Page i
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 39
REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS
COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY
COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH
ENDORSEMENTS
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
Page ii
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois from Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GERHARD A. GESELL, chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel
Page iii
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part Pages Transcript Hearings
No. pages
1 1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3 983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4 1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
Page iv
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 157
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1. Report of Roberts Commission, dated January 23, 1942 ............ 1
2. Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board dated October 20, 1944 ........ 23
3. Appendix No. 1: Supplemental Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board on
phases mentioned in House Military Affairs report which relate to
the Pearl Harbor disaster ....................................... 179
4. Exhibits A and B to appendix No. 1 (above) ...................... 219
5. Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board ...................... 220
6. November 25, 1944, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re APHB report ................................ 231
7. September 14, 1945, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen's Investigation .. 270
8. September 14, 1945, memorandum from Judge Advocate General for
Secretary of War, re APHB Top Secret Report reviewed in connec-
tion with Clausen Investigation ................................. 283
9. Report of Naval Court of Inquiry, dated October 19, 1944 ........ 297
10. Addendum to Navy Court of Inquiry findings of fact ............. 323
11. First endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Navy Judge
Advocate General for Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 2, 1944 .......... 330
12. November 3, 1944, memorandum from CincUS and CNO to Secretary of
Navy, listing parts of Navy Court of Inquiry record that contain
information of super secret nature ............................. 332
13. Second endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report by CincUS and
CNO to Secretary of Navy, dated November 6, 1944 (not made
public) ........................................................ 335
14. Paraphrase of second endorsement (item 13) which was made
public ......................................................... 345
15. Third endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Secretary
of Navy, dated December 1, 1944 ................................ 354
16. Fourth endorsement (undated) to Navy Court of Inquiry report,
and fourth endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary
of Navy (not made public) ...................................... 355
17. Paraphrase of fourth endorsement (item 16), dated August 1945,
made public August 29, 1945 .................................... 371
18. December 3, 1944, memorandum, from CincUS and CNO to Secretary
of Navy, commenting on report of Army Pearl Harbor Board ....... 383
19. Third endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by CincUS and CNO
to Secretary of Navy, dated August 13, 1945 .................... 387
20. Second endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Navy Judge
Advocate General for CincUS and CNO. Dated August 10, 1945 ..... 388
21. First endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary of
Navy, dated July 25, 1945 ...................................... 389
22. Report of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to Secretary of Navy, dated
July 12, 1945 .................................................. 390
Page 220
[a] ARMY PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION
TOP SECRET REPORT AND TOP SECRET MEMORANDA
1. Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, discussing certain
evidence and documents.
2. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 25 November
1944, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor
Board, and recommending further investigation.
3. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September
1945, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board
on the basis of additional evidence.
4. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September
1945, reviewing in greater detail certain aspects of the Top Secret
Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board in the light of additional evidence
and modifications of previous testimony.
Page 221
[b] TOP SECRET REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
[c] Memo: To The Secretary of War:
The following is a brief discussion of the evidence and documents in the
possession of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which for reasons of security
should not be incorporated in the General Report. The Secretary of War
is entirely familiar with this type of evidence and the Board is sure
concurs in its decision to treat it separately and as Top Secret.
[1] 1. General. Information from informers and other means as to the
activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the
negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of
the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941.
Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans
and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese
potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States.
Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the
enemy's intentions.
This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in
November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for
resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of
breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the
eventualities of war.
The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave
only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the
Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the "Do-Don't"
message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent
safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in
Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated to put the
Department on Alert Number 3.
This was not done.
Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon
actions to be taken by field commanders and this information cannot be
disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent
upon the War Department the [2] to assume the responsibility for
specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to
the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete
responsibility upon the competent field commanders.
Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The
disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that
its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The
difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from
the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert
them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly
aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the
right alert.
Page 222
The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to
give it to Short or give him directions based upon it.
The details of this information follow:
2. Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions
from September to December 1941. The record shows almost daily
information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.
1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had
been fixed (Tokyo time) as the government date for Japanese offensive
military operations. (R. 86)
2. On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese'
intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United
States. (R. 87) War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on
November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the [3]
concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready
for offensive action.
3. On December 1 definite information came from three independent
sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United
States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)
As Colonel Bratton summed it up:
"The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning
officials, from the Secretary of State the Secretary of War down to the
Chief of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it
was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not
months. (R. 243-244)"
The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions
as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that
Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was
construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280) All the information
that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to
the policy making and planning agencies of the government. These
officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff,
and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our
intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Office
of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R.
297)
Colonel Bratton on occasions had gone to the Chief of the War Plans
Division and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and stood by while
they read the contents of these folders, in case they wished to question
him about any of it. Colonel Bratton testifies:
"I had an arrangement with Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General
Staff, how he could get me on the telephone at any time in case the
Chief [4] of Staff wished to be briefed on any of them. (R. 299)"
4. When the information on December 3 came as to the Japanese destroying
their codes and code machines, which was construed as certain war,
Colonel Bratton took the information to General Miles and General Gerow
and talked at length with both of them. General Gerow opposed sending
out any further warning to the overseas command. General Miles felt he
could not go over General Gerow's decision. (R. 283) Colonel Bratton
then went to see Commander McCullom of the Navy, Head of the Far Eastern
Section in ONI, and be concurred in Bratton's judgment that further
warning should be sent out because this action of the Japanese meant war
almost immediately. Colonel Bratton then returned after making
arrangements
Page 223
with McCullom and persuaded General Miles to send a message to G-2,
Hawaiian Department, instructing him to go to Commander Rochefort,
Office of Naval Intelligence, with the Fleet to have him secure from
Rochefort the same information which General Gerow would not permit to
be sent directly in a war warning message. (R. 283-284)
All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority
in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go
out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements
in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the
higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302) G-2 was
prevented as a matter of policy from giving out intelligence information
of this sort to G-2 in overseas departments. The Navy also objected to
any of this type of intelligence being sent by the Army without its
authority.
[5] The War Plans Division refused to act upon the recommendations of G-
2. Intelligence Bulletins were distributed giving this information. When
G-2 recommended, for instance, the occupation of the outer Aleutians
ahead of the Japanese, the War Plans Division took no action upon the
estimate and recommendation, with the result that we later had to fight
two costly campaigns to regain Attu and Kiska. (R. 301-302)
Captain Safford of the Communications Security Division in Naval
Operations, testified as to the type of information that was coming into
the Navy during November and December.
Tokyo informed Nomura on the 22nd of November that the 25th was the last
date they could permit him negotiations. (R. 121) On November 26th
specific information received from the Navy indicated that Japan
intended to wage of offensive war against the United States. (R. 123-
124) Nomura on the 26th said he thought he had failed the Emperor and
that his humiliation was complete, evidently referring to the ultimatum
delivered to him by the Secretary of State.
Colonel Sadtler testified as to the information that was coming in as to
Japanese intentions in the fall of 1941, saying:
"The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding
the tense and strained relations between the two countries and the
number of messages about warnings of conditions that obtain in case of
hostilities really reached a climax around the middle of November to
such an extent that we were of then opinion that there might be a
declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday
November so. This as you all know proved to be a "dud," and on Monday,
December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began
coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to destroy their codes and to
reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their
directive."
[6] The Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised to destroy their
codes on December 3. (R. 249-250)
3. The "Winds" Message. Colonel Sadtler said that about November 20, a
message was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission, to the
effect that the Japanese were notifying nationals of possible war with
the United States. The "winds" message was indicated in these
instructions, which would indicate whether the war would be with the
United States, Russia, or Great Britain, or any combination of them. The
Federal Communications Commission was asked to listen for such
information.
Page 224
On the morning of December 5, 1941, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval
Communications, called Colonel Sadtler at 9:30 saying, "Sadtler, the
message is in!" He did not know whether the particular message was the
one that meant war with the United States, but it meant war with either
the United States, Russia, or Great Britain. He immediately advised
General Miles and Colonel Bratton.
Sadtler was instructed to go back to Admiral Noyes to get the precise
wording used, but Admiral Noyes said that he was too busy with a
conference and he would have to attend to it later. Colonel Sadtler
protested that that would be too late. (R. 251-252) He reported back to
General Miles. He then went to see General Gerow, Head of the War Plans
Division, and suggested a message be sent to Hawaii. General Gerow said,
"No, that they had plenty of information in Hawaii." He then went to the
Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Smith, and made the same
suggestion. When Smith learned that G-2 and the War Plans Division had
been talked to, he declined to discuss it further. [7] It was about the
5th or 6th of December that Tokyo notified the Japanese Embassy at
Washington to destroy their remaining codes. It was on December 5 that
Sadtler discussed this matter with General Gerow and Colonel Smith,
because as Sadtler said, "I was sure war was coming, and coming very
quickly." (R. 254)
Colonel Bratton arranged on behalf of G-2 for monitoring of Japanese
weather broadcasts with the Federal Communications Commission. These
arrangements were made through Colonel Sadtler. (R. 57, 103) Colonel
Bratton testified that no information reached him as to the break in
relations shown by the "winds" message prior to the Pearl Harbor
disaster, December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody else in G-2
received any such information. (R. 58-59)
He conferred with Kramer and McCullom of the Navy. The message sent to
him by the Federal Communications Commission was not the message he was
looking for. (R. 60) Later he learned from the Navy about their
monitoring efforts in Hawaii and the Far East, and the fact that they
would probably secure the "winds" message sooner than he would in
Washington. That is the reason why he sent the message of December 5, to
Fielder, G-2, in Hawaii, to make contact with Commander Rochefort to
secure orally information of this sort. (R. 62-63) A copy of this
message has been produced in the record showing that it was sent.
Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler testified to the fact that their
records showed that it was sent. (R. 69, 70, 71) But Colonel Fielder
said he got no such message. (R. 68) The Navy now admits having received
this "winds" activating message about December 6, but the War Department
files show no copy of such message. (R. 89, 281)
[8] From the naval point of view Captain Safford recites the story of
the "winds" message saying that Japan announced about the 26th of
November 1941 that she would state her intentions in regard to war with
Russia, England, the Dutch, and the United States, by the "winds"
message. On November 28, 1941, the "winds" code was given. On December
3, 1941 the Naval Attache at Batavia gave another version of the "winds"
code. All three of these messages indicated the probability of the
breaking off of relations and offensive warfare by Japan against the
United States or the other nations mentioned.
Page 225
On December 4, 1941, information was received through the Navy
Department which was sent to Captain Safford which contained the
Japanese "winds" message, "War with England, War with America, Peace
with Russia." (R. 132) [1]
This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot
be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was collected
with other messages for submission to the Roberts Commission. Copies
were in existence in various places but they have all disappeared. (R.
133-135)
[9] Captain Safford testified:
"General RUSSELL. Have you helped or been active at all in this search
which has been made in the Naval Department to discover this original
message?
"Captain SAFFORD. I have. As a last resort I requested copies of the
message repeatedly from 20G, and on the last occasion I asked the
officer in charge, who was Captain Stone, to stir his people up a little
harder and see if they couldn't make one more search and discover it.
And when Captain Stone discovered it couldn't be found, he called for-
required written statements for anybody who might have any notice of
that; and though the written statements disclosed a of destruction of
other messages and things not messages, but the intercepts; not the
translations nothing ever came to light on that message, either the
carbon copy of the original incoming message, which should have been
filed with the work sheet, or of the translation. And one copy of the
translation should have been filed under the JD number, which I think is
7001, because that number is missing and unaccounted for, and that falls
very close to the proper date. It actually comes in with the 3rd, but
things sometimes got a little bit out as far as putting those numbers on
was concerned. And the other should be filed under the date and with the
translation. We had a double file.
"The last time I saw that message after the attack on Pearl Harbor about
the 15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all
important messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts
Commission; and Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for
completeness and to see that we strained out the unimportant ones, and
that "Winds" translation, the "Winds execute," was included in those. I
do not recall whether that ever came back or not. So far as I know, it
may even be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. It never
came back that I know of, and we have never seen it since, and that is
the last I have seen of it.
"We also asked the people in the Army on several occasions if they could
run it down and give us a copy. We were trying to find out the exact
date of it and the exact wording of the message, to run this thing down
and not make the thing a question depending upon my memory or the memory
of Kramer or the memory of Murray, who do districtly [sic] recall it.
* * * * * *
"General RUSSELL. Well, now, let us talk cases.
"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.
"[10] General RUSSELL. I want to know if over there in 20G you had a
place where you had 20G files of messages, and then over here some other
place you had a JD file which was separate and distinct from the one I
have just discussed.
"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.
"General RUSSELL. But you had messages over there in the JD file?
"Captain SAFFORD. We had. Yes, sir; that is correct.
"General RUSSELL. And they were the same as the ones in the 20G file?
"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, but they were in a different order.
"General RUSSELL. All right. Now, this message of December 4th, when it
went to the JD file, was given the number, according to your testimony,
of 700l?
[1] Captain Safford testified that the Japanese were no longer using the
code employed to transmit the wind messages; that there was no reason
now why they should not be discussed openly.
Colonel Rufus Bratton, on the contrary, testified that it would be
dangerous to acquaint the Japanese with the fact that we intercepted the
winds message, as this might result in further code changes by the
Japanese.
The Board, as a matter of course, decided to follow the safe plan and
treat these messages as Top Secret.
Page 226
"Captain SAFFORD. It probably was.
"General RUSSELL. You don't know that?
"Captain SAFFORD. Not to know; only circumstantial evidence.
"General RUSSELL. Well, is JD 7000 in that file now?
"Captain SAFFORD. JD 7000 is there, and 7002.
"General RUSSELL. But 7001 just isn't there?
"Captain SAFFORD. The whole file for the month of December 1941 is
present or accounted for except 7001.
"General RUSSELL. Now let us talk about 20G, which is some other place
in this office. Is this December 4th message the only one that is out of
those files?
"Captain SAFFORD. That is the only one that we looked for that we
couldn't find. It is possible that there will be others missing which we
haven't looked for, but we couldn't find that serial number. We looked
all through the month to make certain. That is the only one that is
missing or unaccounted for.
[11] The radio station logs, showing the reception of the message have
been destroyed, within the last year. Captain Safford testified that
this message, and everything else they got from November 12 on, was sent
to the White House by the Navy. It was a circulated copy that circulated
to the White House and to the Admirals of the Navy.
It is this message which the Army witnesses testified was never received
by the Army. It was a clear indication to the United States as early as
December 4. The vital nature of this message can be realized.
4. Account of the Delivery of the Long 14 Part Message; the Short
Implementing Message. The first 13 parts of the long reply of the
Japanese finally terminating the relationships with the United States
began to come in in translated form from the Navy on the afternoon of
December 6, and the 13 parts were completed between 7:00 and 9:00 the
evening of December 6. Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section
of the Intelligence Branch of War Department G-2, was the designated
representative for receiving and distributing to the Army and to the
Secretary of State copies of messages of this character received from
the Navy. The Navy undertook to deliver to the President and to its own
organization copies of similar messages.
Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and
10:30 p. m., December 6, as follows:
To Colonel Smith (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in
a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238) He told
General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important
papers and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could
unlock the [12] bag and see the contents. (R 307)
To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing
the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his
presence. (R. 239-241) He stated that General Miles did nothing about it
as far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by General
Miles.
Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's
executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238)
He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State
Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30
p. M. (R. 234, 239)
Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had
urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to General Staff, to communicate with
General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with
Page 227
General Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on
the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the
Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following
morning.
In the meantime, as the testimony of Captain Safford shows, the
following action was taken with the distribution of the same 13 parts of
the message by the Navy which clearly indicates its importance.
Captain Safford testifies that the first 13 parts came in on the
afternoon of December 6 and were translated to English and delivered to
the Army to Major Doud by 9 o'clock Saturday night, December 6. This
portion of the message was distributed as follows: Commander Kramer
consulted with the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson,
and was directed to go to the White House to deliver a copy. He then
delivered a [13] copy to Admiral Wilkinson at his house. As the
President was engaged, Kramer gave a copy to the White House Aide,
Admiral Beardall. When Kramer reached Admiral Wilkinson's house he also
gave a copy to Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans. He delivered the
final copy by midnight to Admiral Ingersoll, who read it and initialed
it. Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark, as did also Admiral Turner.
