From: U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Pearl Harbor Attack; Hearings,
Part 24, pp. 1749-56.
Page 1749
EXHIBIT NO. 49 (NAVY PACKET NO. 2) ROBERTS COMMISSION
Secret
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
SALVAGE OPERATIONS
REPAIRS TO DAMAGED VESSELS
INSTRUCTIONS TO WEST COAST NAVAL DISTRICTS
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
[1] REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE PRESIDENT
The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December 7th was a
complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. Its initial success,
which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state
of readiness against such an air attack, by both branches of the
service. This statement was made by me to both General Short and Admiral
Kimmel, and both agreed that it was entirely true. Neither Army or Navy
Commandants in Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely, because of
the danger which such a carrier-borne attack would confront in view of
the preponderance of the American Naval strength in Hawaiian waters.
While the likelihood of an attack without warning by Japan was in the
minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, both felt certain that
such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of operations, that
is, in the Far East. Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the
attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise
move, made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese
instructions to Nomura, in
Page 1750
which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the
insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one
o'clock on Sunday.
A general war warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on
November 27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message
of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight,
before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after
the attack had been made.
Both the Army and the Navy command at Oahu had prepared careful [2]
estimates covering their idea of the most likely and most imminent
danger. General Short repeated to me several times that he felt the most
imminent danger to the Army was the danger of sabotage, because of the
known presence of large numbers of alien Japanese in Honolulu. Acting on
this assumption, he took every possible measure to protect against this
danger. This included, unfortunately, bunching the planes on the various
fields on the Island, close together, so that they might be carefully
guarded against possible subversive Action by Japanese agents. This
condition, known as "Sabotage Alert" had been assumed because sabotage
was considered as the most imminent danger to be guarded against. This
bunching of planes, of course, made the Japanese air attack more
effective. There was, to a lesser degree, the same lack of dispersal of
planes on Navy stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was
not given the same prominence in Naval minds, both arms of the service
lost most of their planes on the ground in the initial attack by the
enemy. There were no Army planes in the air at the time of the attack
and no planes were warmed up in readiness to take the air.
The Navy regarded the principal danger from a Japanese stroke without
warning was a submarine attack, and consequently made all necessary
provisions to cope with such an attack. As a matter of fact, a submarine
attack did accompany the air attack and at least two Japanese submarines
were sunk and a third one ran ashore and was captured. No losses were
incurred by the Fleet from submarine attack. One small two man submarine
penetrated into the harbor, having followed a vessel through the net,
but because it broached in the shallow water it was immediately
discovered by the Curtis and was attacked and destroyed through the
efforts of [3] that vessel and those of the Destroyer Monaghan. This
submarine fired her torpedoes which hit a shoal to the west of Ford
Island.
The Navy took no specific measures of protection against an air attack,
save only that the ships in the harbor were so dispersed as to provide a
field of fire covering every approach from the air. The Navy morning
patrol was sent out at dawn to the southward, where the Commander-in-
Chief had reason to suspect an attack might come. This patrol consisted
of ten patrol bombers who made no contacts with enemy craft. At least
90% of Officers and enlisted personnel were aboard ship when the attack
came. The condition of readiness aboard ship was described as "Condition
Three", which meant that about one-half of the broadside and anti-
aircraft guns were manned, and all of the anti-aircraft guns were
supplied with ammunition and were in readiness.
The first intimation of enemy action came to the Navy shortly after
seven a. m., when a Destroyer in the harbor entrance radioed that she
had contacted a submarine and had (they believed) successfully depth
charged it. Thus an attempted attack by submarine preceded the air
attack by approximately a half hour. Quite a number of similar
incidents, involving reports of submarine contact, had occurred in the
recent past and too great credit was not given the Destroyer Commander's
report. Subsequent investigation proved the report to be correct.
Admiral Bloch received the report and weighed in his mind the
possibility that it might be the start of action, but in view of
submarine contacts in the past dismissed the thought.
The Army carried out no dawn patrol on Sunday, December 7th, the only
air patrol being that sent to the southward by the Navy.
The Radar equipment installed on shipboard, is practically useless [4]
when the ships are in Pearl Harbor because of the surrounding mountains.
