matters. "No," he said, "As a matter of fact, negotiations are quite out of the question." As His Holiness seemed disinclined to listen, TITTOMAN[a] also went to see him and asked if he would attempt these negotiations in case England and the United States could give him some assurances, but he said, "No."

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[a] Commercial Attaché of the American Embassy in Rome; accredited to the Vatican.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 944

FROM: Berlin — September 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1172.

The allowance for living expenses for the Japanese exchange students and Humbolt scholarship students resident in Germany is not sufficient and so many are making up the deficit by working on the side. (See my #546[a].)

However, in view of the retrenchment of business of firms connected with Japan, wholesome employment is becoming scarce and the pursuit of the study of military subjects is attended with various difficulties, hence I am urging all unless there is some special reason for doing otherwise, to return to Japan at this time. Incidentally if there are any students now planning to come to Germany on the evacuee ship please arrange to stop them. If there are any who think they must come, whether or no, they will have to estimate their living expenses at the very minimum of 500 marks per month and before they sail from Japan they should make

arrangements for permission for having the difference between this figure and their scholarship remitted to them from Japan each month.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 945

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Rome

September 20, 1941
262.

Re your message # 900[a].

The International Students Association have replied that they will put no objection in the way of TSUNODA's permit to return to Japan.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-18-41

No. 946

FROM: Rome (Horikiri)
TO: Tokyo

September 30, 1941
626.

Re your message # 262[a] (Your message to Berlin # 851)

TSUNODA and SHIMIZU have decided to return home on the next evacuation steamer. TSUNODA's return fare will be paid by the Far Eastern Association. We are now negotiating with the -----tsuka Association to guarantee SHIMIZU's passage home.

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[a] See III, 945.

Trans. 10-18-41

No. 947

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Rome

October 8, 1941
279.

Re your # 626[a].

There are too the considerations outlined in wires # 1123[b] and # 1172[c] from Germany to this Minister. The competent authorities here have adopted the policy of delaying the dispatch of students to Europe on vessels for evacuation purposes. For this reason these measures have been taken. It was in compliance with the wishes of the Far Eastern Association authorities that we are sending students to Italy alone at the present time. ---

There is also the matter of the large number of students ----- -----.

I think that it might be very difficult to control this. We would like to arrange matters in accordance with the general policy outlined above. However, after you have conferred with Ambassador OSHIMA please wire me if there is any special reason why Japanese students should be invited.

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[a] See III, 946.
[b] Not available.
[c] See III, 944.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 948

FROM: Rome — October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #642.

Re your #279[a].

Continuing to have students study abroad is desirable. However, I can see no reason why we should send them only to Italy at such a time as this. I am wiring you this immediately because I do not see any use in discussing it with Ambassador OSHIMA.

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[a] See III, 947.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 949

FROM: Rome — October 9, 1941
TO: Washington — Unnumbered.

Rome to Tokyo #645.

In 2 parts complete.

On the 8th, I had an interview with Gayda at which time he expressed his views without reserve as follows:

1. Japanese-American negotiations give us the impression that Japan is pursuing her individualistic ends and is not attempting to act in concert with the Axis. On the other hand these negotiations create the impression that Japan is not able to wage war against England and America and that she is seeking to secure peace in the Orient as a result of which America will be enabled to participate in the war today. Even though Japan does not desire to engage in hostilities, I believe that it is necessary for her to adopt a belligerent attitude in order to exercise a restraining influence on America. It is hardly necessary to state that President Roosevelt desires to put America into the war. I believe that Japan is full aware of his purpose, i.e., first to crush Italy and Germany and then to crush Japan. If Japan does not join in the war and if by some chance Britain and America win this world war, they will most certainly unite against Japan after the war is over. Again, in case Germany and Italy come off victorious in this war, it is not impossible that Germany might bring pressure to bear on Japan by means of certain economic advantages enjoyed in China, or Germany might even cooperate with England and America for the purpose of oppressing Japan economically.

However, if Japan joins the war now, victory is certain and Japan will be able to obtain all she desires in the Orient. But, if Japan fails to fight now, no matter which side wins the loss to be sustained by Japan will be great.

2. It will be sufficient if Japan today instead of attacking Russia, whose fate is already sealed, will use her submarines to threaten the lines of British transportation which are so vital a problem to Britain's existence. By so doing, Japan will cause America to lose confidence in Britain's ability to win and so America will not join the war. Also transportation to Britain will eventually become impossible and Britain will be forced to submission and the war will be over in about six months.

3. I think that after the conclusion of the first phase of the Soviet war, Germany will turn her attention to the destruction of the British Empire by sending another part through Turkey to threaten Syria, Palestine, and Egypt.

4. The economic situation within Italy itself is become more and more acute; however, this situation has been occasioned largely by the necessity of making up for the dearth of commodities in Greece, Croatia, and Montenegro, and will not become any worse than it is at present. Naturally, a certain portion of the people will be discontented, but the populace, in general, are cognizant of the situation, and I do not believe that there will be any general uneasiness within the country. As far as Italy is concerned, she is taking the position that there can be no thought of peace until an all out victory is obtained, and so the war will have to continue until England is forced to submission, etc.

In the above can be seen reflective the subjective viewpoint and desires of an Italy that has long been suffering the pressure of the British fleet, however, it may be of some value for your consideration.

Relayed to Berlin and Washington.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 950

FROM: Rome — October 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #644.

Re my #629[a].

This conferment of decorations may have a good influence on the attitude of official circles in this country toward Japan. This attitude has noticeably cooled because of the Japanese-American negotiations. This step is dictated by policy, so please give it consideration and wire immediately.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-7-41

No. 951

FROM: Rome — October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #646.

It is my urgent desire and recommendation that GUIDO ROCCO, Chief of the Foreign Newspaper Division of the Italian Propaganda Office, who two years ago as Minister was bestowed with the 2nd Order of the Sacred Treasure, be advanced to the 1st Order.

The original decoration was bestowed on account of his many and consistant services to MATSUOKA and other Japanese at the time of the formation of the 3-Power Pact, and since then he has spared no efforts in promoting our friendship with Italy and in rendering many notable services.

He now holds the Italian San Mortiz 2nd class decoration and the Order of the Crown D' Italy. If this recommendation is approved, will you please send the desired decoration by the Asama Maru.

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 952

FROM: Rome — October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #655.

Re my #463[a].

The following is a summation of the economic situation within this country since I wrote you in my caption message:

1. Though figures covering the grain harvest for this year have not been published, in view of the fine weather, it seems that there will be, comparatively speaking at least, a much higher yield than last year. However, as I told you in my #624[b], because of the increased need for supplying the occupied areas outside of Italy, it has made extremely difficult the problem of supply for consumption within the country. During the latter part of last month, prices and the variety of food on menus in restaurants were restricted. On top of this, beginning this month, bread and potatoes have been put on a rationing system (for the time being 1.6 kilos). Shortly milk, eggs, and cheese will come under the application of this same system. However, because the quantity available is extremely limited, it is expected that the lower classes will give evidence of some dissatisfaction.

2. While commodity prices on the surface have been left more or less alone since I wrote my caption message, prices in speculative markets have risen markedly. Astonishing as it may seem, olive oil is understood to have increased 13 times in price. Furthermore, with regard to goods other than foodstuffs, there are evidences of an indisposition to sell and a desire to accumulate by buying. Since the 12th of last month, an emergency decree was promulgated which forbade competition in purchasing on the outside and set forth a requirement that for purchases of more than 20 lira, identification cards issued by the Italian government would have to be presented. In addition to that, on the 30th day of the same month the sale of woolen goods, shoes and other clothing was absolutely forbidden for a two-week period. I think that they are preparing for the institution of a (point system?). In addition to that, because it is extremely difficult to secure coal for heating purposes and lumber, the Government will generally control these commodities within the country, as well as in the various countries of Europe under their control in order to restrict their use.

3. Economic circles generally are attempting to combat the abnormal business conditions concerning which I told you in my caption message. Because of the shortage of raw materials, non-defense industries are putting up no objections to radical curtailment of operations. Though defense industries get preferential treatment in the supply of steel and coal, as a result of the shortage of rolling stock and engines, Germany, which is the only nation supplying the country with this item cannot ship more than 1,000,000 tons per month into Italy. The importation of iron and petroleum in comparison with pre-war days is extremely limited. Recently great numbers of skilled workers have been enticed into Germany. Commercial circles because of the virtual standstill of sales have stopped making payments

on promissory notes. Comparatively speaking, those who are doing the best business are the construction engineers.

4. As the war lengthens, the tendency to use ersatz is becoming more and more noticeable. The price of stocks has soared considerably. Surprisingly enough, in spite of the fact that average dividends have been fixed at 3.3%, it has not deterred investments in stocks. In regard to the advances in prices of stocks, as a result of tax levies since July 15th ranging from 10 to 50% and the application of registration and acquisition taxes, industrial stocks are said to have dropped off 20 or 30% (please refer to my #624[b]). Furthermore, since the 15th of last month, 5% National treasury notes maturing in 1950 were put on sale on a monthly installment basis. As a result of the efforts of the authorities, considerable success has been realized. It is understood that more than 20,200,000,000 lira have been subscribed.

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[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 953

FROM: Rome October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #657.

I shall endeavor to sum up the situation in this country as it has developed in recent days.

1. The report which I gave you in my #655[a] recounted the strengthening of economic control in all areas. This has brought a heavy burden upon the people of this country, both high and low. Furthermore, because of the unrest brought about by the lack of food and other commodities, rumors are rife that there is an atmosphere of extreme unrest in all areas. However, the Government, at the same time that it is mobilizing the party, is taking strong measures to quiet the unrest of the people and to improve the morale in order to bring about the realization to the people that they must bear the same burden as the soldiers and officers in the front line. It is viewed that an attempt is being made to quiet public feeling, to still party strife, as well as to quiet the fears of all the people.

England and the United States are exaggerating the current situation. But speculation to the effect that Italy will collapse internally rather than for any economic reason is nothing but the purest fancy. On the other hand, it would seem that they, England and the United States, are taking this as the opportune time for circulating rumors of the possibility of a separate peace with Italy. Both these ideas are not worth consideration.

Furthermore, in this connection, there are intelligence indicating that because MYRON TAYLOR is giving the President of the United States extremely optimistic reports, the pessimistic observations of Ambassador PHILLIPS are not given the credence they merit.

2. In governmental circles there seems to be considerable satisfaction with the developments of the war against the Soviet. They are anticipating that together with recent developments, there will be stepped-up activities in the Near East shortly. They are convinced that within the near future the time will come when the difficult position Italy faces in the Mediterranean and especially in northern Africa areas will take a decided new turn.

3. With regard to relations with the United States, there is even now the tendency to regard those relationships with a little more optimism. There are many who believe that the United States will not go beyond the position which she is now taking.

4. Recently riots have broken out in Albania and Montenegro. Though the Italian army is being utilized to quiet these disturbances, it would seem that they are meeting considerable

difficulty in certain areas. The anti-Italian feeling in Croatia seems to be no less strong than it has been in the past.

Relayed to Berlin and Washington.

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*See III, 952.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 954

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

October 15, 1941
664.

In 2 parts complete.

On the 14th, I met and talked with Paulucci who headed the mission which visited Japan. The following is his opinion on various subjects.

1. Bluntly speaking, the Italian people in general were of the opinion that when Germany and Italy fought the Soviet Union, Japan would, of course, join with her Axis partners. For this reason, these people find it exceedingly difficult to understand Japan's conducting negotiations with the United States. Certain elements even say that the United States has demanded the right to act freely in China and in Manchukuo for the purpose of tying Japan's hands against any northward or southward move. This has made the Italian's feel some apprehension on two accounts: One concerns the present and is the fear that Germany and Italy will lose the support of Japan; the second concerns the future and is based on fear lest Britain and the United States attempt to do in the Far East, after this war is over, what they have done in the past to Europe. Thus, these Italians feel apprehension for Japan also.

2. My (Paulucci's) personal opinion is that Japan should strike at the Soviet Union immediately. At such a time as this, when the collapse of the Soviet Union is practically at hand, Japan should seize Vladivostok which is a constant source of trouble for Japan as a nation. At the same time, this seems to be the most opportune time for Japan to settle the vitally important North Sakhalien problem as well as others, once and for all.

Japan's entrance into the war against the Soviet Union does not necessarily mean that the United States will be brought into the conflict. There is a strong anti-Communism sentiment within the United States which further substantiates the improbability of her becoming actually involved. Moreover, the United States has not reached the stage as yet where she could effectively fight in this war. All her belligerent displays and threatening acts are no more than bluffs.

After the complete destruction of the Soviet Union, Japan will be connected to Germany and Italy by land. This is an important factor for Japan, for she will then have access to many essential materials.

It is quite true that there is a danger that the Soviet Union will resort to guerrilla warfare in the future, which will not make the above-mentioned land communication line an easy matter to maintain. On the other hand, with the defeat of the Soviet Union, the said guerrillas will have lost the source of their military supplies. Moreover, since neither the United States nor British goods could get to them, this source would also be of no aid. Therefore, it should not be too great a problem to suppress these guerrilla bands.

(Part 2)

3. Japan's southward expansion program should come subsequent to the developments outlined in paragraph 2 above. The right moment to do so must be carefully chosen and at the same time, the opportune moment must not be allowed to pass by. If Japan waits too long, it simply means that Great Britain and the United States will be allowed unnecessarily long hours to make preparations.

4. In my (Paulucci's) personal opinion, the course that should be pursued by the Allies (Germany-Italy-Japan) should be to eliminate British influence from the Near East and from the Mediterranean area, rather than the invasion of England. Hitler seems to be of the opinion that if England herself is crushed, the British Empire as a whole will crumble. It seems as if the Fuehrer puts too much weight on the attack on England. In my opinion, England would lose her main fighting power if she were to be defeated in the Near East, the Mediterranean area and in Egypt. This would be a much quicker way of bringing the Empire to her knees than to do so by defeating England proper.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that it is of the utmost importance to have the Berlin Government realize at this time the importance of:

(1) Manipulation of Turkey.
(2) Military moves in the Near East, Mediteranean and Egypt.
(3) Access to the Near Eastern Oil.

Through these means, if it becomes possible for Germany and Italy to come into contact with Japan by both sea and land, not even the United States could compete with the power which would then become available.

Trans. 10–18–41

No. 955

FROM: Rome
TO: Tokyo

October 15, 1941
661.

Concerning the evacuation of Japanese merchants from Europe, I understand that in Berlin, although the personnel of the various business houses themselves, as well as the higher officials are going to remain. In Rome, on the other hand, all the establishments with the exception of Mitsubishi, are closing down. This is taken as a slight by Italians, when they compare the circumstances with those in Berlin, which is not a favorable condition. Moreover, from the standpoint of trade expansion of the future, we feel that it is essential to keep the various business houses open at this time. Please arrange, if possible, to have at least one member of the Bank of Japan, and at least one young and promising representative of businesses (such as Zumoto of the Mitsui) remain here.

Will you please advise me whether the decision to have all the business houses with the exception of Mitsubishi pull out of Italy, means that Mitsubishi will carry on the business hitherto carried on by Mitsui and Okura? If so, is this being done as a phase of our national policy? I would appreciate being advised of this for my information only.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 956

FROM: Rome — October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #632.

The official notes which we exchanged concerning the extension of the compensatory trade agreement with Italian East Africa, concluded March 26, went out of effect on June 30. Don't you think we ought to renew this understanding? In my opinion, considering the present shipping situation, we ought at least to extend the arrangement for a year, if possible.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 957

FROM: Rome — October 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #666.

Re your #274[a].

The exchange of the official text was completed the 17th. The effective period is from June 30th of this year till June 30th of next year. The text in the main is the same as the previous one.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 958

FROM: Tokyo — August 7, 1941
TO: Vichy — #345.

Action Hanoi as #216.

Due to the French policy of procrastination, no definite decision has yet resulted from the negotiations which were being conducted in your city and in Vichy which regard to an increase in the Japan-Thailand regular plane service.

Recently, however, the French Attaché for Air in Tokyo called on the man in charge in this office in the name of the French Ambassador in Tokyo, and outlined the following French proposal.

(1) a. Semi-weekly service between Tokyo, Hanoi, and Bangkok.

b. Semi-weekly service between Formosa, Canton, Hanoi, and Bangkok. Total of four north bound lines. (Abandon the line which detoured to Saigon.)

c. Bi-weekly seaplane arrivals in Saigon.

The French said they would formally approve the above on condition that in exchange we approve the following:

(2) a. The French also permitted to operate the same number of planes over the same course.

b. In order that contact with the French Concession in Shanghai may be established, the French planes be permitted to stop at Shanghai.

c. Materials be made available in Japan.

We cannot approve points (2) a and b at the present time. However, as was set forth in my message #94, with a view to the future when normal conditions return, we are prepared to give

a preliminary approval on condition that planes of each may fly into Paris and Tokyo respectively.

We are willing to make suitable arrangements with regard to point c.

P. (1) Conflicts with our original requests, (see my message #293[a]). We are anxious to conduct negotiations along the lines of our original proposals. We feel that your city is the most suitable place to conduct these negotiations. Please, therefore, get in touch with the governor there and urge him to give his approval to it. (We shall advise the French Ambassador in Tokyo that we are in favor of holding the negotiations in Hanoi.)

Already two special seaplane flights have been made for the purpose of transporting the committee to definitely establish boundaries. In view of the fact that it is going to be necessary to make several more of these trips, we are anxious to have approval granted for the establishment of a regular seaplane service as soon as possible. In the event that the decision on this point is delayed, we intend to operate ----- transport system.

The last point is for your information only.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 8–11–41

No. 959

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Net

August 7, 1941
#1766.

Action *Shanghai (?)* as *# 795 (?).*
(Abstract.)

The French Ambassador called on Toyoda on the 4th to request permission to send 350 French soldiers from the Shanghai French Concession to French Indo-China for the purpose of exchange of soldiers. Toyoda says that it is difficult to grant this permission to the French alone in view of previous regulations, but because of the special relationship existing between France and Japan now, Japan will give tacit consent.

Trans. 8–13–41

No. 960

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

August 11, 1941
#348.

Re your #452[a].

On the 4th the French Ambassador resident in Tokyo called upon me and made the following requests:

1. For permission to return about 350 Shanghai French Concession French soldiers to French Indo-China for the purpose of exchange of soldiers.

2. For the addition of the French language to the three languages, Japanese, English, and German, to which telegraphic communications between Japan and French Indo-China is restricted at present because of the tremendous inconvenience occasioned.

----- 27 groups missing -----

----- (I replied) that when England had requested permission to exchange some "seamen" the request had been denied and that from the standpoint of principle it was very difficult to

make an exception in the case of France alone, however in view of the special relationship existing between France and Japan at the present time as a special consideration the above exchange would be given tacit permission and that in regard to item No. 2 special permission would be given for that also. In this connection when you have an occasion to confer with Darlan regarding recognition of the Nanking regime please make special reference to the above considerations. Ever since the conclusion of the joint defense agreement the Japanese government has given special consideration to Japanese-French relations. Please stress the fact that we are giving especially favorable consideration to the various problems that come up relating to France.

---

[a] See III, 961.

Trans. 8–28–41

No. 961

FROM: Tokyo — August 8, 1941
TO: Berlin — # 723.

Message from Vichy # 452 on the 6th.

Re your # 336[a].

On July 29th, on the occasion of the signing of the Franco-Japanese agreement, I requested DARLAN to reach an early decision in the matter of recognizing at as early a date as possible the new People's Government in China. This should come as a logical sequence to the spirit of the recently promulgated agreements between Japan and France and, also, in view of the unrest in the French Indo-China area having been already practically dispelled. He promised to give due consideration to this matter. On August 2nd when I had conversations with BUNOIR MESSIEN, I made explanations as to the pro's and con's of this matter. Immediately thereafter he said: "I personally do not feel that we should discuss such questions as these for a little while until public excitement has quieted down as a result of the French Indo-Chinese question."

On August 5th, when I tried to secure an interview with DARLAN, I found that he was out of town. In his stead I saw Acting Vice Minister REGARDE (?) and made detailed explanations to him. Before I left I gave him an Aide Memoire. During the course of our conversation, he said: "Though I will convey the details of the matter to DARLAN upon his return to his post, I can say this much: Though he does not feel opposed to the matter, for various reasons he feels that this matter should be shelved for two or three months." For reasons of public opinion and also since difficulties will arise should relations with Chungking be broken off, the French feel that it would raise difficult and peculiar problems. Continuing, he said: "For myself, I feel that the shelving of this more or less secondary question is in keeping with the French Government's straightforward spirit in which they are putting into operation the various agreements covenanted by Japan and France." I replied: "Although this affects but one part of the Far East, the realization of this matter is of the utmost importance. I urge you at this time to reach a speedy decision."

At any rate, within the next few days I plan to call upon DARLAN after he returns to Vichy.

Furthermore, with regard to the matter of the Italian Ambassador, REGARDE (?) told me that he was immediately taking steps so that the Italian Ambassador would not arrive at his post in Vichy but would stay for a time at some point on the way.

Relay to Berlin.

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[a] In which the Japanese Ambassador in Vichy reports conversations with DARLAN regarding recognition of the Nanking Government.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 962

FROM: Shanghai — August 8, 1941
TO: Tientsin — Circular # 705.

Message to Tokyo # 1479.

Re your # 795[a] and my letter # 2142, secret outside the department and dated August 5.

1. It goes without saying that we should make the French cooperate more than ever for the sake of disposing of the China incident. Regarding the various questions arising from French concessions, French garrisons, and French rights and interests in various parts of China, however, due to lack of a clear-cut and uniform attitude and policy on both sides, we have been able to settle the various questions which have come up in a manner applicable only to the localities concerned, and because of this lack there have been some who have even advocated in the recent Hankow French Concession incident that we should go at one step so far as to demand the control by use of police power. At the same time we found ourselves at a loss as to how to handle the question of taking over the Chungking regime documents kept in the French concessions, though this was relatively a simple question.

2. This lack of a definite policy has left us to seek solution at times in a manner differing according to the locality concerned. It has also led to disagreement among our officials in China. On the other hand, every time an unfortunate incident occurs, it causes discontentment among the French officials as well as French residents. Not only that, we have also given the Chinese as well as the third powers the impression that we were taking advantage of the weak. Under these circumstances, settlement of the respective questions has often been crippled, and even when settlements have been arrive at, by leaving behind an impassable fortified area so to speak, between us and the French we have failed to contribute toward effectively settling the general situation. If we look at the situation here in the same light as above, we find what I have mentioned above has been the greatest cause interfering with the carrying out of the demands which we have made to the French concession as a preliminary step in our dealing with the international concession.

3. Therefore, now that we have succeeded in getting the French to agree to the joint defense of French Indo-China, we should at this time make them adopt a basic policy for cooperating with us with a view to disposing of the China incident (something which goes much farther than the ARITA-HENRI agreement concluded last year). I suggest that the following be made the principal points in such an agreement:

(1) I believe that it would be necessary to have the French recognize the People's Government, thereby making the position of the French officials in China clear and their exercise of power easier. This would contribute toward the settlement of various questions, such as the question mentioned above concerning the return of documents belonging to the Chungking Foreign Office, as well as that of the use of hospitals in the French Concession, the use of

Chungking currency, and that of suppressing Chungking organizations and anti-Japanese elements.

(2) Furthermore, have them directly play a part in the settlement or adjustment of French concession questions (namely, to have them agree to the method of guarding the concession, keeping peace and order, controlling materials, using of currency, and other matters necessary for the settlement of the China incident, and also agree upon our right to supervise these activities, and the right of the People's Government in making proposals regarding them.

(3) We should unhesitantly make our demands direct at this moment with a view to settling the question of French garrisons (to get them to agree to withdraw the garrisons or to use them jointly with Japanese garrisons for defense). This would go a long way toward settling the China incident.

4. The opinion of both the army and the navy with reference to the French request mentioned in your caption telegram was that it should be handled entirely by the Central Government. However, our opinion is what I have given above. While we should like to avoid annoying the French from time to time on these questions, it would be unrealistic to use gentle methods when we have just exercised strong pressure methods with regard to the French Indo-China question, for gentle methods would lead to our adopting a less effective policy. This, therefore, should be avoided. It seems to me that it is necessary to open our negotiations at this time with such reasonable demands as have been listed above.

I have mentioned among other things my views regarding the question of having the French recognize the Peoples' Government, but I presume that you have already considered or even arranged this matter. I referred to it merely for the purpose of reference.

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[a] See III, 959.

Trans. 8–18–41

No. 963

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Net

August 12, 1941
Circular # 715.

Message to Tokyo # 1506.

Regarding your # 795[a].

With reference to the relief (interchange) of the French Anamese troops stationed in China a request has come from the Naval Branch of the French Military forces in Shanghai that facilities be accorded for the relief of those in Tientsin and Hankow as well as those in Shanghai. They want these to be moved in three shifts of about 120 men each, the first during the middle part of August, the second the latter part of August, and the third during the early part of September.

On the other hand our naval authorities here have been informed by headquarters that both the original request from the French Commander and the reply to the same from our war office referred only to the relief of the Shanghai detachment and did not extend to those in Hankow and Tientsin.

It is my understanding that particularly in the case of Hankow, in view of recent events, discussions were limited only to the question of rendering assistance for the actual withdrawal of the troops.

Your caption message indicates that there appears to be certain inconsistencies between the requests made to us here and the request made by the French in Tokyo. Please take this

matter up with the French authorities in Tokyo and wire me what we should do about the Tientsin and Hankow contingents.

[a] See III, 959.

Trans. 8–15–41

No. 964

FROM: Vichy (Japanese Ambassador) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 453.

Regarding your # 339[a].

ARNALD returned to his post and on the 8th I sent HARADA to tell him the purpose of your instructions. ARNALD replied, "I have as yet received no report from Ambassador HENRY, but I knew about this; however, I am quite surprised at the number of people you include in his investigation group. I will give you an answer as soon as I have conferred with Colonial Minister PLATON." HARADA then stated, "What we expect in sending this investigation group is that the French Indo-China officials will cooperate with them entirely. I would like for you to instruct the officials in French Indo-China on the spot of this effect. I understand that you have already sent them my instructions but this is a very serious matter. Please advise them to work hand in hand with us."

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8–10–41

No. 965

FROM: Vichy August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 4––.

Re our # 453[a].

The results of a visit with ARNALD:

ARNALD said that the French were in accord with the proposal submitted by Japan. (They had agreed ?) upon the instructions to be sent to the Governor General in French Indo-China. He further added that he wanted you to understand that choosing the members of the committee to study the large numbers of people[b] would be difficult at any rate. HARADA, after stating that he (ARNALD) should not worry about this matter, went on to say that he believed there was no need of the various stipulations previously requested by the French. It was requested at this time that instructions be sent to the authorities in French Indo-China to cooperate at this time with this investigation and to cooperate wholeheartedly after the arrival of the committee.

[a] See III, 964.
[b] Probably to study the large influx of Japanese into French Indo-China.

Trans. 8–14–41

No. 966

FROM: Vichy (Kato) August 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #461.

The situation in France has lately grown more and more strained. There is much economic desperation; materials of all sorts and particularly food are almost impossible to obtain; hence, the livelihood of the people is precarious.

Lately anti-German and anti-Vichy antipathy had been waxing and swelling. Moreover the obscure activities of the free French and particularly the Communist Party throughout both the occupied and unoccupied areas has brought the government face to face with a delicate problem of such proportions that the government began to feel it might be even beyond its power to maintain eternal peace and order. I told you in various messages how Vichy was negotiating with Berlin. Well, England and the United States, not to mention the de Gaullists, have always been quick to point to that and spread propaganda which has played havoc with the esprit francais. I even heard rumors that if LAVAL had been restored there would immediately have been a revolution.

So the government held successive cabinet conferences for three or four days and as a result Marshal PETAIN at 9 p.m. on the 12th broadcast to the whole country. He gave warnings to the people on the situation here and elsewhere and at the same time pleaded for the United States to understand. He announced the appointment of DARLAN to the post of Minister of National Defense and expressed his intention to endeavor to strengthen the administration of the internal affairs of France and to rationalize its functions. In that broadcast Marshal PETAIN said, "What has done the most damage to the work of reconstructing France is the fact that supporters of the regime of the yester-year and the supporters of the trusts stand between me and my people. In order to break their power first of all I must strike their leaders." This point caused quite a sensation.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 967

FROM: Vichy August 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo #459.

Re my #456[a].

On the 12th Harada called upon ARUNARU[b] on other business but took the occasion to press the matter of rubber also. ARUNARU replied that as yet he had had no reply from the Colonial Office, but in regard to the part for America the agreement has already been signed and inasmuch as it is necessary for French Indo-China to maintain its trade status with American it would be very difficult to divert that rubber to Japan.

To this Harada replied that Japan was not necessarily seeking revenge but that they merely desired half that amount (ARUNARU expressed his appreciation at this), and he requested that ARUNARU try again to prevail upon the Colonial Office.

ARUNARU said further that plans were being laid for the transportation of rubber to France via South America in spite of the fact that this was bound to prove a very dangerous undertaking. And in view of the fact that at least a part of it would have to be diverted to Germany he begged for Japan to consider the poverty of France at this time and to consider this problem as one unrelated to France and to give it our most favorable consideration.

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[a] Not available.
[b] Arnald of the Vichy Foreign Office.

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 968

FROM: Vichy — August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 474.

Re my # 459[a].

The French Foreign Office has delivered a note to us dated the 26th which I have summarized in my separate wires # 475[b] and # 476[b]. Subsequently I had HARADA call on ARNALD[c]. The French attitude with regard to the question of French ships in Saigon is more shilly-shallying than ever before. There is no foretelling the result. Though a speedy settlement of this question is urgently desirable and should be negotiated here in Vichy, the French express a desire to negotiate in Tokyo or, with regard to the portion to be sent to the United States, they feel that they should first secure the approval of the American authorities. Or, since under the present circumstances payment in dollars is impossible, in order to make an explanation to the United States that there is no recourse but to use free yen in these transactions, ARNALD feels that at the same time the French make representations to the United States, Japan should advise the United States in some form or other. ARNALD is understood to have expressed himself further as being willing to negotiate at a later date on the manner of payment.

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[a] See III, 967.
[b] Not available.
[c] Minister at Vichy.

Trans. 9-1-41

No. 969

FROM: Vichy (Kato) — August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 480.

Re your # 361[a].

On the 30th I had HARADA submit to ARNALD a request to the effect that since there is no other method of payment except by transferable yen, we would like to have their agreement to this manner of payment. ARNALD replied that some officials in the French Finance Ministry were opposed to this method because there is a large accumulation of yen currency in France, but that he would study the matter.

Incidentally, ARNALD, referring to the request which Ambassador ARERII[b] recently submitted urging Japan to speed up her exports to French Indo-China, asked that the Japanese Government make greater effort in this direction.

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[a] Not available.
[b] Probably HENRY.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 970

FROM: Vichy — August 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 481.

Re my # 474[a].

On the 30th ARUNARU[b] told HARADA that as a result of conversations with the United States, it will be possible to transfer to Japan the 5,000 tons of rubber which was to go to the United States. Of the remaining 7 tons of French Indo-China rubber, the French Government has finally decided that 4 tons will be allotted to Germany and 3 tons to Japan, and Japan is asked to be satisfied with this arrangement.

HARADA replied that this new proposal still meant that Japan would lack 6 tons for her requirements, but that he would transmit the proposal to Tokyo. Furthermore, he asked that if, before the end of the year, it was found to be impossible to ship any part of France's or Germany's allotments, these quantities also be transferred to Japan.

To this it seems "A" replied that although it was a reasonable point and he would like to agree to it, no such stipulation had been added to the decision arrived at by the special conferees who had met for the purpose.

Please wire me your decision in connection with the new French proposal.

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[a] See III, 968.
[b] French Minister at Vichy.

Trans. 9–15–41

No. 971

FROM: Vichy (Kato) — August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 464.

Re your # 275[a].

The French Foreign Office, by note under date of August 14, inquired the opinion of the Imperial Government concerning the three following clauses.

1. The business involved in the exchange concerning the payment of occupation expenses shall be left up to the Bank of Indo-China and the Bank of Japan.

2. Whenever the Imperial forces in French Indo-China need piastres, they shall so notify the Bank of Indo-China, and at the same time they shall pay to the Bank of Indo-China the dollars or transferable yen requested by the French Government. Thereupon the Bank of Indo-China will pay out an equivalent in piastres.

3. All other technical arrangements will be left up to the Bank of Indo-China and the Yokohama Specie Bank.

It seems, furthermore, that suitable instructions have already been issued to the Bank of Indo-China.

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[a] See II, 971A.

Trans. 8–29–41

No. 971A

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 12, 1941
TO: Vichy #275.

Special message. Secret.

To be handled in Government Code.

Regarding the amount of troops sent to French Indo-China.

1. The French Indo-China authorities are to guarantee to supply this amount in piastres through the organization set-up. The specific method will be brought out in a separate agreement.
2. The amount to be paid for the balance of the year is 23,000,000 piastres (monthly amount, 4,500,000 piastres). This is to be paid in "free yen" (literal translation), American dollars, or in gold, whichever the French Indo-China authorities desire. Furthermore, the amount of 1,000,000 piastres a month 'loaned' to the army stationed in the Northern section is not included in the above figures.

Trans. 7-15-41

No. 972

FROM: Tokyo August 18, 1941
TO: Vichy Unnumbered.

Extra.

(*Translator's Note:*) (This message, being extremely garbled, cannot be translated word-for-word. The following, as a consequence, is merely a summary.)

Re your #466[a].

I am rewiring per your request as follows: #354. Circular #1821 from Tokyo to Hanoi and Saigon.

(Strictly Secret.)

According to a report from the Finance Ministry to Yokohama Specie Bank, acting as an agent of the Finance Ministry, has been momentarily expecting receipt of funds stipulated in the terms of the recent Franco-Japanese agreement since July 23rd. The payment stipulation called for the turning over of funds to cover military expenses of the army of occupation. The August allotment of 4,500,000 Hi[b] dollars is urgently needed. In spite of the fact that the terms of payment as specified in the text of the treaty for the use of the northern(?) army of occupation do not exceed being merely technical ones, their lack of ----- is hard for us to condone. As soon as you have heard the facts of the matter from NAKAGAWA, who is the Yokohama Specie Bank representative in charge of this matter, I would like to have you take such measures as are advisable so that receipt of 4,500,000 Hi dollars can be had since the military authorities are insisting that the receipt of the August apportionment by the night of the 16th is absolutely necessary. Please make formal representations to the Governor-General for the

continuance of conversations on payment terms with the Yokohama Specie Bank representatives on the spot.

Relayed to Vichy.

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[a]Not available.
[b]Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 973

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 1, 1941
TO: Hanoi # 250.

Message from Vichy # 479 on August 30th.

Re your # 361[a].

Before receiving your wire, I received one from the French Foreign Office. The Yokohama Specie Bank in Saigon had consented to the payments in gold for materials for the troops stationed there, in the allotment for the first month; but owing to the fact that it is impossible to get export permits for it, they are taking temporary measures, and France has consented to accept transferable yen. The export permits for this gold have been granted (autoriser le transfer). Because France is not operating with our exported Japanese money to French Indo-China, its holdings of transferable yen have already actually amounted to considerable sums. Accordingly, in case it is impossible to pay for the materials in dollars, they are hoping to be paid to some extent in gold. There is also preparation for negotiations here, and if it was not already agreed to pay the full amount in gold on the spot, please inform me by return wire.

Relay to Hanoi.

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[a]Not available.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 974

FROM: Tokyo August 21, 1941
TO: Hanoi # 232.

Tokyo to Berlin # 752.

Referring to Nos. 308[a] and 310[a] from Hanoi to the Foreign Minister.

1. With reference to the German plan to set up some kind of a representative delegation in French Indo-China, we have no basic reason to oppose this move. In view of the present Franco-German relations, however, we feel that the Armistice Commission is sufficient. Our position is that there is no positive and essential reason for the Germans to establish such a delegation in Indo-China and we do not like it.

2. Thus, if the Germans establish such a body, we cannot avoid recognizing that, because of such a situation, we would have to adopt entirely new measures regarding the present Franco-Japanese defense cooperation and all Japan-Indo-China relations. The German Government's formal proposals for discussion must be settled after careful consideration.

3. Please report the results of proposals to the German Government, based upon the foregoing.

Relay to Vichy. Relayed to Hanoi.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 975

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hanoi

August 21, 1941
233.

Tokyo to Berlin # 753.

Re # 308[a] and # 310[a] from Hanoi to Tokyo.

(1) The protocol recently made between Japan and France has put relations between Japan and French Indo-China on an entirely new basis, and in order that the Imperial Government may be able to effectively carry out her part in the joint defense plan, we expect that in case French Indo-China enters into any new permanent political relations with any other country, French Indo-China and the other country involved will of course give friendly notice of such action (at least if it is not a potential enemy nation). Accordingly, in this matter it would be proper for Germany to notify us in advance.

(2) It might be all right for Germany to think of establishing some representative agency in French Indo-China, but the Germans, as far as the political aspects are concerned, have acknowledged that they have no "claims" on French Indo-China, and in the economic field, it is our intention to give Germany full assistance in the matter of supplying necessary commodities, (see my # 413[b]), and therefore, not only is there very little real reason for Germany's having a representative agency in French Indo-China but also this would needlessly complicate the "status" of French Indo-China, and put her in position between Japan and Germany where it would be harder to assist -----. In view of these considerations the said plan is not one that the Imperial Government could favor. You will please therefore investigate whether it is true, and if it is true, ask the Germans to reconsider in the light of the above.

Relay to Vichy. Relayed to Hanoi.

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[a] Not available.

[b] In reply to a request from Vichy as to what steps Japan should take regarding Vichy's refusal to permit the sending of a German economic representative to F.I-C., Tokyo states that Japan has done her utmost to supply German with F.I.-C. materials, and had it been necessary to dispatch anyone to F.I.-C. Wohlthat, who is now in Tokyo, would have been consulted. (Dated 17 May.)

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 976

FROM: Berlin (Osima) August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1058.

Re your #755[a].

In response to the notice given to the German Foreign Office in compliance with your #485[b], the German Government said that it had no intention of interfering with Japan's plan and that they had taken the matter up because the French Government had made known their desire to join the air route in question and had requested the German Government for permission on the basis of the terms set forth in the armistice agreement. It said, furthermore, that it is a general rule with the German Government not to issue permission, because of military considerations, for expansion of French civilian aviation either in France proper or in the colonies, but that this time, in consideration of Japan's plan, they have decided not to reject the French request at once but to agree to France's negotiating along the lines the French have submitted, on condition that the German Government reserve to itself the final decision in the matter.

It is clear from this reply they gave that what the German Government considers to be a question has to do largely with allowing France to join the air route (please refer to clause #12 of the armistice agreement). I believe, therefore, the quickest way to the realization of this plan is to explain to the French authorities the aforementioned situation, to postpone the settlement of the question as to whether the French should join the air route, and to carry on intensive negotiations so that the Japanese demands will be recognized.

---

[a]Not available.
[b]Not available.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 977

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 2, 1941
TO: Hanoi #253.

Message to Vichy #375.

Re my #345[a].

The French Indo-Chinese authorities have on successive occasions replied to us concerning this matter that the Governor General had no authority to sanction this unless we had first secured the understanding of the German authorities through the Vichy Government. In such a way as this they have constantly procrastinated. The German authorities, as evidenced by Berlin's wire to the Foreign Minister, #1058[b], have clarified their stand in offering no objections to the institution of this service. Therefore, I would like to have you, in accordance with the gist of the latter half of my caption message, immediately and strongly insist upon the acceptance of our demands. Wire me the results.

---

[a]See III, 958.
[b]See III, 976.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 978

FROM: Vichy (Kato) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #487.

Re your #375[a].

On the 4th, I had HARADA request another discussion with ARNALD to inform him that hereafter relations between France and Japan will be settled by compromise since we are adhering to the original bill in all respects, and since it appears that the German authorities, as a matter of principle, have no objections with regard to this matter.

---

[a] See III, 977.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 979

FROM: Vichy September 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo #482.

In connection with the shooting of Laval and Deat at Versailles, the French Government has disclosed the fact that for some time previously the Communist Party has been actively spreading anti-German sentiments and it is a fact that it has issued orders to aid the DeGaulle movement.

Since this latest incident, this sentiment has grown in the occupied territory and there have been many instances of railways sabotaged. German soldiers are being assassinated continually and the situation in France, according to reliable sources, is very bad.

In the occupied zone the prestige of the German military has been lowered, cooperation with the Germans is at present declining, and the general anti-German feeling has been noticeable. Since the outbreak of these incidents fears are felt regarding the maintenance of law and order, especially in the towns and cities. Also, the developments in the Russo-German war, and the domestic food and fuel problems affect the situation.

Moreover, since the understanding of August 10th, several readjustments have been made. German military forces have been reduced and, in view of France's governmental difficulties and the progress of the Russo-German war ----- (remaining few lines too badly garbled for translation).

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 980

FROM: Tokyo September 1, 1941
TO: Vichy #374.

Re your #476[a].

In regard to Condition A that they have stipulated concerning rubber for America, judging from my #372[b] and from Arunaru's frequent statements, I do not believe that any agreement exists with regard to supplying rubber to America. Therefore, there is absolutely no necessity

for obtaining America's consent in the matter. Therefore, please arrange for the purchase for Japan with free yen, without any conditions attached, of 5000 tons of rubber.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Available, J19 dated 1 September.

Trans. 9–16–41

No. 981

FROM: Tokyo — September 1941
TO: Berlin — # 808.

Vichy to Tokyo # 495.

Re your # 381[a].

On the 5th, I had Harada contact Arunaru and give him your message. Arunaru explained the various difficulties involved but said he would give the matter study.

Further, I proposed the matter of stopping the supply to America of your # 372[a] and Arunaru said that just this morning he had had word from the German committee in Paris to the effect that there was no objection to the export of 5000 tons to America. Therefore, they went ahead with the export.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–17–41

No. 982

FROM: Berlin — September 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1111.

On the 4th, I had a conference with Vice Minister Weizsacker at which time Weizsacker expressed himself very strongly on the following points:

(1) In spite of the fact that Germany had complied with Japan's request to import rubber destined for Germany from the South Seas area, Japan had not as yet given sufficient consideration to the transportation to Germany of rubber from Japan.

(2) Of the 25,000 tons of French Indo-China rubber marked for America, 15,000 tons had been consigned to Japan and negotiations are in progress for the remaining 10,000 tons also to be allotted to Japan. The only thing he desired was that an agreement be reached regarding the proportional allotment to France and Japan of the 18,000 tons originally destined for France.

(3) That purchases of French Indo-China and Thailand products (rubber, tungsten, tin, steel) be handled by Japanese merchants approved by the local Japanese authorities only. He requested this very strongly. Also he made strong request that Germany transfer a part of her purchases of tungsten from countries other than the above to Japan.

(4) Referring to the necessity for mutual exchange of commodities between Japan and Germany, he expressed an earnest desire that Japan would cooperate to the full in the above mentioned matters.

Trans. 9–9–41

No. 983

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

September 6, 1941
1112.

Re my # 1111.

On the 5th, WIEHL, Chief of the Trade Bureau, told MATSUSIMA the same thing that the Vice Minister WA[a] had told me yesterday, the 6th, and added the following: "Negotiations are being carried on at present with the Japanese authorities concerning the allotment of rubber for next year. The German Government agrees in principle with the line proposed by Japan." As to rubber for this year, he said that he was of the intention of wiring instructions to Tokyo to the following effect:

"(1) Out of the rubber produced in French Indo-China, the 25,000 tons which has been alloted to the United States should be transferred to Japan.

"(2) Out of the 15,000 tons earmarked for shipment to France, 9,000 tons have already been shipped, and 4,000 tons out of the balance of 9,000 tons should be transferred to Japan."