Admiral Stark ordered Kramer to be at his office at 9:00 Sunday morning.
Kramer came back to the Navy Department about 1 a. m. to see if part 14
had come in, but it had not.
When part 14 did come in it was ready for delivery to the Army in
English by 7:15 a. m., December 7. (R. 158, 160, 164, 166)
The net result was that no one took any action based upon the first 13
parts until the 14th part came in and the Army took no action on that
until between 11:30 and 12:00 on the morning of December 7, or about 13
hours after the first 13 parts came in which clearly indicated the
rupture of relations with the Japanese.
Nothing more was done with this clear warning in the first 13 parts of
the long message until the following events occurred.
Colonel Bratton received from a naval officer courier between 8:30 and
9:00 a. m. on the Sunday morning of December 7, the English translation
of the 14th part of the long message and the short message of the
Japanese direction the Ambassador to deliver the long message at 1 p. m.
on December 7 and to destroy their codes. Colonel Bratton immediately
called General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a. m. (R. 85) [14] General
Marshall was out horseback riding and he asked that he be sent for.
General Marshall called him back between 10:00 and 11:00 a. m. General
Marshall came into his office at 11:25 a. m., of which there is a
contemporaneous written record maintained by Colonel Bratton. In the
meantime, Colonel Bratton called his Chief, General Miles, and reported
what he had done. (R. 77) Neither General Miles nor General Gerow were
in their office on Sunday morning. General Miles arrived at the same
time as General Marshall at 11:25 a. m. The Chief of Staff prepared a
message to General Short and called Admiral Stark, who said he was not
sending any further warning but asked General Marshall to inform the
Navy in Hawaii through Short.
The answer to the following question on the record has not been supplied
this Board:
"Why were not the first 13 parts, which were considered important enough
by the Navy to be delivered to the President and everyone of the
important Admirals
Page 228
of the Navy, delivered by the War Department officers to the Chief of
Staff, and his attention called to it so that he could have taken some
sort of action upon it? (R )" [reference blank, LWJ]
The only possible answer lies in the testimony that Colonel Smith,
Secretary to the General Staff was told about 9 p. m. December 6 that
there was an important document and that General Marshall should see it
right away. (R. 242) There is no proof that Colonel Smith did so act
except that from General Marshall, which shows that he was not advised
of this situation until the following morning when he received a message
from Colonel Bratton between 10:00 and 11:00 a. m., December 7.
The record shows that subordinate officers who were [15] entrusted with
this information were so impressed with it that they strongly
recommended that definite action be taken.
When subordinate officers were prevented from sending this information
to the Hawaiian Department, by arrangement with their opposite numbers
in the Office of Naval Intelligence, upon learning that the Navy had
this information in Hawaii, an apparently innocuous telegram was
dispatched by G-2 to Colonel Fielder, G-2 in Hawaii, telling him to see
his opposite number in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Commander
Rochefort, to secure information from him of importance.
The story of the message of November 27 takes on a whole new aspect when
the facts are really known as to the background of knowledge in the War
Department of Japanese intentions. At the time the Chief of Staff
drafted the message of the 27th on the 26th, he knew everything that the
Japanese had been proposing between themselves for a long period of time
prior to that day, and knew their intentions with respect to the
prospects of war. The message of the 27th which he drafted in rough and
which was apparently submitted to the Joint Board of the Army and Navy,
therefore could have been cast in the clearest sort of language and
direction to the Hawaiian Department.
It was no surprise that the Japanese would reject the Ten points on
November 26; that course of events had been well pictured by complete
information of the conversations between the Japanese Government and its
representatives available to the Government of the United States.
[16] 5. Summary. Now let us turn to the fateful period between November
27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information
came to our State, War and Navy Departments in all of their top ranks
indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the
probable exact hour and date of the attack.
To clinch this extraordinary situation we but have to look at the record
to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply
were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely
translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7
and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu
time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far
Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a locked bag
to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen Smith and Chief of staff to General
Eisenhower, who was then Secretary the General Staff, and he was told
that the message was of the most
Page 229
vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2
General Miles, with whom it was discussed and to the Executive Colonel
Gailey, of the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital
importance of this information that showed that the hour had struck, and
that war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer
personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's
duty officer.
General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as
vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date
by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows when the final
part 14 came in [17] on the morning of December 7 and with it the short
message directing the long message be delivered to the Secretary of
State at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. It was then that this same officer,
Colonel Bratton of G-2, took the initiative and went direct to General
Marshall, calling him at his quarters at Fort Myer and sending an
orderly to find him, where he was out horseback riding. When he finally
did reach him on the phone, General Marshall said he was coming to the
War Department. He met him at about 11:25 a .m., after which time the
message of December 7 was formulated by General Marshall in his own
handwriting. It failed to reach its destination due to sending it by
commercial Western Union RCA. It arrived several hours after the attack.
This brings us to the "winds" message. The "winds" message was one that
was to be inserted in the Japanese news and weather broadcasts and
repeated with a definite pattern of words, so as to indicate that war
would take place either with Great Britain, Russia, or the United
States, or all three.
The Federal Communications Commission was asked to be on the outlook for
these key words through their monitoring stations. Such information was
picked up by a monitoring station. This information was received and
translated on December 3, 1941, and the contents distributed to the same
high authority. The Navy received during the evening of December 3,
1941, this message, which when translated said, "War with the United
States, War with Britain, including the NEI, except peace with Russia."
Captain Safford said he first saw the "winds" message himself about 8 a.
m., on Thursday, December 4, 1941. It had been received the previous
evening, [18] according to handwriting on it by Commander Kramer, who
had been notified by the duty officer, Lt. (jg) Brotherhood, USNR, who
was the watch officer on the receipt of this message.
It was based upon the receipt of the message that Captain Safford
prepared five messages between 1200 and 1600 December 4, ordering the
destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers
on the Asiatic stations. Captain McCullom of the Navy drafted a long
message to be sent to all outlying fleet and naval stations. This was
disapproved by higher naval authority. This message was confirmation to
Naval Intelligence and Navy Department Communications Intelligence Units
that war was definitely set.
This "winds execute" message has now disappeared from the Navy files and
cannot be found despite the extensive search for it. It was last seen by
Commander Safford about December 14, 1941, when he collected the papers
together with Commander Kramer and turned
Page 230
them over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence
before the Roberts Commission.
There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December
4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and
Sunday, December 6 and 7, was clear-cut and definite.
Up the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were
planning to do was known to the United States except the final message
instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with
the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7,
or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor.
Page 231
[a] Memorandum for The Secretary of War
Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, 25 November 1944
[1] 25 Nov 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report.
You have referred to me for opinion the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and exhibits. I
have examined this Report with great care and submit herewith my views.
The present memorandum does not cover so much of the investigation as
pertains to the conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. and related
matters referred to in the Report of the House Military Affairs
Committee dated 14 June 1944.
Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings:
No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is
presented. As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed by
the Secretary of War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-A-A 210.311
(24 Jun 44)), as amended and supplemented, in order meet the wishes of
Congress as expressed in Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June
1944. The Board followed judicial forms, affording full opportunity to
witnesses to produce any data in their possession. Interested parties
such as General Short and others were likewise offered the fullest
possible opportunity to appear before the Board and submit information.
Board's Conclusions in General:
The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor was surprise
to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian
Department, which caught the defending forces practically unprepared to
meet it and to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). The extent of
the disaster was due, the Board states, (a) to the failure General Short
adequately to alert his command for war; (b) to the failure of the War
Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by Short, to
direct him to take an adequate alert; and (c) the failure to keep him
adequately informed of the status of the United States-Japanese
negotiations, which might have caused him to change from the inadequate
alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board follows these general
conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the Secretary of State, the
Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division, and General Short
(Rep. 297-300). The Board makes no recommendations.
It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report to
take up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the other
conclusions later.
Page 232
[2] Board's Conclusion As to General Short:
Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General Short
failed in his duties in the following particulars:
"(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of
a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The
information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was
sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and
the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected.
This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and
make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and
in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.
"(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral
commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval
District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements
then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services.
One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through
the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.
"(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance
reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.
"(d) To replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300.)"
Short's Defenses:
General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is in
the position of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked: it is a
question of the validity of his defenses.
Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio signed
"Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered Alert No. 1,
which his SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat
from without." (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14.) He did
this without consulting his staff, other than his Chief of Staff, and
without consulting the Navy. (Tr., Short 282, 395.)
He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, but
only from 4 to 7 a. m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short
297, 4442.)
[3] The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 27 November
wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside threat. (Tr.
Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14.) His failure to provide for an
outside threat was a serious mistake and resulted in overwhelming
tactical advantages to the attackers, his being taken by surprise, the
destruction of his aircraft on the ground, the severity of the damage
done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and military installations. Short
testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he did not consider there was
any probability of an air attack and that in this regard "I was wrong."
(Tr. Short 4440.)
Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide against
an outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., Allen
3113; Burgin 2618, 2655; Farthing 838-839; Gerow 4274; Hayes 268; Herron
238: King 2700; Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128, 1151-1152; Powell
3911-3912; Throckmorton 1395-1396; Wells 2731; Wilson 1380-1381.)
Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had assumed
the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him
in ample time in the event of an impending attack (Short, Ex. 1, p. 55;
Tr., 299 300, 451, 452; cf. Kimmel 1769); (2) that in response to the
radio signed "Marshall" of 27 November he informed the War Department of
the alert against sabotage and
page 233
the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him
additional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 286,
287, 308); (3) that measures to provide for threats from without would
have interfered with training (Ex. 1, p. 16), and would have disclosed
his intent and alarmed the civilian population (Ex. 12 p. 16-17)
contrary to War Department instructions, and that the prime danger was
sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522; Ex. 1, p. 13-18, 54-57.)
These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the
whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot
excuse him for his failure to take precautions against an outside
threat. In the same way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to
adopt the necessary alert against an air attack because of fear of
sabotage or disclosure of possible intent, or possibility of alarming
the civilian population, or interference with his training program.
These latter must clearly be subordinated to the overshadowing danger of
a possible air attack.
Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient
information as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that
what information he got was at least in part misleading. (Short, Ex. 1,
p. 54-56; Tr., 278-281, 291, 4427.)
The Board in its conclusion stated:
"The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was
sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and
the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected.
(Rep. 300.)"
[4] General Short took command 7 February 1941. That very day the
Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from the
Secretary of the Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated:
"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that
hostilities would be initiated by a *surprise attack* upon the fleet or
the naval base at Pearl Harbor, (Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics
supplied.)"
Secretary Knox further stated that "inherent possibilities of a major
disaster" warranted speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of
the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned * * *."
The letter proceeded:
"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are
considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack,
(3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by
gunfire. (Roberts Report, p. 5.)"
The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were
satisfactory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged
that the Army consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision of
joint Army and Navy defense plans and special training for the forces to
meet such raids. (Roberts Report, p. 5.) Short admitted he received
Secretary Stimson's letter inclosing [sic] Secretary Knox's letter, both
of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368-369.)
On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a letter
containing the following statement:
"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm
is done us *during the first six hours of known hostilities*, thereafter
the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an
attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a *surprise raid
by Air* and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation.
Frankly, I do not see any landing threat
Page 234
in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. (Tr.,
Marshall 17) (Italics supplied.)"
On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter saying:
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian
Department with regard to defense from *air attack*. The establishment
of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end
is a matter of *first priority*. (Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied.)"
[5] Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining the
situation at length and stating:
"The most serious situation with reference to an *air attack* is the
vulnerability of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack. (Tr.,
Marshall 21.) (Italics supplied.)"
Short further stated:
"The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of
warning that would exist on the mainland. (Tr. Marshall 24.)"
On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in cooperating with the Navy,
sent General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy to implement
the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and concluding with the remark:
"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the
air force and the *anti-aircraft* defense. (Tr., Marshall 27.) (Italics
supplied.)"
General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for "being on the job.
(Tr., Marshall 27.)
On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully advising
him of the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese Government
had determined upon its future policy which might involve aggressive
action against Russia and that an advance against the British and Dutch
could not be entirely ruled out. It further advised him that all Jap
vessels had been warned by Japan to be west of the Panama Canal by 1
August, that the movement of Japanese shipping from Japan had been
suspended, and that merchant vessels were being requisitioned. (Tr.,
Marshall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055.)
Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent
General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three
alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of
field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not
sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in
Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and
uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without."
It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual
alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further
that in paragraph 13 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the
earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly
recognized the necessity for preparation for "*a surprise hostile
attack*." (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5. 64.) (Italics supplied.)
[6] On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the War
Department that many of the Summaries of Information received from the
War Department originated with the Office of Naval Intelligence, 14th
Naval District, and that he had already received them. He stated that as
the cooperation between his office, the Office of Naval Intelligence,
and the FBI was most complete, that all such
Page 235
data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington and
recommended that such notices from Washington to him be discontinued to
avoid duplication of effort. (Tr., Bratton D. 292-293.)
On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that the
Japanese Cabinet resignation created a grace [sic] situation, that the
new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between
Japan and Russia were strongly possible, and that since Japan held
Britain and the United States responsible for the present situation
there was also a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers.
The radio concluded:
"In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including
such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or
constitute provocative action against Japan. (Tr. Short 279.)"
Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278.)
Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning sent to
Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055.)
On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff with a full estimate
of the Japanese situation which stated the situation was extremely
critical, that Japan would shortly announce her decision to challenge
militarily any nation which might oppose her policy, and that the major
successes of the Axis afforded an unparalleled opportunity for expansion
with chances of minimum resistance, that probable moves included an
attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in the Far East, a defense
against American attack in support of the British, and a simultaneous
attack upon the ABCD bloc "at whatever points might promise her greatest
tactical, strategic, and economical advantages." The report stated that
a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers
"* * * cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan
considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her
actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide
to strike before our naval program is completed. (Tr. 3688.)"
[7] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short:
"The following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation for
your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains
strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy
seems imminent. (Tr., Short 412-413, Hain 3307, Gerow 4258, 4264.)"
Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation on 25
October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change in the
situation since his warning advice of 17 October above referred to. It
stated that a crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific
by the fall of the Japanese Cabinet, that actions of the new cabinet
"definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States" and
"forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It predicted Jap
use of peace negotiations "as a means to delude and disarm her potential
enemies." It predicted a major move would be made before the latter part
of November "with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not
occur before spring." (Tr., 3689-3694.)
On 5 November, the War Department G-2 wrote Short's G-2 that Hirota,
head of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that
"* * * War with the United States would best begin in December or in
February. * * * The new cabinet would likely start war within sixty
days. [Tr., Bratton D. 289-291.)"
Page 236
Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November in
his Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that
" * * * From all information which had been gathered in our office in
Hawaii it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the
end of November or, if not, then not until spring. (Tr., Bicknell 1439-
1440.)"
Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer Of the Pacific Fleet,
testified he believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 Of the
Hawaiian Air Force and who had been assigned as liaison with the Navy,
that Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, and transports were moving
south. This information came from Naval observers in China, the naval
attache in Tokyo, the naval attache in Chungking, British and other
sources. This intelligence indicated that the Japanese would invade the
Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time had been contacted in the
vicinity Of Oahu. (Tr., Layton 3030, 3031, 3040-3041.)
[8] On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations radioed the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, that
"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations
with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government
and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion
that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack
on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen
this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP,
COMS 11, 12, 13, 14) inform senior army officers their respective areas.
Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense
situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate
dispatch. (Tr., Gerow 4258; cf. Bloch 1503-C.)"
This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton with his
estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he discussed it fully
with Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059.) Short said, "I do not think I ever
got that message. * * * I might have I seen it, * * * and I might have
forgotten about it." (Tr., Short 414.)
On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short:
"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on
special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Carolina group
while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is
desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields,
barracks, camps and naval vessels including submarines * * * before they
depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with
ammunition for guns. (Tr., Gerow 4259.)"
