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765.84/1341
The Ambassador In Italy (Long)
to the Secretary of State
[Extracts]
ROME, September 13, 1935.
No. 1311. [Received September 23.]
SIR:
I have the honor to refer to the
Italo-Abyssinian difficulty and to attempt some observations thereon as regards
its effect upon the present status of European politics and its possible
relationship to future alliances.
As was indicated in my despatch No. 1209 of
September 12th, our information is that preparations continue for amplification
of British forces, both naval and land, in the neighborhood of the Eastern
Mediterranean and that the Italian naval and air forces are concentrated. The
propaganda which has been developed in the Italian press against England during
the last three or four months has been very intensive. The expedition against
Abyssinia in itself was not particularly popular in Italy during the fall of
1934 and the winter and spring of 1935. Various attempts were made in the press
to attribute to it characteristics of popularity but as a matter of fact the
project was not very warmly received by the people. However, as soon as the
attack was commenced on England in the Italian papers there was noticeable a
distinct change in the attitude of the people. As this propaganda has continued
and has increased in intensity, the people have responded to it and today are
united, as far as can be judged from the various contacts and reports which
come to me, in their entirety and to an extent which is tantamount to a fanatic
adherence to Mussolini and his plans, with an antagonism against England which
each Italian seems to take personally.
I had occasion to watch Mussolini's review of
the Ballila and the Avanguardisti last Sunday evening. Some 20,000 youngsters
from the ages of six to eighteen passed before the reviewing stand. Each one
carried a rifle with bayonet affixed, was in uniform, and was unusually Well
drilled. Even the very youngsters showed evidences of personal attachment to
the Duce and time after time elicited the applause of the crowd by the rigor of
their salutes. In the reviewing stand was the British Military Attaché. There
was no open manifestation of antagonism toward him but it was quite noteworthy
that among the crowd in front of the stand he was constantly the object of
their attention. Time after time groups of three or four would
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look at him and engage in close conversation and it was equally
noteworthy that there was not one single friendly gesture or look in his
direction.
When that part of the parade which consisted
of the young sailors passed, it was the occasion for a wild outburst of
enthusiasm.
I cite this as just one instance. But on
every side and from every quarter, one hears the antagonism amongst the people
which has been engendered by the propaganda and one becomes definitely
conscious of the distinct feeling of hostility toward England.
As it is well known to the Department I will
only refer again to my various despatches during the last two years which have
carried reports of bitter attacks on other Governments. Noteworthy among them
was the attack upon Germany, which commenced shortly after the murder of
Dollfuss. There was then the attack upon France in the midst of the Stavisky
scandal and aimed at the parliamentary system of government but against France
in particular. That was followed by the most bitter campaign against
Yugoslavia, preceding the murder of King Alexander and continuing with fitful
spasms thereafter. There was then a bitter attack against Switzerland because
it closed the border against Italian goods at the time of the imposition of the
import restrictions by Italy last winter. In the meantime there have been
violent but not such prolonged attacks against Russia and Japan. A few months
ago it broke out in all its fury against England, upon which I reported at the
time including conversations with the British Ambassador about his intentions
in the matter and the conversation I had with Mr. Suvich when the attack
commenced in the TEVERE.
The relations of all of these countries and
Italy remained strained except in the case of France. The sudden volte-face of
Franco-Italian relations occurred last fall and was preparatory to Laval's
visit last January, which was such an important incident in modern Italian
history. It may be argued from the changed relationship with France, one of
extreme friendliness following a state of bitter antagonism, that the press in
Italy can also change the attitude of its people toward England and that the
all-powerful and omnipresent hand of the Duce can change the sentiment of his
people over night from one of bitter antagonism to one of sweet friendship. No
doubt there would be some truth in that observation. The press is powerful and
the Italian people are volatile. But none of the campaigns except that against
Yugoslavia has continued so long or been so bitter and I am reasonably sure
that it would be practically impossible to eradicate from the minds of the
younger people the personal animosity against England which
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has been inculcated in their hearts and in their minds. They might as a
matter of stoic obedience, assume a different trend, but the see that has been
planted has had the ground so well cultivated and ha been nurtured to such a
young growth that it seems impossible in my mind that its influence could be
eliminated in a short time and highly improbable that it could be changed to a
feeling of friendship in the course of a generation.
But it must not be considered that the effect
has been only upon the people of Italy, for the Italian campaign has made a
marked impress upon the people of England who are without the scope of Italia
propaganda and not subject to its influence.
The effect of this situation is that it has
created a relationship between Italy and England which marks the end of their
long years o friendly cooperation. It is impossible to conceive today that
Italy and England will in the next few years proceed to a friendly cooperation
in any degree consonant with that which characterized their relations for the
past decades. Even if Italy were willing and the people of Italy could be
brought to a realization of the necessity of a change, attitude toward England,
the British Government would have difficulty with its own people in
establishing close cooperation with the Government which has manifested such
bitter antagonism and I might say hostile intentions, and in inducing the
British people to reassume their former friendship toward Italians.
