Appendix No. 7

Agreement between the Army and the Navy General Staffs on Operations in North China (11 July 1937)

I. Guiding Principle for Operations.

1. The theater of operations will be limited to the Peiping-Tientsin area. As a matter of principle, force will not be resorted to in Central and South China. When necessary, however, Japanese residents in the Tsingtao and Shanghai areas will be protected by force of arms.

2. Operations will be carried out jointly by the Army and the Navy.

3. During operations in this area, conflicts with third nations will be avoided insofar as possible.

II. Operational assignments.

1. In accordance with the policy of localizing the conflict, the Peiping-Tientsin area will be secured. For this purpose, the garrison forces in China will be strengthened by the required number of troops sent by the Kwantung Army and from Japan Proper. The Army will be mainly responsible for the operation of securing the Peiping-Tientsin area. The Navy will cooperate in the escorting of army transports and in operations of the Army in the Tientsin area.

2. The Navy will be mainly responsible for security measures in Central and South China.

3. In case the situation in the area mentioned in the preceding paragraph is so aggravated as to necessitate protection of Japanese residents there, they will be protected in the Tsingtao and Shanghai areas by joint action of Army and Navy forces.

4. Air force power is to be provided separately.

III. Disposition of Troops, Transportation and Escort.

IV. Communications.

V. Standard Time to be used.


Appendix No. 7

VI. Maps to he used for Joint Operations.

VII. Code books and ciphers (Instructions pertaining to the items III thru VII are omitted.)

Agreement between the Army and the Navy Concerning Air Operations in North China

I. Destruction of enemy air forces in the North China area will be carried out mainly by the Army, being assisted by the Navy in the following cases:

1. Where the Navy deems it unnecessary to carry out aerial operations in areas outside North China and the Army is in urgent need of aid.

2. Even in the foregoing case, aid will be glen by the Navy only when the Army's need is very urgent and the Navy has available air strength in close proximity.

II. The destruction of enemy air forces in Central and South China will be performed chiefly by the Navy. The Army will perform defensive air operations.

III. Navy air planes will escort army transports and will protect them against land and air attacks during their landings.

IV. If necessary, Navy planes will protect Army troops during landings and after landings until such time as Army planes can take over from them.

V. Details of such items as the division of duties and the essentials for cooperation between Army and Navy air forces assigned in the same area will be decided through direct negotiation between units at the front.

VI. Strength to be committed.

VII. Maintenance of airfields as well as the schedule for their use.

VIII. Supply of fuel, bombs et cetera.

IX. Communications.

(Details of items VI thru IX are omitted.)


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