Then MATSUSIMA said: "The German Embassy in Tokyo, not being familiar with how much aid Japan is giving to Germany, is inclined to make frequent complaints." Whereupon WIEHL replied that he intends to have WOHLTHAT[b] participate in future conferences on this subject and have him offer his assistance in everything connected with it.

---

[a] WEIZSACKER.
[b] Director of Economics, now in Tokyo.

Trans. 9-9-41

No. 984

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

September 10, 1941
603.

The French Government replied that to keep in step with Germany, and in view of the fact that Japan would not assent, one-half of the 28,000 tons (of rubber) will be assigned to Japan. At this time, 8,000 tons (of which 5,000 tons (was?)) assigned to the United States. Of 10,000 tons, 3,000 tons will be sent to France proper, and the remaining 7,000 (-----) will be sent to Japan. In connection with the report of the agreement for the American demands during the last of August as expressed in my # 380[a], Vichy replied as was given in Vichy message # 495[a], to the Minister. The German Government's representations to the Minister in Berlin, as mentioned in your # 1112[b], differ from the above-mentioned French report. Being in accord with the schedule for the (latter period?) and in view of the increasing difficulty of the German-French standpoint, it was decided to demand an additional amount of 10,000 tons (our # 381/3[a] to Vichy). All effort is being made to prevent any decrease in the amount planned to be sent to France and Germany. Furthermore, the problem of resident Germans (Vichy's message # 495[a] to the Minister) is becoming increasingly difficult.

Approval is expected of the monthly schedule for Italy and Germany (our # 382[a] to Vichy).

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 983.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 985

FROM: Tokyo — September 10, 1941
TO: Berlin — #802.

Re your #1112[a].

In connection with French Indo-Chinese rubber, as mentioned in Circular #1751[b], the following needed amounts have been decided in the negotiations between Japan and France, as well as the conversations between Japan and Germany.

1. As yet no answer has been received from the German Embassy regarding the aide memoire of August 19th as described in our #1751.

2. The conversations between the United States and France have been discontinued regarding the French allotment of 5,000 tons to Japan which were to be sent to the United States. This is the result of the representations made along the lines of our Circular #1751. They (the French) replied that 3,000 tons of the 7,000 tons (4,000 tons to be sent to Germany) remaining from the 18,000 tons allotted to France proper will be allotted to Japan, making a total of 8,000 tons.

3. As far as we are concerned, this must be settled as soon as possible. The additional amount to be obtained is 10,000 tons. Negotiations are now being carried on with France through the Ambassador in Vichy along the lines of our #381[b] and #382[b] to Vichy. Representations in the form of an aide memoire have been made to the German Embassy regarding the amount needed by Germany. This is explained in special message #803[c].

4. Oral representations were made by the official handling the matter to the Vichy Commercial Attache today, the 10th. These representations consisted of three points:

(a) France is to prohibit the export to the United States in view of the close Japanese-German cooperation.

(b) The supplementary amount to be given Japan is 10,000 tons.

(c) The German "schedule" is approved. There should be a reply from Vichy regarding this.

---

[a] See III, 983.
[b] Not available.
[c] See III, 984.

Trans. 9–17–41

No. 986

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — September 2, 1941
TO: Vichy — #378.

I am rewiring my #369 as follows:

The gist of #217[a] addressed by this Minister to Hanoi is as follows:

For French Indo-China, which is in the same position with us in effecting joint defense, to allow the continued existence or activity of the representatives as well as agents of the Chungking regime now fighting against Japan, is not only bad, but might cause some unforeseen incident in view of the fact that our army of occupation is entrusted with the task of blockading Chungking. So, in the light of what had taken place at the time our troops occupied Tonkin[b] last year, will you ask the French Indo-China authorities to immediately take steps for either the expulsion of Chungking organs or imprisonment of their personnel. Furthermore, if the

French Indo-Chinese authorities take no steps in compliance to this demand or procrastinate too long in the matter, we might take the initiative for action.

(This is for your information.)

---

[a] Not available.

[b] French Port., N. French Indo-China.

Trans. 9–5–41

No. 987

FROM: Tokyo — September 2, 1941
TO: Vichy — No number.

A. Additional items may be included in this list in the future.

B. No mention is made in this list of the Consuls of the Chungking regime and their personnel. We are very anxious to have them either deported or imprisoned.

C. This matter is so important as to require dispatching of instructions to our army of occupation in French Indo-China.

D. The Army of occupation hopes that immediate action will be taken regarding this matter.

E. Should demands relative to this matter not be accepted or sincerity be lacking in their execution, our army might take independent action.

(Message incomplete.)

Trans. 9–5–41

No. 988

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — September 16, 1941
TO: Vichy — # 407.

383 dated the 11th September, 1941, from Saigon to this Minister.

Re my # 382[a].

I visited the Chief of the Bureau for the Preservation of Public Peace and questioned him on the condition of Chinese consular offices. He answered that (1) it was not clear whether or not the consular offices would be closed; and (2) the staff members of the ministry have been withdrawn and moved to Dalat[b], and only a caretaker is left in Saigon.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] City near the southeastern coast of French Indo-China.

Trans. 9–23–41

No. 989

FROM: Vichy (Kato) September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 512.

Re my # 452[a].

On the 15th when on another business HARADA called on Vice Minister ROSIA, he said that he had recently read newspaper reports about representatives of the Chungking regime withdrawing shortly from Saigon and asked how much thought the French Government had been giving to this question. To this RO replied that the French Government had not yet heard anything to that effect, but that two days ago they had conferred for a second time on this question and that they would like to have us wait a little longer. Then HARADA pointed out the inconsistency of having Chungking representatives remain in the areas in which Japanese forces are stationed and again requested that the matter be settled quickly.

---

[a] See III, 961.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 990

FROM: Vichy September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 493.

On the 5th, I conferred with DARLAN, he spoke as follows: "It is true that in the Russo-German war, Soviet Russia was found to be in possession of a greater quantity of arms and materials than Germany had estimated. It seems that so far about three-fourths of the quantity has been lost. I understand that after gaining a secure hold on the front, including Leningrad, Moscow, and Kharkov by mid-October, Germany will cease activity temporarily; I would like to see the negotiations between Germany and France reach some sort of a settlement by that time.

"What will come up next is the question of Turkey. Turkey has been too long undecided as to her course of action. From what I have heard, Germany has been sending a considerable number of small ships and submarines into the Black Sea and has also been dispatching a large force into Bulgaria. Under the circumstances, Turkey would have to do something. If I remember correctly, the number of German dead and wounded in the Russo-German war as about 100,000. This figure appears to me to be too small. However, it is certain that German casualties are far smaller than Russian. I believe, therefore, that Germany will not make any miscalculation on the basis of this fact."

This message has been transmitted to Germany and Italy.

Trans. 9–11–41

No. 991

FROM: Tokyo August 14, 1941
TO: Net Circular # 1817.

(Message to Shanghai # 826.)

Re your # 1506[a].

According to a wire from Military General Headquarters, it is imagined that the request made by the French military authorities in Shanghai filed with our naval authorities applies not only to Shanghai but also to Hankow and Tientsin. However, according to the French Ambassador, this representation applies only to Shanghai. The naval authorities, too, are considering such a manner of procedure. Therefore, we are now feeling out the attitude of the French Commercial Attaché with regard to making our reply to apply only to Shanghai. After we have negotiated here, we will wire you, but you must bear in mind that we are at the present time pressing the Vichy Government for an early realization of our hopes for their recognition of the Peoples' Government. After this has been achieved, I believe that discussions can be undertaken with the naval authorities so that they will make reconsideration of the possibility of including Tientsin at least in the scope of this matter (this point is, for the time being at least, to be kept strictly secret).

---

[a] See III, 963.

Trans. 8–20–41

No. 992

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hanoi

September 8, 1941
267.

Vichy to Tokyo # 492.

(*Abstract.*)

Darlan says that while France has no objections to recognizing the Nanking regime, in view of their previous relations with Chungking, etc. they wish to take more time about it.

Trans. 9–13–41

No. 994

FROM: Hanoi (Araki)
TO: Tokyo

September 10, 1941
355.

From the Ogawa Branch Office.

On the 20th of August, the Yomiuri gave out a report that many DeGaullists and pro-British and Americans were leaving French Indo-China and that the "M M" Steamship Company vessel, *Compayne*, would carry a great number of these persons when it sailed September 4th.

On September 9th, the local Domei representative was called before Intelligence Chief ROBB and told that such news reports were nothing but the propaganda of the British and false. Recently the safety of French vessels has been guaranteed. That such reports have been circulated reflects carelessness on the part of the officials in charge in the Domei Home Office.

Since the most unpleasant effect could result from such reports, please admonish the Domei Home Office so that they will exercise great care before publishing such reports in the future.

Trans. 11–7–41

No. 995

FROM: Vichy — September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #503.

Re my #502[a].

Please arrange to send 100 cases (60 cans each) immediately. It is impossible to obtain fish and meat here and so we are forced to be vegetarians. Several of the staff have lost a lot of weight. Please by all means send the items requested in my telegram.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–13–41

No. 996

FROM: Tokyo — September 16, 1941
TO: Net — Circular #2013.

(Strictly Secret.) (Message to Vichy #409.)

Re your #505[a].

1. On the 16th the German Commercial Attaché in Tokyo, acting on instructions from the German Government, informed the official in charge that Germany (1) expects to send an additional amount of 10,000 tons to Japan, and (2) the answer to the schedule contained in my message #382[a] (that they agree on the three points of dividing equally between Japan and Germany the increase exceeding 68,000 tons bargained for (?) in my #603[b] addressed to Germany) for the time being by word of mouth (notes will be exchanged in a short time).

2. Accordingly, after you point out that there is no need of getting the consent of the Germans, as explained in your caption message, get, through correspondence, the approval of the French authorities and the aforementioned three points; and at the same time, please negotiate at once with the Governor-General of French Indo-China over instructions as to how to enforce this without delay.

3. Now, according to your caption message, they say that they can supply 3,000 tons of the 8,000 tons additional amount from the 7,000 tons increased amount, but this is at variance with their explanation contained in your #481[c]. We, who had figured this point on the basis of production of 68,000 tons, consider this matter with concern and would like to have you also point out this detail to them.

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 984.
[c] See III, 970.

Trans. 9–23–41

No. 997

FROM: Tokyo — October 7, 1941
TO: Saigon — # 2134.

(Circular.)

Tokyo to Vichy # 440.

Re my # 439[a].

At an informal meeting on September 25, the German Commercial Attaché in Tokyo mentioned that he had heard from his government that the French Government had advised the French Indo-China Governor to permit 5,000 tons to be shipped to Japan as the September allotment, which made him believe that French Indo-China was prepared to fulfill Japan's demands after this date, just as before.

I am telling you this for your own reference.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-29-41

No. 998

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — September 24, 1941
TO: Vichy — # 422.

With regard to the payment for a 2,800 tons ($1,191,451) mentioned in your # 515[a], a telegram to the Yokohama Specie Bank says that on the 18th at Saigon an understanding was reached between the Yokohama Specie Bank and the French Indo-China Bank to effect the settlement in 500,000 Swiss franc (to be transferred at the end of October), 3,450,000 piaster and 1,230,000 yen (free yen).

I am sending this much at this time.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 999

FROM: Tokyo — September 16, 1945
TO: Berlin — # 823.

Secret. From the Minister of Finance to Economic Attaché YUMATO.

234.

The Yokohama Specie Bank and the Indo-Chinese Bank are conferring to stipulate the details of the agreement for putting into effect the proposal of making payment in piastres in compensation for American dollars, gold or free yen (at their request, convertible yen) of the military expense of the troops stationed in French Indo-China which the French Indo-Chinese have in accordance with the French Indo-China agreement there. Although these two banks

are conferring, as yet, no settlement has been reached; therefore, negotiations are to be transferred to the Japanese and French Governments.

KATO, Ambassador in France, is now negotiating with the Vichy Government but as various technical difficulties regarding circulation of money have come up in these negotiations, I believe a beneficial result would be obtained if your office were to cooperate in speeding along his negotiations. As there is the possibility that the Foreign Office will take an interest in this matter, please keep it in mind in sending contemplated instructions to Vichy in the near future and please make preparations (in accordance?). As it is clear from the present military conditions it will not be possible to make payment of the necessary amount as agreed upon for the expense of the troops stationed in French Indo-China, it is planned to contact the French soon about the originally decided supplementary amount. As there was no other way than payment in gold, foreign currency or free yen, according to the original arrangements making up a counter plan, there will be in this way a surplus from the French Indo-China trade relations. Although it is expected that in compensation for obtaining free yen from Japan for this surplus they will be reluctant to supply the supplementary amount for the military expense it will be necessary to adopt forceful negotiations as this is necessary for us.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 1000

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

September 16, 1941
823.

(Part 2 of 2.)[a]

The manner of settlement of Japanese French Indo-China trade may be as follows:

1. The yen which is to be the equivalent to piastres paid for the purchase of rice could be put into a special account and held (unredeemable—deferred) in Japan for a period of one year.

2. The purchase of rubber could be in dollars.

3. Other purchases could be either with yen held by the Indo-China Bank in the Yokohama Specie Bank or with piastres held in the Indo-China Bank by the Yokohama Specie Bank. Any time that the balance remaining, after the monthly accounts have been cleared, amounts to more than 5,000,000 yen the creditor bank could ask for payment in dollars of the unadjusted balance.

As the ways outlined in points 2 and 3 are no longer possible with the American freezing order, alternate methods are being studied but as yet nothing has been decided. At first the negotiations were carried on between the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Indo-Chinese Bank but as nothing was arranged diplomatic negotiations are now being carried on. If the diplomatic negotiations on the spot fail (?) it may be necessary to form a precedent (?) by transferring the negotiations to Vichy.

Please keep all this in mind as in making a settlement of this question your efforts may form an important part.

---

[a] See III, 999.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 1001

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

September 20, 1941
#418.

(Part 1 of 3.)[a]

1. The following supplementary expenditures must be incurred by the French immediately in connection with establishment of our army of occupation (in French Indo-China):

For barracks	5,000,000 piastres
Stables and remount depots	20,000,000 piastres
Aviation fields and equipment	20,000,000 piastres
Airplane hangers	2,000,000 piastres
Supply depots	5,000,000 piastres
Housing for various military equipment	20,000,000 piastres
Marine transportation	4,000,000 piastres
Total	66,000,000 piastres
	(76,000,000 (?)

2. Former agreements related principally to expenses incurred in occupying the territory and did not include the above. It is necessary that the French Government cooperate in every way possible in the joint defense of the country (two lines omitted) and they are expected to turn over to us all existing barracks, warehouses, remount depots, etc. Furthermore, they must do nothing to block our demands upon them and are expected to assist our military establishment in every way.

---

[a] Part 2 of 3 included.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 1002

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Vichy

September 20, 1941
#419.

(Secret outside the Department.)

For reasons given in my #417[a], the army needs to have 66,000,000 piastres by the end of this year as an additional payment for the army of occupation. When the agreement for joint defense was concluded, a payment of 23,000,000 piastres was agreed upon, and so when at this time negotiations with regard to the details are still being carried on in your city, payment of another large sum might prove to be a very difficult thing to negotiate, but this additional sum not only is absolutely necessary for the army but also is what our Government has to provide because of various circumstances.

Looking at the matter from the standpoint of the fact that we shall be needing large sums of piasters in order to defray future military expenses, you might, for the sake of facilitating the negotiations, take the matter up with the French authorities as a fundamental question having to do with the piaster itself by bringing up, for instance, the question of linking the issuing of the piaster with the Japanese currency or the question of the loan agreement and then making this question a part of either. In case you treat this question independently, if you indicate the entire sum at one time, it might arouse unnecessary suspicion regarding ----- ------ -----, and so I suggest—this is information solely for you—that you demand merely the payment of the installments for September and October. At any rate, I would like to have you

commence the negotiations by your following whatever form that you think appropriate in view of the circumstances existing in your area and make every effort to get from them the installments for September and October. If you have any opinions regarding this question, please let me know of them at once.

Furthermore, please caution them to keep this matter absolutely secret.

[a] See III, 1003.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 1003

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 20, 1941
TO: Vichy #417.

Secret within the office.

1. With reference to the payments for military expenditures in connection with the army of occupation in French Indo-China:

It is desired that you enter into negotiations with the French Government at once regarding the supplementary payments described and explained in separate message #418[a].

2. Payments to be made in Japanese free gold yen or in foreign gold.

3. Of the amount specified, we want the September and October portions paid at the earliest possible opportunity, and in the absence of a plan of payment, steps to be taken to ensure the receipt of these amounts by our army by the end of the months, as scheduled below:

September	11,500,000 piaster
October	11,500,000 piaster
November	21,500,000 piaster
December	21,500,000 piaster
Total	66,000,000 piaster

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 1004

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 20, 1941
TO: Vichy #420.

(Secret outside the department.)

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re my #418[a].

I am sending the following information for your reference.

1. Condition of Quartering Troops.

(a) *Saigon and its vicinity.* Despite the negotiations carried on locally, they refuse absolutely to allow the Japanese to use some of the barracks and houses belonging to French Indo-China, merely permitting the use of ----- of Annamites, and they are quartered in a limited space with two persons per one "tsubo"[b], and despite the fact that for the present ----- ----- hundred

thousand "tsubo" is necessary (please keep this matter strictly secret from the other side), they have not offered us the use of the warehouses of the French Army and ----- ----- under French management. We have rented and are using only the rice warehouses belonging to the Chinese and situated in one section of the race track.

At Konota[c] and Natoran[c] the quarters are provided in barracks and school buildings. At Kamuran the quarters are very much limited because there are no buildings. At Kacusanjakku[c] our barracks ----- -----. At Baria[c] the troops are camping here and there because there are no buildings. At Punopen[c] and Sienhreapu[c] the quarters are extremely narrow.

---

[a] See III, 1001.
[b] Approximately 6 ft. square.
[c] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 1005

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 20, 1941
TO: Vichy #420.

(Part 2 of 2.)

2. The French Indo-China authorities have requested that a detailed agreement be concluded regarding joint defense. They would like to have the French Indo-China forces be responsible for the border regions facing China and Thailand and have the Japanese forces be responsible for the remaining areas. It seems that the French Indo-China forces are anxious not to provoke the Chinese Army. However, it is our desire that this matter be arranged in detail between the Japanese and the French Indo-China Armies (please keep this strictly secret and only to yourself).

3. Inasmuch as facilities at airports and barracks are concerned, this question logically comes within matters which should be settled locally, and so we have no intention of negotiating it. We have already referred this matter, together with the purport of paragraph 2 above, to the local army. Should the French authorities approach you with anything in the nature of a protest regarding these questions, do not heed them, but after suitability replying to them, arrange to have them handled as questions to be settled between the armies.

4. Furthermore, in order to assist in these negotiations, I am arranging to have Finance official YUMOTO go to your city from Berlin, and so have him cooperate with you as much as possible as soon as he arrives.

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 1006

FROM: Vichy (Japanese Ambassador) September 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #524.

According to a conversation between a member of the German Embassy in Paris and a member of our staff, the French Government, since the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, has offered various suggestions for the revision of the terms of the armistice. So far as Germany is concerned, they are confident regarding the outcome of the German-Soviet war, and they feel no anxiety regarding the coming war with England. So far as it does not interfere in military

affairs, the progress of Franco-German cooperation is a thing to be desired, and the preliminary machinations have been begun for creating such an atmosphere of cooperation.

Furthermore, the matter of maintaining general peace in the occupied area is hardly a problem any more. The impression that our official received was that as a result of the outbreak of the Russo-German war, German military force in the occupied areas in general has been increased more or less.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 1007

FROM: Vichy (Japanese Ambassador) September 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #522.

Re my #510.[a]

I made representations along the line you laid down, however, on the 22nd Akunaru[b] told Harada that Saigon had made inquiry of the Tokyo Specie Bank on the 9th regarding the problem of the disposition of the August allotment of free yen, but had received no reply as yet, and hence until they could see their way through the problem, they were not prepared to accept our proposal of paying 1/3 contained in my caption message, part (3).

Inasmuch as a decision on the September allotment is urgent, there is no other way than for us to accept one of the French proposals contained in my caption message, I believe.

[a] Not available.
[b] Arnold of Vichy Foreign Office.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 1008

FROM: Vichy September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #526.

Re your #471[a].

On the 24th, I saw Vice-Premier DARLAN and requested the payment of 66,000,000 piastres as this year's supplementary payment for the expense of the Japanese army in French Indo-China (for his reference, I gave him the gist of the request in writing). DARLAN said that he understood that we wanted the French Government to lend the money temporarily, and so I replied that we, of course, intended to repay the sum advanced by means of gold, the free yen, or foreign currency. I then explained that the payment of the 23,000,000 piastres, which is the amount for September and October, required immediate decision. DARLAN understood this, and after calling Vice-Minister ROSIA, immediately got in touch with the offices concerned and ordered -----.

I had HARADA at once negotiate the details.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 1009

FROM: Tokyo October 1, 1941
TO: Vichy #428.

Your #536[a], my #427[b] replied to the matters in your message.

We will transmit a concrete proposal for method of payment in a follow-up message. Details can be negotiated later, impress upon the French the urgency of negotiating this matter.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-8-41

No. 1010

FROM: Vichy September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #529.

Re my #515[a].

On the 22nd HARADA again explained to ARNALD that we are already in contact with the Germans in Berlin and Paris on this question. ARNALD, however, expressed quite a few grievances on the part of France saying that our exports to French Indo-China were not proceeding as well as might be expected; that the various methods of payment were unreliable; and that in case she could not export to the United States, France would prefer to stock surpluses.

As I have told you in a number of messages the main difficulty concerning our occupation expenses, methods of payment, and the matter in question seems to be in the manner in which the economic treaty is at present being carried out. That seems to be the impression here. I want you, therefore, please to inform me by return wire the present state of affairs and the prospects for the future.

Relayed to Berlin.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 1011

FROM: Vichy September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #527.

During my conversation mentioned in my #526,[a] DARLAN said that he had recently gotten some very unsatisfactory reports from French Indo-China. He said that, therefore, he would like for Ambassador YOSHIZAWA to take up his post at the earliest possible moment.

I should like to know just when the Ambassador will start for his office. Please wire me back.

---

[a] See III, 1008.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 1012

FROM: Vichy (Kato) September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #528.

(To be kept a department secret.)

Re your #422.[a]

At the time of our conversation mentioned in my #526,[b] I referred to the matter in question, and DARLAN said, "No, it is all news to me, and I cannot believe it, I assure you. Some time ago on the occasion of the conclusion of the Tokyo-Bangkok agreement, American Ambassador LEAHY came and said, 'I have received instructions from my home government and wish to inform you that the Government of the United States is displeased with the pact in question.' I replied, 'Well, we are taking this action, having considered the respective positions of both Japan and France with reference to French Indo-China, and I want to ask you please to stay out of this affair.'

"I am sure that we could have gained nothing whatever by resisting Germany in Europe and, similarly, there would be no point in our wrangling with Japan in the Far East. This is my conviction, for I do not see how you could suspect us of trying to get the United States to intervene in this sort of matter. Besides, what could the United States do?"

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[a] See III, 998.
[b] See III, 1008.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 1013

FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Vichy #429.

The troops of occupation in northern French Indo-China continually asked the French Indo-China officials to transfer to Haiphong some 60,000 railroad ties that were in the neighborhood of Langson near the Chinese border north of Bandoeng. They did nothing about this, and finally we decided that the only thing to do was to seize the railway between Bandoeng and Haiphong temporarily by force and change these ties ourselves. We made ready, and the army approved our measures, declaring that obviously the French officials were not cooperating with us. Finally, on the 29th, we began the shipments.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 1014

FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Vichy #432.

On the 25th, Ambassador HENRY called on this Minister and said that the Japanese Army in South Indo-China had addressed a demand on the 21st to the Governor-General asking for transference for the use of the army, one building in Saigon, several factories, and hangers, and for free use of two air fields in Cambodia, and warned that unless the demand is complied with by the 26th, these objects will be occupied by the army. However, the Governor-General

rejected the demand on the grounds that these objects, being used by the ----- army, were at present not transferable and that the air fields in question were not included in the agreement for joint-defense. The Ambassador requested that since such was the state of affairs, he would like to have me issue instructions to the army in French Indo-China, telling it to avoid any unfortunate incident arising from use of force.

In reply to this, this Minister said that unless a guarantee is given for the acceptance by the French of the demands made by our army, I could not issue instructions and that without my issuing instructions, it would be only natural that the Japanese Army would resort to force as it predicted to do so; and that since we do not want to create trouble unnecessarily, if the Ambassador would strongly recommend to the Governor-General acceptance of the demands of the Japanese Army, we would also advise the army in French Indo-China to settle the matter peacefully. The Ambassador agreed to do so and left the room.

I, therefore, got in touch with the army here and had them transmit to the army in French Indo-China this intention of the French. According to a report received on the 28th from the Army here, the Governor-General finally gave in to the demands of the Army, and the question was settled satisfactorily.

Trans. 10–6–41

No. 1015

FROM: Vichy (Japanese Ambassador) 23 September 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #523.

Re your Circular #1906.[a]

1. Radio-telegraph agency.

2. Favorable reception from 6 to 7. When necessary, we receive broadcasts directed toward America and also the South Seas. Reception from JUP and JUQ is in general good.

3. The time of broadcasts and the amount is in general O.K. However, the interval between the final broadcast and the first one the next morning is rather long, and it might be well to utilize DNB or Reuters. Also, a short sports news broadcast about 6 A.M. French time is desired. (I have ascertained the above regarding tele-radio.)

4. It is necessary to exercise extreme caution in regard to items concerning ----- for example such things a Domei's continually harping on the matter of Japanese-American negotiations and predicting their completion (whereas in America they are denied each time) is very annoying. I think that the handling of such broadcasts had better be left up to foreign news commentators. Also items dealing with crime, etc., and those deleterious to Japan might well be omitted.

5. Fair reception OFI (for national distribution). An average of 5 headings a day. Furthermore, it appears that a large amount of the tele-radio is being relayed to North and South America, the Balkan countries and Portugal. The amount that Portugal utilizes is particularly large.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 1016

FROM: Vichy — September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #539.

Re your Circular #2022[a].

The results of the experimental broadcast and our desires are as follows:

Although there was interference and static, reception of JUP was good on all three days.

As to JAP and JUO we tried to detect it on each day. Because there was a powerful French broadcast using the wave length close to ours and because the broadcast lasted for only ten minutes, despite the fact that there was only one machine, we could not detect the broadcast and we were not able to receive anything.

In the future, when making experimental broadcasts, we would like to have you, even in case of simultaneous broadcasting, follow a uniform procedure and use a frequency identical in wave length with that used in the broadcasts.

In the future when sending telegraphic messages we would like to have the message repeated twice as a precaution against poor reception, and furthermore, we would like to have you send tentatively any urgent and short message which you intend to send properly at a later time.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 1017

FROM: Nanking — October 8, 1941
TO: Hanoi — Unnumbered.

According to Reuters and other foreign dispatches, the military authorities in your city arrested over 100 Chinese hostile to Japan on the 25th and 26th of last month. It seems that the French Indo-China government office has made a protest and requests their release. Please wire me the facts in the case.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 1018

FROM: Tokyo — October 2, 1941
TO: Vichy — #432.

The following is the gist of #390[a] addressed to this Minister from Hanoi:

Re my #387[a].

I understand that Lt. Col. HAYASHI of the Sumida organ addressed on the 27th a communique to the following effect in reply to a protest made by the Governor General of French Indo-China that we were violating the sovereignty of that country:

"We have repeatedly demanded the expulsion of the leaders of the anti-Japanese Chinese residents. Notwithstanding that about six months have passed, you have not complied with this demand, giving for your reason that the Chinese have not caused disorder in French Indo-

China. However, these Chinese are not only resorting to every available means to get hold of our secrets, especially secrets of the Army, but also have been preventing the Chinese residents in French Indo-China from becoming friendly to Japan. This is a matter of a too serious nature for us to overlook. What is more, their activities have of late increased, and since they were under secret orders to spy on our camps in French Indo-China, we finally had our gendarmerie take emergency measures for the purpose of investigating. In other words, the Army found it necessary for reason of self defense to take the minimum precaution necessary. You protest against us, saying that this was an infringement of sovereignty, but so long as you have recognized the occupation by our Army, we would like to have you understand that any action on our part which we find unavoidable in the interest of self-defense is incidental to that recognition."

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 1019

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

October 2, 1941
1204.

Secret.

PIERRE FAUQUENOT, an Annamite, who has been here since September of last year, and who was formerly the editor of *L'Alerte*, a French language newspaper published in Saigon and who has been an advocate of Japan-French Indo-China cooperation ----- ----- ----- ----- (----- ----- ----- had been serving a prison term since December 1939 in France, but in June of last year when the country was occupied by the Germans, he was released and later came here by way of -----. He has been keeping in touch with the officials of the Japanese Consulate in French Indo-China. I believe you know who he is). He has been wishing for sometime to return to his home and, therefore, I had a member of this office confer with him on several occasions and investigate his character and ideology. We found him to be a person whom we could use in our policy toward French Indo-China. I would like, therefore, to help him, if possible, satisfy his desires. However, before doing so, I would like to have him go first of all to Japan on board the Asama Maru. There might be some difficulty in returning him at once to French Indo-China. In that case, it might be well to have some organization in Japan employ him and assure him his living. Regarding this possibility Military Attaché BANZAI in this city has already communicated with OKAMOTO, Chief of the Sixth Section of the General Staff.

Furthermore, YŪZŌ SATSUMA, who has recently returned to Japan, is expected to confer with KARASAWA, director of the Toā Kenkyūsho on the matter. One of these two will request that he be allowed to take charge of this man. Will you kindly contact them and wire me the results. As soon as it has been decided who should be responsible for this man, I shall issue a Japanese passport and have him take the steamer. His fare as far as Lisbon will be defrayed by us. The steamship fare could be taken care of by a governmental order, but I prefer to have his would-be guardian, if possible, pay it.

Since, as I have pointed out already, this man was imprisoned because he had advocated that Japan and French Indo-China join hands, we should both protect him and treat him hospitably regardless of what our present policy toward French Indo-China happens to be. I, therefore, would like to see this matter handled as favorably as possible.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 1020

FROM: Tokyo October 3, 1941
TO: Vichy #436.

In 3 parts, Part 2 missing.)

Re my #428[a].

Part 1.

Conditions regarding "free yen," foreign currency, and gold, are as stated below, however, inasmuch as it is imperative that acceptance of this matter be effected without delay, please consider the three points stated below and then negotiate on the basis of having the total amount payable in gold.

1. Foreign currency.

(a) American, British, and Dutch currencies are at present frozen and hence cannot be utilized for payment to French Indo-China. There is little leeway in N.E.I. currency anyway.

(b) Furthermore, the balance of Swiss franc funds is small and the only way it could be procured is through the *"free yen block" (?)* and as far as Japanese-German financial transactions are concerned Japan owes Germany marks and hence Japan is reluctant to offer marks, therefore, currency cannot well be supplied in this manner.

The matter of procuring this balance through Italy might also be considered but it is attended with difficulties. The possibility of obtention by transfer of gold -----.

(c) There remain the Escudo and the Peseta, Portuguese and Spanish currencies respectively. These have not been used recently and funds in these currencies are very small. In regard to obtaining these there are the various methods of free marks, Swiss francs and the transfer of gold, however, the difficulties and impossibilities involved are the same as in the preceding paragraph.

Part 2 missing.

Part 3.

3. Gold.

The amount of gold held by this country has reached a comparatively large sum and hence there would be no difficulty in alloting it. Since the possibilities of French Indo-China's obtaining foreign currencies are about what I have outlined above, it is not difficult to imagine that French Indo-China will desire to have settlement made in gold. I also recognize the possibility that the other party might use the fear of inflation as an excuse for not receiving gold and ask to be paid in commodities. In regard to this, in view of the trade agreement that exists between Japan and French Indo-China, it is only natural that Japan should do her utmost to promote said trade and to see that it increases. In regard to the above item, it is possible that a part of the payment might be made in some special commodity. The other party for instance, desires iron and non-ferrous metals, and petroleum. However, circumstances are such that these cannot be supplied in a hurry and a great deal of time would necessarily be consumed in negotiations. To simply state in general that payment would be made in commodities or in free yen ----- I think. -----. I fear -----. Please negotiate these points. ----- paragraphs a, b, c, -----.

(Translator's note: Many gaps in last part of the message.)

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[a] See III, 1009.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 1021

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

October 4, 1941
437.

Re your # 542[a].

1. The requirements referred to below apply principally to the army of occupation in southern Indo-China, but part of it also applies to the Northern Army.

2. It is very difficult at this time to predict what the total requirements from January to December next year will be; however, during January to March approximately 30,000,000 additional piasters (10,000,000 per month) will be needed to complete our military establishment. It appears that a total of some 70,000,000 piasters will be required (about 6,000,000 per month) to cover the maintenance expenses of our troops for one year.

This matter has to do with military secrets, therefore, in taking it up with the Foreign Office it should be explained simply that a total of 100,000,000 piasters is estimated to be required, of which part is to cover expenses in connection with the northern occupation and part is to meet the overhead and extraordinary expenses of the army from January to December. These estimates are subject to change, depending upon the course of events.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-16-41

No. 1022

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

October 7, 1941
442.

Re your # 545[a].

Your explanations in regard to the fixed rate of exchange for purchase of gold by the bank of French Indo-China (including the explanation in parenthesis) and also your explanation in regard to quotations in Shanghai and New York were insufficient, hence it is difficult for us to reach a correct understanding here, so please wire the details immediately, (including a concrete explanation of the exchange rate by the use of figures). Also please wire immediately as to how much this official rate differs from our fixed rate.

Furthermore in regard to the September balance the time is already late so please take steps to see that they do not invent sundry and diverse excuses to further delay the matter.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 1023

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

October 14, 1941
450.

Re my # 449[a].

We are asking HENRY, the Ambassador to Tokyo, to strongly advise the Vichy government to accept our estimate as itemized below. Will you also please present the estimate as revised below from my wire # 418[b] and negotiate at once for a settlement.

1. Billetting costs (barracks, hospitals, -----) 36,000,000 piastres.
2. Aviation facilities (runway, hangars, and other necessary buildings), 12,000,000 piastres.
3. Supply department (headquarters, workshops, warehouses, -----) 12,000,000 piastres.
4. Shipping facilities 6,000,000 piastres.

Total ---------- 66,000,000 piastres.

Please let me know of any progress since my wire # 442[c].

---

[a] Not available.

[b] In which Tokyo outlines the demands made on the French government in connection with the establishment of the Japanese army of occupation in French Indo-China.

[c] In which Tokyo asks Vichy to wire immediately the details with regard to the fixed rate of exchange for purchase of gold by the Bank of French Indo-China and also in regard to quotations in Shanghai and New York.

Trans. 10-30-41

No. 1024

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 7, 1941
TO: Hanoi (Riyoji) # 314.

Secretary of the Foreign Office Ono, who sailed from Kobe 6 October on the Kanju Maru, carried secret documents for you and for Saigon. Please arrange to facilitate his passage through customs and also see that the documents for Saigon are dispatched immediately by safe and reliable official mail.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 1025

FROM: Berlin October 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1221.

As you are well aware, the staff of the German Embassy in Paris, from the Ambassador down, since the German occupation of Paris, have not only extended every facility to the Japanese Embassy in Paris in connection with the protection of residents remaining there, but also have always championed our cause in the Japanese-French negotiations regarding French Indo-China. Particularly was this true this spring at the time of the French Indo-China-Thailand armistice. Again we asked for positive cooperation at the time of our requests on southern French Indo-China in July and we will need their future cooperation in the future in connection with the various problems that continually arise in connection with French Indo-China. Hence I think it would be well at this time to discuss the matter of conferring decorations on the Ambassador and his staff.

If possible please arrange to send the decorations on the Asama Maru. I have discussed this matter with Ambassador Kato who at present is visiting here in Germany.

Ambassador Abetz (Otto Abetz), the First Class Order of the Rising Sun.

Minister Schleier (Rudolph Schleier), the Second Class Order of the Sacred Treasure.

Secretary Zeitohel (Cartheo Zeitohel), the Third Class Order of the Sacred Treasure, (comparable to our first class secretaries).

Secretary Achenbach (Ernest Achenbach), the Fourth Class Order of the Rising Sun, (comparable to our second class secretaries).

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 1026

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

October 15, 1941
559.

Referring to telegram # 1221[a] to the Foreign Minister from Germany.

Ambassador Abetz has been of great help in contributing to the success of our French Indo-China policy. Since the Italian Government plans to confer decorations on the staff from Abetz down, we should be concerned about conferring decorations in the near future.

---

[a] See III, 1025.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1027

FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

October 9, 1941
550.

Re my # 547[a].

On the 9th, Harada called on Arunaru on other business at which Arunaru said that as far as France was concerned, they desired to see a settlement reached on the rubber problem as soon as possible, and hence, they had decided to accept Japan's desire for an increase of 10,000 tons (7,000 tons from the portion destined for America, and about 3,000 tons from increased production) and hence they hoped that Japan would not oppose the export of 3,000 tons to America.

To this Harada replied that his instructions were as outlined in your # 409[b], (even though this was after the receipt of your # 430[a]), and that he could not say whether Japan would accept this or not but at any rate he would transmit it to Tokyo. Please wire instructions immediately.

Relayed to Berlin.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 996.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 1028

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

October 15, 1941
452.

Ambassador Yoshizawa's departure for his post will be in the middle of November. Minister Uchiyama alone left for his post and arrived at Hanoi on the 13th.

Uchiyama has been ordered to conduct conversations with the Governor General in order to speed up a settlement of the payment question, war expenses, rubber, and general accounting matter which will have a bearing on the negotiations to be held in Vichy in January.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 1029

FROM: Hanoi (Hayashi) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #425.

Secret outside the department. #3 from UCHIYAMA, Consul.

On the afternoon of the 15th, the head of the Department of Public Affairs called on me in regard to a very grave incident which just occurred. For some time past the Japanese army has been landing troops at Haiphong and heading toward Shibo and (Seidj?). On the basis of the NISHIHARA–MARUTAN agreement, there is no objection to this.

But on the 15th, Lt. Col. HAYASHI wished to quarter his troops at Dapuko near the town of Bachmai, a very important military center since French Indo-China has troops and ammunition stationed there. He presented a letter saying that if his request was refused, he would seize the barracks at Hanoi, but the letter was withdrawn on the order of Lt. Gen. IIDA, who said that sending troops into Hanoi would be contrary to the NISHIHARA–MARUTAN agreement.

By withdrawing the letter, HAYASHI closed the incident, but the Governor-General specially requested that we send you the facts of the case. When Lt. Col. HAYASHI, who was temporarily in charge in the absence of the Colonel, was asked to repeat his standpoint he replied that he was fully qualified to represent our mission, that he was connected with our local garrison, that until Ambassador YOSHIZAWA assumed office full responsibility rested on him, and, therefore, he was in the position of Japan's representative. Moreover, HAYASHI said he had had a direct promise from (French Indo-China military authorities?) that our troops would be quartered at Dapuko.

However, Col. JUAN, the present commanding colonel, maintained that French Indo-China could not permit HAYASHI to use their barracks at Dapuko for Japanese troops and denied that the above promise was anything but an offer for houses in the neighborhood. There was a long, heated argument as to the exact meaning of the above note.

Trans. 10–22–41

No. 1030

FROM: Hanoi (Hayashi) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #428.

Secret outside the Department. Re the last part of my #425[a]. #6 from Minister UCHIYAMA.

I called on the Governor-General and elaborated on the gist of your instructions contained in #9, and I proceeded by saying that although this question is at present being negotiated at Vichy, I had come in response to a special instruction from my government to carry on parallel negotiations here for the purpose of speeding the settlement, and asked that the matter be settled at once. In reply to this, he said, "Since this question is, as you have just said, being negotiated in France, I am not in a position to give you an immediate reply. It goes without saying that French Indo-China needs to maintain a close relation with Japan economically. As you well know, we have carried out the terms of the Japan-French Indo-China agreement as faithfully as possible. To be sure, recently we did arrange to have certain materials supplied from Shanghai, but it was because the supplies which were to come from Japan were not shipped as promised. We are still waiting for the Japanese authorities to carry out their promise. If, by any chance, there were an instance in which import permits were denied for importation of Japanese merchandise, it was not the result of the Governor-General's intention."

(He then emphatically explained the situation to MARUTAN[b] who was present together with HAYASHI[c].) Then I said that the settlement of the question of payment is a very urgent matter at present, to which he replied that he was quite in agreement regarding that point; that he would like to have me submit our proposal in writing; and that he would reply as soon as possible upon receiving the proposal. (Then when I reminded him of the fact that the French authorities would not hesitate to pay the 66,000,000 ----- of military expenses in gold, the Governor-General turned to MARUTAN with an expression of having heard of this for the first time. What worries them, of course, is not so much the question of how to make the payment, but the possibility of the small-scaled financial structure of French Indo-China being upset by the expenditure of a large sum of money.)

Do you have any objection to my submitting in writing, in compliance with their request, ostensibly a proposal of mine, the method of payment explained in proposal #1 contained in your instructions? Please wire your reply at once. Furthermore, if you deem it advisable, will you please transmit this message to Vichy.

---

[a] See III, 1029.

[b] MARTIN, French Indo-Chinese economic representative.

[c] LT. COL. HAYASHI, stationed in French Indo-China with the Japanese troops.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 1031

FROM: Shanghai — August 2, 1941
TO: Peking, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Teinan, Hankow, Nanking — Circular 671.

(Message to Tokyo # 1425.)

HQ Report.

The Chungking authorities have decided to open a Military Conference for the South West in the city of Kweiyang[a] beginning August 1 and lasting for some few days.

Military representatives have been summoned from each of the following provinces: Kwangtung, Kwangshi, Yunan, Kweichow, Runan, and Szechwan.

PAI CHUNG-HSI[b] has been appointed as chairman; CHEN CHENG[c] and YOKETU[d] have been appointed as ----- chief secretaries.

In this conference it is planned that they will decide upon the strengthening control of military transportation in the South West, the defense of Yunan, Kwangshi and Kwangtung, and in the light of British-Chinese military collaboration they will discuss the establishing of an organization for a general counter offensive. CHIANG will probably attend the Conference once or twice.

Furthermore, with connection to England and the United States, it seems that they have issued invitations for the attendance of specialists from these countries.

Incidentally, at the conclusion of this Conference it seems that they will hold another one, which will be called the North West Military Conference, at the city of Tienshui[e]

Relayed to ----- and Hong Kong.

---

[a] Capital of the Province of Kweichow.
[b] Member of the Central Executive Yuan and Commander-in-Chief of the Ninth Route Army.
[c] Commander-in-Chief of the Eighteenth Route Army.
[d] Kana spelling.
[e] Capital of the Province of Kansu.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 1032

FROM: Shanghai — August 6, 1941
TO: Peking and Tientsin — Circular 692.

(Message to Tokyo # 1460.)

Regarding my # 1425[a].

According to "HQ" the (Chinese) Southwestern Military Conference was formally opened on the 2nd under the leadership of HAKASŪKI (PAI CHUNG-HSI) and the opening ceremonies together with the reading of CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S speech of instructions were completed the first day.

Later HAKASŪKI summoned YŌKETSU, CHŌHAKKEI (CHANG FA KUEI[b]), HEHIGAKU, KOPISHŌ, RIKANKON (LI HAN-HUN[c]), SHŌKOKEI, SAITEIKAI (TSAI TING-KAI[d]), KAYI (HSIA WEI[e]) and others to a conference, and at this meeting it was voted that if a formal request from the British authorities should be received China would send an army of 15,000 men under CHŌHAKKEI (CHANG FA-KUEI[b]) into Burma.

Relayed to -----.

---

[a] See III, 1031.
[b] An Inspector.
[c] Commander of Kwantun Army.
[d] Commander 19th route army.
[e] Commander Kwansi Army.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 1033

FROM: Tokyo — August 6, 1941
TO: Net — Circular 1767.

(Message from Berlin # 1002.)

