Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the
United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic
Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291
Introductory statement ........................................ 291
Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to
the Atlantic Conference ..................................... 293
The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) .................. 300
President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and
at the same time offers to resume the Japanese-American
conversations (August 17, 1941) ............................. 302
Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia
(August 27, 1941) ........................................... 305
Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt
urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) .... 306
IX C O N T E N T S
Appendix D-Continued Page
Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307
President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message
(September 3, 1941) ........................................... 310
Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311
Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference"
(August-September, 1941) ....................................... 314
Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions
in the negotiations with the United States
(September 6, 1941) ........................................... 316
The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals
(October 2, 1941) ............................................. 319
Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war
between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to
war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the
Tripartite Pact (October 1941) ................................ 325
The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission
to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5,
1941) ......................................................... 326
The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal"
(November 5, 1941) ............................................ 331
Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with
"Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) ........ 335
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the
United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) ........... 337
Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States
(November 10, 1941) ........................................... 344
The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less
favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal"
(November 18-19, 1941) ........................................ 355
Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United
States and demands an agreement on that basis
(November 20, 1941) ........................................... 360
The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363
The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese-
American conversations and at the same time moves additional
Japanese troops into southern Indochina
(November 27-December 7, 1941) ................................ 387
The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina
appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) ......................... 405
Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United
States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the
United States (November 29, 1941) ............................. 409
President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern
situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) .... 411
President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its
purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina
(December 2, 1941) ............................................. 415
The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French
Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by
the Chinese (December 5, 1941) ................................ 421
The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424
Page 291
Appendix D
REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN, AND RELATED MATTERS, FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE IN AUGUST, 1941
THROUGH DECEMBER 8,1941
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This appendix reviews, upon the basis of the record before the Committee
and in greater detail than in Part I of the report to which it is
annexed, the diplomatic conversations between the United States and
Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August 1941
through December 8, 1941. While it is not to be regarded as including
all of the material contained in the record before the Committee that
touches upon those conversations during that period, it does attempt to
set forth the material facts in connection therewith.
Prior to the Committee's investigation, nearly all of the information
concerning the diplomatic conversations during 1941 between the United
States and Japan that had been made public was contained in the official
State Department publications, "Peace and War" (ex. 28) [1] and "Foreign
Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29), together
with former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's book, "Ten Years in Japan" (ex.
30), which were published during the war and were subject to wartime
restrictions. To the basic material contained in those publications, the
Committee has added hundreds of documents, personal as well as official,
from the files of the State Department and of the late President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. In addition, the Committee has received in
evidence hundreds of messages between the Japanese Foreign Office in
Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington as intercepted,
translated, and available at the time to high official; in the United
States Government in Washington, including President Roosevelt and
Secretary of State Cordell Hull. There 1S also before the Committee
testimony of former Secretary of State Hull and of former United States
Ambassador in Japan Joseph. C. Grew, a prepared statement and answers to
interrogatories submitted by former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson,
and collateral (regarding diplomatic matters) testimony of Gen. George
C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark, and other high-ranking officers of
the Army and Navy. The record before the Committee also contains
hundreds of captured Japanese documents, as well as reports of
interrogations conducted in Japan for the supreme allied commander, Gen.
Douglas MacArthur, at the request of the Committee, many of which are
directly concerned with the diplomatic events immediately preceding
Pearl Harbor, including an authoritative translation of the memoirs of
Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Premier of Japan until October
[1] All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to
exhibits introduced at the hearings before the Committee.
Page 292 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
16, 1941. This mass of testimony and documentary evidence, from so many
different and independent sources, and including official documents of
the Japanese and other governments, as well as of the United States
Government, affords countless opportunities for verification by cross-
checking
By interweaving the diplomatic material contained in the documentary
evidence and testimony before the Committee, this appendix attempts to
reconstruct chronologically the significant events in the diplomatic
conversations between the United States and Japan during the 4 months
that immediately preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Only
thus, for example, can the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages
between Tokyo and Washington be examined in the surrounding
circumstances in which they were first seen by high officials in the
United States Government, for those messages were the day-to-day
instructions sent by the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo to the
Japanese Ambassadors in Washington for the purpose of guiding them in
their conversations with Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, and the
Ambassadors' reports and comments to the Japanese Foreign Office
concerning those conversations. While in American hands the diplomatic
messages between Tokyo and Washington not only provided Secretary Hull
and President Roosevelt with advance knowledge of the Japanese plans for
the conduct of the conversations but also were one of the most important
and significant types of intelligence information available to the Army
and Navy in Washington, they did not contain any information pointing
toward Pearl Harbor as a possible target of Japanese attack.
Since the report to which this appendix is annexed discusses in detail
the military aspects and implications of the diplomatic conversations
between the United States and Japan and of the intercepted Japanese
diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington, no attempt is made
here to tie in the events on the "diplomatic front" with the various
warning messages sent by the Army and Navy from Washington to the
commanders in the Pacific, although the latter messages were to a
considerable extent based upon the state of Japanese-American diplomatic
relations at the time they were dispatched. Neither does this appendix
attempt to describe the process of building up American military
strength in the Pacific area which was underway during the period in
question, although by taking up the Marshall-Stark joint memoranda of
November 5 and November 27 in connection with the events that gave rise
to each, it does indicate in general terms the over-all military and
naval considerations that affected American policies in the Pacific
during the latter part of 1941. Parenthetically, it may be noted here
that the inherent relationship between diplomatic policies and military
and naval power was succinctly stated by Secretary Hull when he
testified before the Committee that soon after he came to the State
Department he learned that the representatives of the aggressor nations
with whom he talked "were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our
Army," and that the diplomatic strength of the United States went up or
down with their estimate of what the United States Army and Navy
"amounted to."
The record before the Committee shows that the United States Government
participated in the conversations with Japan in an effort to dissuade
the Japanese Government from its course of military aggression and its
Axis ties with Germany and Italy. The fact that
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 293
the United States was engaging in such conversations with Japan was
believed to strengthen the position of the elements in that country who
disapproved of the policies of those who dominated the Japanese
Government; success in negotiations with Japan on the basis of the
principles to which the United States Government adhered would have had
many material and other advantages for both the United States and Japan.
American participation in the conversations had the further purpose of
giving the United States Army and Navy more time to prepare their
defense of areas in the Pacific regarded as vital to the safety and
security of the United States. Recognition of this dual purpose is the
key to an understanding of the day-to-day course of the conversations.
Every action taken, every move made, on the American side must be
considered in the light of those objectives.
BRIEF RESUME OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS PRIOR TO THE
ATLANTIC CONFERENCE
This narrative begins in August, 1941 with the President of the United
States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in conference on a
warship off the coast of Newfoundland, discussing how to prevent the
outbreak of war with Japan. It ends on December 7-8, 1941 with Japanese
bombs falling on ships of the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl
Harbor, with Japanese troops invading Thailand and British Malaya, and
with other Japanese attacks on Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippine
Islands, Guam, Wake, and Midway.
Into the intervening 4 months were crowded events the causes of which
lay deeper and were more fundamental than the Japanese occupation of
southern French Indochina in July or the breaking off of the Japanese-
American conversations and the freezing of Japanese assets in the United
States which had immediately followed that Japanese move. By August
1941, there was but a slim chance that the Japanese Government would
"reverse the engine," as Ambassador Grew expressed it, and abandon the
course of aggression through force of arms to which it had been
committed. Although it was true that the informal conversations in
Washington between the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo
Nomura, had revealed an apparent willingness on the part of the Japanese
Government to go along with certain of the peaceful principles to which
the United States was committed, *provided those principles were stated
in sufficiently general terms to make their application in specific
situations wholly unpredictable*, those conversations had disclosed
three crucial points of difference between the two Governments: the
question of nondiscrimination in international trade, the question of
the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, and the question of
Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact.
During the latter part of January 1941, through private Japanese and
American citizens, the suggestion had reached President Roosevelt and
Secretary Hull that the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity
to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude toward the
"China Incident" (ex. 29, vol. II, PP. 328-329; ex. 179). The initial
reaction of the United States Government had been one of caution (ex.
29, vol. II, P. 330). Secretary Hull testified that -
"In the light of Japan's past and current record and in view of the wide
divergences between the policies which the United States and Japan had
been pursuing
[Pairs of asterisks have been used to replace italics in the original
text. LWJ]
Page 294 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the Far East, I estimated from the outset that there was not 1 chance
in 20 or 1 in 50 or even 1 in 100 of reaching a peaceful settlement.
Existing treaties relating to the Far East were adequate, provided the
signatory governments lived up to them. We were, therefore, not calling
for new agreements. But if there was a chance that new agreements would
contribute to peace in the Pacific, the President and I believed that we
should not neglect that possibility, slim as it was.
"We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful,
fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific
area. Such a course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes and
beliefs of the American people. Moreover, the President and I
constantly had very much in mind the advice of our highest military
authorities who kept emphasizing to us the imperative need of having
time to build up preparations for defense vital not only to the United
States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Our decision to
enter into the conversations with the Japanese was, therefore, in line
with our need to rearm for self-defense.
"The President and I fully realized that the Japanese government could
not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan's
course of aggression. We realized that so much was involved in a
reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any
substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would
require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be patient in an
endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of aggression. We
carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a
basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not
only to Japan but to all countries (tr. 1101-11025)." [1]
In his early conversations with Ambassador Nomura, who reached
Washington in February 1941, Secretary Hull had expressed the hope that
the Japanese Government might have something definite in mind that would
offer a practical approach to a general settlement of the problems in
the Pacific, and had indicated the willingness of the United States
Government to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might
offer that was consistent with the principles to which, the Secretary
had made it clear, the United States was committed (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.
331-332). Secretary Hull testified as follows regarding his meeting on
April 16, 1941, with Ambassador Nomura:
"On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador.
I pointed out that *the one paramount preliminary question about which
our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that
the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its
present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which
our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between
nations should rest*, as follows:
(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each
and all nations;
(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs
of other countries;
(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of
commercial opportunity;
(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status
quo may be altered by peaceful means.
