[This file contains the REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY, pp. 297-386]

Page i

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION PURSUANT TO S. Con. Res. 27 A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO PART 39 REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH ENDORSEMENTS Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1946
Page ii JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois from Pennsylvania OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from from Wisconsin North Carolina COUNSEL (Through January 14, 1946) WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel GERHARD A. GESELL, chief Assistant Counsel JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel (After January 14, 1946) SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel Page iii HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE Part Pages Transcript Hearings No. pages 1 1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 3 983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 4 1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946. 8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE Part Exhibits Nos. 12 1 through 6. 13 7 and 8. 14 9 through 43. 15 44 through 87. 16 88 through 110. 17 111 through 128. 18 129 through 156. 19 157 through 172. 20 173 through 179. 21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings 35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board. Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments. Page iv JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 157 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. Report of Roberts Commission, dated January 23, 1942 ............ 1 2. Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board dated October 20, 1944 ........ 23 3. Appendix No. 1: Supplemental Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board on phases mentioned in House Military Affairs report which relate to the Pearl Harbor disaster ....................................... 179 4. Exhibits A and B to appendix No. 1 (above) ...................... 219 5. Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board ...................... 220 6. November 25, 1944, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for Secretary of War, re APHB report ................................ 231 7. September 14, 1945, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for Secretary of War, re Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen's Investigation .. 270 8. September 14, 1945, memorandum from Judge Advocate General for Secretary of War, re APHB Top Secret Report reviewed in connec- tion with Clausen Investigation ................................. 283 9. Report of Naval Court of Inquiry, dated October 19, 1944 ........ 297 10. Addendum to Navy Court of Inquiry findings of fact ............. 323 11. First endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Navy Judge Advocate General for Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 2, 1944 .......... 330 12. November 3, 1944, memorandum from CincUS and CNO to Secretary of Navy, listing parts of Navy Court of Inquiry record that contain information of super secret nature ............................. 332 13. Second endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report by CincUS and CNO to Secretary of Navy, dated November 6, 1944 (not made public) ........................................................ 335 14. Paraphrase of second endorsement (item 13) which was made public ......................................................... 345 15. Third endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Secretary of Navy, dated December 1, 1944 ................................ 354 16. Fourth endorsement (undated) to Navy Court of Inquiry report, and fourth endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary of Navy (not made public) ...................................... 355 17. Paraphrase of fourth endorsement (item 16), dated August 1945, made public August 29, 1945 .................................... 371 18. December 3, 1944, memorandum, from CincUS and CNO to Secretary of Navy, commenting on report of Army Pearl Harbor Board ....... 383 19. Third endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by CincUS and CNO to Secretary of Navy, dated August 13, 1945 .................... 387 20. Second endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Navy Judge Advocate General for CincUS and CNO. Dated August 10, 1945 ..... 388 21. First endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary of Navy, dated July 25, 1945 ...................................... 389 22. Report of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to Secretary of Navy, dated July 12, 1945 .................................................. 390 Page 297 REPORT OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY [1156] Under date of 13 July, 1944. this Court of Inquiry was ordered by the Secretary of the Navy to inquire into all circumstances connected with the attack made by the Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December, 1941, to include in its findings a full statement of facts deemed to be established, to give its opinion as to whether any offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service and, in case its opinion be that offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred, to specifically recommend what further proceedings should be had. The Court convened on 24 July, 1944, and since then has held daily sessions almost continuously in Washington, San Francisco, and Pearl Harbor, having called and examined numerous witnesses from the State, War, and Navy Departments. The Court, having thoroughly inquired into all facts and circumstances in connection with the attack by the Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941, and having considered all evidence adduced, finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
I
Pearl Harbor is situated on the Island of Oahu, near the city of Honolulu, the capital of the Territory of Hawaii, distant 2100 miles from San Francisco. It is the only permanent outlying United States Naval Base in the Eastern Pacific. It possesses great strategic importance as a point from which naval operations in defense of the Western United States can be conducted, and offensive operations against an enemy to the Westward launched and supported. The United States possesses no base on the West Coast of the United States that meets these requirements to an equivalent extent.
II
Prior to 1940 certain subdivisions of the Pacific Fleet and, beginning in May, 1940, the entire Fleet operated in the [1157] Hawaiian area with Pearl Harbor as a base. In May, 1941, three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic. For the purpose of conducting exercises and maneuvers at sea designed to increase efficiency and readiness for war, the remaining major vessels of the Pacific Fleet were organized in three main Task Forces. The operating schedule was so arranged that there was always at least one of these Task Forces, and usually two, at sea. Frequently, during Fleet maneuvers, the entire available Fleet was at sea. Page 298 The vessels and the Fleet planes thus rotated their scheduled periods in port, periods essential to the mobility of the Fleet for purposes impossible of achievement at sea. At no time during 1941 were all the vessels of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. The operating schedule in effect on 7 December, 1941, was issued in September, 1941. In accordance with its provisions Task Force One, under the command of Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. N., and part of Task Force Two were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. Task Force Three, under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. N., was at sea, engaged chiefly in escorting the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON to Midway to which point planes were being ferried. Part of Task Force Two, under the command of Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, Jr., U. S. N., and including the aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE, was returning from ferrying planes to Wake. [1158] Task Force One included the preponderance of the battleship strength of the Fleet. The three battleships of Task Force Two had been left behind in Pearl Harbor because their slow speed did not permit them to accompany the ENTERPRISE to Wake. It was purely a coincidence that all battleships of the Pacific Fleet, except one undergoing overhaul at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December.
III
Beginning at 0755, Honolulu time, on 7 December, 1941, an attack was delivered from the northward of Oahu by Japanese carrier aircraft against units of the United States Pacific Fleet then moored and anchored inside the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, against Army and Navy aircraft, and against shore installations on the Island of Oahu. An attack delivered simultaneously by Japanese midget submarines was without effect. The details of these attacks and the extent of the loss of life and of the damage inflicted by Japanese aircraft have since been made matters of public record. Within the same 24 hours the Japanese also delivered attacks on the Philippines, Wake and Guam, as well as on Hong Kong and Malaya. The attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be disassociated from these. All were the reprehensible acts of a warrior nation, war-minded and geared to war through having been engaged in hostilities for the past four years, and long known to have aggressive designs for the dominance of the Far East. The United States was then at peace with all nations and for more than 20 years had not engaged in [1159] hostilities. In time of peace it is a difficult and complicated matter for the United States to prevent an attack by another nation because of the constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered. This is a military consideration which gives to a dishonorable potential enemy the advantage of the initiative, deprive the United States of an opportunity to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and places great additional responsibility on the shoulders of commanders afloat in situations where instant action, or its absence, may entail momentous consequences. Page 299
IV
From 1 August, 1939, to 25 March, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations, charged by law under the Secretary of the Navy with the operations of the Fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, was Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet from 1 February to 17 December, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department from 7 February to 17 December, 1941, was Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U. S. A. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District from 11 April, 1940, until 1 April, 1942, was Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N. He was an immediate subordinate of Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in [1160] protecting Pearl Harbor. With respect to those duties connected with the defense of Pearl Harbor, Rear Admiral Bloch's responsibility was solely to Admiral Kimmel. It is an established fact that this responsibility was discharged to the complete satisfaction of the latter.
V
Admiral Kimmel and Lieut. General Short were personal friends. They met frequently, both socially and officially. Their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect and, in general, this was true as regards their subordinates. They frequently conferred with each other on official matters of common interest, and invariably did so when messages were received by either which had any bearing, on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was mindful of his own responsibility and of the responsibilities vested in the other. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the Base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes.