Reliance therefore of both branches of the services is chiefly upon
three Army detector stations on the Island of Oahu. Until 7 December, it
had been customary to operate three Radars for a large portion of the
day. However, on 6 December, permission was requested and obtained from
the Control Officer to, on 7 December, operate only from 4:00 a. m. to
7:00 a. m. Accordingly, on 7 December, the stations were manned from
before dawn until seven a. m., when they were closed officially.
However, by pure chance one Army non-com officer remained at his post to
practice on such planes as might take the air, and probably with no
Page 1751
thought of enemy approach. At least a half hour before the attack was
made this officer's Radar indicator showed a concentration of planes to
the northward, out 130 miles distant. He reported this to the Air Craft
Warning Information Center, which was the place from which it should
have been reported to Headquarters. The Officer there, a Second
Lieutenant, took it upon his shoulders to pass it up, explaining that he
had been told the Enterprise was at sea, and that the planes he had
located were probably from that carrier. No report of this discovery of
an enemy air force approaching from the north reached either the Army or
the Navy Commander. If this information had been properly handled, it
would have given both Army and Navy sufficient warning to have been in a
state of readiness, which at least would have prevented the major part
of the damage done, and might easily have converted this successful air
attack into a Japanese disaster.
The Officer at the Radar station, I was advised, showed this air force
on his instrument as they came in and plotted their approach. [5] I have
seen the radar plot, which also included a plot of the enemy air forces
returning to the carriers from which they had come to make the attack.
This latter information did not reach the Navy until Tuesday, two days
after the attack occurred, although many and varied reports as to
various locations of radio bearings on the Japanese carriers did come to
the Navy Commander-in-Chief.
The Activities of Japanese fifth columnists immediately following the
attack, took the form of spreading on the air by radio dozens of
confusing and contradictory rumors concerning the direction in which the
attacking planes had departed, as well as the presence in every
direction of enemy ships. The Navy regarded the reports of concentration
of enemy ships to the southward as most dependable and scouted at once
in that direction. It is now believed that another unit of the Japanese
force, using the call letters of their carriers, took station to the
southward of Oahu and transmitted. Radio Direction Finder bearings on
these transmittals aided in the false assumption that the enemy was to
the southward. A force from the westward moved over from there in an
attempt to intercept a Japanese force supposedly moving westward from a
position south of Oahu. Subsequent information, based upon a chart
recovered from Japanese plane which was shot down, indicated that the
Japanese forces actually retired to the northward. In any event, they
were not contacted by either of the task forces, one of which was too
far to the westward to have established contact on 7 December.
The Army anti-aircraft batteries were not manned when the attack was
made and the mobile units were not in position. All Army personnel were
in their quarters and the guns were not manned or in position [6] for
firing, save only those in fixed positions. Early anti-aircraft fire
consisted almost exclusively of fire from 50 caliber machine guns.
The enemy attacked simultaneously on three Army fields, one Navy field
and at Pearl Harbor. This attack was substantially unopposed except by
very light and ineffective machine gun fire at the fields and stations.
Generally speaking, the bombing attacks initially were directed at the
air fields and the torpedo attacks at the ships in the harbor. The first
return fire from the guns of the fleet began, it is estimated, about
four minutes after the first torpedo was fired, and this fire grew
rapidly in intensity.
Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during the
assault. As above stated, the first was substantially unopposed. The
torpedo planes, flying low, appeared first over the hills surrounding
the harbor, and in probably not more than sixty seconds were in a
position to discharge their torpedoes. The second wave over the harbor
was resisted with far greater fire power and a number of enemy planes
were shot down. The third attack over the harbor was met by so intensive
a barrage from the ships that it was driven off without getting he
attack home, no effective hits being made in the harbor by this last
assault.
The Army succeeded in getting ten fighter planes in the air before the
enemy made the third and final sweep. And in the combat that ensued they
estimate eleven enemy craft were shot down by plane or anti-aircraft
fire. The Navy claims twelve more were destroyed by gunfire from the
ships, making a total enemy loss of twenty-three. To these twenty-three,
eighteen more may be added with reasonable assurances, these eighteen
being Japanese planes which found themselves without [7] sufficient fuel
to return to their carriers and who plunged into the sea. Conversation
between the planes and the Japanese fleet, in plain language, received
in Oahu is the basis for this assumption. If true, it makes a total of
forty-one planes lost by the Japanese.
