VI. THE WAR PLANS RELATING TO HAWAII AND THE ADEQUACY OF THE PACIFIC FLEET

 

A. THE PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF HAWAII

 

In the Hewitt investigation, the war plans were fully examined. They were:

1. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five:

On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Exhibit 86) was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 86).

According to this plan. the day of execution was to be designated as W‑Day, and the day upon which hostilities opened with Japan would be J‑Day, which might or might not coincide with W‑Day. The plan (Exhibit 35) provided in part:

 

"INTRODUCTION

 

"CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

 

"0101. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M‑day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of thus Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W‑day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day." (Exhibit 85)


*In connection with the relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, it will appear subsequently that there may be questions raised concerning the extent of their knowledge of action taken by one another, particularly after November 27, 1941 their exchange of information, and the degree of cooperation which existed in connection with the Army radar system at Oahu.

 

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"CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

 

"1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, com­prising either:

"1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

"2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand..

"Note:—. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan." . . . (Ex. 35)

 

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

 

"131. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth do ABC‑1 is as follows:

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East." (Exhibit 36)

 

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

 

SECTION 3. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY ACTION

 

"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

"a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

"b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

"c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

"d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

"2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

"3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

"a. Capture of Guam.

"b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of ad­vanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

"c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

"d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall‑Caroline‑Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

"e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

"f. Possibly raids on stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

"a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the

 

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Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

"b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.

"c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanoa‑Celebes area (probably main base in Halmahera).

"d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

"e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

"f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area." . . . (Exhibit 36)

 

"PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

 

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED By NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

 

" 2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

"a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

"b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

"c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

"d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155° East;

"e. Defend .Samoa in category 'D';

"f. Defend Guam in category 'F';

"g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;

"h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and pre­vent the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;" . . . (Ex. 35)

 

"CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS

 

"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formu­lating tasks the Commander‑in‑Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet unto phases, as follows:

"a. PHASE I‑Initial tasks‑Japan not in the war.

"b. PHASE IA‑Initial tasks‑Japan in the war.

"c. PHASE II, etc., Succeeding tasks.

"2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

"a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.

"b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

"c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.

"d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.

"e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M‑Day.

"f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M‑Day.

"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as longitude 165° East.

"h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

 

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"i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Depart­ment.

 " j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,

Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.

"k. Continue training operation. as practicable.

"l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.

"m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan." (Exhibit 36)

 

"PHASE IA

 

"2203. Phase IA tasks areas follows:

"a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.

"b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 e, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.

"c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the Northern Pacific.

"d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Asso­ciated Powers, and of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, chiefly by covering operations.

"e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.

"2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.

"f: Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.

"g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.

"h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian area and the West Coast.

"i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.

"j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.

"k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.

"1. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area." (Exhibit 35)

 

"PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

 

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

 

"SECTION 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)

 

" 3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

" 3142. On W‑Day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

"3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex 1) ," . . . (Exhibit 36)

 

"PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

 

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS‑PHASES I AND IA

 

SECTION 1. PHASE I

 

United States Pacific Fleet

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Place

Date

"Operation Plan

"No. 1‑R5"

"1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O‑1, Rainbow Five.

"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communi­cations of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south

 

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of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East; while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan." . . . (Exhibit 35)

 

"ANNEX I

 

United States Pacific Fleet

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Place

Date

"Patrol and Sweeping Plan." . . .

 

"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O‑1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dis­positions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be fur­nished by the Commander‑in‑Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

"2. Phase I.

"This Fleet will, in the Pacific area, protect the territory and sea communi­cations of the Associated Powers by:

"(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast‑Hawaii, (2) Trans-­Pacific westward of Midway, and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

"(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

"(c) Covering.

"(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

 "(e) Routing shipping."  (Ex. 36)

"3.  (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).

"(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

"(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes. practicable.

"(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

"(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

"(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

"(6) Planes engaged to training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

"(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

"(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O‑1).". . . (Exhibit 36)

 

2. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange 14ND‑JCD‑42.

 

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND‑JCD‑42), was signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval Dis­trict (Ex. 80). The plan was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by mutual cooperation which was co apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked. (Ex. 80)

It will be seen that under this Plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.

The tasks assigned were as follows:

"14. Tasks.

"a. JOINT TASK. To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

"b. ARMY TASK. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

 

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"c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces." (Ex. 80)

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" (Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu). (Ex. 80)

"17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

"a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti‑aircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS‑WHEELER FIELD‑LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

"b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

"c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

"d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

"e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

"f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an aerial observation system an outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea con­ducted within range of Army bombers.

"h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18.e.

