[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
11 November 1941
(Purple)
#764 (In 3 parts, complete)
1.
On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on some other
business, brought up the subject of the conversations. He advised me that he
reported my talks of the other day (see contents of 2 of my message #723.*) to
his home government, to which his government replied along the following lines,
he said:
"The
British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being
conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and
Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof. However, unless the
basis of discussion is first settled upon, it would be useless to go ahead and
enter into negotiations of the details. The British Government feels that
discussions as to the basic principles could safely be left up to the U. S.
Government. However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States
is to confer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, when that
time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the United States
and Japan."
2.
I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan and the United
States there were some phases which greatly affected Great Britain. In the
event of an agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan will
simultaneously seek Britain's agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the
two agreements may be signed at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that
to do the above is necessary, we have already requested the United States to
give their approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador.
The
British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much progress had been
made between the United States and Japan, but he assumed that they were still
in the preliminary stages.
I,
therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the past, but that at
present they had already entered into the realm of the actual negotiations.
Moreover, the Imperial Government has already submitted its final proposal,
thus bringing the negotiations to the final phase. We have made this fact
absolutely clear to the United States, I added.
I
went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made a speech at a
luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he stated that though he did not
know the developments in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations, he would issue a
warning to Japan. Would it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead
of making threats without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more
clearly understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up?
However, I said, with the U. S.-Japanese talks in the phase they are today, and
in view of the fact that I realized that there were certain relationships
between the United States and Great Britain, I have no intention of urging or
opposing British participation in these talks at this time.
The
Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its
final proposal, I explained. We are of the opinion that the United States will
find no objectionable points in it. I believe that it will be possible to sign
the agreement within a week to ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United
States refuses to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the
negotiations. Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays in
reaching a decision.
I
am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in the attempt to
ride out the crisis in the U. S.-Japanese and the British-Japanese relations.
There are factions in the country which insist that there is no need for
negotiating and point out the uselessness of doing so. The negotiations being
continued only after these factions were checked.
For
these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays.
A
speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain
and the United States, I said, and suggested that his country give serious
consideration to this, and cooperate in bringing about an early agreement.
In
the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. The
Ambassador listened to what I said very attentively, giving indications that he
was realizing for the first time how critical the situation was. He advised me
that he would send his government a report of the above conversation and that
he himself would do his best to bring about a speedy settlement.
3.
Thus, there are indications that the United States Government is still under
the impression that the negotiations are in the preliminary stages and that we
are still merely exchanging opinions. This is further supported by the words of
President Roosevelt reported by you in your message #1070** (that part in which
he says that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis
of the real negotiations. etc.)
That
the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact
that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly
unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that Your Excellency will do everything
in your power to make them realize this fact and bring about an agreement at
the earliest possible moment.
24824
JD-1: 6417 (D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (S-TT)*JD-1: 6228 (S.I.S. #24293-94).
**Not available.
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)