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703.94/6T63
Memorandum by the
Secretary of State Regarding a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador
(Saito)
[WASHINGTON] May 19, 1934.
The Japanese Ambassador called and promptly
drew out an elaborate telegram which he said was from Foreign Minister Hirota
in Tokyo to him. He first remarked that Hirota desired to extend his
appreciation of tile friendly spirit in which I sent the statement to him on
April 28, 1934, and which was delivered by United States Ambassador Grew. He
added that Ambassador Grew had stated to Minister Hirota at the time that the
United States Government did not expect any reply. The Japanese Ambassador then
proceeded practically to read the telegram, although appearing more or less to
be speaking orally. He retained the telegram which was in his language. At its
conclusion, I inquired if it was virtually a restatement of the statement
during the latter part of April of his Government to Sir John Simon in the
London Foreign Office. He replied that it was. I then stated that I had kept
perfectly quiet while Japanese officials all the way from Tokyo to Geneva on
April 17th, and for many days following, were reported as giving out to the
press the views and policies of the Japanese Government touching certain
international phases relating to the Orient; that at the conclusion of these
different statements I felt, in order not to be misunderstood here or anywhere,
that I should in a respectful and friendly spirit offer a succinct but
comprehensive restatement of rights, interests, and obligations as they related
to my country primarily and as they related to all countries signatory to the
Nine-Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, and international law as the same applied
to the Orient.
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I then inquired whether the Japanese
Government differed with any of the fundamental phases of the statement I sent
to the Japanese Foreign Minister on the 28th day of April, 1934? The Ambassador
replied that it did not differ, that his Government did agree to the
fundamentals of my note or statement, but that his Government did feel that it
had a special interest in preserving peace and order in China. He then repeated
the same formula that his government had been putting out for some weeks about
the superior duty or function of his government to preserve peace and of its
special interests in the peace situation in—to quote his words—"Eastern
Asia". I remarked that, as Hirota wrote me, I saw no reason whatever why
our two countries should not, in the most friendly and satisfactory way to
each, solve every question or condition that existed now or that might arise in
the future. I then said that, in my opinion, his country could conduct its
affairs in such a way that it would live by itself during the coming
generations, or that it might conduct its affairs even more profitably and at
the same time retain the perfect understanding and the friendship of all
civilized nations in particular; that my hope and prayer was that all the
civilized nations of the world, including Japan, should work together and in a
perfectly friendly and understanding way so as to promote to the fullest extent
the welfare of their respective peoples and at the same time meet their duties
to civilization and to the more backward populations of the world; and that my
Government would always be ready and desirous of meeting his Government fully
half-way in pursuing these latter objectives.
I then remarked that I would be entirely
frank by saying that just now there was considerable inquiry everywhere as to
just why his government singled out the clause or formula about Japan's
claiming superior and special interests in the peace situation in "Eastern
Asia" and her superior rights or duties in connection with the
preservation of peace there; and that many were wondering whether this phrase
or formula had ulterior or ultimate implications partaking of the nature of an
overlordship of the Orient or a definite purpose to secure preferential trade
rights as rapidly as possible in the Orient or "Eastern Asia"—to use
the Japanese expression. The Ambassador commenced protesting that this was not
the meaning contemplated or intended. I said it would be much simpler and
easier if when the national of any other government engaged in some act in the
Orient which Japan might reasonably feel would affect her unsatisfactorily, to
bring up the individual circumstance to the proper government, instead of
issuing a blanket formula which would cause nations everywhere to inquire or
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surmise whether it did not contemplate an overlordship of the Orient and
an attempt at trade preferences as soon as possible. The Ambassador again said
that this so-called formula about the superior interests of Japan in preserving
peace, etc., did not contemplate the interference or domination or overlordship
such as I had referred to.
I stated that to-day there was universal talk
and plans about armaments on a steadily increasing scale and that Japan and
Germany were the two countries considered chiefly responsible for that talk;
that, of course, if the world understood the absence of any overlordship
intentions or other unwarranted interference by his government, as the
Ambassador stated them to me, his country would not be the occasion for
armament discussion in so many parts of the world; and that this illustrated
what I had said at the beginning of our conversation that nations should make
it a special point to understand each other, and the statesmen of each country
should be ready at all times to correct or explain any trouble-making rumors or
irresponsible or inaccurate statements calculated to breed distrust and
misunderstanding and lukewarmness between nations. I went on to say that it was
never so important for the few existing civilized countries of the world to
work whole-heartedly together; and that this action of course would, more fully
than any other, promote the welfare of the people of each and also would best
preserve civilization. I emphasized again that it would be the height of folly
for any of the civilized nations to pursue any line of utterances or professed
policies that would engender a feeling of unfairness or treaty violation or
other unsatisfactory reaction in the important nations who might have both
rights and obligations in a given part of the world such as the Orient. I said
that in this awful crisis through which the world was passing, debtors
everywhere were not keeping faith with creditors in many instances; that
sanctity of treaties, in Western Europe especially, was being ignored and
violated; that this was peculiarly a time when our civilized countries should
be especially vigilant to observe and to preserve both legal and moral
obligations; and that my country especially felt that way, not only on its own
account but for the sake of preserving the better and the higher standards of
both individual and national conduct everywhere.
I remarked that my Government, apart from its
general treaty obligations, was only interested in the equality of trade rights
in the Orient as in every part of the world and also its obligations and rights
under the law of nations; that what little trade we had in the Orient we
naturally desired to conduct on this basis of equality, even though it might be
less in the future than now. Then I re-
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marked that if these treaties which imposed special obligations on my
government in the Orient were not in existence that, while interested in peace
in all parts of the world, my government would also be interested in equality
of trade rights.
I inquired whether his government had any
disposition to denounce and get rid of these treaties in whole or in part, and
said that to ignore or violate them would be embarrassing to my government, and
that this would relieve it of any possibilities of such embarrassment. I said
that I was not remotely suggesting in the matter. He replied that his
government was not disposed to denounce and abrogate these treaties. He said
that they felt obliged to get out of the League of Nations on account of
certain considerations which their membership created. I then inquired of him
whether his government abandoned membership on account of difficulties arising
from the fact that Japan was a member of the League or whether it was due to
Japan being a signatory to the Versailles Treaty. I did not get a complete
answer to this.
The Ambassador then stated that in any
preliminary naval conversations that might soon take place, his government
would be opposed to discussing any Far Eastern political or similar questions
or conditions and that only the purely naval side should be taken up. He said
that political and all other phases of the subject were discussed at the
Washington Conference and his government was opposed to a repetition of this. I
offered no comment.
C [ORDELL ] H[ULL]