[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 1 of 4)
Re
your #480[a].
(1)
As I have successively reported to you, Japanese-American relations have today
reached a stage in which anything might happen at any moment, and they are
likely to grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move. That this
sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view
upon which both Japanese and Americans agree. As I have already informed you,
the United States has not yet attained sufficient unity of mind with regard to
participation in the European war, and the President himself is hesitant.
However, the people are unanimous with regard to taking a strong hand in the
Far East. According to those well versed in political affairs, this is what
Great Britain approves of and both China and Germany desire.
[a] Not available.
Army 21150 Trans. 8/19/41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 2 of 4)
I
hardly think the President will go to the extreme, inasmuch as he and the naval
leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific war would be. I
understand that the British believe that if they could only have a
Japanese-American war started at the back door, there would be a good prospect
of getting the United States to participate in the European war. The people
here believe that though Germany might eventually defeat Soviet Russia, the war
has already passed the stage of being a short, decisive one and has entered the
stage of being one of attrition; that inasmuch as the submarine war in the
Atlantic is turning in favor of Britain and the United States, these countries
will be able in time to attain their original objective; and that the situation
resembles closely that which existed in 1917. I understand that confidence in
ultimate victory is gaining.
Army 21151 Trans. 8/19/41 (7)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 3 of 4)
(2)
Since such is the state of affairs in this country, I could not have helped but
refer to the State Department the proposal for a conference which you made in
your telegram, but as you already know, the Secretary of State gave a negative
reply to the proposal.
I,
therefore, subsequently tried to interest a member of the cabinet who was
intimately associated with the Secretary of State, but he also showed little
interest in the subject. Besides, it is customary the Secretary to be present
at such conversations. I understand the President at one time had thought of
arranging for a conference between the leaders of the two countries, but since Japan's
occupation of French Indo-China, he has come to believe that Japan does not
want a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations but that she is
carrying on an appeasement policy toward the United States. I hear that they
are beginning to think that I have been fooled by my country and that his
having conferred with me was exceptional thing.
Army 21152 Trans. 8/19/41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 4 of 4)
In
the meantime, Japanese newspapers have printed scorching criticism of the
statement issued by the American Government. Thus the atmosphere is getting
worse. Unless something is do now to eliminate this misunderstanding, I shall
not be able to accomplish our object. Furthermore, viewing the problem from the
politic standpoint, so long as the head of the country remains unfavorable to
the proposal, we cannot expect him to do anything about it. I believe the
United States is wishing that we would give, at least, some sort of a pledge
regarding those three critical points taken up during the past conversations;
namely, the question of self-defense, withdrawal of troops from China, and
nondiscrimination in trade. Today, when the Secretary of State has already
rejected our proposal, I cannot help but feel keenly the necessity of careful
consideration and a great deal of smoothing out if we are to bring about what
you have instructed me in your telegram. I am told that the Preside will be returning
in a few days, so will you please consider the point I have given above, and if
you have any further instructions, wire them at once.
Army
21153
Trans. 8/19/41 (2)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)