Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ............................... 75
Consciousness of danger from air attack .......................... 75
Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ........... 75
General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............ 79
Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier ............. 81
Concept of the war in the Pacific .............................. 87
Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air
attack ....................................................... 88
VI C O N T E N T S
Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii-Continued Page
Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the
imminence of war .............................................. 89
Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the
imminence of war .............................................. 100
Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders
from Washington ............................................... 103
Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103
Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104
The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104
Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107
On where the attack might come .............................. 107
Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108
"Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109
The "War warning" and training .............................. 110
The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute
distant reconnaissance .................................... 110
Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117
Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the
warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119
No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120
Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121
"Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and
"Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123
Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125
Interference with training ................................... 125
The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126
The Short reply ................................................. 128
Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27
dispatch ...................................................... 129
The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130
General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter
by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131
The "Lost" Japanese carriers-Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133
The "Mori" call ................................................. 137
Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138
Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140
Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142
Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142
The "Manila message" ......................................... 142
The Honolulu press ........................................... 142
The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145
Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150
Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 75
PART III.
RESPONSIBILITIES IN HAWAII
CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
The Japanese raiding force approached the island of Oahu with
virtually no danger of detection and executed its treacherous attack at
a time when only a minimum state of readiness prevailed to meet it. [1]
One of the causes of the disaster in consequence must lie in the failure
to employ facilities available to detect the attacking force in
sufficient time to effect a state of readiness best designed to repel or
minimize the attack. That the attack on Pearl Harbor surprised the
defending Army and Navy establishments is indisputable. The question
therefore becomes, as previously indicated: Under all of the
circumstances should the responsible commanders at Hawaii have been
surprised or, more particularly, were they justified in failing to
employ adequately the defensive facilities available to them on the
morning of December 7, 1941? [2]
The estimate of both Admirals Richardson [3] and Kimmel [4] in a letter
which they jointly prepared and dispatched to the Chief of Naval
Operations on January 25, 1941, pointed out that if Japan entered the
war or committed an overt act against the United States our position
would be primarily defensive in the Pacific. [5] There were outlined in
the letter certain assumptions upon which the action of the Pacific
Fleet would be predicated, including:
"(a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy; (b) war with Japan
imminent; (c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may
take any form_even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian
flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be
considered German or Italian; and (d) Japanese attacks may be expected
against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units. Surprise raids on
Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are possible. "
It was pointed out that the tasks to be undertaken by the fleet with
respect to these assumptions included the taking of full security
[1] See section "State of Readiness," Part II, supra.
[2] The Army Pearl Harbor Board said: "Therefore, the situation on
December 7 can be summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was
being conducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBY's were out; the
antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with
the Fleet air arm, the naval carriers with their planes were at a
distance from Oahu on that Sunday; the aircraft were on the ground, were
parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one another; the Fleet
was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12, which
included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers Lexington and
Enterprise. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of that near
the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat
divisions as well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent
quarters and not in battle positions. Everything was concentrated in
close confines by reason of anti-sabotage Alert No. 1. This made of them
easy targets for an air attack. *In short everything that was done made
the situation perfect for an air attack and the Japanese took full
advantage of it.*" See Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, Committee
Exhibit No. 157
[3] Admiral James O. Richardson, who preceded Admiral Kimmel as
commander in chief of the Pacific.
[4] Admiral Husband E. Kimmel assumed command of the United States
Pacific Fleet on February 1, 1941 and served in that capacity until
December 17, 1941. The evidence clearly indicates that while Admiral
Kimmel was promoted over several other officers with more seniority, his
selection was made because he was regarded as preeminently qualified for
the position of commander in chief.
[5] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 70.
76 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
measures for the protection of the fleet in port and at sea. Thereafter
there were set forth observations concerning the existing deficiencies
in the defenses of Oahu.
Under date of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of Navy addressed a
communication to the Secretary of War, with copies designated for the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District, observing among other things: [6]
"The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of
the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the
Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This
reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of
the situation with respect to Japan and by reports from abroad of
successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases.
*If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that
hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or
the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.*
"In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the
Fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be
done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to
withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.
"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are
considered to be:
"(1) Air bombing attack.
"(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
"(3) Sabotage.
"(4) Submarine attack.
"(5) Mining.
"(6) Bombardment by gun fire.
"Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have
been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted
principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2)
above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.
"Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out
successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other
operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at
twelve aircraft squadrons and the minimum at two. Attacks would be
launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.
"The counter measures to be considered are:
"(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels
before air attack can be launched;
"(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their
objectives;
"(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire
"(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
"(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.
"The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but,
quit possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack
initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war Pursuit aircraft
in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the
operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit
aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and
equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire
control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on
visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to
four miles. * * *"
The foregoing communication was seen by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he
assumed command. [7]
The Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, replied to the letter of the
Secretary of Navy in the following terms: [8]
"1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility
of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I
wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter
and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a
hostile effort. The Hawaiian
[6] Committee Exhibit No. 10.
[7] Admiral Kimmel testified: "* * * I saw the letter of the Secretary
of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24, 1941, early in
February 1941." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 286.
[8] Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 24.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 77
Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and
continues to old a high priority for the completion of its projected
defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the
Fleet.
"2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight
pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes,
nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less
efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes
assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days,
as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit
group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat
less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit
planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be
assembled at: San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to
Hawaii.
"3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA
guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route) and one hundred and nine caliber
.50 AA machine gun}. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch
guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight
caliber .50 AA machine guns.
"4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment
therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All
arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the
equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery
of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.
"5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to
give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of
balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base
facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for
installation, and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941.
At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured_
forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The
Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred
and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas in Oahu
is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and
geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke
impracticable or large-scale screening operations. However, the
Commanding General will look into this matter again.
"6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am
forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the
local naval authorities in making those measures effective."
In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated January 27, 1941, [9]
Admiral Kimmel stated he thought the supply of an adequate number of
Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the
highest priority.
It should be noted at this point in considering the letter of the
Secretary of Navy dated January 24, 1941, that the following dispatch
dated February 1, 1941, was sent the commander in chief of the Pacific
Fleet from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the subject "Rumored
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor": [10]
"1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27
January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State
Department to the following effect:
" "The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of my staff that he has
heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that in the event
of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the
Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all
of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian
Minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless he considered
them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of
my staff."
"2. The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these
rumors. furthermore, based on known data regarding the present
disposition and employment of Japanese Naval and Army forces, no move
against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable
future.
[9] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[10] This dispatch is indicated to have been dictated by Lt. Comdr. (now
Captain) A. H. McCollum on January 31, 1941. See committee exhibit No.
15.
78 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The estimate made concerning the information supplied by the Peruvian
Minister with respect to a rumored Japanese surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor and a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24
were received by Admiral Kimmel at approximately the same time and are
in apparent conflict. However, the dispatch of February 1 was an
estimate of the rumor concerning the Japanese plan to make a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor based on the then present disposition and
employment of Japanese forces, whereas the Secretary's letter relates to
the dangers of the Pearl Harbor situation in contemplation of future
conflict with Japan. The communications apparently were so interpreted
by Admiral Kimmel for in a letter dated February 18, 1941, to the Chief
of Naval Operations he said: [11]
"I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl
Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to
minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force
will pay."
In a letter of February 15, 1941 [12] the Chief of Naval Operations
wrote Admiral Kimmel concerning antitorpedo baffles for protection
against air-torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. He stated that the
congestion in the harbor and the necessity for maneuverability limited
the practicability of the then present type of baffles. Further, the
letter indicated that the shallow depth of water in Pearl Harbor limited
the need for torpedo nets; that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet
might be assumed necessary to drop torpedoes successfully from planes
and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. A similar
communication was sent Admiral Bloch, the commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District, among others, requesting his recommendations and
comments concerning the matter. [13]
In a letter of March 20, [14] Admiral Bloch replied, stating that the
depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet and for this reason among
others he did not recommend antitorpedo baffles. Admiral Kimmel was in
agreement with this recommendation until such time as a light efficient
net was developed. [15]
However, in June of 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a
communication to the commandants of naval districts as follows: [16]
"1. * * * Commandants were requested to consider the employment of, and
to make recommendations concerning, antitorpedo baffles especially for
the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their
respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph
3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T
baffles among which the following was stated:
" "A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to
successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of
torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this
may be altered."
"2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British
torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three
hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less
than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it
cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe
when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a
sufficient run to arm the torpedo.
"3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be
anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo-
plane attack, it may
[11] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[12] Id., No. 116.
[13] Letter from Chief of Naval Operations dated February 17, 1941.
Committee exhibit No. 116.
[14] See Committee exhibit No. 116.
[15] Letter to the Chief of Naval Operations dated March 12,1941,
Committee exhibit No. 116
[16] Letter dated June 13, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to
commandants of all naval districts. Committee exhibit No. 116. This
communication made reference to the observations set forth in the letter
of February 17,1941 (committee exhibit No. 116), pointing out certain
limitations with respect to air torpedo attack. Note 13, supra.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 79
be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by
any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10
fathoms [16a] or more) is much more likely.
"4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at
Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water,
although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve
fathoms. [17]"
The foregoing communication clearly indicated that preconceived views
concerning the invulnerability of Pearl Harbor to air-torpedo attack
were in error.