VI
For some time preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States, engaged in the protection of shipping and the patrolling of sea lanes in the Atlantic, was passing through the preliminary stage of a transition from a state of national military unpreparedness to an ability to cope successfully with two resourceful and fully prepared enemies. The vigorous and convincing representations made by Admiral [1161] Stark before Congressional committees, beginning in January, 1940, showed clearly that the Navy was unprepared for war and greatly needed ships, planes, and men. These representation, linked with the fall of France, resulted in an Act of Congress in June, 1940, whereby appropriations were voted for practically doubling the size of our Navy. During all of 1941 and for some time thereafter the problem confronting both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff. U. S. Army, was one of expansion and of distributing, to the best advantage, the limited supply of ships, planes, guns, and men and intensifying the training of personnel while production was being stepped up. Page 300 Under date of 30 December, 1940, Rear Admiral Bloch, Commanding the 14th Naval District and the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, after conference with Admiral Richardson, the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Lieut. General Herron, the then Commanding General Hawaiian Department, initiated correspondence addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations in which he set forth the inability of the 14th Naval District to meet a hostile attack with the equipment and forces at hand. He pointed out that, as Naval Base Defense Officer, he had no planes for distant reconnaissance. He gave as his opinion that neither in numbers nor types were the Army bombers satisfactory for the purpose intended. He invited attention to the serious deficiency on the part of the Army with regard to both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. He noted also that an anti-aircraft warning system planned [1162] by the Army was scheduled for completion at an indefinite time in the future. This letter was forwarded to the Navy Department by Admiral Richardson, by endorsement. He concurred in the opinion that the Army aircraft and anti-aircraft batteries were inadequate to protect the Fleet in Pearl Harbor against air attack, and urged that adequate local defense forces be provided. He further expressed the opinion that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection, and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the Fleet. Under date of 24 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, based upon the representations made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and in general concurrence herewith. In this letter the belief was expressed that, in case of war with Japan hostilities might be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or on the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The dangers envisaged in the order of their importance and probability were considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack. (2) Air torpedo plane attack. (3) Sabotage. (4) Submarine attack (5) Mining (6) bombardment by gunfire. Defense against all but (1) and (2) being considered satisfactory, it was proposed that the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii; also that the Army give consideration [1163] to the questions of balloon barrages. The employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses at Pearl Harbor; that local joint plans be drawn for defense against surprise aircraft raids; that there be agreement on appropriate defences of joint readiness for immediate action against a surprise aircraft raid; and that joint exercises for defense against surprise aircraft raids be held. The Secretary of War, under date of 7 February, 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. He pointed out that the Hawaiian Department was the best equipped of all overseas Army departments and held a high priority for completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. He outlined the details of the Hawaiian project and stated the number of pursuit planes and antiaircraft guns eventually to be supplied. He stated that the equipment for the aircraft warning system was expected to be delivered in Page 301 Hawaii in June, 1941, and that all arrangements for installation would have been made by the time the equipment was delivered. Copies of these letters were furnished Admiral Kimmel, Lieut. General Short, and Rear Admiral Bloch. In a letter dated 17 October, 1941, Rear Admiral Bloch reported to the Chief of Naval Operations that the only increment that had been made to the local defense forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, was the U.S.S. SACRAMENTO, an old gunboat of negligible gun power [1164] and low speed. He urged that the Department send a number of small fast craft equipped with listening gear and depth charges for anti-submarine purposes and further urged that he be sent two squadrons of VSO planes to be used for patrol against enemy submarines. Admiral Kimmel forwarded this letter with the following endorsement: "There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet tied to its base by diversions to other purposes of light forces necessary for its security at sea is, in a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as can possibly be made available. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs." The Chief of Naval Operations replied, under date of 25 November, 1941, that no additional vessels could be supplied for the present but that certain sub chasers, due for completion in May, 1942, had been tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval District, certain privately owned vessels might be expected at a future time and that there were no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval District. It is a fact that, through 1941, the demand for munitions and war supplies exceeded the capacity of the nation and in all important commands there existed marged [sic] [1165] deficiencies in trained personnel and in material equipment and instruments of war. Although shortages were inevitable, it is a further fact that they had direct bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor.
VII
On 5 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, submitted a joint memorandum to the President, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time and giving, as one of the basic reasons the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet. On 7 December, 1941, the U. S. Pacific Fleet was numerically inferior to the Japanese naval forces in both combatant and auxiliary vessels. Aware of this existing weakness in relative fighting strength, and of the vigorous steps being taken by the United States to overcome deficiencies, Japan clearly sensed the advantage of striking before these steps could become effective. Her advantageous position was strength- Page 302 ened by her extensive espionage system which utilized her civilian, consular and diplomatic nationals throughout the world, and enabled her constantly to keep accurately informed of the U. S. Naval building program and of the location and movements of U. S. Naval vessels. The topography of Oahu is peculiarly suited to the observation of Pearl Harbor and its activities. The local officials of the United States were unable to overcome Japan's advantage in this respect. It was impossible for [1166] them to prevent anyone from obtaining military information and, because of legal restrictions imposed by the Federal statutes, they could not interfere with the mails and the transmission of messages by radio, telegram, and cable. In addition, having in mind Japan's traditional tendency to distort legitimate actions of a peaceful nation into deliberate threats to her own security and prestige, the War and Navy Departments were compelled to take every precaution to avoid offending her super-sensitive sensibilities. For example, as of 16 October, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to "take such preparatory deployments as will not constitute provocative action against Japan" and, on 28 November, 1941, the War Department directed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to "undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act". In contrast to the ease with which Japanese in United States territory, particularly in Hawaii, were able to obtain and to transmit to Japan military information of value, every obstacle was placed in the way of such information being collected in Japan by foreign nationals. As an instance of Japanese secretiveness and surveillance of foreigners, including those of the U. S. Diplomatic services, the U. S. Naval attache in Tokyo was compelled to report to the Japanese Navy Department whenever he contemplated an excursion beyond the limits of the city, and he was closely watched at all times. He was effectively prevented from obtaining any information as to the type and [1167] number of Japanese ships under construction and the capacity of their naval shore establishments, as well as of the location and movements of Japanese ships. It is a fact that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7 December, 1941.
VIII
A naval base exists solely for the support of the Fleet. The fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits. Periodical visits to a base are necessarily made by mobile seagoing forces in order that logistics support may be provided and opportunity given for repair and replenishment, for rest and recreation, and for release of the personnel from a state of tension. To superimpose upon these essentials the further requirements that the seagoing personnel shall have the additional responsibility for se- Page 303 curity from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base, is to challenge a fundamental concept of naval warfare. There is not, and there has not been, any lack of understanding on the part of the Army and Navy on this point. The defense of a permanent naval base is the direct responsi- [1168] bility of the Army. The Navy is expected to assist with the means provided the naval district within whose limits the permanent naval base is located and the defense of the base is a joint operation only to that extent. To be adequate, the defense must function effectively during the periods when the Commander- in-Chief and all the units of the Fleet are absent. In the case of naval districts lying beyond the continental limits of the United States, the commandant of the district occupies a dual status. As commandant of the district, he is governed by all existing instructions relating to the duties of commandants of naval districts and is answerable direct to the Navy Department. He is also an officer of the Fleet and as such is under the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet for such duties as the latter may designate. The fact that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was thus designated as an officer of the Pacific Fleet is the circumstance that links the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, with the duty of assisting the Army in defending the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor. Except for this, the chief responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was for the readiness, the efficiency, and the security of the vessels of the Fleet while at sea. It is through gaining and maintaining control of vital sea areas that a Fleet contributes to the defense of the shore and its activities. The defense of the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor was the direct responsibility of the Army. [1169]
IX
Under date of 27 February, 1941, the Commandant, 14th Naval District, Rear Admiral Bloch, in his capacity as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued an operations plan establishing security measures, including air defense and surface ship patrol, in order to cooperate with and assist the Army in protecting Pearl Harbor and safeguarding the Fleet. Under date of 28 March, 1941, joint agreements were reached between Lieut. General Short and Rear Admiral Bloch, as to joint security measures for the protection of the Fleet and the Pearl Harbor Base. It was agreed that when the threat of a hostile raid or attack was considered sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander was to take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such portion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warranted. Joint air attacks upon hostile *surface* vessels were to be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Army bombardment strength to participate in each such mission was to be determined by the commander, Hawaiian Department, the number of bombardment planes released to Navy control to be the maximum practicable. Defensive *air operations* over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu were to be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Page 304 Commandant, 14th Naval District, was to determine the Navy fighter strength to participate [1170] in these missions, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control to be the maximum practicable. When naval aircraft under the command of the Naval Base Defense Officer were insufficient for long-distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, the Army aircraft so made available were to be under the tactical control of the Naval commander directing the search operations. The Naval Base Defense Officer was entirely without aircraft, either fighters or patrol planes, assigned permanently to him. He was compelled to rely upon Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units. The Commander Patrol Wing Two, Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N., was by Admiral Kimmel placed under Rear Admiral Bloch's orders, and was by the latter directed to consult with the Army and to prepare a detailed naval participation air defense plan. Rear Admiral Bellinger thus was given the additional status of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, while retaining his status as an air officer of the Fleet. Under date of 31 March, 1941, plans were drawn up and jointly agreed upon by Rear Admiral Bellinger and Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force. These plans were complete, and their concept was sound. Their basic defect lay in the fact that the naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet. This circumstance was forced by necessity, but was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that to be adequate, the defense of [1171] a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance from the Fleet. The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with this as a premise. It was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer, because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at sea.
