[Secret]

 
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
17 September, 1941
(Purple-CA)
#823 (Parts 1 and 2 of 3) [a]

(1) On 6 August, I said at the White House that of the three main points, both parties were in agreement in principle on two. As for the matter pertaining to our evacuating our troops, I expressed my opinion that it was only because he was confident that an agreement could be reached that the Premier is prepared to attend the meeting. At that time, the Secretary of State said that there were two or three other points that had to be clarified and "brought up to date." When he said that, he was referring to our proposal of 24 June.

Although we are aware of your instructions contained in your message #397 of 24 July,* since the negotiations broke down at about that time, we could do nothing about your instructions of 15 July. The breakdown continued, and the talks were resumed only after the recent message was sent.

(2) The "understanding" which was put into words and submitted as a proposal on 24 June, was the culmination of over a dozen conferences between the Secretary of State and myself, in accordance with your instructions of 11 May. The Secretary and I conferred almost up to the moment he departed on his trip in behalf of his health. It is natural that the Secretary feels considerable attached to the proposal, since he had worked on it so hard for so many months.

It is my opinion that the U. S will be more likely to come to terms at the preliminary negotiations if the general lines contained in the proposal were followed.

Hull (insists ?) that the negotiations be held here.

*JD-1: 3986 (S.I.S. #20091)-(You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined on a definite policy because of the fact that I have not as yet been in office very long. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U. S. Should the U. S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the U. S. of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation. 
[a] For Part 3; see S.I.S. #22477. 
 
22506
JD-1: 5301                                     Navy trans. 9-19-41 (7) 

 

[Secret]

 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 
17 September, 1941 
(Purple-CA) 
#823 (Part 3 of 3). [a]

In view of the above facts, I believe that it is doubtful whether the preliminary negotiations can be arranged in accordance with only our proposal of 4 September. In any event, our first task is to find terms which are acceptable to both sides concerned, regarding the three points-particularly regarding the matter of garrisoning troops.

According to information from that usual source, the atmosphere of the Cabinet meeting held here last Friday showed considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U. S. conference. There is no mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the preliminary arrangements can be made.

Page 29

Nishiyama (Financial Attaché) says that a very good friend of his told him that Hull said to him (the friend) that the President "went too far" during the talks with this Ambassador.

 
[a] Parts 1 & 2 not available.
 
22477
JD-1: 5301                                      Navy Trans. 9-19-41 (7)

 

(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)