"I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to
consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as
could be consistent with those principles (tr. 11041104)."
As the result of these early conversations, on May 12 (Washington time),
the Japanese Ambassador had presented to Secretary Hull, upon
instructions from his Government, a document (Annex A attached hereto)
containing a proposal for a general settlement between the United States
and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 418-425). This document had revealed
authoritatively for the first time what the Japanese Government had in
mind as the basis for an agreement
[1] All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to
pages of the transcript of the hearings before the Committee.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 295
between the United States and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 332). Between
May 12 and June 21, there had taken place a number of conferences
between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador at which the Japanese
proposal and related matters were discussed. In the meantime a
counterproposal by the United States had been prepared, and on June 21
(Washington time) this counterproposal (Annex B attached hereto) had
been handed to the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 483-492).
On June 22, 1941, Germany had invaded Russia. The German attack upon
Russia had precipitated a series of events in Japan which were to have
far-reaching effects upon Japanese-American relations. It had quickened
the appetites of those in the Japanese Government who believed that
then, or never, Japan's destiny was in her own hands. Intensive
consideration had immediately been given in Tokyo to the question
whether Japan should not attack Russia at once (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,
p. 16). Foreign Minister Matsuoka in particular had urged this course.
According to the memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the Japanese Premier
at the time, the attention of the Government became so centered upon
this question that the American counterproposal of June 21, which by
that time had been received in Tokyo from the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington, became completely side-tracked until after an Imperial
Conference with Emperor Hirohito on July 2 (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, pp. 16, 18). At that conference the question of war with Russia
had been temporarily shelved in favor of "an advance into the southern
regions," and it had been decided that, first of all, the plans "which
have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and Thai will be
prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the southern
territories" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 70; cf. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2.) It is
now known that at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) it was
also decided that, in case the diplomatic negotiations with the United
States should break down, "preparations for a war with England and
America will also be carried forward"; that all plans, including the
plan to use Japan's military strength to settle the Soviet question if
the German-Russian war should develop to Japan's advantage, were to be
carried out-
"in such a way as to place no serious obstacles in the path of our basic
military preparations for a war with England and America;"
and that-
"In case all diplomatic means fail to prevent the entrance of America
into the European War, we will proceed in harmony with our obligations
under the Tri-Partite Pact. However, with reference to the time and
method of employing our armed forces we will take independent action
(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, P. 71)."
The following report of the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time)
had been cabled by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Japanese
Ambassadors in the United States, Germany, Italy, and Russia, the same
day:
"(National Secret)
"At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd 'The
Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing
Situation' were decided. This Policy consists of the following two
parts. The first part 'The Policy' and the second part 'The Principal
Points.' (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this
has to do with national defense secrets, keep
Page 296 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to
both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution.
The Policy.
1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world
peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity,
regardless of how the world situation may change.
2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the
China incident, *and shall take measures with a view to advancing
southward* in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence
and self-protection.
The Principal Points.
For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, *increasing
pressure shall be added from various points in the south*, and by means
of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions
shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and
various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in
the south. *Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be
reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French
Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed*. As regards the Russo-German
war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained,
every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall
be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations
shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available
shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining
the war, if need be, *Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power
Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed* (ex. 1, pp.
1-2)." [1]
It is worthy of note that this intercepted Japanese message, which was
translated and available in Washington [2] on July 8 (Washington time),
did not mention the decisions at the Imperial Conference respecting the
United States.
Commencing immediately after the Imperial Conference, Japan had
proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale, calling up from 1
to 2 million reservists and conscripts, recalling Japanese merchant
vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean, imposing restrictions upon
travel in Japan, and carrying out strict censorship of mail and
communications. The Japanese press had dwelt constantly on the theme
that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never
equaled in all Japanese history. The United States had been charged with
using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." The
Japanese press had warned that if the United States took further action
in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would
face a final crisis (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 339-340).
Largely as a result of disagreements within the Japanese Government
regarding the reply to be made to the American proposals of June 21,
Premier Konoye and his entire Cabinet had resigned *en bloc* on July 16
(Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 20-24). Prince Konoye had
then been ordered by Emperor Hirohito to organize the new Cabinet, which
he had done, the only important change being the appointment of Admiral
Toyoda as Foreign Minister, in place of Yosuke Matsuoka (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, p. 25). The views of the latter had been one of the principal
causes of the disagreements within the Government regarding its reply to
the
[1] Unless otherwise noted, all italics in this appendix have been
supplied.
[2] The expression "translated and available in Washington," as used in
this appendix, means that English translations of the particular
intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were available at the time
stated to those officials of the United States Government in Washington
to whom the Army and Navy were distributing "Magic" at the time. It
should be borne in mind that all such messages to which reference is
made in this appendix were so available: specific reference has been
made to the date when a message became available only in those instances
where knowledge of the exact date is important.
While the information contained in the intercepted Japanese diplomatic
messages was available at the time, the information contained herein
which is derived solely from captured Japanese documents (exhibits 8 and
132) and from the memoirs of Prince Konoye (exhibit 173) was not, of
course, available at the time.
American proposals of June 21. Following this Cabinet change while
Premier Konoye and the new Foreign Minister in Tokyo and Ambassador
Nomura in Washington had made emphatic and repeated protestations of
Japan's desire for peace and an equitable settlement of Pacific
problems, the messages from Tokyo to Washington had contained such
statements as "there is more reason than ever before to arm ourselves to
the teeth for all-out war" (ex. 1, p. 8). The bombing of American
property in China had continued, including bursts which damaged the
American Embassy and the U. S. S. TUTUILA at Chungking (ex. 29, vol. II,
p. 343). An intercepted message of July 19 (Japan time) from Tokyo to
Berlin had contained the following estimate of the change in the
Japanese Cabinet:
"The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection
with National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign
policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the
principles of the Tripartite Pact (ex. 1, p. 3)."
In the meantime, the movement of Japanese troops and ships in accordance
with the Japanese plans for the "southward advance" had begun in
earnest, (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 340; ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26).
Those military and naval movements, plus the failure as yet of the
Japanese Government to make any reply to the American proposals of June
21, had led Under Secretary Welles, upon instructions from the Secretary
of State, to inform Ambassador Nomura on July 23 (Washington time) that
Secretary Hull "could not see that there was any basis now offered for
the pursuit of the conversations in which he and the Ambassador had been
engaged" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525). About this time, Colonel Hideo
Iwakuro and Mr. Tadao Wikawa, who had been advising Ambassador Nomura in
the conversations, left Washington and returned to Japan. On July 24
(Washington time), in a conference with the Japanese Ambassador attended
by Under Secretary Welles and Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval
Operations, President Roosevelt had proposed that, if the Japanese
Government would withdraw its forces from French Indochina, he would
endeavor to obtain from the British, the Chinese, and the Netherlands
Governments, and the United States Government itself would give, a
solemn and binding declaration to regard French Indochina as a
neutralized country, provided the Japanese Government would give a
similar commitment (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 527-530). Nevertheless, the
Japanese troop movements into French Indochina had continued, and on
July 26 (Washington time) President Roosevelt had issued an Executive
order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States (ex. 29, vol.
II, p. 267). The effect of this order had been to bring about very soon
the virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan (ex.
29, vol. II, p. 343).
In a message dated July 31 (Japan time), which was translated and
available in Washington on August 4 (Washington time), the new Foreign
Minister had advised Ambassador Nomura that since the Imperial
Conference on July 2 (Japan time) the Japanese Government had been
devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of the policies
there decided upon. He told the Ambassador:
"Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries,
led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly
strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire,
to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of
the South Seas. Our Empire
Page 298 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening
chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with
the participation of England and the United States, acting like a
cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain
military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that
territory.
"That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States,
not to mention Russia quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help
Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever
treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United
States.
[Discontinuous text]
"We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows
it and ought to understand our actions.
"6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order
to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for
each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean
to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not
necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should
trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each
use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.
"Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a
determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the
Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an
Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those
objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to
engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action. (Ex. 1, pp. 9-
10.)"
In the meantime, a reply to the American proposals of June 21 had been
transmitted on July 25 (Japan time) to Ambassador Nomura in Washington
(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26). He had not presented it to Secretary
Hull, however, because of the change in Japanese Cabinets, because he
thought it would not be acceptable to the United States Government, and
because he had received no instructions from the new Cabinet as to how
to proceed under the circumstances (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26).
Still another proposal had then been drawn up in Tokyo and this new
proposal had been presented to Secretary Hull on August 6 by Ambassador
Nomura with the statement that it was intended to be responsive to
President Roosevelt's suggestion for the neutralization of French
Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 546-550). The new Japanese proposal had
asked, either expressly or by implication, that the United States-
"(1) remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; (2)
suspend its defensive preparations in the Philippines; (3) discontinue
furnishing military equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for
the arming of their Far Eastern possessions; (4) discontinue aid to the
Chinese Government; and (5) assent to Japan's assertion and exercise of
a special military position and a permanent preferential political and
economic status in Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to
procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the United States
and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government was
committed. In return the Japanese Government offered not to station
Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than
Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indochina
for an indeterminate period. There thus would still have remained the
menace to the security of the United States, already mentioned, as well
as the menace to the security of British and Dutch territories in the
southwestern Pacific area (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 344)."
About this time, in Tokyo, Premier Konoye had determined to propose a
personal meeting between himself and President Roosevelt (ex. 173,
Konoye Memoirs, p. 29). It is now known that he had presented this idea
to the Ministers of War and Navy on August 4 (Japan time). Before that
day ended, the Navy Minister had expressed complete accord and had even
anticipated the success of the proposed conference (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, p. 30). The Minister of War, General Tojo, however, had replied
in writing as follows:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 299
"If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the
United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which
are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the
same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created.
For these reasons, the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The
attempt to surmount the present critical situation by the Prime
Minister's offering his personal services, is viewed with sincere
respect and admiration. If, therefore, it is the Prime Minister's
intention to attend such a meeting *with determination to firmly support
the basic principles embodied in the Empire's Revised Plan to the "N"
Plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of the
United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the
Empire even after this final effort is made*, the Army is not
necessarily in disagreement.