"i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coor­dinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intel­ligence.: Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.

"j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"k. Counter‑espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"m. Any measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1936, Chapter IX.

"n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, shall provide for:

"a. An inshore patrol.

"b. An offshore patrol.

"c. An escort force.

"d. An attack force.

"e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

"f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro‑acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

"g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU‑D. C. A. and installation of sub­marine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU‑D. C. A, as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

"h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

"i. Distant reconnaissance.

"j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

"k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

 

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"l.  In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intel­ligence.

"m.. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter‑espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

"o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

"p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities per­taining thereto." (Exhibit 80)

 

3. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941 (Exhibit 47) dealt with joint security measures and protection oaf the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

This provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces were insufficient), and was to become effective when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to. warrant such action.

It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobiliza­tion for war, there were adopted the following agreements:

Paragraph II, in respect of joint air operations, provide that when the Com­manding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distant patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. (Ex. 47)

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Com­mand Post of the Army Provisional Anti‑Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when; the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit is to their respective organizations. (Ex. 47)

Paragraph IV related to joint anti‑aircraft measures, the arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, baboon barrages, Marine Corps anti‑aircraft artillery, and Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means; will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable." (Ex. 47)

 

4. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in the Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu.

 

On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph 1 of the estimate included a "Summary of the Situations" which indicated that relations between. the United States and Orange were strained, un­certain, and varying, that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by

 

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a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that  it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths," indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete sur­prise (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack, most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust; that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier;" and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using. (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to Us." It was stated that at would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period, and, as a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred. (Exhibit 49)

Paragraph V contained "Decisions." The primary decision was that the Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Com­mander Naval Base Defense Air Force‑Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons. (Exhibit 49)

 

5. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security, of the Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

 

 Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 14CL‑41, from the Commander in Chief; Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.

This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present exist­ing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

 

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Security measures were prescribed covering:

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

C. Sortie and entry.

D. Operating areas.

E. Ships at sea.

F. Ships in port.

The, security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the principal Army anti‑aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would, assist the Army in manning them; and pro­vided that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all Fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti‑aircraft gunfire; and that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army, joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti‑aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills, etc.

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:

"Anti‑aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack was also set forth: The Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie order, sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc.; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to origi­nate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were to be taken by other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding day­light period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was further provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accom­panied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means." (Exhibit 8, Naval Court of Inquiry).

 

The war and defense plans relating to Hawaii were contained in Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, U. S. Navy WPL‑46 (Exhibit 4); in United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5, WP‑PAC‑46 (Exhibit 5); in "Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935" (Exhibit 6); and, particularly, in Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Theatre, Orange 14ND‑JCD‑42 (Exhibit 7); and in Operation Plan No. 1‑41, issued by Admiral Bloch as Naval Base Defense Officer (Exhibit 53).

 

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In accordance with the Basic War Plans, United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 was approved by Admiral Kimmel and issued about July 1, 1941. It was offered in evidence as Exhibit 16. Admiral Smith said that these plans contemplated that the Pacific Fleet was to deny to the enemy the Marshalls and Carolines, and to capture a fleet base in Truk. With the available equipment and personnel, he said, the Marshalls could have been raided, but could not have possibly been captured.

Admiral Pye said that in his opinion, war plan Rainbow 5 was not yet up to date and that he considered that the whole basic war plans had really not been operations plans but development plans and had been used as a lever to get more men, ships and naval shore establishment development. (p. 160)

Admiral Pye said that under the provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance off Hawaii was apparently the Navy's under the direction of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 163)

 

The record submitted by the Naval Court refers to, but does not include, copies of Exhibits 4 to 7, inclusive. There was, however, considerable testimony concerning the local plans for the Hawaiian area.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated March 28, 1941 (Exhibit 23) dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements were adopted.

Paragraph II provided for joint air operations. It stated that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander, directing the search operations.

Paragraph III provided for joint communications and, among other things, stated that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which was secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti‑Aircraft. Brigade. It also stated that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and that special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore which would be secured through Navy channels was to be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

Paragraph IV related to joint anti‑aircraft measures, dealt with arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, and Marine Corps anti‑aircraft artillery, and the Army Aircraft Warning Service. This stated that that service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army an "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Nay, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."

