[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 10, 1941
Purple
#757 (Part 1 of 3) (To be handled in government code)
On
the 10th I went to talk to the American Ambassador, and DOOMAN sat with us. I
opened the conversation with a resume of my #725 [a] and reiterated my earnest
hope that a decision could be reached in the negotiations on a basis just to
our Empire. I explained that I would bend every effort toward the solution of
this difficult situation. Then I continued, "Having examined the results
of the negotiations thus far, what I feel is that the United States does not
have full knowledge of the true situation. I feel that the United States does
not have enough understanding and knowledge. Secretary HULL says that he
recognizes Japan's stabilizing influence, yet unless he realizes sufficiently
present conditions in East Asia and that we Japanese have been occupied over a
period of four and a half years with the China incident, even though he calls
us a stabilizing influence, he contradicts himself. Our population is ever
increasing. Already we have about 100,000,000 people. In order to maintain
their existence, we absolutely must obtain the necessary materials. On the
other hand, six months have passed since Japanese-American negotiations began,
and during that time, although we have given in as much as we could, the United
States sticks to her first proposals and will not bend an inch. This is a most
regrettable circumstance. It would seem that there are not a few Japanese who
doubt the sincerity of the American Government. Consequently, a further delay
would do great damage to our popular spirit. Moreover, the cabinet will soon
convene, and the situation is becoming exceedingly tense. Without the loss of a
day, we should establish these negotiations. I hope that the American
Government, too, will fully consider all these points and take the large view,
settling the whole thing at once. I do not honestly believe that there is any
other way to settle this perplexing situation.
Army 24583 Trans. 11/10/41 (s)
[a] S.I.S. #24330-32 states that as a result of a conference between the Foreign Office and the Military High Command, two new proposals, containing the final concessions Japan is willing to make, have been devised.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 10, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#757 (Part 2 of 3) (To be handled in government code)
Next
I presented him with the English text of Proposal A contained in my #726 [a]
and said, "As a result of deep thought, this was arrived at by the
Government and represents the maximum compromise that we can endure to make.
There is absolutely no possibility of our yielding any further.
"1.
The attitude of both nations toward the European war is recorded in our
proposal of September 25. Therefore, I take it for granted that we are in
agreement on this score.
"2.
I feel that this proposal fully covers America's desires concerning
non-discriminatory treatment in commerce.
"3.
Concerning the ever-knotty problem of evacuating troops, the present proposal,
in view of the difficulties we face here in Japan, ventures our maximum
compromise. I am sure that the United States officials can readily comprehend
this. Let me tell you how strongly I hope that we can reach a quick settlement.
Now included in this documents are many matters in which Great Britain's
interests are deeply concerned, so it is necessary that, simultaneously with
the establishment of Japanese-American negotiations, Japan and England make
preparations to sign." I added, "I hope that the Government of the
United States will undertake this."
The
American Ambassador answered, "I have had no instructions from my home
government, so I would like to reserve my opinion. Only as a hint, let me say
that I have wired to Washington the two situation in detail, so the American
Government understands the Oriental situation fully. Concerning influence for
stability, there are many ways of interpreting that. Concerning the question of
the obtention of materials, the present negotiations aim at that very thing,
and I think that there will probably be some way for you Japanese to obtain
what you need in a peaceful manner."
Army 24584 Trans. 11/10/41 (S)
[a] See S.I.S. #24334, #24335, #24336, and #24337.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 10, 1941
Purple
#757 (Part 3 of 3) (To be handled in government code)
I
answered, "Though I have all along fully appreciated the efforts of Your
Excellency, I do not feel that the Government of the United States has as yet
fully appreciated the situation. The feeling in favor of stability and peace
is, as a matter of course, the feeling of the majority of the people. Then too,
insofar as the question of resources is concerned, if we take the example of
the recent situation wherein the supplying of raw materials to Japan was
suspended as a result of America's actions in the freezing of assets, such
strong-arm measures of economic pressure, in addition to being a threat
indicate the probability of even more severe measures in the future. The people
of Japan, though they may feel deeply within themselves that extreme steps for
self-defense must be brought to bear, cannot bring themselves to the point of
carrying this out.
"On
this question there is a definite need for the United States to give the most
careful consideration. Furthermore, insofar as the China question is concerned,
would you have us ignore the successes gained as a result of sacrifices that we
have made over four and a half years? Submission to terms such as these would
be suicidal to Japan. For the Government, as well as for the people, I believe
that such a course is impossible."
At
this point, Counselor DOOMAN interposed the following: "We cannot accept
the results of aggression." I refuted him by saying, "The Imperial Government
does not consider that it has carried on a war of aggression. Therefore, the
question of the results of aggression cannot be raised. We should, therefore,
make an exception even in a non-aggression pact insofar as military action in
the interests of self-defense is concerned. The fact is, insofar as the
interpretation of the right of self-defense is concerned, judging by the
examples of recent arguments, I believe that it is the United States which has
been exhibiting a tendency to wrongfully magnify this. Therefore, it seems
indicated that it is for Japan to call for the exercise of self-control by the
Government of the United States. But at any rate, insofar as today is
concerned, it behooves us not to become too involved in such arguments as these."
Army 24585 Trans. 11/10/41 (S)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)