Admiral Kimmel himself stated that during his visit to Washington in
June of 1941 he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers
to the fleet at Pearl Harbor including air attack, blocking of the
harbor, and similar matters. [18]
GENERAL SHORT'S AWARENESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
On February 7, 1941, General Short [19] assumed command of the Hawaiian
Department of the Army. Upon his arrival he had the benefit of
conversations with General Herron, [20] his predecessor, with respect to
problems prevailing in the Department. Significantly General Herron had
been directed by the War Department on June 17, 1940, to institute an
alert against a possible trans-Pacific raid. [21] This alert was an all-
out endeavor with full equipment and ammunition and lasted 6 weeks. It
was suspended after the 6-week period and thereafter resumed for some
time. Planes had been dispersed and gun crews alerted with the
ammunition available. The Commanding General lead the benefit of all the
plans and operations incident to the so-called "Herron alert" as a guide
in estimating the steps to be taken on the occasion of a threat of enemy
attack.
General Short saw both the letter from the Secretary of Navy dated
January 24 and the reply of the Secretary of War dated February 7, set
forth in the preceding section, concerning the danger of attack from the
air. [22]
Under date of February 7, 1941, General Marshall directed a letter to
General Short relating in utmost clarity the problems and responsibility
of General Short in his new command. [23] This letter, which referred to
a conversation with Admiral Stark, pointed out that there was need for
additional planes and antiaircraft guns; that the fullest protection for
the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major consideration of the
Army; that the risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid
by air and by submarine constituted the real perils of the situation;
and, again, that they were keeping clearly in mind that the first
concern is to protect the feet.
On February 19, 1941, General Short wrote General Marshall [24] pointing
out, among other things, the great importance of (1) cooperation with
the Navy; (2) dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair,
maintenance, and servicing of aircraft; (3) improvement of the
[16a] A fathom is 6 feet.
[17] The evidence reflects repeated efforts by the Chief of Naval
Operations to secure from the Bureau of Ordnance more efficient light-
weight baffles. See committee exhibit No. 116.
[18] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 367.
[19] Lt. Gen Walter C. Short served as commanding general of the
Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941.
[20] Maj. Gen. Charles B. Herron.
[21] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 213-215.
[22] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 237.
[23] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 1-3.
[24] Id., at pp. 4-9.
80 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
antiaircraft defense; (4) improvement of the situation with reference to
searchlights; and (5) bombproofing of vital installations such as
command posts and communication centers. General Short advised the Chief
of Staff that he was taking the necessary steps in line with the
important needs of the Department.
On March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General short: [25]
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian
Department with regard to *defense from air attack*. The establishment
of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end
is a matter of first priority."
In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated March 6, 1941, [26] General
Short observed that the Aircraft Warning Service was vital to the
defense of the Hawaiian Islands and referred to delays in construction
and establishment of sites. In a subsequent letter [27] General Short
again referred to the necessary for the dispersion and protection of
aircraft as well as to the matter of coordinating antiaircraft defense.
A letter dated March 28, 1941, [28] from General Marshall made reference
to General Short's proposal for relieving congestion by the construction
of an additional airfield and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in
protected bunkers at existing airfields with the observation that the
proposal was undoubtedly sound. He also indicated his hopefulness of
arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison.
On April 14, 1941, General Short wrote the Chief of Staff, as follows:
[29]
"Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are
making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following
agreements made with them: [30]
"1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and
Fourteenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security
Measure.
"2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, to implement the above
agreement.
"3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the
Army the provisions of the joint agreement.
"I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and
we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army
and Navy air forces to act together and with the unity of command as the
situation requires.
"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the
air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at
something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the
more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up
an air defense command. Some months before my arrival this matter was
considered and at that time the conclusion was reached that it was not
necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General Martin and
General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the Fall.
"Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal
to be done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much
encouraged by the increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall
write you from time to time as matters come up which I think will
interest you."
In a letter to the Chief of Staff dated May 29, 1941, General Short made
the following comments concerning the first phase of their recent
maneuvers: [31]
"The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted
of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of Engineer
Supplies for Field
[25] Id., at p. 10.
[26] Id., at pp. 11, 12.
[27] Letter dated March 15,1941. Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 15-17.
[28] Committee exhibit No. 53, p. 18.
[29] Id., at pp. 19, 20
[30] See section "Plans for Defense of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier",
infra.
[31] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 35, 36.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 81
Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers
acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons
and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea.
The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol
planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers
and they then made the attack: Pursuit attacked enemy bombers
represented by naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to
attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our
bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and pursuit planes were
dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I
believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy
Air Force, and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise."
On August 19, 1941, General Marshall addressed a letter to General Short
setting forth his reasons for deciding to establish an airfield base for
the Fifteenth Pursuit Group at Kahuku Point and stated:
"I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance
of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and accordingly,
will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the
efficiency of such defense. [32]"
The Chief of Staff on October 10, 1941, sent the following letter to
General Short: [33]
"The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian
Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am
particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For
instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the
mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu
against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional
battalion of 500 men for military police duty.
"*This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air
strength in Hawaii*, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum
operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of
fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of air-base
defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two
antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving
the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at
locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as
there are in Hawaii."
On October 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short stating that
he appreciated the reasons General Short had assigned for giving ground
defense training to Air Corps personnel [34] but that it appeared the
best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps
training until they have completed their expansion program and have
their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned.
[35]
From the foregoing correspondence there can be no doubt that General
Short was adequately apprised of his responsibility to defend the fleet
from attack and that he was conscious of the necessity of building up
the defense against air attack.
PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER
There is nowhere, however, a better expression of the keen understanding
of the danger of a surprise air attack upon Oahu than is manifested in
the plans which the Army and Navy jointly effected for the defense of
the Hawaiian coastal frontier.
[32] Id., at pp. 40, 41.
[31] Id., at p. 42.
[34] In this connection General Short had written General Marshall on
October 14,1941, in part: "At the time our tentative Standing Operating
Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details
and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the planes and
organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no
assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the
assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers.
Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground
attack on Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces." See
committee exhibit No. 53.
[35] Committee exhibit No. 53, pp. 44, 45.
82 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Hawaiian coastal frontier was listed in defense category D. This
category covered *coastal frontiers that may be subject to major
attack*. The war plans "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," the
basic document controlling the relationship of the Army and Navy in the
formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands, contains the
following with respect to category D: [36]
"Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this
category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with
the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval
operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of
defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a
more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C
(coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor
attack) will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea
areas will be established. In addition, an antiaircraft gun and machine-
gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be
organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to
facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be
developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of
operations. Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans
made for use of the GHQ air force."
As a basic responsibility ("Joint Action Army and Navy 1935") under
contemplation of normal circumstances responsibility for the defense of
Pearl Harbor was that of the Army. [37] It was recognized that- [38]
"* * * The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured.
This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted
as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its
bases * * *. "
The basic allocation of Army and Navy responsibility for coastal defense
was not possible under conditions prevailing in Hawaii during 1941.
Fundamental deficiencies in equipment, particularly shortage of
sufficient Army patrol planes, confronted the responsible commanders. As
Admiral Kimmel stated shortly after assuming command at Pearl Harbor_
[39]
"There is a definite line of demarcation between this objective and
longer range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be
continued as an essential basis for determining and stressing improved
readiness requirements. This planning will naturally include the more
effective schemes of employment that improved readiness, when attained,
will permit.
"Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommendation
for or expectation of, improved conditions or facilities. *Such plans
must be based only on hard fact*. They must be so developed as to
provide for *immediate* action, based on facilities and materials that
are *now* available.
"A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing
is maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor
defense, of all available aviation components. As is well known, much
remains to be done for adequate *future* effectiveness in this respect.
Much, however, can *now* be done with means now available, to make
arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they
now are."
In realistic recognition of this situation, plans were conceived early
in 1941 known as "The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier". [40] This plan was signed and placed in effect on
April 11, 1941, by General Short and Admiral Bloch, commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District. The plan was based on the joint
[36] "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", Navy Court of Inquiry
exhibit No. 6.
[37] Id.
[38] Id., at p. 42.
[39] Letter of February 4, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet
personnel. See committee record pp. 14511, 14512.
[40] See committee exhibit No. 44; also Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit
No. 7.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 83
Army and Navy basic war plans [41] and was to constitute the basis on
which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and
mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the
plan was by *mutual cooperation* which was to apply to all activities
wherein the Army and the Navy would cooperate in coordination until and
if the method of unity of command were invoked.
Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the following tasks of the
Army and Navy were recognized:
"a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to
control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
"b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air
forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.
"c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect
shipping therein; to support the Army forces."
One of the most significant features of the plan was the assumption of
responsibility by the Navy for distant reconnaissance, a normal task of
the Army. In this regard, the plan provided: "The Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District, shall provide for: * * * i. *Distant Reconnaissance*."
On March 28, 1941, an agreement, incorporated as an annex to the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, [42] was prepared and approved by General
Short and Admiral Bloch on April 2 dealing with joint security measures
and protection of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor base. This agreement
was entered into-
"in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the
Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile
raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before
a general mobilization for war."
It was recognized that-
"*when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
Base Defense Officer* (the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District)
*agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently
imminent* to warrant such action, each commander will take such
preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to
the other commander such proportion of the air forces at is disposal as
the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be
conducted * * *"
Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels were to be executed under
the tactical command of the Navy. When naval forces were insufficient
for long-distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were
made available, these aircraft were to be under the tactical control of
the Navy. It was contemplated that the Army would expedite the
installation and operation of an Aircraft Warning service through use of
radar.