The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, all of
which arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows:
"Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government
might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action
unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities
cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires that Japan
commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be
construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize
your defense. Prior to hostile [9] Japanese action you are directed to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary
but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm
the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should
hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as
far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret
information to minimum essential officers. (Tr., Gerow 4259-4260,
Short 280-281)"
Page 237
This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G-
2 as follows:
"Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it
appears at the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent
deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also possible that
hostilities may begin*. (Tr., Gerow 4260.) (Italics supplied.)"
The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through the Navy
Department, reading as follows:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with
Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have
ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few
days. The number and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of
naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the
Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task
assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar
warning is being sent by the War Department. Spenavo informed British.
Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures
against sabotage. (Tr., Gerow 4262.)"
Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469.)
"The following day, 28 November, The Adjutant General sent Short a long
radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions
be taken immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr.,
Arnold 170, Short 293, Scanlon 4176. ) Short stated he took this as
tacit consent to his alert against sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54)
and as a reply to his radio report of 27 November. (Tr., Short 422.)
Short sent a long reply to this message giving the various precautions
taken by him against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Short
294-296.)"
[10] There was a further message from the Chief of Naval Operations,
dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to launch an attack on
the Kra Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8.) Short also received Admiral
Kimmel's Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations, dated
December 1, 1941, which stated that deployment of Jap naval ships
southward indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way
for hostilities and referred to naval and air activity in the Mandates.
(Tr., Kimmel 1769-1770.) An FBI or War Department report that the Jap
Consuls in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers was given
to Short's G-2 on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., Fielder 2986, Bicknell
1413-1414.) The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that Jap Consulates in
Washington and London were destroying codes and burning secret
documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513.) There were two Navy messages on
December 1941, the first on information copy to Kimmel of advice to
certain naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., Bloch
1514), the second a similar radiogram advising "be prepared to destroy
instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain." (Tr.,
Bloch 1514, Safford C. 187.) Another Navy message of 6 December
"directed that in view of the tense situation naval commanders in
Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy confidential
papers." (Tr., Safford C. 189, Bloch 1514.)
In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's
G-2 on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in charge of
naval cryptographic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap weather
broadcasts from Tokyo "that you must obtain" and stating categorically
"contact him at once." This had reference to the important "Winds"
intercept, to be discussed more fully later. (Tr., Bratton
Page 238
B. 62, D. 283.) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff advised
Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning
papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell
1413.) Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel
Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986.)
On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S.
Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern
Command had ordered the execution of Plan A-2 based on their
intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in the vicinity of
Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507.) Lieutenant Robert H. O'Dell who was then
Assistant Military Attache in the American Legation, Melbourne,
Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated into the Rainbow Plan.
(Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512.) The message in question was supposed to be
relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509.) The record
does not show whether Short ever received this message. Other messages
in the same code had been transmitted between the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr.,
O'Dell 4510.) Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to
Washington in the first instance in order that there should be no delay.
[11] Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel
Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a
telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in
Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors,
searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and "poinsettias," (probably code
words). This message evidently had "military significance" as a Mr.
Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testified. (Tr.,
Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416.)
Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would
be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and
exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941
he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy,
paragraph IV of which provided that daily patrols should be instituted
to reduce the probability of "air surprise."' (Tr., Short 387-388.)
Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement (quoted in Report on page 98;
Roberts Record 556-D-F) state:
"(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack
on Oahu would be an air attack. * * *
"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would he
delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be
using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which
pursuit would be slow to start * * *."
General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible
surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388.)
General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 1941,
(Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short's air chief,
and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air
raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the estimate of
the Hawaiian Department in Short's time and also in the time of his
predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268.) Colonel Donegan,
Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929),
Page 239
testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed
"many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963.) Short had at least one air
defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and
he conducted an air raid drill as late as 29 November 941. (Tr., DeLany
1727.)
General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him
to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him that "whoever
wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had
assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance *
* *." (Tr., Short 4442.)
[12] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington did
not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne
in mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of
any of these messages.
Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and
that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative
action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 279-281) and that
when the 27 November message was sent there was still hope in the minds
of the War Department that differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short
281.) He likewise interpreted the 27 November message to mean that he
must avoid any action which would alarm the Japanese population, which
was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio to him of 28 November.
(Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 293-294.) As Short testified:
"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that
there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *. (Tr., Short
437.)"
Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the
War Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without
ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during he
attack. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471.)
Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from
Washington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous
action on his part, Short replied "very definitely not, from the
information I had." (Tr., Short 453.)
The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished
General Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep. 300.)
Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as
conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be
prepared for the most dangerous situation with which he could be
confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding General was
mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the imminent rupture in
diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, of the
imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak of hostilities by
Japan against the United States, and of the possibility of sabotage and
espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and where Japan
would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set
forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal
instruction, namely that war was imminent and Short should be prepared
for it. The instruction to this effect contained in the message of 27
November was as follows:
"[13] * * * This policy should not repeat not be construed as
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your
defense. * * * (Tr., Short 280 281.)"
Page 240
Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not
have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be
on the alert against threats both from within *and from without*.
Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed
"Marshall." This reads:
"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. (Short
Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286.)"
As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty
minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and
without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision
and action by Short occurred before Short's G-2 received the message
which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 November, clearly
indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might commence and be
concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962). Short claims his
report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that he had
only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to
report contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall."
He testified:
"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe
there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have
explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air corps
particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at
the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine
ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action
taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action
taken and there was no comment that my action was to little or too much
I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. (Tr., Short
437.)"
When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading,
"liaison with the Navy" meant, he replied:
"General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch
with the Navy knowing what information they had and what they were
doing.
"General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy
to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance
reconnaissance?
"[14] General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that
or not it would have affected it because they had signed a definite
agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff.
(Tr., Short 380)"
Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an
emergency and called for action under the War Plan. The Navy message
expressly stated:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. * * * Execute an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task
assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar
warning is being sent by the war Department. * * * (Tr. Gerow 4262)"
The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)
On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the
message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this
message. (Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War
Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after
stating "hostile action possible at any moment" goes on to say that
after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks assigned in the Rainbow Plan
will be carried out in so far as they pertain to Japan. The
implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of reconnaissance
refers to paragraph 18 (I) of the Plan which
Page 241
provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr.
Kimmel 1745)
Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a
Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377-
380, 383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only became a Navy
responsibility if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put
into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect, even in
part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676, Short 4437, 4441)
General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified:
"* * * A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans
message of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War
Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not
recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in
accordance with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian
Department and the Fourteenth Naval District. (Tr., Gerow 4283-4284)"
[15] General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison
with the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further
that
"General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive
measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure
under the basic Plan. * * * (Tr., Gerow 4289)"
Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not
only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that
defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan.
There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into effect in
toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides:
"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into
effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as
mutually agreed upon by local commanders. (Tr., Bellinger 1584)"
It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans
Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the
brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War
Department that he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In
any event, a military commander with a great responsibility cannot
entirely divest himself of that responsibility with respect to 7
December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 November 1941 the
report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which intervened from
27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore quoted,
which called for his reexamination of his decision.
Reconnaissance: Means Available:
Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of
his action taken. For example on 27 November, after receiving the
message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into
operation but only from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 469-470) and
primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 516, 4442) No mention of this
was made in his reply. One of the most important means of reconnaissance
was the radar air raid warning service. The 27 November message signed
"Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such reconnaissance and other
measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for twenty-four hour
operation of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian Department did
not have sufficient aircraft
Page 242
for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid
warning system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this
schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short
470)
[16] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance
reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284,
385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not
perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from the
Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being
conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted
reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers of the task
forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training purposes and also
to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 359-360, 384; Bloch
157; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 175; Kimmel 1773; 1794-1795; 1802; McMorris
2885; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)
According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and
*could run reconnaissance of a sort*, but in our estimate which had been
submitted to Washington, * * * it was clearly stated that we had to know
the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits in order to have
anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a
search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get
more planes all the time * * *" (Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied)
Concerning the air force necessary for naval reconnaissance, Admiral
Kimmel stated:
"* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance
against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about
800 miles from Oahu. Around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full
coverage, *and this will take about 84 planes*, assuming a 15 miles
visibility, for one day. * * * (Tr., Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied)"
How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears
that the Navy had 81 patrol planes:
"* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the
fleet as might be available at any one time augmented by such planes as
the Army could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. *The number of
patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told*. Of those approximately
between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service on
the 7th of December. * * * and they had to cover all the Hawaiian
Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet * * *. (Tr., Kimmel
1739; Tr. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)"
Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert
opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be
needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494)
According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were needed for
distant reconnaissance,
"flying at an interval of five degrees. (Tr., Martin 1872)
"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance
mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * *
This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180. (Tr., Martin 1873)"
Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have
required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324,374) But Short
testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from
outlying islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a
180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16), and that the
task force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short
4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have
been
Page 243
needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374)
According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel
1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available Oahu (Tr., Bellinger
1598,1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of these could have been used for
reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of
the then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A-
20's, and 54 B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not
the best type of plane, but as General Martin says,
"* * * *They could be used for reconnaissance*, but * * * were always
recognized as not being a combat ship. (Tr. Martin 1859) (Italics
supplied)"
General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant
reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of
a Navy Flying Fortress.
Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128
planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these
planes were actually available for operations as distinguished from
those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear,
however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were
available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some
extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the umber of
planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance must be
taken with some qualifications.
I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph
XV, p. 12):
"[18] Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan when the plan became
effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating
from Oahu, to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7
1941 no distant reconnaissances were conducted except during drills and
maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in
various areas off the island of Oahu and in connection with such
operations carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the
operating areas. The sectors searched however constituted but small
areas of the total are of 360' and rarely extended to a radius of 700
miles.
"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have
afforded measure of security against a surprise air attack.
"General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant
reconnaissance but after seeing the warning messages of October and
November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with
respect to the distant reconnaissance if any, being conducted by the
Navy."
Information Not Received by Short; In General;
Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important
information prior to the attack which should have been but was not
transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The
Board held that under these circumstances, where vital information
cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is
incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility for
specific instructions to these commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) I do
not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present case.
It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record
or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed no information
definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance
information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to
many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside
Page 244
from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the Dutch-
British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short said would
have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, (Tr.,
Short 449-450), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board,
there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not
transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with
having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also
that Short received important information from his G-2 of which the War
Department was not informed.
[19] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that
it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a
basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These
references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses
consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain
intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and
inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received by
the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out of all
proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received
from day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military
concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander
of the Hawaiian Department. The Board considered that the most damning
indictment of the War Department was that it has possession of
information which indicated war at a time certain (Top Secret Rep., p.
3) and that this information was exclusively in the possession of the
War Department and did not go to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The
basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that the War
Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and
elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their
codes and confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2,
Colonel Fielder, and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information
before 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise
destroying its codes and burning its secret papers, which information in
the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986;
Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he
believed the source of his information was the War Department. (Tr.,
Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G-
2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told
Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war.
(Tr. Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff,
testified Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242-1243)
Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burning of
codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch
1512-1513) which information, according to Short's G-2 would come to him
in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton D. 292-293)
The principal information of the character above described is contained
in Top Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted
radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called
"Winds" message. In order to compare the information Washington had and
what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the contents of
these various messages:
Page 245
24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting
reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into
various subdivisions for that purpose.
14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to
Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner; Turner suggesting
Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and
gradually withdraw Jap troops from China.
[20] 16 October, translated presumably 17 October. Toyoda, Foreign
Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S.
might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three-
Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the
Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the
above.
22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Advises
Tokyo of his lack of success in negotiations and asks to be relieved.
5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost
secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and
urging renewed effort.
14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stating that
should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy British and
American power in China.
15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Honolulu
stating:
"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical,
make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a
week."
16 November, translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. Referring to
impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press
negotiations with the U. S.
18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bringing
Tokyo up to date as to warships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of
eight destroyers entering harbor.
19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to
present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be
secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off.
19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving three
code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap-U.
S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous.
22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends time
for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is
absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to
happen."
26 November translated 28 November. Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu to
Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S. considering the
"proposal" in toto, that if situation remains tense as it is
negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already
be called so. "Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that
rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between
Japan and U. S. but would be followed by U. S. and English military
occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would make war inevitable.
26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating "the
situation is momentarily becoming more tense and tele-
Page 246
grams take too long." Contains code for future telephone conversations.
26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and
Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could make no
progress.
26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great
danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast upon
Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this.
28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating that
in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has "presented a
humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations";
therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after
which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not
to give impression negotiations are broken off.
29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have been
receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you
also report even when there are no movements."
29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing
Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.
30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising Japan's
adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made insulting
proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to Germany and
Italy in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, let alone others,
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for
negotiations" and that United States in collusion with the allied
nations "has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as
an enemy."
[22] 30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Stating
negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured broken" and to give
Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments; that England and
the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to
move forces into East Asia which would require counter measures by
Japan, that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out
and that "the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than
anyone dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in
the most absolute secrecy."
30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between
Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out
negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt.
1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing
destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable.
1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in
deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly
suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States
note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested but
in Washington only.
1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising when
faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for
that purpose.
1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising
continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders
those lower down.
Page 247
1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising that it
was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British and
American Consular rights would not be recognized.
2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting
conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein
Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and
expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of
26th. Japan convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy
settlement which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to
new American proposals.
2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly
Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and
destroy all secret documents.
[23] 3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. Stating
that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great
Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a certainty.
4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain
members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated.
6 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports
destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still
continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine.
6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance
notice of memorandum for. U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to
prepare to present it when directed.
6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating
that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other
Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President and advised
against Jap-American war.
7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely
urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final
memorandum, Japan to U. S., to destroy at once remaining cipher machine
and all machine codes, also all secret documents.
7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: "On the
6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a
British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would
break out on the 7th."
The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed in
detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the
United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941
in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6
December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret
Ex. "B"; Tr., Safford C. 154) The Japanese note in general is a review
of the Japanese-American negotiations and the Japanese position,
complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the negotiations. A
radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same day,
marked "urgent, very important," instructs the Ambassador to present
this note to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret
Ex. "B")
[24] The Winds Message:
The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941,
intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic repre-
Page 248
sentatives to the effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting
off our diplomatic relations)" a warning message would be given in the
middle and the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as
follows:
(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations:
NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)
When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed.
(Exhibit "B", 19 Nov., S.I.S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35; Sadtler D.
250; Safford C. 125-126)
A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26
November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S.I.S. 25432) The
Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately
commenced a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message.
On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications. Phoned
Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The
message is in." Asked which one it was, Admiral Noyes stated he did not
know but believed it meant war between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr.,
Sadtler D. 251) Sadtler immediately went to General Miles, A. C. of S.,
G-2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing Admiral
Noyes' uncertainty as to which message it was, General Miles stated: "Do
you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel
Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and
had no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify
it at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General
Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253)
Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and suggested
that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be notified.
General Gerow replied "I think they have had plenty of notification,"
and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel (now Lieutenant
General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, of the message
and that he had talked to G-2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith did not
wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253-254)
It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds"
message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great
Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel
Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not indicate a
breach in Japanese-American relations. (Tr., Sadtler D.252) According to
[25] Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 ever received a message of this
latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see also Marshall A. 36-
38) The present record fails to show whether Colonel Sadtler or Colonel
Bratton ever ascertained the exact meaning of the Navy activating
"Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry of
Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On
this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who
stated: "I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or
Colonel Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' code
(indicating with whom relations
Page 249
would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38-
39) It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" Code was
intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl
Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified that he
discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy activating
"Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain (Tr., Sadtler
D. 251-2a2) Apparently, therefore, the source of the activating or
second "Winds" message was the Navy.
The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford,
head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4
December the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in
teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer,
wrote on the bottom of it, "War with England, War with America, Peace
with Russia." The message was different in wording from what had been
expected but, according to Captain Safford, its meaning was clear. It
was given immediately to Admiral Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131-132)
According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to the War Department.
