[SECRET]
 
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
September 28, 1941
Purple (CA)
#606 (Part 1 of 2)

In connection with my off-the-record communication to the American Ambassador in Tokyo last night, in case you have an interview with the President, the following is for your information:

1. As the last paragraph of that communication makes clear, we do not mean at all that all questions and answers are now useless. However, I wished again to emphasize that the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance is the turning point and that this occasion is all the more grave. If they have any questions, of course, we will be glad cordially to respond (but as a matter of fact, they have not asked us a single thing since the 10th, and I find this very mysterious).

2. The meaning of the statement that yesterday was the turning point and that the occasion is an important factor is that for the last few days a movement to strengthen the Axis has been afoot, and the popular psychology is being adverted toward this trend. Consequently, the tendency to oppose an adjustment with the United States is naturally increasing. Hence, now is the time, if ever, to concentrate on this accord. This does not mean at all that the power of the present government has dwindled or that the advocates of anti-Americanism have strengthened their position.

Army 22819                                           Trans. 9/29/41 (S)

 

[SECRET]

 
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
September 28, 1941
Purple (CA)
#606 (Part 2 of 2)

It is true, we shall have to get quicker and better results than ever before from our endeavors for an understanding. It may even be necessary for us to publish them. Nevertheless, once the negotiations are decided upon or once the date of an interview is set, the government of this country is sure that the people will stand united and that the opposition's voice will be quickly drowned in a chorus of approval. Of this we have always been sure, nor has our conviction waned for a moment lately. Notwithstanding, the Premier sent his message more than a month ago. Nothing has happened; it seems as though it were pigeon-holed. The government is very much worried over this, needless to say.

3. It is true that one influential admiral and one general were included in the Premier's entourage. This made the United States suspect that a hostile military was holding the whip hand over us. I took this action, therefore, to dispel any such fear on their part (I seem to recall that HULL asked Your Honor something about this once.)

4. I talked with the British Ambassador the other day and he said, "To speak frankly, the trouble is that the United States is uneasy and lacks confidence concerning the attitude of the government of Japan." Well, the integrity of Premier KONOYE and of the present government ought to be a hundred per cent reliable, and the American Ambassador must have sufficiently advised his government on the trustworthiness of Prince KONOYE.

 
Army 22820                                            Trans. 9/29/41 (S) 

 

(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)