On March 31, 1941, Admiral Bellinger, as commander, Naval Base Defense
Air Force, and General Martin, commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a
joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of
sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.
The situation was summarized in the following terms: [43]
(1) Relations between the United States and Japan are strained;
uncertain, and varying.
(2) In the past Japan has never preceded hostile actions by declaration
of war.
[41] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibits Nos. 4 and 5.
[42] Annex VII, see. VI. See committee exhibit No. 44.
[43] See committee exhibit No. 44.
84 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations
on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the
Western Pacific for a long period.
(4) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating
areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or
submarine force which initiates hostile action.
(5) It appears possible that Japanese submarines and/or a Japanese fast
raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters without prior warning from
our intelligence service.
The estimate embracing a "Survey of Opposing Strength" indicated, among
other things, that Japan might send into the Hawaiian area one or more
submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers
supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet
would be when several of the above elements were present and closely
coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii
were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a
patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from a Japanese
carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. It was
elsewhere observed in the estimate that it would be desirable to run
daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 but that this
could only be effectively maintained with "present personnel and
material" for a very short period, and as a practical measure could not
therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a
surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. [44]
The outline of possible enemy action as set forth in the Martin-
Bellinger estimate is a startling harbinger of what actually occurred:
[45]
"(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
"1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
"2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
"3. A combination of these two.
"(b) It appears that *the most likely and dangerous form of attack on
OAHU would be an air attack*. It is believed that at present such an
attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which
would probably approach inside of 300 miles.
"(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more
submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft
have been drawn away by the original thrust.
"(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a
considerable undiscovered surface force *probably* composed of fast
ships accompanied by a carrier.
"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be
delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be
using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which
pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a
diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The
major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and
attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the
carrier could use the night for escape
[44] In a statement submitted to the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral
Kimmel referred to this portion of the estimate and stated: "This plan
was on file with the Departments in Washington. They knew of this
decision. *They had done nothing to change or alter the basic
deficiencies in personnel and material which required that decision.*"
This statement, it should be noted, is not strictly accurate. The number
of Navy patrol bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance was
increased appreciably after the Martin-Bellinger estimate was prepared.
As will subsequently appear, there were sufficient patrol planes at Oahu
to conduct a distant reconnaissance for a considerable period of time
after receipt of the November 27 "war warning" (detailed reference will
be made to this warning, infra). The estimate made by Admiral Bellinger
and General Martin was prepared in March of 1941 and was necessarily in
contemplation of patrol planes then available. As indicated, the number
of Navy planes available for this purpose was substantially increased
before December 7. See committee exhibit No. 120.
[45] Committee exhibit No. 44.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 85
and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a
successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the
day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under
the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for
until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive
action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise.
Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of
the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer
certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk
attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better
chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be
coordinated with any air attack."
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 from Admiral Kimmel the
Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the fleet at base and in
operating areas, was issued in February 1941 and reissued in revised
form on October 14, 1941. [46] This fleet order was predicated on two
assumptions, one being_ [47]
"That a declaration of war may be preceded by_
"(1) A surprise attack on ships at Pearl Harbor.
"(2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
"(3) A combination of these two."
Among the provisions of this letter concerning action to be taken if
submarine attacked in the operating area it was pointed out_
"It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the
presence of more submarines waiting to attack_"
that_
"it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate
the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast
ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must,
therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and
daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet
enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."
A letter dated August 20, 1941, to the commanding general, Army Air
Forces, Washington, prepared by General Martin, and transmitted through
General Short, submitted as an enclosure a plan for the employment of
long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. Several
observations set forth in this plan are of particular pertinence: [48]
"The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of
hostile carriers in this vicinity before the approach within range of
Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an
attack on Oahu.
* * * * * * *
"Our most likely enemy, Orange (Japan), can probably employ a maximum of
six carriers against Oahu.
* * * * * * *
"* * * The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action
open to the enemy.
* * * * * * *
[46] Id.
[47] Referring to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 14, 1941, to the
fleet 2CL-41 (revised) wherein it was stated that a declaration of war
may be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (see
committee exhibit No. 44), he was asked what form of surprise attack on
ships in Pearl Harbor he contemplated by this statement. Admiral Kimmel
replied:
"*An airplane attack. This was an assumption upon which to base our
training. The probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was
sufficient to justify complete training for this purpose.* I felt, as
the situation developed, the Fleet might move away from Pearl Harbor,
and in such a contingency the possibility of a quick raid on the
installations at Pearl Harbor might be attempted. I thought it was much
more probable that the Japs would attempt a raid on Pearl Harbor if the
Fleet were away than if it were there. However, at no time did I
consider it more than a possibility and one which ordinary prudence
would make us guard against." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 287.
[48] See committee exhibit No. 13.
86 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is
highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to escape under cover
of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable.
This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following
reasons:
"(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical
method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.
"(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D-Day at
close at range.
"(3) The enemy will be more concerned with deliverying [sic] a
successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He
will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably
make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept
his losses if his attack is successful.
* * * * * * *
"The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action
upon which we should base our plans of operation is the early morning
attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:
"(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before
the attack.
"(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before
the attack.
"(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of
the attack.
"(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the
day of the attack
* * * * * * *
"He (Japan) will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.
"a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.
"b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian
materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of
detection by friendly surface vessels. *It seems that his most probable
avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0 (due north)
counterclockwise to 180 around Oahu, the next probable*, the quadrant
180 counterclockwise to 90 ; the least probable, 90 to 0 ."
Admiral Kimmel and General Short were both fully familiar with all the
provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The plans
effected for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier viewed in
their entirety were fully adequate under the circumstances and represent
a commendable recognition by the Hawaiian commanders of the realities of
their situation. [49] The unfortunate fact is that features of the plan
designed to meet an air attack were not invoked prior to the actual
attack in view of the imminence of hostile Japanese action. It is clear
that the plans with respect to joint air operations was to be operative
when the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the naval
base defense officer "agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack
is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action." [50] It is equally
clear that the joint security measures for the protection of the fleet
and the Pearl Harbor base were designed in order to coordinate joint
defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks
delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general
mobilization for war. The plan against air attack was prepared in
Hawaii; it was designed to meet the peculiar problems existing in
[49] Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Admiral Kimmel stated that "he
(Admiral Bloch) accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance,
because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible." See Army Pearl
Harbor Board Record, p 1753.
He commented "There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft
available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any."
Id.
[50] Committee exhibit No. 44.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 87
Hawaii; its invocation, implementation, and execution was essentially a
responsibility resting in Hawaii. [51]
From a review of the defense plans prepared in Hawaii the conclusion is
inescapable that the Army and Navy commanders there not only appreciated
the dangers of an air attack on Pearl Harbor but had also prepared
detailed arrangements to meet this threat.
CONCEPT OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC
It is to be recalled that from January 29 to March 27, 1941, staff
conversations were held in Washington between Army and Navy officials of
Great Britain and the United States to determine the best methods by
which the armed forces of the United States and the British
Commonwealth, with its allies, could defeat Germany and the powers
allied with her *should the United States be compelled to resort to
war.* [52] The report of these conversations, dated March 27, 1941, and
referred to by the short title "ABC-1," reflected certain principles
governing contemplated action, including: [53]
"Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the
Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater. The
principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theater,
and operations of United States forces in other theaters will be
conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort."
In recognition of the foregoing principle that the Atlantic and European
area was to be considered the decisive theater, the concept of military
operations as respecting Japan was expressed as follows: [54]
"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the
Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to
deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese
intervention. If Japan does enter the war, *the military strategy in the
Far East will be defensive*. The United States does not intend to add to
its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United
States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken
Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier
by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States
intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas
that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the
necessary forces for the Far East."
Pursuant to the principles and plans visualized in ABC-1, the Army and
Navy prepared "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan_Rainbow No. 5," which
was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on May 28, 1941, and by the
Secretary of War on June 2, 1941. [55] On July 21, 1941, United States
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five was distributed to the Pacific
Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This
[51] The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, expressed this thought in the
following terms: "* * * each theater commander is charged with the
preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of
any defense operations with the local naval authorities. Such plans are
submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington
and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from
that source. *The primary responsibility for such plans and their
creation, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the
local situation and conditions*. Before December 7, 1941 detailed plans
for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked
out by General Short as well as a joint agreement with the local naval
authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency and *he and
the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting
into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion
demanded*." See statement of Secretary of War with respect to the report
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board; committee exhibit No. 157.
[52] Committee exhibit No. 49. See section " ABCD Understanding?", Part
IV, infra, this report.
[53] Committee exhibit No. 49 p. 5.
[54] Id., at pp. 5, 6.
[55] See Navy Court of Inquiry exhibit No. 4. This Plan is also referred
to as "WPL-46."
88 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five)
insofar as the tasks assigned the United States Pacific Fleet were
concerned and was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations on September
9, 1941. [56] It assumed, consistent with "ABC-1" and the United States
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, that the principal military
efforts of the Associated Powers would be in the Atlantic and European
areas, and that operations in other areas would be so conducted as to
facilitate that effort.
In estimating the likely enemy (Japanese) action it was observed, among
other things, that it was believed Japan's initial action would be
toward "possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other
outlying United States positions" and "raiding and observation forces
widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian Area."
