[Secret]

 
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 1 of 4)

Re your #480[a].

(1) As I have successively reported to you, Japanese-American relations have today reached a stage in which anything might happen at any moment, and they are likely to grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move. That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree. As I have already informed you, the United States has not yet attained sufficient unity of mind with regard to participation in the European war, and the President himself is hesitant. However, the people are unanimous with regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. According to those well versed in political affairs, this is what Great Britain approves of and both China and Germany desire.

 
[a] Not available. 
 
Army 21150                                           Trans. 8/19/41 (2)

 

[Secret]

 
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 2 of 4)

I hardly think the President will go to the extreme, inasmuch as he and the naval leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific war would be. I understand that the British believe that if they could only have a Japanese-American war started at the back door, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war. The people here believe that though Germany might eventually defeat Soviet Russia, the war has already passed the stage of being a short, decisive one and has entered the stage of being one of attrition; that inasmuch as the submarine war in the Atlantic is turning in favor of Britain and the United States, these countries will be able in time to attain their original objective; and that the situation resembles closely that which existed in 1917. I understand that confidence in ultimate victory is gaining.

Army 21151                                            Trans. 8/19/41 (7)

 

[Secret]

 
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 3 of 4)

(2) Since such is the state of affairs in this country, I could not have helped but refer to the State Department the proposal for a conference which you made in your telegram, but as you already know, the Secretary of State gave a negative reply to the proposal.

I, therefore, subsequently tried to interest a member of the cabinet who was intimately associated with the Secretary of State, but he also showed little interest in the subject. Besides, it is customary the Secretary to be present at such conversations. I understand the President at one time had thought of arranging for a conference between the leaders of the two countries, but since Japan's occupation of French Indo-China, he has come to believe that Japan does not want a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations but that she is carrying on an appeasement policy toward the United States. I hear that they are beginning to think that I have been fooled by my country and that his having conferred with me was exceptional thing.

Army 21152                                           Trans. 8/19/41 (2)

 

[Secret]

 
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
August 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#703 (Part 4 of 4) 

In the meantime, Japanese newspapers have printed scorching criticism of the statement issued by the American Government. Thus the atmosphere is getting worse. Unless something is do now to eliminate this misunderstanding, I shall not be able to accomplish our object. Furthermore, viewing the problem from the politic standpoint, so long as the head of the country remains unfavorable to the proposal, we cannot expect him to do anything about it. I believe the United States is wishing that we would give, at least, some sort of a pledge regarding those three critical points taken up during the past conversations; namely, the question of self-defense, withdrawal of troops from China, and nondiscrimination in trade. Today, when the Secretary of State has already rejected our proposal, I cannot help but feel keenly the necessity of careful consideration and a great deal of smoothing out if we are to bring about what you have instructed me in your telegram. I am told that the Preside will be returning in a few days, so will you please consider the point I have given above, and if you have any further instructions, wire them at once.

Army 21153                                           Trans. 8/19/41 (2)

 

(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)