Page 1752
The estimate of the number of planes attacking varies. This variance
lies between a minimum of three carriers, carrying about fifty planes
each, and a maximum of six carriers. This would indicate an attacking
force somewhere between one hundred fifty and three hundred planes.
From the crashed Japanese planes considerable information was obtained
concerning their general character. Papers discovered on a Japanese
plane which crashed indicate a striking force of six carriers, three
heavy cruisers and numerous auxiliary craft including destroyers and
other vessels. It is interesting to note that the Japanese fighter
planes were Model O-1, equipped with radial engines and built in early
1941. None of the planes shot down and so far examined, was fitted with
any armored protection for the pilot nor were any self sealing gasoline
tanks found in any plane. American radio and other American built
equipment was recovered from the wreckage. One plane was armed with a
Lewis gun of the 1920 vintage. Some observers believed that the planes
carried an unusual number of rounds of ammunition and the use of
explosive and incendiary 20 millimeter ammunition was a material factor
in damaging planes and other objectives on the ground. The torpedo
bombers were of an old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about
1906, equipped with large vanes on the stern to prevent the initial deep
dive customary of torpedoes dropped by planes. It is pleasing to note
that the attack has not disclosed any new or potent weapons. With this
in mind, it was found that the Armor [8] piercing bombs employed were 15
[sic] inch A. P. projectiles, fitted with tail vanes.
In Actual combat when American planes were able to take the air,
American fliers appear to have proved themselves considerably superior.
One Army pilot alone is credited with shooting down four Japanese
planes. All of the pilots who got in the air returned to the ground
confident of their ability to handle Japanese air forces successfully in
the future.
At neither Army or Navy air fields were planes dispersed. At Kaneohe
some VP planes were, however, moored in the water. They, too, were
destroyed by machine gun fire, using incendiary bullets. Consequently,
most of them were put out of action by the enemy in the initial sweep.
Hangars on all of the fields' were heavily bombed and many of them
completely wrecked. At Hickam Field a very large barracks building was
burned with heavy loss of life. The heaviest casualties in the Navy were
incurred aboard ships subjected to torpedo attack. The bulk of the
damage done to the fleet was done by torpedoes and not by bombs, some
ships being hit by four or more torpedoes. With the sole exception of
the Arizona, bombs proved ineffectual in causing serious damage.
Many of the officers and men of the crews when their ships were set
afire were compelled to take to the water. A very considerable number
were trapped below decks aboard the Oklahoma and the Utah, both of which
capsized. By cutting through the bottom of these two vessels, while the
attack was in progress, twenty six additional men were rescued alive.
Throughout the action, small boats from other ships and from the harbor
swarmed over the harbor engaged in the rescue of men who were driven
overboard from their ships. The rescue of men from drowning and the
recovery and swift treatment of the wounded was carried on throughout
the engagement [9] by both service people and civilians with the
greatest gallantry. Temporary hospital quarters were provided in half a
dozen different places and the wounded were cared for promptly. Because
of the huge number of unidentified dead, many being burned beyond
recognition and a large number having been picked up in the harbor
unrecognizable after several days in the water, several hundred were
buried in a common grave on Government land adjoining the Navy Yard.
While I was still there bodies were being recovered from the water, but
all were in a condition which prevented identification. Dispositions
made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Block [sic])
were adequate and were efficiently carried out.
Of the eight battleships in Pearl Harbor when the attack was made on 7
December, three escaped serious damage and can put to sea in a matter of
a few days. These are the Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Tennessee. The
Nevada can be raised in a month, and will then require a complete
overhaul. The California can be raised in two and one-half months, and
then must be given temporary repairs in order to send her to the Pacific
coast for a year's overhaul. The West Virginia can be raised in three
months, and will require a year and a half to two years for overhaul.
The Oklahoma, which was overturned, it is estimated, can be raised in
four months. Whether she will be worth overhaul cannot be determined
now. The Arizona is a total wreck, her forward magazine having exploded
after she had been damaged by both torpedoes and bombs. The Colorado was
on the Pacific coast for overhaul.
