[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#1106 (In 6 parts, complete.)
Chief
of Office routing.
The
following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I
reported to you in my message #1095*:
Hull
said that the United States is making sincere efforts too, and through such
efforts, he said, he is now able to present a proposal concerning the commerce
problem. So saying, he related to me Note "A", which was reported to
you as my message #1096**.
Hull:
"The United States has entered into trade agreements with 22 nations, all
of which are based on the status of a "most-favored nation". Through
them trade barriers throughout the world are being removed. There actually are
between 1000 and 1200 articles on which tariffs have been substantially
reduced. I strongly advocated this policy at the Economic Conference which was
held in London some time ago, but because opposition to it was voiced by some,
it was not adopted at that time." (He added that Germany was one of the
countries which was opposed to it.)
"In
this way, the United States desires to apply the non-discriminatory policy over
a wide scope. Japan wants that part of the proposal which advocates the
application of these terms to the entire Pacific area to be revised so that it
will be applicable to the entire world. The United States is unable to guarantee
any conditions which are outside of the United States' sphere of influence.
Therefore, I hope that Japan will agree to delete her condition, in which she
insists that she will agree to applying the non-discriminatory treatment to the
Pacific area only if it is applied to the world."
(Part 2)
So
saying, he submitted Note "B" which contains the U. S. proposal and
which was sent to you as my message #1097***. Wakasugi asked Hull if this was a
counter proposal to that part of our proposal which we submitted the other day
concerning the three major problems, pertaining to non-discrimination. Hull
replied that in its application it covers a wider range, (meaning, apparently,
that its contents covers a wider range). I, therefore, advised Hull that we
would give it our study and that we would seek our government's opinion thereon
after which I would submit our reply.
I
said: "Since official proposals have been submitted by me to the President
and the Secretary of State, we feel that these talks should be looked upon as
negotiations."
Hull:
"Your government may consider those talks as being negotiations today. As
I said at our previous meeting, however, the subjects being discussed must be
taken up with Britain, Netherlands, and others. Moreover, the Foreign Minister
himself told Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that it was essential that those
countries participate in the negotiations. For these reasons, we feel that it
is necessary to hold these preliminary exploratory conversations between Japan
and the United States first. It would be inappropriate if we were to consider
these talks formal negotiations, because then it would seem as if we were
trying to force whatever settlements we reached upon those other nations.
"I
feel that we should first find the basic principles on which a suitable
agreement could be reached, after which, the United States would reveal its
attitude to those other countries, and ask them to participate in the final
settlement. Thus until we work things out to a point which would seem to be
satisfactory to all parties concerned, I shall consider these talks to be
exploratory in nature.
(Part 3)
"From
a more practical viewpoint, too, if there were negotiations, the free exchange
of opinions between the United States and Japan would be considerably hindered.
In Tokyo the Foreign Minister requested to Ambassador Grew that . . . (several
lines missing).
"In
the United States proposal of 21 June, the United States advocates that that
part pertaining to the political stabilization be made applicable to the entire
Pacific area. Japan wants to limit it to the southwestern Pacific area only. In
view of the fact that my talks with Your Excellency concerns the establishment
of peace in the entire Pacific area, I find it difficult to understand Japan's
desires to so limit the area. I would like to have this point explained."
He
went on to repeat what he has said from time to time before, regarding Japan's
peace policies and her connections in the Tripartite Pact.
(Part 4)
Hull,
as he did on the previous occasion, requested that the present government of
Japan give its definite approval of the spirit of peace contained in our
statement of 28 August.
I
therefore replied: "The spirit of that statement was contained in our
latest proposal and therefore I am convinced that there has been no change in
our government's attitude. We are doing everything in our power to bring about
a settlement so that peace may be guaranteed on the Pacific. It is true that
the words "southwestern Pacific" appear in the main text of our
proposal, but in the preface thereto we made it clear that our aims are to
establish and maintain peace on the entire Pacific area."
Hull:
"The preface is not a part of the main text and therefore its contents had
no binding powers. The only parts which have any binding powers are the
contents of the main text."
So
saying, he again repeated his doubts as to Japan's expressed peaceful
intentions.
He
went on to say that Japan is apparently wanting to enter into a peaceful agreement
with the United States on the one hand while maintaining a military alliance
with Germany on the other.
Hull:
"I, myself, can understand Japan's viewpoint and explanations on this
matter. The general public, however, are aware only that Japan is allied to
Germany and to it-the general public-this has a very militaristic connotation.
Should the United States, disregarding what seems to be a paradox, enter into a
peace agreement with Japan, the general public and the world in general would
probably howl with laughter. We would be in a very difficult position to try to
make any explanations.
"If
Japan succeeds in coming to an agreement with the United States, she would not
find it necessary to bold on to the Tripartite Agreement, would it?
(Part 5)
"While
on the one hand Japan is asking that Britain and the Netherlands, which are at
war with Germany, to participate in a peaceful agreement which is to be
established between Japan and the United States, while on the other she
negotiates a military alliance with Germany which is the enemy of Britain and
the Netherlands. That is incongruous."
I:
"We have already explained our position in the Tripartite Pact in our
proposal. As I said before, an alliance and a peace agreement need not
necessarily be at odds with each other as may be seen by the example of the
Japanese-British alliance. Fundamentally speaking, this alliance in question
has peace as its main objective. Germany, too, understands that the alliance
would not conflict with peace between Japan and the United States."
Hull:
"If Japan insists on adhering to the alliance with Germany even after an
agreement is reached between Japan and the United States, we could not explain
the apparent paradox to other countries. The United States does not desire a
situation such as exists between Japan and the U. S. S. R., which in spite of
the fact that a Neutrality Pact exists, vast armed forces of each nation must
constantly be facing each other across the national boundary. We desire that
simultaneously with the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the
United States, the Tripartite Pact shall disappear." (He called it a
"dead letter").
Wakasugi:
"In other words, do you mean that a U. S.-Japanese agreement is an
impossibility as long as Japan does not withdraw from the Triple
Alliance?"
Hull:
"A peace agreement and a military alliance must be at odds with each
other. Therefore, if and when an understanding is reached between Japan and the
United States, I desire that the alliance become a dead letter".
Wakasugi:
"May we consider that as your reply to our proposal pertaining to the
matter of right of self-defense which is a part of the other two
subjects?"
(Part 6)
Hull:
"Our reply to the other two problems will be issued after we receive:
Definite assurance that your present government approves the peace policy
expressed in a statement issued by the previous government; clarification of
the meaning of changing "the entire Pacific area" in the U. S.
proposal, to Japan's proposal's "southwestern Pacific area"; Japan's
reply to today's U. S. proposal regarding a joint statement on the economic
policy."
I
said: "In view of the very critical situation, I am afraid that my
government will be very disappointed over your replies."
We
agreed to meet again after I had received further instructions from my home
government.
Today's
talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did clarify their
attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, although we agree in
principle, we differ on interpretations. They harbor deep doubts as to the
sincerity of our peaceful intentions and apparently they view the China
situation through those eyes of suspicion.
Since
the above seems to have been fairly clearly established, will you please
speedily express your definite approval of the government's statement involved,
so that we may make a reply to their proposal.
25085
JD-1: 6627 (D) Navy Trans. 11-21-41 (2)
*JD-1: 6584 (S.I.S. #24930).
**JD-1: 6585 (S.I.S. #24931 & 25006).
***JD-1: 6586 (S.I.S. #24932 & 25007).
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)