VI.
THE WAR PLANS RELATING TO HAWAII AND THE ADEQUACY OF THE PACIFIC FLEET
A.
THE PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF HAWAII
In the Hewitt
investigation, the war plans were fully examined. They were:
1. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan
Rainbow Five:
On 26 July 1941, U. S.
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Exhibit 86) was distributed to the
Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy
basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific
Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval
Operations (Exhibit 86).
According to this
plan. the day of execution was to be designated as W‑Day, and the day
upon which hostilities opened with Japan would be J‑Day, which might or
might not coincide with W‑Day. The plan (Exhibit 35) provided in part:
"INTRODUCTION
"CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION
"0101. At the
date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized,
and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base.
It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for
active service within four days of
an order for general mobilization. To
provide for the contingency of M‑day being set prior to the date on which
hostilities are to open, the day of execution of thus Plan is designated
throughout the Plan as W‑day. The day that hostilities open with Japan
will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day."
(Exhibit 85)
*In connection with the relations between Admiral
Kimmel and General Short, it will appear subsequently that there may be
questions raised concerning the extent of their knowledge of action taken by
one another, particularly after November 27, 1941 their exchange of
information, and the degree of cooperation which existed in connection with the
Army radar system at Oahu.
382 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS
"1211. The
general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:
a. That the Associated
Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less
Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the
'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:
"1. Germany,
Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
"2. Germany,
Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand..
"Note:—.
As of
22 June war exists between the European
Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally
against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan." . . .
(Ex. 35)
"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION
"131. The concept
of the war in the Pacific, as set forth do ABC‑1 is as follows:
"Even if Japan
were not initially to enter the war on the side of the
Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy
their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does
enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The
United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the
Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the
manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the
defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia.
The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to
release the necessary forces for the Far East." (Exhibit 36)
"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION
SECTION 3. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY ACTION
"1331. It is
believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to
commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket
battleship or heavy cruiser.
"1332. It is
conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:
"a. The principal
offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
"b. The secondary
offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian
Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of
Guam and other outlying positions.
"c. The offensive
against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
"d. The principal
defensive efforts to be:
"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
"2. Holding
positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western
Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.
"3. Protecting
national and captured territory and approaches.
"1333. To
accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be
toward:
"a. Capture of Guam.
"b. Establishment
of
control over the South China Sea,
Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the
establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of
United States and allied air and naval
forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
"c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
"d. Denial to the
United States of the use of the Marshall‑Caroline‑Marianas area by
the use of
fixed defenses, and, by the operation of
air forces and light naval forces to
reduce the strength of the United
States Fleet.
"e. Reenforcement
of the Mandate Islands
by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.
"f. Possibly
raids on stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States
positions.
"1334. The
initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
"a. Troops and
aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan,
fairly strong defenses in the
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HEWITT INQUIRY 383
Carolines, and comparatively weak but
constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
"b. Main fleet
concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly
Pescadores) after the capture of
Guam and the reenforcement of the
Mandates.
"c. A strong
fleet detachment in the Mindanoa‑Celebes area (probably main base in
Halmahera).
"d. Sufficient
units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.
"e. Strong
concentration of submarines
and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air
attack units as can be supported there.
"f. Raiding
and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the
Hawaiian area." . . . (Exhibit 36)
"PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS
CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED By NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION
" 2101. The Navy
Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific
Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:
"a. Support the
forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength
away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the
Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;
"b. Prepare to
capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and
to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
"c. Destroy Axis
sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or
indirectly with the enemy;
"d. Support
British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as Longitude
155° East;
"e. Defend .Samoa
in category 'D';
"f. Defend
Guam in category 'F';
"g. Protect the
sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and
patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding
forces;
"h. Protect the
territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the
extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying
hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy
the use of land positions in that hemisphere;" . . . (Ex. 35)
"CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE
ASSIGNED MISSIONS
"2201. It will be
noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption
a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander‑in‑Chief
has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by
the Pacific Fleet unto phases, as follows:
"a. PHASE I‑Initial
tasks‑Japan not in the war.
"b. PHASE IA‑Initial
tasks‑Japan in the war.
"c. PHASE II,
etc., Succeeding tasks.
"2202. Phase I
tasks are as follows:
"a. Complete
mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types
in constant readiness for distant service.
