[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
Purple
#1134 (Part 1 of 2) [a]
Re
my #1131 [b].
In
our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating the ever
worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful situation, as
well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing before the application
of the freezing legislation, we suggested the evacuation of Japanese troops
stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China.
HULL,
showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan has clearly
demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain, the
Netherlands and other interested powers."
In
the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the American
authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in China. Recently,
however, the United States, what with her internal situation and, especially
insofar as it concerns the revision of the Neutrality Agreement, her increasing
involvement in the war in the Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She
is now, rather, exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace
plans insofar as they pertain to the Tri-Partite Alliance. With regard to other
questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to bring about a
compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions. In view of these circumstances,
as a result of our deliberations of successive days it would seem that should
we present Proposal "B" immediately, an understanding would be more
difficult to realize than if we went on with our discussions of Proposal
"A". Therefore, looking at it from a practical point of view, we are
of the opinion that prior to presenting of Proposal "B" it would be
more advisable to reach a practical settlement, principally on the questions of
the acquisition of goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation
mentioned in Proposal "B" and then to try to proceed with the
solution of other questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are
convinced that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.
Army 25090 Trans. 11/21/41 (2)
[a] Part 2 in S.I.S. #25243.
[b] See S.I.S. #25086.
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(18 November-Probable date of drafting)
(19 November-Intercepted)
#1134 (Pt 2 of 2) (This message should probably be #1128).
It
is true that the Konoye government reiterated its approval of the government's
statement referred to here. However, that statement carried several
supplementary notes, some of which apparently aroused the suspicion of the
United States. These supplementary notes were of such character that even if
they are not written down in black and white, they would naturally become
applicable under the rights of self-defense in the event that to do so becomes
necessary.
Please
therefore issue a statement as that of the new government's, in which there are
no provisional notes, and which express our peaceful policies.
The
United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not interested in
mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises in effect. It is
necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to withdraw our troops as soon as
the freezing order is rescinded and materials are made available to us.
Please
advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133*. (Hull to]d me
that he would be glad to see me at any time. However, the day after tomorrow,
the 20th, is a major holiday here, so if you could make it possible for me to
make a reply tomorrow, it would be very convenient for me.)
25243
JD-1: 6760 (D) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (2)
*JD-1: 6759 (S.I.S. #25242).
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)