X
Shortly after assuming command of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel issued specific comprehensive instructions as to the steps to be taken for the security of the Fleet in the operating sea areas. Aware of the inadequacy of the shore defenses of Pearl Harbor, he also required the vessels, while at the base, to assist to the limit of their resources. These instructions were revised and brought to date on 14 October, 1941 were given wide circulation within the Pacific Fleet, and were sent for information to other commands and to the Navy Department. The security of the Pacific Fleet, operating in the Hawaiian Area and based on Pearl Harbor, was predicted on two assumptions: (a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt; Page 305 [1172] (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft. (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel. (3) To lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor. (b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by: (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area, (3) a combination of these two. The measures prescribed to provide against these possibilities included continuous inshore, boom, and harbor patrols, intermittent patrol of the inner and offshore areas by destroyers, daily search of operating areas by air, the covering of sortie and entry, and daily sweeps for magnetic and anchored mines. The only entrance to Pearl Harbor was guarded by an anti-torpedo net. The Task Forces operating at sea were screened protectively by aircraft and destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day and night, ammunition was at hand, and depth charges were ready for use. Water- tight integrity was maintained, horizon and surface battle lookouts were kept posted, the ships steamed darkened at night, and the use of the radio was restricted to a minimum. Admiral Kimmel, recognizing the potentialities of the submarine as an instrument of stealthy attack, and believing that Japanese submarines were operating in Hawaiian waters, was of the opinion that this form of surprise attack against his Fleet was the one most likely to be employed by Japan. Therefore, he had issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters [1173] were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and ran the risk of committing an overt act against Japan, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule "shoot first and explain afterwards". Actually, in execution of these orders, a midget submarine was discovered in an operating area, attacked and destroyed by the combined efforts of a naval patrol plane and a destroyer of the inshore patrol, about 20 minutes prior to the air attack on the morning of 7 December. There was nothing, however, in the presence of a single submarine in the vicinity of Oahu to indicate that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent. It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the security of his Fleet while at sea were adequate and effective. No naval units were either surprised or damaged while operating at sea in the Pacific prior to or on 7 December, 1941.
XI
While vessels of the United States Navy are lying in port, it is the invariable custom to keep on board a number of officers and men sufficient to provide for internal security, and to protect against fire and the entrance of water. The force so remaining on board is always balanced as to ranks and ratings so that all requirements can be met in case of emergency. A watch is maintained day and night. In other than normal situations a "condition of readiness" is placed in effect. On the morning of 7 December considerably [1174] more than half of the Naval personnel were on board their ships in Pearl Harbor, more than ample to meet an emergency in port. Their Page 306 efficiency and their heroic behavior on that day are proof of their fitness for duty. The Navy's practice in numbering its three prescribed "conditions of readiness" is opposite to the method adopted by the Hawaiian Department of the Army in numbering its "alerts". With the Army, the No. 3 alert represents the maximum state of readiness, while the Navy refers to that state as No. 1. In the interest of clarification, definition of the respective states of readiness is here set forth: Army Alerts Navy Conditions of Readiness No. 1. Defense against sabotage No. 1. Entire crew, officers and and uprisings. No threat from without. men at battle stations. Action imminent. No. 2. Security against attacks from No. 2. Provides the means of hostile sub-surface, and aircraft, in opening fire immediately with addition to No. 1. one-half the armament. Enemy believed to be in vicinity. No. 3. Requires occupation of all No. 3. Provides a means of field positions. opening fire with a portion of the secondary and antiaircraft batteries in case of surprise encounter. The alert in effect in the Hawaiian Department of the Army at the time of the attack was their No. 1. The condition of readiness of the vessels in Pearl Harbor at that time was an augmented Navy No. 3. This condition had been in effect for many months preceding that date. To assume [1175] a high condition of readiness in port and to man guns and stations which cannot be utilized in any circumstance, is to impose on the entire personnel an unjustified state of tension and to defeat the purpose for which the vessels have entered the base; i. e., to make repairs, to replenish supplies, to give the personnel rest and relaxation, and thus to prepare for operations at sea. The same holds true with regard to the patrol planes of the Fleet. And to a small number of fighters that had been left behind by the absent carriers. They were part of the Fleet, engaged in daily operations and, when not operating, were undergoing overhaul or the crews were being rested in anticipation of further operations. At the time of and immediately prior to the attack on the morning of 7 December 1941, some were in the air covering the movement of a task force, others were on 30 minutes notice, some others were on 4 hours notice, and the remainder were under overhaul. These planes were not part of the permanent defense of Pearl Harbor. To have kept the crews awake and ready with engines warmed up, in the absence of any indication of an impending attack, would have been to undermine their further usefulness. The Navy controlled none of the guns mounted on shore. The only means available to the vessels of the Fleet for contributing to their own defense against aircraft while in Pearl Harbor was their anti-aircraft batteries. The anti-aircraft batteries installed on the ships in Pearl Harbor were incapable of a volume of fire at all comparable to that of the batteries of the same ships today. [1176] On all ships inside Pearl Harbor a considerable proportion of the anti-aircraft guns was kept manned day and night and with ammunition immediately at hand. Also, by prearrangement with the Army, there was in effect a system, correct as to its details, for the coordinating of the anti-aircraft fire of vessels of the Fleet in part with that of the Army on shore. Page 307 Existing Fleet orders provided for the establishment of air defense sectors within the Pearl Harbor area, and for the berthing of ships within the Harbor in such positions as to develop the maximum anti- aircraft gun fire in each sector, commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. These orders were carried out to the letter. On the morning of the attack the vessels of the Fleet brought hostile planes, as they came within one or more of these air defense sectors, under heavy fire intensified within a very few moments by the full fire of the entire anti-aircraft batteries of all ships. It is a fact that the Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December, 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything to their defense.
XII
An attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launch- [1177] ing of planes. Once launched, the attacking planes can be prevented from inflicting damage only by other planes or anti-aircraft gunfire or both. Even when a determined air attack is intercepted, engaged by aircraft, and opposed by gunfire, some of the attacking planes rarely fail to get through and inflict damage. To destroy an aircraft carrier before she can launch her planes requires that her location be known and that sufficient force, in the form of surface or underwater craft, or aircraft, or all three, be at hand. To have the necessary force at or near the point of intended launching in time to insure the destruction of the carrier, it is necessary that the carrier's presence in a general area, and within narrow limits of time, be known or predicted with reasonable accuracy. Even in time of war the fulfillment of this condition is difficult where vast sea areas are involved, and where both the point from which the carrier departs, as well as the fact of her departure, are unknown. This was the case during the days immediately prior to 7 December 1941. Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port. Their departure and whereabouts were a closely guarded Japanese secret and were likewise unknown, all rumors to the contrary notwithstanding. Although the U. S. Ambassador to Japan reported, as of 27 January, 1941, that there was a rumor to the effect that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was planned, its authenticity was discounted in the Embassy for the reason that such an attack, if actually contemplated, would scarcely be likely to be a topic of conversation in Japan. [1178] The Navy Department informed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of this rumor and stated that the Navy Department "places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future". In time of war, an outlying naval base may be expected to become an enemy objective, sooner or later. It is an established fact, however, that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded Page 308 or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941. The attack of 7 December, 1941, on Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take place was unpredictable.