(Tr., Safford C. 133) Colonel Gibson of War Department G-2 testified
that there is no record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army
Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the
Navy. (Tr. Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message
can now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments
according to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to various
high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State
Department and White House. (Tr. Safford C. 133, 136 138, 172) The proof
that it got to the White House seems to be that this was routine
distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136-138) the same is true as to its
getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138)
Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty
intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in
the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr. Safford C. 139-140,
152) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted in
evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do
not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified that
Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted S.I.S. 25850,
the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00
p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it saying in effect,
"This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a
midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167)
[28] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating
message with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret
papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander McCollum and asked
him whether Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out
to the Pacific Fleet. McCollum said they were and as a result McCollum
finally succeeded in having sent a message to the Pacific naval
commanders, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District,
Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been instructed to destroy
their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-184) Safford stated he also arranged
for four additional messages o be sent out to various naval attaches in
the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr.,
Safford C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the
same effect was also
Page 250
sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy to the
Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford C. 187)
An additional message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190)
One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession
a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the
Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War
Department." (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the
testimony given by Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of
the examination of various witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C.
Hart, during April to June 1944, in accordance with directions of the
Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168)
Examining General Marshall from this document, General Russell stated:
"This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that:
" "On the 4th of December 1941 Commander McCollum drafted a long warning
message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets
summarizing significant events up to that date quoting the Winds Message
and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent."
"Now, this is on the 4th day of December:
" "Admiral Wilkinson approved this message"
"which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely
" "and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the
message to read after Admiral Noyes read it and saw it about three p. m.
Washington time on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do
you thing [sic] of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied 'I think it is an
insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson
stated 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man,'
and so forth. (Tr. Russell A. 33-34)"
[27] Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that
"Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved
sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277)
Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message
translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of
codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles
and General Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton
advocated sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders.
General Gerow felt what sufficient warning had already been given.
General Miles felt that he could not go over General Gerow's decision.
Bratton, however, continued to feel uneasy about the matter and went
over to the Navy Department where he had a conference with Commander
McCollum who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out.
McCollum stated that Commander Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten the
first "Winds" message and was listening for the implementing message. He
suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire be sent to the
Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., Bratton D. 283-284)
Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK this message which
was sent 5 December to Short's G-2 and read as follows:
"Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District
has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are
mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr., Bratton D.
283)"
Page 251
In addition to the "Winds" message, the sheaf of forty-seven intercepts,
Top Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo,
dated 19 November 1941, reading as follows:
"When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the
following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence
broadcasts:
(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "HIGASHI"
(2) Japan Russia relations "KITA"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malay, and NEI) 'NISHI'
(Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)"
There is a conflict as to the meaning of the "Winds" message, namely, as
to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations. (Tr.,
[28] Bratton B. 60-71; Safford C. 126-130; Sadtler D. 250; See also Top
Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This
conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that
Japan might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even
Short realized this. (Tr., Short 456-457; see also Stimson 4051)
There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher officers in
the War Department got either the original "Winds" message, in whatever
version, or the activating message, or got the brief message of 19
November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelligence
broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top Secret Ex.
"B", S. I. S. 25392)
Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit B", a
sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated:
"All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to
the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. * * * The
officials to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State
the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans
Division (Tr., Bratton D. 297)"
Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that
any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or
if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these
officials, is there any showing of the form in which they received them.
Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton's, above quoted
relying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice, without specific
recollection of specific occasions cannot be regarded is fairly bringing
home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge of any specific
intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a specific
denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any recollection of
having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall A 30-31, 33-40, 209-
211)
Discussion of Foregoing Information:
It is obvious that these Top Secret intercepts show a gradual
deterioration in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war.
Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the
outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts
are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed; for
example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October from Tokyo to
Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing
Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the radio of 15
November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu requesting that
the "ships in harbor" [29] report be made
Page 252
twice a week in view of the critical Jap-U. S. relations; the radio of
18 November, translated 6 December from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing
Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving the course
of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24 November,
translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a "ships in
harbor" report even when there were no movements. The above appear to
point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this
inference is in the light of after-events; at that time these radios, to
an unimaginative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to
keep themselves advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or
possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing
boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 November, translated the same day, from
Tokyo to Washington, setting 25 November as the deadline for signing the
agreement; the radio of 16 November, translated 17 November, reiterating
the impossibility of changing the deadline; the radio of 22 November,
translated the same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 29
November, and stating "after that things are automatically going to
happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was
not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an
early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As
General Marshall testified, November 29 came and passed and nothing
happened. (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5) As to the "Winds" message, according to
War Department witnesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain,
not war with the United States. The most significant messages were the
radios of 1 December, translated the same day; 2 December, translated 3
December, 5 December, translated 6 December, directing the destruction
of codes, code machines and secret papers. There is also the reference
to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These messages, to Colonel
Bratton, meant war. But General Short had already been warned that war
was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether, had
General Short received these messages, he would have altered his view
that there was no threat from without is problematical. One message
clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely the radio of 2
December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there,
whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the
war ships there were provided with antimine nets. But this message was
not received until 23 December and not translated until 30 December
1941. (Top Secret Ex. "13", S. I. S. 27065)
It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation
of the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States.
Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer
told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 25850
instructing the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p.
m., he sent along a [30] note stating "This means a sunrise attack on
Pearl Harbor today." (Tr., Safford C. 167) Action upon this information
if believed credible, was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony
it was communicated to the War Department.
The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information
available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis
Page 253
by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture
presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer's
deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might have led to an anticipation of
the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the
time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such an
estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the light
of after-occurring events and read into each message a significance
which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in
mind that substantially all the definite information received is to Jap
naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast
Asia.
As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above
referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and
placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of
conjecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the information
he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were
destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to Short's
Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what Short would have done
if he had gotten all the information he complains he did not get.
As I have previously stated, while there was more information in
Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to
any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which
he should make preparations. To the same effect was he testimony of
General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14-15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow
4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton D. 283), General Bedell Smith (Tr.,
Sadtler D. 253), General Miles (Tr., Miles 127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D.
253-254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8, 14;
Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277; Russell A.
34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep., pp. 18-
21)
Comments on Short's Defenses:
The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no
escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged
with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there
were threats both from within and from without and that the most
dangerous form of attack which he could expect as a surprise air attack,
he cannot now [31] be heard to say at he was led into becoming sabotage-
minded to the exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing
sabotage. It is obvious at General Marshall's radio of 27 November was
not intended to change the official War Department estimate, solidly
imbedded in elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short's
assumption of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a
surprise r attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that
Short's reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not amount
to communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived at a
new and entirely different estimate of the situation which included a
surprise air attack as a then present basic threat.
As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, or,
as held by the Board, that the information which he had was "incomplete
and confusing" (though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that
the information given Short continually stressed the pos
Page 254
sible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a threat from with out.
But, as seen, Short's Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the idea of a
threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have
interpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack on
Pearl Harbor, an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the
inevitability of war. But this would not necessarily have led Short to
establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind the Navy view that there was no
chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Short's claim that in any
event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample time of the
whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short's defense that Alert No. 3 would
have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would have disclosed
his intent and alarmed the civilian population, is refuted by the
statement in General Marshall's radio to him of 27 November that the
policy of avoiding the first overt act should not be construed as
restricting him to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense.
But they are also answered by the fact that Alert No. 2, at least, would
not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the civilian population. It
should be borne in mind that Short's problem was two-fold, both to guard
against an outside attack and at the same time to do so without alarming
the civil population. This should not have been beyond the capabilities
of an experienced Commander.
I am of the opinion therefore that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300)
that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of
readiness for war, in the face of a war warning, appears justified
except in so far as it holds the information which Short had was
incomplete and confusing.
I likewise agree that the Board's conclusion (b) that Short failed in
his duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities in
Hawaii for joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, is
supported by the record. I also concur in the opinion of the Board (c)
that Short failed in his duties in not informing himself of the
effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the
Navy.
[32] The question whether Short's failure in the performance of these
various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an offense
under military law, will be discussed later. In my opinion Short's
various failures were not so much the result of a neglect of duty as of
serious errors of judgment. His first error of judgment was in the
erroneous estimate of the situation which he made and which led him to
the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor from the
air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was his duty to
be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the highly
improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were honest ones,
not the result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind all the
circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty.
Board's Conclusion (d) as to Short's Failure to Replace Inefficient
Staff Officers:
The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient
staff officers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement
in the body of the Report that "Phillips was recognized by the staff as
without force and far too weak for a position of such importance." (Rep
72)
Page 255
A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board
relies for its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain
witnesses were asked as to their *opinion* of Phillips as Chief of
Staff. Their replies varied from complete reluctance to answer (Tr.,
Donegan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel was unqualified.
(Tr., Throckmorton 1408-1409) General Burgin considered Phillips "one of
General Short's fair-haired boys," high-handed, not prone to confer with
subordinates, not "extremely efficient, or otherwise the average, run-
of-the-mine." (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General Hayes, the preceding Chief
of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips had a G-3 trend, and that he
did not "feel that he had worked himself into the position of Chief of
Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack." (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel
Pratt merely added that he considered that Hayes had been a stronger
Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 1977-1978)
These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of
Phillips' training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to
support the blanket conclusion of the Board about Short's staff. The
Board adds, however, that Phillips' own testimony "as to his conception
of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to
competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of
the matter." (Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to support this
findings is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable
interference with training which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were
ordered, that all phases of the situation were discussed, the danger of
a Jap landing, of an air attack, [33] what Phillips considered to be his
duties as Chief of Staff, how Short ordered Alert No. 1 without a
"specific recommendation" from Colonel Phillips, and a general
discussion of activities in the Department after 27 November. (Tr.,
Phillips 1134-1144)
It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as Chief
of Staff, as he had not been appointed until 5 November, 1941, (Tr.,
Phillips 1108) and that Short did not treat Phillips as Chief of Staff,
for example, in not having him present at important Navy conferences.
(Rep. 74) But there is no substantial evidence that Phillips was
inefficient to a degree that would require his removal by Short, or that
Short's failure to remove Phillips was in any way proximate or
concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The most that can be said
is that there were indications that Short selected a man not fully
qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were not fully
investigated by the Board, either as to their accuracy or as to their
possible contribution to the disaster on 7 December 1941.
Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony in
the record as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short's G-1, G-3. or
G4. Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there is no
substantial testimony either from his own lips or from other witnesses
from which the Board could hold Colonel Fielder inefficient. The worst
that can be said against Fielder is that he failed to realize the
importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that Japanese consuls
were destroying their codes and burning their papers. However, this
viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed as Fielder about
these matters.
The Board also stated that
Page 256
"While the various assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony
existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that
there was a lack requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident
to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident
loyalty to General Short. (Rep. 74)"
The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel
Throckmorton, Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified there
was complete harmony when General Hayes was Chief of Staff and that
"such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was of a
serious enough nature to have affected what happened on December 7."
(Tr., Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no substantial testimony
as to any significant disharmony among Short's staff.
It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that
Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not
justified.
[34] Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:
The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations with
the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:
"(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully
advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which
indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war of
which information he ad an abundance and Short had little.
"(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department on November 28 1941 when evidently he failed to
realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th which
indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued
the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his
command for war.
"(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the
early morning of December 7th the critical information indicating an
almost immediate break with Japan though there was ample time to have
accomplished this.
"(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian
Command between November 27 and December 7 1941, despite the impending
threat of war. (Rep. 298-299)"
Adequacy of General Marshall's 27 November Warning Message:
The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed
"Marshall" should be regarded as containing all the information
concerning the Japanese and the instructions necessary for General Short
to accomplish his mission. (Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 197)
The Board's statement that General Marshall failed "to keep the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the
growing tenseness of the Japanese situation" (Rep. 298) over-looks the
fact that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" pictured the
Japanese-United States situation accurately as it appeared from the
information available to the War Department at that time and up until 7
December. The negotiations between the Japanese representatives in the
United States and our State Department actually continued up to 7
December, and various intercepts suggest the possibility that they may
have been conducted by the envoys in good faith and with evident hope of
a peaceful settlement.
[35] Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in Washington
to make one more attempt at settlement along certain lines and "in
carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead
to anything like a breaking off of negotiations." (Top Secret Ex. "B")
Page 257
Mr. Kurusu, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo's drastic
statement, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised the
Japanese negotiators would be in a difficult position. Further, he
stated they Were doing their best and that negotiations were to
continue. (Top Secret Ex. "B")
On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representatives in Washington suggesting
a possible approach for making some progress in negotiations. (Top
Secret Ex. "B")
On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated:
"Judging from my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and
my considerations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is
anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am
convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement.
Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of
our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.
(Top Secret Ex "B")"
On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to delay
destruction of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were still
continuing. (Top Secret Ex. "B")
Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevitability of
war:
"* * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I
would have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were
times when I believed the Japanese government was doing its best to
prevent war for the reason that it realized much better than the
military people did what might be the result of war. * * * Now the
question at that time was whether they would be successful or not, and,
as I say, I was not in a position to answer that question definitely and
finally prior to the outbreak of war. (Tr., Grew 4213-4214 )"
When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was inevitable,
Mr. Grew replied:
"[36] I could not put my finger on any particular date, General. My own
position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible
minute to prevent war; and I did everything in my power to prevent it;
and, not being defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war
was inevitable, up to he last minute. So that I cannot mention any
particular date, prior to December 7, 1941, when I felt that war was
definitely inevitable. (Tr., Grew 4199)"
With reference to Japan's decision to go to war, he stated that there
were "two Japans." The Army and Navy were practically independent and
reported directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet and the
Prime Minister.
"I think it is perfectly possible that the Cabinet was not informed of
the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is well, I won't say
confirmed, but it is increased by the fact that I had a conversation
with Mr. Togo, the foreign minister, at half past twelve, half past
midnight, on December 7, 1941. That was about three hours before Pearl
Harbor. And I have always been convinced from the nature of that
conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that Pearl Harbor
was about to break. I have other evidence, too, which convinces me
personally that he didn't know. * * * (Tr., Grew 4214-4215)"
When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing action
by Japan, Mr. Grew stated: .
"I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it,
that it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it
besides war. The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet
some of our views in connection with their expansion through the Far
East. They could readily have done that, and if they had done that we
might, for our part, have relaxed
Page 258
some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think
that that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened.
But it didn't happen. (Tr., Grew 4218)"
As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November General
Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that the War
Department was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Marshall A. 5) It
was first thought that the 25 November deadline pertained to the anti-
Comitern pact. When the time was extended to 29 November that
possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall A. 4) "November 29 arrived and
passed, and we entered into December without anything happening other
than the continuation of these movements, which we could follow fairly
well, down the China coast and Indo-China and headed quite plainly
towards Thailand and the Gulf of Siam." (Tr., Marshall A. 5)
[37] In the light of all the information possessed by the War Department
at that time and the fact that the 14th part of the Japanese note
breaking off negotiations, and the direction to the Japanese
representatives to present the fourteen parts at 1:00 p. m. (Washington
time) 7 December, was not available until that day, it is my opinion
that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" was an accurate and
adequate description of the Japanese situation at the time it was sent,
and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this message should be read in the
light of the other Army and Navy messages to Short.
General Marshall's Views on Warning:
The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called "Winds" message
referred not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations and that
"very remarkable things had been done under the rupture of diplomatic
relations while still evading an actual act of war." (Tr., Marshall A.
45-46) With respect to other information of the Japanese activities
which reached him from secret sources and influenced his thinking as to
the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff testified that while it may
have been practical and feasible to have sent this information to Short,
nevertheless in his opinion at that time, it would have been unwise.
(Tr., Marshall A. 46) The Chief of Staff conceded that "considering what
has happened. * * * the situation might well have been helped by
translating that information to them." (Tr., Marshall A. 46) Speaking of
his decision at the time, however, he stated:
In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the character
of the two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the
later Army alert, (messages to Short from War Department and Navy
Department) were sufficient for any Commander with a great
responsibility; and in addition to that you must remember that we were
pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, convoys, rushing
everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last extreme. Nobody could
look at that without realizing that something very critical was in the
wind. Our great problem was how to do these things, energized in the way
we were the shipments, and collecting the means and getting them out,
particularly to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii
without giving such notice to the Japanese that it would have an
unfortunate effect in our stalling off this affair.
