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Department of State pub. 701
Address Delivered by the Secretary of State at New
York, February 16, 1935
MR. PRESIDENT, MEMBERS AND GUESTS OF THE
CANADIAN SOCIETY OF New York: I am delighted to be with you on this occasion of
your annual dinner and to be able to join you in extending a sincere welcome to
Prime Minister Bennett and, through him, greetings of my fellow citizens to the
people of your great Dominion. May I also take advantage of this opportunity to
extend our greetings to the people of the entire British Commonwealth of
Nations, with whom we share a heritage of profound devotion to the causes of
international peace, justice, and fair dealing.
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Your society, Mr. President, has a long and
distinguished record. I am impressed with its purposes as set forth in your
constitution: "To interpret Canadian nationalism, to further goodwill
between English speaking peoples, to promote social intercourse among Canadians
in New York and to provide relief for Canadians in need of assistance." I
am confident that the work of your society has contributed to the happy state
of the relations which subsist between our countries.
The United States and Canada probably have as
many and as strong ties and associations as any other two countries in the
world. The reasons for this are clear. Geography, naturally, is the prime
factor, but we cannot underestimate our common origin and traditions.
Furthermore, commerce between the United States and Canada is greater than that
between any other two nations in the world. In addition, our peoples are
closely interrelated. For example, citizens of the Dominion have achieved
distinction in almost every walk of life in the United States. Jacob Gould
Schurman, Margaret Anglin, Franklin R. Lane, Edward Johnson, and Sir William
Osler are some of the names in a list that could be extended almost
indefinitely. It has, in fact, been said that one of the surest prospects of
attaining success in the United States is the possession of a Canadian
grandmother. We have sent to Canada a large number of sturdy pioneers who have
contributed a great deal to the building of your institutions and the widening
of your activities. This exchange of numberless individuals, each of whom can
be a messenger of understanding, is a circumstance which has assisted greatly
in the development of our friendship.
Even between the best of friends there can be
misunderstanding. The United States and Canada have frequently found themselves
in disagreement over particular cases. But our countries have nevertheless a
record for the speedy and amicable settlement of any differences, of which both
may be proud, and in the background of any particular disagreement there has
always been a quiet, firm realization that nothing must be allowed to stand in
the way of our enduring friendship.
With reference to our economic relations, a
few weeks ago announcement was made of forthcoming negotiations between our
Governments looking to the conclusion of a trade agreement. It is my earnest
hope that in these negotiations it will be possible to remove many of the
obstacles, costly to both countries, which have interfered with their trade.
It is natural that on such an occasion as
this I should think not only
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of our relations with Canada but of the nature of our general foreign
policy.
It is often assumed that a nation's foreign
policy is or can be altogether determined by the Government of the moment. This
is true in fact only within certain very definite limits which greatly restrict
the field of choice. I am thinking not merely of historical traditions and
conventions which put a brake on the whims of statesmen and insure a certain
continuity of foreign policy, or of the obvious fact that each country's policy
is affected and to some extent motivated by that of other countries. What I
have in mind rather are such external factors as size and resources,
geographical location, and technical developments, which constitute the
framework within which a nation's foreign policy must evolve and assume its
formal characteristics.
The interaction of these factors is
particularly interesting. Thus it would seem at first blush unlikely that a
small nation with few or undeveloped resources can be in a position to play a
major role in international affairs. Yet such is the influence of location that
such a nation may conceivably counteract and even cancel the supposed
disadvantage of relative smallness. We are all acquainted with the part played
in former centuries by several small maritime communities along the
Mediterranean. It would manifestly be impossible for a land-locked country,
whatever its resources, to become a nation of seafarers. Access to the sea, however,
is not the only consideration applicable to a small state, as shown by the
history of many countries—for instance, Switzerland, whose foreign policy is
fixed very largely by its central location in the heart of Europe, as well as
by its control of the principal Alpine passes. It was this position which in
part helped Switzerland to maintain her neutrality during the World War. The
influence, finally, of technical developments on foreign policy is most clearly
evident in connection with the rapid evolution of the means of communication
which has brought country after country into the current of world affairs and
made any attempted policy of isolation and pure nationalism increasingly
obsolete and impracticable.
Let us consider the effect of some of these
elements on American foreign policy. All of them have conspired to force the
United States out of its earlier preoccupation with domestic matters into an
increasingly active participation in international affairs. The enormous
speeding up of trade and communications under the influence of technical
discovery and advancement condemns to futility any endeavor to induce this
nation again to withdraw into "splendid isolation". Our policies must
of necessity be those of a so-called "great power". We cannot, even
if we would, fail profoundly to affect in-
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ternational relations; our choice is of the various ways of affecting
them which are open to a nation situated as we are. It would be hard to deny
that we are so placed that we could, if that were our intention, engage in a
policy of imperialistic expansion and aggression to the detriment of others.