"b. Maintain
fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
"c. Transfer the
Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
"d. Transfer the
Southeast Pacific Force, if
ordered.
"e. Assign twelve
patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M‑Day.
"f. Assign
two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval
Coastal Frontier on M‑Day.
"g. Protect the
communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension
of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light
forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In
so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as
longitude 165° East.
"h. Establish
defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
384 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"i. Observe, with
submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the
Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
" j. Prosecute the establishment and
defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra,
Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
"k. Continue
training operation. as practicable.
"l. Move the
maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in
landing operations.
"m. Guard against
surprise attack by Japan." (Exhibit 36)
"PHASE
IA
"2203. Phase IA
tasks areas follows:
"a. Continue
tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
"b. Accomplish
such of the tasks in 2202 e, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.
"c. Make an
initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the
Northern Pacific.
"d. Continue the
protection of
the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, and of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, chiefly by covering operations.
"e. 1. Make
reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
"2. If available
cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese
shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
"f: Establish and
maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and
communications near the Japanese homeland.
"g. Maintain air
patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.
"h. Escort
important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian area and
the West Coast.
"i. Route
shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
"j. Augment the
local defense forces of
the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as
necessary.
"k. Move from San
Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of
the Second Marine Division.
"1. Prepare to
capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area." (Exhibit 35)
"PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT
CHAPTER I. PHASE I
"SECTION 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)
" 3141. Task
Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.
" 3142. On W‑Day
transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern
and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these
forces and rotate detail at discretion.
"3143. Perform
tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex 1) ," . . . (Exhibit
36)
"PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS‑PHASES I AND IA
SECTION 1. PHASE I
United States Pacific
Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Flagship
Place
Date
"Operation
Plan
"No. 1‑R5"
"1. Information,
Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O‑1, Rainbow Five.
"2. This Fleet
will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the
Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 385
of the equator as far west as Longitude
155° East; while continuing training and guarding against attack by
Japan." . . . (Exhibit 35)
"ANNEX I
United States Pacific
Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
Flagship
Place
Date
"Patrol and
Sweeping Plan." . . .
"1. Information
and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O‑1,
Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions,
and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander‑in‑Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.
"2. Phase I.
"This Fleet will,
in the Pacific area, protect the territory and sea communications of the
Associated Powers by:
"(a) Patrolling
against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and
on shipping lanes (1) West Coast‑Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of
Midway, and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
"(b) Escorting as
conditions require and forces available permit.
"(c) Covering.
"(d) Employing
striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
"(e) Routing shipping." (Ex. 36)
"3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
"(1) Having due
regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of
personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the
approaches to the Hawaiian area.
"(2) Initially
base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase
the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two
squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the
situation at the time makes. practicable.
"(3) Be prepared,
on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one patrol squadron and
tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.
"(4) Be
particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
"(5) In
transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.
"(6) Planes
engaged to training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal
Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
"(7) Effect
closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during
initial sweep of Phase IA.
"(8) Modify
patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding
and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O‑1).". . . (Exhibit
36)
2. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater,
Orange 14ND‑JCD‑42.
The Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and
FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND‑JCD‑42), was signed and placed in
effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by
the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Ex. 80). The plan was based on the
joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute the basis on which
all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization
plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by mutual
cooperation which was co apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy
would operate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were
invoked. (Ex. 80)
It will be seen that
under this Plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land,
and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval
forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and
protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy
was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.
The tasks assigned
were as follows:
"14. Tasks.
"a. JOINT TASK.
To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping
in the Coastal Zone.
"b. ARMY TASK. To
hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile
sympathizers; to support the naval forces.
386 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"c. NAVY TASK. To
patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support
the Army forces." (Ex. 80)
The Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the
waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" (Oahu and such adjacent land and
sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu). (Ex. 80)
"17. ARMY. The
Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:
"a. The beach and
land, seacoast and anti‑aircraft defense of OAHU with particular
attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat,
HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS‑WHEELER
FIELD‑LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is
recognized.
"b. An
antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.
"c. Protection of
landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with
available forces.
"d. Defense of
installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community
for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within
naval establishments.
"e. Defense
against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore
establishments.
"f. Establishment
of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation
with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an aerial observation
system an outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
"g. Support of
naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within
range of Army bombers.
"h. Provide
personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided
for in paragraph 18.e.
"i. In
conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by
means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint
instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence.:
Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint
Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.
