[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#1098 (In 2 parts, complete)
Let
us suppose that the Japanese-U. S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations
between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately
break down, and that, as a consequence, we pursue an unrestricted course. The
following is my guess as to what would be the relationship between the United
States and Japan under such circumstances.
Much,
of course, would depend on what move we make and how we make it, but
(a)
It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries would
be broken off immediately;
(b)
Even if they are not, the same situation as now exists between Germany and the
United States-that is, the closing of the consulates and recalling of the
Ambassador-will probably be effected. (Through the application of the order
freezing the assets, economic relations have already been broken off for all
practical purposes). Under such circumstances, only a small staff will remain
at the Embassy here. (Please see my separate wire #1099* for my suggestion as
to the personnel of such a reduced staff).
I
presume that the government has given careful consideration as to the
disposition of the various offices and our nationals residing here. I would
appreciate being advised in confidence of your decision in these matters.
In
the event of (b), I presume that the same procedure as was followed in the case
of U. S.-Germany will be followed. That is, personnel of the consulates of the
respective countries will no doubt be evacuated by mutual consent. We can see
that it could be possible for the officials and business men who remained here
at that time (they would total about 300 or 400), to be evacuated on another
vessel. However, we fear that the number of persons desiring passage will
undoubtedly skyrocket. The Consuls will, of course, urge our nationals to
remain here even if the worst eventuality should materialize, but we feel that
there will be many who, because of various circumstances, will find it
impossible to do so.
It
will be practically impossible to make a distinction between them and officials
and business men. Will you, therefore, give your consideration to sending
enough ships to evacuate these people.
(Part 2)
In
the event of (a)-
(1)
No doubt some agreement between the United States and Japan will be entered
into to guarantee the safe passage of Embassy and Consulate staff members,
(agreements will no doubt be entered into with regard to the course of the
vessel, markers, and communication methods). (One plan may be to have these
officials sent to some half-way point, for example Hawaii, some port in the Aleutian
Islands, or, if unavoidable to French Tahiti, on ships belonging to the nation
to which they are accredited, and at such prearranged place, have the
respective ships exchange passengers). To the representative of what nation do
we plan to entrust our national property and to protect the rights of our
nationals remaining here? Is it correct to assume that negotiations with the
country which has been selected will be completed in Tokyo with the diplomatic
representative of that country and in that country by our ambassador or
minister?
(2)
Japanese residents here who are of military age, will undoubtedly be held here.
Therefore, a plan to exchange our nationals residing here for Americans
residing in Japan is conceivable, but in view of the difference in numbers, it
is indeed a very slim hope. Dependence on ships of neutral register, too, would
be an exceedingly precarious undertaking should war actually be declared. We
would appreciate being advised of the government's attitude on these points.
25032
JD-1: 6631 (D) Navy Trans. 11-19-41 (2)*JD-1: 6654 (S.I.S. #25033)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)