 

Admiral Brown said that he would have expected the Army to depend on Navy planes to discover the approach of the enemy. (p 144)

Admiral Bellinger said that the Commanding General of the Army's Air Force at Hawaii apparently expected the Navy would have early information and seemed surprised when Admiral Bellinger told him that they should not expect such information. (p. 131)

 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY                                                                                            391

 

ADMIRAL HEWITT'S EXAMINATION

 

Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District in December, 1941, was shown Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated 28 March 1941 (Exhibit 47), which deals with point Army and Navy measures for the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet. Regarding joint anti‑aircraft exercises and drills in the months preceding December, 1941, Captain Earle stated that definite problems were developed for training purposes, which would serve to develop the control features of anti‑aircraft defense and also develop the necessary coordination between Army and Navy operations. In addition, about once in every ten days a drill was held in which planes flew over Pearl Harbor during ether day or night and ships in the harbor simulated anti‑aircraft fore. The Pearl Harbor area was divided into sectors, with a naval sector commander aboard ship responsible for controlling the fire from that sector and making required reports (p. 457‑458).

Captain Earle stated that about once a month a drill was held which entailed locating an aircraft target at a certain bearing from Pearl Harbor, with warnings being sent to both Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier or unit was located at a certain distance and bearing. Fighters planes would then  be sent up and bombers dispatched to attack the simulated target. Captain Earle believed that at least three of these drills were held prior to 7 December 1941, but could not recall the date of the last drill or whether any was held between 27 November and 7 December (p. 168).

Questioned regarding the command set‑up for the joint exercises, Captain Earle said (p. 458‑459):

"My recollection is colored from operations that took place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my belief that the entire problem of this aircraft coordination was handled through the fleet and the Army. In other words, after the word came through that an enemy had been signed on a certain bearing, this word was given to the fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made between the commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate their operations, including order as to detailed directions as to direction, speed, and number of planes to be used, and so forth.

"To amplify the above statement, there was no joint command post or operations center actually set up for these drills before the war. The Operations Office in the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval District, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary communication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle these drills from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the exact time, but either somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just after, a coast artillery liaison officer was placed in this Operations Office. Plans had been made for a joint command post, but no definite steps had been taken as to location or details prior to the start of the war. It is my recollection that plans had been made for a joint command post, but this had not gone beyond the planning stage."

Exhibit 47 provided in part that pending completion by the Army of an aircraft warning service, the Navy would by radar and other appropriate means attempt to give such warnings of hostile attacks as might be practicable. Captain Earle said that to implement this agreement, the Navy had established communications with the Army over radio nets and the teletype system, so that any information received could be promptly disseminated; had ordered the communications activities to make prompt report of enemy movements; had directed the few destroyers assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District to promptly report contacts; and since there were no planes attached to the District, had instructed fleet planes to forward immediately to the Army any pertinent information (p. 460).

Captain Earle said that prior to 7 December 1941 the Fourteenth Naval District assigned a liaison officer to General Short's headquarters for general liaison duties (p. 160). Captain Earle stated further that there had been a naval officer engaged in assisting the Army to get their aircraft warning system installed and that at one time this officer came to ham and asked for assistance. This officer also stated that several naval liaison officers would be required at the warning center. Captain Earle told him that the District Communications Officer would be glad to give him all possible assistance, but that there were no spare personnel an the District who could be used for naval liaison officers at the center (p. 461).

 

392                                                                   CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

The above agreement was approved April 2, 1941, by Admiral Bloch and General Short.

 

Exhibit 22 is a letter forwarding the joint agreement between General Short and Admiral Bloch and the Joint Estimate, which was sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on May 1, 1941. (p. 86)

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that the Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District would be a member of the Joint Planning Com­mittee established by that plan. Captain Earle, however, did not act formally as a member of that Committee, but said that the Chiefs of Staff acted informally with sub‑committees appointed for the majority of the detailed work. (p. 368)

Captain Earle said that when he first had his assignment as Chief of Staff it took some time to get the plans approved by the Army, but as time went on and various warnings were received, it became easier to accomplish joint action. (p. 369)

Captain Earle said that the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not effective during the period preceding the attack, except as to the portion relating to planning. (p. 369)

Concerning annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which required the Army to expedite the warning service and the Navy to endeavor to give warning of hostile attack until such time as the Army system was in operation, Captain Earle had no recollection of discussion of this requirement. Neither did he have any definite recollection of the provision for liaison officers in connection with the dissemination of informa­tion, but vaguely recalled some talk with a fleet radar officer on the question of assignment of Navy personnel, and recalled that he told the fleet radar officer that as soon as they could get somebody who was qualified they would be glad to turn him over to the Army. (p. 369)

Captain Earle's recollection was vague as to other provisions of the Joint Plan such as procedure for recognition of aircraft and the use of barrage balloons, etc. (p. 370) Captain Earle could recall no plan for the coordination of Fleet anti‑aircraft fire with Army anti‑airc