"j. An
intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather,
evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of
activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"k. Counter‑espionage
within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"l. Control of
dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"m. Any measures
to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication
systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1936,
Chapter IX.
"n. Supply of all
Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"o.
Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"p. Reception and
distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the
civil population.
"18. NAVY. The
Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, shall provide for:
"a. An inshore
patrol.
"b. An offshore
patrol.
"c. An escort
force.
"d. An attack
force.
"e. Provide and
maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.
"f. Installation
and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro‑acoustic
posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of
the Army.)
"g. Support of
Army forces in the OAHU‑D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine
fields in the defense of the OAHU‑D. C. A, as may be deemed necessary and
practicable.
"h. Sweeping
channels and mine fields.
"i. Distant
reconnaissance.
"j. Attacking
enemy naval forces.
"k. Maintenance
of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore
establishments.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 387
"l. In
conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local
communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.
"m.. Navy
measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over
communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
"n. Operation of
a Naval intelligence system, including counter‑espionage, for the
collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.
"o. Supply and
hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.
"p. Operation or
supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining
thereto." (Exhibit 80)
3. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan.
Annex VII, Section VI
to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth
Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General
Short 2 April 1941 (Exhibit 47) dealt with joint security measures and
protection oaf the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base.
This provided for
joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks
delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations and for
the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces
were insufficient), and was to become effective when the Commanding General and
ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently
imminent to. warrant such action.
It stated that in
order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and
for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization
for war, there were adopted the following agreements:
Paragraph II, in
respect of joint air operations, provide that when the Commanding General and
ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently
imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary
steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander
such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in
order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following
plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under
the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the
immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the
Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distant patrol and
search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft would
be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search
operations. (Ex. 47)
Paragraph III provided
for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the
presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through
Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti‑Aircraft
Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently,
when; the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be
made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and
friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available
for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own
evaluation of the available information and transmit is to their respective
organizations. (Ex. 47)
Paragraph IV related
to joint anti‑aircraft measures, the arrival and departure procedure for
aircraft, baboon barrages, Marine Corps anti‑aircraft artillery, and Army
Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be
expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and "during the
period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use
of Radar and other appropriate means; will endeavor to give such warning of
hostile attacks as may be practicable." (Ex. 47)
4. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in the
Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu.
On 31 March 1941, Rear
Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol
Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force,
prepared a joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event
of sudden hostile action against Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).
Paragraph 1 of the
estimate included a "Summary of the Situations" which indicated that
relations between. the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and
varying, that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by
388 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a declaration of war; that a successful
sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent
effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long
period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating
areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines
and/or Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior
warning from our Intelligence Service (Exhibit 49).
Paragraph II of the
estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths," indicating, among
other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area one or more
submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported
by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when
several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their
actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain
for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure
that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a
complete surprise (Exhibit 49).
Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy
Action." It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a
surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on
Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of
these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form of attack on
Oahu would be an air attack, most likely launched from one or more carriers
which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. It was further pointed out
that a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to
attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust;
that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier;" and that in a dawn air
attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete
surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using. (Exhibit
49).
Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to
Us." It was stated that at would be desirable to run daily patrols as far
as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively
maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period, and, as
a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken unless other
intelligence indicated that a surface
raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was
made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack
on ships in the operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of
action could be initiated by our forces
until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred. (Exhibit 49)
Paragraph V contained
"Decisions." The primary decision was that the Naval Base Defense Air
Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or
fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a
surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory
measures. A number of
subsidiary decisions were made, including
decisions for the establishment of
a search and attack group, an air combat
group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions
of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval
Base Defense Air Force‑Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance with
current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment
and reconnaissance squadrons. (Exhibit 49)
5. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security, of
the Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 14CL‑41,
from the Commander in Chief; Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning
the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in
February, 1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.
This order provided
that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:
(a) That no
responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions
by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals
of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from
small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an
obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the
approaches to Pearl Harbor;
(b) That a declaration
of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine
attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.
PROCEEDINGS OF
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Security measures were
prescribed covering:
A. Continuous patrols,
inshore, boom and harbor.
B. Intermittent
patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The
destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance,
(b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or
Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other
than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice.
The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed
by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie
of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship
at other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored
mines.