"However, (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if after making
preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with
someone other than the President, such as Secretary Hull or one in a
lesser capacity. (2) *You shall not resign your post as a result of the
meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be
prepared to assume leadership in the war against America* (ex. 173,
Konoye Memoirs, pp. 30-31)."
On August 7 (Japan time) Premier Konoye had been instructed by Emperor
Hirohito to proceed immediately with arrangements for the meeting (ex.
173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31). That day the Premier had sent a telegram to
Ambassador Nomura, which was translated and available in Washington on
August 8 (Washington time), directing him to propose such a meeting (ex.
1, pp. 12-13).
Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had met on August 8 (Washington
time), and at that meeting the Ambassador had presented the proposal for
a meeting between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye. Secretary Hull
had informed the Ambassador that the new Japanese proposal of August 6
was not responsive to President Roosevelt's suggestion of July 24
(Washington time) mentioned above, and, regarding the proposal for a
meeting between the President and Premier Konoye, had said that it
remained for the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find
means of shaping its policies along lines that would make possible an
adjustment of views between the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.
550-551).
The next day, August 9 (Washington time), Secretary Hull had conferred
with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, who had inquired about the
amount of aid the United States Government would be able to give in case
the Japanese should attack Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. Secretary
Hull recorded:
"I replied that I myself have visualized the problem and issue in a
broader way and that issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to
invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and
continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to
the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape
of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military despotism the trade
routes and the supply sources to the British. I added that this broad
military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to British defense in
Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the Channel.
I said that this Government visualizes these broad conditions and the
problem of resistance which they present; that the activities of this
Government in the way of discouraging this Japanese movement and of
resistance will be more or less affected by the British defensive
situation in Europe and hence by the question of the number of American
naval vessels and other American aid that may be needed by Great Britain
at the same time. I said that in the event of further Japanese movements
south this Government and the British Government should naturally have a
conference at once and this Government would then be able to determine
more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to resistance, in
the light of the statement I had just made (ex. 28, pp. 710-711).
Page 300 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Except that President Roosevelt had left Washington for the Atlantic
Conference meeting with Prime Minister Churchill before either of the
two last-mentioned conferences, [1] the foregoing summarizes briefly the
immediate background for that Conference so far as relations between the
United States and Japan were concerned. The Japanese move into southern
French Indochina while at the same time in Washington Ambassador Nomura
was engaging in conversations with Secretary Hull looking toward a
peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific, and the consequent
breaking off of those conversations, together with the freezing of
Japanese assets in the United States, had brought relations between the
two countries to a critical stage. Moreover, French Indochina, where the
Japanese forces were establishing themselves, was an area of great
strategic importance. From it, those forces could strike in many
directions, toward major objectives. To the east, across the South China
Sea lay the Philippines. To the west and northwest, across Thailand and
the Chinese province of Yunnan, lay Rangoon, Kunming, and the Burma
Road, over which American supplies for China were moving. To the south,
at the tip of the Malay Peninsula, lay the British naval base at
Singapore. Beyond Singapore and the Philippines lay the Netherlands East
Indies, with rubber, oil, and other materials needed by Japan for the
purposes to which the Japanese Government was committed.
When Under Secretary Welles informed Ambassador Nomura on July 23
(Washington time) that the conversations were at an end, he said that
the United States could only assume, first-
"that the occupation of Indochina by Japan constituted notice to the
United States that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy
of force and of conquest, and, second, that in the light of these acts
on the part of Japan, the United States, with regard to its own safety
in the light of its own preparations for self-defense, must assume *that
the Japanese Government was taking the last step before proceeding upon
a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas and of conquest in
the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in that
region* (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525).
THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE
(August 9-14, 1941)
The meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill,
each accompanied by high officials of their respective Governments, took
place at sea near Argentia, Newfoundland, during the second week in
August 1941. At it the President and the Prime Minister agreed upon the
joint declaration of principles which has since become known as the
Atlantic Charter (tr. 1359-1364). Their conversations also dealt with
steps which Great Britain and the United States were taking for their
safety in the face of the policies of aggression of the German
Government and other governments associated with the German Government.
They discussed such matters as the proposed occupation of the Canary
Islands by the British Government to guard the southern Atlantic convoy
route into the
[1] Former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles testified, however,
that he believed he (Welles) left Washington for the Atlantic Conference
the evening of August 8 (Washington time) (tr. 1254).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 301
British Isles, a proposal that the Portuguese Government request the
Government of the United States for assistance in the defense of the
Azores as a means of assurance that those islands would not be occupied
by Germany, and the protection of the Cape Verde Islands against Axis
aggressors (ex. 22-C). The President and the Prime Minister also
discussed the situation in the Far East. During those discussions Mr.
Churchill submitted a proposal for parallel declarations by the United
States, British, and Dutch Governments warning Japan against new moves
of military aggression. [1] This proposal also contemplated that the
Russian Government would be kept fully informed of such steps (ex. 22).
The final discussion of Mr. Churchill's proposal occurred on August 11
(ex. 22-C). According to Under Secretary Welles' record of that
discussion-
"The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements
handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.
"The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the
implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that
she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their
economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval
defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including
the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of
which were particularly unacceptable (ex. 22-C)."
The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, and
after expressing his strong feeling that "every effort should be made to
prevent the outbreak of war with Japan," he stated the procedure with
respect to Japan that he intended to follow upon his return to
Washington. He told the Prime Minister that he would inform Ambassador
Nomura that if the Japanese Government would give satisfactory
assurances that it would not further station its troops in the
Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the
Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina would be withdrawn,
the United States Government-would-resume the informal conversations
with the Japanese Government. He said that he would further state that
if Japan should refuse to consider this procedure and should undertake
further steps in the nature of military expansions, in his belief
various steps would have to be taken by the United States
notwithstanding his realization that the taking of such measures might
result in war between the United States and Japan (ex 22-C). Mr.
Churchill immediately concurred in this procedure (ex 22-C).
There was then discussed-
"the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken
as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a
statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the
Soviet Union (ex. 22-C)."
Under Secretary Welles expressed the view that the real issue involved
was whether or not Japan would continue its policy of conquest by force
in the entire Pacific and suggested that the statement which the
President intended to make-
"might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy
rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the southwestern
Pacific area (ex. 22-C).
[1] The record before the Committee also shows that in February 1941,
just before the Lend-Lease Act-described by Prime Minister Churchill as
"the Bill on which our hopes depend"-was enacted by Congress, the Prime
Minister and Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, had urged upon
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull their desire for some action by
the United States "to deter the Japanese" (ex. 158).
Page 302 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this, and "*it was
decided that the step to be taken by the President* [1] would be taken
in that sense" (ex. 22-C).
Consideration was then given the question whether or not President
Roosevelt should include in his statement to Ambassador Nomura a
statement with respect to British policy concerning French Indochina and
Thailand (ex. 22-C). However, since the statement ultimately made by the
President to Ambassador Nomura did not mention British policy concerning
those countries this latter proposal appears to have been dropped (ex.
29, vol. II, pp. 554-559).
Under Secretary Welles returned to Washington from Argentia several days
before President Roosevelt, at the latter's request. Upon his arrival,
he advised Secretary Hull of what had transpired there, and, at the
President's further request, he prepared the initial draft (ex. 22) of
the proposed warning to Japan from notes he had made of his final
conversation with the President before leaving Argentia (tr. 1259). A
revised draft was given to Secretary Hull by Mr. Welles on August 16,
1941 (ex. 22-A), and was further revised by the Secretary and his
advisors on Far Eastern affairs before being communicated to Ambassador
Nomura by the President (tr. 1272).
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WARNS JAPAN AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION AND AT THE
SAME TIME OFFERS TO RESUME THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS
(August 17, 1941)
President Roosevelt returned to Washington Sunday morning, August 17
(Washington time) . Late that afternoon, Ambassador Nomura met with the
President and Secretary Hull at the White House, at the President's
request (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 554 et seq.; ex. 124). [2] Mr. Roosevelt
read and then handed to Admiral Nomura the document
[1] The evidence before the Committee is conflicting as to whether or
not Prime Minister Churchill promised President Roosevelt that the
British Government would take action parallel to that to be taken by the
United States Government.
The only contemporaneous records of the Atlantic Conference before the
Committee are three memoranda prepared by Under Secretary Welles (ex.
22-B, 22-C, 22-D). Those memoranda show that the procedure outlined by
President Roosevelt differed substantially from that envisaged in Prime
Minister Churchill's proposal. As there described by Mr. Welles, the
President's procedure did not call for parallel action by either the
British or Dutch Governments, or for keeping Russia informed, as Mr.
Churchill had proposed. Nor, as is the case of Mr. Churchill's proposal,
was the precise phraseology of the warning to Japan prescribed, it being
left entirely up to the President. Mr. Welles testified that the promise
given by the President to Mr. Churchill "was limited to the fact that a
warning would be given" (tr. 1422) and that the only agreement reached
between the President and the Prime Minister was "that the President
made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the Government of the United
States, in its own words and in its own way, would issue a warning to
the Japanese Government of the character which actually was made by the
President on August 17" (tr. 1428).
While it is true that Mr. Welles testified that the promise made by
President Roosevelt was to "take parallel action with the British
Government in warning the Japanese Government" (tr. 12354) and that he
"took it for granted Mr. Churchill must have made that statement" (i. e.
promised to make a parallel warning) to the President (tr. 1446), it is
also true that when asked directly whether the President had told him
that Mr. Churchill had promised to make a parallel warning, Mr. Welles
said, "the President in his conversation with me, so far as I remember,
did not make that specific statement" (tr. 1446). Moreover, as
previously noted, the Welles' memoranda neither state nor indicate that
any such promise was made by Mr. Churchill (ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D), and
there is no evidence before the Committee showing that action parallel
to the President's warning to Japan was ever taken by the British
Government. On the other hand both "Peace and War" {ex. 28, p. 129) and
"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941" (ex. 29, vol.
