[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo.
17 November 1941
(Purple)
#1127
The
most emphasis in the talks between Hull, I, and Ambassador Kurusu on the 18th,
(lasting about three hours), was placed on matters pertaining to the Triple
Alliance. Hull, in his customary manner, denounced the Hitlerian policy of
expansion through armed force. He pointed out that as long as Japan is tied up
with such a policy through the Tripartite Pact, it would be difficult to adjust
Japanese-U. S. relations.
Kurusu
then said that it would be impossible to comply if he was demanding of Japan
that she abrogate the Tripartite Pact. He also pointed out that the alliance
was not aimed at expansion through the force of arms.
Hull
said that he was in no position to tell Japan to abrogate the Pact but that as
long as there is no substantiating proofs of the real aims of the pact, it
serves absolutely no purpose.
Then
I and Kurusu explained that it was an impossibility to settle such a basic
point in any specified time limit. However, to ease the exceedingly critical
situation, the first step would be to mutually return to the situation which
existed prior to the date on which the freezing of assets order was put into
effect, (in other words, Japan would withdraw from south French Indo-China and
the United States would rescind her order to freeze the assets). Talks should
then be continued in a more congenial atmosphere, we suggested.
He
did not seem particularly receptive to this suggestion. He said that if the
government of Japan could make it clear that it wants to pursue a course of
peace, then the United States would confer with the British on the subject of
returning to the conditions which existed prior to the time that the freezing
order went into effect. It is essential, however, that under those conditions,
Japan continue to pursue a peaceful policy with ever increasing vigor.
There
were indications that Hull, because of his usual cautious nature, was somewhat
influenced by the exaggerated reports carried in the press regarding the
Premier's speech in the Diet in which he expressed the three basic principles
of international relations and intention of increasing the troops in French
Indo China.
Details
will be sent in a subsequent message.
25170
JD-1: 6722 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)