The following is what was told a staff member of mine by an official of the German Foreign Office as intelligence from a certain German who was sent to Chungking on an intelligence mission to ascertain the present situation there. This man remained there for four or five weeks prior to the middle of June, and he is understood to have returned to Germany by the last plane to this country by way of Siberia.

1. All of the foreigners residing in Chungking have noticed a marked increase in the severity of bombings since the beginning of this year. On one day early in June, the city was bombed three times, and on the last bombing flight over the city the central telegraphic office was hit.

Because the air raid alarm system had stopped operating, between 5,000 and 6,000 died of suffocation (Reuter reported 3,000).

2. Much fear is felt because of the effectiveness of incendiary bombing. On this point, beginning in January, they have started many more fires. The stepping up of incendiary bombing will have a great effect upon the morale of the people.

3. Little or no damage has been done to the general headquarters or the armory. It would seem that the technicians have been made to flee from military air bases, but they are doing their labor off of the airports.

4. They are using the principal air bases as well as reserve bases in the neighborhood. In the event of a bombing, airplanes are sent immediately to these reserve bases.

5. During the latter part of May, American fighter planes, approximately 100, arrived in Chungking and were sent from there directly to the front lines. At the same time, 400 American persons, pilots and members of ground crews, arrived in Chungking (but of these ground crews it is not known how many are pilots in their own right).

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 1034

FROM: Shanghai — August 11, 1941
TO: Net — # 714.

Shanghai to Tokyo # 1498.

(Abstract.)

Secret agent HQ reports to the effect that Chungking plans to build 14 new air bases with the help of America, Britain and Russia. Building to commence in September.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 1035

FROM: San Francisco (Muto) — September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 299.

DANIEL ARNSTEIN, one of the three American experts on transportation who had gone to China in order to improve the roads previously congested, told the following to a newspaper reporter, who, several days ago, returned to America by clipper ship.

"I arrived in Chungking after taking a six-week trip of inspection between Lashio and Yunnanfu. En route there were no repair or gasoline supply stations, and transportation capacity was meager because of a high percentage of trucks broken down as well as all sorts of other reasons. However, pavement of the road had begun, with about 10,000 tons of asphalt already provided for, and 4500 United States made trucks having been distributed. Moreover, a First Lieutenant of the American Army will head a group of 32 American engineers who will have special charge of the task of completing transportation facilities; at the same time, conducting a special system of road police and making many replacements in the methods of wireless communications. This is now being studied and as result of this activity, they have doubled transportation capacities for one month to approximately 30,000 tons."

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 1036

FROM: Tokyo — June 28, 1941
TO: Net — Circular 1348.

(Message to Canton # 111.)

In view of the fact that considerable smuggling of goods intended to assist CHIANG KAI-SHEK seems to be taking place at Macao, will you discuss the matter with both the Army and Navy authorities in your city and have the official who is taking the place of Consul FUKUI in Macao file a strong protest with the local government there requesting strict surveillance of this activity. Will you also refer to my # 233[a] of last year relative to this question.

This matter has already been taken up with the Army and Navy authorities.

Please transmit this message as instructions from this Minister.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 7-24-41

No. 1037

FROM: Canton — August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 318.

To be handled in Government code. Re your # 111[a] and # 126[b].

On the 19th the Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs and the various officers concerned (including Acting-Consul Fukui) assembled in army headquarters as indicated in my separate wire. After agreeing on the text of our representations to Macao with regard to the stopping of pro-enemy activities, the details of which were decided at the conference, they plan next week to have Acting Consul Fukui at Macao (file our protests); but if our representations are rejected, it is understood that we will strengthen the blockade of Macao.

Since the details are in a separate wire, after you have considered them carefully, if you have any suggestions, please send me instructions at once. I have already contacted both the army and navy headquarters.

[a] See III, 1036.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 8-23-41

No. 1038

FROM: Canton — October 1, 1945
TO: Tokyo — # 319.

(To be handled in Government code. Strictly Secret.)

(Separate telegram.)

1. Concerning control of military supplies as well as other materials benefiting the enemy and being shipped into the unoccupied territories:

(a) Banning of shipment into enemy territories by way of unoccupied coastal region centering around Macao, Burma, and Kōshū District of French Indo-China. Also strict control of shipment of all materials other than the above which would benefit the enemy.

(b) Especially the inflow of materials beneficial to the enemy is being effected by smuggling ships from Macao sailing with full intention of breaking through Japan's anti-Chinese blockade. Therefore, the port of Macao should be watched constantly, and all smuggling stopped.

(c) Japan should cooperate with the Macao Government for the purpose of stopping as well as controlling the following two items. With this purpose in view, the Government of Macao should accord all facilities necessary for cooperating with the personnel and ships belonging to Japanese organizations within the Macao territory and should also be responsible for their protection.

2. They should close the organizations connected with the Chungking regime as well as expel enemy persons whom the Japanese have indicated.

(a) There are espionage organizations of the Chungking regime, and these organizations are working toward creating disorder within the unoccupied territories. The Macao authorities should disband these organizations as they are indicated to it by the Japanese.

(b) These authorities should thoroughly suppress as well as punish members of the enemy firms and transportation companies who have formed themselves into secret societies.

3. A thorough-going suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda, opinions, as well as societies.

(a) They should control anti-Japanese newspapers whether printed in Chinese or in any other language; also opinions, broadcasts, moving pictures, and political movements inimical to the Nanking regime.

(b) Suppression of terroristic activities and refusal of admittance into the country of terroristic persons.

Trans. 8–23–41

No. 1039

FROM: Tokyo — October 13, 1941
TO: Net — Circular 2166.

Lisbon to Tokyo # 194.

I called on the director of the bureau of political affairs of the Foreign Office on other business, and the director told me that on the night of the 16th of September a Portuguese patrol boat at Macao belonging to the Government Office was fired upon without warning by a Japanese military patrol boat. A flag was flown immediately to show that it was a Portuguese vessel, but the firing continued. Fortunately, there were no casualties, but representation was immediately made to ----- and protests were also lodged in Tokyo.

While he had not asked me to call especially for this, he wanted to take this opportunity to acquaint me with the facts -----. As there are matters I need to take up with the Colonial Ministry, please advise me as to the facts of this incident by return dispatch.

Trans. 10–16–41

No. 1040

FROM: Shanghai — August 20, 1941
TO: Net — Cir. #747.

Message to Tokyo #1553.

HQ spy report.

1. The leaders in Enan[a] announced on the 15th that besides TINSYŌU (Ch'en Shao-yu)[b] mentioned in my #1533[c], RINYŌ (Lin Piao)[b], RINSOKAN (Lin T'su-han), RYŪRAKUSHŌ (Lin Po-Chao) and others have decided to leave by air for Moscow on the 24th; and that by taking advantage of the British-American-Soviet Conference, they would bring about a favorable turn in the boundary settlement.

2. TOEICHO (Teng ----- -----) arrived in Hong Kong on the 17th. The reason for his visit was to confer with each faction, and to have them request headquarters to convoke the National Association for Assisting the Administration as promptly as possible, as well as assisting the liaison officials in Chungking in preparation for the Moscow conference.

3. The leaders in Enan sent a wire to Latimore to the effect that it was in favor of the joint negotiations among Britain, America, the Soviet and China; and at the same time said strongly that the demands of the headquarters consisted of none other than for its legitimate existence, recognition of equal treatment for the Communist Army, and for the development of the northwest section. We understand that SHUONRAI (Chou En-lai)[b] also expounded at length to Latimore that the Communist Party's political demands consisted of reorganization of the National Association for Assisting the Administration; partial reorganization of the JŪ. GYŌ Administration Bureau, and abolition of the Right Wing of the Anti-Communist platform.

Relayed to Peking, Nanking, Hsingking and Hong Kong.

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[a] Yunan-Fu, Shensi Province.
[b] Chinese Communist leader.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 8–30–41

No. 1041

FROM: Shanghai — September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #1640.

Re my #1553[a].

HQ reports that he has found out that MAO TSE-TUNG[b] arrived at Hami[c] on August 19th and left on the 25th for Moscow. MAO, it seems, remained for six days in Hami, busying himself with general discussions concerning the future development and expansion of the Chinese Communists, as well as discussions concerning the establishment of better relations between the Nationalists and Communists. His business in Moscow concerns a complete compromise on all problems between the Nationalists and the Reds, together with the equipment and instruction of the Communist forces. MAO is planning to expand both the area and activities of the Communists and to work out a concrete joint policy between the Chinese and

Soviet Red forces. It appears that in Moscow he plans to work out the details of future anti-Japanese strategy and the new and greater role to be played therein by the Communists.

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[a] See III, 1040.
[b] Chinese Communist Leader.
[c] Town in E. Sinkiang, China.

Trans. 9–26–41

No. 1042

FROM: Tokyo — September 1, 1941
TO: Hsinking, Nanking & Shanghai — Cir. # 1916.

(Message from Hong Kong # 441 on August 30.)

The following is a report made by XYZ.

At a reception held for -----, KŌ EN BAI[a], who is now in Hong Kong, spoke in the following manner regarding the question of joint action.

1. It looks as if joint military action between Soviet Russia and China will be agreed upon at least formally with the aid of Britain and the United States. In reality, however, the anti-Soviet faction made up of such persons as KA Ō KIN[b], RI SŌ JIN[c], and CHIN SEI[d], fearing Soviet Russia, has been following an opportunistic policy of compromising with Japan while advocating lengthy anti-Japanese resistance. (The ----- is not satisfied with this state of affairs ?.)

2. The materials from the United States intended to give aid to China are not reaching in time their destination where they are needed. Take, for instance, airplanes. Although 200 machines have already reached China, since it is taking two days to assemble one plane, it would be more than a year before 200 planes will be used in the war. Consequently, despite the fact that 700 out of 1,000 pilots who have been training in the United States have reached China, they cannot be effectively employed. Furthermore, the best troops of the government are still far behind the front lines and are in ----- and (Fukien ?). They have not yet given up their policy of putting pressure upon the Chinese Communists. Their so-called anti-Japanese counterattack is nothing more than more propaganda. Therefore, nothing will save Chungking but the formation of an anti-Japanese encirclement by Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia which is being brought on by Japan's advance either northward or southward. Even if a war breaks out between Japan and Soviet Russia, most people are of the opinion that it will not benefit -----. Chungking will probably demand as a price for joint action with the Communists the (surrender ?) of ----- in Sinkyō and Outer Mongolia, as well as the 18th Army. It seems that before taking joint action against Japan, Chungking will take steps to attain this objective. However, in view of the fact that the power to strike back at Japan is quite weak, joint action will not be effective.

3. Friction between ----- and ----- is as common as ever. The Chinese Communist Party leaders are afraid that should the Russian capital fall, the Nationalist Party would suddenly increase its pressure against them, and civil war will inevitably ensue. Furthermore, there is a tendency within groups all over China of separation taking place between the Nationalists and the Communists, and since in this Chungking cannot be asked to mediate, there is danger of a split taking place very soon within the government. It being extremely difficult for the

Nationalist Party to unify these conflicting factions, the Chinese political prospect is a matter of deep concern.

[a] HUANG YEN-PEI, an educator.
[b] HO YING-CHIN, member of Central Executive Yuan.
[c] LITSUNG-JEN, Inspector, Chief of 4th Army.
[d] CHEN CHENG, Commander of 18th Army and 14th Division.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 1043

FROM: Shanghai — September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1658.

Message from JK received on the 4th.

It appears that the anti-Communist, pro-German trend is on the increase among the leaders of the Chungking general headquarters and it is understood that they recently adopted the following plans:

1. To spread propaganda to the effect that the subversive activities of the Chinese Communists render the continuation of resistance impossible and thus to increase the atmosphere favoring their schemes.
2. To unify the various armies and to increase the power of the purely Nationalist forces.
3. As far as diplomacy is concerned, to make it appear that they are in line with England and the United States, but in the meantime to seal amicable relations with Germany and Italy on the sly.
4. TANG EN-PO's main forces are in the Funiu-Shan ----- Tai Betsu San area[a]. TANG, as a Commander in name only, will lead the forces of LI PIN HSIEN[b] in an attack on the Indo-Chinese troops.

[a] In Honan Province.
[b] Commander of forces between Anhwei and Hankow.

Trans. 9-26-41

No. 1044

FROM: Shanghai — September 12, 1941
TO: Peking — Cir. # 814.

Message to Tokyo # 1702.

According to HQ, toward the end of September CHIANG KAI SHEK is planning to formally establish in Kunming military headquarters for southwestern territories and to appoint KA O KIN[a] as Commander in Chief and then to transfer to Kansi[f] ----- and Yunnan the 140,000 men of the army under the command of RYU JI TAN.[b] However, HAKU SU KI[c], RI SAI SIN[d] and others are joining hands with RI KAN KON[e] and are persuading the Keietsu commanders to commence a southward movement. Especially RI SAI SIN on the 3rd and the 6th of September emphatically pointed out to CHIANG KAI SHEK that the Keietsu commanders were opposed to the southward move of the Central Army and urged that the Keietsu forces be per-

mitted to return from Szechwan, Hupeh, Honan, Hunan and Kwangsi and thus strengthen the defenses in the southwest. As a result of all this, it is said that CHIANG's plan of establishing the military headquarters had ended in a failure. CHIANG then sent a telegram summoning KA Ō KIN, who was staying in Kunming, and after watching developments for eight days, telegraphed HAKU SŪ KI in Kunming to organize the military headquarters instead of KA; however, HAKU replied by wire to the effect that he would like to have CHIANG himself go to the southwest and give his final word as to how the headquarters should be established.

Relayed to Nanking and Peking.

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[a]HO YING-CHIN, Member of Central Executive Yuan.
[b]LIU TZU-TAN, Commander of Communist 26th Army.
[c]PAI CHUNG-HSI, Commander 9th Route Army, also Member of Central Executive Yuan.
[d]LI CHI-SHEN, Member of Central Executive Yuan, Military Inspector in Charge of Training.
[e]LI HAN-HUN, Commander, 56th Div. (Kwantung forces).
[f]Kana spelling.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: It is not clear what is meant by "Keietsu." The translator's guess is that the word is a designation for the territories beyond Chungking.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 1045

FROM: Tokyo — September 17, 1941
TO: Hsingking — # 599.

(Moscow to Tokyo # 1139.)

Relaying # 1139 from Moscow to Tokyo.

McAvoy, a reporter of the Chicago Times (who arrived here about a month ago via Chungking and Hami) told a member of the staff on the 12th that he had flown from Chungking to Alma Ata via Lanchow and Hami and then taken the train from there, arriving in Moscow about two weeks later. He seemed to think that Soviet aid to Chiang Kai Shek would not amount to much. There appeared to be many Soviet soldiers in Suchow and Lanchow and Hami, and ten Soviet soldiers accompanied him from Suchow and Lanchow to Alma Ata, he reported.

Trans. 9-24-41

No. 1046

FROM: Tokyo — September 26, 1941
TO: Shanghai — # 987.

(Secret outside the Department.)

According to reliable information, a group of 120 Air Corps officers of the Chungking Government sailed for the United States on board the President Pierce which left your port on September 22. Please send me details regarding this matter.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 1047

FROM: Nanking — September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #677.

(Strictly secret.)

On the 25th, CHOU FUO-HAI[a] told HIDAKA[b] that in Hong Kong the other day ORIEN YUNG-MING told him the following:

Before allowing itself to be wheedled into a peace by the United States, Chungking wishes to be sure that it will be a sincere, complete, and lasting peace. It seems that CHIEN sent CHIANG KAI-SHEK recommendations that he make peace, and CHIANG replied that he would, as a matter of fact, welcome the cessation of hostilities but he could not be certain of making a good peace because Japan is so untrustworthy; that even if an agreement were entered into, after advancing either south or north and strengthening her international position, Japan would only come back again and bomb Chungking some more; that this is, as a matter of fact, her *arriere pensee*; that an understanding between Japan and the United States is impossible because opinion is so divided in Japan; that SADAO ARAKI, TEIICHI SUZUKI, as well as SEIGO NAKANO are making incendiary statements liable to produce a governmental upheaval; that by autumn Germany will do her very level best to take Moscow, because if winter sets in before the fall of the Soviet capital, it will be a cold, hard time for the Nazis, and in the meantime England and the United States will be growing stronger and stronger; that, of course, Japan realizes that Germany will act with celerity and intends to keep pace with her.

CHIEN continued, "About October 30th I am going to Chungking and again warn CHIANG, but I don't expect to get any results. In any case, if you have anything you want to tell him, please let me know. The other day CHOU TSUO-MIN came to Shanghai from Hong Kong, and he said that the United States is not telling the Chinese Ambassador HU-SHIH anything about the negotiations supposed to be going on between Japan and the United States. SOONG TSU-WEN, of course, should be in a position to know the facts, but his correspondence with CHIANG would lead you to believe that he is in complete ignorance. Thus, Chungking seems to be utterly in the dark. The other day a rumor was going the rounds in Chungking to the effect that the United States was going to be satisfied with the evacuation of Japanese troops from Honan only and that she would let the Japanese forces remain in Hopei. CHIANG grew quite belligerent and went so far as to make a statement that he captured Lang Chow September 18."

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[a] Minister of Finance and Police.
[b] Commercial Attaché in Shanghai.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 1048

FROM: Peking — September 27, 1941
TO: China Net — Cir. #494.

Peking to Tokyo #637.

Confidential within the Ministry.

From the Ambassador to the Foreign Minister.

On the 27th, Harada, in a casual conversation with Yang Yu-hsun, the Director of the National Socialist Party, learned that Lu Ting-kuei, the Shanghai Secretary of the party, had

gone to Hong Kong to explain the purposes of the National Socialist Party to a select group there, and to obtain the consent of party leaders there to establish contact with Chang Chun-li. It is rumored that a meeting of the party will be held in the near future, probably during October. It would be unfortunate if the party's reputation were to be impaired.

The "Four Chang Movement" (Chang Chun-li, Chang Po-ling, Chang Chun, and Chang Li-luan) had been advocating a peace on all fronts. Since the death of Chang Li-luan it is evident that the three Changs will have to carry on for the sake of the party's future.

The substance of this message has been repeated to Shanghai. Please repeat to Hong Kong.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 1049

FROM: Tokyo — September 30, 1941
TO: Nanking and Shanghai — Cir. # 2097.

(Message from Rangoon # 357.)

The following intelligences have recently been given to me by a Chinese who has come here after making investigations on the spot.

1. By virture of the disastrous bombing by Japanese planes on August 15, all ordinary warehouses belonging to the Southwest Development Company, 38 -----, and 100-odd trucks were destroyed by fire; 67 (or 87) persons were killed (principally Burmese).

2. Between Kakan[a] and Wanten[a] there are approximately 100,000 troops of the central forces. The greater portion of these are stationed in -----; 4,000 are soldiers.

3. In that city a detachment of the 6th Armored Division of the central Chinese forces is stationed. Their motor equipment is being painted yellow, similar to the color of the Burmese armored vehicles. In addition there are a number of private cars belonging to British and American military personnel.

4. During the middle of August, Chinese troops stationed along the Tenmen route moved to Kun--- inside Burmese territory (this town is at the point where the Tenman Railroad crosses the border).

5. Though a large number of Chinese troops are stationed along the route extending 97 (kilometers ?) from Lashio[b], it is difficult at a glance to tell them from Burmese troops, as they wear hats similar to those worn by native Burmese troops.

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[a] Kana spelling.
[b] Town near the Burmese-Chinese border.

Trans. 10-24-41

No. 1050

FROM: Canton — October 2, 1941
TO: Shanghai, Peking — Cir. # 206.

Message to Tokyo # 388.

Secret. Secondary importance.

According to secret spy reports the Chungking government will prohibit, next Spring, the circulation of the old legal tender now circulating. The printing in the United States of new

paper currency ordered March this year is now finished and will be transported by the Burma route before the end of the year. It is planned that the importation of this money into the occupied districts will be strictly prohibited. The veracity of this report has not been ascertained.

Relayed to Shanghai, Hong Kong, Peking.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 1051

FROM: Shanghai — October 4, 1941
TO: Net — Cir. #670.

Message to Tokyo #1826.

Re my #1746[a].

HQ has given the following report:

At the conference between the Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party held at Lanchow, the Communist Party submitted a demand for a partial reorganization of the government and of the Council for Political Assistance; payment of the unpaid portion of military stipends; cessation of anti-Communist activities; and the formation of a national united front. After a great deal of discussion, it was generally agreed that in order to effect a joint policy between the Communists and the Nationalists in every line, they should secure a guarantee from the three countries of Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia. Upon reaching this decision, the conference was called off. On the 29th, LATTIMORE returned to Chungking to report the conference to CHIANG, and at the same time requested as the next step in this direction that Britain, the United States, and Soviet Russia be asked to send representatives as guarantors, and then he sounded out the views of the various parties and factions regarding greater solidarity and reorganization of the Council for Political Assistance. It was also agreed that the two parties should meet in a formal conference at Sian by the middle of December at the latest, and that, in preparation for this, LATTIMORE, CHANG CHUNG[b], CHANG TZU-CHUNG[c], WANG ----- -----, and HEN PU-LEI[d], respectively, work toward establishing an understanding with various party factions. With this purpose in mind, LATTIMORE went to Hankow on Sept. 26. It is understood that FENG YU-SIANG[e], HU TSUNG-MAN[f], and ----- ----- ----- are still in Lanchow discussing appropriate means for lessening antagonism as well as preventing conflicts between the Communist party on one hand and the Nationalist party on the other.

Relayed to Nanking, -----, Hsinking, and Hong Kong.

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[a] Not available.
[b] Member, Central Executive Yuan; Chief of the Military Administration.
[c] Commander of the 38th Division.
[d] Inspector.
[e] Member Central Executive Yuan; Member Military Council.
[f] Commander of the 1st Division.

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 1052

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Nanking

October 13, 1941
343.

Shanghai to Tokyo as # 1873.

According to a Chungking dispatch on the 9th, Lattimore twice a week gets away from Soong Mai-ling and other close associates, and holds regular conferences with Chiang Kai-shek, and it seems that he is telling Chiang that there is no likelihood of the recent Japan-American conversations resulting in any real understanding between Japan and America, and that, therefore, Chungking should stiffen their ----- in the northeast, and at the same time conclude a military alliance between the Soviet and China.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 1053

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Net

October 4, 1941
Cir. # 671.

Message to Tokyo # 1827.

Re my # 1522[a] and your Circular # 1666[b].

HQ told a member of my staff the following: The secret of this temporary truce is that negotiations are going on with Soviet officials in Moscow. On Sept. 21, CHIANG KAI-SHEK sent STALIN a letter suggesting a joint defense of Inner and Outer Mongolia and the strengthening of the northwestern forces under the leadership of the Red Army. CHIANG suggested a joint policy with Moscow on these questions and showed great zeal ----- ----- -----. On Sept. 23, the Chungking (*Diplomatic Gazette ?*), under orders from CHIANG, was about to publish an editorial advocating putting into effect in Moscow some schemes to use the Anglo-American-Soviet meetings in Moscow to worsen and disrupt Japanese-Soviet relations and to turn the three nations all on Japan. Just before publication, however, Soviet Ambassador PA[c] discovered this and informed them that editorials like this which clearly portray the real situation between China and the Soviet are quite inopportune under the present circumstances, and judging from the fact that this editorial has so far never appeared, it may be assumed that conditions within the Soviet are in a terrible state of confusion.

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[a] Which gives the amounts of oil which arrived in Shanghai at the end of July.

[b] Which instructs Singapore, Batavia and Bangkok to burn certain cryptographic materials used jointly by the three ministries.

[c] PANYUSHUKIN, Russian Ambassador to Chungking.

Trans. 10-8-41

No. 1054

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

October 2, 1941
622.

(Part 1 of 3.)

1. According to an explanation which KING HSIANG-HSI made in April of this year to the Permanent Committee for Administrative Assistance regarding the financial situation, al-

though budgeted expenditures amounted to 6,600,000,000, actually it is expected to be 15,000,000,000, due to rise in commodity prices. I understand that in order to pay for this, except for the 500,000,000 which will be collected as revenue and the 1,500,000,000 which is the Chinese equivalent of credits from Britain and the United States, there is no other source but what may be had from the sale of bonds. However, judging from past experiences, the purchase of bonds by the people would not exceed 500,000,000 at best. The remaining 12,000,000,000 would have to be paid by the banks. This, in the long run, means the printing of additional money (the amount issued at present, September, is 15,000,000,000, but this is expected to increase to 20,000,000,000 by the end of the year. Funds from Shanghai amount at present to about 6,000,000,000 or 7,000,000,000). Unless emergency funds can be obtained in the form of foreign loans, it is expected that the country will go bankrupt in ten months. However, since then, for the purpose of coping with the situation, the people have been encouraged to purchase wartime bonds. This did not save the situation. As a result, the following measures are either being prepared or put into effect:

(1) The transference of the finances of the CHIANG regime to the capital (this is to be carried out from October; thereafter, all expenses in the province will be met by revenue from the provinces only).

(2) The collection by the Chungking Government of rice revenue and the payment in kind of rice revenue at the ratio of one yuan to one "sito".[a] Half of the revenue will consist of the unhulled rice. This will go into effect from September 16.

(3) Issuing of *ryō shoku koken*[b] (regarding this, the Government will issue an order on September 4 with 30,000,000 goku of stored rice as a basis. The purchase is to be made in installments during a period of five years, 30% by means of legal tender and 70% by means of "koken").

(4) The establishment of government monopolies (sales monopolies of tea, salt, wine, tobacco, sugar, and matches are being planned).

(5) Absorption of funds from Shanghai and Hong Kong (the tendency at present is for funds to blow back from the interior). CHIANG KAI-SHEK is, as ever, having economic experts endeavor to rebuild the financial structure, but so far no way has been found. Furthermore, due to the fact that Gishō[c] on the Yangtze-kiang has been wrested from them and that principal ports have either been taken or blockaded by the Japanese forces and that while the Burma route is being used principally for transportation of military supplies, and other routes are scattered, China is experiencing a steady shortage of materials. Along with the coming of the dangerous inflation already referred to, there was a rise in price in March of this year of rice to the extend of 13 times; wheat, sugar and salt 10 times; tea and cotton 18 times; coal 31 times; and charcoal 45 times. More recently it has become necessary to pay 3 yuan for a bowl of noodles, 6 yuan for one candle, 300 yuan for a pair of leather shoes, and 500 yuan for monthly living expense of a single person, the cost of electric current alone being 250 yuan.

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[a] A unit of measure.

[b] Food Storage Certificates (?).

[c] Ichang.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 1055

FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Washington #622.

(Part 2 of 3.)

2. Now, regarding what is taking place behind the so-called anti-Japanese front: The conflict between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party which arose at the time of the dispatching of a punitive force against the invaders of Kwangnan-fu is now enjoying an interlude of calm due to a policy of temporary compromise followed by the Chungking authorities who are afraid of displeasing the United States and due also to the softening of demands on the part of the Communist Party since the opening of the war between Germany and Russia. However, it does not follow that the Chinese Communist Party has given up the policy of provoking the Nationalist Party into opposing Japan and thereby bringing about that party's annihilation. Furthermore, the refusal of the Communist armies to participate in the Chūgen[a] campaign caused a great deal of anti-Communist indignation among the officers of the central forces. Thus, the friction between the two parties still continues; only, so far it has not manifested itself outwardly. On the other hand, the equipment of the government forces is gradually deteriorating, and all along the line the fighters are beginning to lose their fighting spirit. Even within the regime itself in Chungking there have been recently signs of resurgence of sentiments, among the political affiliates as well as the factions in power, against CHIANG and the Nationalist Party. There has been an increase of those who are actively working toward acquisition of power, to be enjoyed after the establishment of peace, by their respective factions. Therefore, once the anti-Japanese campaign ceases, it goes without saying the bitter struggle between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party will come out to the surface (according to reliable information, recently MAO TSE-TUNG is understood to have admitted that since a complete joint action between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party would mean that the former would have to give recognition to the policy of the latter, it would result in depriving the Communist Party of its *raison d'etre*; that, therefore, the Communist Party, for the sake of overthrowing the Nationalist Party as well as for the sake of the growth of itself, would never take joint action with the Nationalist Party and that since nothing could be gained by a conflict between the two so long as the present international situation obtains, the relation now existing between the two is that of standing side by side without touching each other). Centering around the struggle within the Nationalist Party's ----- ----- ----- or for the establishment of a republican system, opposition as well as active conflicts between the various factions and parties on the one hand and between the provincial leaders and the central government on the other are ever sharpening. As economic reconstruction becomes increasingly difficult, there is danger of China again becoming a crucible of civil strife. The present trend is for the causes of this danger gaining both in intensity and number with the prolongation of the China incident. Reports from various sources point out that CHIANG KAI-SHEK himself is very profoundly concerned over this danger.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 1056

FROM: Tokyo October 2, 1941
TO: Washington #622.

(Part 3 of 3.)

3. As regards peace between China and Japan, the Communist Party has, of course, been opposing it. However, even ----- and the faction in favor of aggressive action who, it was rumored, were strongly advocating resistance to Japan, have come in the last several months to regard opposition to the Communists as the key to open the door of peace and, furthermore, are said to have expressed their intention of grabbing this very key. As it may be seen from all this, there is on the part of the government as well as of the people a strong desire for an immediate restoration of peace. However, due to the fact that so much is still being said outwardly in favor of continued resistance, no one mentions peace. The members of the group which planned to bring about peace with Japan have found their way blocked by recognition accorded the Nanking Government and are now at a loss as to what they should do. In Shanghai there were recently serious-minded persons who, while keeping secretly in touch with Chungking, were planning on starting a movement for peace (this movement is one of neutral color, taking sides neither with CHIANG KAI-SHEK nor with WANG CHING-WEI). Furthermore, there are some influential members of the Chungking regime who send representatives to Shanghai and in strict secrecy seek to establish direct connection with the Japanese (they are, of course, motivated also by the desire to take the initiative in the seemingly approaching peace and thereby to bring success to whatever faction they represent).

As soon as the talk of Japanese-American negotiations began to be heard, the attention as well as the expectations of the people at large became riveted chiefly on the negotiations. In fact, CHIANG himself had once remarked that he will was willing to work toward reconciliation and peace if only the United States would speak one word in favor of such a move (this information is of the strictest secrecy and is based upon a confidential intelligence given by one who had a hand in the Hong Kong campaign last year). That he made such a statement may be explained by the fact that suffering among the people at large after four years of war is becoming, in many ways, unendurable; that he sees the need of eliminating as soon as possible the various causes of civil strife which I have dealt with above, and that he is in need, because he had been advocating a fight to the finish, of some good pretext for opening peace negotiations. He, no doubt, believes that one word from the United States, who is a friend of both Japan and China, would be most propitious. The situation in China is such that, should the war continue, the people would have to suffer increasingly and while there is no hope of victory, she would have to ask Japan to keep her troops in the country in case civil strife breaks out after the war. Under the circumstances, therefore, it is only natural that the Chinese are prayerfully watching the progress of the Japanese-American negotiations. In other words, in the anti-Japanese camp within the Chungking regime and in the morale of the people, the symptoms characteristic of the final stage of war have come to manifest themselves. (The Chungking authorities are putting forth ostensibly self-confident propaganda in connection with the Japanese-American negotiations. This is because they, not knowing the nature of the negotiations, are anxious, wondering if the United States is not going to sell them out; and so it would be wrong to interpret this attitude on their part as one of confidence based on accurate knowledge of facts.)

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 1057

FROM: Tokyo October 6, 1941
TO: Washington #638.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Strictly Secret.

The following are some points which I think would be of interest to you in connection with my #622[a]. They were taken from an explanation of the internal condition of the Chungking forces based upon Chungking messages intercepted by the army headquarters, materiels collected from surrendered troops, and accounts given by prisoners—an explanation which the Chief of Staff of the army made on the occasion of the consulor conference held in Nanking on Sept. 24th. (I would like to have this information kept secret outside the department because of its nature.)

1. The winter offensive of last year failed. The Chungking Government has been calling the present phase of the subsequent period the 4th period for preparations and training for the coming spring offensive. For this reason, they have not staged any large scale offensive, but have so far carried on special strategy war (use of strategy, propaganda and policy of creating confusion behind the lines) and partisan wars. It appears that recently their preparations have approached completion, for CHIANG KAI SHEK has issued an order to commence partisan warfare at five points on each sectional front (the entire front is divided into 11 sectional fronts). This, he seems to have done partly because he wanted to find out the strength of the Japanese army and the distribution of its forces on the presumption that transference of troops northward and southward had been effected because of the recent international situation, and partly because he wanted to restrain Japanese-American negotiations. The Chungking General Staff had definitely stated that by driving back the Japanese army at this time CHIANG KAI SHEK will prove the truth of the statement he had made to the United States (CHIANG's broadcast, made on the anniversary of the Manchurian incident, regarding the restoration of Manchuria and the expectation of American aid).

2. The Chungking army consists at present of 292 divisions (of these, 200 are under direct control of CHIANG KAI SHEK). Although in the past each division had 13,000 men; 3,000 rifles, 54 heavy machine guns; 162 light machine guns; and 36 pieces of field artillery, recent investigations made by the Japanese army showed that both the manpower and the equipment have declined to about 70 or 80%. The deterioration of the qualifications of the officers, especially, based on an examination of 2500 prisoners, showed that there are among them as many as 500 who had not finished primary education, and only 62 who were graduates of colleges.

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[a] See III, 1054–1056.

Trans. 10–7–41

No. 1058

FROM: Tokyo October 6, 1941
TO: Washington #638.

(Part 2 of 2.)

It also showed that there were many new recruits (the Chinese find it necessary to supply annually 1,500,000 recruits to replenish the 200 divisions of the first line). In this sense their

fighting power is thought to have greatly declined. According to documents taken from surrendered forces, every front line commander has been giving false reports following CHIANG KAI SHEK's issuing his order for advance. They stick firmly to their respective positions and their reports regarding the number of attacks and the amount of damage inflicted upon the Japanese army are mostly exaggerated to a point beyond one's imagination. Taking various information together, it is clear that no matter what CHIANG KAI SHEK does, the officers and soldiers on the front line refuse to obey his orders; they seem to be suffering, so to speak, from hardening of the arteries.

3. 16,200 prisoners were asked why they were not satisfied with ----- ----- of resistance. As a result, it was found that

(1) Those who found it difficult ----- ----- their pay were most numerous.

(2) Those who replied that the longer they continue to resist Japan the more their footing will be infringed upon by the Communist army came next.

I understand that both the officers and soldiers on the front are debating whether it is better to continue the war of resistance or to make peace. It is said that discussion in the trenches of the war and peace question was unheard of formerly.

Furthermore, there is another thing that deserves special attention and that is that of late there has been an increase of forces surrendering to the Nanking regime. In the past, generally speaking, those who surrendered were mostly miscellaneous forces who had formerly been bandits; but recently there has been a considerable number of the regular troops of the Chungking army which have surrendered (these troops were not those under direct command of CHIANG KAI SHEK, but nonetheless they are those who have been formally registered as Chungking forces). In fact, there was an instance in which an entire battalion, from the Commander down, changed sides.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 1059

FROM: Tokyo — October 7, 1941
TO: Nanking & Shanghai — # 2128.

(Circular.) (Message from Hong Kong # 489 dated Oct. 6.)

Maj. Gen. JOHN MAGRUDER, the head of the United States Army Commission to China and six members arrived at Hong Kong on the 5th from Manila.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 1060

FROM: Tokyo — October 4, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 446.

Message from Hong Kong # 487.

Re # 1813[a] from Shanghai to the Minister.

The Niemeier and Cochran group will arrive here from Manila on the 7th (4th?). HALL-PATCH[b], CHEN KUANG-FU[c], PEI TSU-YI and SEKI TOKU-SHO[d] are already here and will soon be joined by FOX[e], who is coming from Chungking. Together with the currency

stabilization commission, they will begin with the subject of Chinese currency and figure out ways and means of bolstering Chungking's finances.

Relayed to ----- and Canton.

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[a] Not available.

[b] Finance Counselor at British Embassy, accompanying DUFF-COOPER's mission to Shanghai.

[c] Chinese banker, formerly special envoy of Chungking Government to the United States.

[d] Kana spelling.

[e] American financial advisor to CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

Trans. 10-18-41

No. 1061

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Net

October 15, 1941
Cir. # 2176.

(Message from Hong Kong # 500 on the 14th.)

1. MAGRUDER and his party flew to Chungking on the 9th, taking together information gathered from various sources, I have the following:

The total number of representatives is 30 (of which 13 have already arrived). The advance group arrived about the middle of September and have completed discussion of their itinerary with the Chungking government. After making an observation tour in many parts of China, the leaders will remain in Chungking, and the others will stay at the various fronts for a considerable length of time. They will keep in close touch with Chungking and at the same time advise their home government of practicable methods of military assistance in keeping with the actual situation. In preparation for a possible crisis, they will also study the arms as well as the tactics used by the Japanese army. It seems that they would also apply themselves to improving air fields, especially those in the southwest.

2. According to what HYŌ SI CHŪ[a] heard from TŌ KEN KŌ[a], who had come as far as Hong Kong to meet the party, representatives will be dispatched to Chungking on September 30 also from Soviet Russia in order to discuss with MAGRUDER and with the Chungking government the question of using the Chungking forces in the event Japan attacks Soviet Russia. Furthermore, according to U. S. "PA", the United States had toward the end of September ----- ----- the Chungking government ----- ----- ----- ----- -----. ----- At the request of CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Ō SHŌ TEI[b], accompanied by two military men, went to the Philippines early in October (the story of HO YING-CHIN[c] having gone to the Philippines must be a mistaken telegraphic version of this fact). The purpose of this trip was to discuss with the British and American authorities both facts and methods of military cooperation. While the United States is, of course, earnestly hoping that the Japanese-American negotiations would be a success, they are, at the same time, proceeding with fairly frank discussions with the Chungking government for military cooperation to be effected in case of emergency.

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[a] Kana spelling.

[b] Former Vice-Chief of Foreign Relations.

[c] Official of the Military Committee of the Nationalist government; member of Central Executive Yuan.

Trans. 10-18-41

No. 1062

FROM: Tokyo — October 10, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 463.

Message from Hong Kong as # 495.

Re my # 494[a].

According to confidential reports, GRADY's[b] activities are in the main as stated in the newspapers and the United States is investigating methods of obtaining raw materials for military purposes.

In addition to being transported along the Tumen Route, such materials as tungsten and hog bristles are being delivered secretly to Hong Kong by airplane. The United States is now figuring on sending over large transport planes (4 to 7 ton capacity) to increase the traffic in this sort of material.

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[a] Not available.
[b] U.S. economic expert and Presidential advisor. Now enroute to U.S. from the Far East.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 1063

FROM: Shanghai — October 8, 1951
TO: Nanking — Circular # 878.

Message to Tokyo # 1847.

According to the "China Press", October 8th, a member of the crew of the "Coolidge" which arrived here yesterday from (-----) told that on the way from Manila to (-----)[a] they were convoyed by a cruiser and an armed tanker and that at (-----)[a] they unloaded 54 tanks and 2400 ----- men.

In regard to the above, a United Press representative told a member of our office that the local American naval authorities had prohibited publication of this report but that it was probably correct.

Now, as a result of inquiries made here on the 7th, there is a report that American ships sailing from their home to Siberia will soon be armed by the American naval authorities. It is said that each ship's armament will consist of four 14-centimetre guns, and a crew of one Lieutenant and twenty-four sailors.

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[a] These two appear to be the same places.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 1064

FROM: Tokyo — October 11, 1941
TO: Peking, Nanking, Shanghai and Canton — Circular # 2161.

From Hong Kong as # 497 on the 10th.

COCHRAN, American Representative, and NIEMEYER, British representative, to the British-American-Chinese official conference to be held here, together with Major GEORGE and two other members of the American military mission, have arrived here by clipper from Manila on the 9th.

Trans. 10–24–41

No. 1065

FROM: Hong Kong — October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 496.

Tokyo Circular # 2160.

Re my # 487[a].

According to a spy report, the purpose of this visit is to consider a loan of 200,000,000 American dollars to Chungking in order to bolster CHIANG's finances. The troops will investigate Chungking's financial situation and have an English and American member who are connected with treaties serve as financial advisors for Chungking.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 1066

FROM: Peking — October 8, 1941
TO: Hsinking — # 17.

Strictly secret.

Re your # 24 to Commercial Attaché HANAWA[a].

In order to cope with the influences in Kansu and Ningho of Soviet Russia, the Chinese Communist Party, and Chungking, since last year this office has been giving secret directions to WATANABE and have had him contact BA TEI KEN (an influential leader of the Mohammedans in the northwestern area). With this man as the central figure we have been maneuvering for 3 years with a view of having him take the lead in establishing an independent Mohammedan area embracing all the Mohammedans in these provinces. In order to defray the expense of this campaign, WATANABE has been collecting contributions from patrons. IWATA's remittance was made for the same purpose. Although this campaign has been carried on in conjunction with the military authorities, insofar as such connection seemed necessary, it is being continued, as a matter of principle, in strict secrecy; therefore, I would like to have you keep the content of this message to yourself.

I would appreciate your giving special consideration to have the funds in question sent at once.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-10-41

No. 1067

FROM: Peking
TO: Nanking

October 8, 1941
522 (Circular).

(Message to Tokyo # 665.)

On the 7th YŌ IKU JUN confidentially told HARADA the following:

The attack on -----, having secured the Lunghai Railway, making it the border line between North and Central China, has considerably contributed to strengthening North China both militarily and politically. It furthermore has caused the people of Hopen to have a greater inclination toward depending on Japan. The capture of Ting-Chow,[a] made simultaneously with the attack of Changsha, has given an unmeasurable blow to Chungking. However, to withdraw immediately after taking Changsha would not be wise since it would give the Chungking Government material for propaganda. I would like to have the Japanese authorities consider this. Furthermore, these two attacks, bringing about as they are confusion on the part of Chungking, go a long way towards ushering in sentiment in favor of peace along the entire front.

---

[a] In Hopeh.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 1068

FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

August 8, 1941
548.

According to the Finance Bureau customs taxes on salt and sugar are going to have to be paid in new bank notes. This order will be announced on the 15th to take effect on September 1, however, there will be no objection to first talking it over with the Chinese. Besides, since the Japanese government has been urging this move right along there is no reason to believe that it will offer any objections.

Furthermore, a committee meeting to discuss currency policy in connection with the above will be called sometime after the 10th. The principle object will be to ----- (garbled).

Relay to -----.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 1069

FROM: Nanking — August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #11 (*1?*).

-----.

Re #808[a] addressed to the Minister from Shanghai.

I think the following two points should be taken into consideration—although you may have already thought of them—regarding the view that the duties connected with the policy toward the concessions should be considered as auxiliary duties to be rendered in connection with the People's Government and be carried on by our officials in China. These points are:

(1) As you already know, these auxiliary duties are understood officially as those which should be supervised by the Prime Minister in accordance with clause #6 in the Rules and Regulations of the East Asia Reconstruction Bureau. (Please refer to the instructions addressed to Ambassador ABE). So long as these rules and regulations are to be understood in the same light as they have hitherto been understood, even after the recognition of the People's Government, (please refer to the history leading up to the establishment of the Government) any attempt to give an interpretation differing from the traditional one may be justifiable from the standpoint of legal theory, but from the standpoint of actually executing a policy, not permissible. At least such a claim may be considered admissible. Has it been definitely decided by you that the auxiliary duties so called should be considered, since the recognition of the People's Government, as being under the supervision of the Foreign Minister? If it is not so, does not the position set forth in your caption message have the danger of allowing too broad a view as to the part which the East Asia Reconstruction Bureau should play with regard to the policy toward the concessions?