II, p. 345) refer to an "agreement" to take parallel action made by
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, though, of course,
neither of these purports to be a contemporaneous account of the
Atlantic Conference. Likewise, in his testimony before the Committee,
Secretary Hull referred to such an "agreement." Though again Secretary
Hull did not attend the Atlantic Conference (tr. 1116).
[2] This discussion of the meeting referred to in the text, and the
discussions in this appendix of other meetings in Washington or Tokyo
between representatives of the United States Government and the Japanese
Government, are based primarily upon the official State Department
records of such meetings appearing in Volumes I and II of " Foreign
Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29) and upon
intercepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo reporting
such meetings, the Committee exhibits in which such messages appear
being indicated-in all cases. Reference is made to such records and
reports, only the material portions of which have been quoted or
summarized here.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 303
drafted by Mr. Welles and the Secretary. It noted that notwithstanding
the protracted conversations engaged in by the United States and
Japanese Governments looking toward a peaceful settlement in the Pacific
and the President's suggestion on July 24, 1941, for the
"neutralization" of French Indochina, the Japanese Government had
continued to dispose its armed forces at various points in the Far East
and had occupied French Indochina. Reading from the document, President
Roosevelt said that the United States Government felt that at the
present stage "nothing short of the most complete candor on its part in
the light of the evidence and indications" in its possession would tend
to further the objectives sought. He then warned Japan against further
aggression, saying:
"Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to
the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any
further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination
by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of
the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all
steps which it may deem necessary toward safe-guarding the legitimate
rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and
toward insuring the safety and security of the United States (ex. 29,
vol. II, pp. 556-557)."
On behalf of his Government, Ambassador Nomura reasserted the sincerity
of its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japanese-American
diplomatic relations. He expressed his Government's desire to be advised
as to the possibility of arranging a meeting between President Roosevelt
and Premier Konoye and of resuming the informal conversations which had
been terminated by the United States in July because of the Japanese
occupation of southern French Indochina. He stated, however, that he
felt no further explanations regarding his Government's actions in
French Indochina, in addition to the views already expressed to
Secretary Hull, were necessary.
The President then read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a second
document. It opened with a reference to the Japanese proposal of August
8 (Washington time) for a meeting between himself and Premier Konoye and
to the Japanese desire for resumption of the informal conversations. The
President said that the United States Government would be prepared to
resume the conversations provided the Japanese Government felt that
Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist
activities, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along
the lines of the program to which the United States was committed. His
statement concluded:
"the Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of
the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal
conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both
Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or
proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be
so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as
to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has
repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans
(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 559)."
In Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo on this meeting, he emphasized
the "graveness with which he (President Roosevelt) views Japanese-U. S.
relations." The Ambassador expressed the view that the Japanese proposal
for a "leaders' conference" between President Roosevelt and Premier
Konoye had "considerably eased" the attitude of the United States
Government and that there was no room for doubt "that the President
hopes that matters will take a turn for the better" (ex 124).
Page 304 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The next day, August 18 (Washington time), President Roosevelt sent a
message to Prime Minister Churchill describing his meeting with
Ambassador Nomura. This message indicates that the President did not
learn until after his return to Washington of the Ambassador's request
on August 16 (Washington time) for a resumption of the informal
conversations. In his message, the President told Mr. Churchill that-
"I made to him (Admiral Nomura) a statement covering the position of
this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in
the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the
proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made
to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the
statement we had discussed (ex. 70)."
The evidence before the Committee does not show whether or not the
British Government took "parallel action" to the warning given Japan by
President Roosevelt. Under Secretary Welles testified before the
Committee that he took it for granted that the British Government took
such parallel action and that the records of the State Department would
probably show that (tr. 1279), but Secretary Hull testified, and the
State Department has advised the Committee, that its files contain no
record of any such action (tr. 14, 306; 4480). Furthermore, as late as
November 30 (Washington time), Prime Minister Churchill sent a message
to the President saying that "one important method remains unused in
averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain
declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further
act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest
consequences. * * * We would, of course, make a similar declaration or
share in a joint declaration" (ex. 24); and the evidence further shows
that on December 7 the Prime Minister submitted to President Roosevelt a
draft of a proposed warning to Japan (tr. 13738-13740). On the other
hand, on August 25, 1941, in an address reporting to Parliament on the
Atlantic Conference, the Prime Minister said:
"But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by
aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking
to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing
as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying
the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been
wandering about that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them
carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now
they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They
snatch Indo-China from the wretched Vichy French. They menace by their
movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and
menace the Philippine islands under the protection of the United States.
"It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to
secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with
infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will
give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We
earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say:
That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves
unhesitatingly at the side of the United States (tr. 1355-1356; 4480-
4481)."
While Secretary Hull testified that he knew of no parallel action taken
by the British other than this address (tr. 14306), which was broadcast
by radio, Under Secretary Welles testified that in his opinion this
address did not constitute "parallel action" of the kind proposed by Mr.
Churchill to the President, and that in Mr. Welles'
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 305
judgment such action would necessarily have had to have been in the form
of an exchange of diplomatic notes (tr. 1356). [1]
On August 21 (Washington time) President Roosevelt sent a message to
Congress describing the meeting at Argentia (tr. 1359-1364). This
message embodied the text of the "Atlantic Charter" and referred in
general terms to other matters discussed at the meeting, but made no
specific mention of the proposal to issue a warning to Japan. Under
Secretary Welles testified that publication of the proposal to issue a
warning to Japan or of the President's warning, itself, would not have
been conducive to a successful result in attempting to find a peaceful
solution, as it would have inflamed public opinion in Japan (tr. 1277).
JAPAN PROTESTS UNITED STATES SHIPMENTS OF OIL TO RUSSIA
(August 27, 1941)
The Japanese reply to President Roosevelt's request on August 17
(Washington time) for a " clearer statement than has yet been furnished
as to its present attitude and plans" was not received until August 28
(Washington time). During the interval between those dates, Ambassador
Nomura reported to the Japanese Foreign Office an increasing interest on
the part of President Roosevelt in participating in the resumption of
the Japanese-American negotiations and stated that, in his opinion, "the
President is the one who shows the most interest in the 'leaders
conference' " (ex. 124). About the same time the Ambassador received a
report from Tokyo concerning the Foreign Minister's talk with Ambassador
Grew on August 18 (Japan time) at which Ambassador Grew indicated that
he would give the proposed meeting his personal support (ex. 124). On
August 23 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura
that "everything in our power" was being done " to rush our reply to the
United States and at the same time to bring about the 'leaders
conference' at an earlier date" (ex. 124). The next day Ambassador
Nomura called of Secretary Hull and reported that his Government wanted
the "leaders conference" to take place before October 15. The reason he
gave for this was the fear in Tokyo that the impression would be created
that Japan " had given in in the face of the threat of 'encirclement' "
if the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should follow a reported
British-U. S.-Soviet conference to be held at an earlier date (ex. 124;
ex. 29, vol. II, p. 568).
At about this time the German Ambassador in Japan, General Ott, received
intelligence reports that the United States was preparing to ship oil to
Russia via Vladivostok, that the first of the transporting vessels had
already sailed, that they would soon sail in rapid succession, and that
the oil would undoubtedly be used by Russia for an attack upon Japan.
General Ott repeated this information to the Vice Minister for Foreign
Affairs during an interview on August 19 (Japan time), and in reply the
Vice Minister said that the problem of American oil was receiving very
careful attention (ex. 132-A, item C). The nest day, and again on August
22 (Japan time), the Foreign
[1] There is also before the Committee a memorandum of Dr. Stanley K.
Hornbeck, Political Advisor to Secretary Hull, dated, however, February
28, 1944, in which it is stated that toward the end of August 1941, the
British and American Governments "served on Japan a strong warning"
against further extending her courses of aggression (ex. 108).
Page 306 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura requesting him to call the attention
of the United States authorities to the fact that if it should become
known in Japan that the United States was shipping iron, airplanes, and
other materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters, this might
have an adverse effect upon Japanese-American relations (ex. 1, p. 19;
ex. 124). Ambassador Nomura told Secretary Hull during their
conversation on August 23 (Washington time) that the shipment of oil by
the United States to Russia through Japanese waters "would naturally
give the Japanese real concern at an early date" (ex. 29, vol. II, p.
566). A more urgent message concerning this matter was sent from Tokyo
to Ambassador Nomura on August 26 (Japan time) requesting him to "make
representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may
reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general
viewpoint of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations" (ex. 1, p.
21 ) . Representations of this nature were made to Ambassador Grew in
Tokyo the next day (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 569), and on August 27
(Washington time) Ambassador Nomura orally protested to Secretary Hull
against American shipments of oil to Russia through Japanese waters.
Secretary Hull stated that only two tankers were involved and that the
shipments were entirely valid under all the laws of commerce (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 570).
PREMIER KONOYE SENDS A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT URGING
THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE"
(August 28, 1941)
Premier Konoye replied to President Roosevelt's statement of August 17
(Washington time) in a personal message which Ambassador Nomura handed
to the President at a conference at the White House on the morning of
August 28 (Washington time). The Premier's message was accompanied by a
statement which the Japanese Government intended to be responsive to the
President's suggestion that it would be helpful if that Government would
furnish a clearer statement of its present attitude and plans than had
as yet been given (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 571-572).
In his message to President Roosevelt, Premier Konoye urged that the
meeting between himself and the President be arranged "as soon as
possible." He said that while the preliminary informal negotiations that
were terminated in July had been "quite appropriate both in spirit and
content," nevertheless-
"the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion
confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Governments does not meet
the need of the present situation which is developing swiftly and may
produce unforeseen contingencies
"I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the
Governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all
important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific
area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation.
Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary be left to negotiations
between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting
(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 573)."
The statement which accompanied Premier Konoye's message referred, among
other things, to the-
"principles and directives set forth in detail by the United States
Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a
program for the Pacific area-
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 307
and continued-
"The Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these
principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest
manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be
applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world.
Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 575)."
However, while the statement contained many assurances regarding Japan's
peaceful intentions, the more important assurances were qualified or
conditional. Thus, the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its
troops from Indochina, but only "as soon as the China incident is
settled or a just peace is established in East Asia"; concerning Soviet-
Japanese relations it was said that Japan would take no military action
"as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese
neutrality treaty and does not menace Japanese Manchukuo or take any
action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty"; the Japanese
Government had no intention, it was said, of using, "without
provocation" military force against any neighboring nation (ex. 29, vol.
II, pp. 573-576).
Ambassador Nomura reported to his Government that President Roosevelt "
vas well pleased" with the Premier's message (ex. 124). The President
had said, he cabled, "I am looking forward to having approximately three
days talk with Prince Konoye", but that Hawaii was out of the question
as a meeting place and that he would prefer Juneau, Alaska. The
Ambassador quoted the President as having "smilingly and cynically" said
during his reading of the message:
"Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince Konoye, I
wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those
conversations just as an invasion of French Indo-China occurred during
Secretary Hull's conversations with your Excellency (ex. 124)."
The evening of the same day, August 28 (Washington time), Ambassador
Nomura called on Secretary Hull and outlined to the Secretary his ideas
concerning the arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting.
During this conversation, the Secretary pointed out to Ambassador Nomura
the desirability of there being reached in advance of the proposed
meeting "an agreement in principle on the principal questions which were
involved in a settlement of Pacific questions between the two nations."
The Secretary said that if the proposed meeting should fail to result in
an agreement, serious consequences from the point of view of both
Governments would ensue. He expressed the view that therefore the
purpose of the proposed meeting should be "the ratification of essential
points agreed upon in principle" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 576-577).
Ambassador Nomura concluded his report of this meeting to Tokyo with the
comment:
"In general, it may be said that the Secretary of State is an
exceedingly cautious person. There are indications that he is
considering this matter from many angles. I feel that unless we are in
fairly close agreement the "leaders conference" will not materialize
(ex. 124)."
GERMANY SUSPECTS TREACHERY
(August 29-30, 1941)
It became known to the American press, soon after Ambassador Nomura left
the White House following his conference with President Roosevelt and
Secretary Hull on August 28 (Washington time), that
Page 308 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Ambassador had delivered a personal message to the President from
Premier Konoye. Whether this information was given out by Secretary Hull
or by Ambassador Nomura is not clear from the record before the
Committee (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 582-583; ex. 124); however, as a result
of the disclosure, Foreign Minister Toyoda became greatly concerned that
the proposed "leaders conference" should be kept absolutely secret,
fearing the project would fail if news of it should leak out before a
settlement was reached. The Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura
twice on August 29 (Japan time) urging him "to take every precaution" to
guard against leaks (ex. 124).
This concern in Tokyo over the effect of publicity on the conversations
and the proposed "leaders conference" was a major reason for calls by
the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office on
Ambassador Grew on August 29 and September 3 (Japan time) and for a call
by Ambassador Nomura on Secretary Hull on September 1 (Washington time)
(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579-582, 586-587, 583-585). During his first
conversation with Ambassador Grew, the Director, Mr. Terasaki, dwelt at
some length on the unfortunate effects of the publicity in Washington
about Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, and then
communicated to the Ambassador an appeal from Foreign Minister Toyoda
that (1) the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting be arranged without delay
and (2) pending the outcome of the proposed meeting, the United States
postpone the sending oil tankers to the Soviet Union and suspend the
order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. Ambassador Grew's
memorandum of this meeting noted that he left Mr. Terasaki "under no
illusion" that the United States Government would find it possible to
agree to either of the "preposterous requests" contained in (2) above
(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 582). Ambassador Nomura's conference with Secretary
Hull on September 1 (Washington time) was concerned largely with
discussion of the effect upon the conversations of the positions taken
by the press in Japan and the United States. The Secretary took
advantage of the occasion to ask the Ambassador what would happen if an
agreement should not be reached at the proposed "leaders conference,"
and to repeat his suggestion that an effort be made to reach an
agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting (ex.
29, vol. II, pp. 583-585).
As a result of the fear in Tokyo of publicity, Ambassador Nomura wrote a
brief note to Secretary Hull on August 29 (Washington time) requesting
his cooperation in keeping the conversations secret. The Secretary
replied on September 2 (Washington time) saying that he would "be glad
to conform to the desires of yourself and your Government in the
foregoing respect, to every extent practical" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579,
586). However, apparently believing that some official comment was
needed in view of the rumors and speculation in Tokyo about Ambassador
Nomura's meeting with President Roosevelt, at 2:30 p. M. On August 29
(Japan time). The Japanese Foreign Office released an official statement
that Ambassador Nomura had called on President Roosevelt on August 28
and had delivered to the President a message from Premier Konoye stating
"Japan's view regarding Pacific problems which are pending between Japan
and the United States" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579). Ambassador Grew
advised Secretary Hull of this announcement later the same afternoon
(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 309
Foreign Minister Toyoda feared publicity because of "the exceedingly
complex domestic situation" and the consideration which had to be given
to "our relations with Germany and Italy" (ex. 124). What the Foreign
Minister had in mind in the first connection is indicated by his cable
to Ambassador Nomura on September 3 (Japan time), in which he said:
"Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made
known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial
talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the
Tripartite Pact banner (ex. 1, p. 25)."
In the second connection, it is now known from captured Japanese
documents that less than 4 hours after the Tokyo announcement of Premier
Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, General Ott, the German
Ambassador, called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau,
and demanded to know whether the Premier's message departed from the
policy determined at the Imperial Conference on July 2, which had been
secretly communicated to the German Government, and whether the Cabinet
was contemplating any change in that regard (ex. 132-A, item C). The
Vice Minister replied that the message did not mean that there had been
"a change in Japan's policy, nor that we are contemplating any change in
our relations with the Axis." The reason for sending the message, he
told the Ambassador, "was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific" and
to attempt "to start conversations between the two parties." Ambassador
Ott suggested that "precautions must be taken against America's scheme
to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her
advantage," to which the Vice Minister replied that "we have given the
matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations by Japan
with America might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon
Germany and Italy." "Our aim," he said, "is to keep her (America) from
joining in the war." The German Ambassador then requested an interview
with Foreign Minister Toyoda, which took place on the afternoon of
August 30 (Japan time). At that interview General Ott again demanded to
know whether the intentions of Japan were still as secretly communicated
to Germany on July 2. The Foreign Minister denied that there had been
any change in Japan's intentions, and stated that Japan's preparations
to avail herself of any new developments "are now making headway." The
German Ambassador said:
"In Foreign Minister Matsuoka's time the Japanese government authorities
thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an
attitude in conflict with the Tripartite Pact, that is, to give up
taking any positive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion
might arise, and Germany is very grateful that at the time the Japanese
government resolutely resisted these American designs, and we hope that
it will continue to take that "line." I would like to ask what Your
Excellency's views are concerning this point (ex. 132-A, item C)."
Admiral Toyoda replied:
"In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to
prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the
same as in the past; nor will it change in the future (ex. 132-A, item
C)."
The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reported to Tokyo on October 1, 1941,
that because of the Japanese-American negotiations everyone in the
German Foreign Office was "thoroughly disgusted with Japan." He said
that the fact that the feeling of German leaders and people in
Page 310 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
general toward Japan was getting bad could not be covered up, and that
if Japan were to go ahead with the negotiations without consulting
Germany, "there is no telling what steps Germany may take without
consulting Japan" (ex. 1, pp. 4849).
In Italy, the impression created by the Japanese-American talks was not
enthusiastic, as the Japanese Ambassador in Rome reported to the Foreign
Office on September 30:
"Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in
the mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude toward the
Tripartite Alliance appears to them to be faithless. Recently the
newspapers have been growing more critical in tone where we Japanese are
concerned. Official comment, too, has been none too complimentary. As
for Italy's attitude toward the recent celebration of the first
anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite
Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude of the whole Italian people
(ex. 1, p. 44)."
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT REPLIES TO PREMIER KONOYE'S MESSAGE
(September 5, 1941)
President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura his reply to Premier
Konoye at a conference at the White House on the afternoon of September
3 (Washington time) (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 588-592). The President's
reply mentioned the reference in the statement which had accompanied the
Premier's message to the basic principles to which the United States
Government had long been committed and the President's desire to
collaborate in making these principles effective in practice. The
President stated that his deep interest in this matter made it necessary
for him to observe and take account of developments both in the United
States and Japan which had a bearing on Japanese-American relations, and
that he could not avoid taking cognizance of indications-
"of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely
entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful
collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure both of
us earnestly desire to follow (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592)."
The President then suggested:
"that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward
ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring
to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and
essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I
have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical
application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance
of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement
accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this
suggestion (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592)."
The President also read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a statement
which referred to the American proposals of June 21 (Washington time)
and to the fact that subsequent conversations bad disclosed that there
were divergences of view between the two Governments with respect to
certain fundamental questions dealt with in those proposals. Reading
from the statement, the President expressed the desire of the United
States Government "to facilitate progress toward a conclusive
discussion" and its belief-
"that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above
mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific
questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of
the Japanese Government with regard to the fundamental questions under
reference (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 591)."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 311
In connection with this statement, it will be remembered that the second
Konoye Cabinet had resigned on July 16 (Japan time) and had been
replaced by the third Konoye Cabinet the next day (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, p. 24).
In his memorandum of the conversation with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary
Hull wrote:
"Both the President and I repeatedly emphasized the necessity for his
(i. e. Ambassador Nomura's) Government to clarify its position on the
question of abandoning a policy of force and conquest and on three
fundamental questions concerning which difficulties had been encountered
in our discussion of the Japanese proposal of May twelfth and the
discussion of which we had not pursued after the Japanese went into
Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 588)."