XIII
Where a carrier's presence in a general area is not known in advance and is not predictable within narrow limits of time, there must be resort to procedure which will give warning of a hostile approach. The usual procedure employed by carriers bent on delivering a surprise attack, although by no means the only procedure possible, is to arrive about 700 miles from the objective at dark the night preceding the attack, steam at high speed during the night, and launch the planes at dawn, about 400 miles from the objective. It [1179] is this general procedure which establishes early morning as the time when an air attack is most likely to be delivered. The events of 7 December, 1941, point to the likelihood of this procedure having been followed by the Japanese. The greatest degree of warning of an impending early morning air attack is obtained if the hostile carrier be sighted prior to dark the night before. In such event, a maximum warning of about twelve hours may be obtained. In the case of an island base, such as Pearl Harbor, it is necessary to cover the circumference of a circle of 700 miles radius each day (the direction from which the attack is expected being unknown) in order to obtain either positive or negative information. Assuming 25 miles visability (which in the Hawaiian area is not found everywhere nor always assured), an effective daily search requires the daily employment of patrol planes which, in turn, requires that double or triple that number (180-270) be available, it being impossible to employ the same planes and crews every day, or even every other day. If only the dawn circle of 400 mile radius is to be searched daily, the total number of planes required to be available is 100-150. The maximum warning; is then reduced to about two hours. Where planes are not available to cover all sectors, the selection of sectors to be omitted is left purely to chance and under such circumstances the advisability of the diversion of all planes from other duties is questionable unless there be information as to the fact of a hostile [1180] approach and of the direction, within reasonable limits, from which the approach is expected. Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to perform this duty, even if the necessary number is available. The resulting dispersion of strength not only renders the Fleet incapable of performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction in detail. A defensive deployment of surface ships and submarine over an extensive sea area as a means of continuously guarding against a possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown time, is not sound military procedure either in peace or in war. It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and if ordered by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnaissance. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such reconnaissance in case of Page 309 emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers, and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved. In brief, the deciding factors were: (a) The Naval Base Defense Officer, Rear Admiral Bloch, although charged with the conduct of the reconnaissance, had no patrol planes permanently assigned to his command. [1181] (b) The only Naval patrol planes in the Hawaiian area were the 69 planes of Patrol Wing Two and these were handicapped by shortages of relief pilots and crews. They were a part of the Fleet, and not a part of the permanent defense of Pearl Harbor. The only other planes suitable and available for daily long range reconnaissance were six Army bombers. (c) The task assigned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent (how imminent he did not know). The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of available information. (d) If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet for war would be reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet operations. (e) The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be reduced seriously after a few days because of the inability of planes and crews to stand up under the demands of long-range reconnaissance. It is a fact that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not justified [1182] in the absence of information indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time. It is a further fact that, even if justified, this was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available.
XIV
At the time of the attack, only a few vessels of the Pacific Fleet were fitted with radar. The radar of vessels berthed in a harbor such as Pearl Harbor, partially surrounded by high land, is of limited usefulness at best and does not provide the necessary warning of a hostile approach. The shore-based radar on the Island of Oahu was an Army service and entirely under Army control. The original project called for 6 permanent (fixed) and 6 mobile installations. The fixed installations had not been completed by 7 December, 1941, and only 3 sets had been shipped to Oahu up to that time. On that day there were in operation 6 mobile sets located in selected positions, with equipment in efficient condition, but inadequately manned. Training of personnel had started on 1 November, 1941. Lieut. General Short earlier had requested that the Navy assist in this training, Page 310 and 15 of his men had been sent to sea on vessels of the Fleet for that purpose. Admiral Kimmel also had detailed the Pacific Fleet Communication Officer as liaison officer with the Army. He could not supply six other naval officers requested for permanent duty in the Information Center of the air warning system because no officers were available for such detail. During the second week of November, 1941, Commander [1183] W. G. Taylor USNR, was, by Admiral Kimmel, detailed to the Army Interceptor Command for duty in an advisory capacity, in connection with the setting up of the Army air warning system. Commander Taylor had had experience with the British air warning system and was familiar with radar in the stage of its development that existed at that time. On 24 November, 1941, he called a conference for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a war-time basis, and to decide what additional personnel and equipment would be needed. Two naval officers and 6 Army officers were present at this conference. The minutes of the conference, concurred in by all present, included an exhaustive statement of deficiencies and the steps to be taken for their remedy. Copies of the minutes were furnished the conferees and copies were forwarded to the Acting Commanding Officer of then Interceptor Command, and to the Acting Signal Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. Steps agreed upon as necessary for the improvement of the system had not become effective by 7 December, 1941. The Army Interceptor Command was barely in the first stages of organization by 7 December. Four of its officers had been sent to school on the mainland in order to fit them for their new duties. Until 17 December, 1941, the organization was on a tentative basis only and the actual order setting up the Command was not issued until that date. One of the [1184] principal weaknesses of the Interceptor Command on 7 December, 1941, was that the Information Center had no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile. Between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, the Air Warning System operated from 0400 to 0700, the basis for these hours being that the critical time of possible attack was considered to be from one hour before sunrise until two hours after sunrise. On week days training in the operation of the system also took place during working hours. On the morning of 7 December the only officer in the Army Information Center was 1st Lieutenant (now Lt. Colonel) K. A. Tyler, Army Air Corps. He had received no previous instruction as to his duties, had been on duty there only once before, and on the morning in question was present only in the capacity of an observer for training. At 0715 that morning he received a call from the radar station at Opana, located in the northern part of the Island of Oahu, to the effect that a large number of planes, bearing approximately north, had been picked up on the screen. Assuming that these were friendly planes because he had heard indirectly that a flight of B-17s was en route from Hamilton Field, California, to Oahu, he did nothing about this report. These B-17s actually arrived over Oahu during the attack, and many of them were destroyed. Page 311 At the Opana station, where this report originated, Private Locard [sic] (now 1st Lieutenant) and Private Elliott [1185] (now sergeant) were on duty with instructions to observe and track flights and report them to the Information Center. Private Locard had had some previous training but Elliott none. The station was scheduled to shut down at 0700, but as the truck had not come to take these men to their camp for breakfast, Private Locard continued to operate the radar set in order to assist in the training of Elliott. Shortly after 0700 there was picked up on the screen an unusually large flight of planes, coming in from a northerly direction at a distance of about 136 miles. Checking the equipment to make sure, Locard decided to call the Information Center and did so when the planes had come in to 132 miles. Having reported the fact to the Army officer on duty (1st Lt. Tyler), Locard and Elliott continued to track the planes in to twenty miles from Oahu, when they lost them due to distortion. For information of this flight to have been of value as a warning, it would have been necessary for the planes first to have been promptly identified as hostile, and then their presence and their bearing and distance immediately reported to and received by higher authority, and disseminated throughout the Command. The organization and training, of the Information Center and Communication System at this time was not such as to permit these important requirements to be fulfilled. Actually, the oncoming planes were not identified as hostile until the Japanese marking on their wings came into view. [1186]
XV
The greatest damage to ships resulting from the attack of 7 December was that inflicted by torpedoes launched from Japanese torpedo planes. These torpedoes were designed specially for the form of attack in which they were used. Up to the time that the Japanese demonstrated the feasibility of delivering an attack from torpedo planes in relatively shallow water and under conditions of restricted length of approach, the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain was to the effect that such an attack was not practicable. After a study had been made of the problem of protecting vessels in port against torpedo attack, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 15 February, 1941, stated that it was considered that the relatively shallow depth of water (about 45 feet) limited the need of anti-torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor, and, in addition, that the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles. The letter further stated that certain limitations and considerations must be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which were the following: (a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height [1187] for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered. Page 312 (b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths. (c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice. (d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships (e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping. (f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle. (g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult. (h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes. (i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection. (j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion. On 13 June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to the Commandants of the various naval districts, modified limitation (a) by stating that recent developments had shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights as much as 300 feet and, in [1188] some cases, make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet with excellent runs. This letter, however, did not modify the view expressed in the letter of 15 February as to the need for anti- torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor. Barrage balloons and smoke were also considered as means of defense but were rejected, the barrage balloons because they would interfere with the activity of U. S. Aircraft, and the smoke because the strength of the prevailing winds would render it ineffective. The specially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its use fell in the category of the so-called secret weapon, of which the robot bomb and the magnetic mine are examples. Such weapons always give to the originator an initial advantage which continues until the defense against them has been perfected. It is a fact that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to the secret development and employment of a specially designed torpedo.
