This monograph is the second of a series of five monographs dealing with Japan's political and military strategy from the time of the Manchurian Incident to the outbreak of the Pacific War.
The information contained herein was compiled by Rear Admiral Sadatoshi Tomioka, former Chief of Operational Section, Imperial General Headquarters, from official documents as well as from private records.
A statement by Captain Toshikazu Ohmae, then a member of the Naval Affairs Bureau and responsible for the defense of Navy installations throughout the Japanese Empire, has been added to emphasize the fact that it was definitely under duress that the Navy agreed to the signing of the Tripartite Pact.
Additional monographs covering Japanese political and military strategy during this period are:
Title Mono No Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part I 144 Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part III 147 Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part IV 150 Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part V 152 28 February 1953
Through Instructions No. 126 to the Japanese Government, 12 October 1945, subject: Institution for War Records Investigation, steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and Japanese General Staff. Upon dissolution of the War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, research and compilation continued and developed into a series of historical monographs.
The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable.
Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau, the basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. Translation was effected through the facilities of Military Intelligence Service Group, G2, Headquarters, Far East Command.
This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the
Japanese Research Division, Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East and is based on the translation of the Japanese original. Editorial corrections were limited to those necessary for coherence and accuracy.