JAPAN PRESENTS NEW PROPOSALS IN A NEW FORM
(September 6, 1941)
It is now known that about the time President Roosevelt was meeting with
Ambassador Nomura, new Japanese proposals were being discussed at a
Joint Conference of Japanese Foreign Office and War and Navy officials
in Tokyo. According to Premier Konoye, these new proposals were intended
by the Foreign Office to bring up only "immediate and concrete problems"
and to focus the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and the
Premier on those problems. The Foreign Office took the position that it
was difficult to predict how long it would take to consider all of the
important fundamental principles dealt with in the proposals which had
been under consideration by the two Governments before the freezing
orders, and that consequently "the present crisis might not be averted"
if it should be necessary to consider all of those principles (ex. 173,
Konoye Memoirs, p. 37). The new proposals were approved at the Joint
Conference mentioned above and were given to Ambassador Grew by Foreign
Minister Toyoda the next day, September 4 (Japan time), with the request
that they be transmitted to Secretary Hull by the Ambassador to overcome
any possibility of inaccuracy in handling by Ambassador Nomura (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 593).
Ambassador Nomura presented the new proposals to Secretary Hull at a
meeting on September 6 (Washington time). He explained that although the
new proposals had been prepared by the Japanese Government before it
received President Roosevelt's reply of September 3 (Washington time),
nevertheless his Government believed that the contents of the new
proposals constituted a reply to the President. He said that the
proposals were also in response to the view expressed by Secretary Hull
at the conference with him on the evening of August 28, namely, that it
would be desirable for the two Governments to reach an agreement in
principle on the fundamental questions involved before making
arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting (ex. 29, vol. II,
pp. 606-607). As presented to Secretary Hull the new Japanese proposals
were as follows:
DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA)
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1941
The Government of Japan undertakes:
(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters
which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the
United States in the course of their preliminary informal
conversations;
312 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French
Indo-China against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not,
without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any
regions lying south of Japan;
(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the
European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self-
defense, and, in case the United States should participate in the
European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact
by Japan shall be independently decided;
(d) that Japan will endeavor to bring about the rehabilitation of
general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the
realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from
China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between
Japan and China;
(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will
not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;
(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be
carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of
nondiscrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will
cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of
natural resources in the said area which it needs;
(g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of
normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in
connection with the above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue
immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control
regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of
reciprocity.
"The Government of the United States undertakes:
(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment
expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will
abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the
endeavor by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair;
(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment
expressed in point (f) referred to above;
(c) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the
Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;
(d) that the United States will immediately (upon settlement)
reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to
above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act
with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against
the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal (ex. 29, vol.
II, pp. 608-609)."
Secretary Hull testified that these new Japanese proposals-
"were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement
communicated to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese
draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their
obligations under the Tripartite Pact. There was a qualified
undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" resort
to military action against any region south of Japan. No commitment was
offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to
China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's
territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in
China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in
wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of
nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula
contained in that draft that "the economic activities of the United
States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an
equitable basis" clearly implied a concept that the conditions under
which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be
conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan (tr. 1118-1119)."
On September 9 (Washington time) Secretary Hull cabled to Ambassador
Grew a series of questions to be submitted to Foreign Minister Toyoda
regarding the intentions of the Japanese Government in offering certain
of the new proposals, especially those relating to China (ex. 29, vol.
II, pp. 610-613). The Foreign Minister's replies to these questions were
received by Ambassador Grew on September 13 (Japan time) and promptly
cabled to Washington (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 620-624).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 313
On September 15 (Washington time) Ambassador Nomura cabled Foreign
Minister Toyoda that it seemed that the matter of the preliminary
conversations had been entrusted to Secretary Hull. He said that in such
conversations the United States would want to be advised of the peace
terms Japan would propose between Japan and China and would refuse to
act as intermediary unless the terms were fair and just; therefore, he
said, it would be necessary to outline the terms in advance of the
proposed "leaders conference." He also reported that the United States
wanted to arrange matters with Britain, China, and the Netherlands in
advance of the proposed conference, so that those countries would not
get the impression the United States was trading them off (ex. 1, p.
27). Two days later, Ambassador Nomura cabled that there were
"considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U. S. Conference" at a
recent United States Cabinet meeting and that "there is no mistaking the
fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the
preliminary arrangements can be made" (ex. 1, p. 28). On September 22
(Washington time), he cabled a long report to the Foreign Minister
concerning conditions and attitudes in the United States generally. His
report concluded with the following estimate:
"Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to
compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up
forceful aggressions, Japanese-American trade relations could be
restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render
economic assistance to Japan (ex. 1, p. 31)."
In the meantime, in Tokyo at Joint Conferences on September 6 and 13
(Japan time), the Japanese Government had determined the basic peace
terms which it was prepared to offer to China (ex. 132-A, item D). A
document containing those terms (Annex C attached hereto) was handed to
Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23 (Washington time),
having been communicated by the Foreign Minister to Ambassador Grew in
Tokyo on September 22 (Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 631-633).
During this conference with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura reiterated
the desire of his Government to have the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting take
place at the earliest possible opportunity. He told the Secretary that
the several documents which he had now presented were a full expression
of everything the Japanese Government desired to say, and that anything
further pertaining to the Tripartite Pact might best be left to the
proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II,
pp. 634-635). However, on September 27 (Washington time), he delivered
to Secretary Hull a further document (Annex D attached hereto), which
had been prepared in the form, and along the lines, of the American
proposals of June 21 (Washington time) and had been approved at a Joint
Conference on September 20 (Japan time). The new document, it was said,
incorporated all that the Japanese Government had communicated to the
American Government since June 21. A similar document had been delivered
to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 636-641).
On September 27 (Japan time) ceremonies were held in Tokyo celebrating
the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact. That day Foreign Minister
Toyoda requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and asked the
Ambassador to convey to President Roosevelt, through Secretary Hull, the
anxiety of Premier Konoye and the entire Cabinet
Page 314 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lest the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting might be indefinitely
delayed, stating that all preparations had been made by the Japanese
Government. During this conference he described to Ambassador Grew in
considerable detail his Government's position regarding the
conversations (ex. 29, vol. I1, pp. 641-645). The Foreign Minister
cabled his remarks to Ambassador Nomura, saying that "in view of
internal and external circumstances in our country, we cannot keep
postponing matters forever" (ex. 1, p. 33). Ambassador Nomura
communicated the gist of the Foreign Minister's remarks to Secretary
Hull on September 29 (Washington time). He said that while he was well
aware of the United States Government's position and had communicated it
to Tokyo, nevertheless, his Government had instructed him to press for
an answer to the Japanese proposal. AS his personal opinion, he judged
that if nothing came of the proposal for a meeting between the heads of
the two Governments, it might be difficult for Premier Konoye to retain
his position and that he then would be likely to be succeeded by a less
moderate leader (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 652).
AMBASSADOR GREW SUPPORTS THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE"
(August-September 1941)
In Tokyo Ambassador Grew had reached the conclusion that if the
Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should not be held, or if it should be long
delayed, the Konoye Cabinet might fall. He had first learned of the
proposed "leaders conference" at a meeting with Foreign Minister Toyoda
on August 18 (Japan time.) During the Foreign Minister's lengthy remarks
concerning the proposed meeting, Ambassador Grew had commented on
Japan's progressive southward advance and the fact that, in spite of all
peaceful assurances, the United States Government in the light of the
steps Japan had taken "could only be guided by facts and actions and not
words." Notwithstanding the doubts reflected in these statements, at the
conclusion of the Foreign Minister's remarks Ambassador Grew had said
"that in the interests of peace, (he) would give the proposal (for a
meeting) his own. Personal support" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 559-564).
Ambassador Grew reported the Foreign Minister's remarks to Secretary
Hull the following day in a message which included the following, as
paraphrased in the State Department:
"that naturally he is not aware of the reaction President Roosevelt will
have to the proposal made today orally by the Japanese Minister for
Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador urges, however, with all the force at
his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility
of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this
Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful
consideration. Not only is the proposal unprecedented in Japanese
history, but it is an indication that Japanese intransigence is not
crystallized completely owing to the fact that the proposal has the
approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities in the land. The
good which may flow from a meeting between Prince Konoye and President
Roosevelt is incalculable. The opportunity is here presented, the
Ambassador ventures to believe, for an act of the highest statesmanship,
such as the recent meeting of President Roosevelt with Prime Minister
Churchill at sea, with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently
insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific (ex. 29, vol.
II, p. 565)."
A month later, in a personal letter dated September 22 (Japan time) to
President Roosevelt, which apparently did not, however, reach
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 315
Washington until after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, he referred to
his conversations with Premier Konoye "who," he said-
"in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements
in the country is courageously working for an improvement in Japan's
relations with the United States. He bears the heavy responsibility for
having allowed our relations to come to such a pass and he no doubt now
sees the handwriting on the wall and realizes that Japan has nothing to
hope for from the Tripartite Pact and must shift her orientation of
policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever the incentive that has
led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he now means business
and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in
Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the
evidence of Japan's bad faith in times past in failing to live up to her
commitments, I believe that there is a better chance of the present
Government implementing whatever commitments it may now undertake than
has been the case in recent years. It seems to me highly unlikely that
this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than
Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in
carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of
international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The
alternative to reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased
probability of war * * *. I therefore most earnestly hope that we can
come to terms, even if we must take on trust, at least to some degree,
the continued good faith and ability of the present Government fully to
implement those terms." (Ex. 178.)"
A week later, on September 29 (Japan time), following his meeting with
Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 27 referred to above, Ambassador
Grew cabled a long report to Secretary Hull, in which "in all deference
to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary
Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter
is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan," he stated
at length his appraisal of the existing situation (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.
645-650). The most significant part of this report was the following, as
paraphrased in the State Department:
"8. Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese
Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut
commitments which will satisfy the United States Government both as to
principle and as to concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations
will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet
and its supporting elements desiring *rapprochement* with the United
States will come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is
hopeless and that the United States Government is only playing for time.
