[SECRET]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
27 September 1941
(Purple-CA)
#865 (In 10 parts, complete)
(Part
1)
On
this, the 27th, I had Matudaira call on Ballantine and had him relay the contents
of your message and at the same time deliver the English texts contained in
your messages 591* and 595**. He requested that they be delivered to Hull.
I
am taking this opportunity to express my humble opinion on various points which
happen to draw my attention in regard to your message #595**. I pass them on to
you for whatever value they may have.
1.
As I have pointed out on several previous occasions while reporting on matters
pertaining to this issue, the United States insists that it would be
inappropriate to hold the "leaders' conference" until the two nations
have come to a complete agreement on all the points involved. At present the
United States is allegedly investigating our attitude with regard to said
various points. Since, as you said, we have already said all that is to be
said, we are now committed to await expression of intentions by the United
States.
(Part
2)
If
we submit further papers to them in advance of receiving some reply from them,
there is a danger that matters would become further complicated and less clear.
I am of the opinion that this would tend to hamper the progress of the
negotiations.
If,
by some chance, some apparent inconsistencies appear in our various papers, it
may lead to their becoming suspicious of our sincerity.
(Part
3)
Fundamentally
speaking, the United States wishes to proceed along the lines she express in
the U. S. proposals of 21 June. Judging from developments to date we do not
feel that the premises outlined in those proposals are too far afield.
Moreover, from the viewpoint of practicability we feel that they are the most
concrete. I, therefore, hope that you will accept the reasonings embodied
therein.
2.
The deletion of the item reading "no northward advance shall be made
without justification" will no doubt be the point which will invite the
most suspicion.
(Part
4)
3.
The respective attitudes of the two nations to the war in Europe: As I have
pointed out in messages pertaining to this phase, (see particularly my message
#540***), it would be exceedingly difficult from the United States' viewpoint
to retain paragraph 1 proposing joint mediation. Recent developments
(particularly in view of the President's statement subsequent to the sinking of
the U. S. vessel) have further stiffened the U. S. attitude. Therefore, it is
my opinion that considerable difficulty will be encountered in securing U. S.
agreement to this point.
(Part
5)
Concerning
the matter of self defense as contained in paragraph two: Again, as I have
previously reported, all U. S. moves pertaining to the European war are
allegedly being made from the basic national policy of self defense as the
starting point. Even if the United States does become actively involved in the
war, she will do so in behalf of self defense and will not, supposedly, be in
any sense an aggressive attack, even though she may have had ample provocation
to make it so. In this way, they intend to obviate the necessity of our
invoking the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Thus, the United States is very anxious
to have the term "right to self defense" as elastic as possible.
(Read Secretary Hull's speech, contained in my message #381****). For this
reason, they may not be tempted to accept the wording of our proposal on this
point. The fact that we outline our needs for self defense may unduly arouse
their suspicion.
(Part
6)
Regarding
the matter pertaining to the settlement of the Chinese Incident: As I pointed
out in my message #540***, the United States has, fundamentally speaking,
insisted that we outline the peace terms we shall propose to China. She
maintains that she will enter into the real negotiations only after a complete
agreement as to the contents of the "annex." Therefore, we shall
undoubtedly be confronted with the difficult task of coming to an agreement on
the matters of garrisoning troops and non-discriminatory treatment. I am of the
opinion that in the final analysis, we shall have to agree to the terms offered
by the United States in so far as they do not conflict with the terms of the Nanking
Agreement. We should word our explanations and counter proposals with this in
mind.
(Part
7)
Before
we are able to have the United States yield, we shall undoubtedly have to
conduct several negotiations even after this. The danger of the negotiations
breaking down completely as a result of the matter of our stationing troops, is
constantly on the increase. The "non-discrimination" phase is not
quite as tickling a problem as the former. In our proposal we state that
non-discrimination will apply to the conducting of business between China and
Japan only.
We
add that as long as any third nation conducts her economic enterprises on a
fair and even basis, she will in no way be discriminated against. I am not at
all sure that the United States will be satisfied with these conditions.
(Part
8)
Furthermore,
we will probably encounter considerable difficulty in making the United States
swallow, from the standpoint of policy, the new "principle of especially
close relations".
Aside
from these points, paragraph one is so worded as to imply that the United
States and Japan were jointly responsible to settle the China Incident. I am
not at all confident that we shall be able to succeed in this because it may
not give a favorable impression at the time this "understanding" is
published. (As I have reported in previous messages, the United States is not
in favor of keeping this "understanding" a secret).
______________
with regard to the contents of paragraph two referring to having the United
States use her good offices ______________ and the point making the demands,
shall necessitate the making of new demands if we are to pursue the lines laid
down heretofore, as well as those contained in your instruction of 11 April.
(Part
9)
I
also believe that considerable difficulty will be encountered in having them
agree to the new matter. In that part referring to peace terms, the following
words appear: "Konoye statement and those agreements between Japan and
China". I feel that here, too, we shall encounter difficulty in getting
their approval. Since President Roosevelt is very interested in taking the
mediation actions himself it might be well to insert the word
"President" in the sentence.
(Part
10)
5.
We have your instructions of 15 July with regard to the matter of trade between
the two countries. We would appreciate your basing your proposal on the U. S.
proposal of 21 June.
6.
With regard to the matter pertaining to the political stabilization of the
Pacific, it is said that that part of the U. S. proposal of 21 June referring
to it was written by Secretary Hull himself. Since the United States looks upon
this phase with the most importance, we would appreciate your allowing that
part of their proposal to stand as is. We would particularly appreciate your
deleting from the new proposals that part which states that we agree to
evacuate our troops from French Indo-China only at the termination of the China
Incident. We feel that it would be more acceptable to the United States if we
were to retain only that part which refers to the condition of a large scale
peace on the Pacific. In other words, we hope to wind up all arrangements of
the preliminary conference,
*JD-1: 5415 (S.I.S. #22709). Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China even after peace with Japan is restored.
**JD-1: 5438 (S.I.S. #22748). Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U. S. to agree to a "leaders' conference."
***JD-1: 3842 (S.I.S. #19911) Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that based on the thought and discussion given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the Countries' and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.
*****Not available.
22961
JD-1: 5534 (D) Navy Trans. 10-1-41 (2)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)