XVI
Strained relations between the United States and Japan had existed and been a source of concern to this country for many months prior to 7 December, 1941. That the Japanese policy in the Far East was one of aggression had been well known for many years. Their program of expansion, which envisaged Japan as *the* dominating power in the Western Pacific, was in direct conflict with the policies of the United States [1189] and Great Britain, and opposed to agreements established by treaty. At the instigation of the Japanese, negotiations were begun by the State Department on 12 May, 1941, looking to the peaceful settlement Page 313 of existing problems. On 17 November, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was joined by Mr. Kurusu in the capacity of special envoy. On 26 July, 1941, Japanese assets in the United States were frozen. The order freezing these assets required a system of licensing shipments to Japan, and no licenses were issued for oil or petroleum products. There was a feeling on the part of U. S. officials that hostilities, unless prevented by some means, would become an actuality in the not distant future. They were familiar with the Japanese trait of attacking without declaration of war, as had been done against China in 1894, and against Russia in 1904. The Secretary of State held numerous conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, at which the negotiations with Japan were discussed. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations attended many of these conferences and were kept informed of the progress of these negotiations. At the same time efforts to improve the military position of the United States were being vigorously prosecuted. On 16 October, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Admiral Kimmel by dispatch that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, [1190] that the new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were a possibility, and that the Japanese might also attack the United States and Great Britain. In the same dispatch Admiral Kimmel was directed to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions, nor constitute provocative action against Japan. On the following day, 17 October, 1941, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated "Personally I do not believe that the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you (that of 16 October) merely stated the 'possibility' ". For the purpose of viewing the events of the succeeding months in their true relation to the events of 7 December, this date of 16 October, 1941, may well be taken as the beginning of a critical period which terminated in the attack of 7 December, 1941. In accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October, Admiral Kimmel made certain preparatory deployments, including the stationing of submarines off both Wake and Midway, the reinforcement of Johnston and Wake with additional Marines, ammunition, and stores, and the dispatch of additional Marines to Palmyra. He also placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the Fleet which were in West Coast ports, held six submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, delayed the sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a West Coast Navy Yard and placed in [1191] effect additional security measures in the Fleet operating areas. He reported to the Chief of Naval Operations the steps taken and received written approval of his action. He continued the measures which he had already placed in effect looking to readiness for war, preparation of the Pacific Fleet for war being his assigned task. He did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or warranting that he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his staff, all experienced officers of long service, and sought by every Page 314 means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The consensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by the information at hand. On 24 November, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed also to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to Commandants of Naval districts with headquarters at San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Panama, which stated: "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiation with Japan very doubtful X This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addresses to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately." The contents of this dispatch were made known to Lieut. General Short and discussed with him. [1192] The reaction on Admiral Kimmel and his advisers was to direct their attention to the Far East. They did not consider that the expression "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction" included the probability or imminence of attack in the Hawaiian area, specific mention having been made of the Philippines and Guam with no mention of Hawaii. They recognized the capability of Japan to deliver a long-range surprise bombing attack and that she might attack without a declaration of war. They reasoned that she would not commit the strategic blunder of delivering a surprise attack on United States territory, the one course that irrevocably would unite the American people in war against Japan. Public opinion in the United States was far from being crystallized on the question of taking steps to curb her expansion in the Western Pacific. Conceivably, Japan might well have taken aggressive action against British and Dutch possessions in the Far East, gaining the oil and other raw materials that she was seeking, without military interference from the United States. An attack elsewhere than in the Far East seemed, therefore, to be only a remote possibility and not enough of a probability to warrant abandonment of the preparation of the Fleet for war. To continue these preparations was, therefore, Admiral Kimmel's decision, made on his own responsibility in the light of the information then available to him and in the knowledge that every precaution within his power, compatible [1193] with maintaining the Fleet in a state of readiness for war, had already been taken.
XVII
On 27 November, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, reading as follows: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and a aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces Page 315 indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Continental districts, Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage." This dispatch was sent also to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and has since become known as the "war warning message". On the morning following the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral Kimmel discussed its contents with Lieut. General Short, Rear Admiral Bloch, the Flag officers of the Fleet present, and the members of his staff. After much further study, Admiral Kimmel and his advisers interpreted the warning to mean that war was imminent, and that readiness to undertake active operations was expected. They were unable to read into it any indication that an attack against the Hawaiian area was to be expected, particular attention having been directed to the Japanese activities in the Far East, with objectives in that area [1194] specifically mentioned. No reference was made to the possibility of a surprise aggressive move "in any direction", as had been done in the dispatch of 24 November. There was nothing to indicate that defensive measures should take precedence over all others. The "appropriate defensive deployment" that was directed was not interpreted as referring specifically to the Pacific Fleet, in view of the deployments of the Pacific Fleet already made in compliance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October. In addition, since that date, a squadron of submarines had been sent to the Philippines, leaving only 5 in Pearl Harbor. There were other considerations which no doubt influenced Admiral Kimmel. The Navy Department's dispatch of 30 November, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and sent to Admiral Kimmel for his information, ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea. This appeared to indicate that the authorities in Washington expected hostilities to occur in the Far East, rather than elsewhere. On 28 November the Chief of Naval Operations advised Admiral Kimmel that the Department had requested, and the Army had agreed to, the relief of Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops, and the replacement of Marine planes with Army pursuit planes. This action, involving as it did a complicated problem and the movements of sizeable U. S. Naval forces westward to effect their transfer, was an indication of the fact that the authorities [1195] in the War and Navy Departments did not then expect a hostile movement toward the Hawaiian Islands. On 28 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations repeated to Admiral Kimmel the information contained in a dispatch which the War Department, on 27 November, had transmitted to Lieut. General Short, and other Army addressees, to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated, that Japanese future action was unpredictable, that hostile action was possible at any moment, and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act in case hostilities could not be avoided. Such measures as were undertaken were to be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Page 316 To this dispatch Lieut. General Short had replied on 27 November: "Report Department alerted against sabotage. Liaison with Navy." The steps taken caused the Army planes to be grouped in such manner as to afford better protection against sabotage, although militating against their taking the air promptly. In the absence of a reply from the War Department, Lieut. General Short considered that the alert he had placed in effect was approved. Lieut. General Short having, on 28 November, 1941, received instructions from the Adjutant General of the Army to take measures to protect military establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, reported in detail the measures that he had taken and repeated the fact that he had placed in effect Alert (No. 1) against sabotage. He interpreted the dispatch from the Adjutant General as further [1196] indicating that his alert against sabotage constituted complete compliance with the War Department's wishes. There was no mention in any of the dispatches received by Lieut. General Short, between 27 November and 7 December, 1941, of the possibility or probability of an attack against Oahu. As further evidence of the prevailing sentiment against the likelihood of an immediate move toward Hawaii, it is a fact that a flight of B-17s from the Mainland arrived over Oahu during the attack of 7 December, without ammunition and with guns not ready for firing. These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. There were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.