So that I am tempted to fear that it will be
generations the situation now existing can be cured and as a corollary to the
situation there is the necessity for England and France, or one o the other, in
view of the diminishing importance of the League of Nations and the system of
collective security, to seek other support from Governments in central and
eastern Europe to supplant the reliance they had upon Italy and to establish on
a new basis a system of balance.
The Future.
I have dealt up to this point only with the
situation as it exist today. I now venture upon the very delicate ground of
speculation
Any consideration of the effects which the
present situation will have on the future must be based on one or the other of
two premises The first supposition is that force will be applied to Italy in
sufficient strength to stop its bold adventure and to impose upon it a definite
defeat at arms. In this case there would no doubt be terrible trouble in Italy.
Whether the Fascist regime could continue is quite speculative but even if it
did continue it would be with an increasing lack of confidence and with
trouble. Nevertheless, in case there was im-
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posed a crushing military defeat, it would leave the eastern
Mediterranean and Africa in its present status and would simply place Italy
without the pale of friendly association with other nations in Europe.
The other premise is that Italy proceeds to
attain her objectives in Ethiopia. In this case there is only trouble for the
future. There can be nothing else. Those who consider this to be the high
expression of Fascism and the end of their ambitions are entitled to no
confidence. If the regime in Italy were successful in this venture it would but
embolden them to proceed to other ventures. From time to time in the past
Mussolini has made speeches which have been duly reported and commented upon in
which he said that he had no European ambitions but that he did have ambitions
in Africa and Asia. It was one such speech that caused the changed relationship
between Turkey and Italy because Turkey thought that he had ambitions upon some
of her territory. There is no doubt in my mind that if he obtains Ethiopia, or
even a great part of it, he will proceed to establish himself there and will
send millions of colonists. If the Suez Canal assumes an importance as great as
it has today when Italy has: south of the Canal 250,000 soldiers, how much
greater significance would it assume in case Mussolini had south of the Canal
2,500,000 people. The answer in my mind is definite. The Suez Canal would
assume a political importance to Italy comparable to its importance to England,
and considering the fact that the lease on the Canal ends in about thirty years
and England's supposed control over it will terminate in that length of time,
it would be the object of competition between the two Governments. It must be
conceded that, in circumstances such as I have indicated, with a large Italian
population in Ethiopia, it would be necessary to have direct communication with
Italy.
An examination of the map will disclose a
large Italian colony, Libya, running the entire length of Egypt and most of the
length of the Sudan on their western borders. East of the Sudan is Eritrea.
With the Italians in Ethiopia they will be also south of the Sudan. An
alternative route of communication between the Italian East African colonies
and the mother country can be established across the Sudan by joining Ethiopia
with Libya. There is no doubt in my mind that shortly after Italy, should she
become settled in Ethiopia, would begin a program to establish communications
between Libya and Ethiopia. The oasis of Cufra in the southeastern part of
Ethiopia has already been largely developed by the Italians as an air base. I
shall always regret that when I visited Libya last spring an illness prevented
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me from accompanying Balbo on an air flight to But from what I saw and
heard even though I was unable to visit Cufra or the other air bases of Italy,
I became convinced that extensive preparations had been made in Libya to
establish air communications and air bases both along the French border to the
west of Libya and the Egypto-Sudanese eastern border.
The Italian air fleet is only two and a half
or three hours from its Sicilian base to Libya; from eastern Libya it is only a
short distance by air to Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said. There is a large
Italian colony in Egypt . . . The Italian colony there is subject to a press
propaganda similar to that carried on in Italy through the agency of an Italian
newspaper there and other organized Fascist groups. It would be very easy for
Italy to strike from two directions at the nerve centers at the control of
Egypt, i. e., the three cities in the northern part of the country.
So that if you place Italy in control of
Ethiopia you have continuing threat to British control of Egypt and the Suez
Canal and a continuing threat to the British Empire as regards its
communications to the east. It is also equally true that Italian presence in
Ethiopia would threaten British communications with the south by the effort to
join up Libya with Ethiopia across the Sudan.
Conclusion.
The inference I draw from it as to the future
is that Italy must either be defeated now and prevented in the realization of
her ambitions in East Africa, or the trouble will continue on through for a
generation as an additional irritation to European politics and an additional
menace to world peace. And if she is not defeated now it follows that we will
have the menace of a highly organized and militarized state threatening the
eastern Mediterranean and from its synchronized bases in Africa challenging the
British Empire, with the turmoil it will bring from time to time into
international politics through a period of years.
While I realize that this is all speculative,
I think the possibilities have a bearing upon the present situation and that
they may indicate what we may expect in the way of international relations for
some time in the future.
Respectfully yours,
BRECKINRIDGE LONG
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