Page 1753
There were six cruisers in the harbor at the time of the attack. The
Detroit put to sea at once and is uninjured. The New Orleans and the San
Francisco are now ready to go to sea. The Honolulu will be ready on
December 20th. The Helena was badly damaged and may require a new
engine. [l0] She will be ready to go to the Pacific coast for overhaul
December 31st. The Raleigh was flooded throughout her machinery spaces
and seriously injured in other respects. It is estimated she will be
ready for the trip to the Pacific coast for overhaul on January 15th.
There were ten destroyers in the harbor at the time of the attack. Seven
of these put to sea at once and were uninjured. The Cassin and the
Downes were in the same dry-dock with the Pennsylvania. Bombs designed
for the Pennsylvania hit the two destroyers and totally wrecked both of
them. Although both destroyers were badly burned prompt fire fighting
work saved the Pennsylvania from any damage. The destroyer Shaw was in
the floating dry-dock at the time of the attack. All of this ship
forward of No. 1 stack was seriously damaged or blown off. The after-
part of the ship is still intact and can be salvaged and a new section
can be built to replace that part of the ship now destroyed.
The mine layer Oglala was lying moored outside the Helena, and received
the impact of the torpedo attack designed for the cruiser. She is a
total loss. The airplane tender Curtis which was bombed and injured by
fire started when a torpedo plane plunged into her crane will be ready
for service on December 17th. The Vestal, one of the ships of the train
which was damaged, will be ready to go to the Pacific coast on December
17th for overhaul. The old battleship Utah, which had been converted
into a training ship for anti-aircraft instruction, is a total loss.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
There was no attempt by either Admiral Kimmel or General Short to alibi
the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted [11]
they did not expect it and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if
it came. Both Kimmel and Short evidently regarded an air attack as
extremely unlikely because of the great distance which the Japs would
have to travel to make the attack and the consequent exposure of such a
task force to the superior gun power of the American fleet. Neither the
Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the
Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both
felt that if any surprise attack was attempted it would be made in the
Far East.
Of course the best means of defense against air attack consists of
fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft
available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the
diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British,
the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.
The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well disposed
antiaircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this
type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who
has pressed consistently for these guns.
There was evident in both Army and Navy only a very slight feeling of
apprehension of any attack at all and neither Army nor Navy were in a
position of readiness because of this feeling.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there was available to the
enemy in Oahu probably the most efficient fifth column to be found
anywhere in the American possessions, due to the presence of very large
numbers of alien Japanese. The intelligence work done by this fifth
column before the attack provided the Japanese Navy with exact knowledge
of all necessary details to plan the attack. This included exact charts
showing customary position of ships when in Pearl Harbor, exact location
of all defenses, gun [12] power and numerous other details. Papers
captured from the Japanese submarine that ran ashore indicated that the
exact position of nearly every ship in the harbor was known and charted
and all the necessary data to facilitate a submarine attack was in
Japanese possession. It is an interesting fact that the Utah at the time
of the attack occupied a berth normally used by an aircraft carrier and
she was sunk and is a total loss. The work of the fifth column artists
in Hawaii has only been approached in this war by the success of a
similar group in Norway.
The fighting spirit of the crews aboard ship and ashore was superb. Gun
crews remained at their station with their guns in action until they
slid into the water from the Oklahoma's deck or were driven overboard by
fires on other ships. Men ashore manned every available small boat and
carried on rescue work saving the lives of the men who were driven
overboard while the heaviest
Page 1754
fighting was going on. Some of the crew of the Utah, swept from the deck
of the ship as she capsized, were rescued by destroyers leaving the
harbor to engage in an attack on the enemy forces. Although clad only in
their underclothes, they insisted on joining the crews of the destroyers
which rescued them and went to sea.
The evacuation of the wounded and the rescue of men from drowning was
carried on with such superb courage and efficiency as to excite
universal admiration, and additional hospital accommodations were
quickly provided so that the wounded could be cared for as rapidly as
they were brought ashore.
The removal of the convalescent wounded to the mainland promptly is
imperative. I recommend that the Solace should be loaded with these
convalescent wounded at once and brought to the coast with or without
escort.
