XVIII.
REPETITION OF ARMY DISPATCH ON NOVEMBER 28th
On
November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to
CincPac for information (Exhibit 19) which repeated a dispatch which had been
sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:
"Negotiations
with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the
barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to
continue x Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action Possible at
any moment x If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States
desires that Japan commit the first overt act x This policy should not repeat
not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize
your defense x Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures
should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or
disclose intent x Report measures taken x a separate message is being sent to G‑2
Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States x Should
hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far
as they pertain to Japan x Limit dissemination of this highly secret
information to minimum essential officers"
The
Navy dispatch continued that WPL‑52 was not applicable to the Pacific
area and would not be planed in effect in that area, except as then in force in
Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further:
"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act x be
prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in
case hostilities occur"
PROCEEDINGS OF
HEWITT INQUIRY 435
Exhibit 9 is the November 28 dispatch from CNO to CincPac.
A.
GENERAL MARSHALL
General
Marshall thought that he had seen the Army dispatch which was repeated in the
Navy dispatch of November 28th (page 864). However, General Gerow did not think
that Marshall had seen it. The language made Marshall believe that he had seen
it particularly because the instruction that Japan must commit the first overt
act came from the President. He had no recollection that the warning not to
alarm the civilian population came from the same source (page 865).