Page 259
Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed in their
decision by the fact that if they didn't catch it, didn't act within a
certain period of time, it would be too late; we would have gained the
necessary strength to make it undesirable, to make it too dangerous for
them to act.
"[38] All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only the
most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that
commercial shipping in taxing the Pacific Fleets resources in providing
convoys. Everything was involved there at the time and I cannot see how-
I never have quite understood how the change from a great fear as
expressed in all the previous communications, of an air assault suddenly
seemed to lapse. I don't know what the explanation or it is and I myself
have never discussed it. (Tr. Marshall A. 46-47)"
As already indicated, General Marshall had no information of any kind
which indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 27-28)
The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had adequate weapons,
ammunition, and other means for the discharge of his mission to protect
Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A 27) He also was under the belief in late
November and early December of 1941 that Short ad adequate
reconnaissance agencies to carry out the desired reconnaissance. In this
regard, he testified:
"We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there
ahead of other places. We had done everything we could to provide the
means to carry out the air functions of that command particularly as
they were determined in the final agreement between General Short and
Admiral Kimmel (Tr. Marshall A. 27)"
The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant
reconnaissance by the Navy. (Tr., Marshall A 26)
The Chief of staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of several
places on the Japanese front and that "it was by far the best prepared
that we had." (Tr., Marshall A 25) He stated:
"* * * if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 100,
Panama was about 25 percent and the Philippines about 10 percent and
Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible. (Tr., Marshall A. 23)"
The Chief of staff continued:
"I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken, * * * (Tr., Marshall
A 26)"
To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff and
the over-all supervision which was required of him from a global
perspective, the Chief of Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal
Department:
"[39] * * * we had had very peculiar things there, and of course they
could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable
way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A 13-14)"
General Marshall's 7 December Message:
Concerning the Board's conclusion (c) (Rep. 298) that the Chief of Staff
should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the early
morning of 7 December of an almost immediate break with pan, the Chief
of Staff testified that he did not receive the intercept which indicated
such a break until about 11 o'clock on 7 December. (Tr., Marshall A. 6)
He then immediately conferred with appropriate members of his Staff and
wrote a draft of a message to be transmitted
Page 260
to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when completed to
Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western Defense Command,
the Panama command, the Hawaiian command, and the Philippine command.
(Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of Staff knew that the time required for
coding was " a very quick procedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly
as the girl types." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the
message to the Message Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief
of Staff as to the procedure which would be followed and the time within
which it could be expected the message would reach the recipients. The
Chief of Staff did not understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so
he with Colonel Bundy was sent back for additional information. (Tr.,
Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy was on duty in the War Plans Division of
the General Staff in charge of matters pertaining to the Pacific. (Tr.
Marshall A. 9-10) When Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy returned they
informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the message would be in the
hands of the recipients within thirty minutes from that moment. (Tr.
Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to the Chief of Staff as to
what were the time elements, he sent Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy
back for a third time to check again. When they returned their reply
confirmed that the time for transmittal would be satisfactory. (Tr.,
Marshall A. 10)
The Chief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipients
before the one o'clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr., Marshall
A. 14)
Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent the
message to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Francisco to
Hawaii via Radio Corporation of America. This was because the Army radio
was not able to get through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) A further
delay, which was also unknown to the Chief of Staff was caused by the
nonoperation of a teletype at Honolulu on 7 December. Thus when the
message was received in Honolulu it was given to a boy for delivery on a
bicycle. The boy was caught in the bombing and did not deliver the
message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)
[40] The telephone was not considered as means of transmission because,
in the nature of things, it would have been too "time consuming." (Tr.,
Marshall A. 13.) The Chief of Staff testified:
"* * * I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would
have called the Panama Canal second, * * *. And from our own experience,
my own experiences even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. * *
* we now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the
telephone (Tr., Marshall A. 13-14)."
Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the
message for delivery to the Message Center:
"I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of
the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's
desire that the message be transmitted to the addresses by the fastest
possible safe means, * * *. I then returned to the Office of the Chief
of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for
the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message
center and talked the matter over with Colonel French, who informed me
that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in
about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty
minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 a.
m. (Tr., Bratton B. 79-80) (This would be 6:20 a. m. Honolulu time)
Page 261
Colonel French testified that:
"Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would
take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about
30 to 45 minutes to transmit the message to its destination (Tr. French
196)."
Concerning the question as to whether members of the General Staff,
other than the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short a
warning without waiting for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the
morning of 7 December, the following testimony by the Chief of Staff is
pertinent:
"General RUSSELL. Was there anyone of the General Staff other than
yourself with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental
commanders a message which would have told them of these recent
developments, and including the reply of the Japanese to our message of
November 26, and particularly as to the substance of this message of
December [41] 7th relative to the delivery of the ultimatum and the
destruction of the code machines?
"General MARSHALL. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer
concerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge
of principal affairs, can do what in time of a great emergency. It
depends on the judgment of the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff
was here, if the head of the War Plans Division were here, if possible
the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 were aware of this and of the
possibilities of delay, they might have acted. It is very hard to
answer, because you are inevitably involved in backsight regarding a
great; catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way. (Tr., Marshall
C. 211-212)"
Comment on Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:
As to the Board's conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall failed
in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to keep Short
fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation, "of
which information he had an abundance and Short had little," I feel, as
already indicated, that General Marshall's radio to Short of 27
November, considered along with the other messages to Short, accurately
pictured the Japanese-American situation as it then existed and as it
continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a military commander was
required to take the information contained in this radio from his Chief
of Staff as true and not in the critical spirit of awaiting further
information or proof of what he was told. General Marshall was not in
the position of carrying on a negotiation with a foreign plenipotentiary
but was telling a subordinate what the situation was for his guidance.
The Board's conclusion reduces itself to a holding that General Marshall
should have given Short at length and in detail the factual basis for
his succinct statement in his 27 November radio that there was only a
bare possibility the Japanese might renew the negotiations, and that
Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible
at any moment.
So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to Short
is concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Board's
Conclusions clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 November adequately
pictured the emergency, the imminence of hostilities, and the necessity
that Short be on the alert against threats from within and from without.
The most that can be said is that the War Department did not transmit to
Short the Top Secret messages, but these were cumulative. This is
evident from a reading of the messages actually sent Short over a period
of months, hereinbefore referred to. While the War Department was
possessed of more information than Short received, he did receive enough
to require that he be on the qui vive. That Hawaii had already been
sufficiently alerted was [42]
Page 262
the opinion of Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7, 14, 15; Bratton B. 78;
Gibson D. 276-277), of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell A. 34),
of General Gerow (Tr., Sadtler D. 253, Bratton D. 283), of General Miles
(Tr., Sadtler D. 253), and of General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253)
Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. General
Marshall testified it was SOP that the Navy give Short these messages.
(Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772.) The Navy messages of 24 and 27
November specifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36, D. 306; Short
358, 363.) Captain Layton testified that he delivered to and discussed
with General Short in person the message from the Chief of Naval
Operations dated 24 November 1941. (Tr. Layton 3058-3059.)
Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese
situation, of the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear
instructions from the Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from
within and from without, and for eventualities which could be
momentarily expected.
As to the Board's conclusion (b) that General Marshall failed in his
relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send additional
instructions to Short when evidently he failed to realize the import of
Short's 27 November reply, which indicated, the Board said, that Short
had misunderstood General Marshall's radio and had not alerted his
command for war, (Rep. 298) this statement is a non sequitur. But, in
addition, there was no testimony before the Board that General Marshall
ever saw Short's reply. He himself testified that he had no recollection
of ever having seen it, though "the presumption would be that I had seen
it." (Tr., Marshal 38-40; cf. Top Secret Tr., Marshall C. 201.) It is
significant that Short's radiogram to the Chief of Staff, though
initialed "Noted" by the Secretary of War and General Gerow, is not
initialed by the Chief of Staff, although the latter initialed the
corresponding radio from General MacArthur. (Tr., Marshall 39.) The
reply itself was indicative that Short had taken precautions against
sabotage and in stating "liaison with the Navy" was susceptible of the
interpretation that Short had also ordered defense measures in
accordance with the War Plan. That plan contemplated that distant
reconnaissance would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to
General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply,
was entitled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the
Navy" in his reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissance. It
must be remembered that Short was given a definite order in General
Marshall's radio of 27 November to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of
Staff was entitled to believe that his order would be obeyed.
Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in
touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they
were doing." (Tr., Short 380.) He also stated that this phrase indicated
he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long
distance reconnaissance. (Tr., Short 380.) General Gerow, head of War
Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified that the portion of the
reply stating "liaison with the Navy" led to the reasonable assumption
that "General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive
measures in coordination with the
Page 263
Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic plan, * * * (Tr.,
Gerow 4289.) In other words, the Chief of Staff was not definitely
advised by this reply of Short that Short had made no preparations
against an outside threat.
[43] In a consideration of this point it should also be remembered that
while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communications
calling his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack Short at no
time, so far as the record shows, questioned this estimate by a
communication to the Chief of staff.
The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the War
Department that Short had taken all necessary defense measures. It would
be a most anomalous situation if a theater commander could be heard to
say that because he received warnings from the Chief of Staff and had
replied with a fragmentary report that ipso facto he was relieved of his
responsibilities and that these responsibilities were then fastened upon
the Chief of Staff.
Also, since Short received numerous messages and information after 27
November, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff
testified it was SOP to exchange (Tr., Marshall 3S, 36; Kimmel 1772),
the silence of Short after the message of 28 November would indicate to
a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready to meet all threats, both those
from within and those from without.
It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian
Department the Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander-in-
Chief and, in point of truth, personally warned the Hawaiian Department
with prophetic accuracy, against the very type of attack which occurred.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of
Staff did not include the duty of personally directing and supervising
the detailed administration of the various sections of the Office of the
Chief of Staff. His primary duty was to advise the Secretary of War and
the President, to plan and supervise the organization, equipment, and
training of the Army, to make decisions and give advice concerning the
over-all and vital problems of military strategy from the perspective of
global war and the broad military problems which then confronted the
United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy of the War
Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated in the recent
victories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the field whose
records justified the assumption of great responsibilities. Thus, the
prime responsibility is on the theater commander. No duty could thus
devolve upon the Chief of Staff to check personally on the Hawaiian
Command other than as may be related to the stated fundamental policy.
To have singled out the Hawaiian Department for any different attention
would have been peculiar and repugnant to the policy and purposes of a
General Staff. The very nature of an over-all supervision in preparation
for a global war makes mandatory that the Chief of Staff be divorced
from administrative details. In no sense, of course, does the Chief of
Staff avoid his responsibility in the event his organization is
ineffective. There is a distinction, however, between the personal
performance of his especial duties and the performance of duties by
members of his staff.
[44] It is my opinion that the Board's conclusion (b) (Rep 298) that
General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon
receipt of Short's reply, is not justified.
Page 264
As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to get to
Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December
the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan
"though there was ample time to have accomplished this" the record makes
entirely clear that General Marshall personally did not receive this
information until late in the morning of 7 December and that he did his
best to get it to Short immediately but failed because of circumstances
beyond his control.
As to the Board's conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to
investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command
between 27 November and 7 December, the record is silent as to whether
this was the personal duty of the Chief of Staff. It has been already
indicated that General Marshall was entitled to rely upon his
subordinates, including Short, and to believe that elaborate
preparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formulated
over a long period of time would be carried out by a theater commander
in accordance with the traditional American military policy. General
Marshall had been [sic] General Short's tentative SOP dated 14 July 1941
which contained elaborate plans for execution in an emergency. (Tr.,
Marshall 29)
To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as
to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts
Report (Roberts Report, p. 19-20).
Board's Conclusions as to General Gerow:
As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties as
follows:
"(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately
informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the
substance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
"(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on
November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he
approved the message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained
confusing statements.
"(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to
the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he
failed to take corrective action.
"(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans
and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of
the two services in the manner contemplated. (Rep. 299)"
[45] General Gerow was recalled from France where he was Commanding
General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way from the Normandy
beach-head to the Siegfried Line. He testified concerning his activities
as Chief or Acting Chief of the War Plans Division under the Chief of
Staff during the time in question. (Tr., Gerow 4225) This Division of
the General Staff was charged with war plans and operations, and was
under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff.
From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General Short
was given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic relations
and the situation with Japanese, the unpredictable nature of Japanese
future action, the imminence of hostilities, and that under no
circumstances should any limitations or qualifications expressed in the
messages jeopardize his defense. He was also ordered to establish
reconnaissance.
Page 265
But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully
alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had
received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the
Board argues that had this additional information been transmitted to
Short it might have convinced him not only that war was imminent but
that there was a real possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In
retrospect it is difficult to perceive any substantial reason for not
sending Short this additional information or, in the alternative,
checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger.
General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of
imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information
been sent to Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial
effect. General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in failing to make
the proper deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance, the
message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on
vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various
subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to
Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor report" irregular, and the further
message of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there
were no ship movements (Top Secret Ex. "B") might readily have suggested
to an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure
to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of the type
of skill in anticipating and preparing against eventualities which we
have a right to expect in an officer at the head of the War Plans
Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the
advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret information to
Short.
The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in sending
Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was not a clear
and concise directive. In various places in the Report, the Board refers
to this radiogram as containing confusing and conflicting statements. In
my opinion this is an erroneous characterization of the message. It
fails to take into account the very essence of the situation which then
presented [46] itself. Those in authority in Washington, from the
President down, were confronted at that moment with a most difficult and
delicate situation. The diplomatic negotiations which had been taking
place between the Secretary of State and the Japanese emissaries had
practically reached the breaking point. They knew that the Japanese
might resort to war at any moment. On the other hand, they knew that the
United States was not prepared for war and that every week or month of
delay would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very day 27
November 1941 the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Operations
of the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the President of the United
States, urging him to postpone any action that night precipitate war as
long as possible because we were not ready. Confronted with this
situation, those in authority in the War Department, including the
Secretary of War, participated in the preparation of this radiogram and
similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4056), which were sent to other
department commanders, and undertook to express as accurately as
possible the essential elements of this delicate situation, warning of
the possibility of an attack at any moment and
Page 266
that nothing must be omitted to jeopardize our defense. At the same time
they warned them of the importance of not doing anything that would
precipitate war on our part. This naturally presented a delicate
problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of the facts and
not because of any confusion of thought which was translated into the
language. There was no other course except to present this problem just
as it was to the responsible theater commander. In any delicate
situation conflicting factors are bound to exist. It is because it
requires wisdom and judgment to deal with them that only men supposedly
qualified are given posts of such responsibility. In any event, the
Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November, beginning "This is a war
warning", which General Gerow knew was being sent. (Tr., Gerow 4261-
4262)
As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note
Short's reply and to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer
ground. General Gerow admitted that while it was physically impossible
for him to check every message (Tr., Gerow 4288) and that he considered
the War Department gave Short adequate warning (Tr., Gerow 4300),
nevertheless he had erred by assuming that the reply of Short was to the
sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant General of 27 November. (Tr., Gerow
4290-4291) This being so, it follows that he failed also to follow up on
the demand in the radiogram of 2, November signed "Marshall", for a
report from Short. As to this, General Gerow testified:
"The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the
interval of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there were many other
important problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to
follow through, (Tr., Gerow 4290)"
[47] In fairness to General Gerow it should also be mentioned that
Colonel Bundy, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow in charge
of the Planning and Operational Group and had been handling the Pacific
matters. (Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291).
General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable for the
failure of his Division to function with the efficiency that would have
made impossible such an oversight. This is so even though the War Plans
Division is concerned with the operation of many theaters and although
its functions are not comparable to those of a commander of a theater
who, like a sentinel on post, is charged with specific responsibilities.
As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required
steps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii pursuant
to their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these
agreements for joint defensive action could be put into effect by the
two commanders in Hawaii when they deemed it advisable. (Tr., Gerow
4284, Kimmel 1759-1760, Short 4440) General Gerow assumed and had the
right to assume that, warned by the threat of hostile attack contained
in the 27 November message, the two commanders would put into effect the
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Tr., Gerow 4289), or at least such
portions therefore as would assure adequate reconnaissance
On the whole, I feel that the Board's criticism (a) of General Gerow in
failing to send Short the substance of the data delivered to him by G-2
is, in the light of after-events, to a degree justified.