Needless to say, depending on the nature of the question involved, the policy to be followed by the People's Government toward the concessions consists, on the one hand, of those measures in the pursuance of which the People's Government should at least outwardly take the initiative and, on the other hand, of those measures which we alone should pursue according to our own judgment. While the former may be considered to be the so-called auxiliary duties, the latter are, of course, not to be so construed. Although I have no special objection to the opinion you expressed toward the end of your caption telegram, inasmuch as this question is something which we should bear in mind while dealing with the concession problem in the future, I would appreciate your giving us an explanation of the central authorities regarding it.

Relayed to Shanghai.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-18-41

No. 1070

FROM: Tokyo — August 14, 1941
TO: Nanking — No number.

Re your official code telegram sent on the 13th concerning Ambassador HONDA.

The said Ambassador has on several occasions discussed with me certain matters saying that there is a rumor in connection with the reorganization of the people's government to the effect that the position of the said Ambassador will be changed. What he said is in short this:

He believes that he could be more useful to the people's government if he were allowed to serve in China because of the fact that he still maintains close relations with various fields to the development of which he has been contributing. For this reason he does not wish to be removed. He has explained to me his wishes with regard to the situation in various parts of South China and discussed the problem with me. Inasmuch as it is the fact that he holds a position in Japan which cannot be easily filled by another man, I told him that when I returned to my post in China, I will discuss the matter thoroughly with WANG and request him to reconsider. I also advised him not to start agitating ----- in another field. If in WANG's opinion, for the sake of the best policy to be followed with regard to the people's government, the matter is beyond reconsideration, it is a different matter; but if otherwise, I would like to have you explain to him what I have set forth above and request him to consider the Ambassador's continuing in his present position.

Trans. 8-16-41

No. 1071

FROM: Nanking — August 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Re your Government Code telegram sent in the afternoon of the 14th to Ambassador HONDA.

The evening of the 14th when ----- ----- I called on WANG, I explained to him in detail what you had wired me. WANG said that since ----- ----- is a reorganization of the administrative set-up and changes in the personnel accompany it, the transfer of members in the Foreign Office will not, of course, ----- ----- until after definite replies have been received from prospective successors. He said further that, since he had informed me briefly by telegraph, he presumed that the matter would be discussed between me and Ambassador HONDA and that it would be well for me to explain by wire the situation being faced within the People's Government and have him accept the fact by informing him that, for the sake of the highest policy of the People's Government, it cannot be helped. Then, HIDAKA attempted to sound out WANG's real intention by asking if he were right in understanding that WANG will carry out his plan of transfer as originally planned; whereupon WANG replied that, regrettable as it is, for reasons given above he ----- ----- despite Ambassador HONDA's wishes.

Trans. 8-18-41

No. 1072

FROM: Tokyo — August 16, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 360.

Message to Shanghai # 832.

Strictly Secret.

Secretary NISHIDA of the Embassy at Nanking, who is carrying the code to the various offices in the Central China area, sails from Kobe on the 18th aboard the Yawata Maru. Please handle inspection when he arrives.

I want him to stop over for two or three days in order to explain the use of this code to the telegraphic office.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 1073

FROM: Nanking — August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Because of the fact that the code system used by the Nanking Government has not yet been fully developed, if we continue to use the system as heretofore between Japan and this city, there is danger of messages being intercepted by Chungking and our policy being known to them through decipherment. I would like to suggest that the foreign office and the Ministry of communication confer on this subject and decide that, in respect to every route and on condition that the telegraphic matter be handled only by those on the inside, all telegraphic communications between Japan and the Nanking Government be sent by the customary telegraphic system. If necessary we shall direct the telegraphic companies for this purpose. Please reply by wire.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 1074

FROM: Nanking — August 22, 1941
TO: Peking, Tientsin and Tokyo — Cir. 257.

(Message to Shanghai # 318.)

Re --71 and # 71 (2) from Peking to this office.

1. The Nanking Army headquarters has already wired to the North China Army that it did not deem it necessary to be deeply involved in the individual personnel questions affecting the customs officials and that it would be best not to organize within the Special Affairs organizations bodies for the supervision of customs affairs because of the present international situation. It has already been arranged with the Army headquarters that the general question of personnel should be left to the discretion of Foreign Office officials (the gist of the telegram from Peking had been confidentially transmitted to the Army headquarters).

2. Therefore, this personnel question, I trust, will be handled by you in the best manner. As to our suggestion, granted that the facts of the case are such as reported in the telegram from Peking I think this is a good time to transfer ISHII to Shanghai or some other place (as you remember, it was proposed once that ISHII and KOYAMADA be exchanged).

Trans. 8–26–41

No. 1075

FROM: Peking — August 22, 1941
TO: Nanking & Shanghai — Circular 442.

(Message to Tokyo # 563.)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

(Strictly Secret.)

Re my # 559[a].

On the 22nd, HAYASHI confidentially told me the following:

1. After that, because the YEN[b] faction by special messenger, had informed us that they wanted to get through with the signing without delay this month, each of the stipulations in detailed report in my #445, Staff Officer TSUCHIDA of the First Army arrived in *En*[c] on the 19th, (?) in order to confer with Chief of Staff TSUKIYAMA who, at present, is in *En*.

2. The Yen faction urged these signatures because Yen has severed his connections with the Central Military authorities, who had had about 10,000 troops of the South Army -----[d] invade Yen's domain.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] YEN HSI-SHAN, Chief of Military Commission. Member of Central Executive Yuan, Head of Shansi Army.

[c] More often called Enan by the Japanese, Yenan-Fu in Shensi Province.

[d] (Possibly Kiangsi Province. Translator's note.)

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 1076

FROM: Nanking — July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #519.

Re the 300,000,000 yen loaned to the People's Government.

On the 26th WANG agreed with Adviser KAGESA over the loan and said, "Since it is Japan's idea, I have no objections to using yearly allotments to the extent of 100,000,000 yen a year. We feel that we would like to use this fiscal year's allotment chiefly in the purchasing of weapons. In fact, during the last few days, after the announcement of the loan by the Minister, various requests have poured in from all quarters; and as things are now, we fear that conditions will become such that we will be unable to get them. Now I would like to have the People's Government draw up a plan as speedily as possible and present it to the Japanese authorities, especially as the junior staff officers will be graduating soon, and it is a fact that we must supply them with weapons. I want you to cooperate with the Advisory Office in drawing up a concrete plan of action." Thus he requested.

I immediately asked instructions with regard to this matter from the Central Military Headquarters and from the authorites of the General Army. This is all for the present. For your information.

Now, according to what KAGESA confidentially told me, actually the government is hoping for a great deal of military supplies, as it is true that due to the lack of weapons, both military establishments and instructions are extremely hindered. I replied that it will be very fitting for Japan to give courteous consideration to WANG's requests.

Trans. 7-30-41

No. 1077

FROM: Nanking — August 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #592.

Re my #519[a].

According to confidential statement by Major General Kagesa, the National Government has suggested a grant of various kinds of military equipment as a part of this year's allotment of 50,000,000 yen of the 300,000,000 yen loan. Adviser Kagesa has passed this on to the Foreign

Office through the General Army, after squeezing it down to about 10,000,000, but ----- in regard to naval necessities and civilian necessities, ----- (garbled out).

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[a] See III, 1076.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 1078

FROM: Shanghai — August 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1545.

(Message to Nanking # 270.)

(Secret outside the department.)

Re the Foreign Minister's wire to me # 877[a].

When your Excellency was here a short time ago, we had conversations concerning this matter. Now as it is necessary to fix the day for the conference for Consul Generals in China, please make such decisions as you feel are essential.

Furthermore should nothing else interfere we here think it would be most convenient to convene an intelligence meeting on or about September 20.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 1079

FROM: Nanking — August 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 599.

From Minister Hidaka to the head of the East Asia Bureau:

Following the Consul-General's meeting, with the approval of the directors concerned, a business and intelligence meeting would be appropriate, it is felt. This would be for 2 days from September 24th in Nanking. Please get in touch with the China Affairs Board and after conferring on their views wire me.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 1080

FROM: Tokyo — August 30, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 376.

(Part 1 of 2.)

The recent freezing of foreign currency kept in the reserve bank ----- resulted from the fact that the Chinese refused to act in accordance with directions we gave them and continued to delay the matter. All of the government offices concerned are regretful that this has had to happen. However, today, after the freezing had been effected, to exchange this foreign cur-

rency into special yen currency would affect the reserve held in the National Treasury for the Yokohama Specie Bank. If this is done, not only would it mean that we shall have to, for the time being, make good the loss which the Chinese would suffer, but also it would bring up the question of earmarking the gold which would be necessitated by such an action and this, in turn, would influence our exchange question which has, of late, become extremely complicated. This, therefore, is a very serious question insofar as we are concerned. However, if we allow the matter to stand as it is and if the fact that the foreign currency in the possession of this bank has, to a large extent, been frozen leaks out, this bank's credit would suffer in consequence, and there is danger of its operation being interrupted. Furthermore, such a step would not harmonize with the policy we had in the past decided on in our dealings with this bank. Officials concerned are now conferring on some method that could relieve the situation, but even if relief is given, it would be necessary to effect it on certain strict terms.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 1081

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

August 30, 1941
376.

(Part 2 of 2.)

Furthermore, this question is not so simple as can be settled by our officials and the bank officials conferring. In fact, there are some people who say that the Chinese authorities should appreciate the seriousness as well as the difficulty of it and formally request us for our assistance as a question which the Chinese government itself should deal with. However that may be, in view of the circumstances which led up to the freezing of the funds, I have been thinking that it would be necessary for you to take advantage of the situation politically to the end of taking this opportunity for making their policy with regard to exchange and loans increasingly cooperative with and dependent upon Japan. This does not mean that you should at once direct the Chinese authorities in this way. I am suggesting this for your consideration.

Trans. 9-3-41

No. 1082

FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

August 30, 1941
604.

Hitherto the Nanking Petroleum Guild had bought local, refined gasoline from the Shanghai Foreign Oil Dealers, and had distributed it to the Chinese and Japanese military officials and civilians; but on the 28th the Foreign Oil Dealers prohibited the sale of gasoline outside of Shanghai bound for the interior. Thereupon the Japanese authorities drew up a plan for intense distribution and had the Chinese provide the facilities in accordance with this plan. At present the amount in stock does not exceed that of one month's supply.

Since this problem is one which pervades throughout central China and is vitally connected with the transportation of principal commodities as well as the problem of peace and order, we are getting in touch with the military authorities without delay, and are considering a counter plan. This is all for the present.

Will the Minister kindly contact the East Asia Development Company; and will Shanghai kindly contact central China on this matter.

Trans. 9-9-41

No. 1083

FROM: Nanking — September 1, 1941
TO: Net — Circular # 266.

Action Tokyo as # 605.

(*Abstract.*)

The German Charge in Nanking has stated to Minister Hidaka that his government has discussed with the Japanese Embassy the question of appointing Germans as honorary Chinese Consuls and also the question of the protection of German nationals in China.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 1084

FROM: Shanghai — September 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1632.

Re # 270[a] from Shanghai to Nanking.

I think that it will be most convenient to hold the intelligence meeting for four days from the 29th following the Consul Generals' meeting when a special intelligence official dispatched from Moscow will be present. Please make arrangements previously regarding attendance, expenses, personal affairs, etc.

[a] See III, 1078.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 1085

FROM: Nanking — September 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 618.

Re # 1632[a] from Shanghai to Tokyo.

From Hori to Counselor Tashiro.

Following the completion of the Consuls General's meeting 24th, the intelligence meeting will be held for three or four days from the --th.

The Manchuria, Tientsin, Peking, Hankow, Canton, Hong Kong, Nanking, and Shanghai Consuls General will be summoned and any others who desire to attend may do so.

(I have contacted Nanking.)

[a] Not available, dated about 1 September.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 1086

FROM: Nanking — September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo and Peking — Cir. # 269.

Today, the 4th, Minister of Foreign Affairs JO is leaving alone by plane for Tientsin. After making a two-day stopover there, he will proceed to Peking, where he plans to remain for two or three days. He is returning to his post in Japan but doing so by this present northern trip, and en route he will pay a courtesy call on Commander OKAMURA. (In Japan, he is unofficially connected with the Embassy, but this point is for your information only.) Since the purpose of his returning by this northern way is to observe the condtions as they exist in North China today, I have sent messages of introduction and recommendation to yourself and to Director SHIOZAWA. Will you kindly do everything within your power to assist him?

Kindly send this communication to the military authorities and to the liaison officials of the East Asia Development Company.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 1087

FROM: Peking — September 5, 1941
TO: Shanghai — Circular # 460.

Peking to Tokyo as # 591, 5th.

Re my # 563[a].

Secret information from Hayashi on the 5th as follows:

In order to complete the understanding between Japan and EN and have it ratified, Tanabe, Chief of the General Staff of the North Army from Japan, (Accompanied by Hayashi and RYŌJŌCHIN) and CHŌSHŌJU[b] from EN will meet on the 8th at -----.

Colonel Hongō of the North China Army is scheduled to leave for TAIGEN on the 11th with the details of the agreement. It is expected to take about two weeks.

---

[a] See III, 1075.

[b] Chao Chen-shou Confidante of Gen. Yen Hsi-shan. N. China Army. Chinese Army Leader.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 1088

FROM: Peking — September 16, 1941
TO: Nanking and Shanghai — Cir. # 469.

(Secret.) (Message to Tokyo # 611.)

Re my # 591[a].

The following is confidential information given me by HAYASI who arrived in Taiyuan on the 15th.

1. Accompanied by staff officers SIGEZAKI: TSUKIYAMA of the First Army; and TSUCHIDA; the Chief of Staff of the North China Army, TANABE (HAYASI also accompanied

the group), together with the Governor of the Shansi Province who had arrived at Fencheng[b] previously, conferred on the 8th with the party headed by CHO SHŌ JU[c] representing EN[d]. However, no agreement was signed on that day because much time was spent in exchanging telegrams between CHO and EN concerning the questions of the Northwestern Business concern and of the return of the Dō Ho Railway. After deciding that the details should be disposed of by a commission consisting of both Japanese and Chinese experts in the future, an armistice agreement was signed between the two parties at 11:00 A.M. on the 11th.

2. It seems that those on the side of EN wish to have their forces increased to 300,000 or 500,000 men (they claim that they have at present 17 -----, but in reality they probably have 50,000 or 60,000 men). But this is no more than an ideal; it would take many months before it could be realized. In supplying military funds and materials, the form to be followed is the same as you have indicated in your telegram.

3. Although the Japanese have requested EN to announce the fact that he had severed his relations with Chungking and the fact of Japanese-Chinese joint action as soon as the Japanese representatives signed the armistice agreement, it is the desire of those on his side that the announcement be issued after the distribution of the Shansi Army into various sections of the province (so that they could cooperate with the Japanese forces), and after disposal has been made of the question of the treatment to be given to the Central Army and to the 8th Route Army. It is expected that all this will take several months to accomplish.

4. It is planned to use the main power of the Shansi Army for political purposes. The Japanese do not attach much military importance to the army. The value of the move lies in the fact that they have succeeded in embracing EN's political influence and in the fact that they are now in a position to influence through him both YU HSUEH CHUNG[e] and FU TSUO I[f] (they expect to continue to institute plans of this nature). Economically, they will be able to appeal to Chinese traders in distant places through the financial interest in Shansi, and they believe that this would make a turning point in the disposal of the China incident, etc., etc.

Relayed to Shanghai and -----, ----- Hong Kong.

---

[a] See III, 1087.
[b] In Shansi Province.
[c] CHAO CHEN-SHOU, Commander of the 8th Army.
[d] Probably YEN HSI-SHAN, member of the Central Executive Yuan and Commander of the Shansi Army.
[e] Governor of the Hopeh Province and member of the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government.
[f] Chairman of the Suiyuan Province and Commander of the 37th Division.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 1089

FROM: Nanking — September 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #646.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your #393[a].

Since June of last year, WANG CHING-WEI has been conferring with the authorities of the Joint Army Command. The Army authorities, who sent letters to EN[b] on several occasions have -----. If EN goes to war, we think it will be satisfactory to give him not only the rank of Chairman of the Military Council, but also that of Vice-Chief of the Government. The authorities of the Joint Army Command also are in total agreement with the second point in your message concerning the conclusion of the war. Accordingly, with regard to the disbursement

of expenditures regarding this matter, it is true that WANG CHING-WEI immediately gave his consent. (According to the explanation of the Army authorities, they first of all gave 1,000,000 yuan from the secret funds in addition to the 12,000,000 yuan. It seems that they promised disbursement covering a period of three months.)

Furthermore, we have received representations on successive occasions from the authorities of the Joint Army Command and from Advisor KAGESA with regard to -----. For your information.

---

[a] Not available.

[b] EN SHAKU ZAN, Kana spelling for YEN SHI-SHAN, Member of the Central Executive Yuan and Commander of the Shansi Army.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 1090

FROM: Tokyo — September 9, 1941
TO: Shanghai and Peking — Circular # 1973.

Tokyo to Nanking # 395.

(1) In regard to the Central China ----- operations, for the present, not to exceed 30,000,000 yen will be disbursed, and further study will be given to the matter of other necessary expenditures to follow.

(2) This amount of 30,000,000 yen will be considered a refund in an amount equal to the reserves, for foreign loans and reparations moneys that have been accumulated by the affiliated six banks in North China, since 30 March 1940, the time of the setting up of the National Government and the Yokohama Specie Bank will lend this money to the responsible Japanese on the ground who are directing the work of the yen loan (?). The definite conditions etc. for drawing upon these funds will be decided upon separately.

(3) In connection with the preceding paragraph, the foreign loan money of the six banks in North China which has accumulated in Shanghai Maritime Customs incomes since 30 March 1940, when the National Government was set up, will for the time being, be held by the Specie Bank, in Chinese currency in an amount equal to the said allotment of 30,000,000 dollars, as a special reserve fund of the six banks.

(4) The intent of this will be made clear to the National Government. If the National Government desires the refunding to be done in the form of a transaction from the Specie Bank to the National Government, it will be understood that this will not interfere with changes being made in the parties to the contract.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 1091

FROM: Nanking — September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 630.

Re your # 376[a].

I quite agree with you in what you say. It is regrettable that delay in the business on the part of the ----- reserve bank has caused the Japanese authorities inconvenience. I, personally, will see to it that hereafter the advisors direct the work more carefully.

As to the plan of settlement which you gave in your telegram, if you are going to make it conditional, it would be necessary to have such terms that would harmonize with the actual situation and be effective, as well as adaptable. With this in view I am having Advisor AOKI go to Shanghai on the 11th. Will you, therefore, see what he suggests and discuss the matter with him.

Please contact the East Asia Development Bureau in a manner which you think best.

---

[a] See III, 1080–1081.

Trans. 9–12–41

No. 1092

FROM: Tokyo — September 8, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 388.

CORRECTED TRANSLATION.

(To be handled in government code.)

According to talks between the Japanese and the British, some time near the end of this month (precise date uncertain, but appreciably earlier than estimated), because of the evacuation of Japanese from Europe, a Japanese ship (name uncertain, but it will be a first-rate boat) will leave for Lisbon. Is not Ambassador to Germany, RISEIGO[a] of the People's Government, together with his party, expecting to go by this boat? After you have made inquiry, please let me know at once. (There are no restrictions as to the number of passengers.)

---

[a] LI SHENG-WU.

Trans. 9–15–41

No. 1093

FROM: Tokyo — September 9, 1941
TO: Nanking — # 392.

Re my # 388[a].

It has been decided to have the said ship (the Asama Maru) sail from Yokohama (?) on the 20th directly for Lisbon by way of Durban (?). (Due to lack of time, it will not call at Shanghai.) We desire to have Li Sheng-wu and all others who desire to embark make immediate preparations so that they will not miss the boat.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–13–41

No. 1094

FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

September 9, 1941
#633.

Secret.

Re your #392[a].

I am making inquiries in regard to China's attitude. However, in order to go to their posts in Germany and Italy, it will be necessary to pass through countries which have not extended recognition[b]. Please wire as to whether there will be any difficulty over visas or not.

---

[a] See III, 1093.
[b] To Nanking.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 1095

FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

September 12, 1941
#642.

(Secret.)

Re your (#396 ?).

I immediately transmitted the information to the Chinese, and I was informed that although RI TAI CHI[a] will not be in time for the sailing, several members of his office are expected to sail. I shall wire you as soon as the number has been decided. I am sending you this much at present.

---

[a] Possibly same as Ri Sei-go, Nanking Ambassador to Germany.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 1096

FROM: Rome (Horikiri)
TO: Nanking

September 12, 1941
#3.

Re my #1.[a]

On the 12th ANDŌ chided PRUNAS by remarking that Germany had already come to an agreement under which a new Chinese Ambassador to Berlin had recently sailed on a Japanese ship for Europe and adding that he wondered what was the reason for Italy's delay in reaching a similar agreement.

PRUNAS replied that the truth was that there had been such a piling up of affairs in connection with the new order in Europe that they simply had not gotten around to it. Of course, he said, there is no objection to the appointment of a Chinese Ambassador, and the matter will be immediately looked into and pushed forward.

Relayed to Tokyo.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 1097

FROM: Nanking — September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 658.

(Message to Rome # 2.)

Re your # 3[a].

Since the People's Government is making plans in anticipation of sending its newly appointed ambassador to his post by the Asama Maru, which is scheduled to be used soon to evacuate our residents, I want you to keep on using your influence to procure an agreement as quickly as possible.

---

[a] See III, 1096.

Trans. 9–21–41

No. 1098

FROM: Nanking — September 18, 1941
TO: Peking — # 285.

(Circular) (Message *to Tokyo* # 662.)

The Chief of the Foreign Office has sent me confidential information to the effect that inasmuch as he has received from the Italian Government, on the evening of the 17th, an agreement concerning GO GAI SEI, the matter would be referred to the political council on the 18th and he would appoint GO GAI SEI Ambassador to Italy in a day or two. At the same time he requested that since the personnel who are to be sent to Europe will be decided at once, he would like to have the Japanese authorities arrange to have them take a Japanese steamer. (The important members are expected to go to Japan first and then embark.)

Trans. 9–24–41

No. 1099

FROM: Nanking — September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 660.

Recently the German Government addressed us a formal notice to the effect that FISSHAA[a] will be sent to Nanking to be stationed there as a Charge d'Affaires accredited to the People's Government. (I believe that a regular Ambassador will not be sent for sometime to come.)

---

[a] FISCHER.

Trans. 9–19–41

No. 1100

FROM: Tokyo — September 23, 1941
TO: Nanking — #416.

Message from Berlin as #1170 on the 22nd.

Secret.

For some time Ambassador STAHMER has been telling me that he would like to be appointed Ambassador to China. I understand he told KASE[a] on the 22nd that it has been tentatively decided to appoint him to that post, that procedure for the agreement is being taken, and that, as soon as the appointment has been definitely decided upon, he expected to go to his post probably by way of South America.

Relay to Nanking.

[a] Counselor at Japanese Embassy in Berlin.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 1101

FROM: Nanking — September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #676.

Re my #642[a].

Since at this time it is impossible to dispatch RI SEI GO, it is planned to send a secretary. It has been decided that he should serve as a Commercial Attaché in Berlin as well as in ----- and later be sent to Berlin and be made Charge d'Affaires. I understand that this decision was communicated to Charge d'Affaires FISCHER on the 25th and then transmitted by him to Germany.

[a] See III, 1095.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 1102

FROM: Nanking — September 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #673.

Re your #396[a].

Please reply if the time of the Asama Maru's departure from Yokohama has been changed. When the names of the party are decided we will wire you. This is wanted in connection with plans for the departure of the Nanking Government's Ambassador to Germany.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 1103

FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

October 1, 1941
685.

Re my # 684[a].

Please make the following reservations on the Asama Maru:
The Ambassador, 1 1st class ticket.
Minister Li (accompanied by his daughter), 2 1st class tickets.
Secretary Tang (accompanied by his wife and baby), 2 1st class tickets.
Secretary Feng (accompanied by his son and wife), 3 1st class tickets.
Other secretaries (single), 6 1st class tickets.
Attendants, 3 3rd class tickets.
Sending the above by air mail. Will wire any changes.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 10–3–41

No. 1104

FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

September 26, 1941
Unnumbered.

In order to welcome the Chief of the Shanghai Liaison Branch and other officials attending the present conference, there was a banquet in honor of Chief WANG. In the course thereof, WANG told me that he had received a request from certain of his important officials that they be allowed to come to interview him about the 30th; that is, next week. He said that beyond any doubt, the question of the Japanese-American negotiations would come up, and he would like to know what to say to them.

Now I am very anxious that WANG's government entertain no misgivings concerning these negotiations, and for my own information, I think you ought to let me know just what our attitude toward those negotiations is. I would also like for you to wire me what the contents of the KONOYE message was. Please wire me back immediately.

It seems that not long ago when Chief WANG was in Tokyo, Premier KONOYE said to him, "The negotiations with the United States are not making much progress." I would, therefore, like to advise WANG on subsequent developments. I said, "Do you think there are any objections to our dealing with CHIANG through the United States?" and WANG replied, "No, there are no objections." He added, however, repeatedly, "Let us be careful what kind of a peace is made." I said, "I think that it is up to us to be very careful to see that the United States, in working out a joint policy with Japan and China, does not upset our plans for a new order in East Asia. That should be the premise upon which the negotiations are based, in my opinion." The Chief replied, "You are absolutely right."

Now he may question me further on this subject, and I am not in a position as yet to make any reply.

Trans. 10–1–41

No. 1105

FROM: Berlin — October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1203.

Strictly Secret.

1. As you know, STAHMER was recently appointed Ambassador to China. BOLTZE, former Counselor to the German Embassy in Tokyo, has been appointed Counselor to the Embassy in China; so has BORCHERS, who was formerly Consul General in New York, but the latter will reside in Shanghai. FISCHER has been chosen as Consul General in Shanghai. BORCHERS has already left and STAHMER and BOLTZE will leave Berlin on the 10th, taking an Italian plane on the 17th from Spain to South America thence they will head for Japan on one of our ships.

2. STAHMER's appointment was decided upon by HITLER, who has every confidence that his appointee will carry out the Chancellor's policy toward China and will work in unison with Japan. The other appointments were made for the reasons mentioned in my # 843[a].

3. STAHMER has been engaged in diplomatic work ever since the establishment of the Ribbentrop office, however, this is the first time he has served as a foreign diplomat. For that reason he is zealous and excited. He is anxious to clamp down on the old German diplomats in China and put into force an entirely new policy based upon the spirit of the Three-power alliance. I do not need to tell you that he is the best man that could have been chosen for he is our best German friend, but on the other hand the old-school Germans in China are well rooted and the sparks may fly when he encounters them. We have seen that happen time and again. Please bear this in mind and arrange to have him given proper advice.

Please send to the proper military officers. Please send to Nanking.

---

[a] See III, 1105A.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 1105A

FROM: Berlin — July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 843.

On the 3d Ambassador STAHMER, who had gone to Italy for a change of air, returned and I went to see him for a little talk. I said: "In German consulates and other diplomatic establishments throughout China there are many stubborn pro-Chinese officials who have been there all too many years. You have recognized the WANG regime now and this situation does not coincide with what is to be expected. I want you now to discharge all these superannuated officials and replace them with new blood which is more imbued with the spirit of National Socialismus." STAHMER replied: "I go the limit in agreeing with the feeling you express. I shall submit this matter to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and endeavor to remedy this situation as soon as possible." Will you please wire me back immediately the names of the German officials in the consulates and other diplomatic establishments in China which are not in harmony with the policy of the Japanese Imperial Government.

Trans. 7-17-41

No. 1106

FROM: Nanking — October 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #691.

I have spoken to the Ambassador and to Minister Li regarding their future receptions and contacts and relationship with us. However, in view of the fact that the Germans here have been in constant touch with them and have been building them up, it might be well to pay particular attention to their reception in Tokyo before their embarkation. They are scheduled to arrive there so that they can have several days in Tokyo, so please arrange to give them the proper guidance.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 1107

FROM: Tokyo — October 7, 1941
TO: Nanking — #436.

Re my #418[a].

It will be impossible for the Asama Maru to sail on schedule. This is for your information. This has been relayed to Shanghai.

---

[a] Re ship schedules.

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 1108

FROM: Shanghai — October 13, 1941
TO: Peking — #099.

Shanghai to Nanking as #344.

Shanghai to Tokyo as #1875.

According to intelligence secured by a spy from elements connected with the Blue Shirts here, the Chungking military committee is secretly sending a committee of five to Nanking to investigate the rumors that Yen Hsi-shan has recently gone over to the Nanking government. This group has reached Shanghai via Hong Kong, and plan soon to make undercover entry into Nanking.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 1109

FROM: Nanking — October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #710.

(Part 3 of 3[a].)

SUMMARY:

Chief WANG is much concerned over negotiations between Tokyo and Washington. He says that, in order to have a thoroughgoing bona fide agreement, his regime must be taken into

consideration. In other words, the agreement with the United States must be more or less of a Tri-Partite affair, and on all important points, particularly points relating to China and, still more particularly, to the WANG regime, WANG should be consulted. WANG declares that certain revisions may have to be made, upon which he should be consulted; otherwise, he does not see how a truly official understanding can be reached with Washington. If the Nanking Government is included in such a pact, not only would it be more comprehensive, but also more effective.

No just reason can be found for rejecting WANG's claims. Therefore, it is thought that Nanking should be contacted fully on all matters relating to the United States.

---

[a] Parts 1 and 2 of 3 not available.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 1110

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #759.

After Courier NOMOTO, now in your city, finishes his present work (official documents addressed to the foreign office will be taken to Japan in care of Courier KITANO, who will leave on board the Nitiran Maru) I would like to have him remain in your city for a month or two and have him, in addition to assisting telegraphic work, instruct, together with YAMAGUCHI (who is versed only in the old-fashioned simple code systems), all the members of this office (who are likewise versed merely in the old-fashioned systems), the code and telegraphic duties which have of late suddenly become complicated. Since I would like to have this done in order to be ready for any emergency, I request that permission be granted for NOMOTO's remaining here longer.

Trans. 8–12–41

No. 1111

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 16, 1941
TO: Batavia #493.

Refer to your message #796.

Offices furnished with the code are as follows: United States, Mexico, Manila, England, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Switzerland, Manchukuo, Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin, Canton, Hong Kong, Siam, and Hanoi.

When is NOMOTO going to Singapore?

Trans. 8–19–41

No. 1112

FROM: Tokyo August 16, 1941
TO: Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton, Hsinking, Tientsin, Peking, Bangkok and Berne. Circular #1839.

The consulate-General in Batavia has discontinued the use of the code. I want this transmitted from the U.S. to Mexico and from Switzerland to England, France, Germany, Italy and Turkey.

Trans. 8-19-41

No. 1113

FROM: Tokyo August 6, 1941
TO: Batavia #456.

The Ministry of Finance and the authorities of the Yokohama Specie Bank are very anxious to conclude an agreement having to do with the circulation of funds. In regard to this, they would like, on the basis of the following four points, to insist upon the "A" account remaining "free" as heretofore. We would like to have these proposals presented to the Netherlands East Indies authorities by IMAGAWA[a].

However, there is one thing that you must remember and that is that they have already established the Central Afolh[b] Japan Trade. I believe that it is going to be extremely difficult to restore the "A" accounts; therefore, should they strongly oppose their restoration I do not think there would be any objection to your making the concession to agree to the establishment of new accounts should it become necessary.

1. The ships requested in my #439[c], having already been contracted for, we would like to have them proceed. In addition to these, goods contracted for between Japanese and Netherlands East Indies companies should be cleared up (up to and including August 1st). Therefore, contracts for goods by both parties, the Netherlands East Indies and Japan, should be filled.

2. As long as the Netherlands Indies authorities will not permit export of goods to Japan, even though guilders are classified as free, the situation can hardly be said to be auspicious. In addition, at the same time, for the Netherlands East Indies authorities to conclude purchases of goods they alone wish, is senseless. (Among the various items listed in the final Netherlands East Indies reply handed over to us June 6th, were: corn, copra[d], cassava root[g], palm oil, tannin products, sugar, rubber, tin, bauxite, nickel ore, manganese ore, zogymen[c], castor beans, raw quinine, processed quinine, petroleum, -----, scrap iron, pitch coke, tomitm[e], sisal[f], etc. Their proposals permitted the payment of prices for purchase of these products.) (With regard to the payment of petroleum costs in guilders, the Mitsui is at the present time conducting negotiations in Tokyo with RA and SU. As soon as some decisions are reached, I shall advise you by wire.)

3. Should these "A" accounts become -----, ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----.

4. With regard to IMAGAWA's wire to the Yokohama Specie Bank, #9, dispatched August 4th, concerning the matter of yen exchange coverage, I do not think that there will be any objection in complying with their requests.

a. Should Item 2 above be impossible to secure and Item 1 impossible to realize, results will be unsatisfactory. Therefore, I would like to have you do your very best to make their realization possible.

b. Since we would like to have the disposition of our ships parallel the decisions reached in your negotiations, please advise us frequently how you are getting along with these negotiations.

---

[a] Member of the Yokohama Specie Bank.
[b] English spelling.
[c] Not available.
[d] The dried kernel of the coconut, broken up for export.
[e] Kana spelling.
[f] A variety of hemp.
[g] A root which yields a nutritious starch.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 1114

FROM: Batavia 7 August 1941
TO: Tokyo #765.

(Foreign Office Secret.)

1. In the final analysis, the talks revolving around the currency situation between Imagawa and PURENAA, controller, are other N.E.I.-Japanese economic relations. I, therefore, deemed it would be to the interest of all concerned if discussions were held with Chief of Bureau Hofstraaten and Kotani also present.

The arrangements were made and for three hours during this morning and afternoon, the men conferred. The outline of discussion is reported below. (Please refer to the Specie Bank dispatch, also.)

a. Re abandoning of the "freezing" order:

Hofstraaten officially stated that the Netherlands East Indies is prepared to liquidate all of the frozen assets with the exception of an amount equivalent to the losses sustained by merchants of the Netherlands East Indies, on condition that the assets thus liquidated be used for payments of purchases made in the Netherlands East Indies. In the event that it is impossible to apply all of the liquidated funds on local purchases, some other means of disposition shall be settled upon. (The details shall be discussed at conferences which will be held in the near future; settlement through bahts or Shanghai dollars will be given consideration, he said.) He added that the sum equivalent to the losses sustained by the Dutch merchants, which will be kept in a "frozen" condition for the time being, will also gradually be liquidated.

b. Re maximum of Netherlands East Indies goods which can be purchased.

Hofstraaten states that their attitude with regard to this will be determined and Japan will be notified of the details thereof at the earliest possible moment. In connection with this, he would appreciate being advised as to the extent to which Japan is prepared to permit exports of merchandise to the Netherlands East Indies in the future. (Please come to a speedy decision on this point.)

c. Re transactions of Dutch merchants in Japan.

The Dutch merchants have contracted for the purchase of 180,000,000 yen worth of Japanese goods. Of this, payments had been made on an amount somewhere between fifteen and twenty two million yen, at the time of the "freezing" order. Consul General PENNINKU cabled his government that the stock which the Dutch merchants had on hand for which payments had already been made but which had not been loaded on ships, amounted to three million yen worth. (There is considerable difference in this figure with those cabled to

Imagawa from the Specie Bank. We, therefore, requested the Dutch to make further investigations. We would appreciate your checking our figures once again and advising us with the minimum loss of time.)

d. Re petroleum.

At present, the Japan Rising Sun is obligated to pay the BPM between one and a half and two million U.S. dollars. The Dutch advise us that our frozen funds could be liquidated for making this payment.

e. Heretofore, the local Exchange Bureau would not grant permission to the Specie Bank to make new payments on petroleum to the BPM. Through the negotiations conducted today, permit has now been granted by the Exchange Bureau.

f. There were indications, as was pointed out in the Specie Bank dispatch, that the Specie Bank would be considerably hampered in transacting business due to planned interferences. However, as a consequence of today's talks, the Dutch authorities have decided to permit the local branch office of the Specie Bank to use funds it has on its hands (the B account) to make advances to exporters and in other ways engage in domestic credit enterprises. They also agreed to the following plan: About thirty to forty thousand guilders will be liquidated from the A account; a new D account will be established for the Specie Bank; from this D account, the aforementioned advance payments to exporters will be withdrawn and placed in the C account, thus making possible the continuance of business transactions.

g. We are scheduled to confer in the near future as to the disposition of the "Japantrace ??" account. (Translator's note: This paragraph badly garbled—contents gussed at.)

h. The Dutch have unofficially agreed to maintain the status quo in so far as the exchange market is concerned. The details are scheduled to be decided on the 8th.

i. With regard to reviving the currency agreement, the Dutch express their willingness and preparedness to cooperate with us the drawing up some new agreement which will take the place of the old agreement.

2. As may be clearly seen by the above, the Dutch are showing considerable understanding and willingness to dispose of the various problems which are confronting us. Will you please, therefore, give the Dutch banks and merchants the permits necessary for them to continue to transact business, as well as to show them as much courtesy as is possible under the circumstances.

3. I received your message #456[a] dated this day. I shall give the subject referred to therein my careful study after which I shall submit my humble opinions concerning it.

---

[a] See III, 1113.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 1115

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #782.

Re my #765[a].

Today, the 8th, we held our second conversation.

1. With regard to paragraph 3 of the caption message, HOOGSTRATEN, Chief of the Commerce Bureau, made the statement that Netherlands East Indies companies in Japan had balances already contracted for in the excess of 190,000,000 yen. Of this amount, 3,000,000 yen has already been paid on the contract amounts.

KOTANI[b] and IMIGAWA[b], representing us, pointed out one after the other that those sums were too large to be believed. As a result of these statements, HOOGSTRATEN spoke up and said: "According to a wire which we have received from our Consul General in Kobe, PB[c], orders in the amount of 50,000,000 yen have already been contracted for and payment has been made in addition to this of 3,000,000 yen, making a grand total of 53,000,000 yen worth of orders which have passed over his desk. Now, if these figures are correct, what are you going to do about it?" To this, I replied: "At the present time we are in correspondence with Tokyo and therefore I am not at liberty to make any statement. But the figures you have quoted are much too large even to consider." Therefore, in order that we may put into effect paragraphs 1 and 2 of your # 456[d] with regard to these amounts, since it is of vital necessity, please make a careful investigation as to the accuracy and details making up these figures and wire me immediately.

2. As the Netherlands East Indies Government is taking a similar line to that mentioned in paragraph 5 of my caption message, the Bank of Formosa and the Mitsui Bank, too, have agreed to begin business in this wise. However, it has been decided that only the Yokohama Specie Bank will handle the "D" accounts.

Please refer to IMIGAWA's wire to Yokohama Specie Bank with regard to the details of the conversations carried on today.

Please base your considerations on this wire as well as my caption wire.

Relayed to ----- and -----.

---

[a] See III, 1114.
[b] Japanese in Batavia on trade missions.
[c] Kana abbreviation.
[d] See III, 1113.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 1116

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 8, 1941
TO: Batavia # 463.

Re part 2 of my # 456[a].

We have received the following intelligence report from the Fuel Bureau with regard to the payment of petroleum prices:

1. According to a wire which arrived at Mitsui's here from Mitsui in Batavia, with regard to the cargo of the tankers, Zuiyō Maru, Teiyō Maru and San Diego Maru which are sailing to the Netherlands East Indies now, the Netherlands Indies government has indicated its stand that the freight question is one which should be decided by the New York Purchase Permit Control.

2. Consequently, we demanded that they furnish a permit in New York; and they replied by wire that they could see no prospect for permits for crude oil at this time.

3. Now, with regard to arranging for permits, the Yokohama Specie Bank and Mitsui find it necessary to obtain duplicate permits; and at the same time, I understand that they do not have hopes of obtaining them.

4. This being the situation, we have had the tankers postpone departure.

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[a] See III, 1113.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 1117

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 8, 1941
TO: Batavia # 464.

Strictly Secret. Re your # 749[a].

The gist of your instructions are reasonable, and so I immediately decided to exempt partially the restrictions on activities and reports that were made to control transactions among the interested foreigners connected with Holland and the Dutch East Indies, which were the result of a conference with those principle parties. Last night I published the conversations of the Financial Department authorities. Today, the 8th, I enforced, the same day it was proclaimed, the notification of the Finance Ministry. (Refer to the above separate message # 464.) Therefore, please take advantage of this at your own discretion.

Please transmit your caption message, the contents of this message together with the separate wire to Soerabaya, Makassar, Menado, and Medan.

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[a] See III, 1123.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 1118

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) August 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 794.

The system of conscripting natives, as I have frequently told you, has caused a deep rift between the Government and the native leaders. I was surprised at the effect this is having so I gave economic assistance to native societies opposing the Government, as well as to such native newspapers in order to get them to refute arguments against our establishment of a new order in East Asia.

The ----- branch of the Gerindo[a] Party, however, held a meeting at ----- on August 4th and they suggested the following topics for discussion at the mass meeting soon to be held:

1. Opposition to Japan's establishment of a new order in East Asia.
2. The forbidding of Japanese to enter the Islands.

The native language newspaper "Kubangunan"[a] supported these proposals on several successive days, saying that in time of crisis, rather than to quarrel and quibble, the natives ought to cooperate with the Government.

The ---- blatt[b] on ----- declared that the natives show quite capable organization and that native troops are in no wise inferior. This, I imagine, is to bolster native morals and bring about loyalty to the Government.

I think that Japanese officials ought to pay very close attention to the question of the natives in the Netherlands Indies.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

[b] Netherlandish newspaper.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 1119

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #840.

Re my #794[a].

On the 16th the Batavia branch of the Gerindo[b] Party convened 600 of its members and held a regional conference, drafting certain proposals to be discussed in their mass meeting to be held in Batavia in October. They resolved to make the principal theme of the discussions the fact that Japan is allying herself with Nazi and Fascist nations and is planning to bring Indonesia under her influence just like China and French Indo-China. This, they held, contravenes the principle of democracy fostered by the Gerindo Party, as well as threatens democracy throughout the whole South Seas. It was resolved, therefore, (1) that the Government should align a democratic popular front embracing all Indonesia; (2) that the Gerindo Party should arouse the people by direct activities to a consciousness of the necessity of such a front; and (3) that a Gerindo volunteer army should be established.

This party is composed of 10,000 people, made up mostly of the lower classes and laborers. Heretofore their opposition to the Government has been strong and among the members there are very many who have been punished by banishment.

Relayed to Canberra, Bangkok, Hanoi, -----, and Manila.

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[a] See III, 1118.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 1120

FROM: Tokyo August 11, 1941
TO: Batavia #479.

1. Re "c" of paragraph (2) of your message #792[a].

If Japanese business houses and individuals in the Netherlands East Indies are permitted to place their bank deposits in the Specie Bank's B account from whence it is transferred to the D account to enable them to be used as advances on exports and payments for petroleum, we are prepared to reciprocate in the manner described below:

We shall confer with the Ministries concerned to try to evolve some plan by which the funds can be placed on deposit in Japanese currency in Japan. (Under our currency control system, this transaction is, in actuality, prohibited.) We feel sure that something can be done along these lines.

Will you please, therefore, have Imakawa continue to negotiate to have permits issued for the transference to the D account as previously described. Also have Imakawa obtain their approval to allowing the depositing of profits from Japanese enterprises in Netherlands East Indies in the D account in the same manner.

Please advise us of the outcome of the negotiations. (Please prevent any word of these plans leaking out to our nationals residing there.)

2. Re paragraph 1 of my message #471[a].

The Netherlands East Indies authorities seem to indicate considerable agitation over our export control order of 7 July because of the alleged losses inflicted on Dutch merchants in Japan. It is our opinion, however, that our merchants in Netherlands East Indies must have sustained losses too, due to the enacting of the export licensing system. Please,

therefore, make investigations on this matter of our merchants there and use your findings as arguments in our behalf in the negotiations.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 1121

FROM: Batavia (Japanese Consul) August 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo #806.

Secret outside of Department.

