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Memorandum by the
Secretary of State Regarding a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador to
Great Britain (Yoshida)
[WASHINGTON,] June 12, 1936.
Mr. Yoshida, Japanese Ambassador to England,
came in and stated that he was very desirous of promoting better relations and
better understanding between our two countries. He said that the one big fact
which he wanted the American people to recognize was the immense and rapidly
growing population of Japan and the absolute necessity for more territory for
their existence in anything like a satisfactory way. He referred to the fact
that there was misunderstanding and misapprehension on the part of our people
in this respect as it related to Japanese movements in and about China; that
this also was probably true as to the British; that the Japanese armaments were
not intended for war against any particular country, especially us, but that
Japanese naval officials were always undertaking to create additional vacancies
and additional room for promotion, etc., etc. I did not tell him that this by
itself was not entirely appealing. He expressed an earnest desire for
conference, collaboration and, without alliances, such relationships as would
work out any questions arising in an amicable and fairly satisfactory way. He
expressed his purpose to have a number of conversations with Ambassador
gingham, as well as with the British officials, on these subjects, with the
view to the former conversations getting back to me.
In reply, I told Mr. Yoshida that I would
speak frankly but in the friendliest possible spirit and say that the
impression among many persons in this country was that Japan sought absolute
economic domination, first of eastern Asia, and then, of other portions as she
might see fit; that this would mean political as well as military domination in
the end; that the upshot of the entire movement would be to exclude countries
like the United States from trading with all of those portions of China thus
brought under the domination or controlling influence so-called of Japan; that
this presented a serious question to first-class
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countries with commercial interests in every part of the world, reason
that, for instance, my country stood unqualifiedly for the principle of
equality of commercial opportunity and industrial right alike in every part of
the world; and that it would be strange and impracticable for my country to
stand for this doctrine with the announcement always that it qualified same by
applying it to only one-half of the world and one-half of the world's
population. I remarked that I could say in all candor that this Government had
never by the slightest word or intimation suggested to the people or officials
of the 20 Latin American countries as to what amount of trade they should
conduct with Germany, or Great Britain, or Japan, or any other country.
I continued with the statement that there was
no reason, in my judgment, why countries like Japan, the United States and
England, could not in the most amicable spirit, and with perfect justice and
fairness to each, agree to assert and abide by the worldwide principle of
equality in all commercial and industrial affairs, and each country solemnly
agree that it would not resort to force in connection with the operation of this
rule of equality, and why Governments like the three mentioned could not sit
down together and in a spirit of fair dealing and fair play confer and
collaborate and not cease until they had found a way for amicable and
reasonable adjustments or settlements. I said that this would wipe out and
eliminate 90% of all the occasions for friction between the nations. I then
repeated what I told him I had stated to Ambassador Saito, which was that
neither Japan, the United States, England, nor any other country, would be able
for a generation to supply the needed capital of many billions of dollars for
the reasonable internal improvements and development of purchasing power in
China and similar Asiatic localities; that their purchasing power was down to
next to nothing at present; that there was ample room for long years to come
for three or four countries like those just mentioned to supply all the capital
they would have available, with the result that increased purchasing power
would afford markets for most all of what all of the countries combined would
have for sale in that part of the world, and that in any event any questions or
problems arising in this connection could and should be solved in the same
amicable and fair spirit to which I had already referred. I assured the
Ambassador more than once of my high opinion and personal regard for his
people, and especially his statesmen, and that I was anxious to see all parts
of the world develop and go forward with every kind of progress to the fullest
extent. He expressed his interest in the views I offered and indicated a
disposition to collaborate.
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I then carefully and rather fully defined and
described the machinery, the policy and the scope, of our present reciprocal
trade agreements program, which, I said, related to real international trade
recovery to near normal and the restoration of conditions of peace. I added
that for more than two years this Government had unselfishly, and at the
sacrifice of bilateral trading, been making an earnest fight thus to induce
other countries to lower their excessive barriers and permit some 20 billions
of dollars of international trade by degrees to be restored. I stated that if
and as such increased trade was realized, Japan would receive her substantial share
without any effort or contribution on her part, as would other trading
countries, and that this would be far more valuable than the limited amount of
trade to be secured by purely bilateral bartering and bargaining, such at
nations are practicing today, at the expense of triangular and multilateral
trade; that we in this country had at the risk of our political situation been
carrying forward this broad program; that on account of the opposition
sentiment here, it was exceedingly hurtful to the progress of our movement
when, at a critical stage as at present, a country like Japan sent in abnormal
quantities of highly competitive products to the extent of 20 or 40 or 50% of
our domestic production; that this would present a different question in other and
ordinary circumstances, but that at this critical stage, as in the recent case
of certain cotton textiles and other commodities sent in by Japanese
businessmen in unusual quantities, such practice was seriously undermining and
jeopardizing the success of our entire program. I stated that I did not desire
to be misunderstood; that it was this outside interference at a time when it
was extremely dangerous and harmful to the success of the movement on account
of the large opposition sentiment in this country; that I felt a trading
country like Japan, which would share to the extent of billions of dollars in
the world trade which it was proposed to restore by our pending reciprocity
program, could well afford to make a slight contribution to the movement by cautioning
its nationals to refrain at the psychological moment from seriously
embarrassing and handicapping us here by sending in abnormal quantities of
competitive products compared with the amount of our domestic production.
I said I could make this plainer by
suggesting that if the Argentine were carrying forward our reciprocity program
under great difficulties, and just at the critical stage my country should
export unusual quantities of beef, wheat, wool and corn in to the Argentine,
which, like my own country, produces each of these commodities for export,
unquestionably this would seriously endanger the success of such
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Argentine trade agreements program. I said that this illustration fitted
exactly the present situation between Japan and this country.
The Ambassador stated that he would like for
me to remember the difficulties of the businessmen and traders of Japan and the
necessity for outside trade.
I assured him that I was keeping this phase
specially in mind and then added that if our movement to restore some 20
billions of dollars of world trade should break down tomorrow, as a result of
any material number of excessive Japanese imports and their effect on public
opinion, Japan instead of getting between 1 and 2 billions of this increased
trade then would be confined permanently in the future to such small increases
of trade as she might be able to secure by desperate bilateral bargaining and
bartering in a world trade situation steadily becoming less in quantity and
value. I said that this stated exactly the two courses open and that I would
greatly appreciate it if his Government could see more fully these broader
phases.
Mr. Yoshida finally ceased to make any
comment about the urgent needs of Japanese businessmen, but said that he now
understood more fully the viewpoint I had expressed.
C [ORDELL] H [ULL]