One of the tasks formulated to accomplish assigned missions contemplated
by the plan under phase I (Japan not in the war) was to "guard against
surprise attack by Japan."
Under phase IA (initial tasks_Japan in the war) the Pacific Fleet, among
other things was to "make reconnaissance and raid in force on the
Marshall Islands." Among the tasks under phase II (succeeding tasks) was
"to capture and establish a protected fleet base anchorage in the
Marshall Island area."
From the Army standpoint, as stated by General Marshall, the fullest
protection for the Pacific Fleet was *the* rather than *a* major
consideration. [57] The function of the Army, therefore, was primarily
that of protecting Hawaii because it was the sea and air base of the
fleet and to render protection to the fleet proper when it was in
harbor. [53] Aside from these purposes, the protection of the Hawaiian
Islands was secondary and necessary only to the extent of making it
possible for the Army to execute its primary mission.
CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS OF DANGER FROM AIR ATTACK
Considering all of the information made available to the commanding
officers of the Army and Navy in Hawaii from the time of their assuming
command until December 7, 1941, it must be concluded that both General
Short and Admiral Kimmel knew that if Pearl Harbor was to be attacked
the danger of a Japanese air attack upon that base was the greatest
peril of their situation and that the necessity of taking steps to
provide the best possible defense to this most dangerous form of attack
was clearly indicated. It is further concluded that both responsible
officers appreciated the fact that Japan might strike before a formal
declaration of war.
It is clear that the function of both the Army and the Navy in the
Pacific was essentially a defensive one, particularly in the early
stages of the war. While diversionary and sporadic raids were envisaged
for the fleet, naval operations were to be fundamentally defensive in
character. Pending imminence of war against Japan both services were
engaged in preparation and training for this eventuality.
[56] Id, exhibit No. 5. This plan is referred to as "U. S. Pacific Fleet
Operating Plan, Rainbow 5, Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five (WP Pac-46)."
[57] Committee exhibit No. 53 pp. 1-3
[58] As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: "The defense of a permanent
naval base is the direct responsibility of the Army. The Navy is
expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within
whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the
base is a joint operation only to that extent." See Navy Court of
Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 89
The next point of inquiry is to determine whether Admiral Kimmel and
General Short, through information available to them, were adequately
informed concerning the imminence of war in such manner as reasonably to
contemplate they would employ every facility at their command in defense
of the fleet and the fleet base.
INFORMATION SUPPLIED ADMIRAL KIMMEL BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE
IMMINENCE OF WAR
In a letter to Admiral Stark dated February 18, 1941, Admiral Kimmel set
forth the following comments in a postscript: [59]
"I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI
considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-
Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that
Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of
information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed
anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to
keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on
subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix
that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?"
In reply the Chief of Naval Operations advised that the Office of Naval
Intelligence was fully aware of its responsibility to keep the commander
in chief of the Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning foreign
nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the
United States; that information concerning the location of Japanese
merchant vessels was forwarded by air mail weekly and if desired could
be issued more frequently.
On February 25 Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, forwarding a copy of
a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941, discussing the
possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines by way of the
"southern route." [60] Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum
for the President of February 5, 1941, setting forth an analysis of the
situation in Indochina, prepared by Admiral Stark. This expressed
Admiral Stark's view that Japan had some fear that the British and the
United States would intervene if Japan moved into southern Indochina and
Thailand; and that the size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and
Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indochina and Thailand, for
attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use
against the Philippines. It observed that insofar as Admiral Stark could
tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major
move; that, as he saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the
British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take
on more than one at a time; and that at present she desired not to go to
war with the United States at all.
The following significant dispatch was sent on April 1, 1941, from he
Chief of Naval Operations addressed to the commandants of all naval
districts: [61]
PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT
BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS
OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES
[59]Committee exhibit No. 106.
[60] Id.
[61] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 1.
90 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
IN A PARTICULAR FIELD ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS OR ON NATIONAL HOLIDAYS
OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, THEY SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON SUCH DAYS TO SEE
THAT PROPER WATCHES AND PRECAUTIONS ARE IN EFFECT.
In a letter of April 3, 1941, [62] Admiral Stark expressed his
observations on the international situation to the commanders in chief,
Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, including a discussion
of the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. Admiral Stark
stated that the basic idea of this plan contemplated that the United
States would draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reinforce the
Atlantic Fleet; that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval
forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the
Malay barrier; and that the United States Asiatic Fleet would be
supported through offensive operations of the United States Pacific
Fleet. He then discussed the dangers facing Britain and stated that the
Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important bearing
on the future of the war in the Atlantic. He observed that for some time
Japan had been showing less inclination to attack the British, Dutch,
and the United States in the Far East. Admiral Stark instructed the
addressees to watch this situation closely. He expressed the feeling
that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a
stabilizing effect in the Far East but that the question was when and
not whether we would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was
that we might be in the war against Germany and Italy within about 2
months, but there was a reasonable possibility that Japan might remain
out altogether. However, he added, we could not act on that possibility.
In the meantime, he suggested that as much time as available be devoted
to training.
Under date of April 18, 1941, instructions were given various naval
observers to include the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet as an
information addressee in all dispatch reports and to furnish one copy of
all intelligence reports directly to him. [63]
In a memorandum dated May 26 to the Chief of Naval Operations the
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet suggested that he be guided by
broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions; and
that it be made a cardinal principle that he be immediately informed of
all important developments as soon as they occur and by the quickest
secure means possible. [64]
[62] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[63] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 3.
[64] Admiral Kimmel said:
"The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position.
He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly
changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or
change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and,
as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own
situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him
and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry
out his assigned tasks. The lack of information is disturbing and tends
to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that
singleness of purpose and confidence is one's own course of action so
necessary to the conduct of military operations.
"It is realized that on occasion, the rapid developments in the
international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even
the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may
militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the
present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and
authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though
necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, to modify adapt or even reorient his possible courses of action
to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the
current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training
of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the
desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions,
or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this
same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well
informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the
status of current outlying island development, *thus making it even more
necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad
policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions*.
"*It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all
important development as they occur and by the quickest secure means
available*." See committee exhibit No. 106.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 91
In June of 1941 Admiral Kimmel visited Washington at which time matters
of naval policy were reviewed with him. [65]
On July 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel, among others, was advised "for action"
by the Chief of Naval Operations, [66] that the unmistakable deduction
from information obtained from numerous sources was that the Japanese
Government had determined upon its future policy, supported by all
principal Japanese political and military groups; that his policy
probably involved war in the near future. It was pointed out that an
advance by Japan against the British and Dutch could not be entirely
ruled out but that the Chief of Naval Operations held to the opinion
that Japanese activity in "the south" would be confined for the present
to seizure and development of naval, army, and in bases in Indochina.
The dispatch stated that the Japanese neutrality pact with Russia would
be abrogated and the major military effort on the part of Japan against
Russia would be toward the latter's maritime provinces probably toward
the end of July, although the attack might be deferred until after the
collapse of European Russia. It was pointed out that all Japanese
vessels in United States Atlantic Forts had been ordered to be west of
the Panama Canal by August 1, that the movement of Japanese "flag
shipping" from Japan had been suspended and additional merchant vessels
were being requisitioned. Vith an admonition to secrecy, instructions
were issued to inform the principal army commanders and the commander in
chief's own immediate subordinates.
In another dispatch of July 3, [67] Admiral Kimmel was advised for
action that definite information had been received indicating that
between July 16 and 22 the Japanese Government had issued an order for 7
of the 11 Japanese vessels then in the North Atlantic and Caribbean
areas to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific, and that under
routine schedules three of the remaining ships were to move to the
Pacific during the same period. It was suggested that in Japanese
business communities strong rumors were current that Russia would be
attacked by Japan on July 20, and that a definite move by the Japanese
might be expected during the period July 20 to August 1, 1941. On July 7
the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised for information
of the substance of three intercepted dispatches, including one of July
2 from Tokyo to Berlin, stating: [68]
"JAPAN IS PREPARING FOR ALL POSSIBLE EVENTUALITIES REGARDING SOVIET IN
ORDER (TO) JOIN FORCES WITH GERMANY IN ACTIVELY COMBATTING COMMUNIST
(SIC) AND DESTROYING COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN EASTERN SIBERIA. AT SAME TIME
JAPAN CANNOT AND WILL NOT RELAX EFFORTS IN THE SOUTH TO RESTRAIN BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES. NEW INDOCHINA BASES WILL INTENSIFY RESTRAINT AND
BE VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO AXIS VICTORY."
And another of July 2 from Berlin to Tokyo: [69]
"OSHIMA DELIVERS ABOVE NOTE AND TELLS RIBBENTROP IN PART, "MATSUOKA WILL
SOON SUBMIT A DECISION. IF YOU GERMANS HAD ONLY LET US KNOW YOU WERE
GOING TO FIGHT
[65] See Navy Court of Inquiry record page 113.
[66] Committee exhibit No 37, p. 4.
[67] Id., at p. 5.
[68] Id., at p. 6.
[69] Id. This dispatch and that indicated, note 68, supra, were based on
the so-called Magic. For a discussion of Magic see Part IV, this report.
92 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RUSSIA SO SOON WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN READY. WE WERE PLANNING TO SETTLE
SOUTH SEAS QUESTIONS AND CHINA INCIDENT HENCE DECISION CANNOT BE REACHED
IMMEDIATELY, BUT JAPAN WILL NOT SIT ON FENCE WHILE GERMANY FIGHTS."