[13] The reported attempted landing on the west coast of Oahu, near
Lualualei was an effort on the part of the Japanese fifth columnists to
direct the efforts of the U. S. task forces at sea and to lure these
forces into a submarine trap. Fortunately, this fact was realized before
certain light forces under Rear Admiral Draemel reached the vicinity of
the reported landings. His ships were turned away just prior to the
launching of a number of torpedoes by waiting submarines, which
torpedoes were sighted by the vessels in Admiral Draemel's force.
[14] The same quality of courage and resourcefulness was displayed by
the Naval forces ashore as by the men aboard ship. This was likewise
true of hundreds of civilian employees in the yard, who participated in
the fire fighting and rescue work from the beginning of the attack.
It is of significance to note that throughout the entire engagement on 7
December, no enemy air plane dropped any bombs on the oil storage tanks
in which huge quantities of oil are stores [sic]. This was one of many
indications that appear to foreshadow a renewal of the Japanese attack,
probably with landing forces, in the near future. Every effort to
strengthen our air defenses, particularly in pursuit planes and anti-
aircraft artillery is clearly indicated. This anticipation of a renewal
of the attack is shared by both Army and Navy Officers in Hawaii. As a
matter of fact, in the ranks of the men in both services it is hoped
for. Both are grimly determined to avenge the treachery which cost the
lives of so many of their comrades. Instead of dampening their spirits,
the Japanese attack has awakened in them a stern spirit of revenge that
would be an important factor in the successful resistance of any new
enemy approach.
SALVAGE OPERATIONS
The salvage operation involved in raising the sunken battleships is one
of the most important pieces of defense work now under way. Its
magnitude warrants that it should receive maximum attention and all
facilities in man power and materiel that will further its expeditious
progress, including top priorities for material and high speed
transportation facilities to and from the mainland and Hawaii.
The Navy is fortunate that Lieut. Comdr. Lemuel Curtis, who is an
officer in the Naval Reserve, and who is one of the most expert salvage
men in [15] the United States was in Pearl Harbor at the time of the
attack. He is in full charge of the salvage operations under Commander
J. M. Steels, USN, the representative of the Base Force Command. With
personnel already available and with certain additions to be immediately
provided, adequate organization to carry on this work with maximum speed
has been assembled.
I am proposing to send to Pearl Harbor a large force of partially
trained men from San Diego to assist in the salvage operations, and to
be trained to form part of the crews of the new salvage ships due to the
completed next autumn. The most rapid delivery to the job of materiel
and men to expedite this salvage work is essential, and I am proposing
to arrange for the purchase or charter of the S. S. Lurline of the
Matson line, or of some other suitable high speed vessel to be utilized
primarily for this purpose. Such a ship would also be available for
returning to the United States the families of Officers and men who
should be evacuated because of the dangers inherent in the Hawaiian
situation. In addition, any available cargo space in this vessel not
needed for the transfer of material for the salvage operation can be
used to assist in the transportation of food to Hawaii.
Lieut. Cmdr. Curtis is the authority for the estimates of time required
for the salvage operations on the Nevada, California, West Virginia, and
Oklahoma.
Page 1755
REPAIRS TO DAMAGED VESSELS
The possibility of advancing the repairs on salvaged vessels was
discussed with the Commandant and with the manager of the Yard at Pearl
Harbor. A suggestion that help might be rendered direct to the Navy Yard
by Continental Repair Yards did not meet with their approval for the
reason that were compelling, but the desirability of dispersing part of
the Naval work on this Station [16] resulted in the suggestion that the
Navy take over, by purchase or lease, three small ship repair plants
located in Honolulu and that these be operated under a management
contract, with personnel to be furnished by private ship repair yards on
the west coast. These three plants are the Honolulu Iron Works, the
Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company and the Tuna Packers, Inc. Only so
much of these plants as are useful in ship repairs would be taken over,
and the Navy Yard would assign work to them on destroyers, small vessels
and yard craft, thus relieving congestion and scattering the risk in
case of further possible attack. I am studying this proposal with the
various interested parties. With these added facilities, the Navy Yard
can adequately handle the work load presently to be imposed upon it.