C. Sortie and entry.
D. Operating areas.
E. Ships at sea.
F. Ships in port.
The, security
provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the principal Army
anti‑aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine
defense battalions would, assist the Army in manning them; and provided that
in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all
Fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it
prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further
provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure
berthing so as to develop the maximum anti‑aircraft gunfire; and that
ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army,
joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other
action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging
through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air
effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti‑aircraft
fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive
of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills,
etc.
Three conditions of
naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:
"Anti‑aircraft
battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each
sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.)
Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."
The procedure to be
followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack was also set forth:
The Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie order, sending
destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for
sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc.;
and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an
attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of
the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy ships,
and arm and prepare all bombing units available.
The action to be taken
if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. It was provided
that the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language
dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were to be taken by
other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for search and for
offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and
to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of
attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The
shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack
area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions
issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was further
provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not
indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that
"(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may
indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast
ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore,
assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions
warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be
located by air search or other means." (Exhibit 8, Naval Court of
Inquiry).
The
war and defense plans relating to Hawaii were contained in Navy Basic War Plan
Rainbow No. 5, U. S. Navy WPL‑46 (Exhibit 4); in United States Pacific
Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5, WP‑PAC‑46 (Exhibit 5); in
"Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935" (Exhibit 6); and, particularly,
in Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Theatre, Orange 14ND‑JCD‑42
(Exhibit 7); and in Operation Plan No. 1‑41, issued by Admiral Bloch as
Naval Base Defense Officer (Exhibit 53).
390 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In accordance with the Basic War Plans, United States
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 was approved by Admiral Kimmel and
issued about July 1, 1941. It was offered in evidence as Exhibit 16. Admiral
Smith said that these plans contemplated that the Pacific Fleet was to deny to
the enemy the Marshalls and Carolines, and to capture a fleet base in Truk.
With the available equipment and personnel, he said, the Marshalls could have
been raided, but could not have possibly been captured.
Admiral Pye said that in his opinion, war plan Rainbow 5 was
not yet up to date and that he considered that the whole basic war plans had
really not been operations plans but development plans and had been used as a
lever to get more men, ships and naval shore establishment development. (p.
160)
Admiral Pye said that under the provisions of the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance
off Hawaii was apparently the Navy's under the direction of the Commandant of
the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 163)
The
record submitted by the Naval Court refers to, but does not include, copies of
Exhibits 4 to 7, inclusive. There was, however, considerable testimony
concerning the local plans for the Hawaiian area.
Annex
VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department
and Fourteenth Naval District, dated March 28, 1941 (Exhibit 23) dealt with
joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It
stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of
the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids
or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general
mobilization for war, the following agreements were adopted.
Paragraph
II provided for joint air operations. It stated that when the Commanding
General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was
sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such
preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the
other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as
circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in
accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface
vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive
air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under
the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for
long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made
available these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval
commander, directing the search operations.
Paragraph
III provided for joint communications and, among other things, stated that all
information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu
which was secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the
Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti‑Aircraft. Brigade. It also
stated that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was
established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the
location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and that special wire or
radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so
that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and
transmit it to their respective organizations. Information relating to the
presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore which would be secured
through Navy channels was to be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft
Warning Service Information Center.
Paragraph
IV related to joint anti‑aircraft measures, dealt with arrival and
departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, and Marine Corps anti‑aircraft
artillery, and the Army Aircraft Warning Service. This stated that that service
was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army an
"during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the
Nay, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give
such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."
Admiral Brown said that he would have expected the Army to
depend on Navy planes to discover the approach of the enemy. (p 144)
Admiral Bellinger said that the Commanding General of the
Army's Air Force at Hawaii apparently expected the Navy would have early
information and seemed surprised when Admiral Bellinger told him that they
should not expect such information. (p. 131)
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 391
ADMIRAL
HEWITT'S EXAMINATION
Captain John B. Earle,
USN, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District in December, 1941, was shown
Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, dated 28 March 1941 (Exhibit 47), which deals with point Army and Navy
measures for the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet. Regarding joint anti‑aircraft
exercises and drills in the months preceding December, 1941, Captain Earle
stated that definite problems were developed for training purposes, which would
serve to develop the control features of anti‑aircraft defense and also
develop the necessary coordination between Army and Navy operations. In
addition, about once in every ten days a drill was held in which planes flew
over Pearl Harbor during ether day or night and ships in the harbor simulated
anti‑aircraft fore. The Pearl Harbor area was divided into sectors, with
a naval sector commander aboard ship responsible for controlling the fire from
that sector and making required reports (p. 457‑458).