The alternative course open to us is to make our influence felt through a
policy of political, economic, and cultural cooperation to the advantage of all
and in an atmosphere of trust and peace. The latter is our policy, a policy so
accurately described by the President as that of the "good neighbor".
But this policy is not a simple alternative to that of force, arbitrarily
chosen for the immediate future and liable to be discarded again at any time.
Every day, on the contrary, makes it more evident that President Roosevelt's
policy is in consonance with the pivotal factors I have touched upon, and the
merit of its adoption lies not least in the recognition that it is both the
better course, from an ideal humanitarian point of view, and the wiser course,
in the interests of the United States as well as of other countries. The
good-neighbor policy thus meets the requirements of every reasonable test of
history It is in harmony with the great need of the modern world and with the
particular needs of a modern United States in this modern world
While the present foreign policy of the
United States represents, in its fundamental principles, a consistent whole, it
operates differently in relation to different parts of the world, in line with
basic geographic factors. Aside from the common bond created through community
of language, traditions, and cultural heritage, the nature of our northern
frontier, as I have said, has made of Canada and the United States outstanding
examples of good neighbors for over a century. Our two countries, including
Alaska, have the longest common boundaries anywhere on the globe. We are
inevitably the most neighborly of neighbors, and a foreign policy on the part
of either country which attempted to fly in the face of this fact would be
suicidal, not to say impossible. Thus, out of a circumstance of geography has
grown a sense of trust and mutual security which it would be hard to duplicate.
Looking southward, we must not be misled by
the boundary lines of the map. Mexico may at one time have been our only
southern neighbor, but the growth of trade and communications has steadily
enlarged the number of our neighbors in the south. If our immediate
neighborhood a few years past might appropriately be considered as having
included only the Central American and Caribbean republics, the airplane and
the coming inter-American highway are making neighbors of all countries in the Western
Hemisphere.
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I realize only too well that neighbors can be
estranged even when race and language should make them brothers, and of this
the present war in the Chaco is a ghastly reminder. Undoubtedly some of the
states to the south in the past viewed the growing proximity of the United
States with misgiving, and I cannot but admit that there have been occasions
when our words and actions gave some justification to their fears. Today these
suspicions are happily vanishing, and I believe the time is at hand when the
American republics will be convinced not only that the good-neighbor policy is
being carried out in practice, but also that in strictly observing it the
President, with magnificent foresight, has adopted a course which the future
progress of our two continents makes imperative. The truth is that cooperation
is proving itself profitable in every way. The most recent instance is our
reciprocity treaty with Cuba, which, in the few months of its operation, has
worked wonders both in the economic and in the political spheres. If the Platt
Amendment was symbolical of an early epoch in our inter-American relations, its
recent abandonment is an emphatic symbol of a new era in which it becomes our
manifest destiny to enter into ever closer relations of free and voluntary
collaboration for the furtherance of the prosperity of each and the peace of
all.
Thus far I have not dealt with our relations
east and west, or what might be called our transoceanic policies. Here again,
there is no break in unity but merely an adaptation to the very different
geographical and historical situation. The fundamental element is the ocean,
the Atlantic on the east, the Pacific on the west. There was a time when the
ocean meant, or could mean, a certain degree of isolation. Modern communication
has ended this forever; but necessarily a gap remains, and with it the
difference in perspective. Seen from the distance of this hemisphere, the
manifold boundary lines on the map of Europe become blurred and Europe emerges
as an entity. We have no direct concern with the political and economic
controversies of the European states. We have time and again expressly
disassociated ourselves from these disputes. Nevertheless, we are deeply
interested in the peace and stability of Europe as a whole, and have therefore
taken part in a number of multilateral efforts to achieve this purpose.
The most outstanding instance is the
Disarmament Conference, which, by concentrating on land and air armaments,
deals with an issue of primary importance to Europe. Although believing that
the limitation and reduction of armaments in-itself tends to increase
confidence and security—a view which has been amply confirmed by our experience
on our northern borders—we are compelled to recognize
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that rampant suspicion and hostility between nations, based on
longstanding political and economic differences, constitute a barrier to
effective action. This is particularly true on the European Continent, still
smarting under the ravages of the World War. Hence, our basic policy of not
intervening in individual European disputes has not prevented us from
encouraging, proposing, and offering to participate in measures of a universal
nature designed on the one hand to forward general political appeasement and on
the other to facilitate general disarmament. Thus, in his well-known message of
May 16, 1933, to the heads of states, President Roosevelt, after reaffirming
and amplifying the disarmament proposals designed to strengthen security
through abolishing aggressive land weapons, suggested the conclusion of a
general non-aggression pact in which each country would agree not to send any
armed forces of whatsoever nature across its frontiers. Six days later Mr.