If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss
of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction may and
probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Government's
being discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feeling, and this
may and probably will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these
will not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans,
while reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a
situation in which it will be difficult to avoid war. *The logical
outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the
formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the
disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the
United States.* There is a question that such a situation may prove to
be more serious even than the failure to produce a entirely satisfactory
agreement through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and
Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.
648-649)."
In connection with Ambassador Grew's reference to the "viewpoint of the
American Embassy in Japan," in his testimony before the Committee he
said:
"I may say here that we in our Embassy in Tokyo did not have access to
any of the secret documents or intercepted telegrams. We didn't even
know that they existed (tr. 1481)."
Page 316 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
And again:
"I just want to say once more everything I have said today represents
the point of view of one spot, our Embassy in Tokyo, and we were
deprived of a great deal of the information which was available to the
President and Mr. Hull. We had none of the secret intercepts or
telegrams, we had none of the documents that have come into the State
Department from time to time documents of a secret nature, so of course
the President and Mr. Hull saw the picture with a great deal more
information than we had available to us (tr. 1903-1904)."
JAPAN DETERMINES ITS MINIMUM DEMANDS AND ITS MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
(September 6, 1941)
It is now known that in the meantime, in Tokyo far-reaching decisions
had been made. The "Policy of the Imperial Government" which was decided
upon at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) had provided that
in carrying out a southward advance the Government would not be deterred
"by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and
America." It had also been decided at that conference that in carrying
out Japan's preparations for war with Russia and in the use of Japan's
military strength against Russia in case the German-Soviet war "should
develop to our advantage,"
"all plans, especially the use of armed forces, will be carried out in
such a way as to place no serious obstacles *in the path of our basic
military preparations for a war with England and America* (ex. 173,
Konoye Memoirs, pp. 70-71)."
When the Japanese advance into southern French Indochina during the
latter part of July had brought about the termination of the
conversations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura and the
American freezing order, Premier Konoye had come forward early in August
with his proposal for a "leaders conference" between President Roosevelt
and himself. While this proposal had received the support of the
Japanese Navy, it had been supported by the Japanese Army only provided
the Premier intended
"*to carry out a war against America if the President of the United
States still failed to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire*
(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31).
As tension increased in Tokyo, the Japanese Army General Staff began
advocating the immediate breaking off of negotiations with the United
States and the opening of Japanese-American hostilities, and Premier
Konoye discussed this question at innumerable conferences with the Army
and Navy Ministers during the latter part of August (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, p. 39-40).
It is now known that during those conferences there were developed
"Plans for the Prosecution of the Policy of the Imperial Government"
which set forth the manner in which the Government would proceed in
carrying out the plans "for the southern territories" decided upon at
the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time). Premier Konoye submitted
these new "Plans" to the Emperor informally on September ,5 (Japan time)
in the form of an agenda for an Imperial Conference the next day, as
follows:
"1. Determined not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved
in a war with America (and England and Holland), in order to secure our
national existence, *we will proceed with war preparations so that they
be completed approximately toward the end of October*."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 317
"2. At the same time, *we will endeavor by every possible diplomatic
means to have our demands agreed to by America and England*. Japan's
minimum demands in these negotiations with America (and England),
together with the Empire's maximum concessions are embodied in the
attached document.
"3. *If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of
having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned
above, we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war
against America (and England and Holland).*
"Policies with reference to countries other than those in the southern
territories will be carried out in harmony with the plans already laid.
Special effort will be made to prevent America and Soviet Russia from
forming a united front against Japan (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."
According to Premier Konoye, on examining the "Plans", Emperor Hirohito
was impressed by the fact that the document seemed "to give precedence
to war over diplomatic activities." The Premier explained that the order
of business in the agenda did not indicate any differences in degree of
importance. The Emperor then summoned the Chiefs of the Army and Navy
General Staffs. When they came, he questioned them sharply concerning
the probable length of hostilities in the event of a Japanese-American
conflict, and then asked whether it was not true that both of them "were
for giving precedence to diplomacy." Both answered in the affirmative
(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs pp. 40-41) .
At the Imperial Conference the next day, September 6 (Japan time) the
"Plans" were decided upon and approved (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 40).
However, at the Conference first the President of the Privy Council and
then Emperor Hirohito asked for a clarification of the views of the
Government as to whether the emphasis was not being placed by the
Government upon war rather than diplomacy. When none of the Supreme
Command replied, and only the Navy Minister representing the Government,
the Emperor is reported to have rebuked the Supreme Command by
indicating that he was striving for international peace. After this the
Chief of the Navy General Staff assured the Emperor that the Chiefs of
the Supreme Command were conscious of the importance of diplomacy, and
"advocated a resort to armed force only when there seemed no other way
out." According to Premier Konoye, the Conference adjourned "in an
atmosphere of unprecedented tenseness" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 41).
Japan's "minimum demands" in the negotiations with America and England,
as approved at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time), were
as follows, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs:
"1. America and England would be required to agree not to intervene in,
or obstruct, the settlement by Japan of the "China Incident", to close
the Burma Road, and to cease all aid of any kind to China.
"2. America and England would be required to agree to take no action in
the Far East which offered a threat to the Japanese Empire, and not to
establish military bases in Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies,
China, or Far Eastern Soviet Russia or increase their existing Far
Eastern military forces over their present strength. In this connection
Japan would not consider any demands 'for the liquidation of Japan's
special relations with French Indo-China'."
"3. America and England would be required to agree to cooperate with
Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials; to restore trade
relations with Japan and "furnish her with the
Page 318 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"raw materials she needs" from British and American territories in the
Southwest Pacific; and to assist Japan in establishing close economic
relations with Thai and the Netherlands East Indies (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, appendix V, pp. 77-78)."
The "maximum concessions" Japan was prepared to make in return for
agreement to her "minimum demands" were as follows:
"1. Japan would not use French Indochina as a base for operations
against any neighboring countries 'with the exception of China'.
"2. Japan would be prepared to withdraw her troops from French Indochina
'as soon as a just peace is established in the Far East'."
"3. Japan would be prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the
Philippine Islands (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, appendix V, p. 78). In
other words in an effort to take all possible advantage of the world
situation, the Japanese Government (determined at the Imperial
Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that the least Japan would accept
from America and England in return for the withdrawal of her troops from
French Indochina would be the agreement of America and England to cease
all aid to China, to accept a military and naval status in the Far East
inferior to Japan, and to furnish all possible material aid to Japan.
Furthermore, Japan did not intend to perform her part of the "bargain"
until after "a just peace" had been established in the Far East. From
the Japanese standpoint, this latter qualification meant after the
settlement of the "China Incident" by Japan on her own terms. The
substance of these "minimum demands" was contained in the ultimatum
which the Japanese Government later delivered to the United States on
November 20 (Washington time).
The evening of the same day, September 6 (Japan time), Premier Konoye,
with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese Ministers of War, Navy,
and Foreign Affairs met with Ambassador Grew at a private house under
conditions of extraordinary secrecy. In his notes of the meeting,
Ambassador Grew wrote that the Premier had requested that his statements
be transmitted personally to President Roosevelt in the belief that they
might amplify and clarify the approach which he had made through
Ambassador Nomura. Ambassador Grew noted that the Premier and,
consequently, the Government of Japan, conclusively and wholeheartedly
agreed with the four principles put forward by Secretary Hull as a basis
for the rehabilitation of Japanese-American relations. [1] In his
memoirs, however, Prince Konoye stated that when at this meeting
Ambassador Grew asked for his views regarding Secretary Hull's four
principles he said "that they were splendid as principles but when it
came down to actual application a variety of problems arose" and that it
was in order to solve those very problems that he deemed it necessary to
hold the meeting with President Roosevelt (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p.
42). Ambassador Grew noted that Premier Konoye had strongly urged that
no better opportunity for the improvement of Japanese-American relations
would be presented, and that the Premier had
[1] In a memorandum dated October 7 (Japan time) recording a conference
which he had on that date with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador
Grew noted that the Foreign Minister told him that Ambassador Nomura had
been instructed to inform Secretary Hull that the statement in the
United States memorandum of October 2 (Washington time) (*see infra*)
that Premier Konoye "fully subscribed" to the four principles should be
modified to indicate that the Premier subscribed "in principle" (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 664).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 319
said that he had the full support of the responsible chiefs of the Army
and Navy, who were already choosing their delegates to the proposed
conference. Premier Konoye had said, he noted, that he could control any
opposition from within the Government, and that he was determined to
spare no effort, despite all elements and factors opposing him to crown
his present endeavors with success. The Ambassador wrote that during the
conversation he had outlined in general terms-
"the bitter lessons of the past to our Government as the result of the
failure of the Japanese Government to honor the promises given to me by
former Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs apparently in all
sincerity-"
and had stated that, as the result-
"the Government of the United States had at long last concluded that it
must place its reliance on actions and facts and not on Japanese
promises or assurances."
He noted that Premier Konoye had expressed the earnest hope that in view
of the present internal situation in Japan the projected meeting with
the President could be arranged "with the least possible delay" (ex. 29,
vol. II, pp. 604-606).
THE UNITED STATES ASKS JAPAN TO CLARIFY ITS NEW PROPOSALS
(October 2, 1941)
Thus, as September ended the Japanese Government, on the one hand, was
vigorously asserting the urgent and pressing need to go forward with the
proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting at the earliest possible moment. It is
now known that this desire for haste reflected the decision of the
Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that-
"*If by the early part of October* there is no reasonable hope of having
our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations * * *, we will
immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and
England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."
On the other hand, the United States Government, knowing nothing of
these plans but nonetheless skeptical of Japan's peaceful intentions,
was insisting that before the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should
take place the two Governments should preliminary agree upon the
fundamental matters under consideration when the conversations were
broken off in July after the Japanese military occupation of southern
French Indochina. This latter position had been taken in the reply to
Premier Konoye which President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura on
September 3, and had been repeated many times by Secretary Hull in his
subsequent conversations with the Ambassador.
The Committee has obtained from the files of President Roosevelt a
memorandum in Secretary Hull's handwriting, on White House stationery,
apparently written by the Secretary for the President before the latter
left Washington for Hyde Park about September 25 (Washington time) (ex.