XVIII
From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, conversations between our government and Japan did continue, notwithstanding the statement contained in the war warning message under date of 27 November, 1941, that "negotiations with Japan, looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased." This statement was based upon the note delivered by the State Department to the Japanese representatives on 26 November, a copy of which was furnished the Navy [1197] Department. It did not in itself discontinue negotiations and conversations, but, on the contrary, gave an "outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan." The stipulations contained therein were drastic and were likely to be unacceptable to Japan. The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of the War and Navy Department because of the feeling that Japan would not accept the conditions presented, and that diplomatic relations would be severed or that war would declared. The sending of the note therefore began the final phase of the critical period which culminated on 7 December. Although it was stated in the press that a note had been delivered none of its contents was given out to the public until after the attack. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note nor of its contents until many months after the attack. Page 317 In a personal letter to Admiral Stark, dated 26 May, 1941, he had invited attention to the importance of keeping commanders, well removed from Washington, informed of developments and eventualities, stating: "The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a [1198] condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations. "It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions. "It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available." From time to time during this critical period there was received in the War and Navy Departments certain other important information bearing on the current situation. The testimony as to this information forms a part of the record of this Court. The details of this information are not discussed or analyzed in these findings, the Court having been informed that their disclosure would militate against the successful prosecution of the war. [1199] This information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. No facilities were available to them, either in the Fleet or in the Hawaiian area, which would enable them to obtain the information direct. They were dependent solely upon Washington for such information. With regard to not transmitting this information, the stand taken by the Chief of Naval Operations was that the "war warning message" of 27 November completely covered the situation. The fact remains however, that this message, standing alone, could not covey to the commanders in the field the picture as it was seen in Washington. Only three other messages were received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Chief of Naval Operations between 26 November and 7 December, one informing him that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London to destroy certain codes, and the other two relative to the destruction of United States codes at Guam and outlying islands. Page 318 In the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time, the War and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent and, by inference and deduction that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. This information was embodied in a dispatch by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, who, after consulting with the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone, had it encoded and sent to the Commanding Generals in Panama, Manila, and Hawaii, with instructions that the naval authorities in those areas be informed of its contents. [1200] The dispatch to Hawaii left Washington at 12:17 p. m. Washington time (6:47 a. m., Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's RCA office at 7:33 a. m. (Honolulu time) . Thus there remained but 22 minutes before the attack began for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7 December, several hour after the attacking force had departed. Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. Even in this event, however, there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome. There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu.
XIX
It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate commanders, particularly those in distant areas constantly supplied with information. To fail to meet this obligation is to commit a military error It is a fact that Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operation of the Fleet, and having important information in his possession during this critical period, especially on the morning of 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral [1201] Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington.
OPINION
Based on Finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941, was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the Constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered. Prevented the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of defense in the event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing [in] the Hawaiian area, and that it imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might be construed as an overt act. Page 319 Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations between Admiral Husband E Kimmel, USN, and Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there was no lack of interest, [1202] no lack of appreciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part of either. And that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by the common interest. Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in personnel and material which existed during 1941, had a direct adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December. Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the U.S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7 December, 1941. Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. The Court is further of the opinion that the defense should have been such as to function effectively independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet [1203] must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits. Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX, the Court is of the opinion that the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U.S.N., in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily. Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were complete and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need for their employment with the Fleet. Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating areas, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet, and that the steps taken were adequate and effective. Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated Page 320 neither the probability nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and bearing in mind that he had not knowledge of the State Department's note of 26 November, the Navy's condition of readiness on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which resulted in the hostile planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships' antiaircraft batteries as they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances, although had all anti-aircraft batteries been manned in advance, the total damage inflicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor extent and to a degree which is problematical; and, that, had the Fleet patrol planes, slow and unsuited for aerial combat, been in the air, they might have escaped and the number of these planes lost might thus have been reduced. The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known in advance that the attack would take place on [1204] 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects, and that, beyond the fact that conditions were unsettled and that, therefore, anything might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another in so far as expectation of attack is concerned. It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all antiaircraft guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is considered that it could not be known when an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 December. Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it would take place was unpredictable. Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range reconnaissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. [1206] Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore- based air warning system, an Army service under the direct control of the Army, was ineffective on the morning of 7 December, in that there was no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency, a flight of planes which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was confused with a flight of Army B-17s en route from California, and that the information obtained by Army radar was valueless as a warning, because the planes could not be identified as hostile until the Japanese markings on their wings came into view. Page 321 Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the development and existence of which was unknown to the United States. Based on Finding XVI. And particularly in view of the Chief of Naval Operations' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admiral Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October, 1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision, made after receiving the dispatch of [1207] 24 November, to continue preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available to him. Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere, and that the same considerations which influenced the sentiment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support the interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the "war warning message" of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor rather than toward it. Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately [1208] the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service.
RECOMMENDATION
The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter. ORIN G. MURFIN, Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President. EDWARD C. KALBFUS, Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member. ADOLPHUS ANDREWS, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member Page 322 The Court having finished the inquiry, then at 4 p. m., [1209] Thursday, October 19, 1944, adjourned to await the action of the convening Authority. ORIN G. MURFIN, Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President. HAROLD BIESEMEIER, Captain, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate. Page 323 [1] ADDENDUM TO COURT'S FINDING OF FACTS In the Finding of Facts, No. XVIII, the Court had referred to "certain other important information" as being available to the War and Navy Departments. This information was obtained by intercepting Japanese messages and breaking their diplomatic codes. The Court has been informed that these codes are still in use and, if it became known to the Japanese Government that they had been broken by the United States, the codes would be changed and, as a consequence, the war effort would be adversely affected. For this reason, the Court has refrained from analyzing or discussing the details of the information in its Finding of Facts but feels that its report would not be complete without a record of such details. The Court, therefore, submits the following record in this addendum and transmits it to the Secretary of the Navy for filing with other highly secret matter referred to as such in the record of the Court's proceedings. Highly secret messages, hereinafter mentioned, were intercepted by the War and Navy Departments during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, 1941, and prior thereto. The method of handling these messages in the Navy Department was as follows: The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Communications operated directly under the Chief of [2] Naval Operations. They were responsible to see that all messages were transmitted to him in order that he might be kept conversant at all times with existing conditions. Officers in Intelligence and Communications, Divisions of Naval Operations, remained on duty night and day. They made every effort to obtain all possible diplomatic and military information, in order that high officials of our government might be kept fully informed. Messages were translated and placed in a folder immediately upon receipt or intercept. The important messages were marked with a clip and taken by a designated officer to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Directors of War Plans, Naval Intelligence, and Naval Communications, and to the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Wilkinson, kept himself constantly informed regarding all messages. He checked as to whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations had seen the important ones and in many cases took them personally to the Chief of Naval Operations and discussed them with him. Immediately after the receipt of the note of 26 November, 1941, from the Secretary of State, the Japanese representatives in Washington sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted by the Navy Department. This is Document 17, Exhibit 63, which gave Tokyo the following stipulations contained in the note: (a) The recognition of Hull's "four principles". (b) (1) Conclusion of mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Moscow, Washington, The Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok. [3] (2) Agreement between Japan, United States, England, The Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China. (3) Complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China. (4) Japan and the United States both definitely to promise to support no regime but that of Chiang Kai-shek. (5) The abolition of extraterritoriality, the concessions in China, and other requirements bearing on reciprocal trade treaty, rescinding freezing orders, stabilization of yen, etc., and for Japan to amend her tripartite pact with Germany and Italy. The Japanese representatives added in their report to Tokyo, the following: "Both dumbfounded and stated to Hull we could not even cooperate to the extent of even reporting this to Tokyo." No information regarding the delivery of this note or of its contents was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other commanders afloat. From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic dispatch traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November, 1941, Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November, 1941, and referred to as "The Winds Code" was as follows: "Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. [4] "(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.