INSTRUCTIONS TO WEST COAST NAVAL DISTRICTS
Upon arrival in San Diego, I was met by the Commandants of the 11th
Naval District and Navy Yard, Mare Island, and gave them the necessary
information and instructions to post them on the Pearl Harbor attack to
permit them to safeguard their commands so far as possible. This
included all available information about the two men submarines which
might provide a serious menace to the west coast. The Commandant of the
Navy Yard, Mare Island, undertook to pass on all of this information to
the Commandant of the 12th and 13th Naval District who could not attend
this meeting.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In conclusion may I invite particular attention to the following points
in my report and draw certain conclusions therefrom:
(1) Neither the Army or the Navy Commandant in Oahu regarded an air
attack on the Army air fields or the Navy Stations as at all likely.
[l7] (2) The Army and Naval Commands had received a general war warning
on November 27th, but a special war warning sent out by the War
Department at midnight December 7th to the Army was not received until
some hours after the attack on that date.
(3) Army preparations were primarily based on fear of sabotage while the
Navy's were based on fear of submarine attack. Therefore, no adequate
measures were taken by either service to guard against a surprise air
attack.
(4) Radar equipment manned by the Army and usually operated for a longer
period, was only operated from 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m., on December
7th. This change was authorized by the Control Officer. Accurate
information of the approach of a concentration of planes 130 miles to
the northward relayed to the Aircraft Warning information Center by an
unofficial observer was not relayed beyond that office. Nor was other
information from Army Radar showing the retirement of enemy aircraft to
their bases received as such by the Navy until two days after the
attack.
(5) The first surprise attack, simultaneously on five principal
objectives, caught them all completely unprepared. It was about four
minutes before the first anti-aircraft fire by the Navy began, and as
the Army aircraft batteries were not manned nor their mobile units in
position it was some time before their anti-aircraft fire became
effective.
(6) Most of the damage to Army fields and Navy stations occurred during
the first attack, which concentrated on planes, airfields and capital
ships.
(7) As anti-aircraft fire increased the second and third attacks
resulted in successively less damage.
[18] (8) The final results of the three attacks left the Army air fields
and the Naval station *very* badly damaged and resulted in the practical
immobilization of the majority of the Navy's battle fleet in the Pacific
for months to come, the loss of 75% of the Army's air forces on the
Islands, and the loss of an even larger percentage of the Navy's air
force on Oahu.
Page 1756
(9) Once action was joined the courage, determination and
resourcefulness of the armed services and of the civilian employees left
nothing to be desired. Individually and collectively the bravery of the
defense was superb. In single unit combat the American pursuit planes
proved themselves superior to the Japanese and the American personnel in
the air demonstrated distinct superiority over the Japanese.
(10) While the bulk of the damage done to Naval ships was the result of
aerial torpedoes, the only battleship that was completely destroyed was
hit by bombs and not by torpedoes. Hangars of the type used on all four
stations are a serious menace and should be abandoned for use for
storage purposes in possible attack areas.
(11) The loss of life and the number of wounded in this attack is a
shocking result of unpreparedness. The handling of the dead and wounded
has been prompt and efficient. The wounded should be evacuated to the
mainland as soon as possible.
(12) The families of combatant forces should be evacuated to the
mainland as soon as possible. Orders to this end are already in
preparation.
(13) Salvage facilities and personnel are excellent and, as presently to
be augmented, will be ample to meet the Station's needs and [19] will
place the damaged vessels in repair berths in the shortest possible
time.
(14) Repair facilities are adequate to promptly carry out such repairs
as are to be made on this Naval Station. Auxiliary repair facilities are
under consideration to relieve the yard from small craft and to lessen
the concentration of vessels at one harbor.
(15) In view of the attack and the serious damage inflicted by it, the
usefulness and availability of the Naval station must be restudied. Its
air defenses must be strengthened immediately by the despatch of as many
fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns as can be assigned to it. Special
defenses against aerial torpedoes, such as balloon barrages and deep
floats to be moored alongside important combatant units must be
developed. Pending these studies and the addition of satisfactory
safeguards, no large concentration of Naval vessels can be permitted at
Pearl Harbor.
(16) This attack has emphasized the completeness of the Naval and
military information in the hands of the Japanese, the meticulous detail
of their plans of attack, and their courage, ability and resourcefulness
in executing and pressing home their operation. It should serve as a
mighty incentive to our defense forces to spare no effort to achieve a
final victory.
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/12/96 Updated: 12/12/96