179; ex. 1, p. 40). This memorandum summarized Secretary Hull's views at
the time:
"My suggestion on Jap situation-for you to read later*."
"C.H.
"When the Jap Prime Minister requested a meeting with you, he indicated
a fairly basic program in generalities, but left open such questions as
getting troops out of China, Tripartite Pact, nondiscrimination in trade
in Pacific."
Page 320 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"We indicated desire for meeting, but suggested first an agreement in
principle on the vital questions left open, so as to insure the success
of the conference.
"Soon thereafter, the Japs narrowed their position on these basic
questions, and now continue to urge the meeting at Juneau.
"My suggestion is to recite their more liberal attitude when they first
sought the meeting with you, with their much narrowed position *now*,
and earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original liberal
attitude so we can start discussions again on agreement in principle
before the meeting, and reemphasizing your desire for a meeting (ex.
179). [Italics in original.]"
President Roosevelt sent his comments to Secretary Hull from Hyde Park
in the following memorandum dated September 28 (Washington time):
"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
"I wholly agree with your penciled note-to recite the more liberal
original attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting,
point out their much narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot
go back to their original attitude, start discussions again on agreement
in principle, and reemphasize my hope for a meeting.
"F. D. R.
"(Ex. 179.)"
On October 2 (Washington time), Secretary Hull handed to Ambassador
Nomura the United States' reply to the Japanese Government's proposals
of September 6 and its subsequent statements of September 23 (Annex c)
and September 27 (Annex D). This reply briefly reviewed the course of
the conversations thus far, pointing out that developments from early
August up to September 6 had seemed to justify the United States
Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected
to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive
program covering the entire Pacific area. The reply continued:
"It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the
United States that the proposals of the Japanese Government presented by
the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese
Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for
discussions, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two
Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent
explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of
this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the
principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had
been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese
Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting
into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and
maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area (ex. 29,
vol. II, pp. 658-659)."
It was then noted that the Japanese assurances of peaceful intent
continued to be qualified by phrases the need for which was not readily
apparent; that in the economic sphere the new proposals were restricted
to the countries of the Southwest Pacific area, rather than the entire
Pacific area, as before; and that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's
intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and
French Indochina would be most helpful in making known Japan's peaceful
intentions, as would additional clarification of the Japanese
Government's position with respect to the European war. The reply
continued by stating that from what the Japanese Government had so far
indicated in regard to its purposes, the United States Government had
derived the impression that Japan had in mind a program by which the
liberal and progressive principles adhered to by the United States would
be circumscribed in their application by qualifications and exceptions.
The Japanese Government was
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 321
then asked whether, under such circumstances, it believed the proposed
Roosevelt-Konoye meeting would be likely to contribute to the high
purposes "which we have mutually had in mind." The reply concluded by
stating that it was the belief of the United States Government that
renewed consideration of the fundamental principles which it had long
advocated would aid in reaching a meeting of minds in regard to the
essential questions on which agreement was sought and would thus lay a
firm foundation for the proposed meeting, and that it was the
President's earnest hope that a discussion of the fundamental questions
might be so developed that the meeting could be held (ex. 29, vol. II,
pp. 656-661). After reading the reply, Ambassador Nomura commented that
he thought his Government would be disappointed because of its very
earnest desire to hold the meeting, but that in any case he would
transmit it to his Government, which he did the same day (ex. 29, vol.
II, p. 655; ex. 1, p. 50). He added that he was convinced that the
Japanese Government was entirely sincere in this matter and had no
ulterior purpose. He said, however, that in view of the difficulties of
the internal situation in Japan, he did not think his Government could
go any further at this time (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 655).
In a memorandum bearing the same date, October 2 (Washington time),
which was distributed to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in
addition to Secretary Stimson, General Marshall and other high officers
in the War Department, Colonel Hayes A. Kronor, Acting Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, reached the following conclusions:
"10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of
leaders nor economic concessions at this point would be of any material
advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw
from the Axis were obtained prior to the conference. * * *
"11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the
Japanese Government at the present time our course lies straight before
us. This Division still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis
Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and
economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time,
the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the
Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the
Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy"
by the United States is still clearly indicated (ex. 33)."
The following undated note, in Secretary Stimson's handwriting, appears
at the end of his copy of the above memorandum:
"Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them
strongly. I believe however that during the next three months while we
are rearming the Philippines great care must be exercised to avoid an
explosion by the Japanese Army. Put concretely this means, that while I
approve of stringing out negotiations during that period, they should
not be allowed to ripen into a personal conference between the President
and P. M. [1] I greatly fear that such a conference if actually held
would produce concessions which would be highly dangerous to our vitally
important relations with China (ex. 33)."
Admiral Stark testified before the Committee that he neither opposed or
approved the proposal for a meeting between President Roosevelt and
Premier Konoye. He continued:
"I do recall when it was discussed my own personal opinion was that the
President and Mr. Hull were right in not just going out to discuss
something with the Prime Minister without some preliminary agreement
regarding the agenda and something which might be accomplished (tr.
6308).
[1] Prime Minister Konoye.
Page 322 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull set forth at
length the considerations which were taken into account in determining
the position to be taken by the United States Government regarding the
proposed "leaders conference" (tr. 1120-1124).
The next day, October 3 (Washington time), after he had forwarded the
United States reply to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura cabled Foreign Minister
Toyoda a long report on the situation in the United States as he saw it.
His report began by stating-
"although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U. S. Talks have finally
reached a deadlock, we do not believe that it should be considered as an
absolutely hopeless situation. We are of the impression that the United
States worded their memorandum in such a way as to permit a ray of hope
to penetrate through (ex. 1, p. 51-52)."
He expressed the view that an "understanding" between Japan and the
United States hinged on one point, the problem of the evacuation of the
Japanese troops from China (ex. 1, p. 53).
During the next 2 weeks the Japanese Foreign Office made repeated
efforts both in Washington and in Tokyo to have the United States
Government state what further assurances it desired from the Japanese
Government, emphasizing that the position of Premier Konoye was daily
growing more difficult. Also during this period, Ambassador Nomura
appears to have incurred the displeasure of Foreign Minister Toyoda. In
a message to the Foreign Minister on October 8 (Washington time), the
Ambassador indicated that he agreed with many of Secretary Hull's
criticisms of the Japanese proposals of September 6, which the Foreign
Office had prepared. He expressed the opinion that-
"In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did
we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal
conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees
we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated
concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We
limited the area to which the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment
would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was
geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the
question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China
(including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands
which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that
they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact.
These points you probably already know (ex. 1, p. 59)."
As the result of repeated instructions from the Foreign Minister to
obtain from Secretary Hull an expression of his views regarding the
three major points of difference between the two Governments, i. e.,
which had developed in the earlier conversations, namely, (1) the
withdrawal of troops from China, (2) Japan's obligations under the
Tripartite Pact, and (3) nondiscrimination in international trade,
Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull on October 9 (Washington
time) (vol. II, pp. 670 672). The Ambassador's report of this meeting
(ex. 1, p. 61) was plainly unsatisfactory to Foreign Minister Toyoda,
for on October 10 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador
Nomura that he was well aware of the Ambassador's opinions and that what
he wanted was "the opinions of the American officials and none other."
Saying that "slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has
reached the decisive stage," and that he was doing his utmost "to bring
about a decision on them and the situation does not permit of this
senseless procrastination," he told Ambassador Nomura:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 323
"You do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with
these parleys. You do not tell me how Hull answers. You do not tell me
anything else I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire
me in detail and immediately the minutes of these conversations, what
they say and the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you
interview Hull or the President of the United States, please take
Wakasugi or Iguchi with you and please send me without delay the
complete minutes of what transpires (ex. 1, p. 63)."
On the same afternoon, October 10 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Toyoda
requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and during their conversation
told Ambassador Grew that Ambassador Nomura had been "unable to provide
the information" he had asked for and that-
"a week of very valuable time had been wasted in an endeavor to elicit
through the Japanese Ambassador information which, had it been received,
would have measurably accelerated the present conversations (ex. 30, p.
454)."
The Foreign Minister told Ambassador Grew that in order to prevent
further delay he was requesting the Ambassador to ask his Government to
reply to the following question:
"The Government of Japan has submitted to the Government of the United
States with reference to certain questions proposals which are
apparently not satisfactory to the Government of the United States. Will
the American Government now set forth to the Japanese Government for its
consideration the undertakings to be assumed by the Japanese Government
which would be satisfactory to the American Government (ex. 29, vol. II,
p. 678)?"
He continued by saying that since-
"he had the impression that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was
apparently very fatigued, serious consideration was being given to the
question of sending to Washington a diplomat of wide experience to
assist the Ambassador in carrying on the present conversations. Admiral
Toyoda said he had in mind a high-ranking diplomatic official with the
personal rank of Ambassador, but he had not yet approached the official
in question and was therefore uncertain as to whether he would agree to
undertake to accept the mission. It would be of great assistance to the
Minister to ascertain whether the Government of the United States, in
the event that it was decided to send the official in question to
Washington, would be prepared to make available a reservation for him on
the airplane from Manila to San Francisco. Admiral Toyoda said that the
official in question would not be accredited to the Government of the
United-States but would be temporarily and unofficially attached to the
Japanese Embassy in Washington. I told the Foreign Minister that I would
transmit his inquiry to my Government.
"In concluding the conversation, the Minister several times stressed to
me, in view of the importance of the time factor, the necessity of
expediting the progress of the conversations (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 679)."
Ambassador Nomura replied to Foreign Minister Toyoda's message of
October 10 (Japan time) on the same date (Washington time):
"What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, and they
claim that our policy is semipacific and semiaggressive. They say that
our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements
and that it will be out of the question to agree on any preparatory
talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition to the three matters
mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many other
objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do not
understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at
least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance
with the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. *I am sure
that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a
conference of leaders so long as we do not make that compromise.*
"In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they
have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider
at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of
their answer of the 2nd (ex. I, p. 63).
On Oc