Page 267
(Rep. 299) At least it was a precautionary measure which General Gerow
could well have taken. I agree too with the Board's conclusion (c) in so
far as it holds that General Gerow was culpable in failing to check on
Short's reply to the November 27 message signed "Marshall." I disagree
with the Board in its conclusion (b) that General Gerow in approving the
27 November message to Short failed to send a clear, concise directive.
As already indicated, I feel that this radiogram accurately and
adequately picture the situation as it existed and gave definite
instructions. I also disagree with the Board's conclusion (d) that
General Gerow failed to take the required steps to implement the
existing Joint Army and Navy War Plan. General Gerow was entitled to
believe that, warned as they were, the two commanders would themselves
put these plans into effect.
Miscellaneous Statements of Board:
Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary
Hull, are not in my opinion relevant to the Board's inquiry. My failure
to discuss such matters should not be regarded as indicating any
agreement with these conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to consider
such irrelevant matters in arriving at my conclusions.
[48] Unexplored Leads:
In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further
inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might
advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in
all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in
order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these
leads should be further explored. I do not mean to suggest that the
Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by
an individual officer familiar with the matter
In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters
in detail with the officer selected by you.
Recommendations:
As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the
conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous.
As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusions of
the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information
that he did, and (c) in not checking on Short's reply to the 27 November
message signed "Marshall." In my opinion these errors do not warrant
disciplinary action against General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the
error of his division in not checking short's reply, for which he
frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors and the fact that he
has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field command
indicate that his case is now far removed from disciplinary action.
As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep. 300)
that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of
readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting alert against
sabotage only; (b) in failing to reach or attempt to each an agreement
with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy
Plans for defense into operation; and (c) to inform himself on the
effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the
Navy. As to whether Short's culpability in
Page 268
the above respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense
suggesting trial by court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a)
above that Short in failing to put into operation the proper alert was
not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as of a serious error of
judgment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form of a
neglect of duty when the evidence shows that he considered his various
alternatives and came to the conclusion that Alert No. 1 was the proper
alert. The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take
into consideration certain factors such as that a surprise air attack
was the primary threat, or that he failed to subordinate certain other
factors such as possible alarm of the civil population does not remove
the case from the category of a mistake of judgment. These mistakes
simply led up to the error of judgment in establishing the wrong alert.
The fact also that he communicated to the War Department his decision to
establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent
with the concept of a neglect of duty.
[49] As to whether (b) Short's failure to reach or attempt to reach an
agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and
Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of duty in the nature of
being a triable offense, I am of the opinion that, on the testimony now
of record, this question is answered by what has been said above.
Short's failure stemmed from a mistake of judgment on his part.
As to the Board's conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in
failing to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance
reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, Short's defense would be, as
he indicated in the present proceedings, that such reconnaissance was a
Navy function. Whether he was entitled to rely upon the fact that the
Navy was conducting, to the best of its ability, such reconnaissance as
it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do not feel that it can be
made the basis of charges against General Short. I believe the truer
picture to be that General Short had adopted wholeheartedly what was
apparently the viewpoint of the Navy, namely, that there was literally
no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor.
Considering the matter of General Short's possible trial by court-
martial at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese are
still using some of the code systems in which various intercepted
messages were sent and that information of great military value
continues to be obtained from present day intercepts sent in these code
systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result in disclosing these
facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary court of
high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous witnesses
who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all over the
world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of war is
out of the question.
As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be
considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court would
adjudge. As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of
duty, or of his various duties, General Short would have the formidable
defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken
with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, but which should
have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the
Page 269
action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads me to the belief
that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case
of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim that
others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Conclusion 18, p.
21) There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President
Lincoln's refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross
error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p.
125-130) I am therefore forced to conclude that if General Short is
tried and if such trial should result in his conviction there is
considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge a sentence less than
dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond reprimand.
[50] As on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would convict or if
it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand, I am
inclined to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by L
trial should be made rather than to permit the case to linger on as a
current public irritation. I suggest therefore that a public statement
be made by you giving a brief review of the Board's proceedings And
pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment or
which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a
sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further
investigation should disclose a different situation the matter could
later be reexamined in the light of such additional evidence.
MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.
Page 270
[a] Memorandum for the Secretary of War
Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation, 14 September 1945
[1] 14 SEPTEMBER 194:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation
This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you pursuant to
your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to continue the Army Pearl
Harbor investigation, has submitted the affidavits obtained by him in
the course of his further investigation. The present memorandum is my
opinion as to whether my original memorandum to you, dated 25 November
1944, reviewing the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20
October 1944, requires modification either in respect of the conclusions
reached or the statements of fact contained therein drawn from the Army
Pearl Harbor Board report. In my opinion, the conclusions therein are in
no way affected by the additional data obtained by Colonel Clausen's
investigation. Certain statements of fact, however, made by me in my
prior memorandum, which statements I made as a result of my examination
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require clarification in some
respects.
The "Winds" Message:
On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the information
the War Department possessed and which Short claimed he did not receive,
the so-called "Winds Code" message of 20 November 1941 from Tokyo to
Japanese diplomatic representatives. This was to the effect that
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations),
a warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the
Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:
"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. Relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations:
NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)"
When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed.
It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a code
or signal to be given later, was received by the War Department around
20 November 1941. However, the testimony before the Army Pearl [2]
Harbor Board left in doubt whether a second or activating or execute
"Winds" message was ever received and if so by whom. The testimony of
Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24)
that an activating "Winds"
Page 271
message indicating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations had
been received was not entirely satisfactory. This is likewise true of
the testimony of Captain Safford, head of the Navy's Security Division,
to the same effect (my Memo. P. 24).
Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any
testimony that an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicating
breach of Japanese relations with either Great Britain, Russia or the
United States was ever received by the War Department. Thus, Colonel
Harold Doud, in charge of B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which
was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in November and December 1941,
stated:
"I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I
know there was no such execute message received in the War Department.
(Affid., Col. Harold Doud)"
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet,
testified no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor (affid.,
Capt. Edwin T. Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick,
Commander Rochefort's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was to the same effect.
(Memorandum of Comdr. J. S. Holtwick)
Colonel Rox W. Minckler, Signal Corps, in charge of Signal Intelligence
Service at the time, stated:
"I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character
either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such
message was sent. (Affid., Col. Rex W. Minckler)"
He said there were "one or two 'false alarms' ", which he discussed with
representatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in he Navy was
Captain L. F. Safford.
Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time did not recall
meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, at which
meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised him of Admiral
Noyes' telephone call that "The message is in." (See Memo., 25 November
1944, p. 24) General Miles stated: "To the best of my knowledge and
belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War
Department before the outbreak of hostilities." (Affid., Maj. Gen.
Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated that the Far Eastern Section
of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the activating "Winds"
message which was regarded as of vital concern. He stated there were
several [3] messages intercepted which were thought at first to be the
execute message but which turned out not to be authentic. He thought
that if there was any meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941,
it concerned an unauthentic message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles,
p. 2)
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes and
ciphers in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 941, stated
that when he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The message is in" (See
Vol. D., Top Secret testimony, p. 251), he did nothing further to
ascertain from Admiral Noyes or other persons the exact wording of the
intercept as he assumed that according to standard practice, it would be
transmitted without delay to G-2 (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler). In his
affidavit given to Colonel Clausen, Colonel Sadtler stated that after
talking to General Miles and
Page 272
Colonel Bratton about Admiral Noyes' message he went to his office and
typed a proposed warning as follows:
"C. G.-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with
Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a
repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."
However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy of it and
he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) According
to his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow and General
Bedell Smith about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not show them the
above-quoted draft but stated he did suggest that a warning message be
sent the overseas commanders as he testified before the Army Pearl
Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, p. 253). He reiterated this
testimony before Colonel Clausen (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1).
Neither General Gerow nor General Smith had any recollection of any such
conference with Colonel Sadtler or any such recommendation by him.
General Gerow pointed out quite appositely that Colonel Sadtler was
"purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the
dissemination and interpretation of 'Magic' " messages (Affid., General
Leonard Gerow). General Smith likewise has no recollection of Colonel
Sadtler discussing the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was
not on the very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters
of the "Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been
impossible for Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him.
(Affid., Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith)
[4] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen stated
that other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes message
(probably a "false alarm"), he had never seen any execute message to the
"Winds Code" and, so far as he knew, no such execute message was
received in the War Department. He at no time urged General Miles, G-2,
or any other representative of G-2 to send a warning message to overseas
commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis. K. Sadtler, p. 3)
I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses appearing
before Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into the Pearl Harbor matter,
denied the receipt of an authentic execute "Winds" message.
Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, in
1941, recalled a meeting 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel
Sadtler at which Colonel Sadtler presented the information he had
received from Admiral Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was instructed to get the
exact text from Admiral Noyes, as there had been several "false alarm"
reports to the same effect. So far as he knew, Colonel Sadtler never
returned to G-2 with the text or any additional information. Colonel
Bratton had no information about any alleged visit of Colonel Sadtler to
General Gerow or General Bedell Smith Colonel Bratton never brought
Colonel Sadtler's report to the attention of the Chief of Staff.
(Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2)
Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941 did he
ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code."
As to the testimony of Captain Safford of the Navy to the effect that
two copies of such a message were sent to the Army, Colonel Bratton
pointed out that not two but six copies of any such
Page 273
message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, the inference
being that no copies at all were sent. Prior to 7 December 1941,
representatives of the Navy had discussed with him several "false
alarms" relative to the "Winds" message but no one in the Navy or in G-2
ever discussed with him the message supposed to have been sent to the
Army according to Captain Safford's testimony. (Affid., Col. Rufus T.
Bratton)
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio
interception for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, prior
to 7 December 1941, testified that on receipt of the original "Winds"
message, [5] he directed the San Francisco interception station to be on
the watch for an activating message and to send it to him. To the best
of his knowledge, no execute message was ever picked up. (Affid., Col.
Robert E. Schukraft)
General Gerow's and General Bedell Smith's comment on Colonel Sadtler's
testimony relative to the alleged execute "Winds" message received from
Admiral Noyes has already been discussed. (See affidavits, Gen. Gerow,
p. 2; Gen. W. Bedell Smith, p. 3).
Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive Assistant to the
Chief, Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to Colonel
Clausen that the source of his information on all "Ultra" (or "Magic")
messages concerning Japan was Colonel Bratton and Major Dusenbury,
Colonel Bratton's assistant. He inquired of Colonel Bratton on several
occasions as to whether any execute message had come in under the "Winds
Code." He did not recall receiving any such information from Colonel
Bratton and stated that if he had received it, he would have remembered
it. No other person informed him of any such execute "Winds" message
prior to 7 December 1941 (Affid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts).
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel Clausen that
he had no recollection of having received any of the messages in Top
Secret Exhibit B (see my first memorandum of 25 November 1944, pp. 19-
23). He never got the "Winds Code" or any activating or implementing
message. He believed he had seen every "Ultra" message delivered to his
headquarters. (Affid., Gen. Douglas MacArthur) His Chief of Staff,
Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, testified to the same effect.
(Affid., Lt. Gen. Richard Sutherland) Major General C. A. Willoughby,
assistant Chief of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had never
seen any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated
fragments of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE
to his knowledge were advised of the "Winds Code" or of any execute
message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby)
Lieutenant-Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen that
immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian technical
assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic Unit, Signal
Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C., at present
Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, Signal Corps, War Department. In
the latter capacity, he made a search for an activating "Winds" message,
which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett)
[6] My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connection with the
testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the
Page 274
"Winds" message, discussed by me in my memorandum dated 25, November
1944, is that the most diligent search fails to reveal that any
activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received by the War
Department. In this connection, General Marshall's testimony will be
recalled, "I find that no officer of the Navy advised Gen. Miles or Col.
Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' Code had been received
by the Navy." (Vol. A, Top Secret Tr., Marshall, P. 38.)
The Rochefort Message:
In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Bratton's
testimony that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 4
December, from Tokyo to the Embassy at Washington, ordering destruction
of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General
Miles and General Gerow and after discussing it, recommended a further
warning or alert to our overseas commanders. General Gerow, felt that
sufficient warning had already been given and General Miles stated he
was in no position to overrule him. Colonel Bratton, however, still
feeling uneasy about the matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed it
with Commander McCollum, who felt as he did. McCollum stated that as
Commander Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the
Fourteenth Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first "Winds"
message and was listening for the second or implementing message, a
radiogram be sent to General Short's G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander
Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton thereupon drafted a radiogram signed
"Miles," which was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-
2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, reading as follows:
"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather."
No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor Board Report
or in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was informed of the
above message. However, realizing its importance, Colonel Clausen in his
subsequent investigation examined General Fielder, Short's G-2, and
Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant G-2, as to whether this radiogram was
received and what action was taken. General Fielder testified he had no
recollection of ever having seen this radiogram (Affid., Brig. Gen.
Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2).
As to the likelihood of the "Winds" information being sent to him by the
Navy, independently of the so-called Rochefort message, General Fielder
testified:
"[7] My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of
their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the
passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and
myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No
information was given to me by anyone m the Navy, which indicated in any
way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or
contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely
strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to
predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii. (Affid., Brig. Gen.
Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2.)"
General Fielder further said:
"No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies
except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believe the
Pa
Page 275
cific Fleet Intelligence section to have excellent information of the
Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to
know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I
know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from
intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example captain
Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have
divulged the source but in fact, would have given some different
derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian
Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to
defend the Pearl Harbor Naval base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-
aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops, and the 7th Air Force as the
weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive
action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for
Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7 1941 the Intelligence
Officer of 7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley was in liaison with and received some
information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence,
but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did
not come to me and I didn't now of the liaison until after the war
started. (Affid. Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 8 p. 2.)"
General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the
Japanese messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included he
"Winds" message (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 19-23)
(Affid., Brig. Gen. Fielder, par. 11, p. 3).
Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the
Contact Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained very
close [8] liaison with Commander Rochefort and knew prior to Pearl
Harbor Day that the latter was engaged in intercepting and decrypting
Japanese messages. During the latter part of November, 1941, he learned
that the Navy had intercepted the Japanese message containing the "Winds
Code." He took immediate action to have the local Federal Communications
Commission agency monitor for the execute message, which was not
received (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 1). His attention was
again called to the Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941 he saw on
General (then Colonel) Fielder's desk the radiogram from General Miles
to contact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General
Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) Colonel
Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the
pertinent information and was told that Commander Rochefort was
monitoring for the execute message. This information was also given to
Mr. Robert L. Shivers, in charge of the FBI in Honolulu.
The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of the
Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, who assisted in sending the
Rochefort message, contains hearsay statements to the effect that
"Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had"
(including the "Winds" message), the source of which as Navy personnel
whose identity he could not recall. His undisclosed Navy sources were
also authority for his statement that Commander Rochefort's crypto-
analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring for intercepts, breaking and
translating the codes and that the Army in Hawaii would receive all this
information. He said he sent the Rochefort message on 5 December merely
as a precautionary measure. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew)
Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the time, does
not mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. Apparently,
however, the Navy had guardedly advised him of this
Page 276
message or its equivalent prior to 7 December. Thus, he said Captain
Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, told him he was
aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a break in Japanese
relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would inform Shivers
of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed this information
on to Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him the code signal.
(Affid., Robert L. Shivers)
Mr. Shivers testified:
"(Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he
disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until
after 7 December. ( Affid., Robert L. Shivers )"
There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel
Bicknell.
[9] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Rochefort's affidavit
indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to him, specifically
denied that he received it. General Fielder stated:
"I fell [sic] sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell,
who according to his own statement did receive information from
Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and
not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no
idea that Lt. Col Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted
Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to
me direct. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 3)"
General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he received
the "Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his general denial
of the receipt of information other than that he admitted he received.
In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show
conclusively that the "Winds Code" message as such reached General Short
personally either through the medium of liaison between the Navy and the
Army Intelligence Sections in Hawaii or as a result of the Rochefort
message. Whether Short received equivalent information will now be
considered.