Captain Earle stated
that about once a month a drill was held which entailed locating an aircraft
target at a certain bearing from Pearl Harbor, with warnings being sent to both
Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier or unit was located at a certain
distance and bearing. Fighters planes would then be sent up and bombers dispatched to attack the simulated target.
Captain Earle believed that at least three of these drills were held prior to 7
December 1941, but could not recall the date of the last drill or whether any
was held between 27 November and 7 December (p. 168).
Questioned regarding
the command set‑up for the joint exercises, Captain Earle said (p. 458‑459):
"My recollection
is colored from operations that took place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my
belief that the entire problem of this aircraft coordination was handled
through the fleet and the Army. In other words, after the word came through
that an enemy had been signed on a certain bearing, this word was given to the
fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made between the
commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate their operations,
including order as to detailed directions as to direction, speed, and number of
planes to be used, and so forth.
"To amplify the
above statement, there was no joint command post or operations center actually
set up for these drills before the war. The Operations Office in the
Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval District, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary
communication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle these drills
from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the exact time, but either
somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just after, a coast artillery liaison
officer was placed in this Operations Office. Plans had been made for a joint
command post, but no definite steps had been taken as to location or details
prior to the start of the war. It is my recollection that plans had been made
for a joint command post, but this had not gone beyond the planning
stage."
Exhibit 47 provided in
part that pending completion by the Army of an aircraft warning service, the
Navy would by radar and other appropriate means attempt to give such warnings
of hostile attacks as might be practicable. Captain Earle said that to
implement this agreement, the Navy had established communications with the Army
over radio nets and the teletype system, so that any information received could
be promptly disseminated; had ordered the communications activities to make
prompt report of enemy movements; had directed the few destroyers assigned to
the Fourteenth Naval District to promptly report contacts; and since there were
no planes attached to the District, had instructed fleet planes to forward
immediately to the Army any pertinent information (p. 460).
Captain Earle said
that prior to 7 December 1941 the Fourteenth Naval District assigned a liaison
officer to General Short's headquarters for general liaison duties (p. 160).
Captain Earle stated further that there had been a naval officer engaged in
assisting the Army to get their aircraft warning system installed and that at
one time this officer came to ham and asked for assistance. This officer also
stated that several naval liaison officers would be required at the warning
center. Captain Earle told him that the District Communications Officer would
be glad to give him all possible assistance, but that there were no spare
personnel an the District who could be used for naval liaison officers at the
center (p. 461).
392 CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The
above agreement was approved April 2, 1941, by Admiral Bloch and General Short.
Exhibit 22 is a letter forwarding the joint agreement
between General Short and Admiral Bloch and the Joint Estimate, which was sent
to the Chief of Naval Operations on May 1, 1941. (p. 86)
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that the
Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District would be a member of the Joint
Planning Committee established by that plan. Captain Earle, however, did not
act formally as a member of that Committee, but said that the Chiefs of Staff
acted informally with sub‑committees appointed for the majority of the
detailed work. (p. 368)
Captain Earle said that when he first had his assignment as
Chief of Staff it took some time to get the plans approved by the Army, but as
time went on and various warnings were received, it became easier to accomplish
joint action. (p. 369)
Captain Earle said that the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan was not effective during the period preceding the attack, except as to the
portion relating to planning. (p. 369)
Concerning annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan, which required the Army to expedite the warning service and the
Navy to endeavor to give warning of hostile attack until such time as the Army
system was in operation, Captain Earle had no recollection of discussion of
this requirement. Neither did he have any definite recollection of the
provision for liaison officers in connection with the dissemination of information,
but vaguely recalled some talk with a fleet radar officer on the question of
assignment of Navy personnel, and recalled that he told the fleet radar officer
that as soon as they could get somebody who was qualified they would be glad to
turn him over to the Army. (p. 369)
Captain Earle's recollection was vague as to other provisions of the Joint Plan such as procedure for recognition of aircraft and the use of barrage balloons, etc. (p. 370) Captain Earle could recall no plan for the coordination of Fleet anti‑aircraft fire with Army anti‑airc