66
740.00/41-1/2
The Minister in Switzerland
(Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Extracts]
BERN, January 27, 1936.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY:
The Council session has reached a
satisfactory termination with creditable work done in certain items of the
agenda. However, the most interesting feature of the session was the revelation
of an evolution in the concern with which different questions are regarded.
Three months ago the thoughts of the statesmen of Europe were concentrated on Africa;
the Abyssinian question was paramount. A month ago a phase of that question,
namely the military situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, was the focus of
all thought. Today a further evolution has fixed the minds of these men on the
intensity of the rearmament of Germany, leading to the realization of the
implications throughout the whole of Europe of the return of Germany as a first
class military power.
Representations of Great Britain have brought
about undertakings in respect to assistance from the Mediterranean Powers
which, together with Britain's vigorous military effort, have taken the edge
off the apprehension with which a number of Britishers regarded the threat to
their strategic position in Egypt and the possibility of an assault by Mussolini.
They believe now that time is working for
308
DOCUMENTS
them. They believe that however stout an effort the Italians are making
from a military point of view, nevertheless this effort is exceedingly costly,
and that the sanctions already in effect are rapidly curtailing Italy's
resources and ability to maintain the present effort. Hence they can turn their
minds to the question of German rearmament, a question which causes them more
profound concern—if not more immediate concern—than a threat by Mussolini.
I cannot conceal from myself the belief that
the actual application of an embargo on petroleum by the League States will be
dependent largely upon the decision of the United States Congress in respect to
the Neutrality legislation. I hope that no step will be taken here which will
make the League's action appear to be openly dependent upon ours. A number of
the men influential in this matter are convinced that it would be a mistake to
do so. Nevertheless, I doubt whether the embargo will be applied by the League
States unless they feel that in some way the supply from the United States will
not replace that which they cut off. The reverse also appears true. If the
United States curtails its shipments, the States of the League will feel it not
only expedient, but morally imperative to put on the embargo. Since sending you
my cables Nos. 363 and 364, Vasconcellos, the President of the Committee of
Eighteen, has come to see me. He believes that while Eden's methods may seem
less aggressive, his determination in respect to sanctions has not diminished.
I need not recapitulate the arguments for the necessity of the establishment of
the oil sanction. Suffice it to say that in the minds of most of the Delegates,
it is the test of strength between the League of Nations and Mussolini and must
be established as a precedent for use against Germany, if necessity arises.
The extension of the idea of collectivity
into a series of military guarantees against the risk involved in the
application of sanctions is the most recent step in increasing pressure against
the aggressor. It is of the highest importance and cannot fail profoundly to
affect the future relationships and political development of Europe. You will
remember that Aloisi termed such action a military alliance against Italy in
the Mediterranean, and deplored the fact that the League of Nations could be
led by England to assume this shape. Germans who have talked to me during this
session take an analogous position. They point out that nobody hides the fact
that the present action against Italy is in the nature of a rehearsal for
action against Germany. They feel convinced that once it has been proved that
the League can take the form of a military alliance, the threat of that
alliance will be used as a means of coercion against Germany, after this
Italian ques-
309
DOCUMENTS
tion is liquidated. They recognize that though the phrases used are
against Italy, the instrument itself is being forged for eventual use against
their own country. Hence the Italians and the Germans are inspired by like
apprehension and by like mistrust of what they both deem to be a form of
coercion. This in contrast to the League conception, namely, that the military
agreements are precautionary only against possible Italian retaliation.
As to whether this manifestation of force in
regard to Italy, together with the possibility of such a manifestation in
respect to Germany will be effective in bringing Germany to a mood of
negotiation is a question of psychological appreciation. Certainly Paul
Scheffer of the BERLINER TAGEBLATT, a believer in international co-operative
action, makes no secret of his conviction that what he calls a threat of force
will have results on Germany completely the opposite of what it is designed to
effect. The overwhelming opinion of the representatives of other States here
is, however, to the contrary and we can only hope that the future will show
that they are right.
There is indisputable evidence of the
magnitude and intensity of the German effort in military preparation. There may
be question as to the exact stage of the development of this preparation but
there is no doubt that it is on a scale to cause alarm and that it proceeds
with a rapidity which none of the democratic States can equal. The ability of a
dictator to devote practically the entire resources of his country to armament
cannot be matched by democratic countries in times of peace. Rightly or
wrongly, the idea is becoming prevalent that German rearmament on this scale
and in this tempo can be designed only for the purposes of aggression. I
believe that in making this statement I am reflecting the profound conviction
of most of the statesmen on this Continent.
It seems to be generally believed that there
will be no German aggression towards the west. Germany will presumably make
every effort not to give Great Britain apprehension as to the Low Countries.
Her present policy is predicated on not giving offense to Great Britain. Many
French themselves appear to believe that they need fear no attack on their
eastern frontier or through Belgium and Holland. If Germany does contemplate
aggression, it is generally expected that it will be to the east or down the
Danube.
I have gone into this speculation, Mr.
Secretary, with no desire to be alarming but because it is a reflection of the
type of thought that
310
DOCUMENTS
is occupying the minds of those on the Council. It is the type of ought
that has led to a feeling of apprehension which has brought about the
conviction that only by an agreement with Germany, both of a political nature
and for the limitation of armaments, can a cataclysm be avoided. It is a time
in which wisdom and statesmanship are needed on this Continent as never since
the end of the War.
I am, my dear Mr. Secretary, Respectfully
yours,
HUGH R. WILSON