Other Information Possessed by General Short:
I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the Navy Board,
testified that had he gotten General Marshall's 7 December radiogram
prior to the attack, it might have been a different story. In answer to
a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert,
he said:
"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there,
about the destruction of the code machines. *The other matter wouldn't
have made much of an impression on me*. But when you destroy your codes
or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have
had this advantage also I could have asked him the significance to him.
But leaving that out, *the destruction of the code machine could have
been very significant to me*. I would have been very much more alarmed
about that than the other matter. * * * I would have taken the
destruction of the code machine very seriously. (Italics supplied)"
It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short
obtained equivalent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly
others. In my memorandum of 25 November 1944 (p 10, 19, 30), I referred
to General Fielder's and Colonel Bicknell's testimony that they had
information prior to 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu
was [10] "destroying its codes and burning its secret papers," which
information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell
Page 277
meant war. This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the attention of
General Short's staff conference on the morning of 6 December, a
conference presided over by General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel
Phillips. (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 10, 19) Colonel Phillips stated
he brought it to the attention of General Short (Memo. 25 November 1944,
p. 19).
The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. Shivers,
the FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified that on 3
December 1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the
Navy, called him, asking him if he could verify information that the
Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers.
About two hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone message between
the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu, during
which the cook stated that the Consul General was "burning and
destroying all his important papers." Shivers immediately gave this
information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise
telegraphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and
destroying all important papers." Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers'
statement that on 28 November 1941 he received a radiogram from Mr.
Hoover to the effect that peace negotiations between the United States
and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as
anything was liable to happen. Shivers gave this information to Captain
Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, who stated they had already received
similar information from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid.,
Robert L. Shivers)
General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the
destruction by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes and
papers" was related by Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference on 6
December 1941. General Fielder testified, "I gave this latter
information to General Short the same day." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall
J. Fielder, p. 3)
Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned from
Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese
diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Manila, and elsewhere. This apparently was radio OpNav No. 031850, dated
3 December 1941, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval District, Commandant, 16th Naval
District, reading as follows:
"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent
instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular
posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London
to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other
important confidential and secret documents. (Top Secret Vol. C,
Safford, p. 183)"
[11] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col. Bicknell,
p. 2)
About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr.
Shivers, and told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning
the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls." (Affid.,
Col. Bicknell, p. 2)
He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent
formation which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of
Page 278
such papers had a very serious intent and that something war like by
Japan was about to happen somewhere. He had previously prepared and
signed weekly estimates given to the Chief of Staff to the same effect.
(Vol. 30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, p. 3684-3685) Colonel
Bicknell also testified further relative to giving General Fielder and
General Short the Dr. Mori message intercepted by the FBI on 6 December
1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944 p. 11). Their reaction was
as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell:
"Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too
"intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be
quite in order and that it was nothing to be excited about. My
conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively
brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.
"Following 7 December I met General Short while waiting to testify
before the Roberts commission. We were alone and at that time he stated
to me words to the effect "Well Bicknell, I want you to know that
whatever happens you were right and I was wrong." (Affid. Col. George w.
Bicknell, p. 3)"
It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to
Pearl Harbor Day by General Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel Bicknell,
or all three, of current intelligence reports and, in particular, that
the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers. In the
interest of strict accuracy, however, I must mention statements made by
me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memorandum, based on the Army
Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and Assistant G-2 had
information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was destroying its codes
and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this information, does not
mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states the Consul General
was "burning and destroying all his important papers." To most people,
this would mean codes, since it is well known Consulates possess codes,
which are in paper form. Colonel Bicknell evidently so interpreted it,
judging from his statement that he evaluated the Dr. Mori message (See
Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11) in the light of the information he had
received concerning the destruction by Jap Consuls of their "codes and
papers." This is confirmed by General Fielder's testimony that Colonel
Bicknell told the Staff Conference 6 December 1941 that the Jap Consul
was [12] burning his "codes and papers. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J.
Fielder, p. 3)
Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy the
information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was destroying
his codes. As distinguished from other papers, the fact that he was
destroying his secret papers and not some but all such papers at that
juncture of world affairs is entitled to great weight in considering
whether General Short had adequate knowledge of the true Japanese-
American situation. While it may be said that codes are technically
different from secret papers, or "papers," of the Jap Consulate, and
Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are quite different as
sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact remains that to
an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the destruction
of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important papers" by the
Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had extreme
significance.
The Manila Warning Message:
This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colonel G. H.
Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies
Page 279
& Co., Honolulu, one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an
employee of the Davies Company, and the British Consul in Honolulu.
Colonel Wilkinson was a member by marriage of the Davies family and was
secretly working for the British Government as a secret agent in Manila.
The cablegram received by the Davies Company in Honolulu the night of 3
December read as follows:
"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following
developments in Indo-China: .
"A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.
"2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops
and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75
mm).
"B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed
Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
"C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages [sic] early
hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to
attack Russia at present but will act in South.
"You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence
Honolulu."
[13] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, President of
Theodore H. Davies & Company, canceled a considerable volume of orders
for delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cablegram was given to
Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers, head of the FBI in
Honolulu, and Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer of the
Navy. (Statement of Mr. John E. Russell and exhibit)
Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his
undercover activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, the
British Vice Consul in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the Davies
Company. Colonel Wilkinson arranged with him in July of 1941 to give him
information through Mr. Dawson. Mr. Shivers said his files indicated his
receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 1941 from Colonel Wilkinson.
Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that time G-2 of the Philippine
Department, knew of Wilkinson and of his activities.
Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Manila
cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the information
contained in it to General Short. (Amendment to affidavit of Col. George
W. Bicknell)
In addition to the cablegram above referred to, Colonel Bicknell stated
he obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through Colonel
Wilkinson, which he brought to the attention of General Short in one
form or another. (Amend. Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell) A file of this
information is attached to Colonel Clausen's report. General Fielder was
shown this file. Some few items struck a responsive chord in his memory,
but he could not remember if they were brought to his attention prior to
7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to his
attention, according to General Fielder. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, p. 3)
It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the
highly important information contained in the 3 December cablegram from
Manila. The same comment is applicable to the 27 November cablegram from
Colonel Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice Consul, which stated:
"Japanese will attack Krakow [sic] Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat
Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to
getting between Bangkok and Singapore."
Page 280
A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, and
Captain Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the information
he gave to Short "in one form or another." (Amend affid., Col. George W.
Bicknell)
[14] British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell:
These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate
by Colonel Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at
Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr.
Shivers of the FBI, and Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer
of the Navy, are too voluminous to be discussed in detail. In the
aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing of growing tension
in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports found its
way into Colonel Bicknell's estimates of the Japanese situation, which
he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affid., Col. George W.
Bicknell)
Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN:
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl Harbor
disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He testified
to Colonel Clausen that about three months prior to 7 December 1941 the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force,
Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Raley, came to him and requested various
items of intelligence. About ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December
1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel Raley certain top secret intelligence,
without, however, disclosing its origin, which included the "Winds Code"
message and information tending to show a general movement of Japanese
naval forces to the South. When the Army proposed to make photographic
reconnaissance of the Japanese Mandated islands in November, 1941, he
held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley about the matter. From
time to time when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel,
he was called to present the intelligence picture to them. (Affid.,
Capt. Edwin T. Layton, USS ) According to Colonel Raley, his contacts
with Captain Layton were limited to about six conversations with him
over the entire year 1941, the last in October, 1941. He told Captain
Layton and Colonel Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at
any moment. This was in October, 1941. They apparently shared his view.
He also reported this to General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley)
Comment on Information Which Reached General Short:
In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the information
as to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short and additional
information possessed by the War Department which was not sent him, I
said:
"* * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had,
Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander
that there was an outside threat against which he should make
preparations. (P. 30)"
Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortified me in my conclusions above
stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even date, subject
"Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a further discussion
on this subject.
Page 281
[15] Short's SOP Against Attack: In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, I
stated:
"Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent
General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three
alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of
field positions, Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not
sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in
Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and
uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without."
It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual
alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further
that in paragraph 14 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the
earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly
recognized the necessity for preparation for "*a surprise hostile
attack*." (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64.) (Italics supplied.)"
As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on receipt of the
radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 1941, within half an
hour ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described as a defense against
sabotage "with no threat from without." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In
response to so much of General Marshall's radiogram as ordered him to
"report measures taken," he sent the short reply "Department alerted to
prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13)
Short testified that his SOP of 5 November 1941 was sent to the War
Department on that date or about that time (Tr., Short, p. 431, Vol. S).
Under this SOP, Alert No. 1 was against sabotage only. Apparently
Short's present contention is that in advising the War Department by
radiogram that the Department was alerted against sabotage, he brought
home to the War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his SOP of 5
November 1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431)
Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that
Short transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Department on or
around that date. The best evidence indicates that it was not received
in the War Department until March of 1942. Colonel Clarence G. Jensen,
A. C., was specially deputized to make a careful investigation to
ascertain the date of receipt by the War Department of this document. He
searched in the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division,
and the Army Air Forces, and made specific inquires of those likely to
have any knowledge of the matter. His search indicated that no such SOP
was received by the War Department until March, 1942. A letter from the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29
January 1942, transmitting the SOP to the War Department bears a receipt
dated 10 March 1942. (Affid., Col. Clarence G. Jensen)
Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the 14th Part of the
Japanese Intercept of 6-7 December 1941:
[16] Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by me to you of
even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's investigation
of the above matter. No further comment is deemed necessary in this
place.
Conclusion:
My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 relative
to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall,
Page 282
General Gerow and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in the light
of Colonel Clausen's investigation. I find nothing in Colonel Clausen's
investigation which leads me to modify these conclusions. The
statements of fact made in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon
the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that Board's
report, are clarified and modified in accordance with the present
memorandum.
MYRON C. CRAMER
Major General
The Judge Advocate General.
1 Include: Copy memo from TJAG to S/W, "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl
Harbor Board."
Page 283
[a] Memorandum for The Secretary Of War
Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board) 14 September 1945
[1] 14 SEPTEMBER 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR
Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board
This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was
classified as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was
classified as Top secret and consisted of one volume. I have examined
the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence obtained by
Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his investigation and feel
that as a result thereof certain statements of fact contained in the Top
Secret Report require modification.
In its Top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and on page
16:
"Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our
potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the
United States and Japan was in possession of the State War and Navy
Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a
reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions and
were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that
were scheduled by them against the United States. Therefore, Washington
was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions.
"This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in
November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for
resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of
breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the
eventualities of war.
"The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave
only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the
Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the "Do-Don't"
message of November 27 1941. It would have been possible to have sent
safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in
Hawaii or positive directives could have been formulated to put the
Department on Alert No. 3.
"This was not done.
"Under the circumstances where information has a vital bearing upon
actions to be taken by field commanders and [2] this information cannot
be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is
incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for
specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to
the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete
responsibility upon the competent field commanders.
"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The
disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that
its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The
difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from
the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert
them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly
aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the
right alert.
"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either
to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it. (Pp. 1 & 2)
"Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December
6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our
State, War, and
Page 284
Navy Departments in all of their Top ranks indicating precisely the
intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of
the attack. (P 16)"
The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this
information." I have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board
in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation and find that they
should be revised in accordance with the new and additional evidence.
These revisions include the following:
As to information available to the War Department, the Board set forth
on page 2:
"Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from
September to December 1941. The record shows almost daily information as
to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.
"1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had
been fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive
military operations. (R. 86) "
The reference "(R. 86)" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts of
the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These consist of
volumes A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for the record
reference in its report, a quotation by General Russell from a document
as follows:
"[3] On the 24th of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo
time was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations
of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements
for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin
on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds."
The document from which General Russell quoted was the record of the
Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from April to June,
1944, for the Secretary of the Navy. The testimony read by General
Russell was an excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. Safford, USN. A
more detailed examination of this testimony shows that it was in reality
the interpretation by Captain Safford of a Japanese intercept message
which was translated on 22 November 1941, being a message from Tokyo to
the Japanese Embassy at Washington. This message authorized the Japanese
envoys to extend the time for signing an agreement with the United
States from 25 November to 29 November and it stated that the latter
time was the absolute deadline and "after that, things are automatically
going to happen."
The War Department did not send this specific information to the
Hawaiian Department.
It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional
testimony of Captain Safford to the effect that "Hawaii was out of our
minds."
The Board further found:
"On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese'
intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United
States. (R. 87) (P2)
"* * * On November 26th specific information received from the Navy
indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United
States. (R. 123-124) * * * (P 5)"
This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by General
Russell to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference "(R. 123-
124)" is to the testimony of Captain Safford before the Army Pearl
Harbor Board. He was asked by a member of the Board as to the source of
the information which he mentioned in his testi-
Page 285
mony to Admiral Hart. He stated that he could not then recollect the
source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had information
that Japan contemplated offensive action against England and the United
States and probably against Russia. He gave as a basis for this
information his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 25392, which was
a circular message from Tokyo on 19 November 1941. Reference to
additional testimony of Captain Safford set forth on page 125 shows that
what he had in mind was the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" message.
[4] Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that this information reached
Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, the latter part of November
1941.
Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department,
testified before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November,
1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded this Japanese
"Winds Code." He took immediate action to monitor in Hawaii for the
execute message. He further testified that his attention was again
called to the "Winds Code" when he saw on the desk of General Fielder a
warning message from G-2, War Department, dated 5 December 1941, asking
that the G-2, Hawaiian Department, communicate with Commander Rochefort
immediately regarding weather broadcasts from Tokyo. This obviously
refers to the "Winds code." Colonel Bicknell further testified that he
also received information of the "Winds Code" broadcasts from Mr. Robert
L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and information that
Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, Pearl
Harbor, was also monitoring for the execute message.
Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and General
Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, had established and
maintained liaison pertaining to their respective functions, and that he
gave General Fielder such information as he had received concerning
intercepts and Japanese diplomatic messages, and concerning other
information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly
interested, and which came to his knowledge in the course of his duties.
The information thus given to General Fielder during the latter part of
November, 1941, included the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept.
The Board found:
"* * * War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff On November 26 that
the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of
the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action. (Pp. 2
& 3)"
The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton
as he read from a summary called "A Summary of Far Eastern Documents"
which he prepared in the Fall of 1943. The pertinent portion reads as
follows:
"G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a
concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after
moving from Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air
and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands. (P 87)"
This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 7
December 1941.
[5] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Layton, Captain
Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Com-
Page 286
mander Holtwick, of the Navy, in the additional investigation indicates
the probability that General Short was advised of the presence of
Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The Fleet Intelligence
Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, Hawaiian
Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet Intelligence
Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent information of the
increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls. The Navy Combat
Intelligence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Harbor primarily engaged
in intercepting, decrypting and analyzing radio traffic of the Japanese
navy. The Daily Radio Intelligence Summaries distributed by the Combat
Intelligence Officer, during November and continuing down to 7 December,
indicated considerable Japanese military activity in the Mandates and
concentrations of Japanese naval forces in the Marshalls. (See
documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's Report.)
The Board found:
"On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources
that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but
would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87.) (P. 3.)"
This again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford in the Admiral
Hart examination. General Russell read from this while questioning
Colonel Bratton, as follows:
"General RUSSELL. Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the
December 1st message, Colonel.
"Colonel BRATTON. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General * * *
(P. 88.)"
Colonel Clausen's investigation has shown that the basis for this
statement of Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that the
Navy received, i. e., the Navy Department intercept of the "Winds Code"
message and a message from Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving the substance
of the "Winds Code" intercept and stating that by this means Japan would
notify her consuls of war decision, and another message to the same
general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at Batavia, to the State
Department. Mr. Foote also stated: "I attached little or no importance
to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such have been coming since
1936."
As shown above, the "Winds Code" information was available in the
Hawaiian Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not definite
information that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United
States.
[6] The Board stated:
"The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions
as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that
Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was
construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280.) * * * (P. 3.)"
Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned from
Navy sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic
representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila and
elsewhere, had been instructed to destroy their codes and papers, and
that he was shown a wire from the Navy Department dated 3 December 1941,
reading as follows:
"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent
instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular
posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to
destroy
Page 287
most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn all other important
confidential and secret documents.
Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the time
Colonel Bicknell received this information it was discussed with
Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Intelligence
Unit in Honolulu; and that Mr. Shivers told him that the FBI in Honolulu
had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate in
Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General there was
burning his papers. The additional evidence also shows that on the
morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Conference conducted by
General Short's Chief of Staff, those assembled were given this
information. General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen that he
was present at the Staff Conference and that on 6 December 1941 he gave
to General Short the information that the Japanese Consul at Honolulu
had destroyed his codes and papers. (Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of
Staff, also gave this information to Short.) General Fielder further
testified that he gave General Short any pertinent information that came
to his attention.
The Board further stated:
"As Colonel Bratton summed it up:
"The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning
officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the
Chef of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it
was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not
months." (R. 243-244.) (P. 3.)
"[7] * * * All the information that the War Department G-2 had was
presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning
agencies of the Government. These officials included Secretary of State,
Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division.
In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was
presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them
abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297) (P 3)"
The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given by
Colonel Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen. However,
Colonel Bratton corrected his previous testimony and asked that his
prior testimony be modified in accordance with his testimony to Colonel
Clausen. He stated that his testimony to Colonel Clausen represented a
better recollection than when he previously testified. He had previously
testified that the intercepts, of the character mentioned and which were
contained in the Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Board, had been
delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of
State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and
the Assistant Chief of Staff. G-2. But in testifying before Colonel
Clausen, he stated that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy
what material was delivered to whom during the period in question, and
that there were no records to show who delivered or who received the
material. He had also previously testified that he personally delivered
these intercepts to the officials mentioned. But in his testimony to
Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as to such deliveries as were made, the
deliveries were made not only by himself, but also by then Lieutenant
Colonel or Major Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.
The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore,
must be revised in accordance with the corrected testimony of Colonel
Bratton. Similarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4:
"All of this important information which was supplied to higher
authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department
did not go out to
Page 288
the field with the possible exception of the general statements in
occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the
higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302)"
The reference "(R. 302)" is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton which
hence must be revised in accordance with his corrected testimony given
to Colonel Clausen, and in accordance with the new evidence uncovered by
Colonel Clausen as to the information sent to General Short and
available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December.
The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton to
the effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Japanese
were under instructions to destroy their codes and code machines, he
asked [8] General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders
and that General Gerow replied, "Sufficient had been sent." Following
this, according to the testimony of Colonel Bratton, he conferred with
Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent, on 5 December 1941, a
message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort
concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."
General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not recall
the incident, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his action
inadequate, he could quite properly have reported the facts to his
superior who had direct access to General Gerow and to the Chief of
Staff, in a matter of such importance.
The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general type of information
which, according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Washington
during November and December 1941. This included the information already
mentioned that Tokyo, on 22 November, informed the Washington Japanese
Embassy that the deadline for signing an agreement, first fixed for 25
November, was extended to 29 November; and also information available at
Washington on 28 November in the form of an intercept of a message by
Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, advising that there was hardly any
possibility of the United States considering the "proposal" in toto, and
that if the situation remained as tense as it then was, negotiations
would inevitably be ruptured, if, indeed, they might not already be
called so, and that "our failure and humiliation are complete" and
suggesting that the rupture of the present negotiations did not
necessarily mean war between the Japanese and the United States but
would be followed by military occupation of the Netherlands's Indies by
the United States and the English which would make war inevitable. The
proposal referred to was the reply given the Japanese envoys on 26
November 1941 by the Secretary of State. The Board further referred to
information available to the War Department on 5 December, as related by
Colonel Sadtler, relative to the "false alarm" execute message to the
"Winds Code."
None of the above information was given to General Short before 7
December. However, the Secretary of War has, in his public statement of
29 August 1945, and analyzed and shown the substantial nature of the
information which the War Department sent to General Short. [sic]
Colonel Clausen's investigation also shows that a great deal of
additional information was available initially to General Short in the
Hawaiian Department, which was not given to the War Department, on the
general subject of the tense and strained relations between Japan and
the United States and warnings of war.
Page 289
The British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain
Mayfield, and Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelligence
reports. Colonel Clausen has collected these as documentary evidence [9]
which is mentioned in his report to the Secretary of War. One such
dispatch from Manila, given to these three persons in Honolulu on 4
December 1941, set forth prophetically:
"Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities
with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia
at present but will act in South."
The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese
diplomatic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese
execute message to the "Winds Code," or some equivalent message.
In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long
period of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the
Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of
these are included in the documentary evidence attached to Colonel
Clausen's report.
Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio
traffic out of the Japanese Consulate.
Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian
Department G-2 contained much material gathered from observers,
travelers, and Washington sources, which, together with the other
intelligence and information mentioned, was evaluated and disseminated
by the G-2 sections of the Hawaiian Department. These are mentioned by
Colonel Clausen in his report to the Secretary of War. Some are
initialed by General Short.
Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated on 17
and 25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic accuracy, the
probable moves of Japan.
General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War Department
cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the reason that
they were duplicates of information made available to him in Hawaii, and
that his cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI
was most complete. (See Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 6.)
General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional
investigation, "it was well known that relations with Japan were
severely strained and that war seemed imminent."
Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short the
specific intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his
Hawaiian command similar information. The reasons why the War Department
did not send the actual intercepts were, according to witnesses before
Colonel [10] Clausen that this type of information and its source, of
necessity, had to be guarded most carefully, and that its dissemination
to the overseas commanders would have included not only General Short
but also all the overseas commanders and that this, in itself, would be
dangerous from a security standpoint since it would spread the
information into too many hands. There as been considerable evidence
given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as General Marshall testified
before Colonel Clausen,
"* * * Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives
would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence
mentioned had been so compromised."
Page 290
The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General
Douglas MacArthur, who had received the same general War Department
information as General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen,
"Dispatches from the war Department gave me ample and complete
information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in
the Philippines on a war basis which was done prior to 7 December 1941."
The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance
information that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should be
observed, however, that in addition to the intercepts received by the
War Department which are contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the
Board, there were others which, in retrospect and with the benefit of
hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl Harbor. These intercepts
were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at
Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship movements in Pearl Harbor
according to a pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. The requests of
Tokyo increased and the reports by Honolulu were made with more
frequency and in greater detail as 7 December approached. Two
intercepts, which were not decrypted and translated until 8 December,
were part of the series mentioned. These were not included in the Top
Secret Exhibit given the Board. They were sent 6 December by the
Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo Japanese Numbers 253 and 254. The
two in question, Nos. 253 and 254, are attached to Colonel Clausen's
report to the Secretary of War. These latter, Colonel Clausen's
investigation shows, were apparently intercepted at San Francisco and
transmitted to Washington by teletype on 6 or 7 December. They were not
in the code which had the highest priority for immediate attention, and
the teletype between San Francisco and Washington was not in operation
until the night of 6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so,
time elapsing between receipt at Washington and dissemination in
readable English form (2 days) was less than the normal time required of
3.5 days.
There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from which
he could have inferred that Pearl Harbor would be the attack target in
the event of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows [11]
that the Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain information from commercial
traffic sources shortly before 7 December. These arrangements included
an opportunity to the Navy for obtaining the commercial cable traffic of
the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu. Some of this traffic included the
same types of reports as were intercepted and forwarded to Washington
concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. It is not entirely clear just
what commercial traffic was decrypted and transmitted by the Navy at
Honolulu before 7 December. While similar reports were being made to
Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner,
attempted to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports
from Honolulu were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo
and made by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing frequency
as 7 December approached, and were made according to the pre-arranged
division of Pearl Harbor.
The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese "Winds Code" at
pages 6 and 17. On page 6 the Board referred to testimony of Colonel
Sadtler that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of
Page 291
Naval Communications, called him and stated the execute message had been
intercepted. Colonel Sadtler then conferred with General Miles and
Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen's investigation it appears that
Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, who conducted for
the Secretary of the Navy the same type of investigation Colonel Clausen
conducted for the Secretary of War, stated that he did not recall having
so informed Colonel Sadtler. Colonel Sadtler testified before Colonel
Clausen that he did not follow up the information given by Admiral Noyes
on 5 December and that to his knowledge this was not done by anyone else
at the time. He assumed that the Navy would send to the Army the actual
intercept which was before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned.
Captain Safford had testified before the Board that on 4 December he saw
a Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the Japanese
"Winds Code", and that two copies were sent to the Army. Colonel
Clausen's investigation discloses no evidence that the Army ever
received any such copies and I understand the testimony of Captain
Safford has been qualified considerably by testimony of himself and
other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt.
Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference that
the Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the "Winds Code" or
some equivalent warning code, and that this was intercepted by the
British Intelligence Service and formed the basis for the dispatch from
London to Manila, and, in turn from Manila to Honolulu mentioned above.
This dispatch was disseminated to the British Intelligence Service sub-
agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A complete file of the dispatches from
the British Intelligence Service, and available to the Hawaiian
Department at Honolulu, and the British response to Colonel Clausen's
query as to the basis for the dispatch of 4 December, are contained in
the documentary evidence collected by Colonel Clausen and attached to
his report.
[12] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow and General
Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings by the Board based
on the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that he asked General Gerow and
General Smith to send more warning to the overseas commanders. Colonel
Sadtler also testified before Colonel Clausen, as follows:
"I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in
affidavits given Colonel Clausen dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15
June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board
as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941.
I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith contained in
the affidavit mentioned are correct statements of fact wherein they set
forth as follows concerning this subject:
"General GEROW: "I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel
Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was
purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the
dissemination or interpretation of Magic. I would naturally expect that
enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention
and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps Officer. To the best of my
recollection I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification
from any source of implementing message to the Japanese Winds Code.' If
I had received such a message or notice thereof I believe I would now
recall the fact in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel
Sadtler told me of an unverified report or that he had received some
tentative information which was subject to confirmation, In any event,
there should be written
Page 292
evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact,
which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this
time, especially since so many major events have intervened."
"General SMITH: "I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he
has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a
difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S.,
War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of
Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority,
and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to
intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at
that time an 'Ultra' officer, and it would have been impossible for him
to give me any information to support his contention that I should step
out of my rather minor province." P 2—Affidavit of Colonel O. K.
Sadtler.)"
From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred that the
Board meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War Department
Rochefort message of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian Department, because [13]
of receipt of an execute message to the "Winds Code." But Colonel
Bratton has testified that the reason which prompted him to recommend
this warning was information derived from other intercepts to the effect
that the Japanese were destroying their codes and important papers. The
Board, also on page 7, referring to the G-2 warning message of 5
December, set forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian
Department, that he got no such message. In his testimony before Colonel
Clausen, however, General Fielder stated:
"* * * I have no recollections of having received the War Department
radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it
over to Lt. Col. Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort
and had very close liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval
District Intelligence Officer: particularly since the way the radio was
worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. * * *"
Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on about 5
December he saw the War Department message on the desk of General
Fielder and that he then communicated with Commander Rochefort to
ascertain the pertinent information and was advised that Commander
Rochefort was also monitoring for the execute message of the "Winds
Code."
It should be borne in mind that the execute message to the "Winds Code"
was to notify the Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives of a
crisis with the United States, Great Britain or Russia and to instruct
the Japanese representatives to burn their codes and secret papers. The
Japanese later sent the same information to their diplomatic and
consular representatives by other and more direct means. This latter
information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investigation, was
available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 1941.
On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several
findings concerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese
message from Tokyo to the envoys in Washington. The Board concludes:
"Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and
10:30 p m., December 6, as follows:
"To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff
in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238.) He told
Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers
and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the
bag and see the contents. (R. 307)
Page 293
"To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing
the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his
presence. (R 239-241.) He stated that [14] General Miles did nothing
about it as far as he knows. (R. 241.) This record shows no action by
General Miles.
"Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's
executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238.)
"He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State
Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30
p. m.
"Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had
urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with
General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General
Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part
of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of
Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning."
(Pp. 11, 12.)
"To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the
record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final
reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely
translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7
and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately ____
Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of
the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a
locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of
Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to the General
Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most vital importance
to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with
whom it was discussed, and to the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War
Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this
information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at
hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally
delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty officer.
"General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as
vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date
by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows. (P. 16.)
"These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new
evidence. The basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel
Bratton. In testifying before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave
the Board incorrect testimony; that the only set of the 13 parts he
delivered on the night of 6 December was to the duty officer for the
Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans
Division, were not delivered the night of 6 December; that these sets
were not given the night of 6 December to General Gerow, General Smith
on [15] General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the
message with General Miles on 6 December; and that he did not know how
the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession the morning of 7
December. Colonel Bratton claimed that on the night of 6 December he had
asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set to the home of the Chief of
Staff. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that he
received the messages the night of 6 December but did not deliver any
until after 9:00 a. m., on the morning of 7 December. Colonel Dusenbury
stated Colonel Bratton went home before the 13 parts were entirely
received.
"On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also
invited to the testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General
Smith and General Miles From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears
that General Gerow and General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts
before the morning of 7 December. General Miles testified that he became
aware accidentally of the general contents of the 13 parts the evening
of 6 December. He was dining at the home of his opposite number in the
Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardall, the President's Aide,
brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to
General Miles.
"The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton
telephoned General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a. m. the morning of 7
December to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the
Japanese messages directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part
message at 1:00 p. M., 7 December, and to destroy their code machines.
The Board further finds that General Marshall did not come into his
office until 11:25 a. m.
"These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light
of additional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified
before
Page 294
Colonel Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of
Staff, which [sic] would be in the office of the chief of Staff "between
10:30 and 11:30 that morning." Major General John R. Deane testified
before Colonel Clausen that on the morning of 7 December he and Colonel
Bratton did not arrive at the Munitions Building until between 9:00 and
9:30 a. m. General Miles testified before Colonel Clausen that he
conferred with General Marshall the morning of 7 December in his office
at about 11:00 a. m. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen
that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the reply to the
United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December, was not received by Colonel
Bratton until "after he arrived that morning, between 9:00 and 10:00 a.
m."
The Board further found:
"There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December
4 and December 6 the imminence of war on the following Saturday and
Sunday, December 6 and 7 was [16] clear-cut and definite. (P. 15)"
The evidence does not seem to justify any such conclusion. There was not
received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December any information
which indicated that war would take place on Saturday or Sunday, 6 and 7
December. It is true that on the night of 6 December the War Department
received the intercepted text of thirteen parts of the fourteen-part
reply of the Japanese Government to the proposal of the United States,
but this at most suggested a possible breach of diplomatic relations at
some time in the near future, which may or may not have been followed by
war. The only other information that was received between 4 and 6
December of significance, in addition to what had already been
transmitted to General Short, was information received on 4 December
that certain Japanese diplomatic and consular posts had been instructed
to destroy certain codes. As I have heretofore pointed out, this
information was fully available to General Short from his own sources in
Hawaii. The intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be
delivered at 1:00 p. m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as
heretofore pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and
it itself was not a "clear-cut and definite" indication that war would
occur at that time. The Board further found:
"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese
were planning to do was known to the United States except the final
message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part
together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock
on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on
Pearl Harbor. (P. 18)"
This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known that the
Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, this is
not the fact. There is no justification in the evidence for such a
statement.
This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in the
Top Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what General
Short has since testified was information he should have received.
General Short testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the
message which General Marshall attempted to send to him the morning of 7
December, referred to by the Board on page 17. He testified that he
would have gone into a different alert if General Marshall had given him
this message by telephone. General Short testified in response to a
question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert:
Page 295
"[17] I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there
about the destruction of the code machines. _The _other _matter
_wouldn't _have _made _much _of _an _impression _on _me. (Underscoring
supplied.)"
As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short from
his own sources in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941 information that the
Japanese Government had sent orders to various diplomatic and consular
posts to destroy certain of its codes and important papers.
The "other matter" referred to was the information which General
Marshall included in his message which read as follows:
"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we
do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of
this communication.
My Conclusion:
The views expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based
upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and its
reports, should be considered modified in accordance with the views
expressed herein.
MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/12/96 Updated: 12/12/96