29 August 1941
#756 (4 part message, complete except for Part 4)
Regarding my #732 (?)*
The following is the gist of my discussion with Hull, last evening, (28th), regarding the proposed conference, etc.
(A) As the result might be quite unfortunate should either one of the conferring heads of the two governments assume an uncompromising attitude on certain points, it is the expressed desire of Hull to hold preliminary conversations for tile purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the meeting of the two heads, and also to make the decisions of the two principals as final. (Hull used the expression "certification"). (Regarding this point please refer to my #703 (?)**)
(B) While it is necessary to bring up to date the various points of past conversations, the United States maintains that the adjustment of Japanese-American relations can be achieved without-considering the question of China, which is vital to her.
(C) Despite Japan's insistence that she cannot alter her policy towards China, the United States government is unwilling to seek adjustments in Japanese-American relations at the expense of existing American-Chinese relations. Neither is the United States Government willing to give cause to "explosion" in China by its action. Furthermore, the task of placating China by the United States Government for accepting the basis of Chinese-Japanese negotiations will involve the tremendous effort of winning the approval of Britain and the U. S. S. R. and for this reason it is deemed unfeasible.
(D) Regarding the question of withdrawal of our troops from China and the right of protection, I informed the Secretary that I had nothing to state except what has already been stated on previous occasions. However when I explained that so long as Prince Konoe remains in the saddle, I am confident that he will make every effort to settle these questions satisfactorily, Hull replied that he hoped that the Imperial Government will see fit to take definite steps towards this end.
Please check over my #540*** regarding these questions and let me know the government's opinion regarding them. Also please obtain details regarding same from Colonel Iwakuro upon his return.
(E) I wish to make the following suggestions in the event that it has been decided to hold the "Leaders' Conference".
(1) While it is the desire of the Japanese Government to designate Hawaii as the meeting place, we should consent to accept Juneau, if for reasons of constitutional requirements or personal safety, Hawaii is unsatisfactory to the President.
(2) The conference date should be from September 21st (?) to ----.
(3) Five persons each from the Foreign Office, the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and Consulate, that is a total of 20 persons or less, should be present at the conference.
(Part 4 not yet available).
*#732 available, not translated. Dated 23 August. Corrects the word "insisted" in a previous message to "instituted".
**JD-1: 4642 (S.I.S. #21150 to 53). Amb. Nomura brings up to date the seriousness of Japanese-American relations; reports that since Secy. Hull has already rejected Japan's proposal (for continued negotiations) and the President is returning shortly, Tokyo should consider giving the U. S. some sort of pledge regarding the three critical points: self-defense, withdrawal of troops, and nondiscrimination in trade.
***JD-1: 3842 (S.I.S. #19911). Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that, based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.
JD-1: (A) Navy Trans. 9-3-41 (7)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)