With your #479[a] and #471[b] in mind and considering the progress of negotiations thus far, after conferring with Imagawa, I thought it would be well to approach the Dutch with the suggestions given in my #807[b] as our proposals, and I decided yesterday to have Kotani and Imagawa be present in the 4th sitting of our conversations, and we met for three hours from 5 till 8 p.m. The main trend of our conversation was as follows: I could perceive that the Dutch would have some changes to suggest in regard to the final settlement of the problem. The details of the conversation you will please get from Imagawa's dispatch to the Specie Bank.

(1) Before entering upon the discussion of the proposals given in my separate message, I thought it would be well to first urge them to reflect upon the course the N.E.I. Government has recently taken, so I had Kotani lay emphasis upon the following three points: (a) The ostensible reason for the N.E.I. Government's putting into effect this freezing act was to try to "cover" the loss of 190,000,000 yen remaining on contracts already made and 12,000,000 guilders of freight which has been paid for by Dutch merchants in Japan, but which has not been shipped yet. However, there are great discrepancies in these figures, and of course it is very inconvenient to have used such a feeble basis for action. But even now when the absurdity of the reason put forth has been clearly demonstrated, we cannot understand why nothing is done to revoke the said freezing act. (b) The N.E.I. Government had affirmed that they were prepared to cooperate in the concluding of some agreement to take the place of the old exchange agreement, and it is most inexcusable for them now to unilaterally abolish the old agreement. (c) While on the one hand we have been trying to meet the Dutch entire front export license system, to have them on the other hand put into effect (the freezing act ?) ----- which we understood they did because they thought our advance into French Indo-China was a direct threat to the Netherlands East Indies ----- we regret more than we can say.

(2) To this Hofstraaten replied as he stated in our conversation the other day (as per my #713[c]) that ----- was put into effect because of -----, but that he did recognize the point about the figures given, and explained that he merely used the figures at hand and wanted us to understand that he did not maliciously give such figures.

(3) We then took up the main problem, and I presented the suggestions given in my separate message, and Control Board Director Hofstraaten gave his own opinions in regard to item 1 of the proposals ----- but in a word he stated that while he could not give any definite promise now, until the policy of the N.E.I. Government in regard to the export license system

is settled, it can be expected that the Government will give favorable consideration, in the main, along the "lines" of the proposals made, and that he himself will cooperate to -----.

---

[a] (See III, 1120)

[b] Not available.

[c] Jap Consul General Isizawa at Batavia urges Tokyo to decide upon fundamental policy with regard to Jap relations with N.E.I. on the basis of a conversation with Director Hoogstraaten during which the latter expresses his fears as to motives of the Japs in the occupation of French Indo-China.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 1122

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #801.

Secret outside the department.

1. On the 12th the new Thaiese Consul General, B. C. CHEEPPENSOCK came to call on me and I said, "The newspapers in these Islands say that we are making demands on you and using pressure to back them up. I think this is just propaganda but it is stirring up rancor against us Japanese so every time I get a chance I deny these rumors. Have you had any report at all on the more recent events in Thai?"

The Consul General said, "Yes, I have. I have just received three code messages. Here, let me read them to you." They said in effect that on the 8th the Chief of the Bangkok Intelligence Bureau declared that Thai is sticking to her neutrality policy and has received no demands from any country whatever for military bases.

I said, "Well, I think it would be a very fine thing for this to be published by the Netherlands Indies Press.

He said, "not only am I going to inform the Netherlands Indies Press, but also the Government."

Our relations with Thai are a matter of great concern to the people here and their policy towards us will depend greatly upon our policy toward Thai, therefore, for my information will you please wire me immediately just what our intentions with regard to Bangkok are.

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 1123

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 14, 1941
TO: Batavia #483.

Re my #439[a].

1. On the 12th, Minister PA[b] submitted the following request:

(a) A report has come to the effect that some Japanese firms are selling to such export regulatory organizations as development companies and the Export Guild articles, the sale of which had been promised to Dutch merchants. Now if this is true, it would be impossible for Dutch merchants to load ships up to the capacity reserved for them, and so they would like to have the Japanese Government put an end to this sort of purchase being done by these organizations.

(b) Furthermore, if the organizations have already purchased articles in this manner, they would like to have it so that the Dutch merchants to whom the sale had been promised could repurchase the articles on the expectation that they would be able to live up to the terms of the agreement.

Yesterday, the 13th, an official in charge of the matter in this department replied to DOROOSU roughly as follows:

(a) That Japanese merchants had resold to the organization in question in contravention to their contracts is hardly possible. If by any chance they have done so, we shall warn the organizations against the practice. However, in case the Dutch merchants at the time of transference fail to take over the articles after paying for them, the Japanese merchants will cancel the contracts and will freely dispose of the articles in question. Japan wishes that the Netherlands Indies Government be fully informed of this fact.

If, because of their inability to pay, the Dutch merchants do not take over the articles, there will be hereafter an increasing number of cases in which Japanese firms will take the liberty of disposing of the articles as they please.

(b) In such cases, should the Dutch merchants wish to repurchase from the organizations those articles which the latter had already purchased, they have no other way of doing so except by paying new prices. The Japanese Government cannot order that small business of this kind be conducted on the old price level.

2. The following information was added in reference to the above:

The only way in which this question can be settled quickly is to settle it by agreement in Batavia for payments in general, agreement especially providing for actual and quick conversion of Japan's funds for the purchase of Netherlands East Indies products—namely, the 80,000,000 yen which the Netherlands East Indies had frozen—into payment for these products. The question of the 20,000,000 yen, the money with which the Netherlands East Indies were to make purchases (please refer to my #466[a]), will be discussed after the aforementioned matter has been settled.

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[a] Not available.

[b] Probably PABST, Netherlands Minister to Tokyo.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 1124

FROM: Batavia — August 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #811.

Secret outside the Department.

According to intelligences, the Government in Batavia is making the following preparations for possible eventualities:

1. *Commandeering by the Military*

A. All automobiles used and maintained by the people have already been registered.

B. An investigation is being made as to number of horses. (This is now going on.)

2. *Steps being taken with regard to the destruction and burning of property in the event of an invasion by an enemy.*

A. All villages and towns within the rice producing areas of Java (persons in charge of this work have already been assigned) have been instructed to burn all of the unhulled ----- rice.

B. Rice mills have been ordered to destroy their milling machines and to burn their stored grain.

C. Coconut processing plants, bean processing plants, and petroleum refineries have been similarly instructed.

D. Iron mills have been instructed to destroy their lathes, drilling machines, electric equipment and blast furnaces.

With regard to the evacuation of inhabitants, all of the Netherlands East Indies has been divided up into three parts:

A. *Fighting areas*

(They have completed preparations for the evacuation of inhabitants from these areas in which fighting will occur.)

B. *Possible areas in which military activities might be conducted.*

(They are at the present time making preparations for handling the evacuation of inhabitants from areas of this category.)

C. *Areas in which fighting is unlikely.*

(There is no need to evacuate inhabitants from this area.)

All those measures have been designated as compulsory Government orders, and though the Government will not obstruct voluntary evacuation of inhabitants, from the standpoint of public order they are following a policy of not requiring the evacuation of residents from areas mentioned above until such time as it becomes necessary.

Trans. 8–15–41

No. 1125

FROM: Tokyo — August 14, 1941
TO: Batavia — # 480.

Strictly secret.

1. For various matters of convenience in handling, we would like to have wires from the B.O.M.[a] sent as request messages henceforth to the Fuel Bureau because the South Seas Industrial Company has already been dissolved and its functions taken over by the Imperial Petroleum interests.

2. Please transmit the following to the B.O.M. from the Fuel Bureau.

"Please wire answers on the following questions:

"*a.* The contract period for prospecting being about to expire, have you secured permits for future prospecting and mining?

"*b.* Not long ago you expressed the opinion that there was little hope for the time being of securing rights for the operation of machines used in drilling. Bring me up to date on intelligences on this matter.

"*c.* You have expressed the desire to evacuate Japanese employees residing in Soerabaja on schedule. Please send me your opinions on the subject."

3. It is thought that we should transport as scheduled petroleum from the Sa[b] too. What are your opinions in regard to this matter?

---

[a] Japanese concern operating in the Netherlands East Indies.

[b] Kana spelling—they may be referring to the Sapt Company which is a Japanese subsidized company operating in Timor.

Trans. 8–19–41

No. 1126

FROM: Batavia August 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 821.

This telegram is a request telegram. I will begin with the business.

No. 821. Secret.

To the Fuel Section from the BOM head office.

A. On the 11th of August I presented a written request to the head of the Bureau of Mines regarding exploitation (?) of new mine areas. On the 13th the Director of the Bureau of Mines sent back a written reply to the effect that in view of present conditions the signing of such an agreement was impossible. I requested an audience with the Director of the Bureau of Mines on the 16th and received the following reply.

A. The ratification of the agreement regarding the Sankuriran Mines Nos. 6 and 2 would be postponed to a suitable occasion.

A notification from the government of Batavia to the effect that while there was no objection to the agreement itself yet in view of the changing conditions it would be unavoidable that the ratification be postponed.

(Please change the above A to (1)).

(2) I wired to the Dutch Government in June in regard to the No. 1 "A" mine in Sankuriran of 29,800 hectares and the mining agreement however there has been no answer as yet and I have ascertained that this delay is due to the fact that the minister concerned is travelling and therefore even though there was an answer ratification would be impossible. The Consul General and I are scheduled to have a conference with "HO" in the near future and I will report the result.

B. I have studied the matter of imports and it appears that it will be necessary to have the approval of the N.E.I. Government and in view of conditions obtaining at present there is little likelihood of obtaining this.

C. As soon as permission is obtained from the Naval commander and a ship can be found the nine persons are scheduled to leave.

D. Please do not send the new mining machinery until the mining problem is settled. The machinery in Soerabaja is nearly all loaded for shipment here.

This is the end.

From the Communications Section to all: Let's do our best.

Trans. 9–2–41

No. 1127

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 822.

Confidential.

The gist of the conference of the 16th is that when the question of the Mitsui tankers was brought up Hofstraaten wished to delay a reply until the 18th for the following reasons:

(a) Receipt of instructions from London;
(b) Verifying the attitude of the BPM and K companies;
(c) Van Mook is too ill to issue any instructions.

However, according to part 1 of special message # 214[a] from Imagawa to Manager Seki, a credit of ¥400,000 has been arranged in the Japan branch of the Handels-Bank for rubber and tin. The Dutch seem unwilling to determine their position regarding exports of all commodites,

and difficulties are expected in the incidental negotiations, with special reference to the fundamental question of regulating barter exchange.

The best plan would be to have the Finance Ministry make arrangements for specie transfers in order to avoid further troublesome delays.

The gist of my message #807[b], referring to the Dutch reply, was that we should urge Hofstraaten to have the Dutch policy regarding export permits to Japan decided without delay as they seem to be reluctant to make a reply, and we have waited for a long time.

---

[a] See III, 1128.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 1128

FROM: Batavia — August 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #826.

Using padding[a] at the beginning and ending of the main text.

#826. Request message for Specie Bank. From Imagawa to the president. #214. In today's conversations only questions requiring immediate consideration were taken up.

(1) In regard to the question of export permits for petroleum involving Mitsui Bussan's three tankers, it will be impossible to get a reply before Monday afternoon, (you will please learn the reasons from the Foreign Office), and the same will be true of that which is to be loaded on the Eiyo Maru for the Rising Sun Co. (In case the latter loads from storage tanks in Dutch territory off Singapore, it will be necessary to secure permits from the Dutch East Indies Government, but if it is loaded from storage tanks within British territory, permits will need to be secured from the Malay Government and the N.E.I. Government will have nothing to do with it. Please remember this point.

(2) Referring to the matter of exports of petroleum, the chief of the control board suggested in regard to unpaid balances on shipments already made to Japan, as well as payments on petroleum exports yet to be made, at least such obligations as Japan now has or may have in the future to the BPM, the Colonial, or the Rising Sun companies, (including the profits of the petroleum companies in Japan); that these be paid by deposits held by the Yokohama Specie Bank in the Java Bank, or else guarantees that it will be all right to ----- these, will be made conditions for the export of petroleum. He added that this is not given as conditions for the petroleum companies, and furthermore that a detailed statement of present balances of petroleum accounts which Japan owes, will be submitted by about Tuesday. Please give the matter study and advise at once as to whether or not these conditions are acceptable. (While their aforementioned demands are for the purpose of making sure of the payment of petroleum bills, there is a danger that they will suspend exports of petroleum unless Japan consents to them.)

(3) The item of the HANDERUSU Bank[b]. ----- was supposed to send an amount of the equivalent of 350,000 ticals to Japan, but the dealers at that place had no more than --5,000 ticals in foreign money, and they could not send more, and the control board director suggested that this ----- be accommodated with 400,000 ticals. I replied that we would consent to this if he would give a definite promise of export permits for rubber and tin. He would not agree to this on the grounds that it involves the whole basic problem; but inasmuch as giving relief to the factory alone, without any relief to the HANDERUSU Bank,[b] would put the control director in a difficult position, and as relief is very urgent, he requests that we yield the point and consent.

If we refuse this, it may be difficult to continue the negotiations with them, and as there is the danger that if the Japanese banks get into the same difficulty we would have no way of relief for them; therefore would you not be willing, just this once, to yield the point in regard to "free guilders" and give consent. The manager of the said bank will be making representation as to the internal conditions of the bank. Please reply by Monday.

(4) The item mentioned in paragraph 5 of ----- 211: As we have consented to the payment ----- Dutch East Indies goods being exported to China, please have the Shanghai branch issue letters of credit.

This is all.

---

[a] Literal translation: "pillow words".

[b] Handels Bank.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 1129

FROM: Tokyo August 19, 1941
TO: Batavia #500.

Request message.

From the Yokohama Specie Bank to Imagawa:

It is the trend here to feel that your efforts should be directed toward reaching a solution of the main problem inasmuch as the matter of the Handels Bank can be disposed of as soon as the items mentioned in your telegram have been settled.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 1130

FROM: Batavia (Japanese Consul) August 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #857.

Re your #500[a].

The general subject discussed included the question of importing such war materials as tin and rubber. In view of the fact that we did not succeed in arriving at a more satisfactory agreement than we did, despite the fact that our plenipotentiary and I had negotiated so long and so patiently, I hardly think that we could reach a satisfactory agreement in so far as these materials are concerned at this time when the attitude of the Netherlanders is growing worse because of our having occupied French Indo-China. So long as we deem an agreement on the general items as essential before any specific items may be considered, this question will never be settled. In the meantime, the branch of the Mitsui Bank here, which is in need of emergency relief, will have to close down and this would have a disastrous effect on the credit of one of Japan's biggest banking institutions. It will lead to the closing also of the Handerusu[b] and to the complication of the situation to such an extent that it would be impossible to dispose of the question. Although I am quite indignant over the way in which the Netherlands have been acting recently, I believe it would be of an advantage to us if we would at this time quickly dispose of the Handerusu question, which involves only a small amount of money, and

free as soon as possible our frozen funds and proceed to buy whatever is purchasable. Please reply immediately.

---

[a] See III, 1129.
[b] Kana spelling for Handels Bank.

Trans. 8-23-41

No. 1131

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

August 24, 1941
#873.

(Secret outside of the Department.)

Re your #513[a].

From IMAGAWA to the Yokohama Specie Bank.

Although the telegraphic office here has wired to make sure if the #215 which you mention has been transmitted, I have requested the office to investigate again. However, to make sure, I am wiring you the same message again:
#215 From IMAGAWA to the Manager of Yokohama Specie Bank.
I am submitting my opinion for your reference as follows: As to the matter in the third paragraph of my #214, even if the Netherlands East Indies Government permits the export of the petroleum, so long as a guarantee is not furnished by this bank, I expect that the oil company will at the last minute refuse to load the oil. Furthermore, it seems that their real intention is to cancel simultaneously by means of this guarantee the funds of the said oil company frozen by Japan. Will you, therefore, study the matter? Especially with this in mind, the above is -----.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 1132

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

August 20, 1941
#854.

Re your #488[a].

I told HOOGSTRATEN the gist of the statement and he said that since it is obvious that the Dutch merchants in the Kansai[b] have been very much aroused, it is not known whether Consul General PENNINK has become more or less nervous under those influences or not. HOOGSTRATEN thinks that one cause of the outbreak of the trouble was, on the one hand, the snoopy attitude of the Tokyo central authorities, and on the other hand, the unfriendly attitude of the Kobe authorities.

I replied that, if possible, I will try from now on to have negotiations handled through the legation.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Osaka Kobe region.

Trans. 8-23-41

No. 1133

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) August 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo #861.

(Abstract.)

The editors of the Chinese editions of the "To-Indo Nippo"[a] and the "Shinarusutan"[a] have been arrested by the local police and the two papers suspended for one week.

---

[a] Japanese subsidized.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 1134

FROM: Batavia (Consul) August 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo #860.

(Abstract.)

On the 21st the N.E.I. authorities in Java (apparently on orders of the military) ordered that, in addition to Dutch, only Malay and English may be used in telephone calls. Japanese is forbidden, and since this is seriously inconvenient, representations are requested so that the use of Japanese may be permitted.

Whether this ban extends to other islands of the N.E.I. is not yet known.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 1135

FROM: Batavia August 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo #863.

Strictly confidential.

Due to their confidential nature this office has been handling as request messages a large number of messages from the branch of the South Seas Co. to the head office and now due to the "freezing" regulations the said company cannot withdraw funds to reimburse us and so for the present they are not able to pay their telegraph bill to us. Please get the amount that we have advanced from the head office and remit it to us.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 1136

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #866.

HWANG CHANG CH'I, after making proposals to Japan and the Harmony Societies last January, met the most obstinate hostility and oppression on the part of Government officials. Nevertheless, he completely ignored this and finally about the middle of May the restrictions against him were removed. HWANG reports that at that time the Government officials in the People's Council gave a very brief and vague explanation of the Tamurin[a] affair, as you pointed out. He says that no great to-do was made over the matter and that the documents and money confiscated at the time of the incident were returned. He reports that the officials are, however, merely waiting for actual proof and are in the meantime on the alert.

However, knowing that the Government officials had their eye on HWANG constantly, and were out to get him in particular, we Japanese put the soft pedal on direct pro-Japanese propaganda and slowed up on our advocacy of an Asiatic ideology in these islands.

HWANG, however, kept heaping coals of fire on the heads of the Hsinpao (sic) faction, who blindly advocates war. He kept remarking cynically that newcomers in the political field, mere novices, were the first to yell for war and that now they are the ones who are the worst put out through the rupture of Japanese imports because of the recent order freezing capital. He kept stating openly that this was just retribution to such hypocrites. This naturally did not please the insular government by and large and I was afraid that they would clamp down on any direct activities on the part of Hwang and his subordinates, so I took great care to explain to him our point of view.

Late last June in a general meeting of Japanese stock companies, as well as in a general meeting of the Harmony Societies, I left it up to the heads of those concerns and those societies to improve the prestige of our nation. Since then we have gradually set the stage. HWANG has just come of his own accord and told an official in charge in my office that he wishes again to start his direct activities in our behalf. The official in charge told him that in view of the attitude of the insular government officials toward Japan and the present general crisis, we Japanese are indeed interested, without being too conspicuous, in rounding up some supporters who will speak out for us frankly. My official then advised him to go ahead and organize a group of henchmen and start to work procuring for us political, military and all other possible intelligence. So we accepted his proposition.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-25-41

No. 1137

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #874.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your #514[a].

The attitude of the Netherlands East Indies Government toward the question of exporting military supplies to Japan has been explained to you from time to time since the days when negotiations were being held between the two countries. Ever since the occupation by our forces of French Indo-China, this attitude seems to have stiffened further. Thinking that it

is necessary to ascertain how earnest they are in this attitude, I took a few opportunities which presented themselves during the last three weeks and exchanged opinions regarding the general question of Japanese-Netherlands East Indies relations, spending several hours with HO[b], Chief of the Trade Bureau; RO[c], Chief of the East Asia Bureau; and SUPITTO, the Vice-Governor, respectively. I am giving below points in their remarks regarding the expression of which they were unremitting and emphatic, and upon which they concurred among themselves exactly.

1. (a) It is not enough for the Netherlanders to call Germany an enemy; they like to call it a country of devils. They do not harbor special hate against Japan, but there is no possibility of the relations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies improving so long as Japan remains on ally of this devilish country and follows a policy based on that alliance.

(b) Regardless of what sort of explanation Japan may make, the occupation of southern French Indo-China by the Japanese forces is a direct threat to the Netherlands East Indies, and it is unmistakable that Japan is planning to attack the Netherlands East Indies in the near future.

(c) A threat to the Netherlands East Indies is, at the same time, a threat to Great Britain and the United States. Regarding this point, both Britain and the United States agree with the Netherlands East Indies. Therefore, although the Netherlands East Indies are not acting under order from Britain and the United States, so long as Japan has military bases in southern French Indo-China, it is only natural that the Netherlands East Indies' policy with regard to Japan will be parallel to that of Britain and the United States, and the situation is such that it precludes the necessity of the Netherlands East Indies.

(d) Under these circumstances it is absolutely impossible to supply Japan with materials which would contribute toward Japan's military strength.

(e) In other words, without Japan's withdrawing from the Three-power Alliance and maintaining neutrality and without her withdrawing her army, air forces, and navy from southern French Indo-China, there is no way of improving the relations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies.

2. If it is impossible to improve such views held by the leaders in the Netherlands East Indies regarding this question, although I had come all the way from Japan for the second time in hopes of improving the relations, there is nothing I can do now. With both the statements issued by the government and the ideas telegraphed to me by you in my mind, I have explained and emphatically stated to them that both the fact that Japan's policy is based on the third-power alliance and the fact that Japan had dispatched troops to southern French Indo-China as a defensive measure are a matter of a definite policy and, therefore, unchangeable; but the aforementioned three men refused to acknowledge this. Although the aforementioned interviews were held on my own initiative, it is, I believe, not incorrect to say that the views expressed by these three men represent a definite policy of the Netherlands East Indies Government. We must, therefore, expect that the policy that the Netherlands East Indies Government will hereafter follow will always arise from the fundamental standpoint explained above, though at times it may be lenient and at other times stringent.

3. I can very well understand why you had submitted to Minister PA[d] what you mentioned in your caption telegram. PA, however, has been away from the Netherlands East Indies for a long time, and since he has not contacted, the atmosphere which has been prevailing in these islands since the start of the European war, his ideas are ----- ----- -----, and it is clear that the Government here does not take them seriously.

4. Although you have reported to me already that the Netherlands East Indies Government, upon deciding what its fundamental policy should be in the matter of exporting materials (including petroleum) to Japan, will inform me of that policy, it is not hard to surmise that the nature of that policy will be highly unsatisfactory to us; and furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, since the attitude of the Netherlands East Indies Government is already a fixed

attitude, it will not afford us a chance no matter how we negotiate. I believe it very urgent that the Japanese Government at once give up the expectation it has been entertaining toward the Netherlands East Indies Government and, by formulating an entirely new policy toward these islands, take definite steps for securing fuel. Furthermore, I think it might be well for you to postpone for sometime your negotiations with PA and also not to quote the names of the aforementioned three persons to him.

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[a] Not available.
[b] HOOGSTRATEN.
[c] ROFINCK.
[d] PABST, Netherlands Minister to Tokyo.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 1138

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo Unnumbered.

To the Vice Minister.

1. Last October when I was on the point of taking up my post here, there were in Japan those who advocated force as well as those who advocated peace toward these islands, and there was no unity of opinion. I felt that there was much I could contribute to the Empire, well aware as I was of the urgent need in our country for Netherlands Indies goods, and knowing, too, that the international situation, as well as the Imperial Government's strong policies toward the Netherlands East Indies, had as yet not crystallized, because I had been able to bring about the Isizawa-Haruto agreement and, to the extent to which the agreement was successful, I had won the confidence of the Netherlands authorities. I was convinced that, could I secure petroleum concessions and supplies of other essential goods, even though to no great extent, I would be contributing something to my country's welfare. Even though I should fail in doing this, it would be possible for me, through continued negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies, to watch the development of their fundamental policies toward Japan and I then, too, could help in the formation of our counterpolicies. Consequently, as helpless and as ineffective an individual as I am, I took upon myself the responsibilities of this office and took up my post here.

In time, Yoshizawa was dispatched as a special representative of the Imperial Government. For over half a year I have labored with him in continuing our conversations with the representatives of the Netherlands East Indies and, though our successes were not great, we were to a certain extent able to realize the aims which I had set for myself before I came here.

However, after our military forces had occupied French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies Government demonstrated the changes that had taken place in their anti-Japanese policy. As I have told you in my successive wires, it is clear that the general opinion, as well as the opinion of influential persons with whom I have been in contact was summarized by Bureau Chief VAN MOOK in his speech to the People's ----- Association. Henceforth, it is a fact that the results we may be able to secure will hardly be worth mentioning for their opinions will crystallize more strongly against us.

2. Furthermore, as for myself, though I will, of course, continue to extend my best efforts in order that questions concerning Japanese residents in these islands, as well as the various questions relating to the freezing regulations, can be brought to an early settlement, I feel that

it is necessary for me to make a personal report to the Government which will embody the multitude of details and special considerations which it will become necessary to bear in mind if we are to bring about even a temporary betterment in their policies toward us. Therefore, I would like to return home at an appropriate time not too far in the future.

Furthermore, as you are well aware, the climate of the torrid zone is most oppressive. Negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands Indies are ever lengthening. A multitude of miscellaneous problems having to do with the freezing regulations are continuing to present themselves. Night and day, without rest, I am forced to strive for the Empire. In the temperate zone I could continually spur myself on to greater efforts. However, I am finding it extremely difficult to make any recovery here from the fevers that beset me and emaciate my body. Though I regret it very much, at this time it is my most earnest desire that I be permitted to return home. After you have duly considered this, please wire me your permission to return home.

Trans. 9-2-41

No. 1139

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #900.

(Request message.)

To KURIBAYASHI from SAITO.

We see no opportunity of bettering the trade situation now in the doldrums. Of military goods we have been able to secure 230 tons of copra and 50 tons of hemp. In addition, we have made application for the export of 15 tons of cotton cloth and 825 tons of hemp thread for the manufacture of tatami[a]. It is possible for us to purchase 40,000 guilders' worth of material during the month of October. Therefore, please secure the approval of the Treasury Department, as well as the Yokohama Specie Bank so that our enterprises here can carry on their business affairs.

We shall endeavor to maintain at present figures the number of employees and coolies necessary for the operation of compressed air machines, equipment for the dehydration of products, as well as other necessary works. It is urgently required that we develop a counter-policy to offset the ever-expanding -----.

[a]Floor matting.

Trans. 9-341

No. 1140

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo #904.

For my information, please send the fact concerning the mass resignation of the Japanese staff of the Handels Bank in Japan and of other Dutch firms as well as the facts concerning other boycotting actions.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 1141

FROM: Batavia — September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #906.

Secret outside the Department.

On the 4th, Secretary YAMAGUCHI is leaving Soerabaja for Japan aboard the Johore Maru. Since I am sending secret documents in his custody; please arrange at your discretion for his passing the customs at Yokohama with ease and convenience. Likewise, please make special arrangements to send a telegraphic official in order to take these things into custody afterward.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 1142

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) — September 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #902.

Re the first part of Circular #261[a] from Ambassador HONDA.

1. Conditioned by our military invasion of French Indo-China, it is a fact that the government of these islands has drastically stepped up their anti-Japanese tendencies and very evidently assumed an attitude of aid to China. This is evidenced by the unconvincing control exercised by the authorities here over the anti-Japanese editorials of the Chinese press, the solicitation of funds for the construction of military airplanes for Chungking among Chinese resident here, and their demand for suspension of publication of the Japanese-operated *East India Daily News*, Chinese character edition, as well as the Malayan language magazine, *Sinarusuratan*. However, on the other hand, in order that we may give a sufficiently clear picture of the situation, there is a small group of Chinese resident here whose anti-Japanese tendencies have slightly improved as a result of the activities of the government here. However, no sooner than they got the impression that these Chinese were coming slightly closer to us in feeling, it could be seen that they began to exercise their old tendencies on a still greater scale. Japanese who had good contacts with Chinese here were unmercifully exiled, and these Chinese friends were hauled unceremoniously to the police stations for questioning or possibly taken before the person in charge of Chinese affairs here. It has been anonymously reported that a statement has been made that they are in danger of their lives. Thus, they have begun to hinder our schemes with regard to the Chinese with more and more determination.

2. Therefore, when an excellent opportunity presented itself, I deliberately took the occasion to exchange arguments on the Sino-Japanese incident with the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, RO[b], who is chiefly in charge, within the government circles, of the handling of the Chinese question. At that time, the fundamental points of his argument relating to the Chinese here, I am giving below for your information.

(a) "I have lived in China, many, many years. In addition, since my return to the Netherlands East Indies, ten years ago, I have gradually come into repute in my handling of the Chinese question. I think I am pretty well aware of matters having to do with the Chinese, but the fact that Japan has set up the Nanking regime and is very anxious to overthrow the regime of CHIANG KAI-SHEK is, I think, extremely foolhardy and has slight chance of success. I, personally, cannot condone Japan's effort to beguile the Chinese masses from CHIANG KAI-SHEK through the establishment of the Nanking Government made up of second-rate or worse individuals. There is no more logical course for Japan to follow in the settlement of the China incident than to reach a compromise with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. This is my firm belief.

(b) "Though it is said that there are practically no Chinese living here in the Netherlands East Indies who support the Nanking Government, this is actually no exaggeration. All Chinese here give their support to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Furthermore, the Dutch Government recognizes the CHIANG regime, and because she does not recognize the Nanking regime, it can be clearly seen that the Netherlands Government entertains the same convictions.

(c) "WANG CHING-WEI, who heads the Nanking Government, is sold on the Asia doctrine. He advocates Sino-Japanese peace. His fundamental policy is the expulsion of the white man from East Asia. It is but natural that the Netherlands East Indies Government should oppose this theory. Therefore, the consequent reaction here is the decision to follow a course of seeing to it that the Chinese on these islands are not swept off their feet.

(d) "At the present time, martial law has been put into effect on these islands, and everything is on a wartime footing. The people are united, and in order that the Netherlands home government might be restored, they are ready to fight. The 1,500,000 Chinese resident here on these islands are an important and integral part of the society of the Netherlands Indies. Their well-being greatly affects the peace, order, and economic livelihood of all living on these islands. Therefore, the Netherlands Indies authorities have definitely decided to follow a policy of unequivocally crushing out political schemes from abroad directed toward the Chinese resident here."

3. Having said all this, I endeavored to refute him with all the strength that I could command. RO, however, would not be convinced and adamantly stuck to his statements. Not only is the situation like this, but recently the fact that the police strength on these islands has been greatly augmented has made it extremely difficult for us to carry on our schemes toward the Chinese residents here. As a consequence, the situation practically means that we can do nothing directly. Therefore, I would like to have our organs here for the manipulation of public opinion as well as those who work in the development of our schemes remain passive for a little while. For the time being, we are concentrating our efforts in the collection of intelligences having to do with the activities of Chinese here as well as other things.

4. Therefore, in the meantime, until we have securely brought French Indo-China and Thai within our sphere of influence, I think that it would be most propitious for us to strengthen our schemes with regard to the Chinese here. For this purpose, I would like to have sent to these islands influential persons in whom the Nanking Government has much confidence, who can command large numbers of followers among the Chinese here, who will have for their main objective the preaching of the doctrine that the Chinese and the Japanese are one, as well as set up organizations to influence Chinese opinion. These men would have absolutely no relations with either this office or with Japanese persons but would meet in large and small groups and talk with influential Chinese as well as substantial individuals of that group here.

Please transmit this message to Ambassador HONDA in China, and to other competent diplomatic officials to whom this information, in your good judgment, might be usable.

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[a] Not available.

[b] ROFINCK.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 1143

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo #921.

Secret outside the Department.

Re your # 510[a].

1. Since then I have conferred with the banks concerned to work out a practical method and have drawn up the following proposal:

(1) Permission has not yet been issued generally with regard to receiving of deposits made by Japanese.

(2) In the case of bank deposits, we believe that we should accommodate those who are withdrawing from the islands by our accepting their deposits but that we should do so on condition that a method of payment be held in reserve so that we may avoid the danger of the deposits being assessed in case of default in payment of obligations. Those who are withdrawing from the islands should, before their departure, follow the procedure of filling out a fixed form requesting the consulates to take custody of their money in guilders, but actually have the Yokohama Specie Bank or the Bank of Taiwan take the money in trust (in case of those residing in islands in which there are no Japanese Banks, the money should be collected at the consulate and remitted to either Soerabaja or Batavia).

----- the banks which have thus accepted the money in trust should draw up a detailed list of the deposits and send the list through the consulates to both the Foreign Office and to their main offices and complete all procedures that would enable the banks to make loans.

(3) In view of the necessity of keeping secret from the Netherlands Government the fact of thus making loans of the money in Japan, the South Seas Association should be made to act as an intermediary body, giving all advice relative to the movement of those who have withdrawn from the islands, as well as determining quickly in all cases the amount of loan to be made and thus be responsible for issuance of loans.

2. We would like to put this proposition into effect at once if you have no objections to offer and so we would appreciate your wiring us your reply at once.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-6-41

No. 1144

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Batavia Circular # 1946.

It is necessary to decide what sort of explanation should be given in Japan and in your area with regard to deposit security loans to be made to agriculturists and to the Japanese who are withdrawing from the islands. Will you, therefore, take up the matter with the branches of the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan respectively and wire me at once your decision with regard to the following items? Will you also keep the matter in strict secrecy, since there is no telling that there is no danger of the plan failing as a result of carelessness on the part of Japanese residents, and devise methods most suited to the actual conditions.

1. In the case of cash accounts of special cash accounts, would it be possible to convert that portion which serves as a loan security into a fixed deposit and to keep the certificates of deposit in care of the branch banks? Is there not a danger of its becoming known to the outsiders even if it is possible?

2. In case the certificates cannot be kept in the banks, is there a convenient method whereby they could be transferred to the Consul Generals' office for keeping and whereby the depositors could thereafter be prevented from drawing on the deposits?

3. What method should be used to establish connection for the purpose of ascertaining the difference resulting from loan repayment and deposit repayment in the event it is impossible to carry with oneself a bankbook or a certificate of deposit.

4. In the case referred to in paragraph # 3, by what method would it be possible to identify the drawer with the depositor?

5. In case some members of a family are withdrawing and the other members are remaining, by what method may information be exchanged with regard to the (amount?) of loan to be made between loan payments and deposit payments? Is there any method whereby the withdrawal of the portion applied to loan security can be prevented?

Trans. 9–11–41

No. 1145

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Menado #38.

Re your message #94[a].

Secret outside the Department.

While I have great sympathy for the blows suffered by our people living abroad, the complete settlement of the problem is not simply a question of our relations with Netherlands East Indies. In a time of difficulty like the present, Japanese living at home and abroad must impartially bear sacrifices. I am very much afraid that people who, as a result of temporary discomfort and unnecessary panic, give up their rights and privileges by such a compromise as leaving the country will find it impossible to get new passports and come back to reopen their businesses unless there is a complete change in the future. Even if there is no possibility of attracting business now, try to persuade our people to stay for a few months at least, even if their books show a deficit. Get them to stand firm rather then flee from danger, and work out a policy which fits the local circumstances. For the present there is nothing to do about trade and shipping except to decide again when Netherlands East Indies shall have issued definite instructions in regard to supplying goods to Japan.

Please notify Batavia, Macassar, -----, -----, from Batavia ----- to here ----- ----- -----.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11–17–41

No. 1146

FROM: Tokyo September 5, 1941
TO: Batavia (Riyoji) #547.

Re your #333[a].

Am sending all of the 4000 yen disbursements for this year out of the trade promotion fund, office expense and miscellaneous funds. Therefore, please arrange for intelligence reports to be sent from time to time.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–9–41

No. 1147

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #938.

(To be handled in government code.)

To the Vice-Minister.

1. On the 5th, HO[a] called on me and said that according to a report sent by Consul ISHIZAWA to PA[b], the Netherlands East Indies Government will hereafter refuse to permit the export of petroleum to Japan unless Japan:

a. Issues a statement declaring that by her occupation of French Indo-China, she has no intention of attacking the Netherlands East Indies; and

b. Withdraws her troops from -----.

He proceeded to explain, saying, "Even if the aforementioned *a* and *b* were carried out, an unconditional export of petroleum would not be permitted, and the kinds of oil which will be permitted will be limited to those which would not increase the fighting power of Japan. Experts were at work then in order to decide what kinds of oil will be included in this category. Since I had expected the results to be defined in the near future, I confidentially gave you the information, and since you persistently questioned me, I confidentially disclosed to you in a frank manner what I knew of trends in the Government. I did not make any demands upon -----. However, the content of a telegram from PA differed greatly from the information I had given you, and since it was given in such a form as if the Netherlands East Indies Government was demanding the withdrawal of troops, I have been questioned by the Governnor-General and by MO.[c] If what I tell you in confidence and as a special favor is going to be misrepresented in such a way, I had better refrain hereafter from telling you frankly what I think."

There was nothing in my report which could have caused such a misunderstanding. This, it seems to me, was due to Minister PA himself confusing the issues pertaining to concessions, with those pertaining to the sale of oil, because of his lack of sufficient understanding of the history of the matter. I would like to have a wire of inquiry sent.

2. Now HO had spoken frankly about this matter to me as a special favor because he was in close touch with me five years ago when he was assisting HA in arranging the ISHIZAWA-HARUTO agreement, and because after the agreement had been signed, he had, together with me, assisted in the solution in Japan of the questions which arose between the Exporters' Guild and the Netherlands business firms. As it may be clearly gauged from the conversations which took place between me and HO during the recent Japanese-Netherlands negotiations, in many cases HO's opinions ultimately form the policy of the Netherlands East Indies Government and, therefore, should he hereafter cease talking to me, it would become extremely difficult for us to judge the trend of affairs. I, therefore, ask you to invite Minister PA to your office as soon as possible and get him to wire a telegram of explanation in order to correct this misunderstanding. I think this would help to clarify my position as well as HO's to the Governor-General and Mo, and so please ----- the matter and wire me the gist of the conversation you had.

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[a] HOOGSTRATEN.
[b] PABST.
[c] VAN MOOK, Director of Economic Affairs.

Trans. 9-20-41

No. 1148

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Batavia #552.

Re my #550[a].

At noon today, the 6th, the Finance Ministry granted, as a special favor limited to this time only, export permission to the Dutch firms. The permit covers the total amount of 1,588,100 yen and about 1200 or 1300 tons. Please tell HO[b] the circumstances which I have explained in my past telegrams and which led the Foreign Office and the related offices to offer this facility. Furthermore, no matter in how friendly a manner it is considered, under the present circumstances we cannot issue a permit for the amount handled by Handel's. Both the Ministry and HA understand the situation very well, and they are wiring the details to the Netherlands East Indies Government. Please be so informed.

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[a] Not available.
[b] HOOGSTRATEN.

Trans. 9–10–41

No. 1149

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Batavia #553.

From the Fuel Bureau to B.O.M.

We think that 12,000 gilders' worth of crude oil will not keep up business for more than a single month's time.

It is true that recently 10,000 gilders were remitted through the Mitsui Bank, but the Dutch East Indies officials, having frozen it, did not reimburse us; and so, henceforth, for the sake of continuing business, we believe that we must once more devise a means of raising funds. After conferring with the Consul-General, the Yokohama Specie Bank, and other competent persons regarding the above policy on raising funds, by all means please wire me your ideas.

Now, in addition, I want you to do everything in your power in connection with refunding the 10,000 gilders to Mitsui.

Trans. 9–11–41

No. 1150

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #935.

Repeat message.

From the B.O.M. Home Office to the Fuel Bureau.

The Exchange Control Board notified the Mitsui Bank in Soerabaja that it will not permit remittances to be sent from Japan to the B.O.M. accordingly, although we are now conferring with each of the interested parties with regard to some counter plan to this. Yesterday, we received a wire to the effect that 10,000 gilders had been remitted from the guilds. After

this until there is an order from this office, do not let anything like this happen. Address all wires meant for B.O.M. to this home office.

Will your office kindly assume the responsibility of wiring this to the guilds.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 1151

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #934.

Secret outside the Department.

Re telegraphic matter.

1. Will you please devise code words and send them by return wire for the following firms in addition to the list which you have given in your Circular #1907[a] and your separate telegram #531[b]:

B.O.M.; Takeda Chobei; Nanyō Kaiun; Nomura Tōinko Shokusan; Daidō Bōeki; and Iwai Shōten.

2. There are two of your messages numbered #544[b]. One deals with a German Consul embarking on a Japanese ship and the other has to do with the loading of ships in Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies. Please be informed that we have filed the latter as your #549[b].

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[a] See III, 644.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 1152

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 10, 1941
TO: Batavia #570.

Re your #934[a].

Code Words	*Company*
OTFUV	Takeda Chōbei
OVDAW	Nanyō Kaiun
OSGOT	Nomura Kaigaijigyōbu
IFTIG	Daidō Trading Company
IGSOH	Iwai Shōten

As to messages having to do with B.O.M., those whose content ----- requires strict secrecy should be sent in machine code or in some secure Foreign Office code.

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[a] See III, 1151.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 1153

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Singapore, Batavia Cir. # 1947.

(Strictly secret.)

After you have made an immediate investigation on the following matters, please make a report, sending it to us in an appropriate manner.

1. Please inform me as to the various types of fishing entered into by Japanese from the point of view of their use in fishing of gasoline-powered vessels ("gasoline-powered vessels" is a military term for vessels known as "sea arks" which have a considerable cruising ability).

2. In regard to these fishing concerns who operate these so-called "sea arks";

(a) List the number of vessels for each concern separately.

(b) Give the tonnage of each vessel.

(c) The speed of each vessel.

(d) Whether or not they have wireless equipment.

(e) Give the present position of each ship.

(f) Should we require the use of these fishing vessels, please advise us as to the method by which we could transmit instructions for each vessel. (This is particularly important.)

(g) The time of day we should wire these orders. (This is particularly important.)

(h) Please ascertain the length of time required subsequent to receipt of orders to move from their present position to the southern part of French Indo-China.

Trans. 9–10–41

No. 1154

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 943.

Strictly Secret.

Re your Circular # 1947[a].

1. The Taichen Company (owned and operated by Noboru Ogura) and the Ōshiro Company (owned and operated by Moryuki Ōshiro) are the two fishing Companies operating here.

2. (*a* to *e*) The Taichen Company operates four ships; the Ōshiro two ships. All vessels are propelled by 80 h.p. gasoline engines. The tonnage of these ships is 20 to 25 tons. They have a speed of 7 knots. Cruising range for the vessels of the Taichen Company is thirteen days and nights each. The vessels of the Ōshiro Company can stay out of port nine days and nights. None of these vessels have communication facilities. All of these vessels ply alternately from the fishing harbor of Batavia to the fishing areas of Banga and Belitoeng and return.

(f) This office can communicate to the vessels in Batavia harbor on the same day. It will require approximately one day and a half subsequent to receipt of instructions by this office for those vessels on the fishing grounds to be informed. Six days and nights will be required for these ships to sail from Batavia to the southern end of French Indo-China. With each of these vessels towing two fishing barges, eight days and nights will be required to navigate that distance.

Furthermore, three days and nights are required in sailing from the northernmost fishing area in Netherlands East Indies waters to the Natoena Islands. In their considered opinion, they must be advised at least one week before they are to start for southern French Indo-

China, in order that each of the vessels mentioned above may make preparations and make such repairs as are necessary for a safe voyage.

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[a] See III, 1153.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 1155

FROM: Batavia September 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo #950.

Re my #852[a].

(1) I am pressing them for a reply in regard to the San Diego Maru, but on the 8th when I called, HO told me that the government had decided not to permit "special Tarakan" exports. I then told him that according to Mitsui's, the Finance Ministry had told BPM that permits would not be issued for the "gasoil" and "Tarakan diesel" that they had expected to load on the Kiyo Maru and the Teiyo Maru, and asked him if this was true. HO replied that in the case of "gasoil" and "diesel" and also petroleum of any kind, they would be unable to make any statement until the Netherlands Government should decide upon its general policy governing export permits, and that until that decision is reached the N.E.I. authorities would not be able to give any permits on their own initiative; and BPM must have misunderstood the statement of the official in charge in regard to this.