The Chief of Naval Operations in a dispatch of July 15, [70] sent
Admiral Kimmel for information, supplied intelligence received to the
effect that within "the next day or two," Japan would begin commercial
negotiations with Vichy France at which time she would propose "in the
name of mutual defense" Japan's taking over southern French Indochina
naval and air bases; and that at the same time Japan would attempt to
station army and navy air forces peacefully with French agreement, if
possible. It was pointed out that if Vichy objected Japan had decided to
use force; and that Japan did not intend to move farther south or
interfere with colonial government. On the basis of the information
received it was observed that the Japanese move was necessary to
guarantee supplies from "Colony and Thailand" and to prevent "Syrian
type British action"; and that while Tokyo wished to avoid friction with
Britain and particularly the United States, if possible, the risk was
regarded as necessary.
In a dispatch sent Admiral Kimmel on July 17 for his information, he was
advised of a six-point ultimatum sent by Tokyo to Vichy requiring an
answer by July 20 71 The six points were specified as:
(1) Japan to send necessary Army and Wavy air forces to southern French
Indochina;
(2) Vichy to turn over certain naval and air bases;
(3) Japanese expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and move
about freely;
(4) Vichy to withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible
clashes;
(5) Vichy to authorize French Indochina military to arrange details with
Japanese either before or after landing;
(6) Colony to pay Japan 23,000,000 piastres annually to meet cost of
occupation.
This same dispatch advised of intelligence received on July 14 that the
Japanese Army was planning its advance on or about July 20 and, of
intelligence received on July 14, that Japan intended to carry out its
plans by force if opposed or if Britain or the United States interfered.
On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information concerning the
substance of an intercepted Japanese dispatch from Canton to Tokyo, as
follows: [72]
"THE RECENT GENERAL MOBILIZATION ORDER EXPRESSES JAPAN'S IRREVOCABLE
RESOLUTION TO END ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IN THWARTING JAPAN'S NATURAL
EXPANSION AND HER INDOMITABLE INTENTION TO CARRY THIS OUT WITH THE
BACKING OF THE AXIS IF POSSIBLE BUT ALONE IF NECESSARY. FORMALITIES SUCH
AS DINING THE EXPEDITIONARY FORGES AND SAYING FAREWELL TO THEM WERE
DISPENSED WITH TO AVOID ALARM AND BECAUSE WE WISHED TO FACE THIS NEW WAR
WITH A CALM AND COOL ATTITUDE. * * * IMMEDIATE OBJECT WILL BE TO ATTEMPT
PEACEFUL FRENCH INDOCHINA OCCUPATION BUT WILL CRUSH RESISTANCE IF
OFFERED AND
[70] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 8. This dispatch was based on Magic.
[71] Id., at page 9. This dispatch was also based on Magic.
[72] Id., at p. 10. This dispatch was likewise based on Magic, see
committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 93
SET UP MARTIAL LAW. SECONDLY OUR PURPOSE IS TO LAUNCH THEREFROM A RAPID
ATTACK WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS SUITABLE. AFTER OCCUPATION
NEXT ON OUR SCHEDULE IS SENDING ULTIMATUM TO NETHERLANDS INDIES. IN THE
SEIZING OF SINGAPORE THE NAVY WILL PLAY THE PRINCIPAL PART. ARMY WILL
NEED ONLY ONE DIVISION TO SEIZE SINGAPORE AND TWO DIVISIONS TO SEIZE
NETHERLANDS INDIES WITH AIR FORCES BASED ON CANTON, SPRATLEY, PALAU,
SINGORA IN THAILAND, PORTUGUESE TIMOR AND INDOCHINA AND WITH SUBMARINE
FLEET IN MANDATES, HAINAN, AND INDOCHINA WE KILL CRUSH BRITISH AMERICAN
MILITARY POWER AND ABILITY TO ASSIST IN SCHEMES AGAINST US."
On July 19 Admiral Kimmel was advised of an intercepted dispatch from
Tokyo informing that although the Japanese Cabinet had changed there
would be no departure from the principle that the Tripartite Pact formed
the keystone of Japan's national policy and that the new Cabinet would
also pursue the policy of the former cabinet in all other matters. [73]
In another dispatch, supplying information concerning an intercepted
Tokyo message to Vichy, Admiral Kimmel was advised on July 20, that the
Japanese Army had made all preparations and had decided to advance
regardless of whether Vichy France accepted her demands. [74]
Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart on July 24, 1941, [75] sending a
copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel, concerning among other things, a
2-hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Ambassador Nomura. Admiral
Stark expressed the thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that
the United States and Japan avoid open rupture; stated they had a very
plain talk; and observed that he, Admiral Stark, liked Nomura. He
advised that Nomura discussed at length Japan's need for the rice and
minerals of Indochina. Admiral Stark said his guess was that with the
establishment of bases in Indochina, Japan would stop for the time
being, consolidate her positions and await world reaction; that no doubt
the Japanese would use their Indochina bases from which to take early
action against the Burma Road. He said that, of course, there was the
possibility that Japan would strike at Borneo, but that he doubted his
in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them.
Admiral Stark also said that he talked with the President and hoped no
open rupture would come but that conditions were not getting better.
On July 25, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was advised that beginning July 26 the
United States would impose economic sanctions against Japan and that it
was expected these sanctions would embargo all trade between Japan and
the United States, subject to modification through a licensing system
for certain material. [76] It was further pointed out that funds in the
United States would be frozen except as they may be moved under
licensing. In estimating the situation it was observed:
"*Do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use
of military means but you are furnished this information in order that
you may take appropriate precautionary measures against hostile
eventualities.*"
[73] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 11.
[74] Id., at p. 12.
[75] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[76] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14.
94 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated July 31, 1941, [77] Admiral Stark
discussed the over-all international situation, and stated that "after
the Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that they
should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along
with the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies. He
stated he thought it fairly safe to say that the opinion was generally
held that Japan would not go into the N. E. I. [78] but that Admiral
Turner thought Japan would go into the maritime provinces in August. He
commented that Turner might be right and usually was. Admiral Stark said
his thought had been that while Japan would ultimately go into Siberia
she would delay doing so until she had the Indochina-Thailand situation
more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of the
Russian-German clash. He also said that we would give aid to Russia. A
postscript to this letter stated, among other things, that_ .
"*obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate;
this is one thing that is factual*."
Admiral Kimmel was advised on August 14 that the Japanese were rapidly
completing withdrawal from world shipping routes, that scheduled
sailings were canceled, and that the majority of ships in other than
China and Japan Sea areas were homeward bound. [79]
The following dispatch of August 28 was sent to Admiral Kimmel, among
others, for action: [80]
"CERTAIN OPERATIONS PRESCRIBED FOR THE ATLANTIC BY WPL 51 ARE HEREBY
EXTENDED TO AREAS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AS DESCRIBED HEREIN IN VIEW OF
THE DESTRUCTION BY RAIDERS OF MERCHANT VESSELS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN
WITHIN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NEUTRALITY ZONE AS DEFINED IN THE
DECLARATION OF PANAMA OF OCTOBER 3, 1939. FORMAL CHANGES IN WPL 51 WILL
BE ISSUED, BUT MEANWHILE ACTION ADDRESSES WILL EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY THE
FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS. CINCPAC CONSTITUTE THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE
CONSISTING OF TWO 7,500-TON LIGHT CRUISERS AND DISPATCH IT TO BALBOA.
FOR TASK PURPOSES THIS FORCE WILL OPERATE DIRECTLY UNDER CNO [81] AFTER
ENTERING THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AS DEFINED IN WPL 46 PAR. 3222
EXCEPT WESTERN LIMIT IS LONGITUDE 100 WEST. WITHIN THE PACIFIC SECTOR
OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND WITHIN THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC
SUB AREA THE COMMANDER PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND COMMANDER
SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE WILL IN COOPERATION AND ACTING UNDER THE
STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS EXECUTE THE
FOLLOWING TASK: DESTROY SURFACE RAIDERS WHICH ATTACK OR THREATEN UNITED
STATES FLAG SHIPPING. INTERPRET AN APPROACH OF SURFACE RAIDERS WITHIN
THE PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER OR THE PACIFIC
SOUTHEAST SUB AREA AS A THREAT TO UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING. FOR THE
PRESENT THE FORCES CONCERNED WILL BASE BALBOA, BUT CNO WILL ENDEAVOR TO
MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BASING ON SOUTH AMERICAN PORTS AS
[77] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[78] Netherlands East Indies.
[79] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 15.
[80] Id., at p. 16.
[81] Chief of Naval Operations.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 99
MAY BE REQUIRED. ACTION ADEES [82] AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE
INFORM CNO WHEN THESE INSTRUCTIONs HAVE BEEN PLACED IN EFFECT."
In a letter to Admiral Kimmel, also on August 28, 1941. [83] Admiral
Stark discussed, among other things, the status of the Japanese
situation and observed that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at
another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong messages
had been sent to them but just what they were going to do he did not
know. He said he had told one of Japan's statesmen that another move,
such as the one into Thailand, would go a long way toward destroying
before the American public what good will still remained. Admiral Stark
said he had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he
wished the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender.
Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter to Admiral Stark of
September 12, 1941 [84] such as whether he should not issue shooting
orders to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral
Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts
off Pearl Harbor and vicinity. He said:
"As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to
bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb
contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"
Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941, [85] and stated, among
other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders
only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the
longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the
better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to
shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in article 723 of the
Navy Regulations. [86] The letter also stated, in connection with the
question of submarine contacts, that they had no definite information
that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the
Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing orders, i.
e., not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas,
were appropriate, and continued:
"If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that
Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory,
then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such
submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."
Going on, Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not
believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be
sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circumstances
that then seemed possible; and that in all probability the Pacific Fleet
could operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker
than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could be concentrated in
one area only with the greatest difficulty. In this letter, Admiral
Stark inquired:
"* * * would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some
pictures of the Mandated Islands?"
In a postscript to this letter, Admiral Stark stated that Secretary Hull
had informed him that the conversations with the Japanese had
[82] Addressees.
[83] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[84] Id.
[85] Id.
[86] These regulations provide for the use of force in self-
preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last
resort.
96 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could get
nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there as
some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be remote. A
second postscript to the letter, in making reference to a conversation
between Admiral Stark and Nomura, said that Ambassador Nomura usually
came in when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there
was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark observed that
conversations without results could not last forever and that if the
conversations fell through, which looked likely, the situation could
only grow more tense. Admiral Stark said he had again talked to
Secretary Hull and thought the Secretary would make one more try. He
said that Secretary Hull kept him, Admiral Stark, pretty fully informed;
and, if there was anything of moment, he would of course hasten to let
Kimmel know.
With this letter there was enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General
Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to
strengthen the Philippines. The memorandum indicated, among other
things, that on September 30, 26 Flying Fortresses would leave San
Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines.
The following dispatch of October 16, 1941, was sent to the commander in
chief, Pacific Fleet, for action: [87]
"THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CREATED A GRAVE SITUATION.
IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC
AND ANTI-AMERICAN. IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT
IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT
WITH THE U. S. IN EITHER CASE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE A
STRONG POSSIBILITY. SINCE THE U. S. AND BRITAIN ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY
JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY
THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES
YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS
WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS
AGAINST JAPAN. SECOND AND THIRD ADEES INFORM APPROPRIATE ARMY AND NAVAL
DISTRICT AUTHORITIES. ACKNOWLEDGE."
Referring to the dispatch of October 16 concerning the resignation of
the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Stark stated in a letter of October 17 to
Admiral Kimmel: [88]
"Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the
message I sent you merely stated the "possibility", in fact I tempered
the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope
not. In any ease after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we
should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."
In a postscript to this letter Admiral Stark said:
"Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a
reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a
Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him
that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt
it extremely improbable and that while we keep track of Japanese ships
so far as we can, a carefully planned raid
[87] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18.
[88] Committee exhibit No. 106.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 97.
on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to
detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my
advice to him was not to worry. [89]"
On October 17, 1941) Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information
that, effective immediately, all trans-Pacific United States flag
shipping to and from the Far East, India, and East India area was to be
routed through the Torres Straits, keeping to the southward and well
clear of the Japanese Mandates. [90] On the same day he was advised for
action that-
"BECAUSE OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO REINFORCE THE
PHILIPPINES WITH LONG-RANGE ARMY BOMBERS YOU ARE REQUESTED TO TAKE ALL
PRACTICAL PRECAUTIONS OR THE SAFETY OF THE AIRFIELDS AT WAKE AND MIDWAY.
[91]"
Admiral Kimmel was advised, among other things, on October 23 at until
further orders all Army and Navy "trans-Pacific troop transports,
ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military
cargo" would be escorted both ways between Honolulu ad Manila. [92]
On November 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed that complete
withdrawal from Western Hemisphere waters of Japanese merchant vessels
appeared in progress. [93]
A letter to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark on November 7 commented,
among other things: [94]
"Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just
when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it
all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "worser and
worser!" A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable
policies cannot go on forever_ particularly if one party cannot live
with the set-up. It doesn't look good."
On November 14, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, stating among other
things: [95]
"The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has
been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better
understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his
visit. I note this morning in the press dispatches a listing of a number
of points by the Japan Times and
[89] Transmitted as an enclosure to this letter was an estimate dated
October 17 prepared by Admiral Schuirmann with respect to the change in
the Japanese Cabinet, stating:
"I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in
the Japanese Cabinet as indicative great changes in Japanese political
thought or action.
"The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled
for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy
of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military
based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what
they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic
maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties."
After recounting that Konoye cabinets had time and again expressed
disapproval of the acts committed the Japanese military but remedial
action had not been taken, that Konoye himself had declared Japan's
policy was to beat China to her knees; that while the Konoye cabinet may
have restrained the *extremists* among the military it had not opposed
Japan's program of expansion by force; that when opportunities arise
during the "coming months" which seemed favorable to the military for
further advance, they would be seized; and that the same "bill of
goods," regarding the necessity of making some concession to the
moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" had
been offered to the United States since the days when Mr. Stimson was
Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador, Admiral Schuirmann concluded:
"Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better
and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack
Russia, or may move southward, but *in the final analysis this will be
determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they
can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power" (Committee exhibit
No. 106).
[90] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 21.
[91] Id., at p. 22.
[92] Id., at p. 23.
[93] Id., at p. 24.
[94] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[95] Id. As an enclosure to this letter, Admiral Stark forwarded a copy
of a joint memorandum for the President which he and General Marshall
had prepared dated November 5 and bearing caption "Estimate concerning
Far Eastern Situation." This memorandum was prepared with respect to
dispatches received indicating it to be Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's
belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that military
support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States
and British units, was the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The
Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations opposed dispatching
American military assistance to meet this supposed threat. For a
discussion of this memorandum, see Part IV, infra, this report.
98 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Advertiser upon which concessions by the United States are necessary for
the "solution of the Pacific Crisis". Complete capitulation by the
United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this
country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible
to reconcile such divergent points of view."
On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message
marked for action: [96]
"CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL.
THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND
MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT
*A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON
PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY*. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS
DESPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY
OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO
COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION.
GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY."
The postscript of a personal letter dated November 25 from Admiral Stark
to Admiral Kimmel read: [97]
"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.
I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long
talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing
the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as
did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise
attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most
embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who
think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I
included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I
have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed
against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into
Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road areas as the most likely.
"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I
will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that
we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared
for, or we may do nothing_I think it is more likely to be "anything." "
On November 27, 1941, the following dispatch was sent Admiral Kimmel for
action: [98]
"*THIS DESPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING*. NEGOTIATIONS WITH
JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC *HAVE
CEASED* AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW
DAYS. THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION
OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATES AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER
THE PHILIPPINES THAI OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO. *EXECUTE AN
APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS
ASSIGNED IN WPL46*. INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES. A SIMILAR
WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT. SPENAVO [99] INFORM BRITISH.
CONTINENTAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES
AGAINST SABOTAGE."
[96] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32. This dispatch was also sent for
action to commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and commandants of the
Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Naval Districts.
[97] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[98] Committee exhibit No 37, p. 36. This dispatch was also sent for
action to the commander in chief et the Asiatic Fleet. It has been
referred to throughout the proceedings as the "War Warning."
[99] Special naval observer.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 99
The following dispatch dated November 28, 1941, referring to the
November 27 warning, was supplied Admiral Kimmel for his information:
[100]
"* * * ARMY HAS SENT FOLLOWING TO COMMANDER WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
"NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL
PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION
UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT. IF HOSTILITIES
CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT
THE FIRST OVERT ACT. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS
RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR
DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE
St-CH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE
MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL
POPULATION- OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN. A SEPARATE
MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO G TWO NINTH CORPS AREA RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
IN UNITED STATES. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR THEY WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS
ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT
DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
OFFICERS." WPL 52 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO PACIFIC AREA AND WILL NOT BE
PLACED IN EFFECT IN THAT AREA EXCEPT AS NOW IN FORCE IN SOUTHEAST
PACIFIC SUB AREA AND PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. UNDERTAKE NO
OFFENSIVE ACTION UNTIL JAPAN HAS COMMITTED AN OVERT ACT. BE PREPARED TO
CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO JAPAN IN CASE
HOSTILITIES OCCUR."
On December 1 the Chief of Naval Operations sent Admiral Kimmel a
dispatch for information describing a Japanese intrigue in Malaya. The
dispatch indicated that Japan planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malaya
in order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malay into
Thailand. Thailand would then brand Britain an aggressor and call upon
Japan for aid, thereby facilitating the Japanese entry into Thailand as
a full-fledged ally and give Japan air bases on the Kra Peninsula and a
position to carry out any further operations along Malaya. [100a]
[100] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 38. This dispatch was sent for action
to the naval commanders on the west coast.