Norman Davis, representing us at Geneva, made a further contribution in the
form of an offer that the United States, subject to an effective disarmament
agreement, would be willing to consult with other states in case of a threat to
peace, with a view to averting conflict; and that, moreover, the United States
would not take steps to hinder any collective action which the other states
might decide to take against an aggressor, provided the United States should
independently concur in their decision as to the identity of the aggressor.
These proposals, taken together with the
provisions of the Kellogg Pact, provide, I submit, the four pillars of a sound
peace structure: First, the renunciation of war as an instrument of national
policy; second, a promise of non-aggression; third, consultation in the event
of a threat to peace; and fourth, non-interference on our part with such
measures of constraint as may be brought against a deliberate violator of
peace.
All four are political measures, if you like,
as distinguished from technical disarmament measures. However, they are
political only in the wider sense of being designed to assist in general
pacification and stabilization, of equal benefit to all countries and with no
implication of any intervention on our part in controversies between individual
states. I should emphasize, moreover, that these four pillars might readily
crumble were they to be built on the shifting foundations of unrestricted and
competitive armaments. We have therefore insisted that a real limitation and reduction
of the instruments of warfare must be an essential concomitant of any such
peace program as I have outlined.
I have already indicated that the factors
molding our foreign
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policy toward Europe have led to our support primarily of endeavors of a
general and universal nature. While growing out of and adapted to the basic
needs of Europe, they are in effect world-wide in scope and application. If we
turn our eyes in the opposite direction, toward the Pacific, we find a situation
occupying an intermediate stage between our more immediate preoccupation with
the issues of the Western Hemisphere and our more generalized participation in
transatlantic problems. The greater width of the Pacific is more than
compensated for by our possessions in that area and by long-standing historical
developments and relationships. I shall not go into the origin of the
"open door" and other elements of our traditional Far Eastern policy,
but merely point out that this policy is most clearly set forth in a series of
connected treaties which set up an integrated system for the maintenance of
peace and stability in the Far East and the Pacific. I refer, of course, to the
accomplishments of the Washington Conference, which, in their essence, still
embody the basic principles we believe in and stand by. The problems dealt with
in 1922 were in some respects peculiar to the special situation in the Far East
and our relation thereto, notably the emergence of certain territorial
questions, the predominance of economic issues, and the emphasis on naval
rather than land and air armaments. But the elements common both to our
transpacific and transatlantic policies are even more striking: Political and
economic stabilization through conference and mutual agreement; cooperation for
the maintenance of peace through non-aggression, consultation, and through
limitation and reduction of armaments. I endeavored to summarize the basis of
our Far Eastern policy when, on March 3, 1934, I expressed the hope, in reply
to a message from Foreign Minister Hirota, "that it may be possible for
all of the countries which have interests in the Far East to approach every
question existing or which may arise between or among them in such spirit and
manner that these questions may be regulated or resolved with injury to none
and with definite and lasting advantage to all." In other words, a
good-neighbor policy in the Orient.
In this brief survey I have endeavored to
cover the four major divisions of American foreign policy—Canadian, Latin
American, European, and Far Eastern—and have touched upon the varying phases of
each. It would be generalizing too much to state that the fundamental object
uniting them is the preservation of peace. No nation would ever admit its
policy to be or to have been other than one of peace. It is more a question of
the means. After all, the Roman Empire knew long periods of peace; but the
essence of the
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Pax Romana was predominance over wide areas, a peace of inequality based
on force. The kind of peace we envisage, and I think it is the kind not only we
in the United States but the peoples of all nations, great and small, desire at
heart and pray for, is the peace of friends, who feel secure in their
independence not through immense armaments, the balance of which must again and
again be destroyed by uneven competition, but through the give and take of
political and economic cooperation which benefits no one country to the
detriment of others but is of equal advantage to all. For what I said in a
speech shortly after I became Secretary of State is true fundamentally for all
nations: "It is a great satisfaction", I then stated, "to one
who is confronted with the tasks devolving upon the Department of State to
realize how, in meeting the problems that are our daily portion, the interests
of our Government and our people seem so clearly to coincide with the interests
of humanity."