I, therefore, asked him when he expected the general policy would be settled upon. HO replied that the Netherlands Government had not completed its consideration of the subject and that, therefore, he was unable to say when there would be a decision upon it.

(2) I told HO that in this unwarrantable attitude the Dutch were ignoring the understanding reached at the time of our negotiations, and repeatedly asked for an explanation. He remained obstinate, asserting that all this was before the invasion of French Indo-China, that at the time it was made very clear that everything would be worked out all right, providing no serious change should take place in the relations between the two countries, and that there is no occasion for our denunciations now. From the impressions I received during our conversation ----- they are trying to settle upon their future policy of exports of goods other than ----- to Japan from the standpoint of their own position, but in regard to petroleum, the intervention of Britain and the United States is strong, and they seem to be in a position of not being able to decide upon anything without the consent of Britain and the United States. The results are most unsatisfactory from our standpoint, as I think I have made clear in my reference message.

(3) This, as I have reported previously, is all based upon the threat they feel from our invasion of the southern part of French Indo-China, and upon the pressure exerted by Britain and the United States. Accordingly, unless we remove this feeling of being menaced, on the one hand, and devise plans for eliminating the activities of Britain and the United States on the other hand, merely to continue negotiations based on promises never carried out will never accomplish our ends.

(4) Therefore, when you come to negotiate with Pabst, please have these circumstances in mind and do what you can to make the best of the situation. At the same time, because of the fact that it is difficult for the government to purchase petroleum, and even if some could

be secured it is evident it would not meet our needs, I think the sooner we take the attitude that we do not care, and set up counter measures, the wiser we will be.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–16–41

No. 1156

FROM: Batavia — September 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 948.

Strictly confidential.

Re your # 531[a].

I have reported from time to time on the matter of couriers however, very recently conditions here have taken a turn for the worse. When Nomoto arrived here recently, the authorities, saying that a courier's duties had been fulfilled when he had delivered his documents, refused to grant him permission to travel away from the Consulate and in spite of continued negotiations, they have refused to modify their stand. I am sure that the couriers up to the present have been very careful on the above points, but if the courier is not skillful in foreign languages, and if his attitude and conduct are not in accord with that of an employee of the Foreign Office and, if, when he travels, he asks pointless questions of the resident Japanese, which will arouse suspicion, then the Dutch authorities will tend to become alarmed and the next step will be the prohibition of the courier system itself.

I think in this connection, it would be well not to dispatch as couriers any one other than members of the staff. Also, I think it would be desirable in view of the situation to send as a courier a secretary or someone of even higher rank, someone who is well versed in the policy of the office and cognizant of the internal situation and who would be able to carry back to the head office circumstances that defy expression in telegrams and documents.

Please make arrangements to put such a system into effect immediately.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–17–41

No. 1157

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) — September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 940.

Secret outside the department.

Because telegraphic clerk YAMAGUCHI wants to discuss telegraphic matters, he wishes to be sent to Soerabaja, Makasar, Menado, Medan, Thai, and Singapore. Please grant permissions for this, and may we hope for a speedy reply. Besides this, will you kindly agree to NOMOTO being sent home, as he wants to return after YAMAGUCHI returns to his post.

Trans. 9–12–41

No. 1158

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia

September 9, 1941
564.

Strictly confidential.

Re your # 921[a].

The results of the conference with the Finance Ministry were as follows:

1. There is some question in regard to the method of accepting the money on deposit. Even though the money is deposited in the Specie Bank or the Bank of Taiwan the books concerned should be placed in charge of the Consulate.

2. Since there may be orders issued to the head offices of the Specie Bank, and the Bank of Taiwan for the purchase of the guilder funds, it is desired that an understanding be reached with the depositors of those funds regarding the necessary procedure in the matter of issuing orders for this purchase of guilder funds and the sale again in Japan -----.

Please wire as to the total of the guilder funds on hand.

3. In case worse comes to worst and this matter should leak out to the Dutch authorities, the matter might not stop with the mere adoption of counter measures, but might result in the closure of the Consulate hence it is necessary to exercise extreme caution in all the steps taken. (For example, it might be well not to notify all evacuees but simply to take over the funds of those who request it.)

---

[a] See III, 1143.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 1159

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

September 9, 1941
946.

Referring to your Circular # 1946[a].

With reference to items 1, 2, and 3: at present the Dutch require special permission for the withdrawal of current and demand deposits, and it is risky. Planters' profits are entirely in local deposits, and the withdrawal of current and special deposits here is virtually impossible. ----- (8 groups missing) ----- please consider the following points:

(1) The issuing of certificates of balances of current and special deposits of evacuees (notification being impossible in the case of special accounts);

(2) When this has been done, the banks concerned shall earmark the entire balance, or part of it, and notify their head offices in Japan. Loans may be advanced in Japan up to the limit of these earmarked funds.

(3) The method of safeguarding the withdrawing of new deposits was described in my message # 921[b]. Further,

(4) These certificates of balances shall be presented, together with passports, as documentary proof whereupon

(5) Remittances to home may be permitted, letters of credit issued for travel use, and loans advanced in Japan against a part of these deposits.

---

[a] See III, 1144.
[b] See III, 1143.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 1160

FROM: Medan (Hayasaki) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 109.

(Part 1 of 3.)

1. a. At Pangkalan-Brandan and SC(ban ?) airplane direction detectors and observation posts had been set up.

b. Three-fourths of the petroleum factories are under heavy guard.

c. Artillery troops have come over from Java and are engaging in marksmanship exercises; however, with none too good results.

d. Just as in the case of the factories, explosives have been piled around the wells, and the Netherlands officials boast that they can blow them to smithereens in ten minutes. The other day, however, they tried to blow up some drum cans but were unable to rend them.

e. An assistant engineer of the BPM Company, a certain Malayan, came and told me confidentially that it takes time for the employees inside and outside the factories to flee to Shelter and that the destruction of the factories will require at least an hour. Still, nothing could really be done to prevent their razing. As for the oil fields, however, he said he knew where all the electric wires were laid, and in case of emergency it would certainly not be impossible to cut them.

Trans. 10–1–41

No. 1161

FROM: Medan September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 109.

(Part 2 of 3.)

2. Up until July, there were 4 cannon emplacements, 8 machine gun emplacements, and 20 trenches between Belawan[a] and Prapat[a]. (There is great difference in activity, depending on how much smuggling is being done by the Chinese; (land and sea defense lines ?)) 25 kilos to its south. However, since then there has been a marked increase, and even a motor road has been constructed. Everything is camouflaged.

3. (1) The Netherlands East Indies Government is strongly urging the *hongorō* in each village to recruit volunteers. One village near Belawan has had as many as 50 volunteers. However, I have been confidentially informed that in a crisis they would revolt.

(2) A Batak[b] driver employed by the ----- authorities confidentially informed me that 1000 bags of cement had been transported to Prapat and Tanjonbarei[c], respectively.

(3) ABASU[c] (an Atsuchie[c]), son of the Rajah of Kutaraja[d], who was exiled to Java nineteen years ago, planned to (take refuge?) in Japan.

---

[a] In northern Sumatra.
[b] Negro tribe in the Malay.
[c] Kana spelling.
[d] Northern tip of Sumatra.

Trans. 10–1–41

No. 1162

FROM: Medan (Hayasaki) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #109.

(Part 3 of 3.)

4. (1) According to our Rajamura[a], cannons have been emplaced on the Hajubukitsuto[a], Heights on the Island of Samosir[b] in Lake Toba[b] and stout bamboos have been driven in criss-cross fashion on the emergency landing fields all over Atjeh[b].

(2) The road between Lake Toba and this city is 175 kilometers long and that between Pisoso[a] and this city is very steep and is 100 kilometers long. The Hongorō[a] (formerly Chief of Police) is familiar with the geography of this region.

5. (1) The Manager of a Netherlands tea plantation, whose common-law wife is Japanese, (a reserve *officer* (?)) confidentially told me that in case of an emergency all male Japanese will be interned in a building which was formerly a hospital in -----, (at one time this building housed 480 Germans—it is big enough to accommodate 1000 persons), and that the women will not be confined in such a manner.

(2) It is rumored that the last place of internment is situated at Burankejyaren[a], south of Kotochane[a]. We have made a secret investigation but have found no trace of it. It is also rumored now that there are places of internment at the point where the road from Bakanshiapipi[a] runs into River Rokan and at Paguruarama[a] to the southeast of Benkulen[b], but we have not been able to ascertain whether this is true.

6. According to what a Tonkoarifu[a] (an Atjeh) at Kutaraja[b], the construction of the hangers at Saban[a] and other military facilites is being supervised by a Captain of ----- -----.

---

[a] Kana spelling.
[b] In Sumatra.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 1163

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) September 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #951.

Re your #558[a].

Payment to the BPM has been completed, but if, as reported to the main office of the Yokohama Specie Bank from its branch, this ship is now stopping at Purobukomu[b] in the British possession (please refer to your #473[c]), it means that the material in question will be loaded in British territory. Therefore, I think there is no other way but to have the APC and RA Companies apply to the Singapore authorities for permission. The Economic Ministry here claims that it has nothing to do with this matter, and so will you please re-investigate.

This message has been transmitted to Singapore.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] This number must be in error, as #473 concerns the Netherlands East Indies' prohibition of the use of the Japanese language in communication.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 1164

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

September 10, 1941
#953.

Message to Shanghai #13.

Re your #1318[a] addressed to the Minister.

I was under the impression that this question had been settled as a result of your efforts. However, I understand that they are experiencing difficulties in connection with the loading of the third ship (the least quantity) because of change of the official in charge and of other reasons. The Netherlands authorities have again requested us to lend our good offices. Will you, therefore, look into this matter and endeavor to settle it. After doing so, please let me know the results. This message has been transmitted to the Minister.

---

[a] See II, 1109.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 1165

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)
TO: Tokyo

September 11, 1941
#966.

Strictly confidential.

Rumors have been going around among the Dutch recently that November will be a critical month. Again according to secret information received from a Chinese working in the East Asia Bureau all local government offices in anticipation of the worst are apparently making secret preparations to move to Bandong and all workers in the East Asia Bureau have been given secret orders to make preparations for the move to Bandong during this month. I have not yet ascertained whether these rumors are so or not, but I am passing them on for what they are worth.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 1166

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

September 11, 1941
#967.

Re your #559[a].

On the 10th I called on Hofstraaten and requested an explanation of the Tzisalak's departure on the 7th without loading the goods.

He replied that on the 6th the government of the Netherlands East Indies instructed the ship to leave on the 7th, regardless of whether it had completed loading or not. We were aware of these orders, he said. (See my message #936[b].) The final permit of the Japanese Government, he continued, was granted at last during the afternoon of the 6th. However, in view of the various loading arrangements that had to be made, the captain probably was convinced that he could not possibly complete loading in the specified time limit. That was undoubtedly the reason the vessel sailed without loading the goods, the N.E.I. spokesman said.

I then advised him that we would be willing to load goods on Japanese ships from Japan to N.E.I. in accordance with the offer made by our government and asked him if export permits would be granted to ship goods out of N.E.I. on this Japanese ship's return voyage. Hofstraaten expressed his gratitude for this courtesy on our part and added that he would be delighted if at the same time the unfulfilled part of the goods internationally agreed upon could be shipped on said ship too. As to the goods to be loaded on the ship on her return voyage, he said that there would be no objections to exporting sugar and corn. As for other goods, the N.E.I. officials are at present considering the establishment of a new policy regarding exports to Japan, and requests that we await until that is determined to make any applications for export permits.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9–15–41

No. 1167

FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

September 11, 1941
#970.

Re your #567, Part 1.[a]

I negotiated through Imagawa and today the 11th received permission for the transfer of 60,000 guilders to the Specie Bank and at the same time the director of the control bureau stated that there was no objection to rescinding the freezing regulation of the Java Bank when necessary to permit transfer of funds to the Specie Bank in the future. Hence, there is now no obstacle in the way of the South Seas enterprise and since further negotiations concern the general problem, they will be postponed. (Imagawa concurs in this.)

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–17–41

No. 1168

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)
TO: Tokyo

September 11, 1941
#968.

Re your #543[a].

Thinking it would be well to sound out the attitude of the Dutch once more, I explained to ROOFINKU the official in charge of the bureau, Japan's friendly attitude in allowing the use of the Dutch language, and stated that it would be to the advantage of both parties for the international telephone service to be continued on the condition that the use of the Japanese language be permitted in return. RO replied that with marital law in force now, the prospects of permission to use the Japanese language are meager.

Accordingly I think it best to suspend the international telephone service. If it is suspended please have your office advise Minister Pabst, or else have the Ministry of Communications advise the communications authorities of the Netherlands Indies, and report the results to me by dispatch.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–13–41

No. 1169

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 12, 1941
TO: Batavia #575.

(Secret.)

Re your #938[a].

1. Today, the 11th, I summoned PA[b] and had the Chief of the Trade Bureau converse with him. The Chief said, "The other day the Vice-Minister spoke to you about what HO[c] had told Consul General ISHIZAWA; namely, that the Japanese army should withdraw from south French-Indo China, etc. Now, how did you report it to your Government? The fact is that according to the Consul General's report, HO had given what was strictly his private views but because you had sent a report he was questioned by the Governor General and the Chief of the Economic Bureau regarding the confidential conversation and was thereby greatly embarrassed."

PA replied, "Since I was asked by the Vice-Minister whether HO's views could be justly taken as being representative of those of the Netherlands East Indies Government I had addressed an inquiry to my Government. Although I have not yet received any reply regarding this matter, if, as you just said, the Netherlands East Indies Government leaders are questioning HO, it is clear that the views in question were entirely those of HO; and so would it not be well to assume from this that the question has naturally been settled?"

To this, I understand, the Bureau Chief remarked, "I believe it is well to say that this marks the closing of this question." Please be so informed.

2. Incidentally, the Bureau Chief pressed for a reply to the request which the Vice-Minister had made with regard to the oil fields for mineral oil and petroleum. But PA replied that he had not yet received any instructions from his Government and that he believed that his Government would not decide upon its attitude until international situation becomes more definite.

Thereupon, the Bureau Chief spoke of the extreme hardships the crew of the tankers, sent to the Netherlands East Indies, have had to suffer because of food and fuel shortage during the month or so that they have been waiting for permits to be issued for shipping of petroleum and machine oil and he earnestly requested that the permits be issued at once even as a temporary measure for these tankers.

PA replied that he was entirely in sympathy with the Bureau Chief and he would urge his Government to immediately issue a reply one way or the other. (This paragraph was included for your reference.)

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[a] See III, 1147.
[b] PABST, Netherlands Minister to Tokyo.
[c] HOOGSTRATEN, Chief of Commerce Bureau, Netherlands East Indies.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 1170

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo #974.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your #564[a].

1. To be sure, you have already discussed the matter with the Finance Ministry. However, to place the money in custody of the Yokohama Specie Bank, etc., might, in view of (1) in paragraph 1 of my #921[b], cause the scheme to be exposed sometime in the near future as illegal and would, at the same time, have the danger of causing (2) to happen, whether it is carried out openly or secretly. However, if the money is placed in care of the consulate, there is no danger of such a thing happening. Therefore, we would like to have the money placed in such custody outwardly, but actually to have the business connected with this disposal left for the sake of convenience in the hands of the branches of the two banks. The cash will be handled, as a whole, in the two branch banks as belonging to the suspense accounts of the consulate and be entered in the books as such; but books in which detailed listings of the depositors are made will be kept in care of the consulate.

2. (a) A detailed list will be sent on each occasion as explained in my previous telegram.

(b) In the matter of getting the approval of the depositors, when a deposit is to be made the depositor should be asked to accept the proviso that all matters connected with the deposit will be left entirely in the hands of the Consul and that the depositor has no objection to payments being made to creditors from the deposit whenever a formal repayment request has been made by the creditor to the depositor. Since this plan has not yet been carried out, we are not in a position to know what the total amount would be in guilders, but with the withdrawal from the islands of Japanese residents, the amount will gradually increase.

3. Execution of the aforementioned plan in the islands, while the South Seas Development Company assumes the role in Japan of a loan agency, I believe, would make it possible for us to avoid such a serious question as the closing of our consulates by the Netherlands authorities.

We shall be very careful so as not to disclose the details either to the Netherlands authorities or to the Japanese residents in general.

4. We would like to have your approval for carrying out the aforementioned plan (including the South Seas Development Company) at once, and so will you please take up the matter again with the Finance Ministry and wire me your reply (I have discussed this matter with IMAGAWA).

---

[a] Not available.

[b] See III, 1143.

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 1171

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia

September 15, 1941
#582.

Strictly Confidential.

Regarding your #974[a].

The results of the conference with the Finance Minister are as follows:

1. Entering these accounts on the official books of the bank would not be a decrease, but would result in a temporary increase in the funds of the bank, and even if they were carried in a suspense account credited to the Consulate, there is grave danger of the Dutch discovering the procedure; hence, the funds should be left in the custody of the consulate.

2. Is it not possible to send Guilder Paper currency to Japan by some very safe method?

3. We interpret the word creditor of your caption message, paragraph 2 B to mean banks in Japan proper, which will make loans against collateral. Is this correct? (It will be impossible in the future to make loans using ----- funds as security for everyone in general.

4. We would like to have the South Seas Association render all the assistance it can. However, the Finance Minister is opposed to their using their financial strength in the mediation.

5. Please give study to the above points, and wire us your reaction.

---

[a] See III, 1170.

Trans. 9–19–41

No. 1172

FROM: Tokyo — September 13, 1941
TO: Batavia — #577.

Re your #927[a].

Should a decision such as reported in your telegram be made report it as soon as possible. Also exercise all the care and discretion you can.

Furthermore, in regard to the above report should the use of code telegrams be suspended as you suggested or should conditions become acute, send a plain text telegram "please note details", (ISAIRYŌSHŌ).

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–17–41

No. 1173

FROM: Tokyo — September 13, 1941
TO: Batavia — #578.

Re your #950[a].

1. It has been decided to use the SADAEIGO (San Diego) Maru in evacuation. There should have been a telegram from the ship's owner to the captain of the ship on the 12th to this effect.

2. Conditions are as stated in my #575[a] regarding the Teiyo Maru and the Kiyo Maru. Decision as to the movement of the ships will depend upon the nature of PA's (Pabst's ?) reply.

---

[a] See III, 1155.
[b] See III, 1169.

Trans. 9–17–41

No. 1174

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — September 18, 1941
TO: Batavia — #5--.

(Secret.)

Re my Part 2 of 5–5[a].

I asked PA to hurry up the matter but he replied that he had not yet received instructions from his home government. Therefore, I told him that, for reasons of provisions and fuel, the

tankers could not be made to wait any longer and so will be sent back but that this did not mean that we had rescinded our request and also that we would like to have him make further efforts to speedily settle this question. Please be so informed. Today, the 18th, the owners of the Teiyō Maru ordered the ships to return.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-20-41

No. 1175

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 15, 1941
TO: Batavia (Riyoji) # 581.

(In 2 parts complete.)

(*ABSTRACT.*)

The D.E.I. economic position toward Japan is such that we should take up a fundamental policy in order to end this already prolonged conflict. We should determine to continue trade relations with the D.E.I., even though on less satisfactory a basis than before. We should continue making concrete proposals regarding cottons, as well as the status of Japanese merchants in the D.E.I., and of shipments to this country.

It is difficult for us to obtain supplies of sugar, cassava roots, castor beans, maize, scrap iron, copra, and kapok seeds. We are concerned, also about the shipping situation between Menado and Palembang and Padang.

Repeat the substance of this message to Soerabaja, Makassar, Menado, and Medan.

Trans. 9-22-41

No. 1176

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 995.

Re your Circular # 1907[a].

Secret outside the Department.

1. The commercial firms in this area are thinking of requesting that they be permitted to exchange telegrams with related firms through diplomatic consular offices in Manchukuo, China and other places. Do you have any objections to my taking this matter up?

2. If you do not have any objections, I would like to have you inform me the names of the offices to which you have issued the instructions contained in your caption telegram. I would appreciate also your indicating the names of the firms as well as the code to be used.

[a] See III, 644.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 1177

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 18, 1941
TO: Batavia #588.

Re your #995[a].

We are not to handle messages from business firms to their branches in China. The number of these requests is increasing so much that our own officials are inconvenienced in sending their own messages. Not only does this tie us up, but request messages lessen the security of codes very much, and we cannot be sure of their trustworthiness when used for such matters. Although it may make some people feel badly, hereafter please confine messages to Tokyo and our official organs elsewhere.

---

[a]See III, 1176.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 1178

FROM: Batavia September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #993.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your Circular #1906[a].

1. In the islands, only correspondent ANETA is permitted to listen in to Domei broadcasts. Only the news to which the censors at the Government Information Bureau have no objections ----- various newspapers and government -----.

3. Therefore, if it is possible to increase the number of words to be used in night broadcasts directed to these islands, I would like to see this realized.

4. I have noticed that there is a tendency to give considerable value to editorial comments published in Japan, and to judge the trend of public opinion on their basis, and so I would like to have the Government (especially the Foreign Office) thoroughly supervise the wiring of newspaper editorials.

Inasmuch as recently a considerable amount of news concerning the Japanese-Chinese war is being utilized, I would like to see a greater effort made toward improving their contents, and in this connection, it would be better to have news which gives an understanding of the general situation instead of knowledge of local happenings in which many unfamiliar names are mentioned.

5. News relative to the Axis is seldom passed by the censors. However, since the use of short wave receiving sets is permitted in these islands, there seems to be those who secretly listen in to the Domei news; but there is no indication on the surface of this being done.

---

[a]Not available.

Note: Paragraph 2 was missing from original text.

Trans. 9–18–41

No. 1179

FROM: Tokyo — September 17, 1941
TO: Batavia — #587.

Tokyo to Berlin #827.

In regard to the French Ambassador[a] visiting Holland, the Dutch Minister resident in Tokyo said that it was a breach of etiquette toward Holland. I replied that there were precedents for envoys resident in belligerent countries to visit the scene of action upon invitation of the country to which they were accredited and hence I could not recognize it as being a violation of international courtesy.

Relayed to Batavia.

---

[a] Probably the Japanese Ambassador to France is meant.

Trans. 10-1-41

No. 1180

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) — September 17, 1941
TO: Batavia (Riyoji) — Circular #2016.

(Part 1 of 2.)

Strictly Confidential.

Regarding my circular #1946[a]:

After consultation with the Finance Ministry, the following policy has been decided upon. Please arrange as far as possible to adopt this to conditions as they exist there and wire the result.

1. In the case of current accounts and special current accounts where the whole account is to be used as security, have the whole account—or if only a part is to be used as security have that part—converted to a fixed account or a deposit at call account in the name of the evacuee.

2. Even in case where such conversion is not possible, where a part of the account is used as security, have the part that is used as security made a deposit at call account in the name of the evacuee.

3. The certificate of deposit or the notification of the account to be used as security should be placed in the branch there of the bank that is to make the loan (except in case where some of the family remain). In case it is impossible or inadvisable to entrust this certificate to the local branch of the bank, such certificate may be left in the custody of the consul, to be held for the bank.

4. The branch bank shall draw up a statement of deposit, which shall be signed by the consul and then sent via the consul to the Tokyo office. On the statement of deposit shall be written the name of the person who is to be recognized as the one to make withdrawal of funds in Japan.

5. In case the account is not divided, and only a part is used as security, the part that is to be used as security shall be clearly designated on the statement of deposit, and means shall

be devised so that after the drawing up of the statement of deposit, no part of the account that is to be used as security may be withdrawn.

---

[a]Consult with our branch banks there on means of converting to fixed cash deposits in your or the bank's custody the loans made to our nationals who may now be evacuating.

Trans. 9–26–41

No. 1181

FROM: Tokyo — September 17, 1941
TO: Singapore — Circular # 2016.

(Part 2 of 2.)

6. The foreign currency accounts of evacuees may be placed in custody of the consuls or branch banks, and be handled by them.

7. If evacuees wish to use such funds in Japan for their personal needs, a certificate of their personal seals shall be submitted to the Tokyo branch of such banks through the consul.

8. When payments against such deposits are to be made in Japan, the certificate of deposit shall be presented and, in case of payment of the entire balance, a voucher shall be sent at once to the place of origin. If there is any discrepancy, only the amount covered by the statement of balance on file in Japan may be made. For identification, the payee shall present a certificate validated by the consul and sent by the latter to the Tokyo office of the bank.

9. Special consideration is being given to the matter of using the funds left in custody of consuls and branch banks for conversion into yen as security for loans.

Trans. 9–29–41

No. 1182

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) — October 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) — # 1054.

Strictly confidential.

Re your Circular # 2016[a].

In regard to 1 and 2, we are having all accounts used as security changed to fixed or demand accounts.

There are no objections to carrying out 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 as per your suggestions.

Incidentally, I would like to have a telegram regarding the time to carry out the above.

---

[a]See III, 1180.

Trans. 10–13–41

No. 1183

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1025.

Secret outside the Department. To the Foreign Minister and to the Chief of the section of Commerce.

We are trying to figure out the best method of salvaging the guilder currency possessed by our Nationalist leaving this country. I have puzzled over this repeatedly. If we have our departing Nationalists' guilder money placed in Japanese banks in the Islands or if we have it left in the possession of the Consulate, as long as the present regulations and the freezing orders exists, the officials will do their utmost to find out the amount of those guilders particularly in case they find it expedient, thus we might encounter no end of difficulties, moreover, as a result the money might turn out to be absolutely useless.

IMAGAWA has just told me something in strict secrecy. He says that among the various branches in Java of the Yokohama Specie Bank there is a discrepancy in accounts to the extent of a million guilders or there about; thus, it will be possible to place our departing citizens' guilders in the Java branches to the above mentioned figure. At the proper time, quite inconspicuously, this money can be juggled into the accounts. This would seem to be quite a fine suggestion. Please talk this over with the Treasury Department and with the Specie Bank and wire me back what they say.

Now let me point out that none, save the Treasury Department and the very highest officials of the Specie Bank, are aware of the symmetrical accounts, so I want the Foreign Minister in person to discuss this directly with the Minister of Finance. IMAGAWA, I understand, has already wired Mr. TOODORI of the Specie Bank concerning this situation.

Trans. 9–27–41

No. 1184

FROM: Tokyo October 1, 1941
TO: Batavia #611.

Secret.

Re your #1025[a].

I have consulted carefully with the Finance Minister and the Specie Bank regarding this and the Specie Bank says that if the matter can be handled secretly there are no objections to the Specie Bank there receiving money up to the amount for which the discrepancy exists. So please arrange accordingly.

---

[a] See III, 1183.

Trans. 10–13–41

No. 1185

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1015.

Strictly Secret.

Please give the following information to the Director of General Affairs Bureau of the General Staff:

Strictly Secret Java Message # 12.

----- secret.

1. Recently at Karajya,[a] situated about 40 kilometers west of Batavia, and also in the village(s) situated to the southwest of the former, new tochkas[b] facing westward have been constructed.

2. An additional single line tochka has been constructed at Taogeran[c] and in the area to the east of it.

3. Tochkas facing westward ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- at Mawoku[d] and at Karajya to the east of it, and also along the river about 5 kilometers east of the latter. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- permanent bridge has been completed.

---

[a] Kalaradja.
[b] Tochka: A Russian term for small concrete fortifications, usually having machine gun implacements.
[c] Tangerang.
[d] Maoek.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 1186

FROM: Batavia 29 September 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1045.

Strictly confidential. Military data.

Please transmit to the General Affairs Section of the General Staff by strictly confidential means.

Java message # 16.

According to a reconnaissance of September 27, and 28, of the Bandoeng and Merauke regions, the defenses of the Timanjang army post west of Bandoeng, and on the Tisukan river outside UNGANDAN are numerous.

TIKTERU post, north of Bandoeng, is now under construction.

An army post is under construction at KURANJO, ten kilometers from Batavia, a railway junction point.

The land defenses west of Batavia were described in Java message # 12.

There are no defenses at Bantam. There are mangroves, fish ponds and swampy areas along the shore.

There are also no defenses between Merauke, INAN and RABOHAN. There is sandy bottom out to about 10 meters with coral reefs from about 20 meters to 100 meters which are submerged at high tide.

There are usually cocoanut groves and fresh water streams near the shore which would be helpful for reconnaissance from the sea.

With reference to local military geography, we have found that the translation of the book on local place names prepared by Surgeon Major Fukada of the Keijo Medical College has no important changes. An original copy of this book was sent to the General Staff in May.

For precaution, this message is being sent by our own communications clerk. Local time 5:50.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 1187

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) 29 September 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1046.

Strictly confidential. Military secret.

To be forwarded to the Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the General Staff.

Java message # 17.

Basic air fields now in use are as follows:
I. Batavia region.
(1) K-----ran, at the northeast side of Batavia. Training planes.
(2) Tjililitang at the southeast side of Batavia.
(3) Buitenzorg, about 5 kilometers west of town.
(4) Army field at Tandjongbalik.
II. Bandoeng region.
(1) At the western end of Bandoeng.
(2) Karajaan, 30 kilometers north of Bandoeng. Aviation school and parachute company.
(3) Tomo. About 5 kilometers northwest of Tomo. Not verified.
(4) Karangtambak, on the south coast, about 50 kilometers from GARUU.
III. Central region.
(1) About 7 kilometers north of Jokjakarta.
(2) Modjokasri, about 10 kilometers west of Madjene.
(3) Semarang, on the coast about 10 kilometers west of Semarang.
IV. Surabaya region.
(1) Surabaya, land and sea planes.
(2) Malang, about 10 kilometers northeast of Malang.

Trans. 10-3-41

No. 1188

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1024.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re my # 1023[a]

So far, no one holding direct or indirect connection with this office seems to have been examined. I understand that men of importance, including TIN RYŪ KITI, who is an official of the local branch of the Nationalist Party and a man of considerable influence among the Chinese residents (his wife is a Japanese), were subjected to strict investigation eary in the morning of the 20th. This was quite a shock to the Chinese living here.

Trans. 9-29-41

[a]Not available.

No. 1189

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) October 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1065.

Departmental Secret. Military Secret.

Please transmit this to the Vice-Minister of War and Assistant Chief of the General Staff:

Java wire # 19—strictly secret.

With regard to the General's tour through this territory, the Consul General's office is negotiating with the Netherlands Indies authorities. The General, however, is regarded as a temporary resident. Persons who have entered the country since July 1, as well as temporary residents, come under the regulations limiting travel within the country (persons are permitted to travel, but restrictions are constantly being put up through the application of the permit system). Requests have been made for the negotiations concerning this matter, but, as the Netherlands East Indies officials do not seem to be at all sincere in the matter, it appears that it is going to be practically impossible to arrange for this trip.

Trans. 10–13–41

No. 1190

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 26, 1941
TO: Batavia # 600.

(Strictly Secret.)

The War Department informs me that they would like to have a military physician, Dr. KURAUCHI KIKUO go to the Pasteur Institute at Bandoeng to cooperate in some experiments on the pest bacillus. They request that I endeavor to get an understanding with the Netherlands officials whereby he will be allowed to enter their country and be given every convenience in his studies. I[a] myself am connected with the military and think this would be a very good idea, so please negotiate and wire me back.

[a] Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda.

Trans. 10–2–41

No. 1191

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1078.

Re your # 600[a].

You know we have already discussed this with the Netherlands Indies officials on September 9 of last year. They, at the time, added a word to the effect that they would like for us to choose an expert from the Kitazato Experimental Institute or from the Institite for the Study of Communicable Diseases. Even if we conceal the fact that this man is connected with the military, judging from past experience, it is sure to leak out, in which case it would be sure to arouse

the Netherlands officials, particularly under the present circumstances. We might thus defeat our own objects or, to say the least, diminish our chances of success. Therefore, I would suggest that you reconsider and send either a civil service employee concerned with the Institute for the Study of Communicable Diseases or from the Kitazato Institute.

---

[a] See III, 1190.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 1192

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 8, 1941
TO: Batavia #620.

Re your #1078[a].

At the time I conferred with the War Office, Dr. KURAUCHI had been since last year continually and directly connected with Instructor OTSUTEN.[b] Also at the present time, due to the circumstances, they reported that they do not know whether to send him on order to study. Since it is understood that they recommend certain facilities be afforded, after considering the best plan for the present, please wire me the results. Now this man at present is engaged in the Manchurian Railway Public Health Research Institute. For your information.

---

[a] See III, 1191.
[b] Kana spelling; possibly OTTEN.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 1193

FROM: Tokyo 27 September 1941
TO: Batavia #605.

Re my #581[a].

Please wire as quickly as possible regarding the present possibilities for Japanese import firms in Japan for shipment to the Netherlands East Indies.

Please relay to Medan.

Please relay the above, with explanations to Makassar.

---

[a] See III, 1175.

Trans. 10–1–41

No. 1194

FROM: Tokyo 29 September 1941
TO: Batavia #609.

(Secret.)

A. The new permit for importing the remainder of the order of goods from Japan placed by Japanese firms in the N.E.I. for which request was made by paragraph 1 of my #581[a] and

B. The N.E.I.'s new policy toward exporting goods to Japan (see your #997[b]) have an important bearing on our plan for disposition of shipping so please wire immediately regarding A and B.

---

[a] See III, 1175.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10–13–41

No. 1195

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1078 (?).

Departmental Secret.

As you know, Japanese-Netherlands Indies relations are deadlocked, and as I am returning to the Land of the Rising Sun, I will take this opportunity first of all to visit the Governor and then the other Netherlands officials once more. I will do my best to show them our side of the picture and sound them out still further on their fundamental attitude toward Japan. If there is anything in particular which you wish me to tell them on this occasion, please instruct me at the earliest possible moment.

Trans. 10–8–41

No. 1196

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1086.

(Part 1 of 3.)

Re my #1085[a].

After discussing the reply which the Netherlands Government gave, I questioned HOOGSTRATEN, saying, "You have been quite insistent ever since the negotiations about the Netherlands East Indies using her own judgment, but were not the recent actions of the Netherlands East Indies Government and the recent reply exactly the same as those of Britain and the United States? Where is there any sign of the Netherlands East Indies having exercised an independent judgment?" To this HOOGSTRATEN replied, "The individuality of the Netherlands East Indies still remains the same as ever; for example, while the United States and Britain are experiencing difficulties with Japan on the Chinese question, the Netherlands East Indies have not taken the same attitude as those two countries. However, Japan's occupation of South French Indo-China has proven to be a greater shock and a more direct threat than either the government or the people of Japan could imagine, and since events have turned in such a direction, it is only natural that the Netherlands East Indies should resort to every means available for self-defense. It is likewise inevitable that she should keep in step with the policy which the United States and Britain are following in their relation to Japan. To say because of this, that the Netherlands East Indies has given up her choice of courses is not right. In other words, as Japan's threat against her increases, in the same proportion the Neth-

erlands East Indies, in her own way, depending more on her own resources, would cooperate the more with Britain and the United States. In proportion as she feels the threat, this course becomes necessary."

Then I ----- the recent reply which the Netherlands East Indies Government gave completely nullifies that which it gave on June 6.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-11-41

No. 1197

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1086.

(Part 2 of 3.)

"Not only that, but oil contracts and petroleum concessions have thereby been wiped out. This is unfortunate."

HOOGSTRATEN replied, "No, not wiped out, just suspended because of the present threat to our islands under the new circumstances. That is all there is to it."

Finally I said, "Well, in view of the various measures taken by the Netherlands officials recently, I know that it will be hard to reconcile Japanese public and governmental opinion, but I am still confident that relations between our two countries can be ameliorated. This thing called the freezing order was adopted to secure for Netherlands concerns goods already contracted for and already paid for to the amount of only 3,000,000 yen. However, investigation proves that the Netherlands companies, as a matter of fact, had paid out not more than the measly sum of 1,500,000 yen. Now, in view of that fact, why was this step taken? It passes understanding. However, it was Japanese exporters in the Netherlands Indies who underwent the greatest loss from the freezing order of the Netherlands Indies Government. Furthermore, as a result of the order, already Japanese retailers have all been frustrated and forced to shut up shop. The men and women, boys and girls who have had to leave these islands amount to 3,500. Now, buy this most inopportune step on the part of the Netherlands officials, 300 years of amity in the history of our two nations have been brought to a close. This is something which the Japanese people cannot think upon with joy. I, myself, have my doubts, but nevertheless, I hope conditions between our two countries will not be made worse, and I, myself, as ever, desire to do all I can to mend them; but

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 1198

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) October 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1086.

Departmental Secret.

(Part 3 of 3.)

"Under these conditions, I can see no moral reason why I should continue to represent the Japanese empire here in the Netherlands Indies or continue to strive for an understanding. Therefore, I asked my government to let me return to Japan, and they have sent me their permission. So, I will be returning home ere long." HOOGSTRATEN replied, "I am sorry that

we had to take the measure of proclaiming the freezing order. As a matter of fact. I did my utmost to stave it off, as you know. You have for many years tried to iron out the wrinkles between us and Japan, and I am sorry, indeed, to see you go, but the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China threatened us. Under the present circumstances, I still hope to see an improvement between Batavia and Tokyo, but I do not know how it will be. Nevertheless, whenever we get a chance to do business with you, I am ready to consider it within the possible scope. As for the Japanese residents of these islands, so far as the law will permit, we are ready to deal with them in a friendly fashion."

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 1199

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 8, 1941
TO: Batavia #623.

(Strictly Secret.)

(Part 1 of 3.)

Re my #581[a].

The results of our consideration, based upon such reports as have been made by investigating officials, are as follows for your information:

1. The shipment of the balance of orders for export to the Netherlands Indies depend on

a. whether the Netherlands East Indies Government will permit wholesale distribution as in the past and not freeze these goods;

b. and then whether you as well as all the other offices, with regard to Japanese allotments incorporated in your reports, urge the importers to send wires of instruction to their dealers in Japan to load such goods (one-third of the remaining amount) on the Montreal Maru scheduled to leave Japan on the 24th of this month. Therefore, I would like to have you immediately, in regard to *a* above, secure guarantees from the Netherlands Indies authorities and then wire me back.

2. Because of the shortage in the supply of *shōyu,*[b] *miso,*[c] and *katsuobushi,*[d] the competent companies are very reluctant to export these materials from Japan, but insofar as *shōyu, miso* and *konbu*[e] (no particular problem is created by these three items), they have arranged to export a three months' supply on the Nissho Maru. However, as far as *katsuobushi* is concerned, I would like to have you inform all of the companies in the various areas to make efforts to arrange to buy this commodity from the Ōiwa fishing interest in Menado. Shipment is to be made in the following manner.

	Shōyu	*Miso*	*Ager-Ager*
A. Batavia	3300 kilos	2470 kilos	3640 kilos
B. Soerabaja	5500 kilos	4940 kilos	5840 kilos

[a] See III, 1175.
[b] Soy sauce.
[c] Slightly fermented soy bean mash.
[d] Dried bonito.
[e] Agar-agar.

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 1200

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 8, 1941
TO: Batavia #623.

(Strictly Secret.)

(Part 2 of 3.)

	Shōyu	*Miso*	*Ager-Ager*
C. Makasser	660 kilos	320 kilos	910 kilos
D. Medan	1340 kilos	2645 kilos	2620 kilos

(Menado does not require any of these items.)

Furthermore, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is planning to have their competent agricultural companies make exports. The export companies of that ministry have already decided upon methods. Within one or two days, they will wire you. Therefore, wait until you hear from them and then have all of the importers within the jurisdiction of the various consular offices wire their orders immediately.

3. Should it be impossible to secure essential goods as freight for the return voyage, I would like to have SATŌ, your office, and the various consular offices in the Netherlands East Indies secure confirmation of the Netherlands East Indies authorities immediately with regard to the export to Japan of the goods on hand in Japanese companies' warehouses for which payment has already been made. As soon as you have secured their agreement on this point, wire me at once. Furthermore, should they agree to the export of these items on the Nissho Maru, I would like to have you endeavor to have the competent commercial firms take appropriate means for the loading of principally sugar, quinine, castor beans, mangrove, *wattoru*[a] bark, manganese ore, scrap iron, and palm oil. (Please refer to paragraph 4 below.)

Furthermore, after you have reached a decision on the loading of these materials, have these export companies wire their dealers in Japan to secure letters of credit from the Yokohama Specie Bank that will permit payment for these goods from the unfrozen funds of that bank in Hawaii. Please bear this in mind in your negotiations with the exporting firms.

4. Though we have continually been trying to make arrangements, at the present time it looks as though we will not be able to dispatch any other vessel than the Nissho Maru. Therefore, with regard to the baggage of persons being evacuated, I would like to have you take the following matters into consideration and then make such arrangements as are possible.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 1201

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 8, 1941
TO: Batavia #623.

(Strictly Secret.)

(Part 3 of 3.)

A. We have to accommodate 30 passengers and approximately 1200 tons (cubic tons) at Sandakan. Therefore, bear in mind that this much space must be reserved.

B. After you have discussed with the competent consuls the question of preferential embarkation of women and children among the evacuees in your place and in other areas, please make such arrangements as you feel essential.

Furthermore, should it be impossible for some persons to pay for their passage, please wire the number of persons involved and such other essential details as the amount of money required to send them to their homes in Japan.

Furthermore, please bear in mind that this ship will stop at Menado and then proceed from there to Palembang and then Padang. From thence, on its return voyage it will stop at Sandakan.

5. Now should it become apparent that the Netherlands East Indies authorities would request that this vessel carry the unloaded freight left by the Chisaraku[a]. Please do not offer any objections to such a course, since we have already secured the understanding of the competent authorities on this point. Should representations be made, wire me immediately. At the same time wire the Economic Ministry to notify the Minister at once.

Furthermore, insofar as is possible, I would like to have you strongly impress the Netherlands East Indies officials that this is but a measure of our good will. In addition, I would like to have you negotiate for the exportation of the 140 tons of quinine purchased by the Takeda Chobe Company prior to the freezing legislation. Wire me the results.

6. Until the Japanese importers who are able to secure the various items mentioned in paragraph 1 have been taken care of, I would like to have you make preferential distribution of these items to retailers who decided to remain in the country as long as possible. Furthermore, insofar as these retailers are concerned, I would like to have you secure from them a declaration to the effect that they will not unload this material at reduced prices but will use it in the maintenance of their businesses. Please transmit the matters mentioned in this wire in a suitable manner to Soerabaja, Makessar, Menado, and Medan.

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[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 1202

FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1037.

Re my #992[a].

There are 5,000 Japanese nationals living here. The corrected number yet to be evacuated is 3,500.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 11–19–41

No. 1203

FROM: Tokyo October 11, 1941
TO: Batavia #629.

(*Abstract.*)

Evacuation ship Nissho Maru only carries 400, so that it will not be possible to take all waiting persons.

Confidentially, we do not see the possibility of sending another ship soon.
Relay to Soerabaja.

Trans. 12-2-41

No. 1204

FROM: Batavia — October 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1093.

Re my # 1092[a]. Strictly confidential.

I would like to have some sort of a reply immediately in regard to whether or not you are in harmony with the principle of transaction by barter.

Furthermore, in regard to the permit for export of Shanghai cotton goods, please consider my request and inasmuch as it concerns my reply to the N.E.I. and I would like to know the details, please wire the circumstances.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1205

FROM: Tokyo — October 17, 1941
TO: Batavia — # 647.

(*Abstract.*)

Re N.E.I. trade. Tokyo is of opinion that much time would be required if a detailed trade agreement is to be discussed, and thinks it would be better to barter the goods on each ship as a separate transaction.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 1206

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) — October 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 1095.

Secret.

Re your # 620[a].

I negotiated with the head of the Board of Health in regard to according him facilities as a bacteria specialist from the Manchurian Railway research institute. The fact is that the pest becomes prevalent every year around September and in October it becomes necessary to produce immunity serum. For this reason, I asked them to take him around October.