[100a] This dispatch, No. 011400 which was addressed to the commander in
chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action, read: "AMBASSADOR TSUBOKAMI IN
BANGKOK ON TWENTY NINTH SENT TO TOKYO AS NUMBER EIGHT SEVEN TWO THE
FOLLOWING QUOTE CONFERENCES NOW IN PROGRESS IN BANGKOK CONSIDERING PLANS
AIMED AT FORCING BRITISH TO ATTACK THAI AT PADANG BESSA NEAR SINGORA AS
COUNTER MOVE TO JAPANESE LANDING AT KOTA BHARU SINCE THAI INTENDS TO
CONSIDER FIRST INVADER AS HER ENEMY, ORANGE BELIEVES THIS LANDING IN
MALAY WOULD FORCE BRITISH TO INVADE THAI AT PADANG BESSA. THAI WOULD
THEN DECLARE WAR AND REQUEST ORANGE HELP. THIS PLAN APPEARS TO HAVE
APPROVAL OF THAI CHIEF OF STAFF BIJITTO. THAI GOVERNMENT CIRCLES HAVE
BEEN SHARPLY DIVIDED BETWEEN PRO-BRITISH AND PRO-ORANGE UNTIL TWENTY
FIVE NOVEMBER BUT NOW WANITTO AND SHIN WHO FAVOR JOINT MILITARY ACTION
WITH ORANGE HAVE SILENCED ANTI ORANGE GROUP AND INTEND TO FORCE PREMIER
PIBUL TO MAKE A DECISION. EARLY AND FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS ARE POSSIBLE
UNQUOTE " See committee exhibit No. 112, p. 67.
100 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On December 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was supplied the following
information for action: [101]
"HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT
INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR
POSTS AT HONGKONG, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO
DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER
IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS."
And, again, on December 3, 1941, he received the following message for
his information: [102]
"CIRCULAR TWENTY FOUR FORTY FOUR FROM TOKYO ONE DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON,
HONGKONG, SINGAPORE AND MANILA TO DESTROY MACHINE. BATAVIA MACHINE
ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO. DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY,
ALL BUT ONE COPY OF OTHER SYSTEMS, AND ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS. BRITISH
ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED."
On December 4, 1941, a dispatch [103] was supplied the commander in
chief of the Pacific Fleet, for his information, instructing Guam to
destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified
matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to
destroy instantly, in event of emergency, all classified matter.
A dispatch to Admiral Kimmel of December 6 [104] for action stated that
"in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our
outlying Pacific islands" he was authorized to order the destruction in
such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now or under
later conditions of greater emergency." It was pointed out that means of
communication to support "our current operations an special
intelligence" should be maintained until the last moment.
From a review of dispatches and correspondence sent Admiral Kimmel it is
concluded that he was fully informed concerning the progressive
deterioration of relations with Japan and was amply warned of the
imminence of war with that nation.
INFORMATION SUPPLIED GENERAL SHORT BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE
IMMINENCE OF WAR
The accepted practice in the Navy whereby the Chief of Naval Operations
supplemented official dispatches by personal correspondence does not
appear to have been followed by the War Department. The letters sent by
the Chief of Staff to General Short, heretofore discussed, related
largely to the latter's responsibility, steps necessary to improve the
Army defenses in Hawaii, and suggestions and comments with respect
thereto. It does not appear that such correspondence was employed to
acquaint the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department with the
international situation generally nor to convey the personal estimates
and impressions of the Chief of Staff. The
[101] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40. This dispatch was also sent for
action to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the
commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts.
[102] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41. This dispatch was sent for action
to the commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and the commandant of the
Sixteenth Naval District.
[103] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 44.
[104] Id., at p. 45.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 101
evidence indicates that the Army did not forward the substance of any
intercepted Japanese dispatches to field commanders because of the
feeling that the Army codes were generally not so secure as those of the
Navy. [105] General Short, however, was supplied either directly from
the War Department or by reference from his naval opposites in Hawaii
adequate information concerning the critical international situation and
the impending likelihood of war with Japan.
The dispatch of July 3, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, advising among other
things that the unmistakable deduction from information received from
numerous sources was to the effect that Japan was agreed on a policy
involving war in the near future, carried instructions to advise General
Short. [106]
Admiral Kimmel was instructed to supply General Short the information
contained in the dispatch of July 25 advising of economic sanctions
against Japan and possible Japanese reaction. [107]
The following Navy message of October 16, 1941, was received by General
Short through reference from Admiral Kimmel: [108]
"THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE C. N. O. WHICH I
HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU. QUOTE: "JAPANESE CABINET RESIGNATION
CREATES A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY
BE ANTI-AMERICAN AND EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC. IF THE KONOYE CABINET
REMAINS IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES. EITHER WAY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN
JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE STRONGLY POSSIBLE. SINCE BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT SITUATION THERE IS
ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF
THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH
PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR
CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST JAPAN." "
In a radiogram of October 20 signed "Adams" [109] the War Department
advised the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department of its
estimate of the situation in the following terms:
"TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REMAINS STRAINED BUT NO
ABRUPT CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY APPEARS IMMINENT. [110]"
Admiral Kimmel was instructed to advise General Short concerning the
dispatch of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations [111]
advising, among other things, that "chances of favorable outcome of
negotiations with Japan very doubtful" and movements of Japanese forces
"indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility."
General Short expressed the belief that he had seen this dispatch. [112]
[105] See committee record, pp. 2220-2222.
[106] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 4; also, No. 32, p. 1.
[107] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14; also No. 32, p. 2.
[108] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18; also, No. 32, p. 3. See Army
Pearl Harbor board record, p. 279.
[109] Maj. Gen. Emory S. Adams, Adjutant General.
[110] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 4. See also Army Pearl Harbor board
record, p. 4258.
[111] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 5
[112] See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258.
102 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A dispatch of November 26 signed "Adams" was sent General Short reading
in part as follows: [113]
"* * * IT IS DESIRED THAT THE PILOTS BE INSTRUCTED TO PHOTOGRAPH TRUK
ISLAND IN THE CAROLINE GROUP JALUIT IN THE MARSHALL GROUP. VISUAL
RECONNAISSANCE SHOULD BE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY. INFORMATION DESIRED AS TO
THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF NAVAL VESSELS INCLUDING SUBMARINES * * *
INSURE THAT BOTH B-TWENTY FOUR AIR PLANES ARE FULLY EQUIPPED WITH GUN
AMMUNITION UPON DEPARTURE FROM HONOLULU. [114]"
The November 27 dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral
Kimmel beginning "This despatch is to be considered a war warning" [115]
contained instructions that General Short be informed and he did in fact
see this warning.
On November 27 the following dispatch signed "Marshall" [116] was sent
General Short by the War Department: [117]
"NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL
PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION
UNPREDICTABLE BUT *HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT*. IF
HOSTILITIES CANNOT, REPEAT CANNOT, BE AVOIDED THE *UNITED STATES DESIRES
THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT*. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT, REPEAT
NOT, BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT
JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION *YOU ARE
DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM
NECESSARY* BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT, REPEAT
NOT, TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES
TAKEN. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN
RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF
THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS."
The following dispatch signed 'Miles', [118] and also dated November 27,
was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department: [119]
"JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL STALEMATE *HOSTILITIES MAY
ENSUE*. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MAY BE EXPECTED. INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL
AND CHIEF OF STAFF ONLY."
On November 28 a dispatch signed "Adams" was directed to General Short,
as follows: [120]
"CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY
AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY_
FORTY FIVE). ALSO
[113] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 6.
[114] This reconnaissance was not flown inasmuch as the Army planes were
not made ready prior to the December 7 attack.
[115] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.
[116] Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff.
[117] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7.
[118] Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2, Army Intelligence.
[119] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10.
[120] Id., at p. 13.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 103
DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO
PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS, PROPERTY, AND EQUIPMENT
AGAINST SABOTAGE, PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE
PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE. THIS DOES
NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED. PROTECTIVE
MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY, AVOIDING
UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM. TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION
IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT
REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS.
[120a]"
Again on November 28 another dispatch from the War Department was sent
the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, as follows: [121]
"ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE. THAT INSTRUCTIONS
SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER
YOUR CONTROL AND COMMAND IS DESIRED: AGAINST THOSE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT
(SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SR 30_45) THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION
DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN AT ONCE. IT IS DESIRED ALSO THAT
ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY BE INITIATED BY YOU IMMEDIATELY TO
PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING: PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE
PROPAGANDA PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE, AND
PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE OF YOUR EQUIPMENT, PROPERTY AND
ESTABLISHMENTS. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZE ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES.
AVOIDING UNNECESSARY ALARM AND PUBLICITY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE
CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY.
"IT IS ALSO DESIRED THAT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER FIVE THIS YEAR REPORTS BE
SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES OF ALL STEPS INITIATED BY YOU TO
COMPLY WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS. SIGNED ARNOLD."
A dispatch dated December 5 and signed "Miles", [122] was sent the
assistant chief of staff headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, to_
"CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THROUGH COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH
NAVAL DISTRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKYO REFERENCE WEATHER. [123]"
ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL PURSUANT TO WARNINGS AND ORDERS FROM
WASHINGTON
DISPATCH OF OCTOBER 16 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
In the dispatch of October 16 [124] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the
resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation;
[120a] For the reply of General Short to this message from the Adjutant
General, see committee exhibit No. 32, p. 17.
[121] Id., at p. 14. This message was also signed "Adams."
[122] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 20.
[123] This dispatch refers to the so-called winds code which will be
found discussed in detail in Part IV, infra, this report.
[124] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18.
104 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that there was a strong possibility of hostilities between Japan and
Russia and there also was a possibility Japan might attack the United
States and Great Britain; and that he should_
"take due precautions including such *preparatory deployments* [126] as
will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions
against Japan."
Pursuant to the order Admiral Kimmel ordered submarines to assume a "war
patrol" off both Wake and Midway; he reinforced Johnston and Wake with
additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional
marines to Palmyra Island; he ordered the commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands; he
placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in
west-coast ports, held 6 submarines in readiness to depart for Japan,
and delayed the sailing of 1 battleship which was scheduled to visit a
west-coast navy yard; he dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway with
orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island and
placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating
areas. [126]
On October 22, Admiral Kimmel reported by letter [127] these
dispositions to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. By letter
dated November 7 Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet: [128]
"OK on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent
change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is_what next?"
DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 24 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
In the dispatch of November 24 [129] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the
chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very
doubtful and that the movements of Japanese naval and military forces_
"indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any
direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility."
This dispatch carried no orders for the commander in chief of the
Pacific Fleet [130] and would appear designed to acquaint him with the
mounting tenseness of the situation as well as to supply him with an
estimate of probable Japanese action. [131] No action appears to have
been taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to this dispatch and he has stated
that he felt the message required no action other than that which he had
already taken. [132]
"WAR WARNING" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27
The dispatch of November 27 began with the words: [133] "This dispatch
is to be considered a war warning." [134] It stated that negotiations
with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the
[125] Admiral Kimmel said: "The term 'preparatory deployments' used in
this dispatch is nontechnical. It has no especial significance other
than its natural meaning." Committee record, pp. 6708, 6709.
[126] See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6709.
[127] Committee exhibit No. 106.
[128] Id.
[129] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32.
[130] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 50-53.
[131] Admiral Turner testified: "The dispatch of the 24th we did not
consider required any immediate action, except to get ready plans for
putting into effect when we gave them another warning." Committee
record, p. 5159.
[132] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 298, 299.
[133] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36.
[134] Admiral Kimmel observed: "The phrase 'war warning' cannot be made
a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a
characterization of the specific information which the dispatch
contained." Committee record, p. 6717.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 105
Pacific had ceased and "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within
the next few days," and that "the number and equipment of Japanese
troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious
expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or
possibly Borneo." Admiral Kimmel was ordered "to execute an appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in
WPL 46."
After receiving this warning Admiral Kimmel made the deliberate decision
not to institute long-range reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor against
possible air attacks for reasons which will subsequently appear. [135]
Between the warning and the attack on December 7 the following
deployments were made and action taken:
1. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in
command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier Enterprise, three
heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon
searches to 300 miles for any sign of hostile shipping. [136] The
sending of this force to Wake was pursuant to a dispatch dated November
26 to Admiral Kimmel stating, in part_
"in order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available
for expeditionary use OpNav [137] has requested and Army has agreed to
station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake
provided you consider this is feasible and desirable. It will be
necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu
to these stations on an aircraft carrier. [135]"
Admiral Halsey knew of the war warning dispatch and held a lengthy
conference with Admiral Kimmel and other officers on November 27. He
stated that when he prepared to depart with the task force for Wake
Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far the latter wanted him to go;
that Admiral Kimmel replied "Use your common sense." [139] Admiral Smith
said that before Admiral Halsey left in the Enterprise, he asked Admiral
Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces, to which
Admiral Kimmel replied he should use his own discretion. Admiral Smith
stated that Admiral Halsey commented these were the best orders he had
received and that if he found even Japanese sampan he would sink it.
[140]
2. On December 5, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in
command of Task Force 2, consisting of the carrier Lexington, three
heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Like Halsey, Newton conducted
scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance [141] despite the
fact, however, that Admiral Newton was leaving Pearl Harbor with some of
the most powerful and valuable units of the Pacific fleet he was not
even shown the war warning, had no knowledge of it, and indeed had no
knowledge of the dispatches of October
[135] The Navy court of inquiry found: "It was the duty of Rear Admiral
Bloch, when and if ordered by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to
conduct long-range reconnaissance. The commander in chief Pacific Fleet,
for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such
reconnaissance in ease of emergency, specifically ordered that no
routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full
responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was
not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military
decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with
experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all
the factors involved." Navy court of inquiry report, committee exhibit
No. 157.
[136] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750. See also
testimony of Admiral Halsey, Hart inquiry record, p. 299.
[137] Office of Naval Operations.
[138] Dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet, No. 270038, dated November 26, 1941. Committee
exhibit No. 112. See also committee record, pp. 1614, 1615; also Hart
inquiry record, p. 299.
[139] Hart inquiry record, pp. 297, 298.
[140] Id., at p. 43.
[141] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750: see also
testimony of Admiral Newton, Hart inquiry record. p. 318.
106 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
16 and November 24 or the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction
of codes to which reference will hereafter be made Except for what he
read in the press, Admiral Newton received no information concerning the
increasing danger of our relations with Japan. He was given no special
orders and regarded his departure from Hawaii as a mission with no
special significance other than to proceed to Midway for the purpose of
flying off the Lexington a squadron of planes for the reinforcement of
the island. In consequence, no special orders were given for the arming
of planes or making preparation for war apart from ordinary routine.
[142] The failure to supply Admiral Newton any orders or information is
in marked contrast with the "free hand" orders given Admiral Halsey. In
his testimony Admiral Kimmel stated that Admiral Newton's orders and
information would have come through Admiral Brown, who was Newton's
superior. [142a]
3. Admiral Wilson Brown on December 5 left Pearl Harbor en route to
Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises. [143]
4. On November 28, orders were issued to bomb unidentified submarines
found in the operating sea areas around Oahu. Full security was invoked
for the ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts.
[144] However, no change was made in the condition of readiness in port
except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they
began sweeping the harbor channel and approaches. [145]
5. Upon receipt of the war warning Admiral Kimmel ordered a squadron of
patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas
en route. While at Wake and Midway on December 2 and 3 they searched to
a distance of 525 miles. [146]
6. A squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor was ordered to replace
the squadron which went from Midway to Wake. This squadron of patrol
planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded from Johnston to
Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon reaching
Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not
less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3,
4, 5, and 6. On December 7, five of these Midway based patrol planes
were searching the sector 120 to 170 from Midway, to a distance of 450
miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at
the same time to rendezvous with the Lexington at a point 400 miles from
Midway. Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with
bombs, were on 10-minute notice as a ready striking force. [147]
Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified
before the Hewitt inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was
executed, stating_
"there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the
fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to
Midway and
[142] See Hart inquiry record, pp. 316 318.
[142a] In this regard, the testimony of Admiral Brown indicates that he
was not shown the "war warning". See testimony of Rear Admiral Brown
before the Roberts Commission, Committee exhibit No. 143.
[143] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751
[144] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 299, 300; see also committee
exhibit No. 112, p. 96. 115
[145] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 395.
[146] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751.
[147] See Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, page 6752; also
testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 684.
It should be noted that Admiral Inglis stated, "*There is no written
record available of any searches having be made on December 6, either
from the Hawaiian area or from Midway*." For further testimony of Adm.
Inglis concerning the matter of reconnaissance see committee record, pp.
70-73.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 107
Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers,
to those locations to deliver aircraft. [148]"
While the dispatch of the three task forces does not appear to have been
primarily made by Admiral Kimmel as a result of the implications of the
war warning, [149] this action combined with the other steps above-
mentioned had the effect of providing reconnaissance sweeps of the
patrol-plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to
Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to
Pearl Harbor covering a distance of nearly 5,000 miles. Each squadron as
it proceeded would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path,
bring under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of-
ocean area. In addition, submarines of the Fleet on and after November
27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously. [150]
The southwest approaches to Hawaii were thereby to a degree effectively
screened by reconnaissance from a raiding force bent on attacking Pearl
Harbor by surprise. [151] *Nothing was done, however, to detect an
approaching hostile force coming from the north and northwest,
recognized as the most dangerous sector, and it is into the
justification for this non-action that we shall inquire*. [152]
EVALUATION OF THE WAR WARNING DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27.
ON WHERE THE ATTACK MIGHT COME
Admiral Kimmel stated that the war warning dispatch of November 27 did
not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area nor did it
state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area
was imminent or probable. [153]
The warning dispatch did not, it is true, mention Pearl Harbor as a
specific point of attack, and gave the estimate that the number and
equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines,
Thailand or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. [153a] It is to be
recalled in this connection, however, that the November 24 dispatch
[153b] to Admiral Kimmel warned of "*a surprise aggressive movement in
any direction including attack on Philippines or (Guam is a
possibility*". The latter dispatch while indicating that an attack would
possibly come in the vicinity of the Philippines or Guam did
nevertheless indicate, by use of the words "*in any direction*," that
just where the attack might come could not be predicted. [154]
[148] Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 321, 322.
[149] See committee record, pp. 9312, 9313.
[150] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6752.
[151] In this connection, see testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee
record, pp. 9321, 9324.
[152] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9324,
9325, also 9436, 9437.
[153] Admiral Kimmel testified: "The so-called 'war warning' dispatch of
November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian
area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the
Hawaiian area was imminent or probable." Committee record, p 6715. For a
detailed statement by Admiral Kimmel concerning where the attack might
come based on the "war warning," see Navy Court of Inquiry record, p.
301.
[153a] For the full text of the "war warning" dispatch, see p. 98,
supra.
[153b For the full text of the November 24 dispatch, see p. 98, supra.
[154] Admiral Kimmel stated that in the November 24 dispatch the words
"in any direction" did include so far as his estimate was concerned, a
possible submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands but not an air attack.
See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 299.
It has been pointed out that the estimate of enemy action referred to in
the "war warning"_*an amphibious operation to the South*_is to be
distinguished from *a surprise aggressive movement in any direction*
mentioned in the November 24 warning; that the distinction between an
amphibious expedition and a surprise aggressi