* "(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.** "(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.*** "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. "Forward as urgent intelligence." The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and Commandant 14th Naval District, substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 1941, the United States Naval Attach‚, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations substantially the same information. These messages stated that at some future late information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between countries designated. All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy Department, considering the expected information most important, were on the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of * East wind rain. ** North wind cloudy. *** West wind clear. Page 325 diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or [5] war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat. It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat. Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department. It is a matter of general knowledge that Japan has had for many years a thorough system of espionage throughout the world and continuously sought and received information regarding the location and movements of United States naval vessels. There were certain messages received in the Navy Department which showed very clearly that Japan, at this critical period, was particularly desirous of obtaining exact information from two sources, namely, Manila and Honolulu. Messages between Tokyo, Manila, and Honolulu inquiring especially about planes, ships, their places of anchorage, etc., in the latter ports, were intercepted. Similar messages were sent to Japanese officials in Honolulu clearly indicating that Japan was most [6] desirous of obtaining exact information as to ships in Pearl Harbor. The important messages having special reference to Pearl Harbor were as follows: (a) On 15 November, 1941, Document 24, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department, 3 December, 1941, states: "As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical make your "ships in harbor report" irregular but at rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy." (b) On 18 November, 1941, Document 37, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department on 5 December, 1941, states: "Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N" Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy." Note by Navy Department on this message: "Manila Bay" probably means "Mamala Bay." (c) On 18 November, 1941, Document 40, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Honolulu to Tokyo and translated in Navy Department 6 December, 1941, gives information as to ships moored in certain areas in Pearl Harbor and movements of ships in and out. [7] (d) On 29 November, 1941, Document 36, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Washington 5 December, 1941, states: "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future will you also report even where there are no movements." Page 326 Admiral Kimmel was not aware of and had no information regarding these messages. On 5 November, 1941, Document 7, Exhibit 63, Tokyo to Washington, was intercepted. This message stresses the necessity of signing an agreement between the United States and Japan by 25 November, 1941. On 22 November, 1941, Document 11, Exhibit 63, intercept from Tokyo to Washington, stated that the signing of agreement set for 25 November, 1941, could be postponed until 29 November, and in explanation this message stated: "* * * There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, * * * if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. * * *" No intimation of the receipt of this message was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat, nor was any information transmitted to them regarding contents of the messages mentioned in the following paragraphs. [8] On 28 November, 1941, a dispatch, Document 18, Exhibit 63, was intercepted between Tokyo and Washington which in part reads as follows: "* * * The United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal_" referring to note of 26 November_ "* * * the Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions * * *" etc. The message indicates the position of Japan regarding the note of 26 November, and further indicates that within two or three days negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Further, it emphasizes the importance of delay. Neither the message nor any of its contents were transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat. On 29 November, 1941, Document 19, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Washington and translated by the Navy Department 30 November, 1941, directs that Japanese representatives make one more attempt to have United States reconsider and states: "* * * please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations." Again, on 30 November, 1941, Document 20, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Washington to Tokyo indicated that negotiations were to be stretched out. These two messages indicate that the Japanese were sparring for time. [9] On 30 November, 1941, Document 22, Exhibit 63, translated by the Navy Department on 1 December, 1941, was intercepted, being Page 327 a message from Tokyo to Japanese representatives in Berlin, reading as follows: "1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations. "2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other. "Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has [10] become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause. "3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England Australia, The Netherlands, and China_they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy." On 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows: "The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan and this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is." On 1 December, 1941, Document 21, Exhibit 63, was intercepted, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which reads as follows: "1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the [11] United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and ** JD-1: 6710 Page 328 others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information). "2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only. "3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter." On 2 December, 1941, Document 25, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to Tokyo, translated by the Navy Department 3 December, 1941, reports that conversations with the State Department continue; that the Japanese representatives stated to Welles, the Under Secretary of State, that it is virtually impossible for Japan to accept new American proposals as they now stand, and that the Japanese representatives feel that the United States is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. On 3 December, 1941, Document 29, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Washington, translated by the Navy Department 4 December, 1941, requests their representatives to explain Japan's increased forces in Indo-China. On 3 December, 1941, Document 33, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to Tokyo, translated by Navy Department 5 December, 1941, states: [12] "Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand." On 6 December, 1941, Document 38, Exhibit 63, from Tokyo to Washington, was intercepted, giving notice to the Japanese representatives that a reply consisting of 14 parts to American proposal of 26 November is being sent to them, directing that secrecy should be maintained and stating that the time of presenting this reply would be sent in a separate message. The first 13 parts of this reply were intercepted and received by the Navy Department at about 3:00 p.m., December 6, 1941, and were translated and made ready for distribution by 9:00 p.m., Washington time, of that date. These 13 parts contain a very strong and conclusive answer to the note of November 26 and state in part, "Japan cannot accept proposal as a basis of negotiations." Commander Kramer, the officer whose duty it was to distribute this class of information, prior to 9:00 p.m., 6 December, 1941, 'phoned Captain Wilkinson that an important message had been received and was being translated. He also tried to communicate with Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Turner at their homes but found them out. At about 9:00 p.m., Washington time, Commander Kramer proceeded to the White House with the 13 parts of reply and delivered a copy to a White House aide, with the request that [13] it be delivered immediately to the President. Kramer then proceeded to the home of Secretary Knox where he personally delivered to the Secretary a copy of the Japanese reply. Secretary Knox read the reply, did not discuss it in detail with Kramer, but 'phoned the Secretary of War and Secretary of State. *JD-1: 6921. *** Not Available. Page 329 Kramer then proceeded to the home of Captain Wilkinson and gave a copy to him. Kramer told Wilkinson that he had tried to get Stark and Turner. Wilkinson made several 'phone calls, presumably to Admiral Stark and others. This information regarding receipt of these 13 parts or their contents was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet or other Commanders Afloat. Kramer then returned to his office in the Navy Department, arriving about 12:30 a.m., 7 December, and as no other important messages were at hand, went home and returned to the Navy Department about 7:00 a.m. Upon his arrival he found the 14th part of the Japanese reply had been received and decoded. He then delivered a copy of all 14 parts to the Flag Secretary in his office of the Chief of Naval Operations at about 9 a.m., where he found several officers gathering for a conference with Admiral Stark. Kramer then proceeded, about 9:30 a.m., to the White House and made delivery of the 14 parts of the message. He proceeded then, at about 9:50 a.m., to the State Department and delivered same to the Secretary of the Navy, who was there in conference with the Secretary of State. At about 10:30 a.m., Kramer returned to the Navy Depart- [14] ment where he found another message had been translated. This message, an intercept from Tokyo to Washington, was marked "Urgent, very important" and read as follows: "Will the ambassador please submit to the U.S. Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the U.S. at 1:00 p.m., on the 7th, your time." Kramer delivered a copy of this message (hereinafter referred to as the "one p.m. message") to the Flag Secretary of Admiral Stark, the latter at the time being in conference with several officers. Kramer then returned to the White House and delivered the "1:00 p.m. message." From there he went to the State Department where the Secretary of the Navy was still in conference with the Secretary of State. On arrival he requested one of the State Department assistants to present the message to the Secretary of the Navy and to invite his attention to the fact that 1:00 p.m., Washington time, meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia. Admiral Stark had arrived in his office at the Navy Department at some time between 9:00 and 10:30 a.m., on the morning of 7 December. Although he testified that he had no information prior to this time relative to the Japanese reply to the note of November 26th he was informed of the 14 parts and "the 1:00 p.m. message" not later than 10:30 a.m., of that date. He testified that General Marshall 'phoned him and suggested that the information regarding the delivery of the 14 parts at 1:00 p.m. was most important and significant and, in his opinion, should be transmitted to Commanders in the [15] Pacific. Admiral Stark at first demurred and hung up the receiver. Shortly thereafter he 'phoned General Marshall requesting that, in the event he sent the message to the Commanding Generals in the Pacific area, he instruct them to relay this message to naval opposites. The message which General Marshall sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Exhibit 48) reads as follows: "Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we Page 330 do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication." This message left the War Department at 11:52 a.m., Washington time, was sent out over R.C.A. at 12:17 p.m. (6:47 a.m. Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's R.C.A. office at 7:33 a.m. Honolulu time. There remained but 22 minutes before the attack for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7 December, several hours after the attacking force had departed. Had the telephone and plain language been used, this message could have been received in Hawaii before the attack began. Even in this event, however, there was no action open to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome. There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the Fleet planes in their air bases in Oahu. Orin G. Murfin, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) President. Edward C. Kalbfus, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Member. Adolphus Andrews, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Member. [1] FIRST ENDORSEMENT [Stamped:] Nov. 2, 1944. To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July, 1944. 1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation. 2. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the function of a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that of the reviewing authorities. Where the testimony is such as will reasonably support either two or more different conclusions, it is not within the province of the Judge Advocate General to attempt to substitute his evaluation of the evidence for that of the Court. But where there is no creditable evidence in a record to support a finding or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponderantly on one side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion, the Judge Advocate General must hold, as a matter of law, that such a finding or opinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9 of 1928, P. 8; CMO 12 of 1937, P. 8; CMO 5 of 1936;, P. 11. 3. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact XVIII: "In the early forenoon of 7 December, 1941, Washington time, the Army and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, *by inference and deduction, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon*." 4. This Finding, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it may convey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible officials of the War and Navy Departments did in fact make the inference and deduction underscored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing this Finding, used the past tense of the verb "appear", and used the expression "appeared to indicate rather than "should have indicated" lends support to this construction. Such Page 331 an [12] impression would not be supported by the record, as the great preponderance of the evidence before the Court refutes any such conclusion. It is quite clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy Department had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to mean that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian area, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Philippines, and British and Dutch possessions in the Far East. 5. Those witnesses who, on 7 December, 1941 held positions in the Navy Department which qualify them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing opinion there just prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the consensus in the Navy Department was that any attack would probably come in the Far East, and the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given a comparatively low probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the information available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate positions. Their testimony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly unconsciously colored by hindsight, and arrived at by a process of selecting, from the great mass of intelligence reports available to the Chief of Naval Operations, those which in the light of subsequent events proved to be hints or indications of Japanese intentions. Therefore, any finding, opinion or inference that the responsible officials the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack, that an attack on Hawaii was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The Court recognizes this fact, as shown by its finding last paragraph of Finding XVII) that); "These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere." [3] 7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored portion of Opinion expressed by the Court (P. 1207) that: "Admiral Harold R Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation, and especially in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon." As been previously pointed out, the message herein referred to was not construed by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. 8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the time at which the War and Navy Departments had information indicating a break in diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of hostile action by the Japanese on that date, was in the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time. It is not considered amiss to comment in further detail on this finding, in view of a widespread misconception in some quarters that this information was known in Washington on 7 December, 1941. The evidence before this Court establishes, beyond any doubt, that the information referred to was not available to any responsible official in Washington prior to approximately 10 a. m., the morning of 7 December 1941. 9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the apparent contradiction between the Opinion expressed by the Court that the Chief of Naval Operations failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in failing to transmit certain information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the final Opinion that "no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred in the part of any person in the naval service". That this is only an apparent, and not a real, incongruity, is shown by the Opinion that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. This statement, as well as the Finding of Page 332 Facts and Opinions taken as a whole indicate [4] that it was the conclusion of the Court, although not clearly expressed that the evidence adduced did not prove that Admiral Stark's failure to transmit the information in question to Admiral Kimmel was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Fleet on 7 December 1941 and that any causal connection between this failure on Admiral Stark's part and the disaster would be entirely speculative. Such a conclusion is fully supported by the testimony in this record. 10. Subject to the foregoing remarks the proceedings findings opinions and recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, legal. T. L. Gatch T. L. GATCH The Judge Advocate General. --------------------- TOP SECRET [1] UNITED STATE FLEET Headquarters of the Commander in Chief NAVY DEPARTMENT Washington 25, D. C. 3 Nov. 1944. FF/A17-25. Serial: 003191. TOP SECRET. From: The Commander In Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. To: The Secretary of the Navy. Subject: Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry_Review of. Reference: (a) SecNav ltr of 21 October 1944. Annex: (A) List of Parts of Record that Contain Information of super- secret nature. 1. In compliance with Reference (a) the following comment is submitted as to how much of the record of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bears such relation to present military operations as to require high security classification. 2. There are only two general classifications of information which, if made public, would be detrimental to the conduct of current and future operations. These are: (a) Information which directly or by inference would lead the Japanese to suspect that we have been able to break their codes. (b) Verbatim plain language reproductions of messages sent in United States Codes. The Japanese presumably have the enciphered versions of these messages and if they are given the word for word plain language version it would help them to work on our codes. This is a matter of less importance than the possible compromise of what we know about Japanese encryption but it should be guarded against. [2] 3. The really vital point is to preserve absolute secrecy as to our success in breaking Japanese codes. It is essential to keep this information to ourselves. I say this for the following reasons: (a) All Japanese intercepts considered by the Court were in diplomatic codes. Most of these are still in effect with only minor changes. They are still the sources of information of incalculable value. Furthermore, all Japanese codes, Army and Navy ,as well as diplomatic, are of the same general structure. The Japanese codes of today are not basically different from those they used in 1941. Breaking one code makes it easy to break the others. The Japanese presumably are well aware of this. If they were told that we broke their diplomatic codes in 1941 there is a reasonable assumption that they will change the whole basic code structure. If they were to do this the damage would be irreparable. The information we get relates not only to the current and prospective movements of Japanese naval vessels upon which we base our operating plans but also include data as to troop strength and prospective troop movements which are vital to the Army. It also relates to the disposition of Japanese Army and Navy air forces. It is impossible to overstate the disadvantages we would suffer if there were to be a leakage direct or indirect that an alert enemy might interpret as indicating that we can and do break his codes. It is no exaggeration to state that Midway might have been a Japanese victory had it not been for the information which we obtained by intercepting his coded despatches. The risks we have Page 333 taken in advancing into the Marshall Islands and the Philippines would have been far greater than they actually were had we not been able to obtain information of Japanese dispositions and movements from Japanese sources. (b) In view of the foregoing I strongly recommend that there be no public release of any information which would alert the Japanese as to the possibility that we were breaking their codes. [3] (c) It is a pertinent question as to just what part, if any, of the record of proceedings can be made public, without resulting in a leak of vital information. (c) I can say unequivocally that Volume 5 (the Top Secret volume of proceedings) must not be made public. With regard to the other volumes of the record I find there are certain paragraphs which do point quite clearly to the fact that we have information which could only be obtained by reading Japanese coded messages. I have listed these in Annex (A) of the report, which also includes certain references which might be damaging to the security of our own codes. (e) I am not any too certain of the effectiveness of the deletions recommended in Annex (A). There are statements of a border-line nature concerning which it is difficult to tell whether or not an alert enemy might find a clue as to what our knowledge of his codes really is. However, if the record is also abridged by deletion of the matter enumerated in Annex (A), it would be devoid of any direct reference to information which we must keep from becoming public. (f) The foregoing should not be interpreted to mean that I am in favor of making public the parts of the record not referred to in the Annex. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that publication of a weeded record or of abridged Findings would have the following undesirable results: (1) The picture presented would be disjointed and full of unexplained gaps. I think this would lead to a demand of Congress and by the Press for more information, on the ground that the part made public was incomplete, and that withholding of any information is indicative of a desire on the part of the Navy to whitewash high naval officers. A situation such as this might well lead to discussions that would inadvertently disclose just the information that we feel is vital to keep secret. [4] (2) Admiral Kimmel's principal contention is that he was kept in the dark as to certain information which the Navy Department had obtained from various sources, including the breaking of Japanese codes. This is a matter which cannot be made public without irreparable damage to the conduct of the war. It is not unlikely that if there is a public release of some of the Facts and Opinions, but no release concerning matters in which Admiral Kimmel is particularly concerned, he may take further action to protect his own reputation. The potentialities are particularly dangerous, because Admiral Kimmel's civilian lawyers have now been informed, so I understand, of the existence and content of the many Japanese messages in question. I know of no means of keeping these lawyers from talking in public, except such ethical views as they may have concerning their responsibility for not doing anything that would jeopardize war operations. It is a question just how far they could be restrained by ethical considerations, if the Navy Department were to make public the part of the record which is unfavorable to Admiral Kimmel, while suppressing that part which he regards as a main element of his defense. (3) I also invite attention to the fact that the Findings include certain Facts and Opinions critical of Army efficiency, ascertained by proceedings to which the Army was not a party. The publication of this part of the record might well result in an inter-service dispute, which would tend to bring out the very information which it is essential to conceal. 4. In regard to the requirements of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, I note that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify. This law does [15] not obligate the Secretary of the Navy to make any public statement of what the Court of Inquiry has ascertained. Furthermore, as I understand it, the President has definitely expressed himself as opposed to any act which might interfere with the war effort. I,