They replied that because this year the pest was exceptionally scarce it had become unnecessary to produce the above-mentioned serum. Therefore, although they will let him know at

once if any opportunity should arise for important research in this connection, they wish him to postpone his trip at this time.

---

[a] See III, 1192.

Trans. 10–15–41

No. 1207

FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa) October 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1119.

The "Java-Bō" (newspaper) in announcing conclusion of the agreement for establishing an airline from Palao to Timor, also comments that this agreement is not based at all on economic reasons, but from Timor's viewpoint is chiefly a Japanese strategic line. The Dutch East Indies, and, of course, England and Australia, cannot remain indifferent to this.

Trans. 11–8–41

No. 1208

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #492.

(Secret outside the Department.)

(Part 1 of 3.)

Advisor ŌNO makes the following repeated request to the Finance Ministry for instructions. The following are opinions regarding recent developments, and the principal points of a plan for negotiations which is considered appropriate on the basis of these opinions, both the opinions and the plan having to do with my #468[a] and #479[b].

Depending on circumstances, it is my intention to commence at once our negotiations with the Thaiese. Therefore, if you have any opinions to express on this question, I would appreciate your informing me of them by return wire.

As regards the situation here, it is the intention of the Yokohama Specie Bank to adjust its policy to the degree of stringency in which our finance is involved. Yesterday the National Bank Office submitted to the Yokohama Specie Bank a demand for cancellation, on the grounds that an agreement for a loan of 10,000,000 "baatu" had been established, of the agreement concerning overdraft which has been incurred since February (the balance in deposit at present is about 1,400,000 "baatu"). They have, furthermore, asked for a loan regarding our demand made on the 25th of last month for repayment of 135,000 pounds, giving as their reason for this the fact that no definite information has yet reached them from London. Thus in matters of finance at least, the Thaiese authorities persist in an attitude which cannot be understood if regarded merely from the standpoint of such an abstract principle as that of Japanese-Thaiese friendship. This is all the more true, as I have already reported to you, in that the Thaiese seem to have reached the limit of their facility in appropriating the 10,000,000 "baatu" recently discussed. On the other hand, as regards the negotiations concerning matters not yet agreed upon, they are unbelievably afraid of what the United States and Britain might say. Furthermore, there is the fact which I have already reported to you that the leaders in the Finance Ministry of this country are gold standard advocates of the most conservative and unprogressive type.

To make the Thaiese realize the urgency of the situation we are now facing and to have them adopt and carry out theoretically, systematically and actually in the shortest time possible the measures which we would like to have them adopt ----- this, indeed, is a difficult thing to do. In view of this fact and also of the fact that the Thaiese authorities at present have not the mind to enter into political negotiations of such nature.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See II, 1178.

Trans. 8-11-41

No. 1209

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #492.

(Part 2 of 3.)

If, instead of making at this time a proposal for direct payment in yen and of thus wasting time, we proceed by sale of gold in as short a time as possible and outrightly, and do this with care by setting a certain limit to the plan, so as not to frighten the Thaiese authorities, and then go on with our negotiations, I am inclined to think that the prospect for a quick solution of the problem is good. I believe it is important that we choose a quick and effective method if we wish to avoid difficulties which are liable to hamper the immediate procurement of the materials we need (as to how successful we have been of late in securing rubber, tin, etc., has been described in my #491)[a]. (It is highly important that we should accelerate the process at this time.) Therefore, I believe we should begin negotiations on the basis of the following proposals, 3 and 4, and hasten the time for the adoption of our basic proposal and for its execution (such as the revision of the currency law, the method for direct payment, etc.). But in order to do this we have no way but to wait until the political situation changes. It is my belief that if the political changes occur, the following proposals could be carried out with comparative ease.

3. The principal points concerning the appropriation of funds in baatu by sale of gold:

(1) The following agreement should be concluded between the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Thaiese National Bank Office.

(2) The Yokohama Specie Bank should secure baatu by selling gold to the National Bank office.

(3) The maximum amount of gold to be sold should be set for the time being at about 50,000,000 yen (if you have a different idea as to this amount, please let me know at once).

(4) The Yokohama Specie Bank, if need be, may make the sale in two or more installments (in this the transference of the purchasing price, the fluctuation of exchange rate, and facilities for the transference have all been taken into consideration.

(5) The sale should take place in Tokyo.

(6) The price for the sale should be decided in conference of the contracting parties by taking into consideration, at each occasion, the world market price of gold.

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[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 1210

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #492.

(Part 3 of 3.)

(7) The gold which has been sold should be kept in Japan in care of a supervisor of high character connected with the Yokohama Specie Bank.

(8) If a request is submitted by the National Bank office, an application for permission should be filed with the Japanese government for the actual transference of a portion or the entire sum of the gold to be sold as settlement.

(9) The National Bank office should be granted the right to examine and to take other steps regarding the amount of gold, the remittance of which it has requested.

(10) The period of validity of the agreement should be until the end of this year.

(11) The question of the credit granted on August 2 should be disposed of separately from this question.

4. The proposal given above should be submitted by the Japanese Minister to the Thaiese Government along with the following proposal, and an agreement to the following effect should be concluded parallelly.

(1) This agreement is for merely a temporary financial arrangement having to do with the financial policy taken by the United States and Britain. Therefore, as soon as circumstances permit it, the Thaiese Government should consider means, such as revision of the currency law, etc. for improving trade relations between Japan and Thailand (in case the Thaiese authorities delay the conclusion of the agreement, the matter will be dropped).

(2) In case a need arises on the part of the Thaiese Government for using the gold which the Yokohama Specie Bank has sold and which is being kept in Japan, it should be agreed that the Thaiese Government should request remittance only of the amount which it deems absolutely necessary because of an urgent situation.

(3) The Japanese Government should agree to remit the amount when the minimum amount has been thus requested.

(4) If the Thaiese authorities do not make such a request within a year's period, the Japanese Government should agree to pay the expenses connected with remittances made thereafter (if need be, as regards this point, the same procedure for the sale of gold used in New York should be followed).

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 1211

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #519.

Strictly Secret.

The complete text of memoire exchanged between the Thaiese Minister of Finance and Ambassador FUTAMI concerning the sale of gold is as follows (in English):

In connection with the understanding between the Thai Banking Consortium and the Yokohama Specie Bank dated the -- day of August -- B.E. -- 2484 -- relating to the sale of gold by the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Minister of Finance of Thailand and the Japanese Minister in Bangkok hereby agree as follows:

1. The Thai Minister of Finance promises that he will so arrange that the Thai Banking Consortium or any subsequent Thai transferee will not, without his consent, request the trans-

portation to Bangkok of the gold earmarked and kept in safe custody by the Bank of Japan under clause — 4 — of the understanding above-mentioned.

2. When the transportation of the gold is requested by the Thai Banking Consortium or any subsequent Thai transferee the consent of the Thai Minister of Finance, the Japanese Government promises to grant to the Yokohama Specie Bank the requisite permit for such transportation.

Trans. 8–20–41

No. 1212

FROM: Tokyo — August 7, 1941
TO: Washington — # 455.

Recently three Thailand banks in Bangkok sanctioned a "credit" of 10,000,000 bahts to the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, on the 5th it was reported that the National City Bank had frozen the American credits of one of these banks, namely "The Bank of Asia for Industry and Commerce." If this is a fact please ascertain upon what grounds it can order the freezing of the assets of a bank of Thailand which is a country not designated in the order, and wire a reply.

Trans. 8–8–41

No. 1213

FROM: Tokyo — August 7, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 460.

From the head of the Exchange Bureau of the Finance Department to Adviser Ōno.

Reliance upon imports from Thailand by this country is increasing due to present conditions and permits for import exchange are increasing. Please exercise caution in the use of money and the order of investments. If there are any problems feel free to contact us.

Trans. 8–13–41

No. 1214

FROM: Tokyo — August 7, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 462.

To Adviser Ōno from the Minister of Finance.

This country is depending more and more on imports from Thailand therefore please do your utmost to negotiate free movement of currency so that we may obtain necessary materials.

Trans. 8–13–41

No. 1215

FROM: Tokyo — August 7, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 463.

To Adviser Ōno from the head of the exchange Bureau of the Finance Department.

With the exception of French Indo-China and Thailand, importation from third countries is becoming increasingly difficult. The obtaining of necessary commodities from foreign countries is becoming more and more an urgent problem. Therefore please do your utmost to see that imports from that country are not restricted.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 1216

FROM: Tokyo — 9 August 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 473.

Strictly confidential.

Re your # 492[a].

1. Concerning the third caption of your message. Concerning paragraph 1 it is all right to use the Yokohama Specie Bank. Or, if the other party desires to use a specie bank which is a branch of the Bank of Japan there would be no objection to recognizing this. There are no objections to paragraphs 2, 4, and 11.

In regard to paragraph 3. We do not wish to set a limit to the amount of goods it is necessary for us to obtain. Particularly we do not wish to set a minimum. However in order not to astonish the other party during the negotiations if it is necessary to make use of a limit we will leave the figure to be used to your judgment.

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[a] See III, 1208.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 1217

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) — August 8, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 467.

(Secret outside the Department.)

(Part 1 of 2.)

Re your # 468[a].

I would like to have you negotiate along the following lines. Although it is desirable to bring speedy settlement of this matter, in consideration of what you have said in your # 492[b], I will leave with you the decision as to when the negotiations should be commenced.

1. Under the present circumstances, remittance of specie is unavoidable, since payment must be made for excessive imports over exports.

2. I agree with you in your opinion as to whether it is advisable or not to make the payment in specie conditional upon the revision of the currency law.

3. In making payments in specie, the price should be set by taking the exchange value of baatu versus the dollar and the price of gold in the United States ($35.00 per ounce) as the basis. Although theoretically the price at the time of payment in Japan should be that arrived at by deducting the cost of remittance from the price set by the method explained above, actually, when the amounts to be remitted are largely the amounts for Japan, the cost of remittance should be borne by Japan.

4. Although with regard to (1) in *4* of your telegram referring to payment in specie, it is well to have the amounts earmarked, but we do not insist upon this. This matter also will be left to your discretion. As to the original proposal of the Exchange Bureau with regard to direct payment of -----:

(1) Paragraph # 1 is not absolutely necessary.

(2) As to interest payment in the second paragraph, we should like to make it our principle not to require any. However, we should consider charging 1% at the most. Another plan is to increase the rate of interest in accordance with increase of the balance; for example, the interest could be 1% up to 5,000,000 baatu; 2% for the balance between 5,000,000 and 10,000,000 baatu; and 3% for the balance exceeding 10,000,000 baatu.

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[a] Not available.

[b] See III, 1208–1210.

Trans. 8–13–41

No. 1218

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 500.

Today WANITTO, acting on instructions from PIBUL, came to see me and said, "Recently in French Indo-China it was evident that the Japanese army of occupation had been in extremely close proximity to the boundary of Thailand. Because among the defense troops of Thailand's bases of operations there are a great many uneducated persons, should war, perchance, break out between the French troops and the Japanese due to some untoward incident over a misunderstanding, it is feared that it will create the propitious opportunity for the execution of the English and American schemes against Japan. As I have instructed the military leaders to take precautions in all matters, I want to have you accept as agreeable, PIBUL's true intentions; and I want you to consider a way to have the army, also, take precautions."

Trans. 8–13–41

No. 1219

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 497.

Although both our attachés have been following up the report that the British Minister here has asked the Thai Government for the use of military bases for British troops, so far they have been unable to substantiate it. Judging from the difficulty we have experienced in getting Thai to recognize Manchukuo and in advancing credits to the Yokohama Specie Bank it certainly

is not hard to imagine that the United States and England have been engaging in all sorts of under handed machinations.

However I believe that the detailed reports in the form of "News" we are now spreading in this country concerning the failures since last year of America and Britain to carry out their guarantees of assistance to various countries in Europe, etc. are having a restraining effect upon the Thai Government.

Trans. 8–12–41

No. 1220

FROM: Bangkok August 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 505.

Re your # 445[a].

Domei dispatches were carried in the papers here on the 8th in harmony with your telegram. However, on the evening of the 8th the following announcement was made by the information bureau:

"Thailand desires to maintain impartial friendly relations with all nations and has never yet been faced with military demands from other nations. But if invaded by another nation Thailand will fight to the last man".

It is not clear whether this announcement has any direct connection with the above Domei dispatches or not but on the 11th SIRIKUJUNGU who is closely connected with the National Defense Department, alluding to the above Domei reports and the Bureau's statement and also to the telegram from Stockholm on the 8th saying that should Japan attempt to conclude a treaty with Thailand similar to the one concluded with French Indo-China Britain could not remain silent, said that the newspapers should be careful in reporting various international demagoguery centering on Thailand.

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[a] See III, 1233.

Trans. 8–14–41

No. 1221

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 498.

To be handled in Government Code.

Today, DERRECK[b] called on me in regard to sundry other matters. He prefaced his remarks by saying that what he was going to tell me was for my information alone, and then confidentially told me of his conversations with PIBUL. "It seems that the Japanese are strongly desirous of the appointment of PUROMU[a]. Looking at it from various circumstances, PIBUL believes that it is impossible to transfer PUROMU from his present position.

"Now, should the present Minister be elevated in status, it would be very fine; however, should the Japanese not desire this, we could go so far as to make the present Minister a Charges d'Affairs, but such a step would injure the Minister's feelings no end and make him return home at once. PIBUL continued that under the present situation it was most difficult to select a suitable person and that he had no hopes of immediately appointing a formal Ambassador. I wish that the Japanese would realize this."

This being the case, on the occasion of my conversations with PIBUL tomorrow I think that it would be wise for me to state that we wish the appointment of PUROMU and then not to make too big an issue of the policy as there is the fear that his feelings might be hurt.

[a] Thaiese Vice-Minister of Defense.
[b] French Consul General at Bangkok.

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 1222

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) August 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo Unnumbered.

This morning DEIRETSUKU[a] informed me confidentially that the proposal made by Ambassador TSUBOKAMI was approved at the cabinet meeting on the day before yesterday, and arrangements are being made for DEIRETSUKU to submit me a formal reply as soon as he is instructed to do so.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-13-41

No. 1223

FROM: Tokyo August 9, 1941
TO: Bangkok Unnumbered.

You are well aware that we desire to have the announcements of the appointments of our Ambassador to Thailand and the Thai Ambassador to Japan made simultaneously. Apparently due to some indecisiveness on the part of Thailand, however, these appointments are being unnecessarily delayed. We fear that some third country may try to manipulate things in the interior (see my message # 465)[a].

If, therefore, there are indications that the Thai appointment will be further delayed, we would like to have Tubokami assume his post immediately, without awaiting the announcement of the Thai appointment.

According to your message, Tubokami's name was submitted to the Cabinet session of the 6th. Please, therefore, make all other necessary arrangements and advise.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-14-41

No. 1224

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) August 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 507.

Report on the Bangkok situation as of today.

1. I pressed for an agreement and he said, "Certainly, I will take care of that right now." So saying, he called an official in charge and before my eyes said: "Will you please draw up a proposal concerning this conversion of offices."

2. I tactfully brought up the matter of elevating the American Ministry and he said, "For a year or so now the British and American Ministers have been speculating on the exchange of Ambassadors between Bangkok and Tokyo. Each time they mentioned it to us we told them that, if they wished, they could have the same privilege, but, as PIBUL has told you, neither Great Britain nor the United States is interested."

3. He said also that a Senator had approached the President of the United States concerning the recall of the American Minister, but the President would not assent to this. Doubtless, however, ere long he will return home.

Trans. 8–14–41

No. 1225

FROM: Tokyo — August 7, 1941
TO: Net — Circular 1755.

Received from Bangkok on the 5th as # 485.

(Separate telegram.)

His Majesty's Government are glad to recognize the State of Manchoukuo which maintains good trade relations with Thailand, and a telegram to this effect has been sent to notify His Excellency the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo this morning.

The above is communicated for the information of the Imperial Japanese Government.

Trans. 8–12–41

No. 1226

FROM: Hsingking — August 14, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 1.

(Message to Tokyo # 549.

Coincidental with Thai's recognition of Manchukuo, Manchukuo has the intention of establishing a Legation in Thai. When viewed in the light of the special circumstances existing in Thai, and since there may be various delicate manipulations in this connection, we have proposed with regard to the above, that we would like to have them agree with the ideas of the Imperial Japanese Government. Please wire me your opinions at once.

I have sent this to Thai.

Trans. 8–16–41

No. 1227

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) — August 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 514.

Re your # 400 (?)[a].

I spoke to Pibul regarding the currency problem and other problems and then waited a time and today I had another conference with him at which time I pressed the matter. Pibul said

that there were many within the government itself who were holding various and diverse opinions due to the development of the international situation and that he, Pibul, was experiencing difficulty in controlling them. If at this time ----- should be established the problem of personnel, etc. would be extremely difficult therefore would it not be better, he said, for the Prime Minister and myself to confer frequently and directly to effect cooperation. I wondered how it would be to bring pressure to bear but I think it will be best just to watch developments for a time.

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[a] Possibly III, 1214.

Trans. 8-20-41

No. 1228

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo #517.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your #486[a].

On the 8th, bearing in mind the purport of my #492[b] and carrying with him the outline of the plan for the sale of gold, ŌNO conferred with PURAJITTO (on that day we were not yet in receipt of your #473[c]) and explained our idea on the matter. PURAJITTO promised that he will study it at once. As a result of repeated requests that they take quick action on the matter, finally, yesterday afternoon, the 15th, VUIBAA, advisor in the Finance Ministry, requested an interview with ŌNO. He, together with WANWAI, conferred for a while with ŌNO (----- was also present) and made headway toward agreement. The conversations were resumed this afternoon, the 16th, and finally culminated in an agreement (the content of the entire English text and the Memoir). The Thaiese Government will first have to get Finance Minister PURAJITTO to pass on this agreement and submit it to the regular cabinet meeting to be held next week. For this reason, I understand, formal signing will not take place until August 20. Will you order SEKI, the manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank, at once to have everything in readiness so that the bank may at any time take custody in behalf of Thailand of the gold to be sold (instructions for arrangements to be sent to the Yokohama Specie Bank will be given in separate telegram). Will you please see to it that even after the agreement has been formally made, nothing regarding the developments leading up to it will be made known to others. This is because the Thaiese authorities fear that the publication of the agreement would have an unfavorable effect on our future negotiations due to pressure exerted on Thailand by Bitain and the United States. However, we do not insist on keeping it secret should, after the formal conclusion, the Thaiese Government specially desire to have it made known.

Please forward this telegram immediately to the Finance Ministry.

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[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 1208-1210.
[c] See III, 1216.

Trans. 8-12-41

No. 1229

FROM: Bangkok
TO: Tokyo

August 16, 1941
#518.

(Part 1 of 2.)

(Secret outside the Department.)

The following is the entire text of the letter (in English) addressed by the manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank to the Consortium:

1. The Yokohama Specie Bank may sell gold bars, conforming to the New York or London market standard, to the Thai Banking Consortium to such an extent as may be required for the settlement of the balance of trade in favor of Thailand for the period commencing from the date of this agreement to the thirty-first of December—B.E. 2484—inclusive, subject to an overriding maximum equivalent to 25,000,000 baht. Such sale may take place from time to time within the aforesaid period.

2. The sale of gold in accordance with this agreement shall take place in Bangkok.

3. The value of gold shall be computed _____ _____ of the official price of gold in the U.S.A. On the date of sale, the U.S. dollar value thus obtained shall be converted into ----- London-New York cross rate and the ----- to (baht at the rate at which ?) the Thai Treasury purchases sterling, such rates being those in force on the date of sale.

4. The gold sold by the Yokohama Specie Bank to the Thai Banking Consortium in accordance with this agreement shall be earmarked as the property of the Thai Banking Consortium, kept in safe custody on behalf of the Thai Banking Consortium at the Bank of Japan and the Thai Banking Consortium shall not be required to pay any charges whatsoever for such custody.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 1230

FROM: Bangkok (Asada)
TO: Tokyo

August 16, 1941
#518.

(Part 2 of 2.)

5. Upon request by the Thai Banking Consortium, the Yokohama Specie Bank shall forthwith apply to the Japanese Government for permission for the gold, kept in safe custody at the Bank of Japan as aforesaid, to be transported in whole or in part to Bangkok. When the gold is transported to Bangkok, the cost of transportation including insurance will be borne by the Thai Banking Consortium.

6. The Thai Banking Consortium shall be entitled to secure inspection of the gold earmarked and kept in safe custody at the Bank of Japan as aforesaid, and the detailed procedure relating to such inspection shall be agreed upon as soon as possible by the two contracting parties.

7. In case the Yokohama Specie Bank, having already sold the maximum amount of gold equivalent to 25,000,000 baatu, needs to sell a further amount in order to settle the balance of trade between Thailand and Japan, a further understanding will be reached as the need arises.

8. The credit facilities of ten million baatu under the existing understanding between the Thai Banking Consortium and the Yokohama Specie Bank will be renewed on the expiration of the term of the said understanding.

Trans. 8–20–41

No. 1231

FROM: Bangkok — August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #530.

Secret outside the Department.

For reasons given in part 3 of 3 of my #520[a] I would like to be informed by wire and the details by mail of the kind of articles which may be shipped to this country as a result of stoppage of their export to the United States, Britain, Canada, etc. It is my intention to have a thorough investigation conducted here of the demand for such articles and to study the best ways of increasing import of Japanese articles.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 1232

FROM: Hsinking (Umezu) — August 15, 1941
TO: Bangkok — Circular 185.

Hsinking to Tokyo as #552.

According to Intelligence Operative "A" at Harbin, the Soviet Ambassador at Chungking, sent the following report to Moscow on August 6th.

"According to information from the British Embassy, the American and British Governments have decided on the following steps to check the Japanese southward advance:

"(a) Britain and the United States are disseminating propaganda to the effect that they will have to take military measure if the Japan-Thailand agreement is not abrogated.

"(b) If that occurs, there would be increased Anglo-American economic demands on Thailand.

"Consequently from the standpoint of supplies, the British would have to increase their air force in Burma to prevent the Japanese from sending a large military force into Thailand."

Relayed to Harbin.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 1233

FROM: Tokyo — July 31, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #445.

(Foreign Office secret.)

Please instruct the editors of Thailand's vernacular and English language press to carry a story along the following lines immediately and at the same time ----- (one line unreadable, due to garbles) -----:

"Crosby called at the Foreign Ministry of Thailand and stated that the British Government will give favorable consideration to Thailand's demands for the recovery of territories lost to Burma. (Be sure to use the expression "territories lost.") (Also make certain that reference is made of the exact day and time of Crosby's visit to the Foreign Office".)

Trans. 8–5–41po

No. 1234

FROM: Tokyo — August 16, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 487.

(Secret outside the Department)

Re your # 505[a].

We were under the impression that the question-and-answer conversation which was carried on on the 8th between ASAHI's special correspondent OKA here and the home office was the result of your policy based on my # 445(?). There are reasons to believe that your caption telegram is not a reply to the aforementioned telegram of ours. Will you please wire at once how you are handling this matter and what reaction it has caused.

---

[a] See III, 1220.

Trans. 8-22-41

No. 1235

FROM: Bangkok — August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 531.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your # 487[a].

Due to the fact that strict control is being exercised on news published in this country, publication in a newspaper of the contents of your # 445[b] might result in the suspension of the newspaper concerned. We need to avoid such a danger inasmuch as such a result would have a very unfavorable effect upon our future policy toward Thailand. I, therefore, gave the information as news to Japanese correspondents in this country; had them wire it to their home offices in Tokyo; then had the news wired again to this country (the telephone conversation between Correspondent OKA and the main office), and lastly had these correspondents write it up as if it were a rumor picked up in the city. So far we have not noticed any reaction worthy of mention.

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[a] See III, 1234.
[b] See III, 1233.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 1236

FROM: Tokyo — August 14, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 480.

Ambassador TSUBOKAMI'S induction exercises are scheduled for the 16th of August, We will furnish an Imperial Order and the Foreign Office's notification of this promotion under that date. Therefore, whether there is a formal appointment of a Thaiese Ambassador to Tokyo or not, we wish their Ministry in Tokyo promoted to an Embassy simultaneously on the 16th. Please so inform the officials of the Government to which you are accredited.

Now, if it should so happen that some other country promotes its Ministry to an Embassy, it cannot be considered legal, of course, until official credentials are presented. Please be very careful to remind the Thaiese of this. Tell them, furthermore, that telegraphic photostats will be no good.

Trans. 8–16–41

No. 1237

FROM: Tokyo — August 14, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #483.

(To be handled in government code.)

Re the middle paragraph of your #498[a].

The mutual and simultaneous promotion in status of the Embassies, in accordance with your message #407[b], was definitely promised by the Thai authorities. This is a fact and so, if perchance, on the excuse of the appointment of a formal ambassador you should delay the promotion of the Embassy, this would create hard feeling; and so temporarily, pending the appointment of the formal ambassador, I want you to know that there are no objections here if you have either the present Minister or the Secretary act as Charge d'Affairs.

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[a] See III, 1221.

[b] Which says, "On the 14th I received a reply from the Departments of the Interior and Foreign Affairs that they were willing to accept the simultaneous and mutual promotion of ministries to embassies through an aide memoire."

Trans. 8–16–41

No. 1238

FROM: Bangkok (Futami) — August 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #513.

Re your #480[a].

I sought an interview with Pibul immediately and communicated to him the purport of your telegram but Pibul said that tomorrow was altogether too soon and that the necessary details could not be worked out by then and that Thailand desired to raise the status of the legation on the 24th. In regard to the selection of an Ambassador Pibul said that they would rather appoint SIRISENA formally as ambassador temporarily at least rather than as Charge d'Affairs and that they desired Japan's agreement to this. The selection of a permanent ambassador is to be left to a later date. He said further that there was no talk of raising the status of any other country's legation and that until Japan reached a decision it was their intention ----- -----.

---

[a] See III, 1236.

Trans. 8–20–41

No. 1239

FROM: Tokyo August 16, 1941
TO: Berlin Circular 1834.

The Imperial Government, with the object of further promoting the friendly relations existing between Japan and Siam, has this date, the 16th, elevated the Imperial Legation in Siam to the rank of Embassy and has appointed SADAJI TSUBOKAMI as its first Ambassador.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 1240

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #525.

I received a request from the Foreign Office (today?) for the "agreement" of the Japanese Government to the appointment of the Minister in Tokyo Mr. SIRISENA as (Ambassador?).

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 1241

FROM: Bangkok August 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo #526.

PIBUL has told me privately that the Siam Government has given its "agreement" to the appointment as American Minister in Siam of the Counsellor to the American Embassy in China, Mr. PECH.

Trans. 8-21-41

No. 1242

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo #536.

Yesterday I called upon Derreck to pay my respects upon the occasion of raising the status of the Thailand legation at which time Derreck expressed his regrets for the fact that due to lack of time both countries could not effect this at the same time, however, immediately upon the receipt of the "agreement" from the Japanese Government relative to the raising in status of Minister SIRISENA the announcement would be made on the 24th, he said. In regard to the dating of the raise in status should that be made as of the 16th the same as Japan's or should it be the 24th, he inquired. So please wire an answer in regard to this point immediately.

Trans. 8-23-41

No. 1243

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #516.

Confidential information from WRXIVIO.

(1) The agreement between Britain and Thai mentioned in my #402[a] has been practically dropped.

(2) Aside from the question of this agreement between Britain and Thai arrangements have been made for purchasing from ----- 2000 (?) sacks per year, and beer and necessary amounts of petroleum (excepting crude oil). This is entirely unconditional and payments will be made in pounds.

(3) Of late Britain is eagerly trying to curry the favor of Thailand.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-19-41

No. 1244

FROM: Tokyo August 21, 1941
TO: Bangkok #500.

(Abstract.)

The Thai Minister has informed the Foreign Minister that the reason for shortage in shipments of tin and rubber to Japan is that Britain is exerting pressure on Thailand to prohibit exports to Japan, including those of hemp sacks, and oil. The Foreign Minister has given this information to the War and Navy Ministers. A full reply will be made soon. The Thai Minister states that about 80% of the rubber and 40% of the tin for Japan is being supplied.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 1245

FROM: Tokyo August 21, 1941
TO: Bangkok #505.

Tokyo to Hsinking #510.

Re your (Hsinking's) #549[a].

In view of the delicate nature of our relations with Thailand we will wait and see how things shape up after Ambassador Tsubokami assumes his post before deciding on our policy toward Thailand. You will learn the details from Counselor Hanawa.

[a] See III, 1226.

Trans. 8-27-41

No. 1246

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 538.

Reports of reliability "B".

In spite of the fact that it was stipulated in the Thailand-French Indo-China peace treaty that the Thai army was to be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within one month after it was handed over, Pibul ignored the stipulations even before the Japanese army occupied southern French Indo-China and has ordered the Thai troops to be garrisoned there for two months. Furthermore he seems to have issued secret orders to extend this to three months in case the French do not protest.

Trans. 8–22–41

No. 1247

FROM: Tokyo August 20, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 496.

Ambassador TSUBOKAMI will leave Tokyo on the first of September by a Japan-Siamese plane to take up his new post. As this is the first appointment of an Ambassador, it is desirable to use great circumspection; therefore, if you have any suggestions in regard to the presentation of credentials or other preparations to be carried out, please reply by telegraph.

Trans. 8–21–41

No. 1248

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 22, 1941
TO: Bangkok # 503.

Re your message # 525[a].

I would also like your concurrence in the matter of Minister SENA's[b] appointment as Ambassador.

---

[a] See III, 1240.
[b] PAHYA SRI SENA.

Trans. 8–26–41

No. 1249

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 555.

Re your # 496[a].

I have discussed the matter with the Foreign office of this country and found that Minister is the highest rank held among the foreign officials in this country and that the ceremonial of submitting credentials is carried on in a very ----- manner (at first the officials are lined up in front of the palace in which audience is to be granted, and the automobile attached to the palace is

sent around). However, in the case of an ambassador, since there is no precedent, they would like to use the same method as is used in Japan. Therefore, they wish to learn the respective methods applied to an ambassador and to a minister. I would appreciate your immediate reply.

[a] See III, 1247.

Trans. 8-26-41

No. 1250

FROM: Bangkok — August 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 540.

Re my # 517-522 inclusive[a].

Thailand suddenly presented a new proposal this afternoon, the main points of which are:

1. 3 % of the selling price to be deducted and held by the credit group.
2. Elimination of the provision regarding further conference in case the sale of 25,000,000 bahts is not sufficient.
3. Limiting the reverse to be held in Japan to 10,000,000 bahts only. Anything above this to be actually shipped.

Since this new proposal absolutely nullifies the original proposal we are holding to the original proposal and changing to diplomatic negotiations. Therefore signatures cannot be affixed on the 20th and a delay becomes unavoidable.

[a] # 517 See III, 1228.
518 See III, 1229-1230.
519 See III, 1211.
520 Thaiese proposal regarding trade that was superseded by a new proposal submitted 19th of August as given in Bangkok's # 540. Negotiations regarding purchase of Thaiese rice.
521 Financial sale of gold.
522 Satisfactory progress of negotiations with Thaiese regarding gold purchases.

Trans. 8-23-41

No. 1251

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) — August 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 556.

Re your Circular # 1798[a].

An issue for freezing all payments has been put into effect in this country. Until a few days ago remittances by Sinkyoku[b] and other organizations to Hongkong were greatly hampered because of the restriction put on withdrawal from the Shanghai-Hongkong Bank. More lately this restriction has been made less stringent (within the limit of remittances to families) and this has resulted in the resumption of remittances for the Chinese by the Minsinkyoku[b] and banks. The business is now being handled in the usual manner.

The method used in remitting funds applies principally to investments made by the Chinese and large sums are being sent by way of Hongkong and Kunming. Remittances of money

to families in native places, also those for the payment of small trade, are being made in most cases by the Sinkyoku forwarding the money to related Sinkyoku in Hongkong—if not actually sent, the funds are applied for at the latter—and forwarded from Hongkong by mail to persons or firms doing business with banks connected with the Chinese postal system or taken by messengers to them and thus distributed to various sections of China (including the occupied area). (For details, please refer to the telegram dated July 11th -- Furthermore, there has been a rise in the rate of exchange applying to remittances made to occupied areas to the extent of 3 baht per hundred yuan of the regular Chinese currency over the rate in effect last week. The present rate of exchange is 14.-- baht for occupied areas and 11.-- baht for unoccupied areas, and the fluctuation has been stopped at this rate. This rise in the rate is due largely to the fact that remittances are being made by way of Hanoi and to the fact that the areas which have made peace with the South China Army have been cut off from other areas. At least these seem to be the reasons. I am reporting this much without being able to ascertain the matter.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] *Translator's Note:* Probably organizations in the nature of trust companies.

Trans. 8-29-41

No. 1252

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #566.

(Secret outside the Department.)

The following is the content of the memorandum concerning the sale of gold exchanged between Minister FUTAMI and Finance Minister PURAJITTO. The exchange of documents took place at 3:30 P.M. today.

(1) The gold already sold under clause four of the understanding above mentioned may be kept in safe custody in whole or in part at the Bank of Japan or may be transported in whole or in part to Bangkok at the option of the Thai Finance Minister.

(2) When the transportation of gold is requested by the Thai Minister of Finance, the Japanese Government promises to grant to the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. the requisite permit for such transportation.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 1253

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #568.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Exchange was completed under this date of the communication concerning the sale of gold addressed to the head of the Thaiese National Bank from the manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank. Of this, the fifth clause, which differs in its entirety from my #518[a], is as follows. Furthermore, other points of difference are that the party with which the contract has been arranged has been changed to the National Bank, and also the fact that clause 8 has been dropped. The entire text will be sent by air mail.

5. Upon request by the T.N.B.B., the Y.S.B. shall forthwith apply to the Japanese Government for permission for the gold, kept in safe custody at the Bank of Japan as aforesaid, to be transported in whole or in part to Bangkok. When such permission has been granted, the Y.S.B undertakes forthwith to secure the transportation of the gold and the delivery thereof to the T.N.B.B., Bangkok, the cost of transportation and insurance to be borne by the Y.S.B., but the T.N.B.B will compensate the U.S.B. therefor up to an amount not exceeding the difference between the legal parity of the baht and the rate at which the treasury purchases sterling.

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[a] See III, 1229–1230.

Trans. 8–28–41

No. 1254

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #567.

Secret outside the Department.

1. In connection with the purchase of gold, today at 9:30 a.m. under the auspices of PIBUL, Minister FUTAMI, Advisor ŌNO and Secretary AIGHI, representing us, and PURAJITTO, Finance Minister, DERREK, Foreign Minister, and WANITTO, representing the Thaiese, met together under very friendly conditions. At about 12:00 o'clock the main points of the text given in my #517[a] and #522[b] were agreed upon. Next at 3:30 p.m. the previously mentioned three persons, as well as FUKUDA of the Yokohama Specie Bank met together with PURAJITTO, BUIBAA, and the head of the Thaiese National Bank at the Treasury and FUKUDA presented a note to the head of the bank who returned his acknowledgment dated today. Then, PURAJITTO and Minister FUTAMI signed the aforementioned aide memoire.

2. The points of the convention differed from our #512[b] in that:

a. The Thaiese National Bank was designated as the Thaiese correspondent.

b. The Yokohama Specie Bank is to assume the expense and responsibility of transference (of bullion), as mentioned in article 5. The Thaiese National Bank is to pay the Yokohama Specie Bank upon delivery in Bangkok up to the equivalent of 20 satan[c], the difference between the market rate of 10 baht, 80 satan, for one pound, which is the market rate, and the rate of 11 baht for a pound, which is the rate fixed in this agreement.

c. Instead of mentioning in article 8 the renewal of the present 10,000,000 baht loan, mention will be made that this is a special loan from the Yokohama Specie Bank to the Consortium.

---

[a] See III, 1228.

[b] Not available.

[c] *Translator's Note:* Apparently 100 satan equal 1 baht.

Trans. 9–3–41

No. 1255

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #578.

The Thaiese Finance Minister told the Thaiese newspaper men this morning that the Thaiese National Bank will purchase gold to the amount of 25,000,000 bahat from the Yokohama Specie Bank and that an agreement had been made whereby bullion could be left in Japan, earmarked for Thailand, or could be transferred to Thailand. Therefore, this afternoon we announced the same news to Japanese news men here.

Trans. 9–3–41

No. 1256

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) August 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #588.

15,000,000 Bahts were received today at the Specie Bank (it is understood that this will be corrected to the exact figures after calculation). This amount if the "earmarked" gold of your telegram #–28 (of #–22).

Trans. 9–16–41

No. 1257

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 30, 1941
TO: Bangkok #537.

From Vice Finance Minister to Advisor –––––.

On August 28 the bullion which is to be sold by the Yokohama Specie Bank to the Thaiese National Bank was transferred to the former from the gold reserve of the special account and is as follows:

a. 333 pieces.
b. Quality above grade 990.
c. Weight 4,978,175.6 grams; net weight 4,974,091.7 grams.

Trans. 9–3–41

No. 1258

FROM: Rome August 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo #544.

Points that might be of interest to you from the contents of a dispatch from the Minister[a] in Bangkok, which Alexandrini divulged to Ando on the 23rd:

(1) Thai's attitude is unsettled. British and American propaganda is being carried on extensively. The pro-British and American factions are working in various ways, their influence being felt even in the Cabinet, and the sympathies of the populace are with them to quite an extent. The military and economic pressure exerted by Britain and the United States are having some effect.

(2) Japan's constant attitude of excessive interference, it cannot be denied, has been one contributing factor in a certain amount of revulsion of feeling arising among the people.

(3) The Thai Foreign Minister's explanation to the British Minister of their attitude of neutrality and assertion that invasion would be resisted to the very last, was well taken by the citizens, because of the above mentioned situation.

It is said that the Italian Minister is maintaining closest relations with the Japanese Minister.

---

[c]The Italian Minister.

Trans. 8-28-41

No. 1259

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 26, 1941
TO: Bangkok #513.

The following is information which our Ambassador HORIKIRI in Rome gathered concerning a message sent by the Italian Minister in your city to Rome (this is for your reference).

1. The attitude of the Thaiese Government has lately begun to waiver considerably because of the response of the pro-American and pro-British faction in the cabinet to economic and military propaganda as well as pressure applied by the British and Americans.

2. Japan's exacting attitude taken with no regard to time seems to have caused some resentment among the people and this also is probably one of the reasons.

3. The Foreign Minister's statement made to the British Minister with regard to maintenance of strict neutrality by Thailand has won for it the good will of the people.

Trans. 8-30-41

No. 1260

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 29, 1941
TO: Bangkok (Koshi) #531.

The ----- and has expressed their desire for 12,000 tons of crude oil, but as you reported that Britain has arranged to purchase all the petroleum she needs ----- is there any reason for needing to purchase from us? In that purchased by Britain, the crude oil is included, so that in order to avoid having the Thai oil refineries remain idle.

With our difficulty over shortage of oil, it would be impossible for us to furnish crude oil merely on these reasons. If there is no other way out we might furnish a small amount.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 1261

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) August 30, 1941
TO: Bangkok #534.

The shipping bureau of the Communications Department and the Gei Jutsu (Fine Arts) Moving Picture Company are going to cooperate in making a picture called "Kamotsu Sen" (Cargo Ship). Please have Thailand agree to the following:

1. The time will be from the middle of September to the middle of October.

2. We wish to take from a ship some views of Bangkok and the landscape and shipping activities along the Mekong River. The photographers left on Mitsui's Asahiyama Maru which will arrive in Bangkok on the 12th of September. Please do not let the name of this ship be known. The troupe will remain on board the ship and not land.

Trans. 11-3-41

No. 1262

FROM: Bangkok — September 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — No number.

Gogai.

Your Circular # 1906[a] cannot be decoded. Please wire as to how to decode it.

Furthermore the code address of the Daido Trading Company in the commercial list is not clear in your # 527[a] (supplementary to Circular 1907[b]). Please wire.

---

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 644.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 1263

FROM: Bern (Mitani) — September 1, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 100.

1. In regard to the inquiry in your Circular # 1906[a] please reconsider the request in paragraph 2 of my # 35[a].

2. Also please give consideration to the item in my # 90[a].

Please wire immediately the results of your consideration of the above two items.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-16-41

No. 1265

FROM: Tokyo — September 3, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 553.

Supplementing Circular # 1906[a].

Request message from Domei, requesting an investigation regarding the reception of Domei news broadcasts in Thailand by residents of that country, with particular reference to:

(1) Names of government organs, officials and newspaper men receiving these broadcasts;
(2) Wave lengths, frequency, time best suited to the hours of going to press of newspapers;
(3) Number of daily broadcasts;
(4) Content of broadcasts;

(5) The use of Domei news in Thailand.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 1266

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) September 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo #615.

Re your Circular #1906[a].

1. News is received at two stations, the Kurassi[b] Wireless Station in this city and the Press Receiving Station, and then transmitted by ordinary telegraphic channels as radio news to contracting companies. There are no other channels for news.

2. At present, reception is good. The deadline in the respective newspaper offices here is 2:00 P.M., but the time for distributing radio news is 10:00 P.M. (ordinary news) and 6:00 P.M. (special news), and so at present there is no need of making a change.

3. As compared to Reuters and the Transocean, broadcast is made less frequently and in fewer words. For this reason, there is plenty of time ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----. We have had the experience of suffering various damages on account of their having indiscriminately broadcasted abroad ----- ----- ----- and ----- which should have been kept -----. Therefore, we need to pay special attention to selecting the right news and concentrate on world news instead of news centering on Japan.

4. At present there are no special rules for governing broadcasting, but the broadcasting company here is extremely nervous about broadcasting world news. The various newspapers are making fairly good use of Domei news.

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9-13-41

No. 1267

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 4, 1941
TO: Bangkok #558.

Re my #531[a].

To supply crude oil for the purpose in question is, as I have explained in my caption telegram, an extremely difficult thing to do. The opinion of the Naval authorities is that crude oil is not included in the ----- between Britain and Thailand and, therefore, if the crude oil in question is not supplied, the oil refineries will, as a result, become idle. Should this happen, there is a danger of playing into the hands of the British who wish to take over the refineries which are ours by right. (This point is merely for your information.) After taking up the matter with the Government offices concerned, the Thaiese ------ has decided to ----- the refined products obtained from the crude oil which we supply and reserve it for the use of ----- -----. They have also decided that, out of this, the amount which Thailand wishes to use should be

decided by you and the Thaiese authorities in conference. (We ----- ----- ----- air-planes used on the regular Japan-Thaiese schedule -----.)

Will you, therefore, suitably inform them of this and get their approval; but, in doing so, in order that we may use this matter to our advantage in our future negotiations for rice, rubber, tin, etc., impress strongly upon their minds the fact that we are thus disposing of this question in a specially friendly attitude, based on a general consideration of Japanese-Thaiese friendship.

We shall communicate the same to the Thaiese Minister in Tokyo.

---

[a]See III, 1260.

Trans. 9-9-41

No. 1268

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 608.

Re your # 506[a] and # 531[b].

According to an explanation given by PIBUL[c], this question has arisen from Minister SENA's[d] misunderstanding. The Thaiese Foreign Office had sent him, for his convenience, a list of various matters which had recently been discussed with Japan, and SENA, entirely upon his own judgment, had made the proposal to you. So explaining, PIBUL expressed his regret. DERRECK[e] also offered the same explanation. However, when I carefully read Minister SENA's aide memoire, I find points in it which made it hard for me to accept the above explanation. As stated in the last part of my # 605[a], circumstances now make it necessary relative to the said negotiations that we submit a stronger demand for rubber and tin. However, as you may see from the last part of your # 396[f], with regard to petroleum, we have been taking the attitude that we would like to exchange it for rubber and tin, and so it is my surmise that in hopes of softening our strong attitude he had submitted a direct appeal to you.

---

[a]Not available.
[b]See III, 1260.
[c]Prime Minister of Thailand.
[d]Thaiese Minister to Japan.
[e]Thaiese Foreign Minister.
[f]See III, 1268A.

Trans. 9-8-41

No. 1268A

FROM: Tokyo 15 July 1941
TO: Bangkok # 396.

Re your # 395[a].

In regard to the Mizuno-WANITTO understanding, we have had formal negotiations with Britain regarding oil, and America has promised 35,000 tons of rubber and as large an amount

of tin ore as it is possible to supply, hence in order to insure a supply of rubber and tin from Thailand, in spite of the fact that we have no obligation to do so, it may be well to supply Thailand with the 12,000 tons of oil which she needs at this time in view of the fact that we urgently need supplies from her and also in view of the state of relations existing between Japan and Thailand now as stated in your telegram # 398. However in return for supplying this 12,000 tons of oil needed by Thailand we will want definite assurances of a change of attitude on her part and also an assurance of a supply of at least 35,000 tons of rubber a year and 6,000 tons of tin ore a year. From now on we will want to begin importing 3,000 tons of rubber a month and 500 tons of tin ore a month. With this understanding that Thailand guarantees the above supply of commodities we will supply the oil.

It will take about two weeks to complete loading the oil.

---

*Not available.

Trans. 7–18–41

No. 1269

FROM: Bangkok (Asada) September 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 605.

My views on the effect on Thailand of our occupation of southern French Indo-China are as follows:

1. It cannot be doubted that all classes in this country were much aroused by this military occupation. The fact is that since Germany did not seem to be doing so well in Russia, England and the United States were spreading propaganda, trying to organize an international pro-Anglo-Saxon front. The occasion of our occupation was used in an endeavor to frighten both the people and as many as possible of the government officials and to turn them against us. However, the success of this scheme can at best be called only partial.

2. PIBUL and those close to him appear to have already had a very good idea about what we were going to do in French Indo-China. But the pro-British group seems to have connected this with the failure of our negotiations with French Indo-China and to have expected resistance. It appears, then, that there was a considerable discrepancy between the views of these two factions. Anglo-American propaganda, even in high places, has apparently had a rather telling effect. As you know, there are quite a few Anglophiles in government circles and through their words and acts, coupled with Anglo-American propaganda, I would say that lately their influence had waxed rather noticeably. I would say that the recent critical situation allowed the United States in particular to exert considerable pressure.

3. The Propaganda Bureau of Thailand is nervously denying to our Domei and other news agencies recent Anglo-American propaganda and is vouching for Thai's neutral policy. Indeed, I would say that there is nothing new in her recent neutrality declaration. She made this statement purely from the point of expediency. In contrast with her neutrality statements all along, this latest one ----- ----- ----- equal amity with all nations ----- ----- -----. (I mean to say that it is vague and that there is a particular tendency to leave out considerations concerning both Japan and Great Britain. ----- ----- in this since the Anglo-Thai agreement has apparently been dropped. Similarly, recently our rubber and tin trade with Thai was also stopped.) Now, however, in fact, our rubber and tin business with Thai is on the increase, even almost up to our requests. This is something for us to take particular note of.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 1270

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 6, 1941
TO: Bangkok #568.

From the Vice-Minister of Finance to ONO, who is in Bangkok.

After you have made complete arrangements with the Ambassador, there are no objections to your returning home.

The Minister of Finance has completed his talks with the Foreign Minister.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 1271

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #620.

Re your #568[a].

I have completed my informal discussion with special employee ONO, and due to the way conditions look right now, and because we saw no special necessity for his remaining here, it has been decided that his party will return home by way of the South Seas and French Indo-China, leaving here around the 17th. Furthermore, since we have discussed the future policy very thoroughly, please listen to what he has to say.

[a] See III, 1270.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 1272

FROM: Tokyo September 6, 1941
TO: Bangkok #564.

Re your #601[a].

Among the Japanese going to Thailand, those who are going merely for the purpose of travel or of opening new stores are for the time being prevented from entering the country. Will you please wire me whether the bill in question has anything in it that would cause inconvenience in the future to Japanese wishing to enter the country and also your opinion concerning restriction of Japanese travellers to Thailand.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 1273

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) September 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo #618.

Secret outside the Department.

Regarding the supply of 20,000 bales of gunny-sacks referred to in my #516[a], I understand, the British Government has submitted a request for reducing the amount to 14,000 bales. WANITTO has shown me confidentially, on the understanding that I keep it strictly secret, the diplomatic note which the British Minister had addressed to the Foreign Office on this question. The content of this note is roughly as follows:

1. Due to the development of the war, demand for gunnysacks in Britain has suddenly increased. As a result, it is no longer possible to supply the 10,000 bales which had been promised. However, in view of the traditional good relations obtaining between Great Britain and Thailand, Great Britain will agree to supply Thailand with 14,000 bales within this year (delivery to be completed by the end of November) and thereafter 1500 bales per month, amounting, in all, to 72,000 bales (I understand the demand in Thailand is roughly for 70,000 bales).

2. However, in return for this supply, the British Government requests the Thaiese Government to agree to the following (it seems that the Thaiese Government is not obliged to give recognition to these points prior to the execution of the British proposal):

(1) Thailand shall oppose every kind of pressure brought to bear upon her which has to do with the "sphere of coprosperity" or the "new order."

(2) The present policy of not re-exporting empty sacks shall be continued.

(3) Thailand shall increase the export of rice to British territory.

(4) Thailand shall export rice to the Malay as agreed upon.

---

[a] See III, 1243.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 1274

FROM: Bangkok — September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #627.

Bangkok to Shanghai as #8.

On the 5th the Thailand ship Suriyotai left here for Shanghai with a cargo of 1000 tons of rubber and other Thailand products and it appears that early next month another ship will do the same. This is bound to have a severely unfavorable effect on the Shanghai market and will profoundly affect our purchases in the future. ----- (last 3 lines garbled).

Trans. 9-18-41

No. 1275

FROM: Bangkok — September 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #630.

Regarding your #542[a].

1. The local post office is distributing Domei dispatches as "Rengo Imperial News" and the newspapers are making selections from them and publishing them freely. However, I think the following three methods appropriate:

2. The distribution of the zinc plates.

3. The Japanese Domei dispatches are being listened to, but I think it would be advisable to increase our staff of English Domei technicians and furnish the newspapers with an English version of the Domei dispatches.

Further, in regard to this matter, the government and the people here have great confidence in the ultimate victory of England and America, and it is this that is furnishing the greatest obstacle to our diplomatic policy toward Thailand. Therefore, in our propaganda we must put strength into the telegrams in order to break down this idea. For this purpose it would be profitable in the Domei news to stress world news and from time to time to give an analysis of current events or occasionally to broadcast editorials from our newspapers and magazines.

4. Recently a Penang broadcast replied to our Far East Co-Prosperity Sphere problem, to explain concretely to the Thailand populace the advantages of a future entirely separated from American-British economy, and get them to accept it.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 9-19-41

No. 1276

FROM: Bangkok September 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo #629.

(*Abstract.*)

Plans for establishment of joint Japanese-Thaiese shipping company progress. Wanitto held discussions while in Tokyo, and men from the Yamashita Steamship Co. are coming to Bangkok. The Thailand Oil Co. has purchased steamers to be under Thai ownership, to further and protect the commerce and industry of Thailand. Japanese shipping interests should be concerned with this movement. The aims of Japanese economic expansion in Thailand should be energetically pushed, and the proper authorities in the Finance Ministry consulted.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 1277

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 16, 1941
TO: Bangkok #590.

Re your #629[a].

1. The real object in the Navy's wishing to establish this line is to grasp control of Thaiese shipping rights. The Navy left the establishment of the concern up to Yamashita, making it appear that the primary object is to facilitate and further shipping facilities and trade between Japan and Thailand. The Government officials, that is to say, military, communications, treasury, and foreign office people, are naturally very eager to see this sort of scheme prosper, so after you have discussed the details fully with our Naval authorities in Bangkok, will you please assist and direct the man whom Yamashita will send over to take charge. At first we set the figure for the cost of this undertaking tentatively at 3,000,000 baht, but, as we studied the matter, we found it possible to reduce it to 1,000,000 baht. Authorization was granted on the 9th of this month by the Treasury Department for the remittance of the first fourth of the sum, namely, 250,000 baht. On the 12th of this month the Communications Department officially sanctioned the undertaking, so you can see that, so far as we are concerned on this side, preparations have already been laid. Now we are merely waiting for Thai to lay her plans at the earliest possible moment. I might add that the delinquency Thai has recently

shown in this matter is not pleasing to us. Will you please look into the matter and wire back all the details.

In your caption message you mentioned certain points causing wrangling. What is this all about? Are they merely suspicious of the deal, or is it that they do not think much of WANITTO? You know that the provisional signature executed by WANITTO and Yamashita in Tokyo was "private and confidential." Try to find out how all this is and let me know.

---

[a] See III, 1276.

Trans. 9-29-41

No. 1278

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 10, 1941
TO: Bangkok #580.

The following is for Minister KOBAYASHI.

Please transmit the following to Consul General OKAZAKI;

1. Preparations have been made for the evacuation of retail merchants and others insofar as possible. It will be necessary for a certain number to remain in order to continue the business which they feel necessary. Please reply, giving the number of persons desiring to withdraw from Bombay, Colomba, Karachi, and other places (giving the number of men and women, together with children, the aged, dependents, etc.).

2. It has been decided to send the Hie Maru to Bombay, Bandar Shapur[a], and Mombasa[b] for withdrawal of nationals from the Near East, India, and East Asia. This ship will accommodate 76 first-class passengers, 69 second-class passengers, and 186 third-class. There will be approximately 60 persons from the Near East and some ten-odd from Mombasa. As it will be difficult to give them the accommodations desired, the Consul General at Bombay, YAMAGUCHI, and the head of the Nippon Yusen Kaish there have formulated the following:

a. The first and second-class accommodations will be preferably assigned to the aged, expectant mothers, and sick, babes in arms and their mothers.

b. The remaining first and second-class accommodations will be assigned to those from the Near East and East Asia.

c. Even though the number will be large, accommodations will be assigned as impartially as possible (preference being given to women and the aged). The remainder would be assigned to third-class.

On the 24, the Ainfui[c] will enter port to take off the Indians who desire to withdraw. There will be a special train to Yokohama from Kobe for them, and it is arranged that utmost considerations will be given them in passing customs.

---

[a] Iranian port.
[b] In Kenya Colony, Africa.
[c] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9-17-41

No. 1279

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Bangkok

September 11, 1941
583.

Re my # 580[a].

To Minister Kobayashi as follows:

Please convey the following together with my caption telegram to Consul General Okayama:

1. The Schedule of the Hie Maru is as follows:

Sept 22 Leave Kobe
Oct 6 Arrive Bombay (load fuel)
Oct 7 Leave Bombay
Oct 12 Arrive Bandar Abu Shehr
Oct 13 Leave Bandar Abu Shehr
Oct 21 Arrive Mombasa
Oct 24 Leave Mombasa
Oct 31 Arrive Bombay (with evacuees)
Nov 1 Leave Bombay
Nov 20 Arrive Yokohama

2. We have contacted the head office of the N.Y.K. regarding having first and second class treated as one. (There will be some differences in rate.)

We have wired Iran and Mombasa in regard to the allotment of staterooms.

[a]See III, 1278.

Trans. 9–16–41

No. 1280

FROM: Bangkok
TO: Tokyo

September 11, 1941
626.

Re your # 580[a].

Minister Kobayashi left here the 9th and as you know code telegrams cannot be sent to Calcutta, so please arrange to handle the matter of your caption telegram at the head office.

---

[a]See III, 1278.

Trans. 9–17–41

No. 1281

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Bangkok

September 15, 1941
589.

Strictly confidential.

Re my # 583[a].

The Akagisan Maru will take the place of the Akibasan Maru sailing from Yokohama September 16th and arriving in Bangkok October 15th.

Furthermore Technician Saichiro Akada of the mint is scheduled to embark on the *Delhi (?)* Maru. Please inform the Thailand Finance Minister and Adviser Ono of the above.

---

[a] See III, 1279.

Trans. 9–23–41

No. 1282

FROM: Tokyo — September 19, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 593.

Re my # 589[a].

Technician Okada is to carry with him 50 grams of pure gold and 150 grams of pure silver for assaying purposes. Please speak to the Thailand government about clearing this through customs.

---

[a] See III, 1281.

Trans. 9–24–41

No. 1283

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) — September 16, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 634.

From Secretary YOKOBA to the Chief of the Planning Board in the Telegraphic Section of the Communications Ministry and to the Chief of the 2nd Hydroelectric Section.

The closing date for the submission of specifications for the hydroelectric power station in Thailand was the last day of August. Although by that closing date the Kurisuchan Niiruson Company had submitted its specifications from Japan, the Mitsui Company has not submitted its specifications. With regard to -----, in the eyes of the Thaiese authorities the credit of the Japanese side has fallen greatly.

We have asked the Thaiese authorities to give us another month, and now if we let the time pass without doing anything definite, we will lose our opportunity. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the Kurisuchan Niiruson Company has been engaged in engineering work in Thailand for many years and has a good footing, if we are to compete with this company, I believe it is necessary that the utmost effort be made both by the Mitsui Company, which is the front organization, and the Japanese Government, which is directing the matter. Will you, therefore, urge the home office of the Mitsui Company and the Sibaura Electric Company, as well as the other companies concerned, to hurry up matters so that the specifications may be submitted, at the latest, by the end of this month. I would appreciate your wiring me the results.

---

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9–22–41

No. 1284

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) September 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #641.

From Secretary Yokota to the head of the Secretariat of the Communications Ministry, regarding the establishment of the new firm.

(Abstract.)

Under Thailand practice, the chairman of a board of directors is also president of the company. While it would be better from the standpoint of the Imperial Government to have a Japanese in this office, the formalitites involved are very difficult, even for a native, and consequently it is suggested that a native of Thailand would be more suitable, or possibly a Japanese having Thailand nationality; the Japanese, since they are supplying the capital, would have actual control.

Trans. 9–25–41

No. 1285

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) September 20, 1941
TO: Bangkok #595.

Strictly secret.

Re your #634[a]. From the Chief of the Planning Section to Secretary YOKOTA.

I understand that there is an understanding between the Mitsui in your city and the Thaiese Government that it would be all right if the specifications are sent from Tokyo by the end of September. Will you please ascertain this and wire me your reply.

Mitsui's home office is at present busily engaged in preparing the specifications and the plans; however, we have asked them to finish them as soon as possible.

[a] See III, 1283.

Trans. 9–26–41

No. 1286

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #663.

It would do our relations with Thailand much good for us now to cooperate with them in developing their hydro-electric power. Our chief competitor would be one CHRISTIAN NIELSON, and his influence is by no means to be despised. Mitsui on its own will have a hard time negotiating on this matter I feel sure. Will you please wire me back your opinions on the following points:

1. For the Japanese Government to use the development of hydro-electric plants in Thailand as a means of furthering better political relations with this country, would do much to establish confidence and good faith. Therefore, I think that the Government itself should take it upon itself to assist and guide this enterprise. I think I will send a letter to this effect in my own name to BIRIBAN. As a matter of fact, he asked me to.

2. It seems that models of the engineering work on these plants have already been prepared, but I think it would be very shrewd business if we were to show the people concerned here moving pictures of some of our hydro-electric works. I believe this to be the best way to gain their support. If you have any pictures in which the water is very profuse, I think they would be best. I don't think we need to show them to the Government officials because they might be too quick to take it as propaganda.

Trans. 9-30-41

No. 1287

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) September 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo #640.

The Italian Minister received a reply recently from Derreck[a], the gist of which is as follows. For your information.

1. The Italian Minister said that Thailand would consider any country that invaded Thailand as an enemy. This point was made in a government sponsored broadcast that said from the standpoint of common sense it was very difficult to accept the principle that one country's fate should be entrusted to another because of some accidental coincidence. He thought that there was a dispute in the government and that the government's policy did not coincide with either that of Japan or Britain and so he inquired about it. Derreck said that within the government itself there was no particular dispute but that Thailand was having a very difficult time in regard to her policy toward England and Japan, that it was largely a problem of economics however; on the other hand, politically it was very difficult for the Thai and the Japanese to see eye to eye on some points.

2. The Italian Minister's observation on the above was that the above attitude of Thailand was due to the Konoe message and to the fact that the German-Soviet campaign was not turning out to be a brilliant affair and hence Thailand was adopting a wait-and-see policy.

---

[a] French Consul General at Bangkok.

Trans. 9-23-41

No. 1288

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) September 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo #154.

In order to keep our plans secret, please try to have officers who are sent here come incognito.

Trans. 2-12-45

No. 1289

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) September 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo --M-- #158.

On 29 August, the Singora[a] consulate received a wire from the Foreign Office ordering student secretary SHIMIZU JUICHI transferred to Chiengmai. Please send us a reply wire at once to aid us in giving him instructions.

In view of the importance of collecting intelligence on British Malaya and Southern Siam, and student secretary GOTŌ's linguistic ability, I think we should either supply Singora in addition with one officer who speaks English, or else we should send this officer to Chiengmai in place of SHIMIZU.

[a] Possibly Songkla.

Trans. 2-16-45

No. 1290

FROM: Bangkok — September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #168.

1. The height of the piers, for the bridge at the 307 kilometer (mark?) on the railroad between ARANYA and MONGKOL BOREY, (see special report from SIAM #59[a] is about 2.50 (ch 2.50) meters, the speed of the current is, at present 20 (ch 20) cm.[b].

The river bottom is clay and the pier (?footings?) will be covered with about 30 cm. of mud.

2. On the SIAM side, the line is being (extended?), and along the *ARANYA* line a large number of railway sleepers are being accumulated.

About 100 coolies are engaged in building the line.

3. Saigon --3G--

This is addressed to the General Staff and Saigon.

[a] Not available.
[b] Probably per second.

Trans. 1-31-45

No. 1291

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) — September 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN) (Head, General Affairs Dept.) — #173.

Personal.

The "HARIMŌ[a]" subversive activities project is gradually developing. In Malaya[b] two leaders have already been located in each place.

At present we are working to obtain cells (SAIBŌ[c]) and preparing for (?the beginning?) of activities.

[a] Evidently the code word for this project.
[b] Burma is also a possible reading of the text.
[c] Probably the same meaning as "cell" in the "Communist cell".

Trans. 3-2-45

No. 1292

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) September 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN, Head Gen. Affairs Dept.) #184.

1. As reported in plain text wire 949[a], Siam's "ATC" (a private aviation company) plans to open in the near future a Bangkok-Singora[b] line. They wish to use bimotor advance training planes now used by our army. (This year's model, on recommendation of Col. *PAAMU.*) They are anxious to receive the immediate loan of one plane.

2. In case it is difficult for Japan to loan one plane and to supply others in future, they intend to negotiate with another country (perhaps England). So they would like to know the Japanese government's view of the matter as soon as possible.

3. --1M-- consideration of the direction of Siam civilian aviation, expansion of air routes, and also of the equipment of the *SINGORA*[b] airfields, please try to grant their request as far as possible. Please wire a prompt reply.

Please transmit to Air Headquarters.

---

[a]Not available.
[b]SONGKLA (on Malayan-Thai border).

Trans. 3-17-45

No. 1293

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) September 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) #646.

As stated in my separate telegram #647[a], some one is sending circulars to the Japanese residents in Thailand denouncing (?) Nai Wanitto as a traitor. The above circulars have amounted to several hundred and this was played up in the Thailand press on the 18th (although the name of Wanitto was withheld).

This is causing a "sensation" not only among the Japanese but also among the populace in general.

I feel that the above is not merely a denunciation of Wanitto only, but that the spear was pointed at Japan also. This matter cannot be ignored. At present our relations with Thailand require discretion. This much for the present.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 9-25-41

No. 1294

FROM: Bangkok September 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo #649.

To Director Yoshioka from Yatagai.

The expense fund (10,000 yen) for use in furthering our commercial schemes, as agreed upon at the time of my departure, has not reached me yet. Please investigate and wire it immediately.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 1295

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) September 26, 1941
TO: Nanking #4.

Re your #3[a].

Under the present circumstances no well-known person could hope to work well here. It would be much better to send some efficient, yet inconspicuous, fellow. To call him a merchant is a fine idea and no passport or questionnaire will be necessary. You know, any Chinese who is not a sufferer from trachoma or who is not suspected of being a refugee or on some political mission can enter Thailand and dwell here in peace.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9–30–41

No. 1296

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #665.

To Section Chief YOSHIOKA from YATAGAI.

In order to get the best results, I think we should establish a Chinese commercial concern, I mean ostensibly Chinese, in Royakukan.[a] I believe we should make it appear that this concern is dealing in medicines. Business Official TAKASE agrees with me on this point. We should equip this shop as though it were doing a drug business. The equipment would cost approximately 7,000 baht and the rent about 200 baht. Taxes would be low. In view of the situation here, we should disguise the drugs and make it appear that they came from China.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9–29–41

No. 1297

FROM: Tokyo September 19, 1941
TO: Bangkok #594.

Strictly confidential.

According to Mitsui's report the Soviet ship *Nikoyan*[a] entered Bangkok for the purpose of loading Thailand rubber. Is this true? If it is true by what means did the Soviet acquire the above rubber? Please investigate and wire.

[a] *Nickeliner (?).*

(*Note:* The Japanese expect and intend to get monopoly rights on all Thai rubber production.)

Trans. 10–1–41

No. 1298

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #661.

Re your #594.[a]

The *Mikoyan* (2,300 tons; the East Asiatic Company is its branch office) docked on the 15th and took on 1,000 tons of rubber in addition to some rice. On the 26th it will sail. I have not found out the concern ordered to do the purchasing. However, according to a private report from the customs officials, Japanese shippers are very scarce here. In the local Bank of Asia there is a letter of credit from Shanghai for 1,000 tons of rubber to be shipped in two lots of 500 tons each. I think this must be the money for the rubber loaded on the *Mikoyan*. I am trying to find out, and if you have been able to do so as a result of your investigations, considering the matter mentioned in my #662[b], please let me know.

[a] See III, 1297.
[b] See III, 1299.

Trans. 10–9–41

No. 1299

FROM: Bangkok (Tubokami) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #662.

So much rubber has lately been purchased and shipped to Shanghai that the Guild can hardly function at all. I have tried to look into the facts. So far, I found out the following points in addition to my #661[a].

1. The Paymaster's Department of our Imperial Navy in Shanghai changed some military script into baht and had the local SK Company, which is in close touch with the local Naval Attaché's office, purchase some rubber briquettes and load them on the government ship Tatsuta Maru.

2. A German merchant named SCHMIDT came here a month or so ago from Shanghai. Since he has no ship, he has not been buying any rubber. However, I have heard that the general headquarters for our expeditionary forces in China wired the local Imperial Naval Attaché that SCHMIDT was sent to purchase raw rubber. As for the money in question, in addition to the 50,000 baht from the Showa Trading Company, there are 100,000 baht in the Bank of Asia (in both cases, military script was changed into baht). In addition to this, the Yokohama Specie Bank let the Paymaster have 500,000 baht. The central authorities were not thorough in their control of exports of rubber to central and southern China. Furthermore, the recent negotiations concerning gold were postponed. Consequently, I do not believe that the Guild's money was purchased. Moreover, the business concerns lost faith in the control of the central authorities, thus producing a very unfortunate situation. Will you please find out what you can about these matters in Tokyo and wire me whatever details you are able to discover.

[a] See III, 1298.

Trans. 10–9–41

No. 1300

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) September 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #667.

As I told you in my #662[a], we lack vigor in our attitude toward Thai concerning the rubber question. Since I arranged for purchases by going above the regular central control system of these companies, as you point out, our country has become very much pressed for this commodity, and the fact that they overlook this fact is, indeed, regrettable. To cope with this situation, although I know that it is, indeed, difficult for us to endure making a further compromise on the 35,000 tons, which we insisted upon in order to procure rubber, for the present I think we had better agree on 30,000 tons as a minimum quota. (Of course, if we purchase more than 30,000 tons we must insist on them granting us a quota for the surplus. So long as this matter is certified by me, I do not believe that they have any alternative to permitting this export. Please wire me your opinion immediately.)

---

[a] See III, 1299.

Trans. 10–1–41

No. 1301

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) September 30, 1941
TO: Tokyo #676.

Re my #667[a].

Minister CROSBY, before sailing for Singapore on the 25th, conferred with WANITTO and inquired if a settlement had been effected regarding the 18,000 tons of the 30,000 tons with which Japan was concerned. He intimated that England would enter into dangerous competition for this after he had conferred with the authorities in Singapore. It is very undesirable that we concede anything in connection with the 30,000 tons as it is a matter of principle in connection with England's attempt to restrict us but, on the other hand, there is the point that England has not taken any direct worsening steps in the matter of price. Although the (arguments ?) of jingoistic nature to restrict us cannot be (weighed ?), there is the possibility that what WANITTO said, as had been mentioned, might happen. There are also the circumstances mentioned in my caption message. Anyway, it is very desirous that at this time we come to an agreement regarding the 30,000 tons.

---

[a] See III, 1300.

Trans. 10–14–41

No. 1302

FROM: Tokyo October 3, 1941
TO: Shanghai #1021.

Tokyo to Bangkok #637. Strictly confidential.

Re your #667[a].

We have contacted the departments concerned and the results are as follows:

1. With the understanding in mind contained in the parenthesis in your telegram there are no objections to your telling Thailand that we are willing to compromise on 30,000 tons. However, in that event the 30,000 tons is to be understood to be the absolute minimum of our requirements and in order to insure our obtaining this amount we desire to have some arrangement made with regard to export permits in general. Please tell them that in regard to the portion destined for Japan permits shall be issued only upon authorization of our embassy, (export to China shall be regulated according to paragraph 2 below). Furthermore, in case Thailand feels reluctant to issue a formal permit due to the presence of the British, let them at least arrange to make use of some form of special permit.

2. The Navy recognizes the validity of paragraph 1 of your #662[b] and they explain that beyond doubt it was occasioned by the indefiniteness of China's orders. They have promised to see that such purchases are prevented in the future. However, occasionally in order to utilize military yen, it may be necessary to make purchases through Chinese residents abroad. On such occasions, steps will be taken in China to see that the proper connections are maintained and that a repetition of the former confusion in regulation does not occur. (On each such occasion your embassy will be contacted.)

3. Furthermore, in regard to the matter of purchase, please make arrangements for the purchase and loading of 3,000 tons or more each month beginning with this month, October, in order that we may obtain the requisite amount as rapidly as possible. Arrangements are being made for the transfer of the funds for this purchase. This is for your information.

This has been relayed to Shanghai.

---

[a] See III, 1300.
[b] See III, 1299.

Trans. 10–10–41

No. 1303

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) September 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo #652.

Re your #590[a].

1. I frankly questioned WANITTO[b] concerning subsequent developments on and prospects for the matter in question. He said, "Well, the signing in Tokyo with YAMASHITA was my own private affair. Need I tell you that private matters are not subject to governmental procedure? I have asked for reports from the various shipping companies of foreign countries here in Thailand and drawn up my data. I am going to present it to the Cabinet and show them just how hard up we are when it comes to shipping facilities. I am going to try to get some new shipping lines established. Naturally, however, the Naibira[c] Wing will be against me, but still I shall have to do this for the sake of future harmony.

"The Yamashita people seem to be proceeding with their talks without understanding our position here, so the other night I told YAMASHITA's representative that if they would only leave me out and proceed with their plans for the establishment of a jointly managed concern of a private nature between Thailand and Japan, I thought it would be better." Now, for my information will you please wire me the exact facts concerning the signing by WANITTO and YAMASHITA in Tokyo.

2. These are the points which I think might cause trouble and hard feelings in the future:

(a) WANITTO's provisional signature may or may not be in line with PIBUL's[d] ideas. In fact, I doubt if it is. (Also, I would like to know just how much WANITTO told them in Tokyo about the situation here.)

(b) I informed you some time ago that WANITTO's reputation here is by no means in the ascendency. In fact, it might even deteriorate to the extent mentioned in my # 646.[e]

(c) Under the present circumstances, even if we were to leave out WANITTO and form a jointly managed concern between Japan and Thailand, any such concern which turned out not to be to Bangkok's liking might be subject to a very doubtful destiny. Thus, I think we had better try to work out some new scheme.

---

[a] See III, 1277.
[b] Chief of Trade Bureau.
[c] Kana spelling.
[d] Prime Minister of Thailand.
[e] See III, 1293.

Trans. 9–29–41

No. 1304

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Bangkok

September 25, 1941
602.

Strictly confidential.

Re your # 652[a].

1. We have ascertained that WANITTO's letter to the Navy mentioning this matter was not intended to be entirely private, except that it had no connection with Pibul.

2. Under Thailand law, government permission is not necessary in connection with the establishment of a new shipping firm as long as everything is conducted in accordance with law. Therefore the Yamashita Company's problem is that of proceeding with the establishment of the new company as soon as investigations are completed, even though the Thai government may not extend active aid. We want the transfers completed and, even if the worst should happen, legal proceedings should be completed and the company formed as intended, with the Commerce and Navy Ministeries' participation. If the Thai government is unwilling to have WANITTO become president of the stockholders, some other person will have to be considered.

3. Keeping the foregoing views in mind, and in view of the company's importance to our national policy, we must not have any interference from the Thai government. Your efforts are desired to effect the company's establishment at all costs.

---

[a] See III, 1303.

Trans. 10–1–41

No. 1305

FROM: Tokyo — September 27, 1941
TO: Hanoi — # 293.

Major (or Lt. Comdr.) Fujiwara and Lieutenant (or Sub Lieutenant) Yamaguchi of the General Staff Office, under the assumed names of Koichi Yamashita and Hajime Yamada respectively are scheduled to leave here on the 28th by aeroplane to join the Thailand Embassy staff as non-career clerks and they will arrive there on the 29th to stay overnight. Because of the urgency of the situation there was not time enough to secure French Indo-China visas so please have some one from your staff meet them at the airport and take care of them so that no problems arise. Also please make hotel reservations for them.

This has been relayed to Thailand.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 1306

FROM: Tokyo — September 29, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 615.

Strictly confidential.

Re my # 614[a].

In order to collect military intelligence in your intelligence department at this time, Major (or Lt. Comdr.) Fujiwara and Lieutenant (of Sub Lieutenant) Yamaguchi of the General Staff Office, are being sent there as honorary non-career clerks under the assumed names of Koichi Yamashita and Hajime Yamada. They will have the status of general non-career clerks. Please have your Ambassador and Director of the intelligence department recognize this.

[a] See III, 1307.

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 1307

FROM: Tokyo — September 29, 1941
TO: Bangkok — # 614.

The two non-career clerks for your intelligence department, Koichi Yamashita and Hajime Yamada, are scheduled to arrive by aeroplane on the 30th. Please direct their activities.

Note: (See III, 1305 for more detailed information).

Trans. 10-2-41

No. 1308

FROM: Bangkok — October 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 683.

Re your # 613[a].

The hospital in question was originally planned with a view of having the Navy support it; however, now that the Naval authorities have completed their part of the work towards its establishment, they have requested us to take over the entire responsibility connected with it. We are now experiencing considerable difficulty in getting a license issued in accordance with Thaiese medical laws in effect at present.

Persons connected with the Research Laboratory for Tropical Diseases attached to the Governor General's office in Formosa are now quietly endeavoring to have an understanding whereby a license will be issued. The prospect for the establishment of the hospital would, therefore, depend on what success may be achieved by them. At any rate, we would like to have a semi-official, attached to this office, added to the staff of this hospital and, therefore, I would appreciate your arranging this matter.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10–9–41

No. 1309

FROM: Saigon (Minoda) October 2, 1941
TO: Bangkok #74.

From YANO to OKA attached to the staff of the -----.

A surgeon with the rank of Major in the Army is scheduled to arrive in Bangkok on the 7th of October. He plans to stay in the country for approximately 10 days. In conjunction with the organization setting up the demarkation of the border, he will conduct an investigation of sanitation facilities in and around Bangkok. Inasmuch as he would like to contact sanitation officials in the Ministry of the Interior, National Defense Ministry, and the Red Cross organization, as well as military authorities, please arrange for the extension of full facilities to him. On his return trip he will make an inspection tour of sanitation facilities between Seam Reap and Battambang[a].

---

[a] Town in N.W. Cambodia, French Indo-China.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 1310

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) October 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo #685.

Singora to Bangkok #29.

1. On the evening of the 29th a company of Thai troops demonstrated around the vicinity of this office singing a war song.
2. On the evening of the 28th two motor field guns were sent from the HAJAI station to an unnamed destination in the north.
3. For the past four or five nights market stalls have been set up in front of our office and the inside of the office kept under observation.
4. British nationals—business and industrial men—are entering Thailand in increasing numbers from the Sadao region; eight have entered since the 24th.

5. Air defense and light control measures are enforced throughout the city. The Thai are becoming extremely nervous and are becoming increasingly hostile to us. Moreover, all travel in southern Thailand is rigidly restricted.

6. We are informed that about 50 medium tanks arrived in AROO HAKUTAA on the 25th and are posted at strategic points; and that at two river mouth points, Indian troops are erecting gun emplacements.

Trans. 10-7-41

No. 1311

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Bangkok

October 3, 1941
635.

At present there is a large accumulation of pending problems pertaining to the launching of enterprises by Japanese, in the country to which you are accredited, and in regard to work contracts by Japanese concerns. To facilitate the settlement of these, the 5th committee has now decided upon criteria to guide in the launching of such enterprises, the main features of which are as follows:

(1) The general plan and the policies to be followed, in the settlement of individual cases, will be determined by the Planning Committee at headquarters, and will be carried out by the officials concerned. At the scene, the management of these matters will always be handled by the Imperial Embassy in Thailand.

(2) In the settlement of present pending problems or of cases that it is expected will arise in the future, preferential handling will be accorded to such as come within the following standards;

(a) Those enterprises that are essential to the production of vital raw materials that are necessary to Japan, and that will ensure and facilitate the export of such materials to Japan.

(b) Such enterprises as will be *ready* (?) and effective agencies to have at hand for our carrying out any future military, political, and economic plans in Thailand.

(c) Those enterprises which are likely to be hindrances to the work of estrangement of Japanese-Thai friendly relations by British and American advances, when the time comes for Japan to abandon them.

(3) In the carrying out of the above, the government will give guidance on the basis of the following criteria:

(a) The sale of, or contracts for, equipment for enterprises shall be done as advantageously as possible.

(b) In cases where a Japanese firm is to construct or take contract on bid from Thailand, the government shall designate a certain firm, and thus avoid competition as between Japanese firms. Furthermore, in pending cases where competition has arisen between Japanese firms, the government will undertake to assist in a speedy adjustment of the same.

Trans. 10-14-41

No. 1312

FROM: Bangkok (RUMAN)
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff)

October 4, 1941
293.

1. The Siamese have become suspicious about our measure for immediate establishment of (a) beacon(s) and recently advanced the question of tendering bids for the construction con-

tract(s). Negotiations are now under way and progress is being made on the scheme to award the contract(s) to MITSUI's bid.

Therefore, please hold up for two weeks on the matter of the personnel to be sent here.

2. We would like to have SUZUKI and (the) 2 others who embarked on the MELBOURNE MARU, get off.

3. When DENDEN Co. personnel are sent in the future, please change their passports to those of MITSUI personnel.

4. We will have Lt. Col. ITŌ inform you of details.

Please transmit this to Air H.Q. also.

Trans. 4-21-45

No. 1313

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 4, 1941
TO: Bangkok #641.

Secret outside the department.

Strictly Secret.

Re your #665[a].

I give the matter my approval. The operation of the drug stores should be not merely for the purpose of carrying out this plan but should be so directed that they will be self-supporting. As to the drugs with which they will be stocked, we shall arrange to have these purchased here and in Shanghai and shipped to these drug stores under the name of some Chinese export firm. Please consider the following points and wire me the results at once:

1. The names of the stores and their locations (including the name of the proprietors).
2. Since we shall ----- ----- the drugs, reduce as far as possible the cost of equipment.
3. Since it would be difficult to disguise a great variety, but small quantity, of drugs, we shall send you drugs manufactured for the purpose of exporting to China, and also drugs manufactured in other countries but purchased in Shanghai.

---

[a] See III, 1296.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 1314

FROM: Bangkok October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #703.

Secret outside the Department. Strictly Secret.

Re your #641[a].

1. IKUKANSIYAKU (JOHNS Dispensary); DENMURYŪ (BONLIONG TIEN); BANKOKUETSUSAN K-KYŌ #128 (#128) (WOKBUMGIN, HWASAMQHONE, BANHKOK, VHAILANDNME).

2. For the rental of these stores 4000 (the payment was made with the money advanced by this office), and the cost of equipping them 1,000—total 5,000 baht. Will you please remit this

sum at once (this sum would be sufficient for opening business. We do not expect that any additional remittance would be necessary to pay overhead expense).

3. For the time being, it would be safe not to handle articles on which it is indicated that they have been made in Japan. Please see to it that only articles which are not conspicuous are sent (about 30%). Furthermore, clinical apparatuses (such as hypodermic injection apparatuses) should not be sent for the present because of the trouble of getting them in.

4. Please do not ship articles until we have telegraphed you that our procedure as well as preparations are nearly completed.

5. Inasmuch as the amount given in my #684[b] is for the purpose of carrying out our plans indicated in (4) and (5) of paragraph 1 (also Shanghai), please consider it separately from the aforementioned 2.

6. This matter has been taken up with ----- (he is to fly to Saigon on the 13th).

---

[a] See III, 1313.

[b] Which says that 2300 bahts a month will be required.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 1315

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) October 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo #706.

Re your #548[a].

1. I have been having a member here of the Institute for the Study of Tropical Diseases sound out the opinions of the Bureau of Hygiene. The Chief of the Bureau, I understand, explained that doing away generally with the examination system would not only being about legislative difficulties because it would necessitate the revision of medical laws, but also complicate matters internationally because it would mean the exemption only of the Japanese from examinations while requiring examinations of British, German, American and other applicants who are either practicing at present or are wishing to practice in the future. Furthermore, the Bureau Chief, I understand, added that the examinations were being given as a formality for finding out the qualifications of the applicants. I am informed that arrangements are being made to have a member of the aforementioned Institute, as a matter of experiment, take an examination (they tell me that it would be at least a month before it could be taken).

2. I also had a member of this office take the matter up with the Foreign Office. He was told that granting of license without the general examination referred to above would be impossible for the reasons already given and that it would be preferable in such a case as this to resort to such diplomatic procedure as to submit formally through the Ambassador certificates showing that the applicant is a graduate of a school in Japan whose graduates are considered qualified to practice. Incidentally, the member asked if by resorting to diplomatic procedure is meant that it would be possible to have all our demands ----- ----- secretly. I understand that ----- ----- ----- and so we shall have those members of the Institute who wish to take the examinations apply for license by submitting, as suggested above, their certificates through the Ambassador, and after waiting to see what would result from this procedure, we intend to negotiate further.

---

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-17-41

No. 1316

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) October 6, 1941
TO: Bangkok #646.

According to information coming from our business firms, the Thaiese government has recently issued an order that in case any firm engaged in lighter service is found to be capitalized by a foreign country, though Thaiese in name, its business should be watched. Is this true? If so, this order may be regarded as an obstacle placed in the way of the establishment of shipping company dealt with in my #602[a]. I wonder if this action has not some political significance.

Will you investigate in detail the circumstances surrounding this question and let me know the results by return wire.

---

[a] See III, 1304.

Trans. 10-9-41

No. 1317

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #717.

Re your #646[a]

Recently, no such order as you have indicated has been issued. Early last month, a law limiting the rights of the Thaiese (please refer to my communication #411[b] dated September 17) (as to the lighter business heretofore ----- ----- -----. There has been an increasing tendency on their part to closely watch negotiations which are being carried on with foreigners. In order to check up on this matter, I had MISUMI ask WANITTO his opinion concerning the plan of the Yamasita Steamship Company, and his reply, I understand, was to the effect that although there should be no objections raised against investment of foreign capital in Thaiese corporations if done legally, the contract in this particular case should be made after careful consideration.

---

[a] See III, 1316.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 10-20-41

No. 1318

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) October 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo #695.

From Matsumoto to Chief of Section 2 of the Food Control Bureau.

Met Wanitto and learned that it would be possible to secure contracts for 10,000 tons to be shipped in November, December, January, to be divided in lots of 5000 tons each. Price to be determined by the present market values. Will likely be difficult to get it at same price as heretofore, but I will see him again tomorrow, and will report after that.

Trans. 10-15-41

No. 1319

FROM: Tokyo — October 9, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #658.

From the Chief of the Overseas Section of the Food Control Bureau to Technician Matsumoto.

Referring to your telegram, please wire the results of the negotiations.

(1) The volume of loadings for November, December, and January should be settled by a definite contract.

(2) An agreement on a price of not more than 10 bahts, F.O.B.

(3) Regarding future buying, you should endeavor to negotiate prices on each monthly shipment separately at prices lower than the current market quotations for that month if possible.

(4) This is closely related to the credit negotiations, so we wish to have the negotiations started as soon as possible.

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 1320

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) — October 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo — #700.

Re my #675[a].

Confidential reports received by us reveal that PUROMU appealed to the officers because there were no indications that the government would be asked to resign over the incident in which suspicions were cast upon WANITTO and, moreover, because his claims were not heeded. Another cause was the appointment of RUANSSHT to the post of Vice Minister of National Defense, which gave rise to a clash of jurisdictional authorities. He became dissatisfied over the fact that in other ways as well, his authority was diminished.

There are indications that Pibul is making an effort to soothe the irritated PUROMU and to bring about unity in the Cabinet.

WANITTO tells us that it is a fact that there is bad feeling between Pibul and PUROMU but that it is not clear to him as to what, exactly, is behind it all.

---

[a]Not available.

Trans. 11–14–41

No. 1321

FROM: Tokyo — October 11, 1941
TO: Bangkok — #661.

(*Abstract.*)

Refers to Bangkok's #646[a].

The Foreign Office, War and Navy Ministries are agreed that a firm policy should be followed to counter British influence in Thailand. Wanitto should be protected lest the British learn of his activities and denounce him as a traitor as part of their propaganda.

---

[a] See III, 1293.

(*Note:* Wanitto, together with Premier Pibul have been chief collaborators with Japan.)

Trans. 10–17–41

No. 1322

FROM: Bangkok (Tsubokami) October 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo #714/3.

Re your 661.[a]

At the time, all I did was to go and tell DIRECK the following: "There are plenty of other things besides the WANITTO affair that are harming Japanese-Thaiese relations. I can see no sense in trying to put it all on one man. I hope that the culprits will soon be caught." DIRECK replied, "The government is handling this matter in a sincere fashion and I can promise that we will apprehend the wrongdoers." In the meantime, however, the course of events has not borne this out. A commission was organized, composed of PURAJITTO[b], DIRECK, VARNVAL[c], TAMURON[b], and BIBBA[b]. It seems that this commission has it in for WANITTO and that they are endeavoring to bring him to trial for breaking the law. Three or four times they have summoned him, and PURAJITTO and VARNVAI have cross-questioned him strongly on what took place between him and Bureau Chief MIZUNO when he was in Tokyo some time ago. WANITTO told me that himself. WANITTO says that PIBUL seems to be trying to get him out of trouble and that any direct appeal that we might make to PIBUL might make it appear that we are meddling over much and that it will not do to give the Thaiese the impression that Japan is bringing pressure to bear upon PIBUL. He says that it would do him more harm than good.

The commission's investigation is over or suspended now, and they will soon report to PIBUL.

I think the best thing to do to help the man would be to publish articles in Japanese newspapers along the following general lines and have Domei wire them here. In any case, I will talk to WANITTO BORIBANDH and wire you more in particular.

a. The restoration of lost territory was due to the efforts of WANITTO.

b. Upon investigation, Japan finds that WANITTO has not one cent in savings anywhere in Japan.

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[a] See III, 1298.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] Councilor in Thaiese Foreign Office.

Trans. 10–29–41

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